Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking: Essays in Honor ...
Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking: Essays in Honor ...
Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking: Essays in Honor ...
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<strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHENOMENOLOGYIN COOPERATION WITHTHE CENTER FOR ADVANCED RESEARCH IN PHENOMENOLOGYVolume 65Series Editors:Nicolas de Warren, Wellesley College, MA, USADermot Moran, University College Dubl<strong>in</strong>, Irel<strong>and</strong>.Editorial Board:Lilian Alweiss, Tr<strong>in</strong>ity College Dubl<strong>in</strong>, Irel<strong>and</strong>Elizabeth Behnke, Ferndale, WA, USARudolf Bernet, Husserl-Archief, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, BelgiumDavid Carr, Emory University, GA, USAChan-Fai Cheung, Ch<strong>in</strong>ese University Hong Kong, Ch<strong>in</strong>aJames Dodd, New School University, NY, USALester Embree, Florida Atlantic University, FL, USAAlfredo Ferrar<strong>in</strong>, Università di Pisa, ItalyBurt Hopk<strong>in</strong>s, Seattle University, WA, USAKwok-Y<strong>in</strong>g Lau, Ch<strong>in</strong>ese University Hong Kong, Ch<strong>in</strong>aNam-In Lee, Seoul National University, KoreaDieter Lohmar, Universität zu Köln, GermanyWilliam R. McKenna, Miami University, OH, USAAlgis Mickunas, Ohio University, OH, USAJ.N. Mohanty, Temple University, PA, USAJunichi Murata, University <strong>of</strong> Tokyo, JapanThomas Nenon, The University <strong>of</strong> Memphis, TN, USAThomas M. Seebohm, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, GermanyGail S<strong>of</strong>fer, Rome, ItalyAnthony Ste<strong>in</strong>bock, Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Ill<strong>in</strong>ois University at Carbondale, IL, USARosemary Rizo-Patron Lerner, Pontifical Catholic University <strong>of</strong> Peru Lima, PeruShigeru Taguchi, Yamagata University, JapanTed Toadv<strong>in</strong>e, University <strong>of</strong> Oregon, OR, USADan Zahavi, University <strong>of</strong> Copenhagen, DenmarkRichard M. Zaner, V<strong>and</strong>erbilt University, TN, USAScopeThe purpose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> series is to serve as a vehicle for <strong>the</strong> pursuit <strong>of</strong> phenomenological researchacross a broad spectrum, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g cross-over developments with o<strong>the</strong>r fields <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiry such as<strong>the</strong> social sciences <strong>and</strong> cognitive science. S<strong>in</strong>ce its establishment <strong>in</strong> 1987, Contributions toPhenomenology has published nearly 60 titles on diverse <strong>the</strong>mes <strong>of</strong> phenomenologicalphilosophy. In addition to welcom<strong>in</strong>g monographs <strong>and</strong> collections <strong>of</strong> papers <strong>in</strong> established areas<strong>of</strong> scholarship, <strong>the</strong> series encourages orig<strong>in</strong>al work <strong>in</strong> phenomenology. The breadth <strong>and</strong> depth <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Series reflects <strong>the</strong> rich <strong>and</strong> varied significance <strong>of</strong> phenomenological th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g for sem<strong>in</strong>al questions<strong>of</strong> human <strong>in</strong>quiry as well as <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly <strong>in</strong>ternational reach <strong>of</strong> phenomenological research.For fur<strong>the</strong>r volumes:http://www.spr<strong>in</strong>ger.com/series/5811
Frank SchalowEditor<strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>,<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong><strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad
EditorFrank SchalowDepartment <strong>of</strong> PhilosophyUniversity <strong>of</strong> New OrleansNEW ORLEANSLouisianaUSAfschalow@uno.eduISSN 0923-9545ISBN 978-94-007-1648-3 e-ISBN 978-94-007-1649-0DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Dordrecht Heidelberg London New YorkLibrary <strong>of</strong> Congress Control Number: 2011934045© Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media B.V. 2011No part <strong>of</strong> this work may be reproduced, stored <strong>in</strong> a retrieval system, or transmitted <strong>in</strong> any form or by anymeans, electronic, mechanical, photocopy<strong>in</strong>g, micr<strong>of</strong>ilm<strong>in</strong>g, record<strong>in</strong>g or o<strong>the</strong>rwise, without writtenpermission from <strong>the</strong> Publisher, with <strong>the</strong> exception <strong>of</strong> any material supplied specifically for <strong>the</strong> purpose<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g entered <strong>and</strong> executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by <strong>the</strong> purchaser <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work.Pr<strong>in</strong>ted on acid-free paperSpr<strong>in</strong>ger is part <strong>of</strong> Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media (www.spr<strong>in</strong>ger.com)
A dictionary can provide an <strong>in</strong>dication forunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g a word but it is never a simpleauthority that would be b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g a priori. Theappeal to a dictionary is always an appeal toan <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> language which is <strong>of</strong>tennot grasped at all <strong>in</strong> its style <strong>and</strong> limits.Considered <strong>in</strong> view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> historical spirit <strong>of</strong>a language as a whole, no dictionaryprovides an immediate st<strong>and</strong>ard; <strong>and</strong> none isb<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g....There is no translation at all <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>words <strong>of</strong> one language could or should cover<strong>the</strong> words <strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r language....<strong>Translation</strong> is an awaken<strong>in</strong>g, clarify<strong>in</strong>g,<strong>and</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> one’s own language bycom<strong>in</strong>g to grips with <strong>the</strong> foreign language.—Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>
PrefaceWe do not know goals<strong>and</strong> are only a pathway—<strong>Heidegger</strong>, M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, p. 6. 1This volume <strong>of</strong> essays honors <strong>the</strong> many contributions <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad throughout hislife <strong>and</strong> career <strong>of</strong> four decades, both as an <strong>in</strong>terpreter <strong>and</strong> a translator <strong>of</strong> Mart<strong>in</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs. Though Emad has addressed various th<strong>in</strong>kers <strong>in</strong> his scholarlyarticles <strong>and</strong> books, his legacy primarily revolves around his impact <strong>in</strong> advanc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> appropriation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought throughout <strong>the</strong> UnitedStates <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> world. As we enter ano<strong>the</strong>r decade, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g cont<strong>in</strong>ues to grow at a remarkable rate. We would not be surprised,<strong>the</strong>n, that <strong>the</strong>re are many different avenues for approach<strong>in</strong>g his philosophy.The central approach that this volume <strong>of</strong> essays will embody, tak<strong>in</strong>g its cue bothfrom <strong>the</strong> example <strong>and</strong> spirit <strong>of</strong> Emad’s work, is that <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation providesa unique “gateway” to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought.One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ct advantages <strong>of</strong> this “Festschrift” is that <strong>the</strong> longevity <strong>of</strong> ParvisEmad’s career <strong>of</strong>fers a perspective on how much has changed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> field <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong> studies dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> past four decades. In <strong>the</strong> 1960s <strong>and</strong> early 1970s, <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g was just beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to blossom, <strong>and</strong>, with <strong>the</strong> exception<strong>of</strong> his magnum opus, Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time (1962), precious little <strong>of</strong> his writ<strong>in</strong>gs hadbeen translated <strong>in</strong>to English. As <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> his thought would cont<strong>in</strong>ue to grow, <strong>and</strong>,on <strong>the</strong> cusp <strong>of</strong> his death <strong>in</strong> 1976, <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial volumes <strong>of</strong> hisGesamtausgabe ushered <strong>in</strong> a new era <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> field <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> studies. The fewtranslations <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s works which appeared <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1960s, provisional <strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>complete as <strong>the</strong>y were, never<strong>the</strong>less served to <strong>in</strong>troduce an English-speak<strong>in</strong>g audienceto his philosophy. The translations that followed, particularly those which were1Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Bes<strong>in</strong>nung, Gesamtausgabe (Hereafter, GA 66) (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann, 1997), p. 9. M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Thomas Kalary (London:Cont<strong>in</strong>uum, 1997), p. 6.vii
viiiPrefacebased on <strong>the</strong> texts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gesamtausgabe, perhaps had an even greater impact <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>aras <strong>the</strong>y allowed <strong>the</strong> unity <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g to unfold (ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>in</strong> a“piecemeal” fashion).While <strong>the</strong>se translations sparked new <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> evenpromoted occasional reflection on <strong>the</strong> “strategies” <strong>of</strong> translation, <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong>one volume <strong>in</strong> particular, Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis) [1989] <strong>and</strong> itssubsequent translation (by Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly) under <strong>the</strong> titleContributions to Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g), 2 would dramatically <strong>and</strong> irrevocablytransform <strong>the</strong> l<strong>and</strong>scape <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> studies. Not only does <strong>Heidegger</strong> significantlyradicalize his own philosophy as well as <strong>the</strong> language for its expressionthroughout this text, he also provides <strong>the</strong> keys to unravel various confusionssurround<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> his th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, most notably <strong>the</strong> so-called turn<strong>in</strong>g(die Kehre). Yet, <strong>the</strong>re is also ano<strong>the</strong>r factor that cannot be underestimated <strong>in</strong> terms<strong>of</strong> its “impact,” 3 <strong>and</strong> which, because <strong>of</strong> his role as a co-translator as well as an <strong>in</strong>terpreter<strong>of</strong> this text, placed Emad before a new threshold <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> study <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sthought. Specifically, <strong>the</strong> complex <strong>and</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al language <strong>of</strong> Beiträge zur Philosophie– equally <strong>in</strong> regard to its dist<strong>in</strong>ctive idioms <strong>and</strong> syntax – not only underscored <strong>the</strong>difficulty <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g this text <strong>in</strong>to English, but self-reflexivity crystallized <strong>the</strong>parallel issue as to <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic methodology <strong>of</strong> translation itself. Now <strong>the</strong> question<strong>of</strong> translation, which had been considered only peripherally, had to be addressedseriously. Suddenly, <strong>the</strong> concern for translation as a task vaults <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> forefront <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> study <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> a way which had never occurred before. A newera <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> study <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy is born.In retrospect, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> a way that is surely more evident today, Parvis Emad stoodat <strong>the</strong> forefront <strong>of</strong> this new era, <strong>and</strong>, even at this juncture <strong>of</strong> his career, cont<strong>in</strong>ues todo so. First, as <strong>the</strong> editor-<strong>in</strong>-chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies <strong>in</strong> 1985, he outl<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong>threefold mission <strong>of</strong> this journal: (1) as cultivat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>terpretive exploration <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> new texts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gesamtausgabe,” (2) as foster<strong>in</strong>g “<strong>in</strong>ternational” <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs by publish<strong>in</strong>g articles <strong>in</strong> English, German, <strong>and</strong> French, <strong>and</strong> (3)as stated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prelude to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>augural issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, as “tak[<strong>in</strong>g] seriously<strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction that <strong>Heidegger</strong> makes between merely scholarly research <strong>in</strong>philosophy <strong>and</strong> philosophy as th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g that is underway....” 4 Instead <strong>of</strong> only translat<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs, as many have done, Emad developed his own <strong>in</strong>sights<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic methodology <strong>of</strong> translation <strong>in</strong> order to <strong>of</strong>fer, <strong>in</strong> his most recent2Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann, 1989). Contributions to Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g), trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong>Kenneth Maly (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1999).3For a discussion <strong>of</strong> this development, see Frank Schalow, “The Impact <strong>of</strong> Contributions toPhilosophy <strong>and</strong> its Critical Implications for <strong>the</strong> Reductionistic Interpretations <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sThought,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 25 (2009): 25–48.4<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 1 (1985): 1.
Prefaceixbook, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, a highly orig<strong>in</strong>alre<strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unity <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g as a whole. 5 Even <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> midst<strong>of</strong> this contribution, however, a fur<strong>the</strong>r development <strong>of</strong> this <strong>in</strong>sight unfolds, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>aras today Emad cont<strong>in</strong>ues to demonstrate <strong>in</strong> his work that translation can no longerbe viewed merely as an addendum to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy, but must <strong>in</strong>stead beconsidered as <strong>in</strong>tegral to <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g itself.By mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> translation a new “gateway” for access<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sthought, <strong>and</strong> creat<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>ternational forum with<strong>in</strong> which scholars can broaden <strong>the</strong>underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> his philosophy, Parvis Emad rema<strong>in</strong>s a leader <strong>in</strong> his field. Mostsignificantly, <strong>in</strong> a climate that bends to <strong>the</strong> latest academic fashions, Emad cont<strong>in</strong>uesto stay <strong>the</strong> course. His example <strong>in</strong>stills a sense <strong>of</strong> calm <strong>in</strong> whose silence reverberates<strong>the</strong> echo <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> Rudyard Kipl<strong>in</strong>g’s epoch poem, “If you can keep yourhead when all about you are los<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>irs....” 6 The commitment to “keep to <strong>the</strong> path”may <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> end be one <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad’s greatest lessons (<strong>and</strong> his endur<strong>in</strong>g legacyas well), even to those who never attended his classes. While it was not my goodfortune to have this opportunity, as did o<strong>the</strong>r contributors to this volume, I never<strong>the</strong>lessconsider myself to be one <strong>of</strong> his students, for he has played a vital role <strong>in</strong>enhanc<strong>in</strong>g my underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy.In this respect, <strong>the</strong> essays <strong>in</strong> this volume each gives thanks to Parvis Emad by shift<strong>in</strong>gattention to <strong>the</strong> work ahead, that is, <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g to explore, <strong>in</strong>terpret, <strong>and</strong> appropriate<strong>the</strong> thought <strong>of</strong> Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>. Appropriately, this Festschrift beg<strong>in</strong>s with <strong>the</strong>translation <strong>of</strong> an orig<strong>in</strong>al essay by <strong>Heidegger</strong> entitled “Poverty” (“Die Armut”), whichhe composed <strong>in</strong> June <strong>of</strong> 1945. In <strong>the</strong> spirit <strong>of</strong> this beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> essays <strong>in</strong> this volumeattempt to radiate <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> humility whichcomes by seek<strong>in</strong>g guidance from <strong>the</strong> path, ra<strong>the</strong>r than only its dest<strong>in</strong>ation.New OrleansFrank SchalowReferencesEmad, Parvis. 2007. On <strong>the</strong> way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s contributions to philosophy. Madison: TheUniversity <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1997. Bes<strong>in</strong>nung, GA 66. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann. Trans.Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Thomas Kalary. 1997. M<strong>in</strong>dfulness. London: Cont<strong>in</strong>uum.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1989. Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann. Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly. 1999. Contributions tophilosophy (From enown<strong>in</strong>g). Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.Kipl<strong>in</strong>g, Rudyard. 1927. “If.” songs from books, 145–146. New York: Doubleday.Schalow, Frank. 2009. The impact <strong>of</strong> contributions to philosophy <strong>and</strong> its critical implications for<strong>the</strong> reductionistic <strong>in</strong>terpretations <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 25: 25–48.5Parvis Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to Contributions to Philosophy. Madison: Wiscons<strong>in</strong>: The University <strong>of</strong>Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press, 2007, pp. 186–208.6Rudyard Kipl<strong>in</strong>g, “If,” <strong>in</strong> Songs from Books. New York: Doubleday, 1927, pp. 145–146.
AcknowledgmentsThis Festschrift, which pays tribute to <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad, would not havebeen possible without <strong>the</strong> efforts <strong>of</strong> those who equally embrace <strong>the</strong> mission <strong>of</strong> cultivat<strong>in</strong>gMart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. The title <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> open<strong>in</strong>g essay, “Poverty,”which <strong>Heidegger</strong> composed <strong>in</strong> 1945, embodies <strong>the</strong> deepest humility <strong>of</strong> those whoundertake <strong>the</strong> momentous task <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g his thought. In thisspirit, I give thanks, first <strong>and</strong> foremost, to Herr Dr. Hermann <strong>Heidegger</strong>, executor <strong>of</strong>Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s literary rema<strong>in</strong>s, for grant<strong>in</strong>g me permission to publish a translation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al German text <strong>of</strong> “Die Armut.” I also wish to acknowledge <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>estimable help <strong>of</strong> Pr<strong>of</strong>. Dr. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann for his counsel <strong>and</strong>direction <strong>in</strong> help<strong>in</strong>g to br<strong>in</strong>g this Festschrift to fruition.I would like to thank Duncker <strong>and</strong> Humblot for grant<strong>in</strong>g me <strong>the</strong> rights to repr<strong>in</strong>t arevised version <strong>of</strong> “The Phenomenal Basis <strong>of</strong> Entities <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Manifestation <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>gAccord<strong>in</strong>g to Sections 15–17 <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time: On <strong>the</strong> Pragmatist Misunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g,”by Marylou Sena, <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 11 (1995): 11–31, as well as “A Conversationwith Parvis Emad on <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>,” by Frank Schalow,<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 25 (2009): 219–230. I would also like to thank State University<strong>of</strong> New York Press for allow<strong>in</strong>g me to repr<strong>in</strong>t a revised version <strong>of</strong> “<strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>Ethics <strong>of</strong> Faciticity,” by Eric Sean Nelson <strong>in</strong> Reth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g Facticity, ed. Eric SeanNelson <strong>and</strong> François Raffoul (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008), along with The RomanianSociety for Phenomenology, for grant<strong>in</strong>g me permission to publish a revised version<strong>of</strong> “<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Failure <strong>of</strong> ‘A GrassrootsArchival Perspective,’” by George Kovacs, Studia Phaenomenologica, 6 (2006):319–345. F<strong>in</strong>ally, I would like to express my gratitude to <strong>the</strong> staff <strong>of</strong> Spr<strong>in</strong>gerPublishers, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Willemijn Arts, Maja de Keijzer, Naomi Portnoy, <strong>and</strong> Anita Feivan der L<strong>in</strong>den, as well as <strong>the</strong> editors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> series “Contributions to Phenomenology,”Pr<strong>of</strong>essors Nicholas de Warren <strong>and</strong> Dermot Moran, for <strong>the</strong>ir much needed encouragement<strong>and</strong> support to see this volume through publication.xi
ContentsPart I <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s PathwayPoverty.............................................................................................................. 3Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Translated by Thomas Kalary <strong>and</strong> Frank SchalowIntroduction..................................................................................................... 11Frank SchalowPart II The Search For Beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Onset<strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-Historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>Deformalization <strong>and</strong> Phenomenon <strong>in</strong> Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>.................... 49Burt C. Hopk<strong>in</strong>sA Purview <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g: The Ontological Structure <strong>of</strong> World,Reference (Verweisung) <strong>and</strong> Indication (Indikation).................................... 71Marylou Sena<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Experience with Language........................................................ 95George Kovacs<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>of</strong> Difference <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> God-Question........................ 111Thomas KalarySubstance <strong>and</strong> Empt<strong>in</strong>ess: Preparatory StepsToward a <strong>Translation</strong>al Dialogue Between Western<strong>and</strong> Buddhist Philosophy................................................................................ 135Paola-Ludovika Cori<strong>and</strong>o, Translated by Virg<strong>in</strong>ia Lyle Jenn<strong>in</strong>gs ColomboPrelim<strong>in</strong>ary Notes on Div<strong>in</strong>e Images <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Light<strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-Historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>.......................................................................... 145Bernhard Radl<strong>of</strong>fxiii
xivContentsPart III The Place <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>A Conversation with Parvis Emad on <strong>the</strong> Question<strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>............................................................................ 175Frank Schalow<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy: The Challenge<strong>of</strong> Its <strong>Translation</strong>.............................................................................................. 191George KovacsDase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> Contributionsto Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g)...................................................................... 213Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Translated By Bernhard Radl<strong>of</strong>fHusserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Da-se<strong>in</strong>: With a Suggestionfor Its Interl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong>...................................................................... 225Ivo De Gennaro<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Eccentric <strong>Translation</strong>......................................... 253Julia A. Irel<strong>and</strong>Individuation, Responsiveness, <strong>Translation</strong>: <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Ethics................ 269Eric Sean NelsonAttunement <strong>and</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>........................................................................... 291Frank SchalowAppendix: List <strong>of</strong> Publications <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad............................................ 313Selected Bibliography...................................................................................... 321Index................................................................................................................. 331Greek Index...................................................................................................... 339
ContributorsPaola-Ludovika Cori<strong>and</strong>o is pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> philosophy at <strong>the</strong> University <strong>of</strong> Innsbruck,Austria. Her books <strong>in</strong>clude Der Letzte Gott als Anfang. Zur abgründigen Zeit-Räumlichkeit des Übergangs <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>s “Beiträge zur Philosophie” (1998),Affektenlehre und Phänomenologie der Stimmungen (2002), <strong>and</strong> Individuation undE<strong>in</strong>zelse<strong>in</strong>: Nietzsche–Leibniz–Aristoteles (2003).Ivo De Gennaro is pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> philosophy at <strong>the</strong> Free University <strong>of</strong> Bozen-Bolzano, Italy. His articles <strong>in</strong>clude “Why Be<strong>in</strong>g Itself <strong>and</strong> Not Just Be<strong>in</strong>g?” <strong>in</strong> TheNew Yearbook for Phenomenology <strong>and</strong> Phenomenological Philosophy, (2007):157–195 <strong>and</strong> “<strong>Heidegger</strong> on <strong>Translation</strong>—Translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>,” PhänomenologischeForschungen, 5 (2000): 3–22. He is <strong>the</strong> author <strong>of</strong> Logos—<strong>Heidegger</strong> liest Heraclitus(2000). He is currently prepar<strong>in</strong>g a translation (<strong>in</strong> Italian) <strong>of</strong> Bes<strong>in</strong>nung, Vol. 66 <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Gesamtausgabe.Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann is pr<strong>of</strong>essor emeritus <strong>of</strong> philosophy at <strong>the</strong>University <strong>of</strong> Freiburg, <strong>the</strong> chief editor <strong>of</strong> Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Gesamtausgabe, <strong>and</strong>coeditor <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies. He is also <strong>the</strong> author <strong>of</strong> a three-volume commentary onSe<strong>in</strong> und Zeit. Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Dase<strong>in</strong>s. E<strong>in</strong> Kommentar zu Se<strong>in</strong>und Zeit, vol. 1, E<strong>in</strong>leitung: Die Frage nach dem S<strong>in</strong>n von Se<strong>in</strong>” (1987); E<strong>in</strong> Kommentarzu “Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit,” vol. 2, “Erster Abschnitt: Die vorbereitende Fundamentalanalysedes Dase<strong>in</strong>s,”§9-27 (2005); <strong>and</strong> Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Dase<strong>in</strong>s. E<strong>in</strong>Kommentar zu “Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit,” vol 3 (2008).Burt C. Hopk<strong>in</strong>s is pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>and</strong> chair <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philosophy Department at SeattleUniversity. He is <strong>the</strong> coeditor <strong>of</strong> The New Yearbook for Phenomenology <strong>and</strong>Phenomenological Philosophy, <strong>and</strong> author <strong>of</strong> Intentionality <strong>in</strong> Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>.The Problem <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Orig<strong>in</strong>al Method <strong>and</strong> Phenomenon <strong>of</strong> Phenomenology (1993).Julia A. Irel<strong>and</strong> is assistant pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> philosophy at Whitman College. She is complet<strong>in</strong>ga book on <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> Hölderl<strong>in</strong> entitled To Become German:<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Hölderl<strong>in</strong>. She is co-translator with William McNeill <strong>of</strong> volume 53 <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Gesamtausgabe, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s Hymn “The Ister” (1997) under <strong>the</strong> namexv
xviContributorsJulia Davis, <strong>and</strong> is currently translat<strong>in</strong>g with McNeill Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s Hymns “Germania”<strong>and</strong> “The Rh<strong>in</strong>e” (GA 39) <strong>and</strong> Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s Hymn “Andenken” (GA 52).Thomas Kalary is pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> philosophy at Suvidya College, Bangalore,India. He is <strong>the</strong> author <strong>of</strong> Das bef<strong>in</strong>dliche Verstehen und die Se<strong>in</strong>sfrage (1999),<strong>and</strong> co-translator (with Parvis Emad) <strong>of</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness (2006).George Kovacs is pr<strong>of</strong>essor emeritus <strong>of</strong> philosophy at Florida International University.He is <strong>the</strong> author <strong>of</strong> The Question <strong>of</strong> God <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Phenomenology (1990).Eric Sean Nelson is associate pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> philosophy at University <strong>of</strong>Massachusetts–Lowell. He has coedited several works, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Re-th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gFacticity (2008), Address<strong>in</strong>g Lev<strong>in</strong>as (2005), <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cont<strong>in</strong>uum Companion to<strong>Heidegger</strong> (forthcom<strong>in</strong>g). He has published over 30 articles on 19th <strong>and</strong> 20th centuryEuropean philosophy.Bernhard Radl<strong>of</strong>f is pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> English at <strong>the</strong> University <strong>of</strong> Ottawa. He is <strong>the</strong>author <strong>of</strong> Gestalt <strong>and</strong> Disclosure: <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> NationalSocialism (2007).Frank Schalow is university research pr<strong>of</strong>essor at <strong>the</strong> University <strong>of</strong> New Orleans.He is <strong>the</strong> author <strong>of</strong> several books, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g The Incarnality <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g: The Earth,Animals, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Body <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Thought (2006), <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Quest for<strong>the</strong> Sacred (2001), <strong>and</strong> The Renewal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>-Kant Dialogue: Action,Thought, <strong>and</strong> Responsibility (1992).Marylou Sena is an associate pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> Philosophy at Seattle University. She haspublished articles <strong>in</strong> various journals, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Research <strong>in</strong> Phenomenology <strong>and</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies. She currently serves on <strong>the</strong> Editorial Advisory Board <strong>of</strong> TheNew Yearbook for Phenomenology <strong>and</strong> Phenomenological Philosophy.Virg<strong>in</strong>ia Lyle Jenn<strong>in</strong>gs Colombo has published articles <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies<strong>and</strong> Existentia.
Part I<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Pathway
Poverty*Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> † , Translated by Thomas Kalary <strong>and</strong> Frank SchalowIn <strong>the</strong> draft <strong>of</strong> an essay concerned with <strong>the</strong> historical periods <strong>of</strong> Europe, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>writes <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g guid<strong>in</strong>g dictum:“For us everyth<strong>in</strong>g is concentrated upon <strong>the</strong> spiritual, we have become poor <strong>in</strong> order tobecome rich.” (III, 621) 1These words were written at a time when <strong>the</strong> eighteenth century was pass<strong>in</strong>gover <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century. The op<strong>in</strong>ion that Hölderl<strong>in</strong> makes this statementabout his own time is so obvious that one would shy away from specifically tak<strong>in</strong>gnote <strong>of</strong> it aga<strong>in</strong>. And yet, Hölderl<strong>in</strong> also says “for us everyth<strong>in</strong>g is concentratedupon <strong>the</strong> spiritual.” Does this “for us” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> dictum refer only to <strong>the</strong> Germans <strong>and</strong>does <strong>the</strong> “us” here refer only to those who were <strong>the</strong>n contemporaries <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Europeanhistory <strong>in</strong> Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s lifetime? This is an issue that cannot be immediately <strong>and</strong> easilydecided. We know only this much: when Hölderl<strong>in</strong> speaks <strong>of</strong> history whereby healways has <strong>the</strong> Occident <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d, he th<strong>in</strong>ks <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> long stretches <strong>of</strong> time. Whenhe calls us “us,” <strong>and</strong> says “now,” he does not mean <strong>the</strong> historically datable time <strong>of</strong> a*The translators wish to express <strong>the</strong>ir deepest gratitude to Herr Dr. Hermann <strong>Heidegger</strong> for grant<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> copyright permissions to publish this English translation <strong>of</strong> Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s essay, “DieArmut,” which first appeared <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 10 (1994): 5–11†Deceased.1Johann Christian Friedrich Hölderl<strong>in</strong>, Sämtliche Werke. Historisch-Kritische-Aufgabe,Vol. III eds. Norbert v. Hell<strong>in</strong>grath, Friedrich Seebass, Ludwig v. Pigenot, p. 621, 1943.T. KalaryDepartment <strong>of</strong> Philosophy, Suvidya College, Electronics City,Bangalore, Karnataka 5601000, Indiae-mail: kalary@gmail.comF. SchalowDepartment <strong>of</strong> Philosophy, University <strong>of</strong> New Orleans,2000 Lakeshore Dr., New Orleans, LA 70148, USAe-mail: fschalow@uno.eduF. Schalow (ed.), <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad, Contributions To Phenomenology 65,DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0_1, © Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media B.V. 20113
4 T. Kalary <strong>and</strong> F. Schalowparticular <strong>in</strong>stant <strong>in</strong> time <strong>in</strong> which he writes down <strong>the</strong> sentence; with “us,” <strong>of</strong> course,he refers to himself but “himself” not as <strong>the</strong> historically ascerta<strong>in</strong>able person, but“himself” as <strong>the</strong> poet, who by poetiz<strong>in</strong>g rises above “his own time” <strong>and</strong> who <strong>in</strong>timates“<strong>the</strong> years <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> peoples” (An die Deutschen IV, 133) 2 <strong>and</strong> who <strong>in</strong>timat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>this manner is m<strong>in</strong>dful <strong>of</strong> that which enowns what is sheltered-hidden <strong>in</strong> Westernhistory but can never be read <strong>of</strong>f <strong>the</strong> historically ascerta<strong>in</strong>able events. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly,Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s words could have not been <strong>in</strong>deed about <strong>and</strong> for <strong>the</strong> time <strong>in</strong> which it waswritten, <strong>and</strong> that is why <strong>the</strong> time <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>se words were written is a differenttime than <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> historical dates <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> differentiable junctures <strong>of</strong> acentury that is chronologically familiar.Hölderl<strong>in</strong> says: “For us everyth<strong>in</strong>g is concentrated on <strong>the</strong> spiritual, we havebecome poor <strong>in</strong> order to become rich.” We can only underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> content <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>implications <strong>of</strong> this statement when we know what Hölderl<strong>in</strong> th<strong>in</strong>ks when he says“<strong>the</strong> spiritual.”The “spiritual” is <strong>in</strong>deed that which is determ<strong>in</strong>ed from out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> spirit “<strong>and</strong>” by<strong>the</strong> spirit. But what is “<strong>the</strong> spirit”?A long tradition <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g has various answers ready for this question. It issaid: spirit is <strong>the</strong> opposite <strong>of</strong> matter. Contrasted with <strong>the</strong> material, <strong>the</strong> spiritual is <strong>the</strong>immaterial. But this determ<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> spirit <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> spiritual is stuck <strong>in</strong> a merenegation <strong>of</strong> matter <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> material. The Greek word pn,Øma, <strong>the</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> word spiritus,<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> French word l’esprit def<strong>in</strong>itely say more. The immaterial is <strong>the</strong> pneumatic<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> spiritual. It means: spirit is <strong>the</strong> effective power <strong>of</strong> enlightenment <strong>and</strong>wisdom, what <strong>the</strong> Greeks call s<strong>of</strong>ίa. In <strong>the</strong> Christian Church’s <strong>the</strong>ological–philosophicalspeculation concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> unitar<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>of</strong> God, this substance-ak<strong>in</strong> essence<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> spirit was carefully thought out. Consequently, August<strong>in</strong>e’s work, DeTr<strong>in</strong>itatae became decisive for <strong>the</strong> Western Roman Church as a different developmentoccurred <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Oriental Church <strong>and</strong> particularly <strong>in</strong> Russia where <strong>the</strong> doctr<strong>in</strong>e<strong>of</strong> holy Sophia was unfolded. This doctr<strong>in</strong>e is even today alive <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Russian mysticism<strong>in</strong> a manner that we can hardly imag<strong>in</strong>e. The efficacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> spirit as <strong>the</strong> allpervad<strong>in</strong>gpower <strong>of</strong> enlightenment <strong>and</strong> wisdom (Sophia) is “magical.” The ownmost<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> magical is as <strong>in</strong>scrutable <strong>and</strong> opaque as <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pneumatic. Yet,we know that Jacob Böhme, <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>osophist <strong>and</strong> philosopher – <strong>the</strong> shoemaker fromGörlitz, who from all <strong>the</strong> shoemakers was called <strong>the</strong> most quiet one – had recognized<strong>the</strong> magical <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> shoemaker’s globe 3 <strong>and</strong> thought <strong>of</strong> it as <strong>the</strong>primal will. Böhme’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e Sophia (<strong>the</strong>osophy) was known <strong>in</strong>Russia as early as <strong>the</strong> seventeenth century. In those days, <strong>the</strong> Russians referred to2Hölderl<strong>in</strong> Werke und Briefe, Vol. 1., eds. Friedrich Beißner <strong>and</strong> Jochen Schmidt (Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Insel Verlag, 1969), p. 65.3The lens-shaped tool was filled with water <strong>and</strong> used <strong>in</strong> earlier times for concentrat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> light on<strong>the</strong> spot where repairs had to be done on shoes. Here, <strong>Heidegger</strong> does not use this word metaphorically,but <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> strict sense <strong>of</strong> a tool used by <strong>the</strong> shoemakers. His po<strong>in</strong>t appears to be this: JacobBöhme was spiritual enough to recognize <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> spiritual (das Magische) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> lightcast by his own shoemaker’s globe.
Poverty5Jacob Böhme as <strong>the</strong> holy fa<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Church. In Russia, at <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century, a renewal <strong>of</strong> Jacob Böhme’s <strong>in</strong>fluence came about simultaneouslywith <strong>the</strong> strong <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>of</strong> Hegel <strong>and</strong> Schell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g Vladimir Solovyov.It is thus no exaggeration when I say that what one nowadays conceives shortsightedly<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>completely as merely “political” or even roughly “political” <strong>and</strong> calls RussianCommunism comes from a spiritual world about which we know hardly anyth<strong>in</strong>g,even if we totally overlook <strong>the</strong> fact that we already forget to th<strong>in</strong>k <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>in</strong>which even Materialism taken roughly as <strong>the</strong> forefront <strong>of</strong> Communism is not itselfsometh<strong>in</strong>g material, but ra<strong>the</strong>r someth<strong>in</strong>g spiritual com<strong>in</strong>g from a spiritual worldthat can only be experienced <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> spirit if its truth <strong>and</strong> untruth are to befulfilled.However, spirit is not only <strong>the</strong> effective will as substance, it is thought at <strong>the</strong>same time, but especially s<strong>in</strong>ce Descartes right through modernity, as selfconsciousness,that is, as subject <strong>and</strong> is as <strong>in</strong>tellect, reason, underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>soul superord<strong>in</strong>ated to, equated with, or juxtaposed to <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>of</strong> life <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>sense <strong>of</strong> what is merely alive <strong>and</strong> body-ak<strong>in</strong> (Cf., <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> Nietzsche byLudwig Klages <strong>in</strong> his Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele [Leipzig, 1929–1932].Klages takes spirit as “underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby forgets <strong>the</strong> pneumatic <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>spiritual <strong>of</strong> which Nietzsche was very well aware). The ownmost <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> spirit is <strong>the</strong>primal will, which wills itself, <strong>and</strong> this will is at times thought as substance, at timesas subject, <strong>and</strong> at times as <strong>the</strong> unity <strong>of</strong> both. We had briefly to recall <strong>the</strong>se more orless familiar <strong>and</strong> prevail<strong>in</strong>g metaphysical representations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>spirit because we want to heed what it means that Hölderl<strong>in</strong> th<strong>in</strong>ks <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> spirit totally differently.What is a spirit for Hölderl<strong>in</strong>? In what does <strong>the</strong> spiritual rest for him? What doeshe mean when he says that “for us everyth<strong>in</strong>g is concentrated upon <strong>the</strong> spiritual”?At about <strong>the</strong> same time as Hölderl<strong>in</strong> writes <strong>the</strong> dictum just mentioned, he writesa philosophical aperçu from which we quote <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g sentences (Cf., Über dieReligion, III, 263). 4Nei<strong>the</strong>r from out <strong>of</strong> himself alone, nor solely out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> objects that surround him, can manexperience, that more than a mechanical course, <strong>the</strong>re is a spirit, <strong>the</strong>re is a god <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world,but <strong>of</strong> course he can experience it <strong>in</strong> a more lively relationship that is exalted above <strong>the</strong>press<strong>in</strong>g need, a relationship <strong>in</strong> which “he” st<strong>and</strong>s toge<strong>the</strong>r with that which surrounds him.What is this exalted relationship where<strong>in</strong> man st<strong>and</strong>s toge<strong>the</strong>r with that which surroundshim? By experienc<strong>in</strong>g this relation, we experience <strong>the</strong> spirit <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> spiritual.Hölderl<strong>in</strong> does not say anyth<strong>in</strong>g more precise about this relationship reason enoughfor us to try to th<strong>in</strong>k this relationship more clearly by tak<strong>in</strong>g a step to meet Hölderl<strong>in</strong>.Hölderl<strong>in</strong> says that this relationship is not oriented to <strong>the</strong> objects; it is not <strong>the</strong> relation<strong>of</strong> a subject to <strong>the</strong> objects, a relation that for <strong>the</strong> most part is determ<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> prevail<strong>in</strong>gpress<strong>in</strong>g needs, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong> objects are those that we process <strong>and</strong> use for variouspurposes <strong>and</strong> goals to satisfy <strong>the</strong> needs that <strong>the</strong> distress arouses <strong>in</strong> us.4Hölderl<strong>in</strong> Werke und Briefe, Vol. 2., eds. Friedrich Beißner <strong>and</strong> Jochen Schmidt (Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Insel Verlag, 1969), p. 638.
6 T. Kalary <strong>and</strong> F. SchalowMan abides <strong>in</strong> a relation to that which surrounds him – a relation that is exaltedabove <strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> a subject to an object. Here, “exalted” does not just mean “hover<strong>in</strong>gover” but ra<strong>the</strong>r reach<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> high, about which Hölderl<strong>in</strong> once said, man –especially <strong>the</strong> poet – could also “descend” <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> high. Thus, <strong>the</strong> height <strong>of</strong> thisapogee <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> exalted is <strong>in</strong> itself at <strong>the</strong> same time <strong>the</strong> deep. The exalted relationrefers to that which towers over all objects <strong>and</strong> man <strong>and</strong> at <strong>the</strong> same time susta<strong>in</strong>s all<strong>the</strong>se. And what is that? Hölderl<strong>in</strong> does not say it; <strong>the</strong>refore, we must specificallyth<strong>in</strong>k it <strong>and</strong> that means append it via poetiz<strong>in</strong>g. What surrounds us normally, what<strong>in</strong>dividually st<strong>and</strong>s over aga<strong>in</strong>st us (= <strong>the</strong> objects), we also call a be<strong>in</strong>g that is. Butthis “is” on be<strong>in</strong>gs is itself not someth<strong>in</strong>g that aga<strong>in</strong> is a be<strong>in</strong>g, but ra<strong>the</strong>r that which<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first place lets all be<strong>in</strong>gs be be-<strong>in</strong>gs (Seyendes ) <strong>and</strong> thus shelter<strong>in</strong>gly encloses<strong>and</strong> surrounds <strong>the</strong>m. We call it be-<strong>in</strong>g (das Seyn). The exalted relation where<strong>in</strong> manabides is <strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g to man, namely so that be-<strong>in</strong>g itself is this relationthat draws to itself <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> man as <strong>the</strong> ownmost that abides <strong>in</strong> this relation<strong>and</strong> preserves <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>habits this relation by abid<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> it. We experience “<strong>the</strong>spirit” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> openness <strong>of</strong> this relationship <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g to human be<strong>in</strong>gs – it is thatwhich sways from out <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> presumably for be-<strong>in</strong>g.Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s dictum reads: “for us everyth<strong>in</strong>g is concentrated upon <strong>the</strong> spiritual.”Given <strong>the</strong> preced<strong>in</strong>g, this means: a concentration, a ga<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g, is enowned as <strong>the</strong>ga<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g upon <strong>the</strong> relationship <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g to our ownmost, a relationship that is <strong>the</strong>center, <strong>the</strong> midpo<strong>in</strong>t, that is everywhere as <strong>the</strong> midpo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> a circle whose peripheryis nowhere.The dictum “for us everyth<strong>in</strong>g is concentrated upon <strong>the</strong> spiritual” is not a historicalidentification <strong>of</strong> a fact perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> situation <strong>of</strong> that time, but a th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gpoetiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vocation <strong>of</strong> an enown<strong>in</strong>g that is hidden-sheltered <strong>in</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g itself – anenown<strong>in</strong>g reach<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>in</strong>to what is com<strong>in</strong>g from afar <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>timated by only a few,or perhaps only by <strong>the</strong> one who can say <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k that enown<strong>in</strong>g.What follows <strong>the</strong> first part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dictum, namely “we have become poor, <strong>in</strong> orderto become rich,” has <strong>the</strong> same character <strong>of</strong> a poetic statement as <strong>the</strong> first part, namely“for us everyth<strong>in</strong>g is concentrated upon <strong>the</strong> spiritual.” What does “poor” mean? Inwhat does <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> poverty consist? What does “rich” mean, if only <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong>through poverty we are to become rich? Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary mean<strong>in</strong>g, “poor”<strong>and</strong> “rich” perta<strong>in</strong> to possession, to hav<strong>in</strong>g wealth. Poverty means not hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g specifically deprived <strong>of</strong> what is needed. Wealth means not be<strong>in</strong>g deprived <strong>of</strong>what is needed; it means a hav<strong>in</strong>g that surpasses what is needed. The ownmost <strong>of</strong>poverty, however, lies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> s<strong>in</strong>gular be-<strong>in</strong>g (beruht <strong>in</strong> e<strong>in</strong>em Seyn). To be truly poormeans to be so that one is deprived <strong>of</strong> noth<strong>in</strong>g except what is not needed.To be truly deprived means not be<strong>in</strong>g able to be without what is not needed <strong>and</strong>thus immediately <strong>and</strong> exclusively belong<strong>in</strong>g to what is not needed.But what is it that is not needed? What is it that is needed? What does needful(nötig) mean? Needful is that which arises out <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> through need. And what isneed? Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> fundamental mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word, <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> need iscompulsion. What is need-ak<strong>in</strong>, what is needful, what makes needy (das Nötigende)is what compels. It is that which <strong>in</strong> our life places <strong>the</strong> needs (Bedürfnisse) at <strong>the</strong>service <strong>of</strong> this life to susta<strong>in</strong> it <strong>and</strong> compels us exclusively to satisfy <strong>the</strong>se needs.
Poverty7What is not needed is what does not arise out <strong>of</strong> a need, that is, is what does notarise out <strong>of</strong> compulsion, but out <strong>of</strong> what is free <strong>and</strong> open (das Freie).But what is free <strong>and</strong> open? Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>timat<strong>in</strong>g say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> our oldest language,what is free <strong>and</strong> open is <strong>the</strong> un-violated, is <strong>the</strong> safeguarded, is that whichcannot be put to use. Orig<strong>in</strong>ally <strong>and</strong> actually to set free means to safeguard, to shelterby lett<strong>in</strong>g someth<strong>in</strong>g rest <strong>in</strong> what is its s<strong>in</strong>gular ownmost. But to shelter means toensconce (<strong>in</strong> der Hut behalten) <strong>the</strong> ownmost, where<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ownmost rema<strong>in</strong>s onlywhen it is allowed to return to itself <strong>and</strong> rest <strong>in</strong> itself. Shelter<strong>in</strong>g means help<strong>in</strong>gconstantly with this rest<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> await<strong>in</strong>g it. Only this is <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g ownmost <strong>of</strong>safeguard<strong>in</strong>g. In no way does it exhaust itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> negativity <strong>of</strong> not concern<strong>in</strong>goneself with someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> merely not us<strong>in</strong>g it.Free<strong>in</strong>g rests <strong>in</strong> an owned safeguard<strong>in</strong>g. The liberated is what is released untoits ownmost <strong>and</strong> protected from <strong>the</strong> compulsion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> need. What is liberat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>freedom averts or circumvents <strong>in</strong> advance all need. Freedom means this avert<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> circumvent<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> need. Turn<strong>in</strong>g unto need (Not-wendigkeit), necessity(Notwendigkeit), sway only <strong>in</strong> freedom <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> its safeguard<strong>in</strong>g liberation. If weth<strong>in</strong>k <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> freedom <strong>and</strong> necessity <strong>in</strong> this way, <strong>the</strong>n necessity is not at all<strong>the</strong> opposite <strong>of</strong> freedom, as metaphysics assumes, but freedom <strong>in</strong> itself is solelyturn<strong>in</strong>g unto need (Not-wendigkeit) as <strong>the</strong> avert<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> circumvent<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> need.Metaphysics goes even so far as to teach through Kant that, necessity, namely <strong>the</strong>compell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ought <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> empty constra<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> duty for <strong>the</strong> sake <strong>of</strong> duty, is <strong>the</strong>true freedom. The metaphysical essence <strong>of</strong> freedom atta<strong>in</strong>s its completion at <strong>the</strong>juncture where<strong>in</strong> freedom becomes an “expression” <strong>of</strong> necessity giv<strong>in</strong>g rise to awill<strong>in</strong>g that wills <strong>the</strong> will to power as <strong>the</strong> will to actuality <strong>and</strong> as life itself. Anexample <strong>of</strong> this is Ernst Jünger. He th<strong>in</strong>ks <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> will to power when <strong>in</strong> Der Arbeiterhe writes, “The certa<strong>in</strong>ty <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g able to participate <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>nermost nuclei <strong>of</strong> timeis one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>g marks <strong>of</strong> freedom – a certa<strong>in</strong>ty, that amaz<strong>in</strong>gly exhilaratesactions <strong>and</strong> thoughts all <strong>the</strong> while as <strong>the</strong> freedom <strong>of</strong> those who act recognizesitself <strong>in</strong> that certa<strong>in</strong>ty as a special expression <strong>of</strong> necessity (Notwendigkeit).” 5But if we th<strong>in</strong>k deeply how to turn back, we realize that everyth<strong>in</strong>g now turnsaround. Freedom means turn<strong>in</strong>g unto need (Not-wendigkeit), <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as what liberatesis not necessitated by a need <strong>and</strong> is thus what is not needed.Be-<strong>in</strong>g poor (Armseyn) means be<strong>in</strong>g deprived <strong>of</strong> noth<strong>in</strong>g except <strong>of</strong> what is notneeded; it means be<strong>in</strong>g deprived <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> liberat<strong>in</strong>g free <strong>and</strong> open.However, what we are deprived <strong>of</strong> is not our own so that we are <strong>in</strong>deed concernedwith own<strong>in</strong>g what we are deprived <strong>of</strong>. What we are deprived <strong>of</strong> we do not have, butit has us. It can even have us <strong>in</strong> such a manner that our ownmost is exclusively pend<strong>in</strong>gon depravation because our ownmost belongs exclusively to depravation <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>aras our ownmost is <strong>of</strong> old (formerly <strong>and</strong> futurely) owned over to it.Be-<strong>in</strong>g poor means to be exclusively deprived <strong>of</strong> what is not needed; it meansbelong<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> old to <strong>the</strong> unrestra<strong>in</strong>ed that liberates; it means resid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a relationshipto that which liberates.5Ernst Jünger, Der Arbeiter: Herrschaft und Gestalt (Stuggart: Klett-Cotta, 1982), pp. 59–60.
8 T. Kalary <strong>and</strong> F. SchalowNow, be-<strong>in</strong>g is that which lets each <strong>and</strong> every be<strong>in</strong>g be what it is <strong>and</strong> how it is,precisely because be-<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>the</strong> liberat<strong>in</strong>g that lets th<strong>in</strong>gs rest <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ownmost;be-<strong>in</strong>g is what safeguards each <strong>and</strong> every be<strong>in</strong>g.When <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> man resides solely <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> relationship <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> liberat<strong>in</strong>gbe-<strong>in</strong>g to man, that is, when human be<strong>in</strong>gs are deprived <strong>of</strong> what is not needed, <strong>the</strong>nman has become <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> strict sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word poor.Hölderl<strong>in</strong> says: “For us everyth<strong>in</strong>g is concentrated on <strong>the</strong> spiritual, we havebecome poor <strong>in</strong> order to become rich.” Accord<strong>in</strong>g to this say<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> concentrationon <strong>the</strong> spiritual means be<strong>in</strong>g ga<strong>the</strong>red <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g to man <strong>and</strong> as ga<strong>the</strong>redresid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> it.We have become poor, <strong>in</strong> order to become rich. Becom<strong>in</strong>g rich does not followfrom be-<strong>in</strong>g poor like an effect follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> cause. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> genu<strong>in</strong>ely be<strong>in</strong>gpoor is <strong>in</strong> itself be-<strong>in</strong>g rich. As we are not deprived <strong>of</strong> anyth<strong>in</strong>g because <strong>of</strong> poverty,we own beforeh<strong>and</strong> everyth<strong>in</strong>g; we reside <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> overflow<strong>in</strong>g be-<strong>in</strong>g, which overflowsall needs that make us needy.Just as freedom <strong>in</strong> its liberat<strong>in</strong>g ownmost is to everyone that which averts <strong>and</strong>circumvents <strong>the</strong> need, <strong>and</strong> is so a turn<strong>in</strong>g unto <strong>the</strong> need (Not-wendigkeit), be-<strong>in</strong>gpoor as be<strong>in</strong>g deprived <strong>of</strong> noth<strong>in</strong>g o<strong>the</strong>r than what is not needed is <strong>in</strong> itself alreadybe-<strong>in</strong>g rich.In that everyth<strong>in</strong>g for us is concentrated on <strong>the</strong> spiritual, be-<strong>in</strong>g poor enownsitself. This will attune human be<strong>in</strong>gs. The overtone <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> still hidden-shelteredownmost <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Western people <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir dest<strong>in</strong>y is poverty.Poverty is <strong>the</strong> mourn<strong>in</strong>g joyfulness <strong>of</strong> never be-<strong>in</strong>g sufficiently poor. In this reticentrestiveness lies poverty’s releasement, which is used to overcom<strong>in</strong>g everyth<strong>in</strong>gneed-ak<strong>in</strong>.The actual danger <strong>of</strong> need <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> times <strong>of</strong> need consists <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>excess <strong>of</strong> need prevents <strong>the</strong> genu<strong>in</strong>e experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> need <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong>tak<strong>in</strong>g from this ownmost <strong>the</strong> h<strong>in</strong>t for overcom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> need.Viewed from <strong>the</strong> entirety <strong>of</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> actual dest<strong>in</strong>y <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> West, <strong>the</strong> danger <strong>of</strong>fam<strong>in</strong>e for example <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> years <strong>of</strong> scarcity consists, not only <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact thatperhaps many human be<strong>in</strong>gs perish, but <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>in</strong> which those who survivelive only <strong>in</strong> order to eat so that <strong>the</strong>y may live. “Life” rotates around its own peculiarvoid, which surrounds life <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hardly noticed <strong>and</strong> admitted boredom.Man goes to ru<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> this void. He goes astray on <strong>the</strong> way whereupon he learns <strong>the</strong>ownmost <strong>of</strong> poverty.What is ahead <strong>of</strong> us as world-historical dest<strong>in</strong>y <strong>and</strong> is <strong>in</strong>appropriately called“Communism” does not make us poor. We are poor, only when everyth<strong>in</strong>g for us isconcentrated on <strong>the</strong> spiritual.Only when <strong>the</strong> European nations are attuned to <strong>the</strong> overtone <strong>of</strong> poverty do <strong>the</strong>ybecome <strong>the</strong> richest peoples <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> West – <strong>the</strong> West that does not <strong>and</strong> cannot go underbecause it has not yet risen at all. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> West’s ris<strong>in</strong>g lies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>fact that <strong>the</strong> people <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> West alternately awaken <strong>the</strong>mselves to <strong>the</strong>ir ownmost, learnto have a know<strong>in</strong>g awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> poverty so that <strong>the</strong>y can be poor.By be-<strong>in</strong>g poor, we do not avoid <strong>and</strong> bypass Communism but supercede it <strong>in</strong> itsownmost. Only <strong>in</strong> this way will we be able to truly overcome it.
Poverty9The way is long. But still greater than this long way is <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ability to th<strong>in</strong>k truly<strong>and</strong> listen carefully to what is already thought <strong>and</strong> said, <strong>and</strong> to hear out what is <strong>of</strong>old <strong>and</strong> unique <strong>and</strong> to transform what is heard <strong>in</strong>to a know<strong>in</strong>g awareness.Wars do not have <strong>the</strong> capability to historically decide on dest<strong>in</strong>ies because warsalready rest upon spiritual decisions upon which <strong>the</strong>y solidify <strong>the</strong>mselves. WorldWars too are <strong>in</strong>capable historically to decide on dest<strong>in</strong>ies. But for <strong>the</strong> people, WorldWars <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir outcomes can become an occasion that gives rise to a m<strong>in</strong>dfulness.But such a m<strong>in</strong>dfulness itself arises from o<strong>the</strong>r sources, which must beg<strong>in</strong> to flowout <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people. That is why a self-m<strong>in</strong>dfulness is needed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>alternat<strong>in</strong>g dialogue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people with one ano<strong>the</strong>r.Editorial NotesPublished for <strong>the</strong> first time from Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s literary rema<strong>in</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> text entitled“Poverty” was presented on June 27th, 1945 by <strong>Heidegger</strong> to a small audience<strong>in</strong> Forsthaus von Burg Wildenste<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hausen. Comment<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> guid<strong>in</strong>g dictumhe quotes from Hölderl<strong>in</strong>, <strong>Heidegger</strong> noted <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> first page <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>manuscript: “Why <strong>in</strong> this moment <strong>of</strong> world history do I chose for us this dictum toelucidate must become clear by <strong>the</strong> elucidation itself.”The h<strong>and</strong>written manuscript <strong>of</strong> this text consists <strong>of</strong> twelve pages <strong>in</strong> D<strong>in</strong> A5-Format. 6 It belongs to a manuscript that <strong>Heidegger</strong> himself put toge<strong>the</strong>r under <strong>the</strong>title “Das Wesen der Frage. E<strong>in</strong>e Reihe von Manuskripten zum Ereignis (1943/1944).”This manuscript will appear along with a few o<strong>the</strong>rs as Volume 73 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Gesamtausgabe under <strong>the</strong> title “Zum Ereignis-Denken.”Without fur<strong>the</strong>r ado, I have corrected <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s occasional slips <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pen. Ihave also <strong>in</strong>serted <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ted text with<strong>in</strong> square brackets three words miss<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> h<strong>and</strong>written text. By contrast, <strong>the</strong> addition to Hölderl<strong>in</strong> quotation also appear<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> square brackets is <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own. The spell<strong>in</strong>g, punctuation, <strong>and</strong> division<strong>of</strong> paragraphs correspond to <strong>the</strong> h<strong>and</strong>written text. <strong>Heidegger</strong> has taken both <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Hölderl<strong>in</strong> quotations from <strong>the</strong> third edition (1943) <strong>of</strong> Hell<strong>in</strong>grath’s Hölderl<strong>in</strong>-Ausgabe. 7 My cordial thanks go to Herr Dr. Hermann <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>the</strong> executor <strong>of</strong>Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s literary rema<strong>in</strong>s, for permission to pr<strong>in</strong>t this text.F.-W. v. Herrmann6D<strong>in</strong> A-5 Format is an acronym for “Deutsche Industrie Norm.” It refers to a st<strong>and</strong>ardized papersize used across Germany for prepar<strong>in</strong>g manuscripts, <strong>and</strong> was <strong>the</strong> paper size preferred by<strong>Heidegger</strong>.7Norbert von Hell<strong>in</strong>grath (1888–1916), a German literary scholar who fell <strong>in</strong> Verdun, assembled<strong>the</strong> Complete Edition <strong>of</strong> Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s work.
10 T. Kalary <strong>and</strong> F. SchalowReferences<strong>Heidegger</strong> Mart<strong>in</strong>. (1994). Die Armut. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 10: 5–11.Hölderl<strong>in</strong>, Johann Christian Friedrich. (1943). Sämtliche Werke. Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe,vol. III, ed. Norbert v. Hell<strong>in</strong>grath, Friedrich Seebass, Ludwig v. Pigenot. Berl<strong>in</strong>: PropyläenVerlag, Zweite Auflage.Hölderl<strong>in</strong>, Johann Christian Friedrich. (1969). Hölderl<strong>in</strong> Werke und Briefe, vols. 1 & 2, ed.Friedrich Beißner <strong>and</strong> Jochen Schmidt. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Insel.Jünger Ernst. (1982). Der Arbeiter: Herrschaft und Gestalt. Stuggart: Klett-Cotta.
IntroductionFrank Schalow1 A Historical Perspective on <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Study<strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s ThoughtWhen Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> passed away on May 26, 1976, both <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong>appreciation <strong>of</strong> his thought had spread to all corners <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> globe. Implicit <strong>in</strong> thisdevelopment was <strong>the</strong> simple fact that many <strong>of</strong> those who were devoted to study<strong>in</strong>ghis thought <strong>and</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>gs were not native German speakers, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>deed, may havebeen fluent only <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own nationality <strong>and</strong> upbr<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g. With<strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> English-speak<strong>in</strong>g world, this “language gap” was probably most glar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> United States, where <strong>the</strong> “melt<strong>in</strong>g pot” <strong>of</strong> diverse cultures had <strong>of</strong>ten occurredat <strong>the</strong> expense <strong>of</strong> cultivat<strong>in</strong>g fluency <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r languages. Given this unique twiston <strong>the</strong> “Zeitgeist,” a grow<strong>in</strong>g audience <strong>of</strong> students <strong>and</strong> scholars alike not onlydepended upon exist<strong>in</strong>g translations, but, also discovered <strong>in</strong> each “new” translation<strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong> opportunity to ga<strong>in</strong> greater access to his th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby achieve deeper <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to his philosophy.To be sure, <strong>the</strong> limitations <strong>of</strong> this “<strong>in</strong>tellectual climate” may have similarlyimpacted <strong>the</strong> broader appreciation <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r literary figures <strong>and</strong> philosophers, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gFriedrich Nietzsche, whose reception <strong>in</strong> post-World War II America h<strong>in</strong>ged largelyon new translations <strong>of</strong> his writ<strong>in</strong>gs. In <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s case, however, <strong>the</strong> divergencesmay be more important than <strong>the</strong> parallels. For <strong>in</strong> constru<strong>in</strong>g his own philosophicalmission as always “underway,” he also recognized that <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> hiswrit<strong>in</strong>gs constituted a key component <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>terpretation, <strong>and</strong>appropriation <strong>of</strong> his th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Given that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g gravitates around aF. Schalow (*)Department <strong>of</strong> Philosophy, University <strong>of</strong> New Orleans, 2000 Lakeshore Dr.,70148 New Orleans, LA, USAe-mail: fschalow@uno.eduF. Schalow (ed.), <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad, Contributions To Phenomenology 65,DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0_2, © Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media B.V. 201111
Introduction13isolation, any more than can <strong>the</strong> depth <strong>and</strong> scope <strong>of</strong> his th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g be conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> anys<strong>in</strong>gle text or an assortment <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>.Indeed, when <strong>the</strong> first translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s magnum opus was publishedapproximately a half century ago (1962), it became for <strong>the</strong> English reader almost<strong>the</strong> sole open<strong>in</strong>g onto <strong>the</strong> entirety <strong>of</strong> his thought, not only because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> paucity <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r key works 2 ; but, more importantly, because an importantcrossroads was still to be reached that could shift attention back to <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>ation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> works <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir place <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> overall development <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Specifically, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terlude <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s pass<strong>in</strong>g also marks <strong>the</strong> birth <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong> his Gesamtausgabe or Complete Edition. With <strong>the</strong> cooperation<strong>of</strong> his son, Hermann <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> guidance <strong>of</strong> his personal assistant,Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (<strong>the</strong> manag<strong>in</strong>g editor <strong>of</strong> this edition up to now),<strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiated this lengthy process <strong>of</strong> publish<strong>in</strong>g his Gesamtausgabe. As <strong>the</strong>first <strong>of</strong> 102 volumes <strong>of</strong> his Gesamtausgabe began to appear, <strong>the</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g, appropriation,<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>reby reached one <strong>of</strong> its mostdecisive junctures.First, <strong>the</strong> wealth <strong>of</strong> lecture-course texts, treatises, essays, <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r writ<strong>in</strong>gs,which were published <strong>in</strong> German for <strong>the</strong> first time, for example, Die Grundproblemeder Phänomenologie (1975b), called for <strong>the</strong>ir translation. 3 Secondly, whe<strong>the</strong>r onecould read <strong>the</strong>se volumes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al German or not, <strong>the</strong> plethora <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se writ<strong>in</strong>gsprovided a wider perspective <strong>and</strong> helped to bridge <strong>the</strong> gaps <strong>in</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought, which <strong>in</strong> many cases (particularly for <strong>the</strong> English speaker)occurred <strong>in</strong> a ra<strong>the</strong>r piecemeal if not fragmented way. The challenge posed by <strong>the</strong>publication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gesamtausgabe provides a concrete example <strong>of</strong> how <strong>the</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs become <strong>in</strong>terwoven with <strong>the</strong>irtranslation, even if this hermeneutic synergy was completely evident at <strong>the</strong> outset<strong>and</strong> would only become fully appreciated much later. As if through a reciprocal<strong>in</strong>terplay, <strong>the</strong> appearance <strong>and</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se volumes not just lend greateropportunity to underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought; <strong>the</strong> gradual enhancement <strong>of</strong> thisunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g opens <strong>the</strong> possibility to address <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation as a hermeneuticphenomenologicalcraft <strong>in</strong> its own right. The need to exam<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> evaluate <strong>the</strong>sevarious translations, notwithst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rigors <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, paves<strong>the</strong> way for outl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> methodology <strong>of</strong> translation, not as an addendum to hisphilosophy, but <strong>in</strong> direct synergy with it.2<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, GA 2 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977c). Orig<strong>in</strong>allypublished <strong>in</strong> 1927, Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit was first translated <strong>in</strong>to English by John Macquirrie <strong>and</strong> EdwardRob<strong>in</strong>son. See Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962). Published <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>same year was <strong>the</strong> English translation <strong>of</strong> Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (which <strong>Heidegger</strong>composed <strong>in</strong> 1929). See Kant <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Problem <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics, trans. James Churchill (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton:Indiana University Press, 1962). Among o<strong>the</strong>r early translations <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s key works is AnIntroduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959).3<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann,1975b).
14 F. Schalow2 The Importance <strong>of</strong> “Beiträge” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> ControversySurround<strong>in</strong>g Its English <strong>Translation</strong>The Gesamtausgabe edition <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s works <strong>in</strong>cludes both previouslypublished <strong>and</strong> unpublished writ<strong>in</strong>gs. Among <strong>the</strong> latter, undoubtedly <strong>the</strong> most anticipatedwas a manuscript from 1936 to 1938, which <strong>Heidegger</strong> deliberately “heldback” <strong>and</strong> which subsequently was published <strong>in</strong> 1989 as volume 65 under <strong>the</strong> titleBeiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). Not only was <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong> this volumea “high po<strong>in</strong>t” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> study <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought, it also marked a turn<strong>in</strong>gpo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> how to approach <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> his writ<strong>in</strong>gs particularly with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>English-speak<strong>in</strong>g world. There are, <strong>of</strong> course, various reasons why this proved to beso, but <strong>the</strong> most basic <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>the</strong>se. First, Beiträge stood alongside Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit asamong <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s most important works, <strong>and</strong> moreover, forged a new pathway forradicaliz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> enact<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, which he has first<strong>in</strong>itiated through his magnum opus <strong>of</strong> 1927. Second, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s deeper awaken<strong>in</strong>gto <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> language, <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g’s dependence upon it, posed an obstacleto any attempt to <strong>in</strong>terpret much less translate his writ<strong>in</strong>gs: that is, that language <strong>and</strong>its s<strong>in</strong>gular idioms held <strong>the</strong> key to th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g’s ability to address “be<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>and</strong> reemergewith<strong>in</strong> its expanse <strong>of</strong> openness <strong>and</strong> unconcealment. Given this s<strong>in</strong>gularity <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> idiom, it became clear that <strong>the</strong> correspond<strong>in</strong>g “mean<strong>in</strong>gs” <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sic to be<strong>in</strong>g, thatis, to its manifestation, <strong>in</strong>terpretation, <strong>and</strong> expression <strong>in</strong> words, were not unilaterallytransferrable like currency (or exchangeable as co<strong>in</strong>s). Third, due to <strong>the</strong> complexity<strong>of</strong> his own th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> its unique mission <strong>of</strong> allow<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g to manifest itself(ra<strong>the</strong>r than “represent” it), <strong>Heidegger</strong> employed a novel <strong>and</strong> ground-break<strong>in</strong>g syntax,which <strong>in</strong> its departure from conventional grammar eclipsed (<strong>in</strong> audacity) eventhat <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time. Ultimately, when both <strong>the</strong> need <strong>and</strong> opportunity presenteditself to translate Beiträge, that task would not only h<strong>in</strong>ge on confront<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> previouslymentioned considerations <strong>and</strong> challenges. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> daunt<strong>in</strong>g task wouldcall for a prelim<strong>in</strong>ary maneuver, a “step back” to ponder <strong>the</strong> guid<strong>in</strong>g thread <strong>of</strong> each<strong>and</strong> every attempt at translation <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> express synergy between this undertak<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g as such. As a result, <strong>the</strong> entry po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> arena <strong>of</strong> translationwould become problematic for <strong>the</strong> first time, <strong>in</strong> such a way as to raise a questionconcern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic elements for translat<strong>in</strong>g his writ<strong>in</strong>gs.As early as 1993, William J. Richardson, S.J., po<strong>in</strong>ted to <strong>the</strong> “formidable challenge”that <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Beiträge posed, not only for re-<strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>basic thrust <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought but also, by implication, for <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong>translat<strong>in</strong>g such a highly s<strong>in</strong>gular <strong>and</strong> idiomatic text. 4 The magnitude <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>4William J. Richardson, S. J., “Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ground <strong>of</strong> Negativity: A Note on <strong>the</strong> FourthMovement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Beiträge-Symphony,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 9 (1993): 35, 37. Also, see GeorgeKovacs, “<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Failure <strong>of</strong> ‘A Grassroots ArchivalPerspective,’” Studia Phaenomenologica, 6 (2006): 319–345. See <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Beiträge zurPhilosophie (Vom Ereignis) (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989). Contributions toPhilosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g), trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: IndianaUniversity Press, 1989).
Introduction15challenge carries with it a double responsibility born <strong>of</strong> preserv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>ality <strong>of</strong>his thought <strong>and</strong> negotiat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> turbulent sea <strong>of</strong> its “formidable” syntax (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> wave <strong>of</strong> criticisms that would <strong>in</strong>evitably follow <strong>the</strong> appearance <strong>of</strong> this translation).But what is <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> such criticisms, whence do <strong>the</strong>y come? What we mightglean (ra<strong>the</strong>r than dismiss<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m) is a rem<strong>in</strong>der <strong>of</strong> a response that <strong>Heidegger</strong> made<strong>in</strong> address<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> charge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “violence” <strong>of</strong> his radical re<strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> ImmanuelKant’s philosophy. 5 Specifically, <strong>the</strong> need to break with convention is an essentialdynamic <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, for only by st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> abid<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> crucible <strong>of</strong> conflictcan philosophy renounce its pretense <strong>of</strong> sovereignty <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>stead belong to what is“orig<strong>in</strong>al.” In this orig<strong>in</strong>ality resides <strong>the</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g (Bergung) that welcomes <strong>the</strong>risk <strong>of</strong> error—for <strong>the</strong> translator as well as <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>ker—<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby prepares for a“leap” (Sprung) <strong>in</strong>to what is s<strong>in</strong>gular <strong>and</strong> ownmost <strong>in</strong> our experience <strong>of</strong> language.There is, <strong>the</strong>n, a doubl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> challenge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Beiträge, such that <strong>the</strong> “leap” withwhich <strong>Heidegger</strong> reserves to th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g has its own mode <strong>of</strong> enactment, or “re-enactment,”as it were, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> endeavor to translate that formidable text. In a way, parallel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>“violence” <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Kant-<strong>in</strong>terpretation, translation <strong>of</strong> this “first magnitude”is itself a venture, a “leap” <strong>in</strong>to a crucible <strong>of</strong> conflict.When Parvis Emad undertook <strong>the</strong> “Herculean task” <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g Beiträge zurPhilosophie (Vom Ereignis), he entered this crucible. 6 In an analogous way to<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s “violent” encounter with <strong>the</strong> Western tradition, we might expect that<strong>the</strong> attempt to translate <strong>the</strong> key terms <strong>of</strong> his second most important text wouldunleash its own disruptive forces. We would also expect, conversely, that <strong>the</strong> moredar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> venture, <strong>the</strong> more heated would be <strong>the</strong> criticism, which <strong>in</strong>evitably follows.Such has been <strong>the</strong> case with Contributions to Philosophy, which from itspublication <strong>in</strong> 1999 has become a lighten<strong>in</strong>g rod <strong>of</strong> controversy among various critics.Indeed, some scholars have exaggerated <strong>the</strong>ir criticisms <strong>in</strong> an effort to parody <strong>the</strong>most radical aspects <strong>of</strong> this translation, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g its effort to evoke <strong>the</strong> dynamism<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g through such unusual expressions as “essential sway<strong>in</strong>g” (Wesung) <strong>and</strong>“enquiver<strong>in</strong>g” (Erzittern). While <strong>the</strong> evaluation <strong>of</strong> any translation poses its ownunique challenge, we must make a deliberate effort to access its impact as a whole,ra<strong>the</strong>r than consider<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>in</strong> a piecemeal fashion.In this regard, <strong>the</strong> most vehement criticisms can also serve as “contrary <strong>in</strong>dicators”to how <strong>the</strong> English translation <strong>of</strong> Beiträge rema<strong>in</strong>s uncompromis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its search fororig<strong>in</strong>al mean<strong>in</strong>gs, as well as test<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> limits <strong>of</strong> language. What <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> eyes <strong>of</strong>Emad’s critics appears as creative license may portend a higher lawfulness <strong>and</strong>5For <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s discussion <strong>of</strong> this “violence,” see Kant und das Problem der Metaphysics, GA 3(Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: 1992), pp. 201–202. Kant <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Problem <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics, trans. RichardTaft (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 141.6See Parvis Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy (Madison: TheUniversity <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press, 2007). For a discussion <strong>of</strong> Emad’s book, see Frank Schalow,“Access<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Thought through a New Approach to <strong>Translation</strong>,” Existentia, 18 (2008a):301–314; <strong>and</strong> “Review <strong>of</strong> On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy by ParvisEmad,” Journal <strong>of</strong> Phenomenological Psychology, 39/1 (2008b): 121–125.
Introduction17whose mean<strong>in</strong>g is frequently gleaned from economic <strong>and</strong> fiscal discussions(e.g., budgetary matters <strong>in</strong> state <strong>and</strong> federal government), is not a familiar expression<strong>in</strong> everyday discourse. Put <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s terms, its philosophical mean<strong>in</strong>g can onlybe conveyed by appeal<strong>in</strong>g to a formal <strong>in</strong>dicator, which highlights an activity <strong>in</strong>which each <strong>of</strong> us can participates, that is, <strong>the</strong> endeavor <strong>of</strong> “mak<strong>in</strong>g one’s own.” Forexample, we tell our students that <strong>the</strong>y have learned or understood <strong>the</strong> class materialonly when <strong>the</strong>y can re-state it <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own words, that is, “appropriate” it. Put <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>simplest way, to appropriate means to “make one’s own.” The more esoteric term“appropriate” still refers back to a simpler root <strong>in</strong> English <strong>of</strong> “own<strong>in</strong>g,” “ownership,”<strong>and</strong>, most <strong>of</strong> all, <strong>of</strong> “com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to its own.” To take ano<strong>the</strong>r example, we mightadvise a student to pursue a career path <strong>in</strong> which he/she can “appropriate” what he/she may have learned—a suggestion which, despite its vagueness, entails that <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>dividual develops his/her “ownmost” talents, that is, what is uniquely one’s “own.”When <strong>the</strong> attempt is <strong>the</strong>n made to translate “Ereignis” as “appropriation” or even as“event <strong>of</strong> appropriation,” we cannot deny that “own<strong>in</strong>g” rema<strong>in</strong>s an importantelement <strong>in</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g that term. Conversely, we must also acknowledge that byrender<strong>in</strong>g “Ereignis” through <strong>the</strong> neologism “enown<strong>in</strong>g,” a new precedent is set,which allows <strong>the</strong> German idiom to speak from <strong>the</strong> simplest roots <strong>of</strong> our language(that is, from “en-own<strong>in</strong>g”).The controversy over how to translate “Ereignis,” as well as o<strong>the</strong>r key terms <strong>in</strong>Beiträge, should serve as a counterchallenge for <strong>the</strong> staunchest critics <strong>of</strong> Contributionsto Philosophy, <strong>and</strong>, most <strong>of</strong> all, for future generations who herald <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r onset <strong>of</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Indeed, we immediately confront this challenge upon ponder<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>enigma <strong>of</strong> how to translate <strong>the</strong> “essential head<strong>in</strong>g” or paren<strong>the</strong>tical title, “VomEreignis.” Not only must we consider <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word “Ereignis,” but mustalso yield to <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> its th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g (by <strong>and</strong> from <strong>the</strong> gift<strong>in</strong>g-refusal <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g).To be sure, one alternative render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> this subtitle as simply “<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Event” mayresonate with some readers, even while <strong>the</strong> significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>of</strong>” (as convey<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> nuance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word “vom”) rema<strong>in</strong>s unquestioned <strong>in</strong> its role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> overall attemptto express <strong>the</strong> dynamic <strong>of</strong> “Ereignis.” As we will exam<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> a subsequent section<strong>of</strong> this “Introduction,” <strong>the</strong> substitution <strong>of</strong> “event” for “Ereignis” (<strong>and</strong>, by <strong>the</strong> sametoken, render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subtitle as “<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Event”), 10 which some readers may welcomedue to its simplicity, illustrates both how immeasurably nuanced <strong>and</strong> extremelydifficult <strong>the</strong>se “translation decisions” are. As a result, <strong>the</strong> world <strong>of</strong> “academicreviews” may cross an entire spectrum <strong>of</strong> perspectives <strong>in</strong> evaluat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Englishtranslation <strong>of</strong> Beiträge. But <strong>the</strong> extremes may also tell us someth<strong>in</strong>g, whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>characteriz<strong>in</strong>g this task as a “hard nut to crack” or as a “hermeneutic labor,” 11 on <strong>the</strong>one h<strong>and</strong>, or, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g to a k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> juggernaut <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> attempt to translate10For an example <strong>of</strong> this way <strong>of</strong> translation, <strong>the</strong> “Essential Head<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> Contributions to Philosophy,see Dennis J. Schmidt’s “Foreword” to Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNYPress, 2010), p. xvii.11See Kovacs, op cit, pp. 320, 325.
18 F. Schalowkey terms that appear so idiosyncratic as to seem almost “untranslatable.” 12 Indeed,however one sorts out this debate (as will be <strong>the</strong> aim <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> papers <strong>in</strong> thisvolume), <strong>the</strong> negativity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Angst” over it only re<strong>in</strong>forces <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>translation, <strong>and</strong>, reciprocally, how monumental <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong> Beiträge zurPhilosophie has proven to be. In this regard, <strong>the</strong> ongo<strong>in</strong>g controversy serves as arem<strong>in</strong>der <strong>of</strong> how pr<strong>of</strong>ound <strong>the</strong> “impact” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong> Contributions toPhilosophy has been. While a so-called “politician,” ra<strong>the</strong>r than a philosopher, mightbe tempted to tally votes “pro” <strong>and</strong> “con,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> cautions aga<strong>in</strong>st such tactics:a so-called “consensus” may be as much a barometer <strong>of</strong> falsehood as <strong>of</strong> truth.If we steer away from <strong>the</strong> caustic character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> academic climate today, <strong>and</strong>follow <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s lead <strong>of</strong> temper<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> urge to “pass judgment,” <strong>the</strong>n we cancome to a clearer <strong>and</strong> calmer recognition that <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> English translationdoes not lie <strong>in</strong> its “f<strong>in</strong>ality” or even <strong>in</strong> a pretense <strong>of</strong> “perfection,” but, on <strong>the</strong>contrary, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “provisional” attempt to proceed along <strong>the</strong> path <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> toreside <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> s<strong>in</strong>gularity <strong>of</strong> its language. In this regard, we need to separate <strong>the</strong>polemics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> criticism, <strong>and</strong> even <strong>the</strong> “defense” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> English translation, from ahermeneutically mediated, self-reflexively formulated observation concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>limitations <strong>of</strong> this translation. As Emad emphasizes <strong>in</strong> his book, On <strong>the</strong> Way to<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, <strong>the</strong> best we can ever strive for is an“approximate” translation. 13In a parallel way to <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, translation rema<strong>in</strong>s an opened-endedchallenge. When we beg<strong>in</strong> from <strong>the</strong> simplicity <strong>of</strong> this <strong>in</strong>sight, we can get beyond <strong>the</strong>impasse <strong>of</strong> contentiousness that not only conta<strong>in</strong>s its own pitfalls, but also blocksour access to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought. After address<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terface between translation<strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> language, we will outl<strong>in</strong>e his strategy fortranslat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> key words <strong>of</strong> Beiträge (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Ereignis <strong>and</strong> Abgrund).3 <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> Its K<strong>in</strong>ship with LanguageHowever we gauge <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> English translation <strong>of</strong> Beiträge zurPhilosophie, we need to consider its impact with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> larger context <strong>of</strong> Mart<strong>in</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g as a whole. With<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> twentieth century, <strong>Heidegger</strong> emerges as <strong>the</strong>philosopher par excellence who took up <strong>the</strong> ultimate challenge <strong>of</strong> re-ask<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> mostbasic <strong>of</strong> all philosophical questions, namely <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “mean<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g.12For examples <strong>of</strong> this claim <strong>of</strong> “untranslability,” <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> regard to its implications for <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong>translation <strong>in</strong> general, see Quent<strong>in</strong> Lauer, Phenomenology: Its Genesis <strong>and</strong> Prospect (New York:Harper <strong>and</strong> Row, 1965), p. 169. Also see John Sallis, On <strong>Translation</strong> (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: IndianaUniversity Press, 2002), pp. 1, 100–102. For a critical counter focus to this <strong>the</strong>me, see FrankSchalow, “Freedom, Truth, <strong>and</strong> Responsibility: A Critical Look at Recent <strong>Translation</strong>s <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Gesamtausgabe,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 23 (2007): 96–111.13See Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 37, 39.
Introduction19Not merely as a philosophical concept, but as an enigma surround<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong>use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word “be<strong>in</strong>g” itself, <strong>the</strong> concern for <strong>the</strong> “mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g” has implicationsboth for <strong>the</strong> central role that language plays <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>and</strong> for his methodology<strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigation. In terms <strong>of</strong> his method, <strong>Heidegger</strong> developed “hermeneuticphenomenology”as a way <strong>of</strong> address<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong> light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> humanpower to underst<strong>and</strong> it <strong>and</strong> develop new <strong>in</strong>terpretations <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> throughout <strong>the</strong> course<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> philosophical tradition. Yet hermeneutic-phenomenology is also uniquely suitedfor explor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> etymology <strong>and</strong> ancestry <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most basic philosophical terms, <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong>n for provid<strong>in</strong>g guidel<strong>in</strong>es to “<strong>in</strong>terpret” <strong>the</strong> various mean<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se key idioms<strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong>y enrich our underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. The fact that <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>gs perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gto “be<strong>in</strong>g” are not self-evident, <strong>and</strong> may even be obscured <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> words <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> greatphilosophers, creates a tw<strong>of</strong>old problem. First, <strong>the</strong> activity <strong>of</strong> philosophiz<strong>in</strong>g or thoughtcan no longer be considered apart from <strong>the</strong> language by which it achieves expression;<strong>and</strong>, secondly, <strong>the</strong> words by which <strong>the</strong> great th<strong>in</strong>kers speak, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>, alsorequire a hermeneutic-phenomenological explication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir roots <strong>and</strong> backgrounds,that is, <strong>the</strong>y need an “<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation.” For this endeavor is shaped by <strong>the</strong>ongo<strong>in</strong>g struggle <strong>of</strong> thought to f<strong>in</strong>d new ways for express<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> most perennialphilosophical motifs, which <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s case occurs eo ipso through <strong>the</strong> nativeidioms <strong>of</strong> his own German language.The fact that <strong>the</strong> concern for translation should become central to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’senterprise is not accidental, but, on <strong>the</strong> contrary, is already prefigured <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> design<strong>and</strong> methodology by which he formulates <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g.”Indeed, <strong>the</strong> need to recover <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most basic philosophical idiomsthrough an act <strong>of</strong> “<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual” translation already implies that <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g cannot be monopolized by a native tongue. By <strong>the</strong> same token, if th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gis to become truly “historical,” it must be able to render <strong>the</strong> most basic philosophicalidioms <strong>in</strong>to o<strong>the</strong>r possibilities <strong>of</strong> expression, that is, through an act <strong>of</strong> “<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation.” As Emad describes <strong>in</strong> his book, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sContributions to Philosophy, any attempt to translate terms from one language <strong>in</strong>toano<strong>the</strong>r, that is, to engage <strong>in</strong> “<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual” translation (as we commonly refer to<strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation), proceeds from <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ds its direction through a prior “<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual”translation. 14 Put simply, <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation requires <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation, <strong>and</strong> vice versa. Moreover, this scenario is not just one aspect <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, but <strong>in</strong>stead constitutes <strong>the</strong> crown<strong>in</strong>g message <strong>of</strong> his hermeneutic-phenomenologicalmethodology <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong> his own words, <strong>the</strong> task faced bywhat he calls “be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.”For many <strong>of</strong> us who have been follow<strong>in</strong>g along <strong>the</strong> journey <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sthought for years, if not decades, it is <strong>of</strong>ten difficult to put ourselves <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> position<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “novice” who is faced with <strong>the</strong> daunt<strong>in</strong>g challenge <strong>of</strong> enter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> labyr<strong>in</strong>th<strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy. Before much underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g can develop, <strong>the</strong> novicemay frequently be struck by an experience so fundamental, as to suggest why <strong>the</strong>14For a discussion <strong>of</strong> this important dist<strong>in</strong>ction, see Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributionsto Philosophy, pp. 21–42.
20 F. Schalowissue <strong>of</strong> translation becomes <strong>in</strong>extricably tied to <strong>the</strong> challenge <strong>of</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought. If <strong>the</strong>re is any undeniable fact, it is that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophydepends upon terms whose mean<strong>in</strong>gs appear to be remarkably different than<strong>the</strong>ir customary use. For example, even his co<strong>in</strong>age <strong>of</strong> “Da-se<strong>in</strong>,” as <strong>the</strong> term forhuman existence as “st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g out” toward possibilities, poses as great a challengefor its use <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al German, as does its attempted translation <strong>in</strong> English. 15 But<strong>the</strong> appreciation <strong>of</strong> this simple example cuts two ways, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong> novel use <strong>of</strong>this key term <strong>in</strong> English h<strong>in</strong>ges upon a parallel <strong>in</strong>novativeness <strong>of</strong> its “mean<strong>in</strong>g”with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> German language. Thus <strong>the</strong> English-speak<strong>in</strong>g student will discover that<strong>in</strong> order to study <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought, it is necessary to ga<strong>in</strong> at least some m<strong>in</strong>imalappreciation for <strong>the</strong> German language. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, <strong>in</strong> tak<strong>in</strong>g his/her first step,<strong>the</strong> student has already experienced a “slippage,” a strange dissociation, <strong>and</strong> consequently<strong>the</strong>ir realization that his/her capacity to underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> h<strong>in</strong>ges on afragile relation to language, <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong> some mysterious way, this frailty is l<strong>in</strong>ked to <strong>the</strong>problem <strong>of</strong> “translation.”And yet, even with this simple revelation, <strong>the</strong>re is no easy way to isolate thisproblem. Because given <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s unique way <strong>of</strong> re-ask<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> most perennial <strong>of</strong>all philosophical questions, namely <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “mean<strong>in</strong>g” (S<strong>in</strong>n) <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g,even a concept that is as ostensibly straightforward as “translation” may become“worthy <strong>of</strong> question<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong> its own right. As we shall discover, a foremost example<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> method <strong>Heidegger</strong> develops <strong>in</strong> order to guide his philosophical <strong>in</strong>vestigationis <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ctive way <strong>in</strong> which he <strong>in</strong>tertw<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g two concerns as <strong>the</strong>ymutually implicate each o<strong>the</strong>r: (a) <strong>the</strong> concern with “what is translation, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar asit perta<strong>in</strong>s to underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> key terms <strong>of</strong> his philosophy” <strong>and</strong>(b) <strong>the</strong> concern with <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. He calls this method “hermeneutics.” Inorder to address “be<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> precise manner <strong>in</strong> which it becomes manifest, orshows itself, that is, <strong>in</strong> order to enact “phenomenology,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> employs <strong>the</strong>term hermeneutics as <strong>the</strong> chief <strong>in</strong>novation to radicalize <strong>the</strong> approach that his mentor,Edmund Husserl, pioneered. As a result, <strong>Heidegger</strong> calls his dist<strong>in</strong>ctive methodology“hermeneutic phenomenology.” Unlike previous philosophical methods, <strong>the</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> hermeneutic phenomenology does not depend on <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tellectual stance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>philosopher, but, as I shall show <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> this <strong>in</strong>troduction, beg<strong>in</strong>s from<strong>the</strong> “vague” <strong>and</strong> imprecise “pre-philosophical” level <strong>of</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g, that is. <strong>the</strong>uncover<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial obscurity that serves as <strong>the</strong> “signpost” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> first lessonon <strong>the</strong> long <strong>and</strong> arduous path <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Constitut<strong>in</strong>g a foremost example <strong>of</strong> wha<strong>the</strong> calls <strong>the</strong> “hermeneutical situation,” this unfold<strong>in</strong>g is also reflected <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> vaguenessconcern<strong>in</strong>g our <strong>in</strong>itial underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> translation <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> cluesthat this vagueness provides about <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> departure <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy.The hermeneutical situation comprises <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial set <strong>of</strong> presuppositions that guide15For a discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term “Da-se<strong>in</strong>,” see Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions toPhilosophy, pp. 15–16, 26–27.
Introduction21any attempt to formulate <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> to address be<strong>in</strong>g’s manifestation<strong>in</strong> light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>tra- <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gually” translated “key words” <strong>and</strong> central motifs<strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought. As we will discover throughout this volume, <strong>the</strong> hermeneuticalsituation also provides <strong>the</strong> translator with <strong>the</strong> provisional “foothold” <strong>and</strong> orientationto undertake <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs. The more fully we underst<strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> implications <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s hermeneutic-phenomenology, <strong>the</strong> more canwe also appreciate this <strong>in</strong>itial “lesson” <strong>in</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g his philosophy. First, wedist<strong>in</strong>guish that “th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s unique enactment <strong>of</strong> it, always occurs by“dwell<strong>in</strong>g” with<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong>deed, <strong>in</strong> relation to <strong>the</strong> ownmost (Wesen) <strong>of</strong> language.Secondly, we realize that because <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own language <strong>in</strong>cludes a uniquerange <strong>of</strong> idioms, which hark back to <strong>the</strong>ir German roots, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> a few cases to <strong>the</strong>irGreek ancestry, <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation (no matter how vaguely conceived) leads to<strong>the</strong> heart <strong>of</strong> his enterprise. Thirdly, we realize that no matter how carefully weattempt to arrange <strong>the</strong> basic concepts <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy <strong>in</strong>to an elaboratesystem, this pursuit can never be substituted for <strong>the</strong> transformation that comes fromembrac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> first two po<strong>in</strong>ts, that is, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>teraction between <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s enactment<strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> unique range <strong>of</strong> his idioms. In this regard, while an <strong>in</strong>troductionsuch as this seeks to sketch <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terconnectedness <strong>of</strong> many <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’scentral concepts, its unique approach proceeds from <strong>the</strong> example <strong>of</strong> his own hermeneuticsituation with<strong>in</strong> whose horizon each <strong>of</strong> us, as students, first become acqua<strong>in</strong>tedwith his philosophy. I shall highlight this by po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g to specific <strong>in</strong>stances <strong>of</strong> transformationthat stem from <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s use <strong>of</strong> key words, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong>y open up adist<strong>in</strong>ctive “gateway” to his th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.As more <strong>and</strong> more volumes <strong>of</strong> Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Gesamtausgabe have beenpublished <strong>and</strong> translated, <strong>the</strong> questions as to precisely what <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation<strong>in</strong>volves, as well as <strong>the</strong> role it plays <strong>in</strong> appropriat<strong>in</strong>g his th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, have never beenmore important. Unlike his predecessors, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g bears upon, is <strong>in</strong>timatelytied to, <strong>and</strong> ultimately illum<strong>in</strong>ates, <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation itself. In thisrespect, <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> translation wields a double-edged sword. For <strong>the</strong> hermeneuticguidel<strong>in</strong>es that direct his <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g are precisely thosethat govern any attempt to translate texts, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own. This statementechoes a provocative remark that <strong>Heidegger</strong> makes <strong>in</strong> one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lecturecourseshe devoted to <strong>the</strong> great German poet, Friedrich Hölderl<strong>in</strong>: “Tell me whatyou th<strong>in</strong>k about translation, <strong>and</strong> I will tell you who you are.” 16 In this regard, translationis not merely an addendum to thought, but, understood “<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gually” as wellas “<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gually,” is <strong>in</strong>timately jo<strong>in</strong>ed with <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. With this observation,<strong>the</strong> precise focus <strong>of</strong> this anthology comes to <strong>the</strong> forefront <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as its title,<strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>, captures <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tricate relationbetween translation <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.16<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>s Hymne “Der Ister”, GA 53 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann,1984b), p. 76. Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s Hymn “The Ister”, trans. William McNeill <strong>and</strong> Julia Davis (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton:Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 63.
22 F. Schalow4 The “Be<strong>in</strong>g-Historical Perspective” <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s ThoughtThe order <strong>of</strong> words <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> title <strong>of</strong> this volume is not co<strong>in</strong>cidental, but stems from apriority emerg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>, ultimately, from <strong>the</strong> development<strong>of</strong> its “be<strong>in</strong>g-historical perspective.” We need to elaborate precisely how thisbe<strong>in</strong>g-historical perspective both governs <strong>and</strong> comes to light <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> key terms <strong>of</strong> histh<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> advantage provided by this focus on translation is that, ra<strong>the</strong>rthan simply “def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g” <strong>the</strong> key terms <strong>of</strong> his philosophy as a pedagogical tool tohelp <strong>the</strong> reader, we are directly led <strong>in</strong>to a discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “mean<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se terms<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>ation from with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> language. By explicat<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se key terms, we can ga<strong>in</strong> a hermeneutic foothold with<strong>in</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>to be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> his own th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. In <strong>the</strong> process,we enter <strong>in</strong>to a hermeneutic circle <strong>of</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation, by which <strong>the</strong>mean<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> key terms <strong>of</strong> his philosophy come to be developed <strong>and</strong> amplified.This hermeneutic dimension, however, applies equally to <strong>Heidegger</strong> himself, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>aras he is already engaged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual” translation <strong>of</strong> familiar German words,“Ereignis” <strong>and</strong> “Abgrund,” transform<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se through his <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation<strong>in</strong>to “Er-eignis” <strong>and</strong> “Ab-grund,” that is, two key terms govern<strong>in</strong>g his philosophy.These terms, <strong>in</strong> particular, are “be<strong>in</strong>g-historical” words <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense that <strong>the</strong>y orig<strong>in</strong>atefrom <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> its endeavor to <strong>in</strong>habit <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong>language as <strong>the</strong> “place” for <strong>the</strong> manifestation <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g throughout <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong>history as etched specifically <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> philosophical tradition.It is easy to overlook, however, <strong>the</strong> importance that <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical perspectivehas for underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g/<strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g/translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> key terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy.The more we are drawn <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> orbit <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> more<strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> verbal form “to be,” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> correspond<strong>in</strong>g syntax <strong>of</strong> its expression,dislodges our reliance upon <strong>the</strong> familiar, conventional styles <strong>of</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g,which are rooted <strong>in</strong> metaphysical concepts <strong>and</strong> substantialist grammar. Or, putano<strong>the</strong>r way, Contributions to Philosophy raises <strong>the</strong> bar <strong>in</strong> our underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>in</strong> such a way as to give priority to its language, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby thrust <strong>in</strong>to<strong>the</strong> foreground <strong>the</strong> concern for translat<strong>in</strong>g his key terms <strong>of</strong> his th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g (both as itapplies <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gually to <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> his own dist<strong>in</strong>ctive German idioms <strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gually to <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir mean<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> English). And here adist<strong>in</strong>ctive philosophical problem arises. Because <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g-historicalwords are <strong>the</strong>mselves granted from this o<strong>the</strong>rwise withdrawn (<strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate) dimension,that is, from “Ereignis,” <strong>and</strong> hence unfold <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> creative tension <strong>of</strong> this “<strong>in</strong>between”(Zwischen)—whe<strong>the</strong>r through <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic figure <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>termediaryor “<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual” receiv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> a gift—<strong>the</strong>ir mean<strong>in</strong>gs cannot simply be mapped uponcorrespond<strong>in</strong>g terms <strong>in</strong> a dictionary. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, ano<strong>the</strong>r application <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “hermeneuticalcircle” occurs, such that <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g enacted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se be<strong>in</strong>g-historical wordscan alone “project open” <strong>the</strong>ir mean<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>and</strong>, conversely, this manner <strong>of</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g(“vom Ereignis”) allows for <strong>the</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>terpretation, <strong>and</strong>appropriation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy. These hermeneutic guidel<strong>in</strong>es, however,
Introduction23can never be formalized <strong>in</strong>to an explicit “<strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> translation,” 17 because <strong>the</strong>yspr<strong>in</strong>g from a deeper lawfulness resid<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> silent depths <strong>of</strong> language, thatis, with<strong>in</strong> its ownmost.By virtue <strong>of</strong> this new project<strong>in</strong>g–open<strong>in</strong>g (which we can figuratively describe asa “hermeneutic circle”), our underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s key philosophical termsare necessarily prefaced by his own “<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual” translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gmost explicitly <strong>the</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g-historical” words beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g with “Er-eignis”). Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as<strong>the</strong>se key words orig<strong>in</strong>ate from <strong>the</strong> dimension <strong>of</strong> “Er-eignis,” <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s enactment<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation, first <strong>and</strong> foremost <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> this worditself, pave <strong>the</strong> way for <strong>the</strong>ir render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to English, or <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation.As a result, <strong>the</strong> directive (der H<strong>in</strong>weis) <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own thought suggests <strong>the</strong>idiom for <strong>the</strong> proper English translation. As <strong>the</strong> foremost example, <strong>the</strong>n, Er-eignisis translated as “en-own<strong>in</strong>g,” ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> “conventional” mean<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> a dictionaryvia such presumably “equivalent” cognates as “appropriation,” “event <strong>of</strong> appropriation,”or simply “event.” 18 No dictionary can come to rescue here (even for <strong>the</strong>German speaker). For a hermeneutic transformation has occurred <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> language, which “raises <strong>the</strong> bar” higher than any dictionary can reach.This basic <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>the</strong>n has pr<strong>of</strong>ound repercussions for carry<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s German terms <strong>in</strong>to English (or <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation).Put simply, what we can characterize as “decisions” <strong>of</strong> translation stem from a carefor <strong>and</strong> responsiveness to <strong>the</strong> word. As a result <strong>of</strong> safeguard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> word <strong>in</strong> this way,<strong>and</strong> return<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g stillness <strong>of</strong> its silent depths, a “hermeneutic responsibility”<strong>of</strong> translation governs <strong>the</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> key words <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy<strong>in</strong>to English. 19 From <strong>the</strong> perspective <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, Ereignispo<strong>in</strong>ts to a transformation that both grants be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> possibility to appear, <strong>and</strong> allocatesa reciprocal place (for its appear<strong>in</strong>g) through <strong>the</strong> haven <strong>of</strong> language. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sclarity on this po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>and</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st his various warn<strong>in</strong>gs have not detoured commentators,however, from err<strong>in</strong>g on both sides: ei<strong>the</strong>r falsely equat<strong>in</strong>g Ereignis with“be<strong>in</strong>g” (Se<strong>in</strong>), 20 or giv<strong>in</strong>g some k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> quasi-mystical, “trans-historical” status as17For a different view <strong>of</strong> translation, which is not based on <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s hermeneutical pr<strong>in</strong>ciples,see Paul Ricoeur, On <strong>Translation</strong>, trans. Eileen Brennan, “Introduction” by Richard Kearney(London: Routledge, 2006), pp. x–xv, 8–15.18See Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 10–11. Emad po<strong>in</strong>ts to<strong>the</strong> error <strong>of</strong> a “monological reductionism” at <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> such render<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> Ereignis (enown<strong>in</strong>g)as “event.” Also see p. 33. For a recent example <strong>of</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g “Ereignis” as “event,” see The<strong>Heidegger</strong> Reader, p. 177. The title <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> excerpt from Beiträge, that is, “Ereignis,” is leftuntranslated.19For a discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “responsibility” as it bears on <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation, see Emad, On <strong>the</strong>Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 21–42 (Chapter I).20As an example <strong>of</strong> this false equation, or view <strong>of</strong> Ereignis as ano<strong>the</strong>r “name” for be<strong>in</strong>g, seeCharles R. Bambach, <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Dil<strong>the</strong>y, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Crisis <strong>of</strong> Historicism (Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1995), pp. 258–259.
24 F. Schalowan “event” outside <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> beyond be<strong>in</strong>g’s manifestation <strong>in</strong> history. 21 Though most <strong>of</strong>this confusion can simply be attributed to misconstru<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy,we cannot underestimate <strong>the</strong> pivotal role that <strong>the</strong> early (mis)translations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word“Ereignis” had <strong>in</strong> perpetrat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se false underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gs. For over three decades,such an imprecise render<strong>in</strong>g as “event” <strong>and</strong> “event <strong>of</strong> appropriation” has created aclimate <strong>of</strong> misunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> tendency has been ei<strong>the</strong>r to construeEreignis as ano<strong>the</strong>r k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> “happen<strong>in</strong>g” or “occurrence” (albeit a peculiar one), orto hypostatize Ereignis as a mystical force. Even more recently, with <strong>the</strong> emphasison <strong>the</strong> so-called “early” phase <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s development, commentators have<strong>in</strong>voked false l<strong>in</strong>guistic constructions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> impersonal “it” that presumably parallelshuman facticity (while try<strong>in</strong>g to connect this “it” with <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s early use <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> word Ereignis). 22 But no matter what forms <strong>the</strong>se confusions take, <strong>the</strong>y all reveala common failure to follow <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s lead, <strong>and</strong> consider <strong>the</strong> clue provided by <strong>the</strong>hyphenated form <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word, that is, “Er-eignis.”In this regard, two considerations immediately follow. First, by explor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>root <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term, we discover that any translation <strong>of</strong> Er-eignis must <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>the</strong> connotations<strong>of</strong> “eignis,” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir conservatorship, that is, <strong>in</strong> English, <strong>of</strong> “own<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>of</strong>com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to its own. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, if “be<strong>in</strong>g” is <strong>in</strong> some ways to be “granted,” <strong>in</strong>accord with “it gives” (es gibt) or “<strong>the</strong>re are” be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> grant<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> thisdynamic must already yield (<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g/belong<strong>in</strong>g) its “own” preservation:hence <strong>the</strong> need to use <strong>the</strong> English prefix “en-” for <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “enabl<strong>in</strong>g”that comes with that “yield<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>and</strong> “own<strong>in</strong>g.” And this enabl<strong>in</strong>g–yield<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>counter balance <strong>of</strong> preservation, is a more stra<strong>in</strong>ed way <strong>of</strong> express<strong>in</strong>g what alreadyspeaks <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> idiom “en-own<strong>in</strong>g.” Secondly, <strong>the</strong> idiom speaks from Ereignis, <strong>and</strong>,correlatively, how <strong>the</strong> latter arises from with<strong>in</strong>, engages, <strong>and</strong> transforms languageitself, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g how to “say” <strong>the</strong> most basic words <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Because Ereignis is<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> immanent transformation <strong>of</strong> “say<strong>in</strong>g” (Sage), <strong>the</strong>re is no warrant foremploy<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> term “event,” or even “event <strong>of</strong> appropriation,” as hermeneuticallyresponsible renditions <strong>of</strong> Er-eignis. An “event” implies someth<strong>in</strong>g “external,” a“before” <strong>and</strong> “after,” a distance, a sequence <strong>and</strong> hence can never approximate anenabl<strong>in</strong>g–yield<strong>in</strong>g transformation from with<strong>in</strong> language—a transformation divested<strong>of</strong> all “before” <strong>and</strong> “after,” <strong>of</strong> all causality, <strong>and</strong> “sequentiality,” which requires nobasis for its preservation than “its own.”Given this dual emphasis on “enown<strong>in</strong>g,” both <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>, we <strong>the</strong>n discover why <strong>the</strong> parallel designation <strong>of</strong> “belong<strong>in</strong>g”should assume <strong>the</strong> importance it does. Indeed, when a “relationship” implies apriority <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> one to ano<strong>the</strong>r, that is, where a sense <strong>of</strong> “belong<strong>in</strong>g” prevails,a guidance for “com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to its own” must already be entailed. Put simply, without21See Bret W. Davis, <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Will: On <strong>the</strong> Way to Gelassenheit (Evanston, IL:Northwestern University Press, 2007), pp. 272–273.22For a critique <strong>of</strong> this error reify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Ereignis by equat<strong>in</strong>g it with an “impersonal” it, see ThomasKalary, “Towards Sketch<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Genesis <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 16 (2000):200–205.
Introduction25“enown<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>the</strong>re can be no <strong>in</strong>timacy <strong>of</strong> belong<strong>in</strong>g. But what, <strong>the</strong>n, <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sterms, is said to “belong,” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby be jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> a reciprocity so fundamental asto preclude a separation? Of course, th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g becomes possible only by virtue <strong>of</strong> arelationship <strong>in</strong> which it belongs to be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> that belong<strong>in</strong>g toge<strong>the</strong>r also enablesbe<strong>in</strong>g to allocate a “place” for its appear<strong>in</strong>g. And what <strong>in</strong> turn arises to shape <strong>the</strong>“<strong>in</strong>-between” (Zwischen) <strong>of</strong> this <strong>in</strong>tersection, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby spr<strong>in</strong>gs from <strong>the</strong> depths <strong>of</strong>“enown<strong>in</strong>g?” And <strong>the</strong> answer <strong>in</strong> turn is language, whose example <strong>of</strong> “transformedsay<strong>in</strong>g” alone confirms why “enown<strong>in</strong>g,” 23 <strong>and</strong> not <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r alternatives, can serveas an acceptable render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “Ereignis.”Because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> long-st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g precedent set by o<strong>the</strong>r render<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> Er-eignis, <strong>the</strong>acceptance <strong>of</strong> its translation as “enown<strong>in</strong>g” has been somewhat gradual—<strong>and</strong>, aswe have discussed, at times staunchly contested—throughout <strong>the</strong> field <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>studies. Yet, while this may <strong>in</strong> part be due to <strong>the</strong> fact that “old habits die hard,” wemust also recognize that only a decade has elapsed s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong>Contributions to Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g). There have been, however, noteworthyexamples where commentators have adopted <strong>the</strong> term<strong>in</strong>ology <strong>of</strong> this Englishtranslation <strong>and</strong> employed “enown<strong>in</strong>g” as <strong>the</strong> pivotal term to express <strong>the</strong> subtleties,<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s words, <strong>of</strong> “Ereignisdenken,” or “th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g enown<strong>in</strong>g.” Certa<strong>in</strong>lyDaniela Vallega-Neu st<strong>and</strong>s out among <strong>the</strong>se commentators by mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> term“enown<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>the</strong> preferred translation <strong>in</strong> her commentary on Contributions toPhilosophy, as well as <strong>in</strong> her recent book, The Bodily Dimension <strong>in</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>. 24“Enown<strong>in</strong>g” guides th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> respond<strong>in</strong>g to be<strong>in</strong>g’s openness, <strong>and</strong> allow<strong>in</strong>g thisreciprocity to unfold <strong>in</strong> order that thought can be experienced as “enowned” throughits devotion to <strong>the</strong> word. Through <strong>the</strong> conservatorship <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g, language can<strong>the</strong>n provide a place for be<strong>in</strong>g’s disclosure.By <strong>the</strong> same token, only by follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s example <strong>of</strong> his be<strong>in</strong>g-historicalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, does it becomes possible to experience <strong>the</strong> transform<strong>in</strong>g power <strong>of</strong> his“en-owned” <strong>in</strong>tra-l<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>of</strong> such words as “Wesen.” By recall<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>root <strong>of</strong> Er-eignis, <strong>and</strong> recogniz<strong>in</strong>g that it echoes <strong>in</strong> “eigen” <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> “eignis,” we discover<strong>the</strong> clue for translat<strong>in</strong>g a parallel term such as “Wesen”; this translation explicitlycircumvents <strong>the</strong> metaphysical <strong>and</strong> substantialist overtones <strong>of</strong> “essentialism,” whichoccurs through <strong>the</strong> customary render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Wesen as “essence.” By follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>hermeneutic guidel<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g Er-eignis as “en-own<strong>in</strong>g,” we see that “eigen”echo<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> “eignis” also harbors <strong>the</strong> connotation <strong>of</strong> what is most “its own,” <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong>reby suggests a more precise <strong>and</strong> felicitous way to translate Wesen, that is, as“ownmost” ra<strong>the</strong>r than “essence.” Yet without follow<strong>in</strong>g this hermeneutic guidel<strong>in</strong>e,23For a discussion <strong>of</strong> this “transformed language as ‘say<strong>in</strong>g,’” see Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sContributions to Philosophy, pp. 30–31, 39–40, 57–59, 70, <strong>and</strong> for <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> future <strong>of</strong>philosophy see, p. 122.24DanielaVallega-Neu, The Bodily Dimension <strong>in</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2005),pp. 90–92. See also Vallega-Neu, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction(Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 2003), pp. 66–80. Also see Vallega-Neu, “Poietic Say<strong>in</strong>g,”<strong>in</strong> Companion to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, ed. Charles E. Scott, et al. (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton:Indiana University Press, 2001), p. 70.
26 F. Schalowas <strong>the</strong> evidence <strong>of</strong> recent literature shows, even deconstructionists who mostvehemently condemn “essentialism” can easily relapse <strong>in</strong>to a language <strong>of</strong> “essences,”<strong>and</strong> hypostatize Ereignis as a transhistorical reality beyond history. 25The fact that <strong>the</strong> dual errors <strong>of</strong> mistranslat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> mis<strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’swrit<strong>in</strong>gs are <strong>in</strong>tertw<strong>in</strong>ed, ra<strong>the</strong>r than disparate occurrences, <strong>in</strong>dicates <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> conversea fundamental hermeneutic pr<strong>in</strong>ciple: namely that translation is <strong>in</strong>tegral to <strong>the</strong> task<strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. If by th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g along with <strong>Heidegger</strong> we respond to <strong>and</strong> are duly transported<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> unconcealment <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> most humble way we becomeboth beneficiaries <strong>and</strong> guardians <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth. Yet, if <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>in</strong>deed an <strong>in</strong>timacybetween translation <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong>n it is by engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> concern“ownmost” to <strong>the</strong> former, that is, by safeguard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> word, that we also “belong”to truth as <strong>the</strong> disclosive power <strong>of</strong> language. Indeed, with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> doma<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> “enown<strong>in</strong>g,”this relation <strong>of</strong> “belong<strong>in</strong>g” first becomes possible. Such is <strong>the</strong> decree, declaration,<strong>and</strong> testimony <strong>of</strong> Ereignis as “enown<strong>in</strong>g.” By <strong>the</strong> same token, <strong>in</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g Ereignisas “enown<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>the</strong> guidance that arises is not arbitrary, but <strong>in</strong>stead prevails <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>manner <strong>of</strong> a “gift,” that is, from “enown<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> its truth as a claim that governs<strong>the</strong> translation. Because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gift<strong>in</strong>g that gently guides <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong> how totranslate <strong>the</strong> key words <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, responsible translation is also anact <strong>of</strong> humility. As Emad emphasizes, <strong>the</strong> translator must ultimately “abdicate <strong>the</strong>throne he occupies when he conceives <strong>of</strong> himself as <strong>the</strong> master <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> lord <strong>of</strong> language,”<strong>in</strong> order that <strong>the</strong> power (Kraft) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most elemental words can prevail. 26There are <strong>in</strong>stances, <strong>of</strong> course, when <strong>the</strong> resiliency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translator, <strong>in</strong> all his/herforbearance <strong>and</strong> humility, becomes severely tested: that is, at key junctures where<strong>the</strong> “thrownness” <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> ownmost language, that is, <strong>in</strong>to its Wesen is most emphatic<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> stakes <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> keywords <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy are at <strong>the</strong>irhighest. Perhaps, <strong>the</strong> noteworthy example stems from <strong>the</strong> decision to translate“Abgrund,” not as ei<strong>the</strong>r “abyss” or “abysmal ground,” as <strong>the</strong> all-too dubious “conventionalwisdom” might have it, but <strong>in</strong>stead through <strong>the</strong> s<strong>in</strong>gular, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby,thoughtful neologism, “ab-ground.” In contrast to <strong>the</strong> recently adopted alternative,abground, “abysmal ground” neglects <strong>the</strong> nuance <strong>of</strong> hesitation, refusal, <strong>and</strong> reservedness,which harbors <strong>the</strong> mystery <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> concealment <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. The term“abground” elicits <strong>the</strong> connotation <strong>of</strong> refusal that reverberates <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> hyphenation <strong>of</strong>Ab-grund, allow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> prefix “ab” to play out <strong>the</strong> nuance <strong>of</strong> “stay<strong>in</strong>g away.” 2725See Davis, <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Will: On <strong>the</strong> Way to Gelassenheit, pp. 212–213.26See Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 39. See GA 2, p. 262.27<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Bes<strong>in</strong>nung, GA 66 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997b), p. 361.M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Thomas Kalary (London: Cont<strong>in</strong>uum, 2006), p. 251. SeeEmad’s <strong>and</strong> Kalary’s “Translators’ Foreword,” pp. xix–xx. Also, see Emad’s <strong>and</strong> Maly’s “Translators’Foreword to Contributions to Philosophy,” pp. xxii–xxiii. As Kenneth Maly expla<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> preferencefor abground over abyss: “Abgrund says <strong>the</strong> stay<strong>in</strong>g-away <strong>of</strong> ground that is part <strong>and</strong> parcel <strong>of</strong>Grund. Thus, not an ‘abyss,’ which ‘opens up’ <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>to which one might ‘fall,’—thus not someth<strong>in</strong>gthat th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g might even consider to avoid—but ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> stay<strong>in</strong>g-away <strong>of</strong> ground that <strong>in</strong>heres <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> ground itself. Thus: not abyss, but ‘abground.’” Kenneth Maly, “Translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Works<strong>in</strong>to English: The History <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Possibility,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 16 (2000): 136–137.
Introduction27The English term “abground” is an example <strong>of</strong> a “neologism,” whose leap <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>novation breaks <strong>the</strong> shackles <strong>of</strong> conventional usage <strong>and</strong> answers to a more primordiallaw <strong>of</strong> freedom. Such a response to freedom must ultimately “go aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong>gra<strong>in</strong>” <strong>of</strong> what <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dictionary suggests as a suitable (English)cognate for <strong>the</strong> German term. Translat<strong>in</strong>g Abgrund <strong>in</strong> a way that heeds <strong>the</strong> relationto ground, ra<strong>the</strong>r than denies it altoge<strong>the</strong>r, averts <strong>the</strong> misunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> deconstructionistswho claim that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s later thought comes to fruition <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>“groundless” play <strong>of</strong> différence. In this regard, we must pay special attention to <strong>the</strong>translation <strong>of</strong> such words as Ereignis <strong>and</strong> Abgrund. By hyphenat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se words,<strong>Heidegger</strong> assigns <strong>in</strong>dependent status to <strong>the</strong> prefixes er <strong>and</strong> ab. 28 He <strong>the</strong>reby leadsus <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> space <strong>of</strong> freedom, which rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong>accessible through <strong>the</strong> simple use <strong>of</strong>a dictionary. In its dynamic unfold<strong>in</strong>g, this “free space” jo<strong>in</strong>s toge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> “gift” <strong>of</strong>language with <strong>the</strong> ownmost responsibility to it as <strong>in</strong>separable <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> open resolve(Ent-schlossenheit), which guides <strong>the</strong> translation. A responsible translation, <strong>the</strong>n,proceeds from a prior attunement to <strong>the</strong> “‘ga<strong>the</strong>red r<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> stillness’” (das Geläutder Stille) <strong>of</strong> language, 29 which <strong>the</strong>reby revisits <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own “<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual”translation as <strong>the</strong> prelude for render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> key words <strong>of</strong> his philosophy. There is,however, a critical counter focus we need to emphasize <strong>in</strong> order to unfold <strong>the</strong> hermeneuticelements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation. An important transformation occurs <strong>in</strong>light <strong>of</strong>: (1) <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g-historical words, (2) <strong>the</strong>ir enactment <strong>in</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong>(3) <strong>the</strong>ir render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to English, chang<strong>in</strong>g our underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>terpretation, <strong>and</strong>appropriation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy, <strong>and</strong> affect<strong>in</strong>g how we look at <strong>the</strong> hi<strong>the</strong>rtorender<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> his key terms <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> various English translations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gesamtausgabe.We witness ano<strong>the</strong>r rotation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic circle <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial fore-hav<strong>in</strong>gor pre-underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, which guide <strong>the</strong>se early translations, must be taken back <strong>in</strong>to<strong>the</strong> wider orbit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> illum<strong>in</strong>ation/project<strong>in</strong>g open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.But with this observation, we come to ano<strong>the</strong>r important crossroad; <strong>in</strong>deed, wecome even to an uncomfortable moment <strong>of</strong> self-evaluation <strong>and</strong> self-criticism. Foramong <strong>the</strong> early translations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gesamtausgabe, we must also <strong>in</strong>clude Emad’s(<strong>and</strong> Maly’s) render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s lectures from 1930/31, or volume 30, HegelsPhänomenologie des Geistes. 30 Indeed, absent <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong>Beiträge zur Philosophie, Emad (<strong>and</strong> his co-translator) skirted <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> howto translate <strong>the</strong> term Wesen throughout Hegel’s Phenomenology <strong>of</strong> Spirit (1988).28For a discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> keys to translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se terms, see Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sContributions to Philosophy, pp. 31–35, 38–40.29Regard<strong>in</strong>g this ‘r<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g,” see Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy,pp. 38–39. For a fur<strong>the</strong>r discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>timacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relation between language, be<strong>in</strong>g-historicalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> translation, see Ivo De Gennaro, “<strong>Heidegger</strong> on <strong>Translation</strong>–Translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>,”Phänomenologische Forschungen, 5 (2000): 3–22.30See <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes, GA 32 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann, 1980). For a brief discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> English translation <strong>of</strong> thiswork, see Frank Schalow, “Review <strong>of</strong> Hegel’s Phenomenology Spirit by Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, trans.Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly,” The Review <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics, 62/4 (June 1989): 837–838.
28 F. SchalowHere, <strong>the</strong> issue becomes, as mentioned above, whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> reverberation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g-historical words exacts new dist<strong>in</strong>ctions surround<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “Wesen,”which throws out <strong>of</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>t its isomorphism with <strong>the</strong> dictionary cognate (i.e., conventional,metaphysical term “essence”).In this context, <strong>the</strong> so-called “rightness” or “wrongness” becomes secondary to<strong>the</strong> search for an alternative render<strong>in</strong>g, which could resonate with <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical words, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby, based on <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> Wesen as “eigneste,” that is, “ownmost,” exact a“new decision” <strong>in</strong> regard to translat<strong>in</strong>g Wesen as “ownmost” ra<strong>the</strong>r than as“essence.” 31 By circumscrib<strong>in</strong>g “Wesen” <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> “ownmost,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>of</strong>fersone <strong>of</strong> his foremost examples <strong>of</strong> “<strong>in</strong>tra-l<strong>in</strong>gually” translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> key words <strong>of</strong> histhought. As soon as we acknowledge this alternative translation, we short circuitany attempt to correlate <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g with a substantialist metaphysics <strong>of</strong>“essences,” <strong>and</strong> with <strong>the</strong> stance <strong>of</strong> “essentialism” to which some <strong>of</strong> his critics, particularly<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> deconstructionist camp, mistakenly sought to reduce his philosophy.When viewed <strong>in</strong> retrospect, <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decision to translate Wesen as“ownmost,” ra<strong>the</strong>r than “essence,” becomes quite clear: an “essence” is what isshared by all <strong>the</strong> member <strong>of</strong> a given class—that is, as such, “essence” does not st<strong>and</strong>for what is “ownmost” to each member <strong>of</strong> a given class. 32 Conversely, we can readilysee how <strong>the</strong> mistranslation <strong>of</strong> Wesen as “essence” gives rise to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>appropriatecharacterization <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy as “essentialism,” <strong>and</strong> how easily thisblatant misunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g would have been avoidable. Because false criticisms <strong>and</strong>mis<strong>in</strong>terpretations can easily result due to <strong>the</strong>se errors, <strong>the</strong> care by which we translate<strong>the</strong> key words <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, far from be<strong>in</strong>g merely an academicexercise, proves to be <strong>in</strong>tegral to underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g his philosophy. Or, put <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> terms31See GA 9, p. 141.32Without <strong>the</strong> guidance <strong>of</strong> this hermeneutic precondition or strategic <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong>translation, Emad encountered an <strong>in</strong>itial obstacle <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> a centuries old, metaphysical presumptionthat <strong>the</strong>re is a simple identity hold<strong>in</strong>g between <strong>the</strong> key terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir English cognates, most noteworthy, <strong>the</strong> patently obvious <strong>and</strong> yet for that reason questionableprecedent <strong>of</strong> us<strong>in</strong>g “essence” as a dictionary equivalent for “Wesen.” Almost a decade laterwhen Emad co-translated volume 25 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gesamtausgabe, <strong>the</strong> Phenomenological Interpretation<strong>of</strong> Kant’s Critique <strong>of</strong> Pure Reason, (1997) he began to establish a more solid “foothold” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>hermeneutic situation <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s texts. See <strong>Heidegger</strong>, PhänomenologischeInterpretation von Kants Kritik der re<strong>in</strong>en Vernunft, GA 25 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann, 1977b). Phenomenological Interpretation <strong>of</strong> Kant’s Critique <strong>of</strong> Pure Reason, trans.Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1997). St<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong>threshold <strong>of</strong> uncover<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> hermeneutical basis <strong>of</strong> translation, Emad discovered clues, which hadhi<strong>the</strong>rto lay dormant <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s works, specifically, <strong>in</strong> Vom Wesen des Grundes, <strong>in</strong>which, as h<strong>in</strong>dsight shows, <strong>Heidegger</strong> was already enact<strong>in</strong>g an “<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual” translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>word “Wesen” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby suggest<strong>in</strong>g how to translate it <strong>in</strong>to English. In a key passage <strong>in</strong> thiswork, <strong>Heidegger</strong> observes that “To attribute be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world to Dase<strong>in</strong> as its basic constitutionmeans to state someth<strong>in</strong>g about its Wesen, i.e., its ownmost <strong>in</strong>ner possibility (se<strong>in</strong>e eigenste <strong>in</strong>nereMöglichkeit).” See <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Vom Wesen des Grundes,” <strong>in</strong> Wegmarken, GA 9 (Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976a, b, c), p. 141.
Introduction29<strong>in</strong> which Emad came to crystallize his pioneer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sight (despite <strong>the</strong> limitations <strong>of</strong>his <strong>in</strong>itial hermeneutic foothold <strong>in</strong> his translation <strong>of</strong> Hegel’s Phenomenology <strong>of</strong>Spirit), <strong>the</strong>re is a hermeneutic synergy between “<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation,” “<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation,” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>terpretation” <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs. 33The implications that follow from unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> hermeneutical situation <strong>of</strong> translationare obvious, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> prelim<strong>in</strong>ary guidel<strong>in</strong>e for translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> key words<strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy. But <strong>the</strong> conflict that bears fruit is first <strong>and</strong> foremost <strong>the</strong>self-criticism, which Emad brought to this mission from his previous venture <strong>in</strong>totranslation <strong>and</strong> lengthy journey it embodies. As such, Emad’s unique path illustrateshow his translations comprise a body <strong>of</strong> work <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own right; <strong>and</strong> how this workarises from a specific “hermeneutical situation,” or set <strong>of</strong> presuppositions, <strong>in</strong> which<strong>the</strong> translator resides <strong>and</strong> first undertakes his task. Given this hermeneutical situation,<strong>the</strong> keys to translat<strong>in</strong>g would not come easily or overnight. Instead, <strong>the</strong>y wouldemerge as <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “backward–forward” dynamic <strong>of</strong> Emad’s lifelongencounter with <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought or, put ano<strong>the</strong>r way, on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sametemporality that projects open our human capacity to underst<strong>and</strong>. In this regard, <strong>the</strong>first translation <strong>of</strong> his several translations <strong>of</strong> volumes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gesamtausgabe, <strong>the</strong>1930/31 lecture-course text, Hegel’s Phenomenology <strong>of</strong> Spirit, illustrates how Emadwas still on <strong>the</strong> way to a crucial <strong>in</strong>sight, namely, that <strong>the</strong> key idioms <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’swrit<strong>in</strong>gs were already “translations” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own right. From this brief assessment<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “hermeneutic situation” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translator, we should not conclude anyth<strong>in</strong>gspecifically about <strong>the</strong> problems <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> any attempt at translat<strong>in</strong>g a text, but, on<strong>the</strong> contrary, acknowledge <strong>the</strong> unique parallel between translation <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g:namely, that errancy is <strong>the</strong> repository <strong>of</strong> future lessons, just as be<strong>in</strong>g’s withdrawalthrusts thought <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> light<strong>in</strong>g concealment (lichtende Verbergung). 34By <strong>the</strong> same token, whoever ventures to translate <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs mustfollow his example, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as that guidance serves as <strong>the</strong> “go-between,” <strong>the</strong>“Hermes” to which all translation, by virtue <strong>of</strong> its hermeneutical situation, is“owned.” Emad’s early venture <strong>in</strong>to translation (a year before <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong>Beiträge zur Philosophie) proves to be <strong>in</strong>structive, not only because it provides acounter focus <strong>of</strong> criticism for our study, but also because it illustrates how we mustbe alert to <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic pre-underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, which guides translation (i.e., whe<strong>the</strong>rit is <strong>in</strong> some way limited by our metaphysical pre-conceptions). In this regard, <strong>the</strong>primary lesson to be learned is that no translator can st<strong>and</strong> outside <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hermeneuticalcircle. In summation, through <strong>the</strong> guidance <strong>of</strong> Hermes, <strong>of</strong> this “emissary,”<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual act <strong>of</strong> translation transmits what is ownmost, <strong>in</strong> order to allow its“<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual” counterpart to unfold (e.g., as <strong>the</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s German<strong>in</strong>to English). Only because <strong>the</strong> transmission <strong>of</strong> what is “ownmost” already shapes<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation can its adherence to <strong>the</strong> word direct us <strong>in</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> keyterms <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy <strong>and</strong>, by unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir deepest roots, also clear <strong>the</strong>way to address <strong>the</strong> methodology <strong>of</strong> translation.33Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 31.34GA 66, p. 259; tr. 229.
30 F. Schalow5 Errancy, Technicity, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Turn<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s enactment <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g underscores <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> key terms or “ground<strong>in</strong>g words” (Grundworte) that shape his attempt to re-ask<strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> retrieve its implications throughout <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> philosophy.Indeed, we cannot underestimate <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nuances <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> words thatsusta<strong>in</strong> this question, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong>y can easily be distorted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> suchpivotal notions as “Se<strong>in</strong>svergessenheit” (forgottenness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g). For <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>the</strong>emphasis on <strong>the</strong> “forgottenness” must be understood <strong>in</strong> its tension with <strong>the</strong> reciprocalpossibility <strong>of</strong> “recollection” (Er<strong>in</strong>nerung) <strong>and</strong> vice versa. In direct<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> entirecourse <strong>of</strong> Western metaphysics, “enown<strong>in</strong>g” as “gift<strong>in</strong>g-refusal” equally preservesbe<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its mystery through <strong>the</strong> shelter <strong>of</strong> its concealment, <strong>the</strong>reby hold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>promise <strong>of</strong> its “recollection” <strong>in</strong> its very “forgottenness.” As a result, <strong>the</strong> so-called“errancy” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> metaphysics is not just an “accident,” but <strong>in</strong>stead displaysa necessity because “enown<strong>in</strong>g” shapes <strong>the</strong> tension <strong>of</strong> both possibilities simultaneously.In <strong>the</strong> sixth jo<strong>in</strong>ture <strong>of</strong> Contributions to Philosophy, <strong>Heidegger</strong> appeals to <strong>the</strong>“last god” (der letzte Gott) to dist<strong>in</strong>guish <strong>the</strong> tension <strong>of</strong> gift<strong>in</strong>g-refusal, which transforms<strong>the</strong> concealment <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to a mystery, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> counter sway <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>flight <strong>and</strong> return <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gods. 35 The history <strong>of</strong> metaphysics, as <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>“forgottenness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g,” is <strong>the</strong>reby not <strong>in</strong> va<strong>in</strong>, s<strong>in</strong>ce it safeguards <strong>the</strong> “mystery”(Geheimnis) for its arrival <strong>in</strong> future possibilities <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. 36Specifically, <strong>in</strong> re-exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> “Vergessenheit,” we discover <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>adequacies <strong>in</strong> such earlier render<strong>in</strong>gs as “forgett<strong>in</strong>g” (because <strong>of</strong> its accidental, aswell as “subjectivistic” overtones), <strong>and</strong> “oblivion” as well. The render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>Vergessenheit as “oblivion,” which became accepted decades ago with JoanStambaugh’s translation <strong>of</strong> Identity <strong>and</strong> Difference, 37 harbors <strong>the</strong> confusion <strong>of</strong> bothmiss<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German root <strong>and</strong> creat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> false image <strong>of</strong>“decl<strong>in</strong>e,” “deterioration,” “demise,” <strong>and</strong> “dissolution” that Oswald Spengler popularized<strong>in</strong> his book (whose simplistic account <strong>of</strong> Western history <strong>Heidegger</strong> alsoseverely criticized). 38 In contrast to translat<strong>in</strong>g Vergessenheit as “forgottenness,” <strong>the</strong>35GA 65, pp. 415–417; tr. 286–293 For a discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> forgottenness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> difference betweenbe<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, see <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Der Spruch des Anaxim<strong>and</strong>er,” Holzwege, GA 5 (Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977a ), p. 322.36GA 65, pp. 411–412; tr. 289.37See <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Idenität und Differenz, GA 11 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006),p. 59 (die Vergessenheit der Differenz). Compare <strong>the</strong> German text with <strong>the</strong> English version (whichis not based on <strong>the</strong> Gesamtausgabe edition), Identity <strong>and</strong> Difference, trans. J. Stambaugh, p. 50(“<strong>the</strong> oblivion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> difference”).38See <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristotles: E<strong>in</strong>führung <strong>in</strong> die phänomenologischeForschung, GA 61 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985b), p. 26.Phenomenological Interpretations <strong>of</strong> Aristotle, trans. R. Rojcewicz (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: IndianaUniversity Press, 2001), p. 21. Also, see <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, GA 29/30(Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983b), pp. 111–112. The Fundamental Concepts <strong>of</strong>Metaphysics, trans. William McNeill <strong>and</strong> Nicholas Walker (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana UniversityPress, 1995), p. 75.
Introduction31latter (Stambaugh) translation blurs <strong>the</strong> counterpossibility <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g’s historicalrecollection, <strong>and</strong> hence how “enown<strong>in</strong>g” pervades refusal (whose dynamic rema<strong>in</strong>slost <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> English word “oblivion”). The follow<strong>in</strong>g passage from M<strong>in</strong>dfulnessreveals <strong>the</strong>se nuances that are <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical word “Vergessenheit,”by specifically emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g that “forgottenness” is always prefaced by <strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>the</strong>reby preserv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g’s recollection: “The forgottenness<strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>the</strong> forgottenness that is held unto <strong>the</strong> ab-ground (that is, it is<strong>the</strong> forgottenness that is turned towards be-<strong>in</strong>g).” 39We now see how Er-eignis, both through <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s “<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual” translation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German prefix “er” <strong>in</strong>to “eignis” <strong>and</strong> its “<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual” render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Englishas “en-own<strong>in</strong>g,” harbors <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> Se<strong>in</strong>svergessenheit, not just as a negative,but as belong<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> dynamic <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g’s giv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> refusal. While alreadyimplied <strong>in</strong> our discussion thus far, it is important to note <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> oldGerman word “Seyn” <strong>in</strong> both Contributions to Philosophy <strong>and</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness. To differentiatethis word from “Se<strong>in</strong>,” as <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong>tends for it to speak directly from<strong>the</strong> doma<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> “enown<strong>in</strong>g,” Emad employs <strong>the</strong> hyphenated form <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word “be-<strong>in</strong>g”to translate <strong>the</strong> old German term “Seyn.” This hyphenation, however, is not merelya l<strong>in</strong>guistic marker, but <strong>in</strong>stead evokes <strong>the</strong> transformation <strong>in</strong> our underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>the</strong> dynamic <strong>of</strong> giv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> refusal. To quote from <strong>the</strong> “Translators’Foreword” to M<strong>in</strong>dfulness:The s<strong>in</strong>gularity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> syntax <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g follows from <strong>the</strong> fact that thisth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is not a th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g about be<strong>in</strong>g but is one that is enowned by be<strong>in</strong>g. And <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar asthis th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g itself is enowned by be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> syntax <strong>of</strong> this th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g musttake its bear<strong>in</strong>gs from this enownment. 40By tak<strong>in</strong>g its “bear<strong>in</strong>gs” <strong>in</strong> this way, be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g undertakes <strong>the</strong>task <strong>of</strong> “th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g enown<strong>in</strong>g” (Ereignisdenken), <strong>in</strong> such a way that it first becomespossible to <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>the</strong> counter sway <strong>of</strong> errancy as <strong>the</strong> un-truth <strong>of</strong> concealment thatis “en-owned” by be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby “belongs” to truth as unconcealment. As<strong>Heidegger</strong> states <strong>in</strong> a crucial passage from M<strong>in</strong>dfulness:This errancy (Irre) itself is <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g (openness-truth) <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g. Errancy does not setitself up aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> truth, <strong>and</strong> is also not removed by truth <strong>and</strong> made to disappear. Ra<strong>the</strong>r,errancy is <strong>the</strong> appear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth itself <strong>in</strong> its own sway. Errancy is that with<strong>in</strong> which aparticular <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g must err, which err<strong>in</strong>g alone traverses <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>refusal—traverses <strong>in</strong> accord with <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> what is lighted up. 41Only because, as Er-eignis, <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g also harbors <strong>the</strong> possibility<strong>of</strong> its opposite, can <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> metaphysics unfold as <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> anuntruth, which culm<strong>in</strong>ates <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> epoch <strong>of</strong> modern technicity. This untruth is notmerely “noth<strong>in</strong>g,” but <strong>in</strong>stead provides <strong>the</strong> occasion to illum<strong>in</strong>ate, through <strong>the</strong>onslaught <strong>of</strong> “mach<strong>in</strong>ation,” <strong>the</strong> historical culm<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> philosophical39GA 66, p. 217; tr. 191.40See “Translators’ Foreword” to M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, p. xxxix.41GA 66, p. 259; tr. 229.
32 F. Schalowtradition’s neglect <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as this neglect, that is, as “forgottenness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g”or “Se<strong>in</strong>svergessenheit.”Although a few th<strong>in</strong>kers with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> twentieth century (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Ernst Jünger<strong>and</strong> John Dewey) recognized <strong>the</strong> dawn <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> technological age, only <strong>Heidegger</strong>addressed “mach<strong>in</strong>ation” as <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> which technology appears. Byformulat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> technicity as <strong>in</strong>tegral to <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> asharbor<strong>in</strong>g a danger, which can only be confronted with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> wider expanse <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g, he st<strong>and</strong>s apart among all his contemporaries. Because technicityarises from <strong>the</strong> Western tradition’s tendency to subord<strong>in</strong>ate be<strong>in</strong>g to be<strong>in</strong>gs, anhistorical confrontation with its metaphysical roots address <strong>the</strong> “forgottenness <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g” as <strong>the</strong> source <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> imm<strong>in</strong>ent danger pervad<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al phase <strong>of</strong> metaphysicsby rais<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> question concern<strong>in</strong>g technicity. 42 By <strong>the</strong> same token,be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g addresses <strong>the</strong> double-edged character <strong>of</strong> technicity asembody<strong>in</strong>g both <strong>the</strong> culm<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> modernity <strong>and</strong> as harbor<strong>in</strong>g an alternativepossibility for be<strong>in</strong>g to manifest itself <strong>in</strong> a way that exposes technicity as <strong>the</strong>global danger it is. The forgottenness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> its corollary “ab<strong>and</strong>onment <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g” (Se<strong>in</strong>sverlassenheit), lead<strong>in</strong>g to be<strong>in</strong>gs’ exclusively “<strong>in</strong>strumental” uses<strong>in</strong> technicity, however, is nei<strong>the</strong>r an “accident” nor a philosophical lapse <strong>of</strong> forgett<strong>in</strong>g.Instead, this forgottenness occurs as a dest<strong>in</strong>y, which shapes <strong>the</strong> entirecourse <strong>of</strong> Western history s<strong>in</strong>ce its <strong>in</strong>ception as belong<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> gift<strong>in</strong>g-refusal<strong>of</strong> Ereignis. Enown<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>reby reveals <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal necessity between <strong>the</strong> forgottenness<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> metaphysics. For each st<strong>and</strong>s <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sicrelation to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’s essential correlate: forgottenness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g leads to <strong>the</strong>ab<strong>and</strong>onment <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs (to <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>strumental uses) <strong>and</strong> metaphysics as <strong>the</strong>“errancy” leads to <strong>the</strong> rise <strong>of</strong> modern technicity. 43 By mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se crucial connections,we discover (1) that “Se<strong>in</strong>svergessenheit” has to be translated <strong>in</strong> a waythat recognizes its necessary l<strong>in</strong>k to “Se<strong>in</strong>sverlassenheit,” 44 that is, as “forgottenness”ra<strong>the</strong>r than as ei<strong>the</strong>r “oblivion” or “forgett<strong>in</strong>g”; <strong>and</strong> (2) that Ereignis, thatis, “enown<strong>in</strong>g,” as <strong>the</strong> giv<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> refusal, shapes <strong>the</strong> dest<strong>in</strong>y <strong>of</strong> Westernmetaphysics <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g its culm<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> modern epoch <strong>of</strong> technicity.As it becomes more <strong>and</strong> more evident as we proceed, <strong>the</strong> careful <strong>in</strong>terpretation<strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought can h<strong>in</strong>ge, not only on render<strong>in</strong>g a s<strong>in</strong>gle word (e.g., “Ereignis”)but also on <strong>the</strong> proper translation <strong>of</strong> such simple phrases as “das Seiende im Ganzen,”which is frequently mistranslated as “be<strong>in</strong>gs as a whole.” This simple phrase shouldbe translated as “be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> a whole” where <strong>the</strong> seem<strong>in</strong>gly <strong>in</strong>nocuous preposition42See <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Die Frage nach der Technik,” <strong>in</strong> Vorträge und Aufsätze, GA 7 (Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000), pp. 7–36.43See GA 66, p. 369; tr. 327.44For <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> this l<strong>in</strong>k, see <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Se<strong>in</strong>svergessenheit,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 20(2004): 9–14. Also, see GA 65, pp. 113–114; tr. 79.
Introduction33“im” holds <strong>the</strong> key to this translation. 45 The phrase, “be<strong>in</strong>g as a whole,” suggests anaggregate or collection <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs whose unity might be given through some k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>tuition about what all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m may have <strong>in</strong> common. One such example might bean <strong>in</strong>tuition <strong>of</strong> a sphere called “nature.” As such, nature could be conceived ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>45In translat<strong>in</strong>g Vergessenheit as “forgottenness,” ra<strong>the</strong>r than as “forgett<strong>in</strong>g,” or “oblivion,” wediscover an important example <strong>of</strong> how we can avert many crucial misunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sthought by practic<strong>in</strong>g hermeneutically responsible translation. Yet <strong>the</strong>re are even more subtle<strong>in</strong>stances <strong>of</strong> errant translations that have prompted significant misunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sthought. Foremost among <strong>the</strong>se is <strong>the</strong> errant decision to translate “das Seiende im Ganzen” sometimesas “be<strong>in</strong>gs as a whole,” <strong>and</strong> sometimes as “be<strong>in</strong>g as a whole,” while this technical phraseshould have been translated as “be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> a whole.” The history <strong>of</strong> this error beg<strong>in</strong>s as early as <strong>the</strong>Krell/Capuzzi translation <strong>of</strong> Early Greek <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1975a),reappear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Krell’s translation <strong>of</strong> What Is Metaphysics? <strong>in</strong> Basic Writ<strong>in</strong>gs (New York: Harper &Row, Publishers, 1977), only to be preserved <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> slightly modified version <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> English edition<strong>of</strong> Pathmarks. See <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1998). Here is an example <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial error, which occurs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Krell/Capuzzi translation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> essay “Moira,” <strong>in</strong> Early Greek <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>: “One could certa<strong>in</strong>ly be justified <strong>in</strong> wonder<strong>in</strong>gfur<strong>the</strong>r why Parmenides proceeds to give a special pro<strong>of</strong> for this <strong>in</strong>clusion, particularly through <strong>the</strong>commonplace notion that aside from be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> totality, <strong>the</strong>re can be no o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs”(p. 80). We see this same error reemerge <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1977 translation <strong>of</strong> “What Is Metaphysics?”: “In <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>quiry concern<strong>in</strong>g noth<strong>in</strong>g such an <strong>in</strong>quiry beyond or over be<strong>in</strong>gs, as be<strong>in</strong>g as a whole, takesplace.” See, <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “What Is Metaphysics?”, <strong>in</strong> Basic Writ<strong>in</strong>gs, p. 109. As <strong>the</strong> designation <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> boldface <strong>in</strong> both <strong>in</strong>stances suggests, <strong>of</strong> special note is <strong>the</strong> way <strong>in</strong> which Krell renders “dasSeiende im Ganzen” as “be<strong>in</strong>g” not “be<strong>in</strong>gs” as a whole.” First, we discover that by us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>s<strong>in</strong>gular ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> plural form “be<strong>in</strong>gs,” both translations fail to contrast das Seiende with dasSe<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong>reby obscur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ontological difference. In <strong>the</strong> process, <strong>the</strong>se translations ignore <strong>the</strong>uniqueness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g’s unconcealment, as a “s<strong>in</strong>gularity” to which no be<strong>in</strong>gs, even <strong>the</strong> “all-highest”or God, can compare. Secondly, we f<strong>in</strong>d that <strong>the</strong> two translations vacillate between us<strong>in</strong>g “totality”<strong>and</strong> “whole,” <strong>the</strong>reby disregard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> phenomenological fact that <strong>the</strong>y are not <strong>the</strong> same. Thirdly,we see that <strong>the</strong> mistaken substitution <strong>of</strong> “as” for “<strong>in</strong>,” despite <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s word is “im”<strong>and</strong> not “als,” ignores that what is at stake <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> phrase “das Seiende im Ganzen” is his concernfor <strong>the</strong> situatedness <strong>of</strong> a be<strong>in</strong>g—any be<strong>in</strong>g—<strong>in</strong> a whole.Yet , when two decades later, <strong>the</strong> slightly modified version <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> “What IsMetaphysics?” is <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> edition <strong>of</strong> Pathmarks, <strong>the</strong> identical error reappears <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>same l<strong>in</strong>e. Let me quote <strong>the</strong> relevant passage from <strong>the</strong> 1998 English translation <strong>of</strong> “Was istMetaphysik?”: “In <strong>the</strong> question concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> noth<strong>in</strong>g such an <strong>in</strong>quiry beyond or over be<strong>in</strong>gs,be<strong>in</strong>g as a whole, takes place.” For examples, see <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Was ist Metaphysik?”, Wegmarken,GA 9 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976b), pp. 118–119. As different examples <strong>of</strong>how this l<strong>in</strong>e is translated, see “What Is Metaphysics?”, trans. D. F. Krell <strong>in</strong> Pathmarks, p. 93. In<strong>the</strong> “Notes” to Pathmarks, <strong>the</strong> editor po<strong>in</strong>ts out that <strong>the</strong> “present edition is edited <strong>and</strong> revised byDavid Farrell Krell <strong>and</strong> William McNeill” (p. 366). This translation was based on <strong>the</strong> version thatappeared <strong>in</strong> Basic Writ<strong>in</strong>gs, p. 109. Although here “das Seiende” is properly translated as “be<strong>in</strong>gs”(ra<strong>the</strong>r than as “be<strong>in</strong>g”), <strong>the</strong> mistake <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g “im” as “as,” ra<strong>the</strong>r than as “<strong>in</strong>,” has not beencorrected. The history <strong>of</strong> this error, however, does not end with <strong>the</strong> 1998 edition <strong>of</strong> Pathmarks. On<strong>the</strong> contrary, translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 2003 one <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s most crucial essays, “The Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Work<strong>of</strong> Art, ”Julian Young <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Haynes perpetuate <strong>the</strong> same error made decades ago by Krell<strong>and</strong> Capuzzi when Young <strong>and</strong> Haynes use “be<strong>in</strong>gs as a whole,” <strong>in</strong>stead <strong>of</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> a whole.” Totake a simple example, allow me to quote <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g passage from “The Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Work <strong>of</strong>Art”: “Now it is <strong>in</strong>deed possible that <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> creation which is grounded <strong>in</strong> faith can lose its
34 F. Schalowmodern terms as an aggregate <strong>of</strong> material objects, which are organized by <strong>the</strong> law<strong>of</strong> physics, or <strong>in</strong> ancient terms as <strong>the</strong> “natural” cycle <strong>of</strong> com<strong>in</strong>g to be <strong>and</strong> pass<strong>in</strong>gaway as an expression <strong>of</strong> fύoiV. Yet even while <strong>the</strong> retrieval <strong>of</strong> this ancient perspectivemight appear to be <strong>the</strong> more desirable alternative, mis<strong>in</strong>terpretations can stillarise when <strong>the</strong> dynamic emergence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong>mselves are privileged ahead<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir manner <strong>of</strong> becom<strong>in</strong>g present with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “clear<strong>in</strong>g whole” as such. As acase <strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t, <strong>the</strong> contemporary version <strong>of</strong> “naturalism” is no different from pragmatism<strong>in</strong> its metaphysical presumptions, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as it succumbs to <strong>the</strong> illusion <strong>of</strong>“posit<strong>in</strong>g” “be<strong>in</strong>gs as a whole” as self-conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent. This posit<strong>in</strong>gdetaches be<strong>in</strong>gs from <strong>the</strong> historical “clear<strong>in</strong>g whole” <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>y emerge, <strong>and</strong>ignores <strong>the</strong> gift<strong>in</strong>g-refusal that yields different possibilities for <strong>the</strong>ir appearance <strong>in</strong>dist<strong>in</strong>ctive epochs.By contrast, it is precisely by emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g how be<strong>in</strong>gs reside <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> whole, <strong>and</strong>hence depend upon be-<strong>in</strong>g’s gift<strong>in</strong>g-refusal, that we can also recognize how <strong>the</strong>irmanifestation occurs, not just accidentally or “willy-nilly,” but by belong<strong>in</strong>g to adest<strong>in</strong>y. Indeed, it is only by virtue <strong>of</strong> this belong<strong>in</strong>gness that be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> wholeemerge through a shelter<strong>in</strong>g unconcealment, which ab<strong>and</strong>ons <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong> exclusively<strong>in</strong>strumental uses <strong>of</strong> mach<strong>in</strong>ation. Indeed, if it were not <strong>the</strong> case that <strong>the</strong>whole pervades <strong>the</strong> ab<strong>and</strong>on<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> ab<strong>and</strong>on<strong>in</strong>g pervades <strong>the</strong> whole, <strong>the</strong>recould never be a dist<strong>in</strong>ctive k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> uncover<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> technicity’s “Gestell,” suchthat it could emerge as a global danger to both humanity <strong>and</strong> nature simultaneously.For what <strong>the</strong> “im” both “<strong>in</strong>tra-l<strong>in</strong>gually,” <strong>and</strong> “<strong>in</strong>ter-l<strong>in</strong>gually” as “be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> whole” translates, is <strong>the</strong> significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> double-genitive, that is, it is always<strong>the</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g.” 46 Without <strong>the</strong> guidance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se“<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual” <strong>and</strong> “<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual” translations, however, multiple errors have arisen(e.g., as noted above, <strong>the</strong> naturalist mis<strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> his pragmatistpower to guide our knowledge <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as a whole.” See <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Der Ursprung desKunstwerkes,” <strong>in</strong> GA 5, p. 15. “The Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Work <strong>of</strong> Art,” <strong>in</strong> Off <strong>the</strong> Beaten Track, trans.Julian Young <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 11. Byrender<strong>in</strong>g “im” from <strong>the</strong> phrase, “das Seiende im Ganzen” as “as,” thus confus<strong>in</strong>g “im” with “als”ra<strong>the</strong>r than translat<strong>in</strong>g “im” as “<strong>in</strong>,” Young <strong>and</strong> Haynes lose sight <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s attempt to br<strong>in</strong>gDase<strong>in</strong>’s situatedness <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> forefront <strong>of</strong> question<strong>in</strong>g. The loss <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> creation does notlead to <strong>the</strong> loss <strong>of</strong> our knowledge <strong>of</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>gs as a whole,” but to <strong>the</strong> loss <strong>of</strong> our knowledge <strong>of</strong>“be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> a whole.”46As Emad po<strong>in</strong>ts out, whe<strong>the</strong>r it be a “pair <strong>of</strong> shoes or Nietzsche’s new god,” a tool or a person, atstake <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s emphasis on <strong>the</strong> situatedness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs is <strong>the</strong> fact that any be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> possibility<strong>of</strong> our knowledge <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>, always occurs “<strong>in</strong>” a whole. See Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sContributions to Philosophy, p. 168. For his criticism <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> “das Seiende im Ganzen”as “be<strong>in</strong>g as a whole” see Emad, op cit, p. 188, <strong>and</strong> note number 93 on pp. 218–219. In <strong>the</strong>ir“Translators’ Foreword” to M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, Emad <strong>and</strong> Kalary address <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> avoid<strong>in</strong>g thismistranslation, by rais<strong>in</strong>g an important question: “Is it perhaps <strong>the</strong> epistemology <strong>of</strong> analytic philosophythat h<strong>in</strong>ders o<strong>the</strong>r translators <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> from “see<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>the</strong> situatednesss <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gswith<strong>in</strong> a whole <strong>and</strong> bl<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>sight that <strong>the</strong>re are no be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> isolation from a whole?How else is one to underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> assess <strong>the</strong> mistranslation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “im”—how else is one to grasp<strong>the</strong> fact that “be<strong>in</strong>gs as a whole” translates “das Seiende als Ganzes” <strong>and</strong> not <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s “DasSeiende im Ganzen”—o<strong>the</strong>r than look <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> that epistemology?” See Emad’s <strong>and</strong>Kalary’s “Translators’ Foreword” to M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, p. xxxiv.
Introduction35misconstrual to name just a few), which have distorted <strong>the</strong> true message <strong>of</strong>hermeneutic phenomenology as a return to <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g.By appreciat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> key words <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy on <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong>avoid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> errors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir mistranslation on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, we ga<strong>in</strong> a hermeneutic footholdon <strong>the</strong> attempt to <strong>in</strong>terpret <strong>the</strong> vast writ<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> his Gesamtausgabe. The basis<strong>of</strong> this hermeneutic foothold becomes never more important than when we revisit<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s allusion to <strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>and</strong> clarify its mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> undo<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> many confusions surround<strong>in</strong>g it. As we will discover, <strong>the</strong> web <strong>of</strong> confusioncan be traced back to a mistranslation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term <strong>in</strong> question, “Kehre,” which subsequentlyhas sparked so many contentious debates as to conceal <strong>the</strong> source <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>itial misunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g. Although today it appears straightforward to translate “dieKehre” as “turn<strong>in</strong>g,” such was not <strong>the</strong> case when <strong>the</strong> seeds <strong>of</strong> this controversyerupted almost half a century ago.As early as 1962, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> response to a query from William J. Richardson, S. J.whe<strong>the</strong>r “die Kehre” or “<strong>the</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g” should be understood <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> as a change<strong>of</strong> course <strong>and</strong> direction from his early to his later thought, <strong>Heidegger</strong> had rejectedany characterization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong> this sense. 47 Without hav<strong>in</strong>g access toContributions to Philosophy <strong>in</strong> 1962, William J. Richardson formulated a splitbetween <strong>the</strong> so-called “<strong>Heidegger</strong> I” <strong>and</strong> a “<strong>Heidegger</strong> II.” 48 As <strong>the</strong> title <strong>of</strong>Richardson’s book illustrates, <strong>Heidegger</strong> abruptly changed <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> his philosophy,by leav<strong>in</strong>g beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong> phenomenological exposition <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> order t<strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>d a more orig<strong>in</strong>al path for th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. As a result <strong>of</strong> this misunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>“turn<strong>in</strong>g,” a debate has raged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> secondary literature for four decades as towhe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Heidegger</strong> ab<strong>and</strong>oned his earlier phenomenological exposition <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>favor <strong>of</strong> a poetic, meditative style <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g centered exclusively on “be<strong>in</strong>g.”Without pay<strong>in</strong>g any attention to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s explicit warn<strong>in</strong>g that “‘<strong>the</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g …is above all not a procedure adopted by <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g [that] questions (be<strong>in</strong>g)…,’”Richardson conceives <strong>of</strong>, <strong>and</strong> translates <strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g” (die Kehre) as a “reversal,”that is, a change <strong>of</strong> course <strong>and</strong> direction, lead<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong> supposedly to privilege<strong>the</strong> so-called “later” attempt to th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g over <strong>the</strong> “earlier” phenomenologicalanalysis <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>. 49 In respond<strong>in</strong>g to Richardson, <strong>Heidegger</strong> citeshis discussion from <strong>the</strong> “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” <strong>in</strong> which he addresses <strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g47See <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “E<strong>in</strong> Vorwort: Brief an Pater William J. Richardson,” <strong>in</strong> Identität und Differenz,GA 11 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006), pp. 141–152 <strong>and</strong> “Foreword” to WilliamJ. Richardson, S. J., <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Through Phenomenology to Thought, 4th ed. (Bronx: FordhamUniversity Press, 2003), pp. viii–xiii.48In <strong>the</strong> “Preface to <strong>the</strong> U.S. Edition” <strong>of</strong> his book, which conta<strong>in</strong>s both William J. Richardson’sletter to <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> his reply to Fr. Richardson, Richardson concedes that <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong>Beiträge zur Philosophie requires “nuan[c<strong>in</strong>g] <strong>the</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Kehre” as <strong>the</strong> divisionbetween “<strong>Heidegger</strong> I” <strong>and</strong> “<strong>Heidegger</strong> II.” See William J. Richardson, S. J., “Preface to <strong>the</strong> U.S.Edition” <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Through Phenomenology to Thought, 4th ed., p. xxxvi.49This mis<strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> die Kehre as a “reversal” <strong>and</strong> not as <strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g,” occurs most overtly<strong>in</strong> Kockelmans’s characterization <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought as hav<strong>in</strong>g two phases, one “Dase<strong>in</strong>oriented,”<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r “be<strong>in</strong>g-oriented.” See Joseph J. Kockelmans, <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Art <strong>and</strong> ArtWork (The Hague: Mart<strong>in</strong>us Nijh<strong>of</strong>f, 1985), p. 76. For a critical account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> secondary literatureabout <strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g,” see Emad, op cit, note #41, p. 214.
36 F. Schalowaround” (umkehren) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question from “be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time” to “time <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong>reference to <strong>the</strong> unpublished third division <strong>of</strong> his magnum opus. 50 In translat<strong>in</strong>g“umkehren ” as “reversal,” however, Richardson overlooks <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “sichkehren” as “turn<strong>in</strong>g around,” <strong>the</strong>reby spawn<strong>in</strong>g his confusion about “<strong>Heidegger</strong> I”<strong>and</strong> “<strong>Heidegger</strong> II.” As a result, his mistranslation <strong>of</strong> “Kehre” as “reversal” opens<strong>the</strong> path to <strong>the</strong> reductionism that has distorted <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought<strong>in</strong>stead <strong>of</strong> lett<strong>in</strong>g this ownmost show itself as it is. Specifically, this reductionismforecloses <strong>the</strong> avenue <strong>of</strong> “returnership” (Rückkehrerschaft) to be<strong>in</strong>g’s unconceal<strong>in</strong>gshelter<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> a tw<strong>of</strong>old way: first, by impos<strong>in</strong>g an extraneous model which bifurcateshis task <strong>in</strong>to “<strong>Heidegger</strong> I” <strong>and</strong> “<strong>Heidegger</strong> II,” <strong>and</strong>, secondly, by overlook<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> foremost hermeneutic premise, namely, that any attempt to translate <strong>the</strong> keywords<strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy must proceed from a prior directive to th<strong>in</strong>k <strong>the</strong>reciprocity between Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> “enown<strong>in</strong>g.”Once this <strong>in</strong>itial level <strong>of</strong> confusion has been undone, <strong>and</strong> “die Kehre” has beenproperly translated as “turn<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>the</strong> way is <strong>the</strong>n cleared for undo<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> subsequentmisunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g that is evident <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> division between “<strong>Heidegger</strong> I” <strong>and</strong>“<strong>Heidegger</strong> II.” In his “Letter” to Richardson, <strong>Heidegger</strong> cites his lecture-coursetext from <strong>the</strong> w<strong>in</strong>ter semester <strong>of</strong> 1936/37 <strong>in</strong> which he talks about <strong>the</strong> transformation<strong>of</strong> man, <strong>in</strong> order to illustrate that <strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g” does not <strong>in</strong>volve a “reversal” <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> hermeneutics <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time <strong>in</strong> favor <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g. He says:This transformation is not <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> new psychological or biological <strong>in</strong>sights.....On <strong>the</strong>contrary, man here is <strong>in</strong> question <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> most pr<strong>of</strong>ound <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> most extensive respect…i.e.,we are question<strong>in</strong>g man <strong>in</strong> his relation to be<strong>in</strong>g, or, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g, we are question<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> its truth <strong>in</strong> relation to man. The determ<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> essential sway <strong>of</strong> truth is accompaniedby a necessary transformation <strong>of</strong> man. Both are <strong>the</strong> same.The dislocation <strong>of</strong> humanity – to be this ground – turns man away from himself <strong>the</strong>fur<strong>the</strong>st <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>to a relation to be<strong>in</strong>g itself. But only out <strong>of</strong> this fur<strong>the</strong>st distance can mantruly f<strong>in</strong>d himself back, i.e., be who he truly is. 51When placed with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> Contributions to Philosophy, this passageclearly shows that <strong>Heidegger</strong> never divorced his hermeneutics <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> from hisendeavor to th<strong>in</strong>k <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g; nor did he ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that <strong>the</strong> former <strong>in</strong> any wayreplaces or supersedes <strong>the</strong> latter. By realiz<strong>in</strong>g that Da-se<strong>in</strong> provides a “place” forunconcealment to occur, <strong>and</strong> that Dase<strong>in</strong> resides <strong>in</strong> this expanse <strong>of</strong> openness, wealso discover <strong>the</strong> impossibility <strong>of</strong> separat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic- phenomenologicalaccount <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> from <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g.50See Richardson, Through Phenomenology to Thought, pp. xviii–xix <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Brief überden ‘Humanismus,’” <strong>in</strong> GA 9, p. 328.51<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte “Probleme” der “Logik”, GA 45(Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1984a), pp. 214–215. Basic Questions <strong>of</strong> Philosophy:Selected “Problems” <strong>of</strong> “Logic,” trans. R. Rojcewicz <strong>and</strong> A. Schuwer (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: IndianaUniversity Press, 1994), p. 181 (translation modified). Also, see <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “E<strong>in</strong> Vorwort: Brief anPater William J. Richardson,” GA 11, p. 151. “Foreword” to Richardson, <strong>Heidegger</strong>: ThroughPhenomenology to Thought, 4th ed, p. xx.
Introduction37Several key passages <strong>in</strong> Contributions to Philosophy, which suggest that <strong>the</strong>“turn<strong>in</strong>g” is a transformation that reveals <strong>the</strong> reciprocity between be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>Dase<strong>in</strong>, go far to clarify <strong>the</strong> crux <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> confusion that bifurcates <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sphilosophy <strong>in</strong>to two dist<strong>in</strong>ct phases. Specifically, <strong>Heidegger</strong> characterizes <strong>the</strong>“turn<strong>in</strong>g” as “<strong>the</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g relation <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g” (der kehrige Bezug des Seyns), <strong>in</strong>which be-<strong>in</strong>g solicits Dase<strong>in</strong> to participate <strong>in</strong> its openness <strong>and</strong> cultivate an abodefor its manifestation <strong>in</strong> language. With this dist<strong>in</strong>ctive expression, <strong>Heidegger</strong> construes<strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g” as a transformation whereby “enown<strong>in</strong>g” br<strong>in</strong>gs Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>toits ownmost relation to, <strong>and</strong> reciprocity with, be-<strong>in</strong>g itself, ra<strong>the</strong>r than “subjectively”as a change <strong>of</strong> direction <strong>in</strong> his philosophy. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than assum<strong>in</strong>g a “break”between “<strong>Heidegger</strong> I” whose th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g traverses <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonalpathway, <strong>and</strong> “<strong>Heidegger</strong> II” whose th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g opens <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical pathway,<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>stead <strong>of</strong> assum<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>Heidegger</strong> first attends to Dase<strong>in</strong> only to leave beh<strong>in</strong>dfundamental ontology <strong>in</strong> order to attend to be<strong>in</strong>g, we must heed, <strong>in</strong> Emad’s words,a constant “passage” <strong>and</strong> a “back <strong>and</strong> forth” occurr<strong>in</strong>g between transcendentalhorizonal<strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. By draw<strong>in</strong>g upon central passages <strong>of</strong>Contributions to Philosophy <strong>and</strong> carefully <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m, Emad concludes thatany account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relation between transcendental-horizonal <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historicalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g must take its orientation from <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s discovery, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> hisfundamental ontology <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two structures called “project<strong>in</strong>g open”(Entwurf) <strong>and</strong> “thrownness” (Geworfenheit):There is no break between <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gbecause <strong>the</strong>re is no break between <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historicaldeterm<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open <strong>and</strong> thrownness. <strong>Heidegger</strong> does not discard <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonaldeterm<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open <strong>and</strong> thrownness <strong>in</strong> favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>ghistoricaldeterm<strong>in</strong>ation but passes “back <strong>and</strong> forth” from <strong>the</strong> one to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. Morespecifically, <strong>the</strong>re is no break between <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historicaldeterm<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> this structure because <strong>the</strong> former determ<strong>in</strong>ation is conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>latter. 52In Contributions to Philosophy “project<strong>in</strong>g open” is no longer conceived asopen<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>the</strong> factical possibilities <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>, 53 <strong>and</strong> “thrownness” is no longerthought <strong>of</strong> as “thrownness” <strong>in</strong>to that facticity. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, “project<strong>in</strong>g open” now appearsas <strong>the</strong> act <strong>of</strong> open<strong>in</strong>g up a historical clear<strong>in</strong>g, enowned by be-<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>to which <strong>the</strong>th<strong>in</strong>ker who enacts <strong>the</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g is “thrown.” Both “project<strong>in</strong>g-open” <strong>and</strong> “thrownness”unfold <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir primordial unity as enowned by be-<strong>in</strong>g’s clear<strong>in</strong>g, that is, byen-own<strong>in</strong>g (Er-eignis). En-own<strong>in</strong>g holds <strong>the</strong> key to underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> simultaneous transform<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “project<strong>in</strong>g open” <strong>and</strong> “thrownness.” BecauseRichardson was unaware <strong>of</strong> this reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> simultaneous transform<strong>in</strong>g, he52See Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 3–4, 9–10, <strong>and</strong> 16.53By demonstrat<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> two structures called “project<strong>in</strong>g open”<strong>and</strong> “thrownness” are reta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> simultaneously transformed, Emad opens <strong>the</strong> path towardapproach<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought with no need for <strong>the</strong> premeditated <strong>the</strong>sis <strong>of</strong> a “<strong>Heidegger</strong> I”“<strong>Heidegger</strong> II” dist<strong>in</strong>ction. Ibid., pp. 200–201.
38 F. Schalowassumed that “<strong>Heidegger</strong> I” discards <strong>the</strong> fundamental ontology <strong>in</strong> order to become“<strong>Heidegger</strong> II.”Seen <strong>in</strong> light <strong>of</strong> Contributions to Philosophy, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> novel <strong>the</strong>matization <strong>of</strong>“project<strong>in</strong>g open” <strong>and</strong> “thrownness,” we must now acknowledge that <strong>the</strong> “<strong>Heidegger</strong> I”“<strong>Heidegger</strong> II” dist<strong>in</strong>ction has become obsolete. No longer blocked by <strong>the</strong> assumption<strong>of</strong> “two” <strong>Heidegger</strong>s, th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is set free to enact <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong>history <strong>of</strong> en-own<strong>in</strong>g. By underscor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s characterization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g”as “<strong>the</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g relation <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>in</strong> which be-<strong>in</strong>g solicits us to “projectopen” its truth <strong>and</strong> cultivate an abode for its manifestation <strong>in</strong> language, we avoid<strong>the</strong> mistake <strong>of</strong> assimilat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought to preset models <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation.54 Without <strong>the</strong> confusion stemm<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong>se errant, reductionistic modelsfor <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought, we can now appreciate <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>hermeneutic phenomenological analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> occurrence <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> man can nolonger be left out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> equation. 55 For only by ventur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> “clear<strong>in</strong>g” can<strong>the</strong>re be an opportunity for be<strong>in</strong>g to appear, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g openthis appear<strong>in</strong>g:In o<strong>the</strong>r words, be<strong>in</strong>g’s turn<strong>in</strong>g relation requires an enactment by th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g s<strong>in</strong>ce this relationis a relation to what is ownmost to man....This turn<strong>in</strong>g turns unto th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g because it needsth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g to susta<strong>in</strong> it. And for th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g to respond to this need <strong>and</strong> thus to susta<strong>in</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g’sturn<strong>in</strong>g relation, it must act—must occur as act<strong>in</strong>g (H<strong>and</strong>eln). 56Because it perta<strong>in</strong>s to what is decisively orig<strong>in</strong>al, <strong>in</strong>deed, what is ownmost to <strong>the</strong>hermeneutic-phenomenological mode <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigation, <strong>the</strong> debate over <strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g”is not a purely academic exercise. Far from mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> concern for Dase<strong>in</strong>irrelevant, <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g gives fur<strong>the</strong>r impetus to questionDase<strong>in</strong> more fundamentally, that is, <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> power granted to it by virtue<strong>of</strong> its <strong>in</strong>habitation <strong>of</strong> language. This means that ra<strong>the</strong>r than form<strong>in</strong>g a disjunctionwith Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, Contributions to Philosophy opens up a “passageway,” <strong>the</strong>rebyfacilitat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> appropriation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>sights ga<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time. 57Through <strong>the</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g-historical perspective” opened up <strong>in</strong> Contributions toPhilosophy, we rediscover <strong>the</strong> unity <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, as it comes to light <strong>in</strong>three permutations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g.” Given thought’s “enownment” by <strong>and</strong> belong<strong>in</strong>gnessto be<strong>in</strong>g by virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>habit<strong>in</strong>g language, we can dist<strong>in</strong>guish (1) <strong>the</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>garound <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question from “be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time” to “time <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g,” (2) <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sown way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>and</strong> (3) as <strong>the</strong> hallmark <strong>of</strong> “die Kehre” <strong>the</strong>dynamic <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>’s thrownness <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g, by dwell<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> it<strong>and</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g it open through language—<strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g.” In this turn<strong>in</strong>gresides <strong>the</strong> possibility that Da-se<strong>in</strong> can experience <strong>the</strong> gift<strong>in</strong>g-refusal that both54On this po<strong>in</strong>t, see GA 65, pp. 238–239; tr. 169. See Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributionsto Philosophy, pp. 188–189.55For a good example <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s discussion <strong>of</strong> this “occurrence,” see GA 3, p. 229; tr. 160.56Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 190.57Ibid., p. 200.
Introduction39thrusts it <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> reveals it as vulnerable to <strong>the</strong> danger <strong>of</strong> technicity. 58As <strong>Heidegger</strong> states <strong>in</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, “…Da-se<strong>in</strong> is that belong<strong>in</strong>gness that, hold<strong>in</strong>gunto <strong>the</strong> ab-ground, belongs to <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g....Dase<strong>in</strong>’s ownmost isbe-<strong>in</strong>g-historical.” 59Yet even as th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g takes its directive from <strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>and</strong> learnsto dwell <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> silence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word, <strong>the</strong> debate concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “dieKehre” has not been <strong>in</strong> va<strong>in</strong>. For that debate br<strong>in</strong>gs to <strong>the</strong> foreground (1) <strong>the</strong> importancethat Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) has for clarify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> misunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gs<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Kehre,” <strong>and</strong> (2) how <strong>the</strong> pendulum for <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sthought sw<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> re-exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> his key terms, aswell as <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic guidel<strong>in</strong>es for <strong>the</strong>ir translation <strong>in</strong>to English. As <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>gessays will help to illustrate, <strong>the</strong>re is a s<strong>in</strong>gular direction to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gno matter where we st<strong>and</strong> at its crossroads.6 Summary <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Essays</strong>The essays <strong>in</strong> this volume follow a tw<strong>of</strong>old development, which addresses, first,“The Search for Beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Onset <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>,” <strong>and</strong>,second, “The Place <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>,” <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g its precisemethodology, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> challenge (as well as <strong>the</strong> controversy) <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g hiswrit<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>to English. The division <strong>of</strong> this volume <strong>in</strong>to Part I, Part II, <strong>and</strong> Part IIIwill help <strong>the</strong> reader to identify common <strong>the</strong>mes throughout <strong>the</strong> paper. By <strong>the</strong> sametoken, it is important to emphasize that <strong>the</strong> essays complement each o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong> forma mosaic, <strong>in</strong> order to help <strong>the</strong> reader to underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought <strong>in</strong> greaterdegrees <strong>of</strong> subtlety <strong>and</strong> depth.Proceed<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s essay, “Poverty” (Part I), <strong>the</strong> essays <strong>in</strong> Part II <strong>in</strong>itiatedifferent po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>of</strong> entry <strong>in</strong>to his thought, <strong>and</strong> yet <strong>in</strong> a manner which recalls <strong>the</strong> tentativeness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gs. Whe<strong>the</strong>r guided by <strong>the</strong> prelim<strong>in</strong>ary hermeneutic <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s exposition <strong>of</strong> “everydayness” on <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>and</strong> or, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, by <strong>the</strong>“language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g,” each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se pathways seeks to projectopen <strong>the</strong> space <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiry, which guides his own philosophical journey. Despite <strong>the</strong>natural temptation <strong>and</strong> historical precedent to do, we must avoid <strong>the</strong> precedent <strong>of</strong>polariz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> “early” <strong>and</strong> “later” phases, or <strong>in</strong> any way succumb<strong>in</strong>gto a “chronology” <strong>of</strong> his development. 60 On <strong>the</strong> contrary, to dist<strong>in</strong>guishbetween <strong>the</strong> “transcendental-horizonal perspective” <strong>and</strong> a “be<strong>in</strong>g-historical perspective”is not to suggest contrary viewpo<strong>in</strong>ts, but, <strong>in</strong>stead to experience <strong>the</strong>58For a discussion <strong>of</strong> this key transformation, see <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Die Kehre,” <strong>in</strong> Vorträge und AufsätzeGA 7, pp. 113–124.59GA 66, pp. 321–322; tr. 286.60For a critique <strong>of</strong> this chronological view, see Thomas Kalary, “Towards Sketch<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Genesis <strong>of</strong>Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 16 (2000): 200–207.
40 F. Schalowremarkable “back <strong>and</strong> forth” movement, which shapes <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sentire philosophical journey. The concern for “Dase<strong>in</strong>” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> concern for “be<strong>in</strong>g”are not separate <strong>in</strong> any way. Indeed, among its many sem<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>sights, Contributionsto Philosophy makes explicit <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>in</strong> which Dase<strong>in</strong> belongs to be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong>,reciprocally how be<strong>in</strong>g addresses thought. In <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ctive language <strong>of</strong> Contributionsto Philosophy, <strong>Heidegger</strong> characterizes this reciprocity as <strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g relation <strong>of</strong>Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g.” 61 While much more can be said about <strong>the</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g, it is worthnot<strong>in</strong>g that its importance is discussed throughout this volume <strong>and</strong> appears as a keymotif <strong>in</strong> several essays.If <strong>the</strong>re is any lesson to be learned from <strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g,” it is that thought cannot<strong>in</strong>duce its own change, but that any transformation stems from <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>and</strong>guidance <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. This is <strong>the</strong> simple message, <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic rem<strong>in</strong>der, housed <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> paren<strong>the</strong>tical title <strong>of</strong> Beiträge zur Philosophie, that is, “Vom Ereignis,” <strong>and</strong>,conversely, <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> its translation: that any transformation stems “fromenown<strong>in</strong>g.” In this regard, th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is always underway, both <strong>in</strong> its “<strong>in</strong>ception” <strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong> its transition to <strong>the</strong> “o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g”—or what <strong>Heidegger</strong> calls “<strong>in</strong>ceptual th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.”The characterization <strong>of</strong> thought as always “underway,” <strong>and</strong> his own claim thatth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is a movement <strong>of</strong> “returnership” back to its orig<strong>in</strong>s, constitutes a crucial<strong>the</strong>me <strong>in</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> appropriat<strong>in</strong>g his philosophy. The dawn <strong>of</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>unfold<strong>in</strong>g “m<strong>in</strong>dfulness” <strong>of</strong> what <strong>Heidegger</strong> calls “<strong>in</strong>ceptual th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g” epitomizesthis quest. 62 In this way, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s methodology is unique <strong>in</strong> that he emphasizesthat <strong>the</strong> arrival <strong>of</strong> a deeper underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g is always predicated upon philosophy’sreciprocal return to, appropriation <strong>of</strong>, <strong>and</strong> transmission <strong>of</strong> its orig<strong>in</strong>s.In this respect, <strong>the</strong> key phenomenology maxim, “back to <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong>mselves,”is grounded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> deeper movement <strong>of</strong> returnership <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> counter concessionthat <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>s are granted from <strong>and</strong> reserved with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g (Bergung) <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g’s own self-concealment. In <strong>the</strong> open<strong>in</strong>g essay, Burt C. Hopk<strong>in</strong>s takes up thisissue with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> explor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> roots <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s hermeneutic phenomenology.Specifically, <strong>in</strong> “Deformalization <strong>and</strong> Phenomenon <strong>in</strong> Husserl <strong>and</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>,” Hopk<strong>in</strong>s addresses <strong>the</strong> uniquely hermeneutic manner by which<strong>Heidegger</strong> grounds <strong>the</strong> self-show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong>mselves” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> dynamic <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g’s self-concealment. Hopk<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong>reby outl<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> radicalization <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sconcept <strong>of</strong> phenomenology as occurr<strong>in</strong>g through a dialogue with, <strong>and</strong> yet <strong>in</strong> contrastto, his mentor, Edmund Husserl. In “A Purview <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g: The Ontological Structure<strong>of</strong> World, Reference (Verweisung) <strong>and</strong> Indication (Indikation),” Marylou Senaexam<strong>in</strong>es ano<strong>the</strong>r crucial step <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> development <strong>and</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’shermeneutic phenomenology. In this essay, Sena outl<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> “project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g”<strong>of</strong> world as <strong>the</strong> key to a phenomenological access to be<strong>in</strong>g. This project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>gmakes explicit both <strong>the</strong> error <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> attempt by “pragmatism” to reduce world to <strong>the</strong>totality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> self’s deal<strong>in</strong>gs with equipment on <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong>, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>importance <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s key phrase <strong>of</strong> “das Seiende im Ganze” <strong>in</strong> a61GA 65, p. 315; tr. 221.62See GA 66, pp. 40–42; tr. 31–33.
Introduction41manner recall<strong>in</strong>g Dase<strong>in</strong>’s situation with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, that is, as “be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> a whole”ra<strong>the</strong>r than “be<strong>in</strong>gs as a whole.”The claim <strong>of</strong> returnership also carries with it, <strong>and</strong> echoes, a new <strong>in</strong>timacy betweenlanguage <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. This <strong>in</strong>terdependence between <strong>the</strong> two harbors <strong>the</strong> possibility<strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g’s address<strong>in</strong>g what o<strong>the</strong>rwise rema<strong>in</strong>s “unspoken” <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> counter sway <strong>and</strong> withdrawal <strong>of</strong> its concealment <strong>and</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g. In“<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Experience with Language,” George Kovacs illustrates how <strong>the</strong> power<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> spoken word h<strong>in</strong>ges on preserv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> safeguard<strong>in</strong>g what rema<strong>in</strong>s unspoken,which ga<strong>the</strong>rs forth <strong>the</strong> wealth <strong>of</strong> possibilities for translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s term<strong>in</strong>ology<strong>in</strong> novel, albeit fundamental ways. The emphasis on be<strong>in</strong>g’s shelter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>concealment simultaneously highlights a topic which, despite its religious implications,actually opens up <strong>the</strong> space <strong>of</strong> difference (e.g., <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>ological difference”),prior to any <strong>the</strong>ological focus, namely <strong>the</strong> last god (der letzte Gott). In “<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Difference <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> God-question,” Thomas Kalary po<strong>in</strong>ts to <strong>the</strong>“last god” as highlight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> gift<strong>in</strong>g-refusal <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g (Seyn), which both shelters<strong>and</strong> preserves <strong>the</strong> mystery <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e. In <strong>the</strong> process, he argues that <strong>the</strong> “question<strong>of</strong> God” cannot be developed <strong>in</strong> a historical vacuum, but must also be jo<strong>in</strong>ed with,<strong>and</strong> depend upon, <strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g around” <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own question from “Be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> Time” to “Time <strong>and</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g”—<strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r words, h<strong>in</strong>ge upon <strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>enown<strong>in</strong>g.” The designation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>ological difference” not only holds <strong>the</strong> keyto underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> flight <strong>and</strong> arrival <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gods, but also <strong>the</strong> counter resonance <strong>of</strong>what is s<strong>in</strong>gular <strong>and</strong> ownmost <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “lett<strong>in</strong>g be” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>ities, that is, <strong>in</strong> grant<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> leeway to abide <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir mystery.By emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ological difference, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> methodological priority <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, we open <strong>the</strong> space for develop<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> religious implications<strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought (ra<strong>the</strong>r than foreclos<strong>in</strong>g it). Among one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> more prevalenttrends <strong>in</strong> this regard is <strong>the</strong> discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> parallels between his th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>Eastern spirituality. In “Substance <strong>and</strong> Empt<strong>in</strong>ess: Preparatory Steps toward a<strong>Translation</strong>al Dialogue between Western <strong>and</strong> Buddhist Philosophy,” Paola-LudovikaCori<strong>and</strong>o explores <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> a “translational” dialogue between Easternth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Western tradition. She outl<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> path <strong>of</strong> a translation between <strong>the</strong>key terms <strong>of</strong> Eastern <strong>and</strong> Western traditions, <strong>in</strong> order to retrieve <strong>the</strong>ir mean<strong>in</strong>gs froma deeper orig<strong>in</strong>, which enriches each tradition. In <strong>the</strong> process, Cori<strong>and</strong>o shows how<strong>the</strong> reciprocal dialogue <strong>of</strong> this translation forms <strong>the</strong> cornerstone <strong>of</strong> tradition, preserv<strong>in</strong>git with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g.” In <strong>the</strong> conclud<strong>in</strong>g essay to Part I, BernhardRadl<strong>of</strong>f br<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong> discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> religion full circle, as embody<strong>in</strong>gboth <strong>the</strong> movement <strong>of</strong> “returnership” <strong>and</strong> his critique <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Western tradition <strong>of</strong>“onto-<strong>the</strong>o-logy” (<strong>and</strong> its expression <strong>in</strong> Christianity). In “Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Notes onDiv<strong>in</strong>e Images <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Light <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>,” Radl<strong>of</strong>f details <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sway <strong>of</strong> address<strong>in</strong>g religious experience through such key works as M<strong>in</strong>dfulness <strong>and</strong>Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens. Proceed<strong>in</strong>g from “clues” (adopted from Emad) asto <strong>the</strong> methodological connection between hermeneutics <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gon <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> arrival <strong>and</strong> flight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gods on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r,Radl<strong>of</strong>f addresses <strong>the</strong> simultaneous conceal<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> (div<strong>in</strong>e) mysterywith<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> age <strong>of</strong> “mach<strong>in</strong>ation.” He shows how <strong>the</strong> Christian revelation <strong>of</strong> God both
42 F. Schalowh<strong>in</strong>ges on <strong>the</strong> preservation <strong>of</strong> this mystery <strong>and</strong> yet jeopardizes it through itsmetaphysical expression as <strong>the</strong> ground <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “causa sui.”The <strong>the</strong>mes <strong>of</strong> returnership, be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> search for beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gs,which <strong>the</strong> second part <strong>of</strong> this volume develops, are amplified fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> Part IIIwhen <strong>the</strong> focus shifts to develop<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs<strong>and</strong> its <strong>in</strong>tersection with <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g itself. As we make <strong>the</strong> transition toPart III, however, we discover that <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> translation is not self-conta<strong>in</strong>ed, butalso punctuates <strong>and</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>ates <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> preced<strong>in</strong>g group <strong>of</strong> essays. This observationhelps us to see to what extent <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thoughtunifies <strong>the</strong> various essays <strong>in</strong> this volume, despite <strong>the</strong> diversity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir topics. In thisway, <strong>the</strong> study <strong>of</strong> translation is not a concern about provid<strong>in</strong>g a “<strong>the</strong>ory” per se, but<strong>in</strong>stead answers <strong>the</strong> more orig<strong>in</strong>al claim <strong>of</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g an “access” to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> its “be<strong>in</strong>g-historical” perspective.The attempt to provide a “gateway” to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought through translation,particularly as it perta<strong>in</strong>s to translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> key terms <strong>of</strong> his philosophy, is notwithout controversy. No doubt, this controversy reaches its zenith <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Englishtranslation <strong>of</strong> Beiträge zur Philosophy (vom Ereignis). In <strong>the</strong> unique style <strong>of</strong> a“Conversation,” Parvis Emad provides his responses to questions (posed by FrankSchalow) as to <strong>the</strong> decisions <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> such key terms<strong>in</strong> Contributions to Philosophy, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Ereignis as “enown<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>and</strong> Abgrund as“abground.” To appreciate <strong>the</strong> import <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se responses, it is necessary to place<strong>the</strong>m with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> larger context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ongo<strong>in</strong>g debate over render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> key terms<strong>of</strong> Beiträge <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> criticism over us<strong>in</strong>g “neologisms” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> English translation. 63The “sett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to opposition” (Ause<strong>in</strong><strong>and</strong>ersetzung) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sides <strong>of</strong> this debate doesnot merely seek <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ality <strong>and</strong> closure <strong>of</strong> a “polemical” resolution, but <strong>in</strong>steaddirects us to <strong>the</strong> frontier <strong>of</strong> a new arrival <strong>and</strong> onset <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. In“<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy: The Challenge <strong>of</strong> its <strong>Translation</strong>,”George Kovacs tackles <strong>the</strong> difficulties <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> English render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Beiträge,as well as <strong>the</strong> various criticisms which have arisen <strong>in</strong> recent years. In <strong>the</strong> process, heexplores (1) <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic methodology <strong>of</strong> translation <strong>and</strong> (2) exam<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> specific“decisions,” which are <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> key terms <strong>of</strong> that text, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gEreignis as “enown<strong>in</strong>g.”In address<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> controversy over address<strong>in</strong>g terms <strong>in</strong> Beiträge, we cannot overlook,however, <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> revisit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> key terms <strong>of</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit. In “Dase<strong>in</strong><strong>and</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> Contributions to Philosophy,” Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann addresses <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Da”—a central63It should be po<strong>in</strong>ted out that us<strong>in</strong>g neologisms is one <strong>of</strong> many ways <strong>in</strong> which <strong>Heidegger</strong> faces <strong>the</strong>task <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> relation to language. Perhaps, it suffices to mention a few cases. From <strong>the</strong>transcendental-horizonal th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g: Alltäglichkeit, Bew<strong>and</strong>tnisganzheit, Erschlossenheit, Jeme<strong>in</strong>igkeit,Bef<strong>in</strong>dlichkeit; from be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g: Anfängnis, Bewëgen, Eignung, Ereignung, Gegnet,Jeweiligkeit, Übereignung, das Seiendste, Ge-Stellnis, <strong>and</strong> Wesung. For a discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> importance<strong>of</strong> neologisms <strong>in</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs, see Frank Schalow, “Freedom, Truth, <strong>and</strong>Responsibility <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Recent <strong>Translation</strong>s <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gesamtausgabe,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 23 (2007):104–105.
Introduction43concept <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time. He also deals with <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> Ereignis—a centralconcept <strong>of</strong> Contributions to Philosophy, while tak<strong>in</strong>g issue with <strong>the</strong> naive render<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Da” <strong>in</strong> English as <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re.” Von Herrmann observes that, from with<strong>in</strong> a“transcendental horizonal perspective,” <strong>the</strong> “Da” <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>the</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>disclosedness <strong>and</strong> thus never refers to a spatial determ<strong>in</strong>ation as “<strong>the</strong>re.” Correlatively,from <strong>the</strong> perspective <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> “Da” implicates <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>gthrow <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g. Turn<strong>in</strong>g his attention to Ereignis, von Herrmann argues for its render<strong>in</strong>gas “enown<strong>in</strong>g.”Ivo De Gennaro develops fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> key terms <strong>of</strong>Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time <strong>in</strong> “Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Da-se<strong>in</strong>: With a Suggestion for itsInterl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong>.” Specifically, De Gennaro po<strong>in</strong>ts to <strong>the</strong> hyphenation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>word “Da-se<strong>in</strong>” as mark<strong>in</strong>g not just a grammatical shift, but a dist<strong>in</strong>ctive “moment”<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g that uncovers <strong>the</strong> reciprocity betweenbe-<strong>in</strong>g (Seyn) <strong>and</strong> man. The <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong>n, po<strong>in</strong>ts to <strong>the</strong>“cut” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> history, as <strong>the</strong> place for <strong>the</strong> manifestation <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g itself.But just as <strong>the</strong> term “Da-se<strong>in</strong>” has a dist<strong>in</strong>ctive ancestry <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> German language, so<strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> its mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> English must also be addressed through <strong>the</strong> “cross<strong>in</strong>gover” <strong>of</strong> an “<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation.”In “<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Eccentric <strong>Translation</strong>,” Julia A. Irel<strong>and</strong> turns aspotlight on <strong>the</strong> “violence” <strong>of</strong> translation, <strong>in</strong> order to show how language’s capacityfor creativity <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>novative breaks with <strong>the</strong> conventional usages <strong>of</strong> words. As acorollary to her argument, she shows how <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s ground<strong>in</strong>gwords is shaped by both <strong>the</strong> idioms <strong>of</strong> Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s poetry <strong>and</strong> Greek tragedy. Inthis way, Irel<strong>and</strong> develops a new <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic directives fortranslat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs, which simultaneously complements <strong>and</strong> departsfrom that <strong>of</strong> Emad.A question that <strong>in</strong>evitably arises <strong>in</strong> address<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation is how wecan characterize it as a “craft,” <strong>in</strong> a way analogous to th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby <strong>in</strong> someway as “commissioned” <strong>and</strong> “enowned” by language <strong>in</strong> its way <strong>of</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g a placefor <strong>the</strong> manifestation <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. While <strong>the</strong>re is “guidance” with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> act <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g,it is not necessarily governed by external st<strong>and</strong>ards any more, than for example,<strong>Heidegger</strong> would ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that his own vision <strong>of</strong> an “orig<strong>in</strong>al ethics” could bereduced to normative pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>of</strong> morality. The conclud<strong>in</strong>g two essays addressprecisely this issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “guidance” <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> translation <strong>and</strong> its dist<strong>in</strong>ctive characteras a craft. In “Individuation, Responsiveness, <strong>and</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>: <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Ethics,”Eric Sean Nelson shows how translation is a pursuit that safeguards <strong>the</strong> word <strong>and</strong>responds to <strong>the</strong> subtlest <strong>in</strong>flections, which echo <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. The task <strong>of</strong> “orig<strong>in</strong>altranslation” po<strong>in</strong>ts to <strong>the</strong> underly<strong>in</strong>g ground <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> human capacity “to be ethical”<strong>in</strong> which “responsiveness” is <strong>the</strong> key to responsibility (Verantwortlichkeit). But howcan we <strong>the</strong>matize this responsiveness, which relocates its orig<strong>in</strong>, not <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> subjectivity<strong>of</strong> human choice, but with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> open space <strong>of</strong> freedom <strong>and</strong> its power to “letbe”? “Attunement <strong>and</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>” (Frank Schalow) specifically addresses thisquestion <strong>of</strong> how hermeneutic directives govern <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> key terms<strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. These directives are never reducible to <strong>the</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>of</strong>semantical equivalency supported by a dictionary; <strong>in</strong>stead, <strong>the</strong>y issue from <strong>the</strong>
44 F. Schalowhidden wellspr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> what is unspoken <strong>and</strong> unsaid, whose manner <strong>of</strong> attunementbr<strong>in</strong>gs th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to its reciprocity with be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> permits its disclosure <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> most“elemental words.” A “hermeneutically sound” translation, <strong>the</strong>n, renounces <strong>the</strong> presumption<strong>of</strong> an absolute transfer <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s key words, tak<strong>in</strong>g its orientation<strong>in</strong>stead from <strong>the</strong> attuned response <strong>and</strong> comportment toward <strong>the</strong> disclos<strong>in</strong>g power <strong>of</strong>language. In a way that harks back to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s essay at <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ception <strong>of</strong> thisvolume, it is seen that <strong>the</strong> venture <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g, like th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, must first descend<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> “poverty” <strong>of</strong> language <strong>in</strong> order to experience <strong>the</strong> “wealth” <strong>of</strong> its power to letbe<strong>in</strong>g become manifest.As diverse as <strong>the</strong>se essays are, <strong>the</strong>y converge at <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> a s<strong>in</strong>gle realization:that <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs is not merely an academic exercise,but <strong>in</strong>stead <strong>in</strong>terfaces with <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> his th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. 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46 F. SchalowKalary, Thomas. 2000. Towards sketch<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> genesis <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies16: 189–220.Kockelmans, Joseph C. 1985. <strong>Heidegger</strong> on art <strong>and</strong> art work. The Hague: Mart<strong>in</strong>us Nijh<strong>of</strong>f.Kovacs, George. 2006. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s contributions to philosophy <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> ‘A GrassrootsArchival Perspective’. Studia Phaenomenologica 6: 319–345.Lauer, Quent<strong>in</strong>. 1965. Phenomenology: Its genesis <strong>and</strong> prospect. New York: Harper & Row.Maly, Kenneth. 2000. Translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s works <strong>in</strong> English: The history <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> possibility.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 16: 219–233.Maly, Kenneth. 2008. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s possibility—Language, emergence, say<strong>in</strong>g be-<strong>in</strong>g. Toronto:University <strong>of</strong> Toronto Press.Richardson, William J., S.J. 1993. A note on <strong>the</strong> fourth movement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Beiträge-Symphony.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 9: 32–52.Richardson, William J., S.J. 2003. <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Through phenomenology to thought, 4th ed. Bronx:Fordham University Press.Ricoeur, Paul. 2006. On translation. Trans. Eileen Brennan. Introduction by Richard Kearney.London: Routledge.Sallis, John. 2002. On translation. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.Schalow, Frank. June 1989. Review <strong>of</strong> Hegel’s Phenomenology Spirit by Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>. Trans.Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly. The Review <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics 62(4): 837–838.Schalow, Frank. 1993. The Gesamtausgabe Nietzsche: An exercise <strong>in</strong> translation <strong>and</strong> thought.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 9: 139–152.Schalow, Frank. 2008a. Access<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought through a new approach to translation.Existentia 18: 301–314. 2007. Freedom, truth <strong>and</strong> responsibility: A critical look at <strong>the</strong> recenttranslations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gesamtausgabe. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 23: 95–111.Schalow, Frank. 2008b. Review <strong>of</strong> On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy byParvis Emad. Journal <strong>of</strong> Phenomenolical Psychology 39(1): 121–125.Vallega-Neu, Daniela. 2001. Poietic say<strong>in</strong>g. In A companion to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s contributions tophilosophy, ed. Charles E. Scott et al., 67–80. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.Vallega-Neu, Daniela. 2005. The bodily dimension <strong>in</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Albany: SUNY Press. 2003. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’scontributions to philosophy: An <strong>in</strong>troduction. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.
Part IIThe Search for Beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Onset<strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-Historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>
Deformalization <strong>and</strong> Phenomenon <strong>in</strong> Husserl<strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>*Burt C. Hopk<strong>in</strong>s1 Deformalization <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Project <strong>of</strong> Phenomenology<strong>in</strong> Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>Husserl’s thought from beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to end is preoccupied with <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong>“deformalization.” 1 The problem guid<strong>in</strong>g his first philosophical work (<strong>the</strong> Philosophy<strong>of</strong> Arithmetic) is precisely that <strong>of</strong> “deformaliz<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>the</strong> symbolic calculus characteristic<strong>of</strong> formal arithmetic (arithmetica universalis). In <strong>in</strong>vestigations that he himselflater came to regard as “implicitly” phenomenological, Husserl sought <strong>in</strong> that workto establish <strong>the</strong> genesis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “logic” <strong>of</strong> symbolic ma<strong>the</strong>matics <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> content properto <strong>the</strong> au<strong>the</strong>ntic presentation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nonsymbolic concept <strong>of</strong> card<strong>in</strong>al number.Husserl’s last great <strong>in</strong>vestigations <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Crisis <strong>of</strong> European Sciences <strong>and</strong>Transcendental Phenomenology are likewise guided by <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> deformalization,albeit with a greatly exp<strong>and</strong>ed scope <strong>in</strong> comparison with <strong>the</strong> Philosophy <strong>of</strong>Arithmetic. By l<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “crisis” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “ungrounded” formalization characteristic*I dedicate this paper to my Doktorvater Parvis Emad, who not only taught me how to read<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s texts, but whose work cont<strong>in</strong>ues to po<strong>in</strong>t my own th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> “dasDenken” conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong>re<strong>in</strong>.1To my knowledge Husserl uses <strong>the</strong> term “Entformalisierung” <strong>in</strong> his published corpus only once(Ideen I – see below), def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g it “as <strong>the</strong> fill<strong>in</strong>g-out <strong>of</strong> an empty logical-ma<strong>the</strong>matical form or aformal truth [als ‘Ausfüllung’ e<strong>in</strong>er logisch-ma<strong>the</strong>matischen Leerform, bzw. e<strong>in</strong>er formalenWahrheit]” (26). What, exactly, is meant by <strong>the</strong> “Ausfüllung” <strong>of</strong> a (formalized) logical-ma<strong>the</strong>maticalform or truth is not specified by Husserl <strong>in</strong> this passage (or <strong>in</strong> any o<strong>the</strong>r passage I am aware <strong>of</strong>),which is limited to “go<strong>in</strong>g back to essential <strong>in</strong>tuition [auf die Wesens<strong>in</strong>tuition zurückzugehen]”(27) <strong>in</strong> order to clarify <strong>the</strong> logical dist<strong>in</strong>ction between “generalization” <strong>and</strong> “formalization.”The underly<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>sis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> discussion to follow, however, is that Husserl’s phenomenology as aB.C. Hopk<strong>in</strong>s (*)Department <strong>of</strong> Philosophy, Seattle University,Broadway <strong>and</strong> Madison, Seattle, WA 98122-4460, USAe-mail: burthopk<strong>in</strong>s1@gmail.comF. Schalow (ed.), <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad, Contributions To Phenomenology 65,DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0_3, © Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media B.V. 201149
50 B.C. Hopk<strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> method <strong>of</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>matical physics to <strong>the</strong> contemporary crisis <strong>of</strong> Europeanhumanity, Husserl at once ties <strong>the</strong> prospect <strong>of</strong> cultural renewal to that <strong>of</strong> deformalization<strong>and</strong> elevates transcendental phenomenological philosophy to its vanguard,because <strong>of</strong> its philosophically privileged capacity to br<strong>in</strong>g about deformalization.In <strong>the</strong> works situated between his first <strong>and</strong> last works, it is, <strong>of</strong> course, precisely<strong>the</strong> self-critical task <strong>of</strong> overcom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> psychologism characteristic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> attempteddeformalization <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philosophy <strong>of</strong> Arithmetic that led to Husserl’s “breakthrough”phenomenological discovery <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Logical Investigations, namely, to <strong>in</strong>tuitive actswhose content fulfills <strong>the</strong> formal significations characteristic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “symbolic” <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong>refore <strong>in</strong>tentionally “empty” acts <strong>of</strong> logical signification. Even Husserl’s turn totranscendental phenomenology is rooted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> deformalization. AsHusserl himself came to recognize approximately 100 years ago <strong>the</strong> “rational psychology”<strong>of</strong> both editions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Logical Investigations precludes, on methodicalgrounds, “pure” logic’s (<strong>the</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>sis universalis’) deformalization, because implicit<strong>in</strong> its method is <strong>the</strong> assumed validity <strong>of</strong> formal logic’s most basic concepts <strong>and</strong> laws.This assumption <strong>the</strong>refore prevents, <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple, even “phenomenological psychology”from “ground<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>rewith deformaliz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> formal.<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought from beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to end is likewise preoccupied with <strong>the</strong>problem <strong>of</strong> “deformalization.” Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time explicitly formulates <strong>the</strong> problemdriv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “prelim<strong>in</strong>ary concept” <strong>of</strong> phenomenology as <strong>the</strong> “phenomenological”deformalization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal concept <strong>of</strong> phenomenon, which both follows <strong>and</strong>must be kept dist<strong>in</strong>ct from its “ord<strong>in</strong>ary” deformalization. And although not denom<strong>in</strong>atedas such by <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong> his magnum opus, <strong>the</strong> “ontological difference” thatresults from both <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se deformalizations is <strong>the</strong> target <strong>of</strong> his self-critique <strong>in</strong>Contributions to Philosophy, <strong>and</strong> it is so, aga<strong>in</strong>, on <strong>the</strong> grounds <strong>of</strong> what can only becalled deformalization. 2 By approach<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g or truth <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g (Seyn) fromwith<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>matization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> difference between be<strong>in</strong>gs (Seiende) <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g(Se<strong>in</strong>), <strong>and</strong>, thus, from with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>matization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “formal” “is” that belongs tobe<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir manifestation, <strong>Heidegger</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that <strong>the</strong> forgottenness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>whole amounts to <strong>the</strong> attempt to br<strong>in</strong>g about precisely a “deformalization” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formalization <strong>of</strong>cognition <strong>in</strong>itiated (as I will argue below) by modern ma<strong>the</strong>matics with François Vieta <strong>and</strong> modernphilosophy beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g with Descartes. My discussion will <strong>the</strong>refore employ <strong>the</strong> terms “formalization”<strong>and</strong> “deformalization” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> descriptive-phenomenological sense signaled by phenomenology’smotto <strong>of</strong> “return to <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong>mselves” <strong>and</strong> not <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> radically different conceptual-logisticalsense <strong>in</strong> which contemporary logic employs <strong>the</strong>se terms. Thus, whereas <strong>the</strong> contemporary logicalsense <strong>of</strong> both formalization <strong>and</strong> deformalization signifies conceptual processes possess<strong>in</strong>g an(canonically fixed) exact mean<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong>ir phenomenological sense is descriptive <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore fixedexclusively by a phenomenological appeal to <strong>in</strong>tuitive evidence. Among o<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>in</strong>gs, this meansthat <strong>the</strong> common thread <strong>of</strong> “deformalization” here identified <strong>in</strong> Husserl’s works refers not to auniversal concept but to <strong>the</strong> project <strong>of</strong> restor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity <strong>of</strong> formal knowledge by retrac<strong>in</strong>g itsorig<strong>in</strong> back to <strong>the</strong> immediate givenness <strong>of</strong> a true content that is pre- <strong>and</strong> ultimately nonformal.2<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann, 1989), pp. 250–251. Contributions to Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g), trans. ParvisEmad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1999), pp. 176–177.
Deformalization <strong>and</strong> Phenomenon <strong>in</strong> Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>51“onefold” proper to <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g (or truth) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relationship between be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> abe<strong>in</strong>g is “settled” as a “‘sett<strong>in</strong>g apart’ [aus-e<strong>in</strong>-<strong>and</strong>er] <strong>and</strong> a “‘sett<strong>in</strong>g unto’”[zu-e<strong>in</strong><strong>and</strong>er]. 3 This consolidation, <strong>in</strong> turn, gives rise to <strong>the</strong> need to th<strong>in</strong>k <strong>the</strong> “is”<strong>of</strong> this onefold from a beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g that gives up <strong>the</strong> formality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “first beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g.”As Parvis Emad states:The ontological difference opens an avenue to enown<strong>in</strong>g [Ereignis] <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as this differenceitself would not occur without <strong>the</strong> sway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g. Without this sway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ontologicaldifference would not appear; it would not reveal what transpires <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘firstbeg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g,’ that is, th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g’s submission to <strong>the</strong> perspective <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g’s dom<strong>in</strong>ationby <strong>the</strong> forgottenness <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g. 4Despite Husserl’s <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s common recognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> need for deformalization<strong>in</strong> order to realize <strong>the</strong>ir respective phenomenologies, what each meansby <strong>the</strong> “formal” <strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong>refore, how each underst<strong>and</strong>s its deformalization to yield<strong>the</strong> phenomenological doma<strong>in</strong>, is different. There is, <strong>of</strong> course, what amounts to <strong>the</strong>st<strong>and</strong>ard view <strong>of</strong> this matter. Husserl’s account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal is characterized aslogical <strong>and</strong> epistemological, while <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s account is ontological. It followsfrom this that <strong>the</strong> phenomenon revealed by Husserl’s phenomenology, when <strong>the</strong> formal,<strong>in</strong> this sense, is deformalized, is limited by <strong>the</strong> cognitive structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formalthat functions as <strong>the</strong> clue that guides <strong>the</strong> methodic process <strong>of</strong> deformalization.In <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s phenomenology, <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal, as “ontological” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reforenot limited <strong>in</strong> this regard, functions as <strong>the</strong> guid<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>e that leads <strong>the</strong> methodicprocess <strong>of</strong> deformalization to a phenomenon that is presupposed by <strong>the</strong> cognitivestructure <strong>of</strong> Husserl’s phenomenon, <strong>and</strong> which discloses a doma<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> onticoontologicalmean<strong>in</strong>g “prior” to this cognitive limitation. Thus, even when Husserl’sphenomenology addresses <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g or <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> general,<strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al logical <strong>and</strong> epistemological limitation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formalthat it deformalizes <strong>in</strong> order to get at ontological phenomena precludes access to<strong>the</strong>m o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mode <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “objectification” that is characteristic <strong>of</strong> “straightforward,”pre-philosophical cognition. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s phenomenology, on <strong>the</strong> contrary,be<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>dful <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ontological limits imposed by <strong>the</strong> transposition <strong>of</strong>pre-philosophical cognition <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical doma<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> non-objectify<strong>in</strong>g“cognition” proper to philosophy, is <strong>the</strong>refore truer to <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>tentiontoward deformalization that motivates Husserl’s phenomenology than Husserl’sown phenomenology is.It what follows, I will not challenge this view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> matter. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, I will <strong>in</strong>vestigateits two most obvious presuppositions: (1) Husserl’s, that <strong>the</strong> formal, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> logical-epistemological structure <strong>of</strong> cognition, is capable <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gdeformalized; <strong>and</strong> (2) <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s, that <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g is such as to lend3See <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Bes<strong>in</strong>nung, GA 66 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999), p. 308.M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Thomas Kalary (London: Cont<strong>in</strong>uum Press, 2006), p. 274.4Parvis Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy (Madison, WI: TheUniversity <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press, 2007), p. 141.
52 B.C. Hopk<strong>in</strong>sitself to a formal conceptuality. My <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>tends to show that Husserl’spresupposition is only possible on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conflation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>s proper totwo very different senses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal: (1) <strong>the</strong> modern sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal, whichis derived from <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>acy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> object <strong>of</strong> cognition proper to <strong>the</strong> formalsciences <strong>of</strong> logic <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>matics, <strong>the</strong> “object <strong>in</strong> general” (Etwas überhaupt); <strong>and</strong>(2) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> premodern sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal, which is derived from logic’s <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>matics’“general treatment” <strong>of</strong> objects that are manifestly determ<strong>in</strong>ate. And hav<strong>in</strong>gcalled attention to <strong>the</strong> conflation at work <strong>in</strong> Husserl’s phenomenology <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal,I will show that <strong>the</strong> presupposition underly<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s phenomenology is onlypossible on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> his uncritical appropriation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conflation compos<strong>in</strong>gHusserl’s presupposition.2 Generalized <strong>and</strong> Formalized Universality <strong>in</strong> HusserlEven before his <strong>in</strong>troduction <strong>of</strong> a specifically historical reflection to <strong>the</strong> phenomenologicalmethod <strong>of</strong> deformalization, Husserl’s <strong>in</strong>vestigations called attention to afundamental difference <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> conceptuality proper to <strong>the</strong> “formal” <strong>in</strong> Aristotle’slogic <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> modern, algebraized logic. In Formal <strong>and</strong> Transcendental Logic, helocates this difference <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that modern logic has been formalized <strong>in</strong> a waythat contrasts with <strong>the</strong> concrete (gegenständlichen) relation to reality that def<strong>in</strong>esAristotle’s logic. 5 Not be<strong>in</strong>g formalized, Aristotle’s logic lacked formal ontology<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> cognition <strong>of</strong> its <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sic priority over <strong>the</strong> ontology <strong>of</strong> realities. Be<strong>in</strong>g formalized,modern logic, toge<strong>the</strong>r with modern ma<strong>the</strong>matics (which is also formalized),<strong>in</strong>vestigates precisely <strong>the</strong> same “ontological” doma<strong>in</strong>, that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “object <strong>in</strong>general” or, <strong>in</strong> its more proper phenomenological render<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> “anyth<strong>in</strong>g whatever”(Etwas überhaupt). 6 Indeed, it is precisely this circumstance, that is, <strong>the</strong> formalization<strong>of</strong> both ma<strong>the</strong>matics <strong>and</strong> logic <strong>in</strong> modern thought, that is one <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gsresponsible for <strong>the</strong> formal unity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se two discipl<strong>in</strong>es, which is someth<strong>in</strong>g,Husserl notes, that did not characterize ancient ma<strong>the</strong>matics <strong>and</strong> logic. 7 Husserl, <strong>of</strong>course, follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> early moderns but above all Leibniz, termed <strong>the</strong> unity <strong>of</strong> formalizedma<strong>the</strong>matics <strong>and</strong> formal logic <strong>the</strong> “ma<strong>the</strong>sis universalis,” <strong>and</strong> devoted <strong>the</strong>mature logical <strong>in</strong>vestigations <strong>in</strong> Formal <strong>and</strong> Transcendental Logic to a programmaticdiscussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenological foundation <strong>of</strong> this unity <strong>in</strong> a transcendentalphenomenological <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> judgment.Husserl first <strong>the</strong>matically articulated <strong>the</strong> difference between <strong>the</strong> formality or“universality” characteristic <strong>of</strong> modern logic <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>matics <strong>and</strong> that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nonformalizedontology <strong>of</strong> realities <strong>in</strong> Ideas I, when, on eidetic grounds, he characterized5Edmund Husserl, Formale und Tranzendentale Logik. Versuch e<strong>in</strong>er Kritik der logischen Vernunft,hrsg. P. Janssen (Hua XVII), Den Haag 1974, 42–43, 70.6Edmund Husserl, Formale und Tranzendentale Logik (Hua XVII), 70.7Edmund Husserl, Formale und Tranzendentale Logik (Hua XVII), 70.
Deformalization <strong>and</strong> Phenomenon <strong>in</strong> Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>53<strong>the</strong> “heterogeneity” <strong>of</strong> “formalization” <strong>and</strong> “generalization.” 8 In that text, he located<strong>the</strong>ir eidetic difference <strong>in</strong> generalized universality’s (1) material content (i.e., generalizedformality is <strong>in</strong>separable from both <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>and</strong> ideal objectivities) <strong>and</strong>(2) hierarchical structure (<strong>the</strong>re is both an upper limit to generalization, <strong>the</strong> materialregion, <strong>and</strong> a lower limit, <strong>the</strong> concretum), nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> which characterizes <strong>the</strong> materiallyempty character <strong>of</strong> formalized universality. Husserl also came to dist<strong>in</strong>guish (<strong>in</strong>Experience <strong>and</strong> Judgment) formalized from generalized universality on <strong>the</strong> grounds<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir different orig<strong>in</strong>s, because generalization yields formal essences on <strong>the</strong> basis<strong>of</strong> eidetic variation (both <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual objects <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir genera), whereas formalizationyields formalized essences on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> what Husserl characterizes as <strong>the</strong>“empty<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> material content from <strong>the</strong> essences yielded by generalization. 9Oddly enough, Husserl’s recognition (<strong>in</strong> Formal <strong>and</strong> Transcendental Logic) <strong>of</strong> a“historical” aspect belong<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction between <strong>the</strong> conceptuality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>“formal” <strong>in</strong> ancient <strong>and</strong> modern logic 10 is someth<strong>in</strong>g that he does not pursue anyfur<strong>the</strong>r. He does not pursue it ei<strong>the</strong>r on its own terms, or <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcendentalphenomenological <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> judgment to which he assigns <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> account<strong>in</strong>gfor <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “unity” proper to <strong>the</strong> formalized unity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “anyth<strong>in</strong>g whatever”<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> perceptual experience <strong>and</strong> evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual objects. His failure todo so is not just philosophically but also phenomenologically significant, becausenotwithst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> his thought <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> differences this <strong>in</strong>troduces<strong>in</strong>to his account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> methodology <strong>and</strong> content <strong>of</strong> deformalization, <strong>the</strong> convictionthat formalized unity has its orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>and</strong> evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividualobjects rema<strong>in</strong>s constant throughout this development. Thus, despite <strong>the</strong> fact thatHusserl recognizes a difference between <strong>the</strong> generaliz<strong>in</strong>g abstraction that yields <strong>the</strong>formal universality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> material a priori <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> formaliz<strong>in</strong>g abstraction thatyields <strong>the</strong> formal universality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> materially empty a priori, he never<strong>the</strong>lessrema<strong>in</strong>s conv<strong>in</strong>ced that <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual objects <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> material a priori is rootedare relevant to <strong>the</strong> constitution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formalized a priori. As he puts it <strong>in</strong> Formal <strong>and</strong>Transcendental Logic, if this is not <strong>the</strong> case, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> formalized a priori <strong>in</strong>vestigatedby formal ontology would lack “ontological” significance – which, forHusserl, it clearly does not. 11Husserl’s conviction is, <strong>in</strong> fact, a presupposition that cannot be realized.Specifically, that whatever <strong>the</strong> “ontological” significance <strong>of</strong> formal ontology is, it isclear that <strong>the</strong> constitution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formalized unity, as <strong>in</strong>separable from its basic concept,<strong>the</strong> “anyth<strong>in</strong>g whatever,” cannot be phenomenologically grounded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> unity8Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu e<strong>in</strong>er re<strong>in</strong>en Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie,I, Buch: Allgeme<strong>in</strong>e E<strong>in</strong>führung <strong>in</strong> die re<strong>in</strong>e Phänomenologie, hrsg. Karl Schuhmann (Hua III),Den Haag 1976, 26–27.9Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, ausgearbeitet und hrsg. Ludwig L<strong>and</strong>grebe, Hamburg1985, 435.10See especially Edmund Husserl, Formale und Tranzendentale Logik (Hua XVII), 42–43.11Edmund Husserl, Formale und Tranzendentale Logik, (Hua XVII), 190.
54 B.C. Hopk<strong>in</strong>sbelong<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>dividual objects. Generaliz<strong>in</strong>g abstraction is “founded” <strong>in</strong> perceptualacts directed toward <strong>in</strong>dividual objects. It sets <strong>in</strong>to relief generalized “states <strong>of</strong>affairs” <strong>in</strong> a concrete perceptual content. These states <strong>of</strong> affairs are “moments” <strong>of</strong> alogical whole that <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>and</strong> ideal material contents. Formaliz<strong>in</strong>gabstraction, from <strong>the</strong> Logical Investigations onward, is said to abstract from <strong>the</strong>“specificity” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> species contents yielded by generaliz<strong>in</strong>g abstraction, <strong>in</strong> a mannerthat at once empties <strong>the</strong>ir material categorial content <strong>and</strong> reveals <strong>the</strong> manifold relationalcategories responsible for <strong>the</strong>ir syntactical connections. 12 As such, <strong>the</strong>se syntacticalcategories (e.g., “<strong>and</strong>,” “or”) nei<strong>the</strong>r refer to nor are abstracted from <strong>in</strong>dividualobjects, but, ra<strong>the</strong>r, are abstracted from <strong>the</strong> connections between <strong>the</strong> categories thatare grounded <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual objects <strong>and</strong> that determ<strong>in</strong>e “what” <strong>the</strong>y are. 13Given Husserl’s account <strong>of</strong> formaliz<strong>in</strong>g abstraction, two fundamental questionsemerge. One, why, despite <strong>the</strong> explicit recognition <strong>in</strong> his account <strong>of</strong> formaliz<strong>in</strong>gabstraction accord<strong>in</strong>g to which formalized categories are abstracted from <strong>the</strong> relationsbetween <strong>the</strong> species <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual objects <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore not from <strong>the</strong>se speciesor objects <strong>the</strong>mselves, does he th<strong>in</strong>k that <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al evidence for <strong>the</strong> unity properto formalized concepts must be sought <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>and</strong> evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividualobjects? That is, whence Husserl’s conviction that <strong>the</strong> constitution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unity <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> formalized concepts that are modes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “anyth<strong>in</strong>g whatever” has to be capable<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g deformalized <strong>in</strong> a manner that traces its phenomenological source to <strong>the</strong>perception <strong>of</strong> sensible, <strong>in</strong>dividual objects? Two, just how are multiple formalizedsyntactical categories able to constitute <strong>the</strong> unity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> materially empty (<strong>and</strong>,<strong>the</strong>refore) materially <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate formalized categorical region, <strong>the</strong> “anyth<strong>in</strong>gwhatever” that composes <strong>the</strong> subject doma<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>sis universalis? 143 Husserl’s Conflation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Unity Proper to Indeterm<strong>in</strong>ate<strong>and</strong> Determ<strong>in</strong>ate Formal UniversalityThe answers to <strong>the</strong>se questions are <strong>in</strong>terrelated. Husserl never tells us how multiplesyntactical categories can never<strong>the</strong>less constitute a formalized unity because hebr<strong>in</strong>gs to his philosophy <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore his phenomenology <strong>the</strong> conviction that allunity is orig<strong>in</strong>ally determ<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong>refore, grounded <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual objects. 1512Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter B<strong>and</strong>, Erster Teil: Untersuchungen zurPhänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, hrsg. Ursula Panzer (Hua XIX/1), Den Haag 1984, 291.13Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen (Hua XIX/1), 657.14On this po<strong>in</strong>t, see J.N. Mohanty: “Husserl regards ‘object’ [i.e., <strong>the</strong> formal concept <strong>of</strong> ‘object <strong>in</strong>general’] as a purely syntactical category. The object is what is designated by a syntactically nom<strong>in</strong>alexpression. . . . For Husserl, concepts are also objects, so also are relations <strong>and</strong> functions. Hisidea <strong>of</strong> ‘object’ is <strong>the</strong>refore vacuous.” The Philosophy <strong>of</strong> Edmund Husserl (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 2008), p. 180.15See Mohanty aga<strong>in</strong>: “‘Be<strong>in</strong>g’, for Husserl . . . is not <strong>the</strong> most general concept, but a formal concept.Husserl’s problem . . . is how to reconcile this formulation with an <strong>in</strong>tuitionist epistemology” (180).
Deformalization <strong>and</strong> Phenomenon <strong>in</strong> Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>55This conviction br<strong>in</strong>gs with it <strong>the</strong> related conviction that all higher-level unities,whe<strong>the</strong>r generalized or formalized, must have <strong>the</strong>ir basis <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> unity <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividualobjects, because Husserl th<strong>in</strong>ks that this is <strong>the</strong> most orig<strong>in</strong>ally given unity. Thus, <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> Philosophy <strong>of</strong> Arithmetic, <strong>the</strong> materially empty character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formalized precursorto <strong>the</strong> Etwas überhaupt, <strong>the</strong> Etwas, is said to be generated by “reflexion upon<strong>the</strong> psychical act <strong>of</strong> present<strong>in</strong>g (Vorstellungs), for which precisely any determ<strong>in</strong>ateobject may be given as <strong>the</strong> content.” 16 In later works, <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> concept “anyth<strong>in</strong>gwhatever,” <strong>of</strong> course, is no longer said to be grounded <strong>in</strong> a psychical relation,but <strong>in</strong> what exactly it is grounded or how it o<strong>the</strong>rwise orig<strong>in</strong>ates is never discussedwith any specificity. These works now approach <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> account<strong>in</strong>g for thisunity programmatically, by attempt<strong>in</strong>g to tie <strong>the</strong> earlier “static” analyses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constitution<strong>of</strong> formalized unity to <strong>the</strong> unrealized project <strong>of</strong> desediment<strong>in</strong>g this unity’sgenesis <strong>in</strong> a hierarchal trail <strong>of</strong> evidences that ultimately term<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> pre- <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong>refore proto-logical “unity” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conceptually unmediated experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividualobjects. 17 Thus, <strong>the</strong>se works account for <strong>the</strong> formalized universality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> apriori by repeat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> earlier work’s vague references to “empty<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>the</strong> material apriori <strong>of</strong> its material content, only now <strong>the</strong>se references are cast <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>irpropaedeutic (<strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong>refore, <strong>in</strong>complete) status as <strong>the</strong> epistemological “spadework” for <strong>the</strong> more fully realized transcendental phenomenological <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong>judgment. 18 Or, as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first appendix to Formal <strong>and</strong> Transcendental Logic, 19 <strong>the</strong>“ultimate” formal structures are characterized as “cores” – which are <strong>the</strong>mselvessyntax-less – <strong>of</strong> formalized mean<strong>in</strong>g that are presupposed by all levels <strong>of</strong> formallogical syntax. Such cores, significantly, are not said to orig<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>in</strong> material empty<strong>in</strong>gbut by “comparisons” that yield <strong>the</strong> formal structures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “core-stuffs” presupposedby logical syntax <strong>in</strong> “formaliz<strong>in</strong>g universality.”Had Husserl pursued <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>sight implicit <strong>in</strong> his recognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> historical aspect<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> difference between generalization <strong>and</strong> formalization, however, he would havebeen forced to ab<strong>and</strong>on his conviction regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ontological <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore logicalpriority <strong>of</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ate unity, <strong>and</strong>, with this, his conviction that <strong>the</strong> symbolic orempty conceptual content <strong>of</strong> formalized unity must be <strong>of</strong> such a nature to lend itselfto a deformalization that leads (ultimately) to <strong>in</strong>dividual objects. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, on<strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> his recognition that <strong>the</strong> formal conceptuality found <strong>in</strong> Aristotle does notrefer to a logical concept whose <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate conceptual content possesses ontologicalsignificance, but to a general method <strong>of</strong> treat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> cognition <strong>of</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ateobjects, Husserl would have had to confront <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conceptuality<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> modern concept <strong>of</strong> just such an <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate concept <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reforeformally ontological object has to be sought elsewhere than <strong>in</strong> Aristotelianabstraction. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> argument could be made that Husserl’s Crisis-texts beg<strong>in</strong>16Edmund Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, hrsg. L. Eley (Hua XII), Den Haag 1970, 80.17Edmund Husserl, Formale und Tranzendentale Logik, (Hua XVII), 276–277.18Edmund Husserl, Formale und Tranzendentale Logik, (Hua XVII), 197.19Edmund Husserl, Formale und Tranzendentale Logik (Hua XVII), 271–272.
56 B.C. Hopk<strong>in</strong>sto do just this, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir attempt to render <strong>the</strong> formalization driv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>matization<strong>of</strong> nature comprehensible by desediment<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> unity compos<strong>in</strong>g its mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>expos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>reby <strong>the</strong> early modern transformation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ideal ma<strong>the</strong>matics <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Greeks <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> formalized ma<strong>the</strong>matics that grounds, to this day, modernma<strong>the</strong>matical physics.4 <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Uncritical Appropriation <strong>of</strong> Husserl’sConflation <strong>of</strong> Determ<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>and</strong> Indeterm<strong>in</strong>ate FormalityTo complete this task, Husserl would have had to desediment François Vieta’s<strong>in</strong>vention <strong>of</strong> modern algebra <strong>and</strong>, with this, <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> formalization, whichmakes its first historical appearance <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>matical calculation with materially<strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate concepts that def<strong>in</strong>e Vieta’s logistice speciosa. 20 The fact that thistask rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong>complete <strong>in</strong> Husserl’s thought, however, does not mitigate aga<strong>in</strong>st itsei<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>g completed or us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> its completion to address <strong>the</strong> topic <strong>of</strong>deformalization <strong>and</strong> phenomenon <strong>in</strong> Husserl’s <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s phenomenologies. 21What I <strong>in</strong>tend to show <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>der <strong>of</strong> my discussion is <strong>the</strong> genealogy <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s formal concept <strong>of</strong> phenomenon <strong>in</strong> Husserl’s formulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> heterogeneity<strong>of</strong> generalization <strong>and</strong> formalization, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Husserl’s account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong><strong>of</strong> formalization <strong>in</strong> an act <strong>of</strong> empty<strong>in</strong>g that does not rely on anyth<strong>in</strong>g that ispregiven, o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> concepts yielded by generalization. Once I have shownthis, I will articulate <strong>the</strong> conclusion that necessarily follows, namely, that because<strong>Heidegger</strong> situates his project <strong>of</strong> deformaliz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> formal concept <strong>of</strong> phenomenon<strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> Husserl’s account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> formalization <strong>and</strong> formalized unity, hisaccount <strong>of</strong> phenomenology both <strong>in</strong>herits <strong>and</strong> exacerbates some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> problems<strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> this account. These problems are (1) <strong>the</strong> presupposition that <strong>the</strong> phenomenologicalorig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formalized unity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Etwas überhaupt orig<strong>in</strong>ates from <strong>the</strong>unity <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual objects <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong>refore deformalization “returns to <strong>in</strong>dividual20Husserl was well aware <strong>of</strong> Vieta’s role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>matics, correctly credit<strong>in</strong>g him with“[t]he genu<strong>in</strong>e discovery <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal” (Edmund Husserl, Formale und Tranzendentale Logik,(Hua XVII, 70).21Jacob Kle<strong>in</strong> effectively accomplished <strong>the</strong> desedimentation <strong>of</strong> Vieta’s <strong>in</strong>vention <strong>of</strong> modern algebra<strong>in</strong> his sem<strong>in</strong>al study Greek Ma<strong>the</strong>matical Thought <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> Algebra, trans. Eva Brann(Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969); repr<strong>in</strong>t: (New York: Dover, 1992). This work was orig<strong>in</strong>allypublished <strong>in</strong> German as “Die griechische Logistik und die Entstehung der Algebra” <strong>in</strong>Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Ma<strong>the</strong>matik, Astronomie und Physik, Abteilung B: Studien,vol. 3, no. 1 (Berl<strong>in</strong>, 1934), 18–105 (Part I); no. 2 (1936), 122–235 (Part II). For a discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>relation to Husserl’s thought <strong>of</strong> Kle<strong>in</strong>’s discussion <strong>of</strong> Vieta’s role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> formalization,see Burt C. Hopk<strong>in</strong>s, “The Husserlian Context <strong>of</strong> Kle<strong>in</strong>’s Ma<strong>the</strong>matical Work,” The St. John’sReview 48 (2004): 43–71 <strong>and</strong> “On <strong>the</strong> Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘Language’ <strong>of</strong> Formal Ma<strong>the</strong>matics: AnIntentional-Historical Investigation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Discovery <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Formal,” <strong>in</strong> Mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Language:Phenomenological Perspectives, Dordrecht: Filip Mattens, 2008): 149–168.
Deformalization <strong>and</strong> Phenomenon <strong>in</strong> Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>57objects with particular concrete content,” 22 <strong>and</strong>, essentially related to this, (2) <strong>the</strong>articulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> methodology proper to <strong>the</strong> (phenomenological) access to <strong>the</strong>phenomenon <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> deformalization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal concept <strong>of</strong>phenomenon. Because <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s phenomenology makes between<strong>the</strong> “self-show<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> its opposite, its “concealment,”takes its methodical po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> departure from its formal conception, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sdeformalization <strong>of</strong> this dist<strong>in</strong>ction will be plagued by <strong>the</strong> problems <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>Husserlian account <strong>of</strong> deformalization.The genealogy l<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s phenomenological project <strong>of</strong> deformalizationto Husserl’s account <strong>of</strong> formalization, however, is not direct but mediated through<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s notion <strong>of</strong> formal <strong>in</strong>dication. Thus, I will also articulate how this notionarises from both an aspect <strong>of</strong> his uncritical appropriation <strong>of</strong> Husserl’s thought <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> attempt to reformulate critically ano<strong>the</strong>r aspect <strong>of</strong> it. On <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>Heidegger</strong>takes over Husserl’s account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> spontaneity <strong>of</strong> formaliz<strong>in</strong>g empty<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> itscapacity to yield a region <strong>of</strong> formalized objectivity, while, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>,<strong>Heidegger</strong> attempts to distance <strong>the</strong> “phenomenological” mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formalthat characterizes Husserl’s <strong>the</strong>oretical objectivism from what he (<strong>Heidegger</strong>)ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s is <strong>the</strong> genu<strong>in</strong>e mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> phenomenology, which is “primarily a concept<strong>of</strong> method.” 23Before be<strong>in</strong>g able to show all <strong>of</strong> this, I first need to discuss <strong>the</strong> salient features <strong>of</strong>formalization’s orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Vieta’s logistice speciosa, which will permit me to makegood on my claims that Husserl conflates <strong>the</strong> radically different (<strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir orig<strong>in</strong>s,historically dated) conceptuality <strong>of</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate formality.Thus, it is my claim that <strong>the</strong> “historicity” <strong>of</strong> formalization’s orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> this very dist<strong>in</strong>ctionprevents <strong>the</strong> unity proper to <strong>the</strong> modern, formalized ma<strong>the</strong>sis universalisfrom be<strong>in</strong>g deformalized <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> unity proper to <strong>the</strong> abstracted Aristotelian universal.Once this is established, both Husserl’s account <strong>of</strong> formaliz<strong>in</strong>g abstraction as anessentially Aristotelian material empty<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s account <strong>of</strong> its orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> relational sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> objectively <strong>the</strong>oretical attitude will have to be rejected onrigorous philosophical grounds, <strong>and</strong> with this, so, too, <strong>the</strong>ir formulations <strong>of</strong> phenomenologyas <strong>the</strong> project <strong>of</strong> deformalization.Desedimentation <strong>of</strong> Vieta’s <strong>in</strong>vention <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> modern, formalized concept <strong>of</strong> amaterially “<strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate” ma<strong>the</strong>matical object co<strong>in</strong>cides with <strong>the</strong> rediscovery <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al (<strong>and</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ate) ma<strong>the</strong>matical evidences <strong>of</strong> Greek ma<strong>the</strong>matics. 24This is <strong>the</strong> case because <strong>the</strong> unit <strong>of</strong> calculation <strong>in</strong> Vieta’s algebra is a magnitude that22<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem, GA 56/57 (Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong> 1987), p. 68.23<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, GA 2 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), Section 6.24Jacob Kle<strong>in</strong>, “Phenomenology <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> History <strong>of</strong> Science,” <strong>in</strong> Philosophical <strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> Memory<strong>of</strong> Edmund Husserl, ed. Marv<strong>in</strong> Farber (Cambridge, Mass: 1940), pp. 143–163; repr<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>in</strong> JacobKle<strong>in</strong>, Lectures <strong>and</strong> <strong>Essays</strong>, ed. Robert B. Williamson <strong>and</strong> Elliott (Annapolis: Zuckerman, 1985),65–84, here 83.
58 B.C. Hopk<strong>in</strong>sis identical with nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> discrete nor cont<strong>in</strong>uous magnitudes that compose <strong>the</strong>two possible objects <strong>of</strong> Greek ma<strong>the</strong>matics, numbers <strong>and</strong> geometrical shapes (<strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong>ir elements), respectively. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, Vieta’s unit <strong>of</strong> calculation, which he called a“symbol,” is identical with <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> magnitude <strong>in</strong> general, that is, a magnitudethat is “<strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate” with respect to numbers <strong>and</strong> shapes. As such, this conceptmanifestly does not owe its orig<strong>in</strong>ation to <strong>the</strong> disregard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> material content <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> species <strong>of</strong> numbers <strong>and</strong> geometrical shapes. With<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> Greek ma<strong>the</strong>matics,<strong>the</strong> species <strong>of</strong> numbers are <strong>the</strong> “odd” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “even,” 25 <strong>and</strong> empty<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir material content, which, presumably, would be <strong>the</strong> unlimited multitude <strong>of</strong>positive <strong>in</strong>tegers beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g with “two,” does not yield modern algebra. Likewise,empty<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> species <strong>of</strong> geometrical shapes, circles, squares, etc., toge<strong>the</strong>r with<strong>the</strong>ir elements, l<strong>in</strong>es, po<strong>in</strong>ts, etc., <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir material content does not yield analyticalgeometry.The conceptuality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal unity proper to Greek ma<strong>the</strong>matics is not identicalwith <strong>the</strong> species <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> only k<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>of</strong> objects recognized by this ma<strong>the</strong>matics,discrete <strong>and</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>uous magnitudes, both <strong>of</strong> which are always determ<strong>in</strong>ate, but with<strong>the</strong> objects that are required for <strong>the</strong>se objects’ cognition, which are accessible onlyto thought (nohtά). Aristotelian abstraction <strong>the</strong>refore can only be understood with<strong>in</strong>this context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “ontological” status <strong>of</strong> ancient Greek ma<strong>the</strong>matical objects. 26Aristotle’s controversy with <strong>the</strong> Platonists was <strong>the</strong>refore not about whe<strong>the</strong>r suchnoetic objects exist, but about <strong>the</strong>ir true mode <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. His account <strong>of</strong> this mode <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g, “from abstraction,” can only be properly understood with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> horizon <strong>of</strong>this controversy. Abstraction is <strong>the</strong>refore not only <strong>the</strong> psychological process <strong>of</strong> disregard<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> sensible characteristics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bodies with which <strong>the</strong> arithmetician <strong>and</strong>geometrician deal (when <strong>the</strong>y calculate <strong>the</strong>ir amounts, demonstrate <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>the</strong>orems,<strong>and</strong> construct <strong>the</strong>ir figures) <strong>in</strong> order to treat as separate what, <strong>in</strong> truth (<strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong>refore,<strong>in</strong> contrast to <strong>the</strong> cwrismόV <strong>the</strong>sis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Platonists), is not separate from <strong>the</strong>m.Abstraction <strong>in</strong> Aristotle is also <strong>in</strong>separable from <strong>the</strong> “logical” process <strong>of</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>gan account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> noetic objects that compose <strong>the</strong> true objects <strong>of</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>maticalέpistήµh. And <strong>the</strong>se objects are decidedly not “universals,” which, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>context <strong>of</strong> ancient Greek ma<strong>the</strong>matics, would mean that <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>the</strong> species <strong>of</strong>ma<strong>the</strong>matical objects, <strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong>refore, not <strong>the</strong>se objects <strong>the</strong>mselves. Thus, for Platoas for Aristotle, <strong>the</strong>re is no such “th<strong>in</strong>g” as ma<strong>the</strong>matical objects that be<strong>in</strong>g nei<strong>the</strong>ra discrete nor cont<strong>in</strong>uous magnitude are <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> precisely this sense“general.” 27 The formal conceptuality <strong>of</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ate ma<strong>the</strong>matical unity <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>abstractive sense relevant to my discussion is – ow<strong>in</strong>g to its orig<strong>in</strong> – completelydeterm<strong>in</strong>ate. Aristotle characterizes this orig<strong>in</strong> as (1) disregard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> sensible contentsperceived <strong>in</strong> bodies <strong>in</strong> order to treat <strong>the</strong>ir species as separable from <strong>the</strong>sebodies <strong>and</strong> (2) disregard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> specific natures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> abstracted species <strong>the</strong>mselves,25See Jacob Kle<strong>in</strong>, Greek Ma<strong>the</strong>matical Thought <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> Algebra, 57.26See Jacob Kle<strong>in</strong>, Greek Ma<strong>the</strong>matical Thought <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> Algebra, 100.27See Jacob Kle<strong>in</strong>, Greek Ma<strong>the</strong>matical Thought <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> Algebra, 123.
Deformalization <strong>and</strong> Phenomenon <strong>in</strong> Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>59<strong>in</strong> order to abstract from <strong>the</strong>se a species-neutral unity, which, <strong>in</strong> turn, is treated asseparable from this or that species. The result<strong>in</strong>g “universality” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> abstractedspecies-neutral unity is <strong>the</strong>refore, <strong>in</strong> truth, not separate from <strong>the</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ate species<strong>of</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ate objects; as such, it is an abstracted “piece” <strong>of</strong> a determ<strong>in</strong>ate object.Its function <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g able to refer to <strong>the</strong> whole <strong>of</strong> any arbitrary determ<strong>in</strong>ate object is<strong>the</strong>refore not <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> its putative <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate content, such that <strong>the</strong>se objectscould be legitimately understood to “fall under” its concept. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, this functionis <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> species-neutrality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ate ma<strong>the</strong>matical object assist<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>matician <strong>in</strong> pick<strong>in</strong>g out what it is <strong>in</strong> (fully determ<strong>in</strong>ate) sensible objectsthat permits <strong>the</strong>ir general ma<strong>the</strong>matic treatment <strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong>refore, ma<strong>the</strong>maticalέpstήmh with respect to <strong>the</strong>m. 28The conceptuality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> species that compose <strong>the</strong> formalized units <strong>of</strong> calculation<strong>in</strong> Vieta’s logistice speciosa, <strong>in</strong> contrast, does not owe its orig<strong>in</strong> to hav<strong>in</strong>g been“lifted <strong>of</strong>f” sensuously perceived objects. Vieta’s formaliz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>novation does nothave its basis <strong>in</strong> a “perceptual modification” but <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> transformation <strong>of</strong> a preexist<strong>in</strong>gma<strong>the</strong>matical procedure for <strong>the</strong> discovery <strong>of</strong> unknown magnitudes, “analysis<strong>and</strong> syn<strong>the</strong>sis.” This procedure granted as given <strong>the</strong> magnitude that is unknown <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong>refore sought (which was called analysis) <strong>and</strong> proceeded to perform calculationsthat ei<strong>the</strong>r term<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>in</strong> an impossible magnitude (one that contradicts exist<strong>in</strong>g ma<strong>the</strong>maticalknowledge) or <strong>in</strong> a magnitude that (be<strong>in</strong>g consistent with exist<strong>in</strong>g ma<strong>the</strong>maticalknowledge) is possible. In <strong>the</strong> latter case, <strong>the</strong> granted as given magnitudethat is sought is <strong>the</strong>n demonstrated to be <strong>the</strong> “true” one by resolv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> problem(which was called syn<strong>the</strong>sis), ei<strong>the</strong>r by construct<strong>in</strong>g a geometrical figure or perform<strong>in</strong>gdeterm<strong>in</strong>ate arithmetical calculations. Vieta transformed this whole procedureby restrict<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> magnitudes <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “analysis” to numbers, <strong>and</strong>treat<strong>in</strong>g both <strong>the</strong> unknown (as was traditionally done) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> known numbers(which was not done traditionally <strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong>refore, is a major part <strong>of</strong> his <strong>in</strong>novation),as “granted as given,” <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong> precisely this sense, as “<strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate.” This enabledhim to restrict all calculations with arithmetic magnitudes to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate mode<strong>of</strong> traditional analysis, <strong>and</strong> to <strong>the</strong>n “resolve” <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g an unknownnumber <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate mode, dispens<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ate calculationsrequired by traditional syn<strong>the</strong>sis <strong>in</strong> order to resolve <strong>the</strong> analysis.Vieta’s <strong>in</strong>novation, which, be<strong>in</strong>g self-conscious <strong>of</strong> its l<strong>in</strong>eage, he named <strong>the</strong>“analytical art,” is <strong>the</strong>refore not based <strong>in</strong> an abstraction from <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual, determ<strong>in</strong>ate,ma<strong>the</strong>matical objects <strong>of</strong> traditional arithmetic. The reactivation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>alevidence <strong>of</strong> Vieta’s procedure, which “anticipates” <strong>the</strong> transformation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>formal conceptuality <strong>of</strong> traditional ma<strong>the</strong>matics <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> formalized conceptualityconstitutive <strong>of</strong> modern symbolic ma<strong>the</strong>matics, discloses that what makes this conceptualitypossible is <strong>the</strong> shift <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “true object” <strong>of</strong> arithmetic, from <strong>the</strong> apprehension<strong>of</strong> a determ<strong>in</strong>ate number, to <strong>the</strong> apprehension <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> apprehension <strong>of</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>atenumbers – <strong>in</strong> general. This “apprehension <strong>of</strong> apprehension” is <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>28See Jacob Kle<strong>in</strong>, Greek Ma<strong>the</strong>matical Thought <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> Algebra, 109–110.
60 B.C. Hopk<strong>in</strong>sprecise sense <strong>of</strong> its nonco<strong>in</strong>cidence with both known <strong>and</strong> unknown determ<strong>in</strong>atenumbers. Vieta used <strong>the</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> eÉdoV (a term he appropriated from <strong>the</strong>traditional arithmetic <strong>of</strong> Diophantus), “species,” to characterize <strong>the</strong> formalized(because <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate) “units” employed by his method <strong>of</strong> calculation us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>atemagnitudes, <strong>and</strong> used letters from <strong>the</strong> alphabet to designate <strong>the</strong>m.Significantly, it was Descartes, <strong>and</strong> not (as Husserl thought) Leibniz who was <strong>the</strong>first to connect <strong>the</strong> new dimension <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate magnitude that is characteristic<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “pure” algebra made possible by Vieta’s “analytical art” with <strong>the</strong> “ma<strong>the</strong>sisuniversalis,” <strong>the</strong> word that Barocius, Proclus’s translator <strong>in</strong>to Lat<strong>in</strong>, used to designate<strong>the</strong> highest ma<strong>the</strong>matical science <strong>of</strong> Greek antiquity. And likewise it was alsoDescartes who, significantly, first attributed to this science an ontological significance,as he identified its <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore general concept with <strong>the</strong>essence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> substance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, “extension.” 29 F<strong>in</strong>ally, Descartes was <strong>the</strong> first –<strong>and</strong> also <strong>the</strong> last – philosopher to attempt to fix conceptually <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d’s ability to“<strong>in</strong>tuit” <strong>and</strong> calculate with <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate concepts that it has abstracted from itsown power <strong>of</strong> know<strong>in</strong>g, from its “apprehension <strong>of</strong> its apprehension,” given <strong>the</strong> factthat <strong>the</strong> “purity” (as <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se concepts does not allow <strong>the</strong>m to bepredicated – without contradiction – upon determ<strong>in</strong>ate objects. What allows <strong>the</strong>m<strong>in</strong>d to do this, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Descartes, is its enlistment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> imag<strong>in</strong>ation’s capacityto make visible to <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d its (<strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d’s) “pure” concepts by employ<strong>in</strong>g determ<strong>in</strong>ateimages to represent <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate content <strong>of</strong> such concepts. This iseffected via <strong>the</strong> identification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d’s “pure” concepts with visible letters <strong>and</strong>figures. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Descartes, <strong>the</strong> “pure” <strong>in</strong>tellect enlists <strong>the</strong> service<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> imag<strong>in</strong>ation’s power to make its images visible, but not <strong>the</strong>se visibleimages <strong>the</strong>mselves, <strong>in</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g visible its pure concepts by us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> medium <strong>of</strong>sense perceptible letters <strong>and</strong> figures that, because <strong>the</strong>y employ a determ<strong>in</strong>ate markto represent an <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate conceptual content, now function as symbols.This necessarily brief <strong>and</strong> abbreviated synopsis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> desedimentation <strong>and</strong> reactivation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore formalized objects <strong>in</strong>Vieta’s logistice speciosa <strong>and</strong> its connection with Descartes’ ontology is <strong>in</strong>tended toshow <strong>the</strong> deficiency <strong>of</strong> Husserl’s account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> formalized unity. By attribut<strong>in</strong>gthis orig<strong>in</strong> to an abstraction that has its basis on a perceptual modification,Husserl, <strong>in</strong> effect, employs Aristotelian abstraction, which is only capable <strong>of</strong> yield<strong>in</strong>ga universality whose “formal” status is <strong>in</strong>separable from <strong>the</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ate objectsgiven <strong>in</strong> sensuous perception, to account for <strong>the</strong> “formalized” universality <strong>of</strong> conceptsthat are generated from <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d’s apprehension <strong>of</strong> its own apprehension. BecauseHusserl’s phenomenological project <strong>of</strong> deformalization is borne <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> convictionthat <strong>the</strong> unity <strong>of</strong> such formalized universality must be “reducible” to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tuitivegivenness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unity <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual objects, <strong>the</strong> conclusion that this project has itsbasis <strong>in</strong> an unsusta<strong>in</strong>able conflation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> two essentially different k<strong>in</strong>ds<strong>of</strong> unity is unavoidable.29See Jacob Kle<strong>in</strong>, Greek Ma<strong>the</strong>matical Thought <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> Algebra, 210–211.
Deformalization <strong>and</strong> Phenomenon <strong>in</strong> Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>615 The Problematical L<strong>in</strong>k Between Husserlian Formalization<strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Formulation <strong>of</strong> Phenomenology<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s account <strong>of</strong> “formal <strong>in</strong>dication” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1920/1921 lecture course,“Introduction to <strong>the</strong> Phenomenology <strong>of</strong> Religion,” 30 makes explicit its connection toHusserl’s account <strong>of</strong> formalization <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> considerable degree to which this connectiondraws on Husserl’s dist<strong>in</strong>ction between formalization <strong>and</strong> generalization.This dist<strong>in</strong>ction, accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>Heidegger</strong>, is known to ma<strong>the</strong>matics from at least <strong>the</strong>time <strong>of</strong> Leibniz, but is only logically explicated for <strong>the</strong> first time by Husserl.<strong>Heidegger</strong> glosses Husserl’s account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> difference between generalization <strong>and</strong>formalization, characteriz<strong>in</strong>g generalization as “universaliz<strong>in</strong>g [Verallgeme<strong>in</strong>erung]accord<strong>in</strong>g to genus” 31 <strong>and</strong> formalization as aris<strong>in</strong>g “out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relational sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>pure [<strong>the</strong>oretical] attitud<strong>in</strong>al relation itself.” 32 Thus, as for Husserl, “<strong>the</strong> formalpredication is not bound <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> its material contents” 33 whereas generalizationis said to articulate “<strong>the</strong> concretely determ<strong>in</strong>ed order<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> levels <strong>of</strong> ‘generalities’(genus <strong>and</strong> species).” 34 Formalization’s orig<strong>in</strong> is characterized by <strong>Heidegger</strong>,aga<strong>in</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g Husserl, <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> a turn<strong>in</strong>g away from “<strong>the</strong> particular ‘what’ <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> object to be determ<strong>in</strong>ed” 35 <strong>in</strong> order to determ<strong>in</strong>e it “as that which is grasped; asthat to which <strong>the</strong> cogniz<strong>in</strong>g relation refers.” 36 What is <strong>the</strong>reby grasped is <strong>the</strong> “‘objectas such’ [Gegenst<strong>and</strong> überhaupt],” 37 that is, “a someth<strong>in</strong>g as object [e<strong>in</strong>es Etwas alsGegenst<strong>and</strong>]” 38 <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “‘to which’” 39 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>oretical attitud<strong>in</strong>al relation”40 <strong>and</strong> not <strong>the</strong> “what content” <strong>in</strong> general <strong>of</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g that is materially determ<strong>in</strong>ed.<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s account <strong>of</strong> formalization even mirrors <strong>the</strong> obscurity <strong>in</strong> Husserl’saccount regard<strong>in</strong>g how, exactly, <strong>the</strong> multitude <strong>of</strong> formalized syntactical categories isable to constitute <strong>the</strong> unity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Etwas überhaupt” that composes <strong>the</strong> subjectdoma<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>sis universalis. This can be seen <strong>in</strong> his claim that “this attitud<strong>in</strong>alrelation conta<strong>in</strong>s a manifold [mannigfaltigkeit] <strong>of</strong> senses that can be explicated,” 4130<strong>Heidegger</strong>, E<strong>in</strong>leitung <strong>in</strong> die Phänomenologie der Religion, <strong>in</strong> Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Phänomenologiedes religiösen Lebens, GA 60 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996), pp. 1–156.31GA 60, p. 58.32GA 60, p. 58.33GA 60, p. 58.34GA 60, p. 58.35GA 60, p. 61.36GA 60, p. 61.37GA 60, p. 61.38GA 60, p. 61.39GA 60, p. 61.40GA 60, p. 61.41GA 60, p. 61. Theodore Kisiel’s reconstruction <strong>of</strong> a crucial sentence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> lecture course concern<strong>in</strong>gformalized objectivity adds supplemental material from <strong>the</strong> student transcript <strong>of</strong> FritzNeumann (Leuven Archiv) (personal communication from Kisiel) that is relevant to <strong>the</strong> claim I am
62 B.C. Hopk<strong>in</strong>ssuch that <strong>the</strong> “manifold” 42 proper to <strong>the</strong> attitud<strong>in</strong>al relation “is formed out <strong>in</strong>to aformal object-category to which a ‘region’ corresponds.” 43<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s account <strong>of</strong> “formal <strong>in</strong>dication,” however, attempts to go beyondHusserl’s account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> difference between generalization <strong>and</strong> formalization, bydist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>g “formal <strong>in</strong>dication’s” formality from that <strong>of</strong> formalization. Under <strong>the</strong>head<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Phenomenology <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal,” 44 which he characterizes as <strong>the</strong>“orig<strong>in</strong>al consideration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal itself <strong>and</strong> explication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relational sensewith<strong>in</strong> its accomplishment [Vollzugs],” 45 <strong>Heidegger</strong> holds that formal-ontologicaluniversality does not prejudice philosophy “<strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong> formal-ontological determ<strong>in</strong>ationsare formal.” 46 He thus ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s “it is fitt<strong>in</strong>g to lead philosophy back to<strong>the</strong>m.” 47 Only if <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>sis that philosophy is an attitude is withdrawn, <strong>and</strong> with this,<strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>sis withdrawn that philosophy is a <strong>the</strong>oretical science, can “<strong>the</strong> acceptedformal-ontological grasp <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> object” 48 be understood as “prejudic<strong>in</strong>g.” 49 In o<strong>the</strong>rwords, on <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s view, <strong>the</strong> question whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> formal-ontological prejudicesphilosophy only “makes sense if one accepts <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>sis that philosophy is not anattitude.” 50 Once this “presupposition” 51 is accepted, <strong>the</strong>n “formal-ontologicalstudy < cannot > 52 be <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al one.” 53The f<strong>in</strong>al study, <strong>of</strong> course, is phenomenology. It does not orig<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>in</strong> an attitude<strong>and</strong> is <strong>the</strong>refore not a <strong>the</strong>oretical science. What it is, <strong>and</strong> what a phenomenon is,advanc<strong>in</strong>g here that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s account <strong>of</strong> formalization closely follows Husserl’s. GA 60 pr<strong>in</strong>tedOskar Becker’s transcript, which does not conta<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> crucial words “someth<strong>in</strong>g . . . <strong>and</strong>, or” thatKisiel restores follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Neumann notes, The Genesis <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time(Berkeley: University <strong>of</strong> California Press, 1994), p. 167, <strong>and</strong> which would have found its place <strong>in</strong>GA 60, p. 59, l<strong>in</strong>e 4. These words, <strong>of</strong> course, are found <strong>in</strong> Husserl’s account <strong>of</strong> formalized universality<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore highlight all <strong>the</strong> more <strong>the</strong> proximity <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s account <strong>of</strong> formalizationto Husserl’s.Neumann’s transcript verbatim is as follows, with <strong>the</strong> omitted sentence (<strong>in</strong> square brackets)flanked by <strong>the</strong> sentence before <strong>and</strong> after to del<strong>in</strong>eate <strong>the</strong> entire context <strong>in</strong> which it belongs:“Das formale Gegenständliche entspr<strong>in</strong>gt nicht aus e<strong>in</strong>em Wasgehalt überhaupt, sondern ausdem Bezugss<strong>in</strong>n des re<strong>in</strong>en E<strong>in</strong>stellungsbezuges selbst. [Und erst auf Grund dieses Ausgangeskönnen die Bezugss<strong>in</strong>ne selbst als Gegenstände gefaßt werden und weiterh<strong>in</strong> als formaleKategorien: Etwas, Und.] Der re<strong>in</strong>e E<strong>in</strong>stellungsbezug muß noch selbst als Vollzug betrachtetwerden, um der Ursprung des Theoretischen zu verstehen.”42GA 60, p. 62.43GA 60, p. 62.44GA 60, p. 62.45GA 60, p. 62.46GA 60, p. 62.47GA 60, p. 62.48GA 60, p. 62.49GA 60, p. 62.50GA 60, p. 62.51GA 60, p. 62.52GA 60, p. 62.53Correct<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> obvious omission <strong>of</strong> “nicht” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text.
Deformalization <strong>and</strong> Phenomenon <strong>in</strong> Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>63“can be itself <strong>in</strong>dicated only formally,” 54 albeit not formally <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>objectivation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relational sense characteristic <strong>of</strong> formal ontology – despite itsproximity to <strong>the</strong> latter. Each experience, accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>Heidegger</strong>, qua its experienc<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> what is experienced, can be <strong>in</strong>terrogated with respect to its orig<strong>in</strong>al “what”(content sense), its orig<strong>in</strong>al “how” (relational sense), <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al “accomplish<strong>in</strong>g[vollziehen]” 55 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “how” proper to its relational sense. Phenomenon is <strong>the</strong> totality<strong>of</strong> sense <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se three <strong>in</strong>terrogative directions, <strong>and</strong> phenomenology its explication.This explication, however, faces a formidable obstacle, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as “formalontological determ<strong>in</strong>ateness” 56 ei<strong>the</strong>r “prescribes, or at least contributes to prescrib<strong>in</strong>g,a <strong>the</strong>oretical relational mean<strong>in</strong>g” 57 that “conceals <strong>the</strong> accomplishment aspect[das Vollzugsmäßige]” 58 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relational sense “<strong>and</strong> turns one-sidedly to <strong>the</strong>content.” 59 <strong>Heidegger</strong> presumably means here that formal-ontological determ<strong>in</strong>ationleads to “<strong>the</strong>ory” (<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> philosophy) turn<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> “what sense” <strong>of</strong>each experience <strong>in</strong> a manner that makes it “objective” <strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong>refore, “entirely <strong>in</strong>differentas to content.” 60 It is to “formal <strong>in</strong>dication” that <strong>Heidegger</strong> assigns <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong>prevent<strong>in</strong>g this “prejudice,” 61 which dom<strong>in</strong>ates “<strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> philosophy” <strong>and</strong>which is “fatal for <strong>the</strong> relational- <strong>and</strong> accomplishment side [Vollzugsseite] <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>phenomenon.” 62<strong>Heidegger</strong> is quite clear that <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “formal” <strong>in</strong> “talk <strong>of</strong> formal <strong>in</strong>dication”63 is someth<strong>in</strong>g that “has noth<strong>in</strong>g to do” 64 with <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> universality” 65that “is common to formalization <strong>and</strong> generalization.” 66 Thus he writes: “<strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> ‘formal’ <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘formal <strong>in</strong>dication’ is more orig<strong>in</strong>al.” 67 With<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> formalized, <strong>the</strong>differences between “someth<strong>in</strong>g is an object” 68 <strong>and</strong> “experience as such” 69 gotoge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> “sense <strong>of</strong> ‘universal’,” 70 whereas “<strong>the</strong> formal <strong>in</strong>dication has noth<strong>in</strong>gto do with this.” 71 Formal <strong>in</strong>dication is never<strong>the</strong>less called formal because “<strong>the</strong> formal54GA 60, p. 62.55GA 60, p. 63.56GA 60, p. 63.57GA 60, p. 63.58GA 60, p. 63.59GA 60, p. 63.60GA 60, p. 63.61GA 60, p. 63.62GA 60, p. 63.63GA 60, p. 63.64GA 60, p. 59.65GA 60 p. 59.66GA 60, p. 59.67GA 60, p. 59.68GA 60, p. 59.69GA 60, p. 59.70GA 60, p. 59.71GA 60, p. 59.
64 B.C. Hopk<strong>in</strong>sis someth<strong>in</strong>g relational,” 72 albeit <strong>the</strong> “relational” <strong>in</strong> formal <strong>in</strong>dication concernsnei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> “direct” 73 order<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> generalization nor <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>direct” 74 order<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>formalization. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than concern any k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> universal order<strong>in</strong>g, formal <strong>in</strong>dication“should <strong>in</strong>dicate beforeh<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon.” 75 <strong>Heidegger</strong>unpacks this relation <strong>in</strong> two senses, one <strong>of</strong> which is “negative” 76 <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong>which “means <strong>the</strong> posit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenological explication.” 77 The negativesense <strong>in</strong>dicates that “a phenomenon must be pregiven <strong>in</strong> a manner that holds itsrelational sense <strong>in</strong> suspense,” 78 <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore functions “as a warn<strong>in</strong>g” 79 aga<strong>in</strong>st“tak<strong>in</strong>g it for granted that its relational sense is orig<strong>in</strong>ally <strong>the</strong>oretical.” 80 The o<strong>the</strong>rsense, hav<strong>in</strong>g noth<strong>in</strong>g to do with order<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> classification, leaves “everyth<strong>in</strong>gundecided,” 81 <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore “has sense only <strong>in</strong> relation to <strong>the</strong> phenomenologicalexplication.” 82Precisely, how <strong>the</strong> tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g as formally <strong>in</strong>dicated is able to f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>“admittedly improper” 83 character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “formal” (as <strong>Heidegger</strong> puts it <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>gyear <strong>in</strong> his 1921–1922 lecture course “The Phenomenological Interpretation <strong>of</strong>Aristotle”) “a positive reference,” whereby “<strong>the</strong> empty content <strong>in</strong> its sense-structureis at <strong>the</strong> same time that which provides <strong>the</strong> direction toward its accomplishment(Vollzugrichtung),” 84 is a secret that <strong>Heidegger</strong> apparently took with himself to <strong>the</strong>grave. 85 The proximity <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s talk <strong>of</strong> formal <strong>in</strong>dication to Husserl’s account<strong>of</strong> formalization, never<strong>the</strong>less, does permit <strong>the</strong> discernment <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s reasons72GA 60, p. 59.73GA 60, p. 63.74GA 60, p. 61.75GA 60, p. 61.76GA 60, p. 63.77GA 60, p. 63.78GA 60, p. 64.79GA 60, p. 63 f.80GA 60, p. 63.81GA 60, p. 64.82GA 60, p. 64.83GA 60, p. 64.84<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristotles. E<strong>in</strong>führung <strong>in</strong> diePhänomenologische Forschung, GA 61 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann,1985), p. 33.85Daniel Dahlstrom, for <strong>in</strong>stance, ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> this connection “that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s emphasis on <strong>the</strong>formality <strong>of</strong> philosophical concepts is somewhat mislead<strong>in</strong>g,” because <strong>the</strong>y “are clearly not understoodby him as be<strong>in</strong>g so devoid <strong>of</strong> content that <strong>the</strong>y are unable to preclude errant presumptivedeterm<strong>in</strong>ations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir mean<strong>in</strong>g.” Dahlstrom, “<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Method: Philosophical Concepts asFormal Indications,” Review <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics, 47 (June 1994): 775–795, here 785. Steven Crowell,on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that “Formality here is not <strong>the</strong> empt<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>of</strong> logical formality, butra<strong>the</strong>r like Husserl’s ‘empty’ <strong>in</strong>tentions that conta<strong>in</strong> directions for <strong>the</strong>ir own fulfillment.” Crowell,Husserl, <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Space <strong>of</strong> Mean<strong>in</strong>g (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001),p. 141. Crowell also characterizes <strong>the</strong> “accomplishment <strong>of</strong> evidence” that follows <strong>the</strong> formal <strong>in</strong>dication’sfulfillment as its becom<strong>in</strong>g “deformalized” (ibid.).
Deformalization <strong>and</strong> Phenomenon <strong>in</strong> Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>65for persist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> call<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dication <strong>in</strong>volved “formal,” despite its critical relationto <strong>the</strong> formalized sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal that (on his view) has dom<strong>in</strong>ated philosophythroughout its history. The formalized sense where<strong>in</strong> “someth<strong>in</strong>g as object” is <strong>the</strong>oreticallydeterm<strong>in</strong>ed as an objective content never<strong>the</strong>less <strong>in</strong>directly refers to <strong>the</strong>relational sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al “how” <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> content sense <strong>of</strong> “what” is experienced<strong>in</strong> experience is experienced. Because <strong>of</strong> this, <strong>the</strong> suspension <strong>of</strong> this formalizedsense is able to avoid formalization’s <strong>the</strong>oretical classification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>phenomenon’s relational sense while reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “formal” as someth<strong>in</strong>grelational. Specifically, <strong>the</strong> suspension <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical posit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>relational sense achieved by formal <strong>in</strong>dication permits <strong>the</strong> posit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al“how” <strong>of</strong> this relational sense’s “accomplishment” (Vollzug), that is, it permits <strong>the</strong>posit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> phenomenological explication.This proximity <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s account <strong>of</strong> formal <strong>in</strong>dication to Husserl’s account<strong>of</strong> formalization, however, also br<strong>in</strong>gs with it <strong>the</strong> problem (identified earlier) thatplagues Husserl’s account. Namely, Husserl’s misguided conviction that <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ateunity that characterizes <strong>the</strong> materially empty <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore formalized“Etwas überhaupt” lends itself to be<strong>in</strong>g deformalized <strong>in</strong> a manner that leads back toits orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> unity <strong>of</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>in</strong>dividual objects. This problem shows up <strong>in</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s conviction that <strong>the</strong> “orig<strong>in</strong>al fulfillment <strong>of</strong> what is <strong>in</strong>dicated” 86 by<strong>the</strong> formal <strong>in</strong>dication is “factical life.” 87 Thus, he holds that formal <strong>in</strong>dication “as <strong>the</strong>method <strong>of</strong> approach” 88 to this life is “factically necessarily.” 89 The problem heremay be put succ<strong>in</strong>ctly: <strong>the</strong> statement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> factical necessity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> method <strong>of</strong>formal <strong>in</strong>dication presupposes ra<strong>the</strong>r than establishes that its directional sense f<strong>in</strong>dsits fulfillment <strong>in</strong> a phenomenon that is not ordered <strong>in</strong> any way by its putatively non<strong>the</strong>oreticalrelational sense. Stated differently: because <strong>the</strong> formality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “formal”proper to “formal <strong>in</strong>dication” is understood by <strong>Heidegger</strong> to be <strong>in</strong>itially dist<strong>in</strong>ctfrom <strong>the</strong> phenomenon that it <strong>in</strong>dicates, justify<strong>in</strong>g this formality (viz. <strong>in</strong>dication)“phenomenologically,” that is, on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon, cannot but proveimpossible.<strong>Heidegger</strong> himself seems to have realized this. Thus <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, <strong>the</strong> formalityproper to <strong>the</strong> phenomenological method is collapsed <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> phenomenonitself. This enables him to dist<strong>in</strong>guish <strong>the</strong> formal concept <strong>of</strong> phenomenonfrom <strong>the</strong> “deformalized” 90 phenomenological concept <strong>and</strong> to formulate <strong>the</strong> methodicallocus <strong>of</strong> ontology’s possibility as phenomenology <strong>in</strong> precisely <strong>the</strong> formal concept<strong>of</strong> phenomenon’s deformalization. The formality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal concept <strong>of</strong>phenomenon, unlike <strong>the</strong> formality <strong>of</strong> formal <strong>in</strong>dication, is not characterized by its“relational sense” but by its ontico (related to be<strong>in</strong>gs)-ontological (related to <strong>the</strong>86GA 61, p. 33.87GA 61, p.134.88GA 61, p.134.89GA 61, p.134.90GA 2, pp. 46–47.
66 B.C. Hopk<strong>in</strong>sbe<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs) <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>acy. Thus, <strong>the</strong> formal concept <strong>of</strong> phenomenon is graspedby leav<strong>in</strong>g “undeterm<strong>in</strong>ed which entities are to be addressed as phenomena” 91 <strong>and</strong>“whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> self-show<strong>in</strong>g is actually a particular entity or a characteristic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> entities.” 92 Related to this, if “we underst<strong>and</strong> 93 <strong>the</strong> self-show<strong>in</strong>g that is<strong>in</strong>separable from <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> phenomenon <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> entities, “phenomenon has<strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary concept <strong>of</strong> phenomenon.” 94 The phenomenologicalconcept <strong>of</strong> phenomenon differs from <strong>the</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary concept, because what is “let tobe seen” 95 by “phenomenon <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ctive sense” 96 <strong>of</strong> phenomenology is “someth<strong>in</strong>gthat does not show itself <strong>in</strong>itially <strong>and</strong> for <strong>the</strong> most part, someth<strong>in</strong>g that isconcealed, <strong>in</strong> contrast to what <strong>in</strong>itially <strong>and</strong> for <strong>the</strong> most part does show itself.” 97Because, however, <strong>the</strong> deformalized phenomenological concept <strong>of</strong> phenomenon“essentially belongs to what <strong>in</strong>itially <strong>and</strong> for <strong>the</strong> most part shows itself,” 98 <strong>and</strong> doesso as “its mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> ground,” 99 <strong>the</strong> “ord<strong>in</strong>ary concept <strong>of</strong> phenomenon becomesphenomenologically relevant.” 100 And this means that not only is <strong>the</strong> deformalizedphenomenon <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenologically proper sense – <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> entities –someth<strong>in</strong>g that is <strong>in</strong>itially <strong>and</strong> for <strong>the</strong> most part concealed <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore someth<strong>in</strong>gwhose self-show<strong>in</strong>g must be won <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> access that genu<strong>in</strong>ely belongs to it,but that, so, too, <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al self-show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se entities <strong>the</strong>mselves is concealed<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore must be phenomenologically secured.By shift<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> term<strong>in</strong>us a quo <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proper task <strong>of</strong> phenomenology –deformalization – from formalized objectivity’s <strong>the</strong>oretically liberated relationalsense to <strong>the</strong> ontico-ontological <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>acy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal concept <strong>of</strong> phenomenon,<strong>Heidegger</strong> posits three <strong>in</strong>terrelated th<strong>in</strong>gs. (1) The formulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> methodologicalmean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> phenomenology properly situates <strong>the</strong> locus <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon’s<strong>in</strong>itial concealment with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon itself, ra<strong>the</strong>r than with<strong>in</strong> an attitude thatis <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sically alienated from <strong>the</strong> phenomenon. (2) Deformaliz<strong>in</strong>g phenomenology’sformal component does not lead to an orig<strong>in</strong>al accomplishment <strong>of</strong> sense but to<strong>the</strong> concealed self-show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> both be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g. Thus, deformalizationleads to <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic problem <strong>of</strong> wrest<strong>in</strong>g from this tw<strong>of</strong>old conceal<strong>in</strong>g “<strong>the</strong>proper mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> basic structures” 101 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ontically privilegedbe<strong>in</strong>g, that is, Dase<strong>in</strong>, such that <strong>the</strong>se structures “are made known to <strong>the</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g91GA 2, pp. 41–42.92GA 2, pp. 41–42.93GA 2, pp. 41–42.94GA 2, pp. 41–42.95GA 2, pp. 46–47.96GA 2, pp. 46–47.97GA 2, pp. 46–47.98GA 2, pp. 46–47.99GA 2, pp. 46–47.100GA 2, pp. 49–50.101GA 2, pp. 49–50.
Deformalization <strong>and</strong> Phenomenon <strong>in</strong> Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>67<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g” 102 that belongs to this be<strong>in</strong>g. And (3), <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ateness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ctionbetween be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> characteristics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs implicit <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> formalconcept <strong>of</strong> phenomenon never<strong>the</strong>less <strong>in</strong>dicates that this dist<strong>in</strong>ction’s deformalizationleads to <strong>the</strong> proper orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> a be<strong>in</strong>g.It is not necessary to turn to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own self-critique <strong>in</strong> Contributions toPhilosophy <strong>in</strong> order to question whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> presupposition runn<strong>in</strong>g through <strong>the</strong>sethree th<strong>in</strong>gs, namely, that <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g is such as to lend itself to aformal conceptuality, is unwarranted. The proximity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal hereto Husserl’s conflation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> formalized universality with that <strong>of</strong> generalizeduniversality is sufficient for this purpose. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s formulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenological method as <strong>the</strong> deformalization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal concept<strong>of</strong> phenomenon assumes that <strong>the</strong> path to <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g leads through <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terrelated <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terdependent concealed self-show<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> both be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. In both cases, what is responsible for thisconcealment turns out to be <strong>the</strong> ontology <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “present-at-h<strong>and</strong>.” This ontology isderived ultimately from <strong>the</strong> mistaken posit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal sense belong<strong>in</strong>g tobe<strong>in</strong>gs (as <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir cognitive apprehension) as <strong>the</strong> true mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>irbe<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong>, conversely, <strong>the</strong> concealment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world (Welt) throughwhich <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs becomes manifest with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> purview <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’severydayness. 103I conclude with two questions about <strong>the</strong> “present-at-h<strong>and</strong>’s” formal sense <strong>in</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s phenomenology <strong>and</strong> a remark on <strong>the</strong> proper context for answer<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong> a way that renounces <strong>the</strong> formality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “first beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g.”The two questions: One, is <strong>the</strong> “present-at-h<strong>and</strong>” formal <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formalizeduniversality that characterizes <strong>the</strong> modern project <strong>of</strong> a ma<strong>the</strong>sis universalis,first formulated by Descartes? The formality <strong>of</strong> this sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal presupposes(as we have seen) <strong>the</strong> ontological <strong>in</strong>dependence <strong>of</strong> a ma<strong>the</strong>matical object that is<strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate (i.e., nei<strong>the</strong>r arithmetical nor geometrical), namely <strong>the</strong> “magnitude <strong>in</strong>general” whose expression (<strong>and</strong> progressive formalization <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Etwas überhaupt)is only possible via <strong>the</strong> sense perceptible symbols <strong>of</strong> a symbolic logistic. Or, two, isit formal <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ancient Greek sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> general treatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two differentk<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>of</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ate ma<strong>the</strong>matical objects, discrete (i.e., numbers) <strong>and</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>uous(i.e., shapes) magnitudes? (Husserl, as we have seen, recognized <strong>the</strong> differencebetween <strong>the</strong> formality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se two formal senses but not <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>ir differentunities must have different “phenomenological” orig<strong>in</strong>s.)The remark: <strong>the</strong> present-at-h<strong>and</strong>’s sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal cannot be understood, as<strong>Heidegger</strong> apparently understood it, to encompass both <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se senses <strong>of</strong> formality 104without <strong>in</strong>herit<strong>in</strong>g Husserl’s conflation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir phenomenological orig<strong>in</strong>s <strong>and</strong>102GA 2, pp. 49–50.103GA 2, pp. 212–213.104GA 2, pp. 82, 480–481.
68 B.C. Hopk<strong>in</strong>sexacerbat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> problem this conflation poses to phenomenology. In <strong>the</strong> formercase, Husserl’s failure to dist<strong>in</strong>guish <strong>the</strong> different orig<strong>in</strong>s <strong>of</strong> two very different senses<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal is cont<strong>in</strong>ued. In <strong>the</strong> latter case, <strong>the</strong> historicity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se different sensesis concealed <strong>in</strong> a way that it is not <strong>in</strong> Husserl’s phenomenology.ReferencesCrowell, Steven. 2001. Husserl, <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> space <strong>of</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g. Evanston: NorthwesternUniversity Press.Dalhstrom, Daniel. 1994. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s method: Philosophical concepts as formal <strong>in</strong>dications.Review <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics 47: 775–795.Emad, Parvis. 2007. On <strong>the</strong> way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s contributions to phenomenology. Wiscons<strong>in</strong>: TheUniversity <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1977. Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, GA 2. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1985. Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristotles. E<strong>in</strong>führung <strong>in</strong> diePhänomenologische Forschung, GA 61. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1987. Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem, GA 56/57.Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1989. Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann. Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly. 1999. Contributions toPhilosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g). Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1996. E<strong>in</strong>leitung <strong>in</strong> die Phänomenologie der Religion. In Phänomenologie desreligiösen Lebens, GA 60. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1999a. Bes<strong>in</strong>nung, GA 66. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann. Trans.Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Thomas Kalary. 2006. M<strong>in</strong>dfulness. London: Cont<strong>in</strong>uum.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1999b. Contributions to philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g). Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong>Kenneth Maly. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.Hopk<strong>in</strong>s, Burt C. 2004. The Husserlian context <strong>of</strong> Kle<strong>in</strong>’s ma<strong>the</strong>matical work. The St. John’sReview 48: 43–71.Hopk<strong>in</strong>s, Burt C. 2008. On <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘Language’ <strong>of</strong> formal ma<strong>the</strong>matics: An <strong>in</strong>tentionalhistorical<strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> discovery <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal. In Mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> language:Phenomenological perspectives, 149–168. Dordrecht: Filip Mattens.Husserl, Edmund. 1970. Philosophie der Arithmetik. Hrsg. L. Eley (Hua XII), Den Haag:Spr<strong>in</strong>ger.Husserl, Edmund. 1974. Formale und Tranzendentale Logik. Versuch e<strong>in</strong>er Kritik der logischenVernunft. Hrsg. P. Janssen (Hua XVII). Den Haag: Spr<strong>in</strong>ger.Husserl, Edmund. 1976. Ideen zu e<strong>in</strong>er re<strong>in</strong>en Phänomenologie und phänomenologischenPhilosophie, I, Buch: Allgeme<strong>in</strong>e E<strong>in</strong>führung <strong>in</strong> die re<strong>in</strong>e Phänomenologie. Hrsg. KarlSchuhmann (Hua III). Den Haag: Spr<strong>in</strong>ger.Husserl, Edmund. 1984. Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter B<strong>and</strong>, Erster Teil: Untersuchungenzur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. Hrsg. Ursula Panzer (Hua XIX/1). Den Haag:Spr<strong>in</strong>ger.Husserl, Edmund. 1985. Erfahrung und Urteil. Ausgearbeitet und hrsg. Ludwig L<strong>and</strong>grebe.Hamburg: Spr<strong>in</strong>ger.Kisiel, T. 1994. The Genesis <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time. Berkeley: University <strong>of</strong> CaliforniaPress.
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A Purview <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g: The OntologicalStructure <strong>of</strong> World, Reference (Verweisung)<strong>and</strong> Indication (Indikation)Marylou Sena1 IntroductionFundamental to <strong>the</strong> very task <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, <strong>and</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>oundly strik<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its ownright, is <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s claim that traditional ontology has failed to ascerta<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ontologicalstatus <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world “closest” to Dase<strong>in</strong>, that is, <strong>the</strong> everyday world thatDase<strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ds itself already <strong>in</strong>. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s phenomenology promises to attend tothis neglect, not, as might be expected, by <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g this everyday world directly.Instead, <strong>Heidegger</strong> holds that it is better to attend to <strong>the</strong> ontological status <strong>of</strong> thisworld <strong>in</strong>directly, by way <strong>of</strong> “lay<strong>in</strong>g bare” <strong>the</strong> phenomenal basis (Grund) <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs.Sections 15–17 <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time carry out this specific task through a series <strong>of</strong>analyses that attend to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicative character <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. When encountered phenomenally,be<strong>in</strong>gs are nei<strong>the</strong>r objects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical concern nor objects that are“useful” <strong>in</strong> a “pragmatic” sense. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, be<strong>in</strong>gs are signs (Zeichen) <strong>in</strong>dicative both<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world. As signs, be<strong>in</strong>gs po<strong>in</strong>t to what<strong>the</strong>y are <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>, at <strong>the</strong> same time, to <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world. Yet,it is <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world that delivers be<strong>in</strong>gs over to <strong>the</strong>mselves, allow<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong>m to be seen <strong>and</strong> to be <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own right. Specifically, this <strong>in</strong>dicative capacitydef<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g all be<strong>in</strong>gs reveals a paradoxical state <strong>of</strong> affairs regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> exact ontologicalstatus <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relational character between be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> world. While any be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> its read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> (Zuh<strong>and</strong>enheit) provides “access” to <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong>M. Sena (*)Department <strong>of</strong> Philosophy, Seattle University, Broadway <strong>and</strong> Madison,98122-4460 Seattle, WA, USAe-mail: MSENA@seattleu.eduF. Schalow (ed.), <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad, Contributions To Phenomenology 65,DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0_4, © Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media B.V. 201171
72 M. Senaworld, it is precisely <strong>the</strong> phenomenon: world, 1 which, when caught sight <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong> itsontological dimension as reference (Verweisung), grants to all be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g(Se<strong>in</strong>) as hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> capacity to <strong>in</strong>dicate. When encountered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own right asread<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>, be<strong>in</strong>gs have <strong>the</strong> phenomenal modality <strong>of</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g-towards” assigns. As signs, <strong>the</strong>y have <strong>the</strong> dual capacity <strong>of</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>and</strong> beyond<strong>the</strong>mselves to <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world as <strong>the</strong> very ground <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own be<strong>in</strong>g.Be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>the</strong>n, show <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ownmost be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>), as hav<strong>in</strong>gthis dual capacity <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dication, while <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world, <strong>in</strong>itially“accessed” by <strong>the</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, is itself manifest as alreadydisclosed, <strong>and</strong> as such, as <strong>the</strong> a priori ontological condition for <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> anybe<strong>in</strong>g’s <strong>in</strong>dicative capacity. The ontological status <strong>of</strong> any be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>n (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gthose be<strong>in</strong>gs taken <strong>and</strong> characterized as equipment), considered <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>irparadoxical relation to world (what <strong>Heidegger</strong> calls <strong>the</strong>ir “phenomenal basis”[Grund]), 2 is that <strong>of</strong> “<strong>in</strong>dication” (Indikation). This means that <strong>the</strong>ir ownmost be<strong>in</strong>gas this capacity <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dication is granted to <strong>the</strong>m, as it were, by <strong>the</strong> phenomenon<strong>of</strong> world.With few exceptions, however, 3 <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s readers have not considered <strong>the</strong>ontological status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world as <strong>the</strong> primordial reference (Verweisung) where<strong>in</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs are encountered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ownmost be<strong>in</strong>g as hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> capacity to <strong>in</strong>dicate.While Sections 15–17 <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time cont<strong>in</strong>ue to receive new attention, a susta<strong>in</strong>edtreatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ontological status <strong>and</strong> relational character <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as signswith <strong>the</strong> capacity <strong>of</strong> “<strong>in</strong>dication” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenal basis (Grund) <strong>of</strong> world as“reference” rema<strong>in</strong>s sorely lack<strong>in</strong>g. To <strong>the</strong> extent that <strong>the</strong> literature treats <strong>the</strong> issue,1Despite <strong>the</strong> clums<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> locution “<strong>the</strong> phenomenon: world,” I prefer to use it at times to whatis perhaps <strong>the</strong> grammatically more graceful expression “phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world.” My preference isbased on what I take to be suggestive <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> latter phraseology, viz., that <strong>in</strong> addition to <strong>the</strong> world asphenomenon, <strong>the</strong>re is ano<strong>the</strong>r world, to which <strong>the</strong> world as phenomenon is somehow related or<strong>in</strong>volved. In my view, however, this is precisely not what is at issue <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s phenomenologicaltreatment <strong>of</strong> “world.” Hence, <strong>in</strong> what follows I will employ at times <strong>the</strong> phrase “<strong>the</strong> phenomenon:world” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> attempt to forestall any suggestions regard<strong>in</strong>g what is phenomenally at issue for<strong>Heidegger</strong>.2<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, GA 2 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), pp. 91, 103.Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, trans. John Macquarrie <strong>and</strong> Edward Rob<strong>in</strong>son (New York: Harper & Row,Publishers, 1962), pp. 96–97, 107. While not a translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gesamtausgabe edition, I have,for <strong>the</strong> benefit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> reader, cited from this Macquarrie-Rob<strong>in</strong>son edition, albeit with slight modificationsfrom time to time.3See Parvis Emad, “Reference, Sign, <strong>and</strong> Language: Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, Section 17,” <strong>in</strong> The CollegiumPhaenomenologicum: The First Ten Years, ed. J. Sallis, G. Moneta, <strong>and</strong> J. Tam<strong>in</strong>iaux (Dordrecht:Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), pp. 175–190; Joseph P. Fell, “The Familiar <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Strange:On <strong>the</strong> Limits <strong>of</strong> Praxis <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Early <strong>Heidegger</strong>,” <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>: A Critical Reader, ed. Hubert L.Dreyfus <strong>and</strong> Harrison Hall (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 65–80. Robert Bernasconi, <strong>in</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong> Question: The Art <strong>of</strong> Exist<strong>in</strong>g (Atlantic Highl<strong>and</strong>s, NJ: Humanities Press International,Inc., 1993), treats <strong>the</strong> issues underly<strong>in</strong>g Sections 15–17 <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time by way <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>-depth<strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>of</strong> praxis <strong>and</strong> poièsis. Left unclarified <strong>in</strong> Bernasconi’s <strong>in</strong>vestigation, however, despite hisstated <strong>in</strong>tentions, is “<strong>the</strong> precise purpose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> discussion <strong>of</strong> equipment <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time” (p. 5).
A Purview <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g: The Ontological Structure <strong>of</strong> World, Reference (Verweisung)...73it treats <strong>the</strong> phenomenal status <strong>of</strong> world, for <strong>the</strong> most part, without treat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ontological status <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. Indeed, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s readers have neglected almostcompletely <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicative mode <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as signs, <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong> so do<strong>in</strong>g, have neglected<strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>separable ontological relational status to <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world.I am conv<strong>in</strong>ced that this neglect is largely due to a lack <strong>of</strong> consideration <strong>and</strong>treatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s self-underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “primary aim” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se sections.<strong>Heidegger</strong> states explicitly that <strong>the</strong> analyses <strong>of</strong> everydayness, by way <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> analysis<strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>, come “pre<strong>the</strong>matically” <strong>in</strong>to view by way <strong>of</strong> “a ‘know<strong>in</strong>g’which primarily looks toward be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>).” 4 Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>Heidegger</strong> clearly states thatbe<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) is <strong>the</strong> “primary aim” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> analysis <strong>of</strong> everydayness, while be<strong>in</strong>gs areits “accompany<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>me.” 5 Here two po<strong>in</strong>ts are to be noted regard<strong>in</strong>g this “primaryaim” <strong>and</strong> its “accompany<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>me”: (1) that <strong>the</strong> analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relational characterbetween be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>dicative capacity <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world as <strong>the</strong>primordial reference where<strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs first appear is essentially to be taken as ananalysis <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) <strong>and</strong> not s<strong>in</strong>gularly, nor most essentially, as an analysis <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs as such; <strong>and</strong> (2) that when conceived properly, Dase<strong>in</strong>’s everyday comportment(Verhalten) <strong>in</strong> each <strong>of</strong> its factical <strong>in</strong>volvements with be<strong>in</strong>gs shows how be<strong>in</strong>g(Se<strong>in</strong>) is rendered concrete as <strong>the</strong> phenomenal basis <strong>of</strong> both Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> all o<strong>the</strong>rbe<strong>in</strong>gs. Both <strong>the</strong>se po<strong>in</strong>ts address <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> “access” to be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> clarify <strong>in</strong> anexcit<strong>in</strong>g way <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “primary aim” <strong>and</strong> “accompany<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>me” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> analyses<strong>of</strong> everydayness: to render how be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) becomes accessible to phenomenologicalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, such that it shows itself concretely as that which is given beforeh<strong>and</strong>(vorgängig) with respects to be<strong>in</strong>gs. In fact, <strong>Heidegger</strong> tells us that <strong>the</strong> analyses <strong>of</strong>everydayness are to make explicit how be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) shows itself <strong>in</strong> any <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>of</strong>Dase<strong>in</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>volvement with be<strong>in</strong>gs. The analyses <strong>of</strong> everydayness as an <strong>in</strong>vestigation<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g are to “br<strong>in</strong>gs to completion, autonomously <strong>and</strong> explicitly, that underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g which belongs already to Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> which ‘comes alive’ <strong>in</strong> any (myemphasis) <strong>of</strong> its deal<strong>in</strong>g with be<strong>in</strong>gs.” 6If we keep <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d, <strong>the</strong>n, that <strong>the</strong> analyses <strong>of</strong> everydayness br<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>to view <strong>the</strong>structure <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that determ<strong>in</strong>es be<strong>in</strong>gs, we can better underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sformal notion <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that is passed over by traditional ontology. Be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) isnot a “matter <strong>of</strong> soar<strong>in</strong>g speculation” about <strong>the</strong> “emptiest <strong>of</strong> concepts.” In fact,be<strong>in</strong>g’s universality <strong>of</strong> transcendence is not a concept <strong>of</strong> any k<strong>in</strong>d. Be<strong>in</strong>g’s universalityis ra<strong>the</strong>r that which is “most basic <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> most concrete.” 7 This is <strong>the</strong> cases<strong>in</strong>ce be<strong>in</strong>g phenomenologically comes <strong>in</strong>to view <strong>in</strong> any <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s comportmenttoward be<strong>in</strong>gs as <strong>the</strong> primordial disclosure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re” (Da) givenbeforeh<strong>and</strong>. Be<strong>in</strong>g, as <strong>the</strong> prior disclosure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re,” is what makes possible <strong>the</strong>encounter <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves. Be<strong>in</strong>g is what is given beforeh<strong>and</strong>4GA 2, p. 90; tr. 95–96.5Ibid.6GA 2, p. 90; tr. 96.7GA 2, p. 12; tr. 29.
74 M. Senaprior to any ascerta<strong>in</strong>ment, conception, or misconceptions <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. Givenbeforeh<strong>and</strong>, be<strong>in</strong>g provides Dase<strong>in</strong> with <strong>the</strong> most basic <strong>and</strong> fundamental way <strong>of</strong>factical orientation toward be<strong>in</strong>gs. 8 <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s, non-conceptual, formal account <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> concrete disclosure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re” given beforeh<strong>and</strong> is “that whichdeterm<strong>in</strong>es be<strong>in</strong>gs as be<strong>in</strong>gs, that <strong>in</strong> view <strong>of</strong> which (woraufh<strong>in</strong>) be<strong>in</strong>gs are alreadyunderstood.” 9 This means that be<strong>in</strong>g’s universality, rendered concrete as always <strong>and</strong>already operative <strong>in</strong> each <strong>and</strong> every encounter with be<strong>in</strong>gs, is <strong>the</strong> phenomenal basis<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. This pre-ontological underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g closest to Dase<strong>in</strong>, givenbeforeh<strong>and</strong>, alive “<strong>in</strong> any way <strong>of</strong> comport<strong>in</strong>g oneself towards be<strong>in</strong>gs as be<strong>in</strong>gs,” 10 isalways <strong>and</strong> already operative even if presupposed <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong>deed, misconceived bytraditional ontology <strong>and</strong> its present-at-h<strong>and</strong> (Vorh<strong>and</strong>ense<strong>in</strong>) conception <strong>of</strong> bothbe<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. In fact, it is also <strong>the</strong> case that <strong>the</strong> prior disclosure <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, whilepresupposed <strong>and</strong> unaccounted for, makes possible <strong>the</strong> conceptual notion <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as<strong>the</strong> “highest concept” <strong>in</strong> traditional ontology.To remedy <strong>the</strong> present-at-h<strong>and</strong> misconceptions <strong>of</strong> both be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gsoperative <strong>in</strong> traditional ontology, Dase<strong>in</strong> only needs to attend to <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g that determ<strong>in</strong>es be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own capacity <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dication. For while cont<strong>in</strong>uallypassed over <strong>and</strong> misconceived by traditional ontology, be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) never<strong>the</strong>lesscomes <strong>in</strong>to view “completely” <strong>and</strong> “autonomously” whenever Dase<strong>in</strong>subord<strong>in</strong>ates itself to an encounter with be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir dual capacity <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g.For this reason, <strong>Heidegger</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that Dase<strong>in</strong>’s history, if it ever were toadmit <strong>of</strong> an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>), is completely bound up with Dase<strong>in</strong>’sfactical life def<strong>in</strong>ed by proper orientation <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>volvement with be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>irread<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>:The concept <strong>of</strong> “facticity” implies that an entity ‘with<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world’ has be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world<strong>in</strong> such a way that it can underst<strong>and</strong> itself as bound up <strong>in</strong> its ‘dest<strong>in</strong>y’ (Geschick) with <strong>the</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> those be<strong>in</strong>gs which it encounters with<strong>in</strong> its own world. 11This subord<strong>in</strong>ation, or what <strong>Heidegger</strong> also calls “submission” (angewiesen), tobe<strong>in</strong>gs as <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>and</strong> to that which grants to <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong>ir freedom tobe, is <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> primordial sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lógoV as a “lett<strong>in</strong>g be seen.” 12In light <strong>of</strong> this submission to be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>the</strong> primary aim <strong>of</strong> Sections15–17 comes<strong>in</strong>to view. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> aim <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se sections is to show how be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ctivesense as <strong>the</strong> dynamic <strong>of</strong> manifestation shows up <strong>and</strong> is rendered concrete <strong>in</strong>any <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s comportment towards be<strong>in</strong>gs when taken phenomenally assigns. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> analyses <strong>of</strong> Sections 15–17 demonstrate how be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) first8GA 2, p. 12; tr. 29.9GA 2, p. 9; tr. 26.10GA 2, pp. 6–7; tr. 23.11GA 2; p. 74; tr. 82.12GA 2; p. 118; tr. 121–122.
A Purview <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g: The Ontological Structure <strong>of</strong> World, Reference (Verweisung)...75announces itself as <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world by way <strong>of</strong> phenomenal character <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs as signs. World, as <strong>the</strong> prior disclosure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re,” is <strong>the</strong> first nam<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g. Put differently, world as be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) is <strong>the</strong> primordial “where<strong>in</strong>” <strong>of</strong> disclosure<strong>in</strong> which particular be<strong>in</strong>gs come <strong>in</strong>to view <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong> on <strong>the</strong>ir own. Thanks to<strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world/be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>), be<strong>in</strong>gs come to st<strong>and</strong> on <strong>the</strong>ir own <strong>and</strong> show<strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own right as signs. As signs, def<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> phenomenal structure<strong>of</strong> Ersche<strong>in</strong>ung, be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> turn bear a necessary <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>separable relationship tobe<strong>in</strong>g, to what determ<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong>ir possibility <strong>of</strong> manifestation. Through <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicativecharacter <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>the</strong> world announces itself.Yet, <strong>the</strong> pragmatists who read <strong>the</strong>se sections do not see that <strong>the</strong> analyses <strong>of</strong> everydaynesshave just this “primary aim”; <strong>the</strong> pragmatists fail to see that <strong>the</strong> analysis <strong>of</strong>world <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs is to be taken as a way <strong>of</strong> know<strong>in</strong>g that “looks primarily towardsbe<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>).” Nor do <strong>the</strong>y take seriously <strong>the</strong> ontological status <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as <strong>the</strong>“accompany<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>me” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se analyses, a <strong>the</strong>me that renders concrete how <strong>the</strong>phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world/be<strong>in</strong>g is manifest “completely” <strong>and</strong> “autonomously” beforeh<strong>and</strong>.Lack<strong>in</strong>g such basic ground<strong>in</strong>g considerations, <strong>the</strong> pragmatists treat <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong>se sections by misconceiv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m at <strong>the</strong>ir very <strong>in</strong>ception. In <strong>the</strong> effort tocounter <strong>the</strong> pragmatist misconceptions, <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g discussion will provide a susta<strong>in</strong>edtreatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se sections. By show<strong>in</strong>g how <strong>the</strong> pragmatists stifle <strong>and</strong> misconceive<strong>the</strong>se sections, I will show <strong>in</strong> what follows that (1) <strong>the</strong> goal <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sanalysis <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> is to disclose how <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world taken as<strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) shows itself concretely with respect to be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>and</strong>shows itself <strong>in</strong> every <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s comportment, (2) how world/be<strong>in</strong>g showsitself as <strong>the</strong> phenomenal basis (Grund) <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g-character(Se<strong>in</strong>scharakter), <strong>and</strong> (3) that <strong>the</strong> phenomenal clues for <strong>the</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong> world/be<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> phenomenal basis for <strong>the</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g-character” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs are uncoveredonly <strong>in</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s factical concern <strong>and</strong> comportment toward be<strong>in</strong>gs as <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong>ir read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>.2 The Pragmatists’ Misconception <strong>of</strong> EverydaynessThe pragmatists ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that <strong>the</strong> analysis <strong>in</strong> Sections 15–17 is an <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>of</strong>everydayness, which aims at show<strong>in</strong>g how <strong>the</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>world as present-at-h<strong>and</strong> (Vorh<strong>and</strong>ense<strong>in</strong>) are derivative <strong>of</strong> a pragmatic underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gthat <strong>Heidegger</strong> is said to clarify by way <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s pre-<strong>the</strong>matic, ready-to-h<strong>and</strong>,modality <strong>of</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g towards” <strong>the</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs called equipment.Generally, <strong>the</strong> pragmatists underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret <strong>the</strong>se sections as an analysis(ra<strong>the</strong>r than a series <strong>of</strong> analyses) directed toward clarify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g explicit <strong>the</strong>dist<strong>in</strong>ction between underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g vorh<strong>and</strong>en th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> zuh<strong>and</strong>en th<strong>in</strong>gs.<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s analyses <strong>of</strong> everydayness, as <strong>in</strong>terpreted by <strong>the</strong> pragmatists, are takenas an analysis <strong>of</strong> tools <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> equipment <strong>in</strong> its read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>(Zuh<strong>and</strong>enheit), is characterized <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> a usability, <strong>in</strong>strumental for Dase<strong>in</strong>.This pragmatic underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g has found wide support even among <strong>the</strong> more “strict”
76 M. Sena<strong>Heidegger</strong>ians 13 (those <strong>Heidegger</strong>ians who place most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir efforts towardclarify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s text as such) as well as among those who, with <strong>the</strong> “discovery”<strong>of</strong> this so-called “pragmatic” dimension <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought, see a possibledialogical mediation between <strong>the</strong> phenomenological <strong>and</strong> analytical traditions. 14 Butno matter how well <strong>in</strong>formed or supported this “pragmatic” underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>analyses <strong>of</strong> everydayness <strong>in</strong> Sections 15–17 might appear to be, it is, to put it bluntly,severely limited due to its lack <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> ontological problematic present <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong>se analyses.In fact, <strong>Heidegger</strong> himself, <strong>in</strong> his analyses <strong>of</strong> “read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>,” characterizessuch a “pragmatic” underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g as “ontic.” Such an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g for <strong>Heidegger</strong>is “ontic” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore, not yet “ontological,” because <strong>the</strong> phenomenal character <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs (equipment), seen <strong>in</strong> light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir phenomenal basis, is not recognized <strong>and</strong>made explicit by this underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g. Specifically, <strong>the</strong> pragmatic, “ontic” underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g(Verstehen) <strong>and</strong> its (restricted) sight (Sicht) neglects to see <strong>the</strong> phenomenon<strong>of</strong> world as <strong>the</strong> a priori <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> which <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> equipment <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> generalfirst become encountered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves. In <strong>the</strong> specific case <strong>of</strong> equipment, thismeans that <strong>the</strong> pragmatic underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g falls short <strong>of</strong> giv<strong>in</strong>g an account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenalbasis <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> equipment as equipment is first encountered <strong>in</strong>its own right as available <strong>and</strong> usable <strong>in</strong> its read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>. Yet, it is not only <strong>the</strong>case that <strong>the</strong> pragmatic <strong>in</strong>terpretation passes over <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world as mak<strong>in</strong>gpossible <strong>the</strong> usability <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> general <strong>the</strong> encounter-ability <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ownright. It is also true that this <strong>in</strong>terpretation fails to underst<strong>and</strong> that equipment <strong>and</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> general not only have <strong>the</strong> capacity to po<strong>in</strong>t to <strong>the</strong>ir own be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> to show<strong>the</strong>mselves from with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves. In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> equipment, this means that <strong>the</strong>capacity <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g “available for use” <strong>and</strong> usable is not <strong>the</strong>ir only capacity <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g.Beyond <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicative capacity <strong>of</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong>ir own be<strong>in</strong>g as equipment,equipment <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> general are able to po<strong>in</strong>t to <strong>the</strong> very ground <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>gthat first grants to <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong>ir capacity to be. Indeed, it is <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world,a phenomenon that is through <strong>and</strong> through ontological, that grants to be<strong>in</strong>gs thisdual capacity <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dication.The dual character <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g is made more apparent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> specific be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>equipment s<strong>in</strong>ce equipment <strong>in</strong> its very be<strong>in</strong>g as equipment po<strong>in</strong>ts beyond itself. Notonly is equipment usable <strong>in</strong> itself; equipment <strong>in</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>g as serviceability makesreadily apparent how all be<strong>in</strong>gs also po<strong>in</strong>t beyond <strong>the</strong>mselves. While <strong>the</strong> pragmatic<strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> equipment sees how any item <strong>of</strong> equipment <strong>in</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>tsbeyond itself to an <strong>in</strong>volvement with a totality <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs, it fails to see thatbeyond <strong>the</strong> “pragmatic” totality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>-order-to” <strong>of</strong> equipment, equipment po<strong>in</strong>tto <strong>the</strong> phenomenon: world. The be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> equipment, <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> general are<strong>in</strong>dicative not only <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g with o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs; equipment<strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> general are <strong>in</strong>dicative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world. The pragmatists,13GA 2, pp. 75–76; tr. 82–83.14Michel Haar, “The Enigma <strong>of</strong> Everydayness,” <strong>in</strong> Read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Commemorations, ed. JohnSallis (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 20–28.
A Purview <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g: The Ontological Structure <strong>of</strong> World, Reference (Verweisung)...77however, restrict <strong>the</strong> phenomenal “be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs to what <strong>Heidegger</strong> characterizes<strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>volvement that be<strong>in</strong>gs have “with” one ano<strong>the</strong>r. This leave unclarified,<strong>the</strong> more fundamental condition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as render<strong>in</strong>g manifesta free <strong>in</strong>volvement “with” o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs by virtue <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world.This oversight reflects a general tendency among various scholars, whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> a“pragmatic” orientation or not, to misconstrue <strong>the</strong> “im” <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s reference to“das Seiende im Ganzen” as def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g a relation among “be<strong>in</strong>gs as a whole,” ra<strong>the</strong>rthan <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>clusion <strong>of</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> a whole,” which <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple transcends <strong>the</strong> freeform<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> any given totality <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>volvements. As a result, <strong>the</strong> pragmatists fall short<strong>of</strong> see<strong>in</strong>g that be<strong>in</strong>gs, by virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>clusion <strong>in</strong> a whole, po<strong>in</strong>t to <strong>the</strong> very source<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir capacity to <strong>in</strong>dicate; <strong>the</strong>y fail to see that <strong>the</strong> ontological basis (Grund) <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs arises through <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>clusion with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world. The pragmatists do not address<strong>the</strong> genesis <strong>of</strong> usability, availability, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> most basic ontological capability <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs, that is, <strong>the</strong>ir function<strong>in</strong>g as signs <strong>in</strong>dicative <strong>of</strong> world <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ally, as <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sanalyses show, <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) itself. Thus, <strong>the</strong> ontological structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “im,” <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> phenomenon: world, <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> which be<strong>in</strong>gs are granted, as it were, <strong>the</strong>se <strong>in</strong>dicativecapabilities <strong>and</strong> out <strong>of</strong> which totalities first emerge <strong>and</strong> come <strong>in</strong>to play, rema<strong>in</strong>sunthought by <strong>the</strong> pragmatists. Indeed, to <strong>the</strong> degree that <strong>the</strong> with<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs is identifiedas “world,” it (<strong>the</strong> “with<strong>in</strong>”) is mis<strong>in</strong>terpreted “ontically” by <strong>the</strong> pragmatists as arelational whole <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. This mis<strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ontological basis (Grund) <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g-character” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs is guided by an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, which conceives <strong>of</strong>this basis <strong>in</strong> terms similar to <strong>the</strong> status <strong>and</strong> character <strong>of</strong> a be<strong>in</strong>g. However, <strong>the</strong> basis<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g-character” <strong>of</strong> a be<strong>in</strong>g, as <strong>the</strong> phenomenal condition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong>a be<strong>in</strong>g’s availability <strong>and</strong> usability (emerg<strong>in</strong>g with respect to <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g’s relationalcontext <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g with o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs) is itself nei<strong>the</strong>r a be<strong>in</strong>g nor a whole <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. Thephenomenon <strong>of</strong> world is ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> “where<strong>in</strong>” <strong>of</strong> a be<strong>in</strong>g. Stated simply, <strong>the</strong>n, <strong>the</strong>pragmatists leave essentially unexplored <strong>the</strong> deeper phenomenal basis <strong>of</strong> a be<strong>in</strong>g,that is, its be<strong>in</strong>g with o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs as someth<strong>in</strong>g that is made possible by way <strong>of</strong> itsbe<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world. In silence, <strong>the</strong> pragmatists pass over <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong>world, fail<strong>in</strong>g to recognize its a priori status for <strong>the</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g-character” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs.The pragmatic underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g is restricted also <strong>in</strong> its treatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong>Dase<strong>in</strong> as <strong>the</strong> ontic a priori condition that frees be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir dual capacity <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dication<strong>and</strong> that keeps Dase<strong>in</strong> open to <strong>the</strong>m <strong>and</strong> to <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world.<strong>Heidegger</strong> expresses this admittedly difficult thought as follows:Ontically, “lett<strong>in</strong>g someth<strong>in</strong>g be <strong>in</strong>volved” signifies that with<strong>in</strong> our factical concern we letsometh<strong>in</strong>g ready-to-h<strong>and</strong> be so-<strong>and</strong>-so as it is already <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> order that it be such....This apriori lett<strong>in</strong>g-someth<strong>in</strong>g-be-<strong>in</strong>volved is <strong>the</strong> condition for <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> encounter<strong>in</strong>ganyth<strong>in</strong>g ready-to-h<strong>and</strong>, so that Dase<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> its ontical deal<strong>in</strong>gs with be<strong>in</strong>g thus encountered,can <strong>the</strong>reby let it be <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> this ontic sense. 1515See Hubert Dreyfus, “<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Equipment,” <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>: A CriticalReader (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992), pp. 173–185; Mark Okrent, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Pragmatism:Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, Be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Critique <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988);Richard Rorty, “<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Cont<strong>in</strong>gency, <strong>and</strong> Pragmatism,” <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>: A Critical Reader,pp. 209–230.
78 M. SenaDase<strong>in</strong>’s ontic a priori character is manifest <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “for-<strong>the</strong>-sake<strong>of</strong>-which,”a structure that signifies, among o<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>in</strong>gs, “lett<strong>in</strong>g someth<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>volved.” 16 Involved <strong>in</strong> this ontic capacity <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> is its underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation<strong>of</strong> all be<strong>in</strong>gs (<strong>and</strong> not just o<strong>the</strong>r Dase<strong>in</strong>s) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g. <strong>Heidegger</strong> emphaticallyformulates what is <strong>in</strong>volved here as follows:Dase<strong>in</strong> is <strong>the</strong> ontic condition for <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> discover<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>gs, which are encountered<strong>in</strong> a world with <strong>in</strong>volvement (read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>) as <strong>the</strong>ir k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> which canthus make <strong>the</strong>mselves known as <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves. 17The pragmatists, however, <strong>in</strong>terpret be<strong>in</strong>gs as be<strong>in</strong>g solely “for-<strong>the</strong>-sake-<strong>of</strong>”Dase<strong>in</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g. When <strong>the</strong> “for-<strong>the</strong>-sake-<strong>of</strong>” is <strong>in</strong>terpreted <strong>in</strong> this manner, be<strong>in</strong>gsmust exist for <strong>the</strong> sake <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s use, with <strong>the</strong> consequence that Dase<strong>in</strong>’s orientationtoward be<strong>in</strong>gs is taken by <strong>the</strong> pragmatists exclusively <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir “usefulness”for Dase<strong>in</strong>. With this underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> pragmatists never reach <strong>the</strong>phenomenological level <strong>of</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g Dase<strong>in</strong> as <strong>the</strong> “ontico-ontological” a prioricondition for <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>mselves. Be<strong>in</strong>gs are seen only <strong>in</strong>reference to Dase<strong>in</strong>. This is due to <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> pragmatists do not take <strong>the</strong> “for<strong>the</strong>-sake-<strong>of</strong>-which”<strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g back <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> fuller phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world.Specifically, <strong>the</strong> pragmatists fail to see <strong>the</strong> “for-<strong>the</strong>-sake-<strong>of</strong>-which” <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’sbe<strong>in</strong>g from with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> deeper phenomenal structure <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g as be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong>-world.As a consequence, <strong>the</strong>y completely miss <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s ontological account<strong>of</strong> how Dase<strong>in</strong> is first delivered over to itself by way <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world.Specifically, <strong>the</strong> pragmatists fail to see that characteristics <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> itself as “m<strong>in</strong>eness”<strong>and</strong> “existence” are first granted by way <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world.Completely missed, <strong>the</strong>n, is Dase<strong>in</strong>’s encounter with itself <strong>in</strong> its “m<strong>in</strong>eness” <strong>and</strong>“existence” as be<strong>in</strong>g for-<strong>the</strong>-sake-<strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs only by way <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> manifestation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>phenomenon: world. The pragmatists, <strong>the</strong>n, pass over <strong>the</strong> ontological status <strong>of</strong>Dase<strong>in</strong>, whose “for-<strong>the</strong>-sake-<strong>of</strong>-which” <strong>in</strong> its capacity as be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world, isdisclosed as <strong>the</strong> ontic capacity <strong>of</strong> lett<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>gs be. They fail to see that <strong>the</strong> phenomenon<strong>of</strong> world first frees Dase<strong>in</strong> for its ontic capacity <strong>of</strong> “lett<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>gs be <strong>in</strong>volved.”“Lett<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>gs be <strong>in</strong>volved” is <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong> primary character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lόgoV, whichclarifies Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> its ontic a priori status as that which lets be<strong>in</strong>gs be <strong>the</strong>mselves. 18In lett<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>gs be <strong>in</strong>volved with <strong>the</strong>ir most appropriate be<strong>in</strong>g by way <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g,Dase<strong>in</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g is “for-<strong>the</strong>-sake-<strong>of</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-o<strong>the</strong>r.” 19 Interpreted from with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> structure16GA 2, p. 113; tr. 117.17GA 2, p. 117; tr. 120.18Ibid. It must be kept <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d, however, that <strong>the</strong> phenomenon: world is <strong>the</strong> ontological a prioricondition not only <strong>of</strong> a be<strong>in</strong>g’s “be<strong>in</strong>g-character,” but also <strong>the</strong> condition <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s ontologicalcapacity as <strong>the</strong> ontic a priori condition <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g both like <strong>and</strong> unlike itself. Due to <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>phenomenon: world is <strong>the</strong> ontological a priori condition <strong>of</strong> both be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>, its a prioristatus is designated as ontological while <strong>the</strong> a priori status <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> is designated as ontic.19<strong>Heidegger</strong> makes explicit <strong>the</strong> phenomenal character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “for-<strong>the</strong>-sake-<strong>of</strong>-which” as be<strong>in</strong>g “for<strong>the</strong>-sake-<strong>of</strong>-o<strong>the</strong>rs”<strong>in</strong> Chapter IV when address<strong>in</strong>g “be<strong>in</strong>g-with” o<strong>the</strong>r Dase<strong>in</strong>s.
A Purview <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g: The Ontological Structure <strong>of</strong> World, Reference (Verweisung)...79<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world, <strong>the</strong> “for-<strong>the</strong>-sake-<strong>of</strong>-which” is not Dase<strong>in</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g for itself,but ra<strong>the</strong>r its be<strong>in</strong>g for those be<strong>in</strong>gs both like <strong>and</strong> unlike itself. Thus, it is not <strong>the</strong>case that <strong>the</strong> world <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs exist “for-<strong>the</strong>-sake-<strong>of</strong>” Dase<strong>in</strong>.There are reasons, however, why <strong>the</strong> pragmatists’ <strong>in</strong>terpretation has not advancedtoward an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ontological <strong>and</strong> ontic a priori conditions for be<strong>in</strong>gsas <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves. Their limited underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g has its basis <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> preconceptions<strong>and</strong> misconceptions that <strong>the</strong>y hold regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> concepts <strong>of</strong> everydayness<strong>and</strong> world. In my view, <strong>the</strong> pragmatists fail to grasp <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> everydayness<strong>and</strong> world as essential for an orientation to <strong>the</strong> deeper dimension <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sanalyses <strong>of</strong> everydayness. <strong>Heidegger</strong> clearly states that <strong>the</strong> concepts <strong>of</strong> everydayness<strong>and</strong> world have a “hidden” ontological dimension. This dimension, <strong>the</strong>n, needsto be taken <strong>in</strong>to account both at <strong>the</strong> start <strong>and</strong> throughout <strong>the</strong> analyses <strong>of</strong> everydayness,if <strong>the</strong> appropriation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> latter is to move <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g “explicit”<strong>the</strong> hidden character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> former.Generally speak<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> pragmatists th<strong>in</strong>k “everydayness” <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s“unowned” mode <strong>of</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>.” While it is true that “everydayness” <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sanalyses is explicitly identified as a particular mode <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g, it is also <strong>the</strong>case that this “mode” <strong>of</strong> trend<strong>in</strong>g toward unownedness, characterized by Dase<strong>in</strong>’s“absorption” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, is understood by <strong>Heidegger</strong> to provide <strong>the</strong> start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>tfor <strong>the</strong> analyses <strong>of</strong> everydayness. The analyses <strong>of</strong> everydayness are to start with <strong>and</strong>depart from this mode, as <strong>the</strong>y move <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> phenomenalbasis <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g-character” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. <strong>Heidegger</strong> conveys this when he says that<strong>the</strong> analyses <strong>of</strong> everydayness are meant to move toward ontological determ<strong>in</strong>ationsby way <strong>of</strong> a “critical” departure from <strong>the</strong> mode <strong>of</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g” characterized as “be<strong>in</strong>galongside,”<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> particular mode <strong>of</strong> “absorption.” 20 Symptomatic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pragmatists’failure is <strong>the</strong> identification <strong>of</strong> everydayness with <strong>the</strong> derived mode <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s“be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>” as “be<strong>in</strong>g-alongside” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> particular mode <strong>of</strong> “absorption.” With thisidentification, <strong>the</strong> pragmatists fail to see that one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tasks <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s analyses<strong>of</strong> everydayness is to provide an account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mode <strong>of</strong> everydayness, which showsit to be not <strong>the</strong> preem<strong>in</strong>ent but a derive mode <strong>of</strong> everydayness. Due to too much“absorption” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, <strong>the</strong> derived mode <strong>of</strong> everydayness “takes” (<strong>in</strong> an unreflectivemode <strong>of</strong> immediacy) <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terprets pre-<strong>the</strong>matically <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g character <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> as a “usability” def<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>in</strong>strumentality.Ironically, <strong>the</strong> pragmatists underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g is itself limited to <strong>the</strong> derived mode <strong>of</strong>absorption, which due to too much “absorption” <strong>in</strong>terprets be<strong>in</strong>gs (equipment) <strong>in</strong>terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir immediate usefulness for Dase<strong>in</strong>.The misconception <strong>of</strong> everydayness by <strong>the</strong> pragmatists is not only to be found <strong>in</strong>this identification <strong>of</strong> everydayness with <strong>the</strong> mode <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong> characterized byabsorption. They also misconceive <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “positive signification”<strong>of</strong> everydayness, a signification that, were it considered, would lead to a criticalassessment <strong>of</strong> “everydayness.” By draw<strong>in</strong>g attention to <strong>the</strong> “positive” character <strong>of</strong>20GA 2, p. 73; tr. 80–81.
80 M. Senaeverydayness, <strong>Heidegger</strong> shows that “everydayness” is more than an account <strong>of</strong>Dase<strong>in</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g towards equipment <strong>in</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>g as read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>. The “positive”character <strong>of</strong> this “more” <strong>of</strong> everydayness lies precisely <strong>in</strong> its “hidden ontological”dimension. 21 Everydayness refers to a “basic state <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong> which Dase<strong>in</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> “m<strong>in</strong>eness” <strong>and</strong> “existence” is “delivered over” to itself. Expressed“positively,” <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> everydayness is most fundamentally characterizedby <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world, <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> which <strong>the</strong> very capacity <strong>of</strong> “existence”<strong>and</strong> “m<strong>in</strong>eness” is given to Dase<strong>in</strong>. Everydayness <strong>in</strong> this sense, <strong>the</strong>n, dist<strong>in</strong>guishesDase<strong>in</strong>’s existential states <strong>of</strong> both “m<strong>in</strong>eness” <strong>and</strong> “existence,” becauseeverydayness first <strong>and</strong> foremost is characterized by <strong>the</strong> basic structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon<strong>of</strong> world. Thus, <strong>the</strong> hidden ontological dimension <strong>of</strong> everydayness is equivalentto <strong>the</strong> “basic state <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g,” that is, be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world. Mirror<strong>in</strong>g this “basicstate” <strong>of</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world,” everydayness is <strong>in</strong>dicative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g structuralitems: (1) <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world <strong>and</strong> (2) Dase<strong>in</strong>’s vary<strong>in</strong>g modes <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>world.As such, everydayness is both an ontological <strong>and</strong> existential concept.The pragmatists are not clear <strong>in</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> two dist<strong>in</strong>ct mean<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong>world as an ontological-existential concept. For <strong>the</strong> most part, ‘world’ is understoodby <strong>the</strong>m as an existential mode, which is characteristic <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g.World as an ontological concept refers specifically to <strong>the</strong> “phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world”as that which makes possible various modes <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world, rang<strong>in</strong>g fromownedness to unownedness, is thus completely missed by <strong>the</strong> pragmatists as be<strong>in</strong>gonly an existential mode <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g. As an “ontological concept,” <strong>the</strong> phenomenon<strong>of</strong> world is that structural item which makes possible both <strong>the</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>gcharacter”<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s mode <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world. Thephenomenon <strong>of</strong> world, unfolded <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “how” <strong>of</strong> its phenomenal “already<strong>the</strong>re,” is, fur<strong>the</strong>r, that which makes possible every mode <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s “be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>”<strong>and</strong> its orientation “toward” <strong>the</strong> world. Everydayness <strong>and</strong> world are existentials <strong>of</strong>Dase<strong>in</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g because, first <strong>and</strong> foremost, <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>in</strong>dicative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ontologicalstructure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world. This phenomenon yields <strong>and</strong> makespossible <strong>the</strong> deliverance <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s “m<strong>in</strong>eness” <strong>and</strong> “existence” “over” to itself.Both “existence” <strong>and</strong> “m<strong>in</strong>eness” are “delivered over” to Dase<strong>in</strong> by virtue <strong>of</strong> anenigma, announced both <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> analyses <strong>of</strong> everydayness as <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong>world <strong>and</strong> earlier <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Introduction to Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, section one, as be<strong>in</strong>gitself. 22The failure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pragmatists to treat “everydayness” <strong>and</strong> “world” as existential<strong>and</strong> ontological concepts is hidden <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir charge aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>Heidegger</strong> that goes s<strong>of</strong>ar as to accuse his analysis <strong>of</strong> equipment <strong>of</strong> “contribut<strong>in</strong>g” to a technological21GA 2, pp. 58–59; tr. 68–69.22Regard<strong>in</strong>g elucidation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Introduction to Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, as well as discussion <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>section one <strong>of</strong> this Introduction, see F.-W. von Herrmann, Hermeneutische Phänomenologie desDase<strong>in</strong>s: E<strong>in</strong>e Erläuterung von “Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit”, I. E<strong>in</strong>leitung: Die Exposition der Frage nach demS<strong>in</strong>n von Se<strong>in</strong> (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985).
A Purview <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g: The Ontological Structure <strong>of</strong> World, Reference (Verweisung)...81underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> both equipment <strong>and</strong> world. Dreyfus, who has cont<strong>in</strong>ued hisreflections on Sections 15–18 <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time 23 for two decades now, still wavers<strong>in</strong> decid<strong>in</strong>g whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s analysis <strong>of</strong> equipment is a “contribution” to <strong>the</strong>fur<strong>the</strong>r development <strong>of</strong> technology or its “critique.” In his <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se sections,however, Dreyfus makes someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> an argument for <strong>the</strong> former. Accord<strong>in</strong>g toDreyfus, <strong>Heidegger</strong> fails to see <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs what he lateridentifies as <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> nature (fύsiV). As a result <strong>of</strong> this, Dreyfus claims that<strong>Heidegger</strong> is led to a conception <strong>of</strong> both equipment <strong>and</strong> world <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time,which <strong>in</strong> fact advances <strong>the</strong> technological fram<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world. Yet, it is Dreyfus <strong>and</strong>not <strong>Heidegger</strong> who adheres to <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>strumental” misconception <strong>of</strong> equipment,which <strong>in</strong> fact has no place <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s analyses <strong>of</strong> it. The pr<strong>of</strong>ound <strong>in</strong>sistence <strong>of</strong>giv<strong>in</strong>g an account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> equipment as it is <strong>in</strong> itself defies <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>strumental misconceived <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> equipment that misplaces <strong>and</strong> mis<strong>in</strong>terprets<strong>the</strong> source <strong>of</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>g. In <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>strumental misconception <strong>of</strong> equipment, <strong>the</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> equipment is not seen as hav<strong>in</strong>g its be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> itself, but ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> as<strong>the</strong> “ends” <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs. Ironically, Dreyfus charges <strong>Heidegger</strong> with his own lack <strong>of</strong>ontological <strong>in</strong>sight. He does not see how <strong>Heidegger</strong> takes seriously, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>deedwants to preserve, already <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, <strong>the</strong> “refusal <strong>of</strong> earth,” which is characteristic<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> self-givenness <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-character <strong>of</strong> equipment through its withdrawal<strong>in</strong>to <strong>in</strong>conspicuousness. As a result, Dreyfus ignores <strong>the</strong> fact that this“refusal,” as <strong>Heidegger</strong> emphasizes <strong>in</strong> Contributions to Philosophy, is also ashelter<strong>in</strong>g concealment, which is necessary for <strong>the</strong> earth to enter <strong>in</strong>to its “strife”with world. 24 Such misunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gs could be mitigated, if not elim<strong>in</strong>ated altoge<strong>the</strong>r,by recall<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s emphasis on <strong>the</strong> phenomenal manifestness <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs through <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>clusion “<strong>in</strong>” <strong>the</strong> whole, ra<strong>the</strong>r than merely collected as awhole by virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>strumentality. Conversely, we discover that <strong>the</strong> conceal<strong>in</strong>g,withdraw<strong>in</strong>g character <strong>of</strong> world allows be<strong>in</strong>gs to withdraw <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong>mselves, <strong>and</strong>become “<strong>in</strong>conspicuous,” so as to be available <strong>and</strong> usable. 25 In what follows, I shalltake up <strong>in</strong> detail <strong>the</strong> issues <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s advancement beyond <strong>the</strong> narrow<strong>and</strong> limited misunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs by <strong>the</strong> pragmatists. Essential to this advancementare <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s analyses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>conspicuousness” <strong>of</strong> ready-to-h<strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs,that is, <strong>the</strong>ir potential for reveal<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “refusal <strong>of</strong> earth.”23H. Dreyfus, “<strong>Heidegger</strong>: History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Equipment,” pp. 173–185. Also, see H. Dreyfus,Be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-Word: A Commentary on <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time (Cambridge, Mass.: The MITPress, 1991), pp. 99–107. For a recent critique <strong>of</strong> Dreyfus’s pragmatism, see Frank Schalow, “HowViable is Dreyfus’s Interpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>? Anthropologism, Pragmatism, <strong>and</strong>Misunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Texts,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 20 (2004): 17–33.24<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann, 1989), p. 390. Contributions to Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g), trans. Parvis Emad<strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 273.25GA 2, p. 100; tr. 106.
82 M. Sena3 The Phenomenal Character <strong>of</strong> Withdraw<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Appear<strong>in</strong>gI shall beg<strong>in</strong> with an overview <strong>of</strong> Sections 15–17 <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time. The analyses<strong>of</strong> everydayness have as <strong>the</strong>ir task, as I have already suggested, someth<strong>in</strong>g morethan clarify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g explicit <strong>the</strong> ontological status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> concepts <strong>of</strong> everydayness<strong>and</strong> world. These analyses are to make explicit how be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) showsitself “with respect to be<strong>in</strong>gs.” The phrase “with respect to be<strong>in</strong>gs” is carefully chosenhere to emphasize that, for <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>the</strong> primordial manifestation <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>),that is, its show<strong>in</strong>g itself from itself, although <strong>in</strong>extricably bound up with be<strong>in</strong>gs, isnot to be reduced to nor conceived <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own manifestation. Indeed, <strong>in</strong>this connection I would want to say that <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> phenomenology, as <strong>Heidegger</strong>conceives it, is to make explicit <strong>the</strong> very dist<strong>in</strong>ction between <strong>the</strong> manifestation <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) <strong>and</strong> that <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. The move from <strong>the</strong> formal to <strong>the</strong> deformalizedconception <strong>of</strong> phenomenology dem<strong>and</strong>s, on <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>and</strong>, that be<strong>in</strong>g be renderedconcrete, that is, that it be seen by way <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> “with respect to be<strong>in</strong>gs,” while, on <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, it dem<strong>and</strong>s that be<strong>in</strong>g be explicitly encountered <strong>in</strong> its manifestness asdist<strong>in</strong>ct from <strong>the</strong> appearance <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs.As is well known, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s phenomenology attempts to retrieve <strong>the</strong> Greekconception <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g still shrouded <strong>in</strong> darkness. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, “phenomenon” <strong>in</strong> itsprimordial signification as that which shows itself from itself, that is, <strong>the</strong> “manifest,”as well as phenomenon <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> modes <strong>of</strong> show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> entities as Sche<strong>in</strong>, Ersche<strong>in</strong>ung,etc., is to be brought to self-show<strong>in</strong>g. In my view, everydayness is seen by <strong>Heidegger</strong>as <strong>the</strong> place <strong>in</strong> which be<strong>in</strong>g is seen as <strong>the</strong> phenomenal ground <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs.Phenomenological see<strong>in</strong>g is first <strong>and</strong> foremost to render transparent that be<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>the</strong>phenomenon <strong>of</strong> phenomenology. The phenomenological analyses <strong>of</strong> everydaynessclarify, make explicit, <strong>and</strong> render concrete how be<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> worldannounces itself by way <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as <strong>the</strong>y appear <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mode <strong>of</strong>Ersche<strong>in</strong>ung. Be<strong>in</strong>g is to be clarified, made explicit, <strong>and</strong> rendered concrete “withrespect to be<strong>in</strong>gs” as <strong>the</strong>y appear structurally as <strong>in</strong>dicative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenal groundthat determ<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own be<strong>in</strong>g. To see this structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs,be<strong>in</strong>gs must be seen phenomenally as <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves as structurally relatedto be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) by way <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s factical comportment toward <strong>the</strong>m, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mode<strong>of</strong> “lett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m be seen.” But s<strong>in</strong>ce be<strong>in</strong>g is “that which is ontically ‘closest’ toDase<strong>in</strong>” but “ontologically far<strong>the</strong>st from Dase<strong>in</strong>” (due to Dase<strong>in</strong>’s lack <strong>of</strong> phenomenal<strong>in</strong>sight), <strong>Heidegger</strong> returns to everydayness where <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs is still pre-<strong>the</strong>matically operative. Indeed, everydayness addresses thisneglect so as to br<strong>in</strong>g Dase<strong>in</strong> nearer to an ontological underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> itself, be<strong>in</strong>gs,<strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. That which is ontically “closest” <strong>and</strong> ontologically far<strong>the</strong>st from Dase<strong>in</strong>,namely Dasien’s pre-ontological underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g alive <strong>in</strong> its everyday be<strong>in</strong>gtowards its concernful deal<strong>in</strong>g with equipment, is to be rendered manifest by <strong>the</strong>phenomenological analyses <strong>of</strong> everydayness.The tw<strong>of</strong>old task <strong>of</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g concrete by way <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, while carefullydist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its manifestation from be<strong>in</strong>gs, when applied to <strong>the</strong> analyses<strong>of</strong> everydayness, <strong>in</strong>volves a “pre-<strong>the</strong>matic” <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> those be<strong>in</strong>gs “closest”
A Purview <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g: The Ontological Structure <strong>of</strong> World, Reference (Verweisung)...83to Dase<strong>in</strong>, <strong>of</strong> those be<strong>in</strong>gs that are encountered <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>.This means that read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> reveals <strong>the</strong> phenomenal manifestation <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs.<strong>Heidegger</strong> is clear that <strong>the</strong>se be<strong>in</strong>gs, when treated pre-<strong>the</strong>matically, are nei<strong>the</strong>robjects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical observation nor <strong>of</strong> pragmatic usefulness. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, when takenpre-<strong>the</strong>matically, <strong>the</strong>y are those be<strong>in</strong>gs that Dase<strong>in</strong> comes across <strong>in</strong> its concernfulbe<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world. Phenomenological “see<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>in</strong> its task <strong>of</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> stay<strong>in</strong>gwith<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> pre-<strong>the</strong>matic encounter with be<strong>in</strong>gs, sees through <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical eideticmode <strong>of</strong> see<strong>in</strong>g that traditionally determ<strong>in</strong>es both <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical <strong>and</strong> pragmatic(productive) mode <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>gs. Phenomenological see<strong>in</strong>g is guidedbeforeh<strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) as it attends to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicative, read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong>“be<strong>in</strong>g-character” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. In <strong>the</strong> move to be<strong>in</strong>g, phenomenological see<strong>in</strong>g isalready directed beyond <strong>the</strong> ontic <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs closest to Dase<strong>in</strong> thatmisunderst<strong>and</strong>s <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> a “productive” modality. In <strong>the</strong> move to be<strong>in</strong>g,phenomenological sight is directed toward <strong>the</strong> ontological orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>particular those be<strong>in</strong>gs “closest” to Dase<strong>in</strong>, that is, be<strong>in</strong>gs that <strong>Heidegger</strong> identifiesas equipment. The <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>of</strong> equipment <strong>the</strong>refore seeks <strong>the</strong> ontological orig<strong>in</strong><strong>of</strong> equipment <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> general when attend<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicative phenomenalcharacter <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own be<strong>in</strong>g as “read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>.” Be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>)as <strong>the</strong> phenomenal ground, provides proper orientations to be<strong>in</strong>gs, while read<strong>in</strong>essto-h<strong>and</strong>provides access to be<strong>in</strong>gs as <strong>the</strong>y are grounded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves so as to show<strong>the</strong>mselves from with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves. Orientated to be<strong>in</strong>gs by way <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g meansthat be<strong>in</strong>gs are encountered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own right as <strong>in</strong>dicative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>,<strong>in</strong> turn, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> what grants to <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong>ir own be<strong>in</strong>g as read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>.Treated phenomenologically, be<strong>in</strong>gs as be<strong>in</strong>gs (<strong>and</strong> specifically be<strong>in</strong>gs as equipment),are not to be <strong>in</strong>terpreted solely <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong>y possess <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>irown right as be<strong>in</strong>gs with <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong> equipment; <strong>the</strong>y are to be pre-<strong>the</strong>maticallytaken <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpreted <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> “<strong>the</strong> structure (my emphasis) <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) that<strong>the</strong>y possess.” 26 When taken as such, be<strong>in</strong>gs not only po<strong>in</strong>t to <strong>the</strong>ir ownmost be<strong>in</strong>g,to what <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own right; <strong>the</strong>y also po<strong>in</strong>t beyond <strong>the</strong>mselves to be<strong>in</strong>g.Thus, when attend<strong>in</strong>g to be<strong>in</strong>gs “phenomenally,” phenomenological analysis isdirected by <strong>the</strong> phenomenal character <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, that is, <strong>the</strong>ir read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>characterized as “<strong>in</strong>conspicuousness,” as <strong>the</strong>y po<strong>in</strong>t both towards <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>and</strong>beyond <strong>the</strong>mselves towards be<strong>in</strong>g. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s analyses <strong>of</strong> everydaynessare directed toward disclos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “phenomenal basis <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs” by way <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>analyses <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>. These analyses aim at <strong>the</strong> “ontological” clarification<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that be<strong>in</strong>gs possess. To be seen <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> this structure,be<strong>in</strong>gs must be grasped phenomenally <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g as be<strong>in</strong>g with o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong>fundamentally as already be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world. Understood phenomenologically, <strong>the</strong>presuppositions “<strong>in</strong>” <strong>and</strong> “with” refer to <strong>the</strong> “broadest” phenomenal basis <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs,<strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> which <strong>the</strong> various phenomenal show<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs are <strong>in</strong>vestigated. As <strong>the</strong>analyses <strong>of</strong> everydayness unfold, <strong>Heidegger</strong> makes both concrete <strong>and</strong> explicit that26GA 2, p. 90; tr. 96.
84 M. Sena<strong>the</strong> “where<strong>in</strong>” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) is <strong>the</strong> phenomenal basis <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. Be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> turn are<strong>in</strong>dicative <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g only <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong>y are encountered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir “<strong>in</strong>conspicuous”character as read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>. Indeed, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s analyses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>conspicuouscharacter <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>, ontologically clarifies <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction between be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “concrete” character <strong>of</strong> both. These analyses render explicit <strong>and</strong>secure from with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction between be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs by way <strong>of</strong> a careful “read<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>dicative capacity.Aga<strong>in</strong>, it needs to be emphasized that this “concreteness” means see<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g“with respect to” be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> yet as dist<strong>in</strong>ct from <strong>the</strong>m. With <strong>the</strong> secur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>more “primordial” conception <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, be<strong>in</strong>g can no longer be seen as a matter <strong>of</strong>“soar<strong>in</strong>g speculation” nor as a matter reduced by representational thought to <strong>the</strong>status <strong>of</strong> a be<strong>in</strong>g. Be<strong>in</strong>g is ra<strong>the</strong>r seen <strong>and</strong> secured as <strong>the</strong> most basic <strong>and</strong> most concrete<strong>of</strong> all matters; “primordially” conceived, be<strong>in</strong>g is always manifest as <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>rethat is” whenever Dase<strong>in</strong> comports itself towards <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>conspicuous, read<strong>in</strong>ess-toh<strong>and</strong>“be<strong>in</strong>g-character” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs.How are be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir phenomenal character <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> to be encounteredso as to disclose <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong>y possess? How is be<strong>in</strong>g to beconceived if it “transcends” <strong>and</strong> is o<strong>the</strong>r than any <strong>and</strong> all be<strong>in</strong>gs? And f<strong>in</strong>ally, whatis <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenal relatedness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs; how is this relatednessto be conceived without reduc<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) to a be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> without reduc<strong>in</strong>gbe<strong>in</strong>gs to <strong>the</strong>ir derived conception as someth<strong>in</strong>g extant (vorh<strong>and</strong>en)? To discern <strong>the</strong>phenomenal basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> its “be<strong>in</strong>g-character”<strong>in</strong>volves more than secur<strong>in</strong>g “read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>” as <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> access to <strong>the</strong> genesis<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. Dase<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> its mode <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g toward ready-to-h<strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, also mustbe secured properly if be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> are to be seen aright, if<strong>in</strong>deed be<strong>in</strong>gs are to be seen as <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir phenomenal givenness. For<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Dase<strong>in</strong>’s mode <strong>of</strong> see<strong>in</strong>g is rooted <strong>in</strong> its factical <strong>in</strong>volvement. Dase<strong>in</strong>’sfacticity consists <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> enigmatic state <strong>of</strong> affairs that Dase<strong>in</strong>’s very be<strong>in</strong>g is tied tobe<strong>in</strong>gs. 27 In an excit<strong>in</strong>g way, “facticity” po<strong>in</strong>ts to Dase<strong>in</strong>’s encounter with <strong>the</strong> ontologicalcondition <strong>of</strong> both its own be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> terms<strong>of</strong> its engagement with <strong>the</strong>m. Dase<strong>in</strong> must be engaged <strong>in</strong> a mode <strong>of</strong> comportment<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>volvement, which lets be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>dicate, if Dase<strong>in</strong> is to have any ontologicalaccess to be<strong>in</strong>g itself <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs it encounters <strong>in</strong> concernful <strong>in</strong>volvement. Dase<strong>in</strong>must engage itself <strong>in</strong> more than an eidetic mode <strong>of</strong> “look<strong>in</strong>g” (∈ÉdoV) def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>perception (<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s emphasis) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present-at-h<strong>and</strong> (Vorh<strong>and</strong>en) conception<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, which “imposes upon” <strong>and</strong> obscures <strong>the</strong>ir self-show<strong>in</strong>g. Dase<strong>in</strong> mustcomport itself toward be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> such a way as to be guided by both be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs,if it is to have any ontological access to itself <strong>and</strong> to be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong>mselves as <strong>the</strong>y aregiven <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ontological orig<strong>in</strong>.<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s phenomenological elucidations <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> Section 15 aregeneral <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore removed from <strong>the</strong> concrete unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> how be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir27GA 2, pp. 75–76; tr. 82–83.
A Purview <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g: The Ontological Structure <strong>of</strong> World, Reference (Verweisung)...85read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>, are <strong>in</strong>dicative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong>y <strong>in</strong>dicate. However,this general encounter with read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> is never<strong>the</strong>less addressed from with<strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> its ontological horizon. <strong>Heidegger</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs his analysis <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-toh<strong>and</strong>by noth<strong>in</strong>g that be<strong>in</strong>gs first become accessible <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>conspicuousness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>irread<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> by virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> reference called <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>-order-to.” 28A be<strong>in</strong>g is ready-to-h<strong>and</strong> only <strong>in</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>g with o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs. Phenomenologically“follow<strong>in</strong>g through” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> this referential structure, <strong>Heidegger</strong> notesthat <strong>the</strong> referential structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>-order-to” is multidimensional. Be<strong>in</strong>gs asequipment first become ready-to-h<strong>and</strong> (accessible <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g as usability) <strong>in</strong>terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> referential structure that <strong>the</strong>y bear to one ano<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong> to <strong>the</strong>mselves.The “<strong>in</strong>-order-to” po<strong>in</strong>ts beyond itself to o<strong>the</strong>r equipment, to nails, lea<strong>the</strong>r, to <strong>the</strong>work, to nature <strong>and</strong> its by-products, <strong>and</strong> to Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> its shared world. Yet, <strong>the</strong>“<strong>in</strong>-order-to” also refers to <strong>the</strong> “for which” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g itself, to <strong>the</strong> hammer’s ownusability, which is used “<strong>in</strong>-order-to” fasten <strong>and</strong> hold secure <strong>the</strong> different materialsthat are needed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work. The structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>-order-to” has,<strong>the</strong>n, both a self-referential structure that po<strong>in</strong>ts to itself, as well as, a structure that“po<strong>in</strong>ts” beyond itself to its mode <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>sart) as be<strong>in</strong>g with o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs. In<strong>the</strong> “follow<strong>in</strong>g through” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> referential po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>, Dase<strong>in</strong> isfreely transported to <strong>the</strong> “where <strong>of</strong>,” that is, to <strong>the</strong> “beyond” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> materials that <strong>the</strong>work is dependent upon <strong>and</strong> to <strong>the</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> equipment itself, to itsself-referential character, what <strong>Heidegger</strong> refers to as its own serviceability.It is also <strong>the</strong> case that <strong>the</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work (although not as immediatelyapparent as <strong>the</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> a particular piece <strong>of</strong> equipment), exhibitsthis tw<strong>of</strong>old referential character: The read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work freely po<strong>in</strong>tsbeyond itself to <strong>the</strong> “towards which” <strong>of</strong> a whole <strong>of</strong> equipment <strong>and</strong> toward <strong>the</strong> “forwhich” <strong>of</strong> a particular item <strong>of</strong> equipment that is needed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work.The work also has a self-referential character, even when <strong>the</strong> work is considered <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g made. The clock, as <strong>the</strong> work to be produced, po<strong>in</strong>ts to its ownusability, which is “<strong>in</strong>-order-to” tell time, as well as to those o<strong>the</strong>r items <strong>of</strong> equipmentthat are needed <strong>in</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g forth <strong>the</strong> clock. <strong>Heidegger</strong> emphasizes <strong>the</strong> free play<strong>of</strong> referential po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g that is underway between works <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, works <strong>and</strong> equipment.Dase<strong>in</strong>’s comportment moves freely from a particular item <strong>of</strong> equipment <strong>in</strong> itsread<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> to <strong>the</strong> work <strong>and</strong> vice versa, from <strong>the</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> work to<strong>the</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> a particular piece <strong>of</strong> equipment.Thus, <strong>the</strong> analysis <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> Section 15 lays bare <strong>the</strong> general character<strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>. This analysis f<strong>in</strong>ds that any item <strong>of</strong> equipment (be it aparticular item <strong>of</strong> equipment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work itself) exhibits this tw<strong>of</strong>old referentialcharacter. Be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir phenomenal character, identified as read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>,po<strong>in</strong>t (by way <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dication) both beyond <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>and</strong> to <strong>the</strong>mselves. Indeed, allbe<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> bear <strong>the</strong> mark<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> this free tw<strong>of</strong>old referentialplay <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g. Yet for all this, <strong>the</strong> analysis <strong>in</strong> Section 15 leaves unclear <strong>the</strong>28GA 2, p. 92; tr. 97.
86 M. Senaontological conditions that make possible this play <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g; this first analysisleaves unclear what <strong>Heidegger</strong> refers to as <strong>the</strong> “ontological genesis” (ontologischenGenesis) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> referential character <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs.The analyses <strong>of</strong> everydayness <strong>in</strong> Section 16 advance by gett<strong>in</strong>g closer to <strong>the</strong>ontological concretion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> everyday <strong>in</strong> that <strong>the</strong>se analyses attempt to locate <strong>the</strong>“ontological emergence” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> referential character <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. This is accomplishedby <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> a deepened <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> “emergence” <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>:In <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>-order-to” as a structure <strong>the</strong>re lies an assignment or reference <strong>of</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g tosometh<strong>in</strong>g. Only <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> analyses which are to follow can <strong>the</strong> phenomenon which <strong>the</strong> term“assignment” <strong>in</strong>dicates be made visible <strong>in</strong> its ontological genesis (ontologischen Genesis). 29Here, <strong>Heidegger</strong> makes explicit <strong>the</strong> specific issue that overall <strong>in</strong>forms his analyses.Proceed<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terrogative mode, <strong>the</strong> issue emerges <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> “ontological genesis” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs: What makes possible <strong>the</strong>ir referential capacityas manifested <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>-order-to”? What makes possible <strong>the</strong> availability<strong>and</strong> usability <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as seen by way <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relational be<strong>in</strong>g with one ano<strong>the</strong>r<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs? To answer <strong>the</strong> questions concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> manifestation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>Heidegger</strong> must aga<strong>in</strong> hold open <strong>the</strong> phenomenal character <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-toh<strong>and</strong>so as to follow through <strong>and</strong> make explicit <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> referential capacity<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. This means that phenomenological see<strong>in</strong>g must try to see beyond <strong>the</strong>referential capacity <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as emerg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>gs with one ano<strong>the</strong>r, to <strong>the</strong>source <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> very <strong>in</strong>dicative capacity <strong>of</strong> such “be<strong>in</strong>g with.” While attempt<strong>in</strong>g tohold open <strong>the</strong> phenomenal basis <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs by means <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> referential character <strong>of</strong>read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>Heidegger</strong> advances his analyses by mak<strong>in</strong>g explicit <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> place <strong>and</strong> source <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> referential capacity <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. This issue concerns <strong>the</strong>prob<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> a highly significant question: whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> free referential po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>“<strong>in</strong>-order-to” most properly belongs to read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> per se, to <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own right, or to a source that renders “<strong>the</strong>ir” so-called referentialcapacity possible.The attempt to locate <strong>the</strong> “ontological genesis” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> referential po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>“<strong>in</strong>-order-to” is carried out by attend<strong>in</strong>g to both <strong>the</strong> conspicuous <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>conspicuouscharacter <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> form with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> unread<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>. Tomy knowledge, no one has yet observed how, <strong>in</strong> his analysis <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>,<strong>Heidegger</strong> persistently emphasizes that <strong>the</strong> conspicuousness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs is never <strong>in</strong>fact completely severed from <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>conspicuous character <strong>and</strong> source. <strong>Heidegger</strong>states <strong>in</strong> various ways <strong>the</strong> same essential <strong>in</strong>sight throughout <strong>the</strong> analyses <strong>in</strong> this section,namely, that <strong>the</strong> phenomenal character <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs is such that “<strong>the</strong> presence-at-h<strong>and</strong><strong>of</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g that cannot be used is still not devoid <strong>of</strong> all read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>.” 30To demonstrate phenomenologically this po<strong>in</strong>t, <strong>Heidegger</strong> looks to both <strong>the</strong>conspicuous <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>conspicuous moments <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ready-to-h<strong>and</strong>. The “moments,” while29Ibid.30GA 2, p. 92; tr. 97.
A Purview <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g: The Ontological Structure <strong>of</strong> World, Reference (Verweisung)...87never separate, give <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> whole phenomenonal character <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs (that<strong>the</strong> “conspicuous” character is never completely severed from its <strong>in</strong>conspicuouscharacter) as well as <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> genesis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenal nature <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. Tak<strong>in</strong>g hisclues from <strong>the</strong>se vary<strong>in</strong>g moments, <strong>Heidegger</strong> is able to discern more fully <strong>the</strong>locale <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>-order-to.” By attend<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> phenomenal disclosure <strong>in</strong>dicated by<strong>the</strong>se moments, <strong>Heidegger</strong> attempts to facilitate access to <strong>the</strong> phenomenal structure<strong>and</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g that makes possible read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>.Attend<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>conspicuous “moment” <strong>of</strong> a damaged item <strong>of</strong> equipment, thatis, to <strong>the</strong> unread<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> that is still not devoid <strong>of</strong> all read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>,<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s analyses <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> move toward ontological considerationsthat are <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenal structures that make read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> possible.Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>Heidegger</strong>, unread<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> po<strong>in</strong>ts to <strong>the</strong> deeper ontological state<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, which makes possible <strong>the</strong> relational whole <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. Inthis po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g back to <strong>the</strong> phenomenal basis (ground<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs by way <strong>of</strong> whatstill rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mode <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> unread<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>, that is, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenalcharacter <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>Heidegger</strong> uncovers a dist<strong>in</strong>ction with<strong>in</strong> this very phenomenalbasis. This dist<strong>in</strong>ction concerns <strong>the</strong> phenomenal moments <strong>of</strong> “with” <strong>and</strong> “<strong>in</strong>.” Theread<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> a damaged item <strong>of</strong> equipment br<strong>in</strong>gs to <strong>the</strong> fore <strong>the</strong> whole <strong>of</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r equipment that <strong>the</strong> damaged equipment was with. It br<strong>in</strong>gs to <strong>the</strong> fore <strong>the</strong>“how” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> availability <strong>and</strong> usability <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as emerg<strong>in</strong>g by way <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>gwith a whole <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs. <strong>Heidegger</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>” <strong>of</strong> this whole is <strong>in</strong>dicatedby way <strong>of</strong> what still rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenal character <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>. Yet,beyond this totality <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g with o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> along with <strong>the</strong> whole <strong>of</strong> assignments<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, as that “where<strong>in</strong>” concern always dwells, <strong>the</strong> “world announcesitself.” 31 Here, it is important to emphasize <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s exact words: “with thiswhole, <strong>the</strong> world announces itself.” He does not say that <strong>the</strong> world announces itselfas this whole. The “where<strong>in</strong>” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon: world, announces itself as“already <strong>the</strong>re.” It announces itself as a dist<strong>in</strong>ct moment, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>deed as <strong>the</strong> moreprimordial phenomenon that first makes possible a free<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicative capacity<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as hav<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>volvement “with” one ano<strong>the</strong>r. Be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>the</strong>n, are <strong>in</strong>dicative<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>volvement with o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs. Yet beyond this <strong>in</strong>dicative capacity, be<strong>in</strong>gsare <strong>in</strong>dicative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own orig<strong>in</strong>. The orig<strong>in</strong>, aga<strong>in</strong>, announces itself as <strong>the</strong> phenomenon:world. However, this <strong>in</strong>dicative ability <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs to po<strong>in</strong>t to <strong>the</strong> phenomenon<strong>of</strong> world must be seen by Dase<strong>in</strong>. <strong>Heidegger</strong> is exceed<strong>in</strong>gly clear on this po<strong>in</strong>t whentalk<strong>in</strong>g about how <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicative character <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> still shows up <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>unread<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g miss<strong>in</strong>g. Follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicativecapacity <strong>of</strong> what is miss<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> world announces itself. The announcement <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> world through <strong>the</strong> unread<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, however, is “<strong>in</strong>accessible tocircumspection so far as circumspection is always directed towards entities:”Similarly, when someth<strong>in</strong>g ready-to-h<strong>and</strong> is found miss<strong>in</strong>g, though its everyday presence[Zugegense<strong>in</strong>] has been so obvious that we have never taken any notice <strong>of</strong> it, this makes a31GA 2, p. 100; tr. 105.
88 M. Senabreak <strong>in</strong> those referential contexts which circumspection discovers. Our circumspectioncomes up aga<strong>in</strong>st empt<strong>in</strong>ess, <strong>and</strong> now sees for <strong>the</strong> first time what <strong>the</strong> miss<strong>in</strong>g article wasready-to-h<strong>and</strong> with, <strong>and</strong> what was ready-to-h<strong>and</strong> for. The environment announces itselfafresh. What is thus lit up is not itself just one th<strong>in</strong>g ready-to-h<strong>and</strong> with among o<strong>the</strong>rs; stillless is it someth<strong>in</strong>g present-at-h<strong>and</strong> upon which equipment ready-to-h<strong>and</strong> is somehowfounded: it is <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘<strong>the</strong>re’ before anyone has observed or ascerta<strong>in</strong>ed it. It is itself <strong>in</strong>accessibleto circumspection so far as circumspection is always directed towards entities (myemphasis). 32The priority <strong>and</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> structural moment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> where<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> world arenot brought <strong>in</strong>to view when attend<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> still <strong>in</strong>conspicuous character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> unread<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>. The priority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong> world as mak<strong>in</strong>gpossible <strong>the</strong> capacities <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as <strong>in</strong>dicative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own availability <strong>and</strong> usabilityis made explicit by attend<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> so-called “conspicuous” moment <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong>ir unread<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>. Attend<strong>in</strong>g to just <strong>the</strong> conspicuous character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>unread<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> a damaged item <strong>of</strong> equipment, its be<strong>in</strong>g-just-present-ath<strong>and</strong>,<strong>Heidegger</strong> po<strong>in</strong>ts out that <strong>the</strong> damaged be<strong>in</strong>g itself, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r ready-toh<strong>and</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs with it, all become deprived <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir referential po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g. Expresseddifferently, when attend<strong>in</strong>g to be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> such a way as to “bracket out” <strong>the</strong>ir phenomenalcharacter <strong>of</strong> referential po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g, as if <strong>the</strong>y were <strong>in</strong>deed, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong>mselves,present-at-h<strong>and</strong> (<strong>and</strong> as such, autonomous <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent with respectto both <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g with o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world), <strong>Heidegger</strong> suggeststhat <strong>the</strong> conspicuous be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> damaged be<strong>in</strong>g becomes deprived <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>“phenomenal pull,” which l<strong>in</strong>ks it to itself by way <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong>, most essentially,by way <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon: world. The damaged be<strong>in</strong>g shows itself as someth<strong>in</strong>gmerely extant. Indirectly, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s analyses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> reference(Verweisung), made explicit <strong>in</strong> this conspicuous moment, suggest that this structure<strong>of</strong> reference, <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>-order-to,” cannot belong to be<strong>in</strong>gs as such. Forif <strong>the</strong>y did, if this referential capacity belonged to be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong>mselves, be<strong>in</strong>gs wouldnot suffer <strong>the</strong> loss <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>conspicuous character when isolated from <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>terconnectionwith o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world. If <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicative capacity <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-toh<strong>and</strong>belongs properly to a be<strong>in</strong>g as such, it would not lose this capacity <strong>of</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>gto itself <strong>and</strong> beyond itself when separated from its <strong>in</strong>volvement with o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> world. In this connection, <strong>Heidegger</strong> notes:That <strong>the</strong> world does not “consist” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ready-to-h<strong>and</strong> shows itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact (among o<strong>the</strong>rs)that whenever <strong>the</strong> world is lit up <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> modes <strong>of</strong> concern which we have been <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g,<strong>the</strong> ready-to-h<strong>and</strong> becomes deprived <strong>of</strong> its worldhood so that be<strong>in</strong>g-just-present-at-h<strong>and</strong>comes to <strong>the</strong> fore. 33The fact that be<strong>in</strong>gs lose <strong>the</strong>ir capacity to <strong>in</strong>dicate when treated as if <strong>the</strong>y werejust this be<strong>in</strong>g “<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves” br<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>to relief <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> reference; reference32Ibid.33GA 2, p. 101; tr. 106.
A Purview <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g: The Ontological Structure <strong>of</strong> World, Reference (Verweisung)...89belongs most properly to <strong>the</strong> referential releasement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon: world.This structure <strong>of</strong> reference does not belong to be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own right, but <strong>in</strong>deedto <strong>the</strong> phenomenon: world.In general, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s analyses <strong>of</strong> both <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>conspicuous <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> conspicuousmoments <strong>of</strong> unread<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> shows <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> reference, <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>-order-to,” to be granted by <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world <strong>and</strong> not by be<strong>in</strong>gs assuch. The “where<strong>in</strong>” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world, <strong>in</strong> withdraw<strong>in</strong>g, frees be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong>grants <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g what <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> for <strong>in</strong>volvementper se. Thus, <strong>the</strong> phenomenal referent <strong>of</strong> world is ontologically prior to <strong>the</strong>limited referential po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. Specifically, <strong>the</strong> priority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “where<strong>in</strong>,” thatis, <strong>the</strong> phenomenal referent <strong>of</strong> world, over <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicative capacity <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, showsitself <strong>in</strong> a disclosure that cannot be accomplished by <strong>the</strong> specific po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g ahead byread<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>. Read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> this disclosure, itpartakes <strong>of</strong> this disclosure, but without be<strong>in</strong>g able to br<strong>in</strong>g it about. The phenomenon<strong>of</strong> world, as <strong>the</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “where<strong>in</strong>” is <strong>the</strong>n that which allows <strong>the</strong>multidimensional <strong>in</strong>dicative capacity <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs to become manifest; be<strong>in</strong>gs are“with” o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs, but only as be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world. The phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world as<strong>the</strong> primordial referent shows itself as <strong>the</strong> phenomenal horizon “where<strong>in</strong>” <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>conspicuousbe<strong>in</strong>g-character <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs becomes accessible as <strong>the</strong> capacity <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>gthat which is granted to <strong>the</strong>m. The analyses <strong>of</strong> both <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>conspicuous <strong>and</strong> conspicuousmodes <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> unread<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> suggest that <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> worldannounces itself already <strong>the</strong>re, that is, as <strong>the</strong> ontological horizon “where<strong>in</strong>” be<strong>in</strong>gs<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> are granted <strong>the</strong>ir capacities <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g available, usable,<strong>and</strong>, most essentially, <strong>the</strong>ir capacity <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g or po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong>world. The phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world emerges as <strong>the</strong> ontological basis for “deliver<strong>in</strong>gbe<strong>in</strong>gs over” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g. Conversely, because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir dual character <strong>of</strong> “po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>gto” <strong>and</strong> rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g “<strong>in</strong>conspicuous,” be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong>mselves suggest a mode <strong>of</strong> concealment,which parallels <strong>the</strong> self-shelter<strong>in</strong>g “refusal” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> earth.Before tak<strong>in</strong>g up aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> analyses <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>Heidegger</strong> formulates<strong>the</strong> ontological advancements achieved by <strong>the</strong> analyses <strong>in</strong> Sections 15 <strong>and</strong> 16. At <strong>the</strong>phenomenal level, <strong>the</strong> formal dist<strong>in</strong>ction between be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ontological tie to<strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world is articulated. The term “sign” denoted <strong>the</strong> capacity <strong>of</strong>“referr<strong>in</strong>g” as <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g that is manifested by <strong>the</strong> phenomenal be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> ready-toh<strong>and</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>. In contrast to this, <strong>the</strong> term “reference” characterizes<strong>the</strong> “phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world.” 34 To <strong>the</strong> latter belongs <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> referenceproper. For <strong>the</strong> disclosedness <strong>of</strong> world makes possible <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> “referr<strong>in</strong>g” as<strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g manifested by ready-to-h<strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>. Thesebe<strong>in</strong>gs are limited <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir referential po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> that <strong>the</strong>y po<strong>in</strong>t to <strong>the</strong> disclosedness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world, which is already <strong>the</strong>re s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong>y are unable to reach orto claim this phenomenal character on <strong>the</strong>ir own. The specifically limited po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>, as dist<strong>in</strong>guished from <strong>the</strong> reference proper, whichbelongs to <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world, is called by <strong>Heidegger</strong> “<strong>in</strong>dication.”34GA 2, pp. 110–111; tr. 114.
90 M. SenaWith <strong>the</strong> clarification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction between <strong>the</strong> phenomenal character <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> world, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s analyses <strong>of</strong> everydayness, “<strong>of</strong> that which is onticallyclosest but ontologically far<strong>the</strong>st from Dase<strong>in</strong>,” move toward fur<strong>the</strong>r ontologicalexplicitness. Tak<strong>in</strong>g up aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “accompany<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>the</strong>me <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir phenomenalcapacity <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dication, <strong>the</strong> analyses <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> now move <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong>irf<strong>in</strong>al <strong>and</strong> decisive phrase. Hav<strong>in</strong>g established that <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world is <strong>the</strong>primordial locale, <strong>the</strong> referential horizon, “where<strong>in</strong>” be<strong>in</strong>gs become manifest <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong>mselves, <strong>Heidegger</strong> now <strong>in</strong>vestigates <strong>the</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs with a viewtoward be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>). With <strong>the</strong> secur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> earlieranalyses, this phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world now can be treated phenomenologically notonly as <strong>the</strong> phenomenal basis <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, but also as <strong>the</strong> first nam<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “where<strong>in</strong>”<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>). For be<strong>in</strong>g, while itself not a be<strong>in</strong>g, when encountered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> middlevoice form, is <strong>the</strong> primordial “where<strong>in</strong>” <strong>of</strong> “openness” <strong>in</strong> which be<strong>in</strong>gs first come tost<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> appear <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore as hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves.Here, two senses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “where<strong>in</strong>” must be clarified <strong>and</strong> radically kept dist<strong>in</strong>ct.There is <strong>the</strong> “where<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs;” <strong>in</strong>deed, because <strong>the</strong> “where<strong>in</strong>” <strong>in</strong> which be<strong>in</strong>gsappear, that is, <strong>the</strong> place <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>y appear <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own right, is <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves.Be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong>refore have <strong>the</strong>ir own be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>and</strong> show <strong>the</strong>mselves fromwith<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves. Put differently, be<strong>in</strong>gs are self-ground<strong>in</strong>g s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> ground <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong>ir own <strong>in</strong>dividual be<strong>in</strong>g lies with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves. But first <strong>and</strong> foremost, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong>“where<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> world” as <strong>the</strong> first nam<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) as <strong>the</strong> primordial disclosure<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “open,” <strong>the</strong> expanse <strong>of</strong> openness as <strong>the</strong> prior ground, that is to say, <strong>the</strong>abground (Abgrund), which delivers be<strong>in</strong>gs over to <strong>the</strong>mselves. 35 Given <strong>the</strong> ontologicalpriority <strong>of</strong> this primordial “where<strong>in</strong>” <strong>of</strong> world/be<strong>in</strong>g, be<strong>in</strong>gs can be encountered<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terrogated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own modes <strong>of</strong> show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> brought to <strong>the</strong> primordialmode <strong>of</strong> self-show<strong>in</strong>g, that is, as that which shows itself from with<strong>in</strong> itself, withrespect to be<strong>in</strong>g.The f<strong>in</strong>al phase <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> analyses <strong>of</strong> everydayness concerns <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> “primary”<strong>the</strong>me <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g by way <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “accompany<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>the</strong>me <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. Yet, <strong>in</strong> this f<strong>in</strong>alphase, <strong>Heidegger</strong> only h<strong>in</strong>ts at <strong>the</strong> relational character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se two <strong>the</strong>mes by mak<strong>in</strong>ga few comments regard<strong>in</strong>g what he now discerns as a more “primordial” way <strong>of</strong>tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>. 36 Access to <strong>the</strong> more “primordial” way <strong>of</strong>“tak<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>and</strong> “<strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>the</strong> “read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as signs, however, isapparent only to those Dase<strong>in</strong>s who are phenomenally rooted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world. In <strong>the</strong>case <strong>of</strong> those Dase<strong>in</strong>s who already st<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> modality <strong>of</strong> fullyencounter<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own right as sign, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicative capacity <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs isseen as manifest<strong>in</strong>g itself as hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> capacity to reveal (entdecken). Secured <strong>in</strong>terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world as <strong>the</strong> horizonal “where<strong>in</strong>,” be<strong>in</strong>gs are <strong>in</strong>terrogatedas to how <strong>the</strong>y appear. Be<strong>in</strong>gs appear as <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves but also<strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that determ<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong>m. As <strong>in</strong>dicative <strong>of</strong> both35For a pert<strong>in</strong>ent discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s description <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “open,” see GA 65, p. 329; tr. 230.36GA 2, p. 107; tr. 111.
A Purview <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g: The Ontological Structure <strong>of</strong> World, Reference (Verweisung)...91<strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>), be<strong>in</strong>gs have <strong>the</strong> phenomenal character <strong>of</strong> Ersche<strong>in</strong>ung.Ersche<strong>in</strong>ung means “<strong>the</strong> announc<strong>in</strong>g-itself by someth<strong>in</strong>g which does not showitself, but which announces itself through someth<strong>in</strong>g which does show itself.” 37Deformalized, this means <strong>the</strong> world/be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) announces itself as <strong>the</strong> already<strong>the</strong>re through <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicative capacity <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. Here, <strong>the</strong> ga<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s analyses<strong>of</strong> everydayness is seen through <strong>the</strong> appear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. The <strong>in</strong>dicative character<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as “(Ersche<strong>in</strong>ung)…means a reference-relationship which is <strong>in</strong> anentity itself.” 38 This phenomenal structure <strong>of</strong> Ersche<strong>in</strong>ung, as manifest[ed] bybe<strong>in</strong>gs, is <strong>in</strong>dicative <strong>of</strong> how <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world/be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) announces itselfthrough be<strong>in</strong>gs as <strong>the</strong>y po<strong>in</strong>t beyond <strong>the</strong>mselves to this very ground <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ownbe<strong>in</strong>g. Yet, still concealed, world/be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) does not show itself from with<strong>in</strong> itselfby way <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. Ra<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>g world/be<strong>in</strong>g “announces” itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> throughbe<strong>in</strong>gs. Formally conceived, <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> Ersche<strong>in</strong>ung br<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>to relief that <strong>the</strong>phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world/ be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) does not show itself from itself; ra<strong>the</strong>r, itannounces itself through someth<strong>in</strong>g that appears, that is, be<strong>in</strong>gs. Be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong>n po<strong>in</strong>tDase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> open<strong>in</strong>g/“<strong>the</strong>re,” yet it is Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> its worldly characterthat must encounter it. The announc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple can be brought toself-show<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> manifest, but only <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> its worldly characterreleases itself towards <strong>the</strong> “open.”But while <strong>the</strong> world announces itself through be<strong>in</strong>gs, it is also <strong>the</strong> case that be<strong>in</strong>gscan become <strong>the</strong> occasion through which ano<strong>the</strong>r particular be<strong>in</strong>g announces itself.While at all times world/be<strong>in</strong>g announces itself through be<strong>in</strong>gs, be<strong>in</strong>gs can becomeas well <strong>the</strong> occasion through which <strong>the</strong> announc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g that is not immediatelypresent phenomenally appears. <strong>Heidegger</strong> uses <strong>the</strong> example <strong>of</strong> a farmer whost<strong>and</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world <strong>and</strong> encounters be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> primordial capacity <strong>of</strong> reveal<strong>in</strong>g. In<strong>the</strong>se be<strong>in</strong>gs, taken as signs, <strong>the</strong> sign is still not “free from what it <strong>in</strong>dicates.” Thefarmer takes <strong>the</strong> appearance (Ersche<strong>in</strong>ung) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> south w<strong>in</strong>d as a sign reveal<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>approach<strong>in</strong>g ra<strong>in</strong>. Here, <strong>in</strong> this example, <strong>Heidegger</strong> suggests that this primordialmode <strong>of</strong> tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>gs is already a way <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g towards both be<strong>in</strong>g(Se<strong>in</strong>) <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. For it is <strong>the</strong> case that proper orientation towards be<strong>in</strong>g is alreadycalled for if Dase<strong>in</strong> is to encounter be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir full <strong>in</strong>dicative capacity whereboth be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs appear through <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> modality <strong>of</strong> an announcement.In Section 7, <strong>Heidegger</strong> already draws explicit attention to <strong>the</strong> phenomenalmode <strong>of</strong> Ersche<strong>in</strong>ung def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>gs. There, he states that all <strong>in</strong>dication has <strong>the</strong>formal phenomenal structure <strong>of</strong> Ersche<strong>in</strong>ung:All <strong>in</strong>dication, presentations, symptoms, <strong>and</strong> symbols have this basic formal structure <strong>of</strong>appear<strong>in</strong>g, even though <strong>the</strong>y differ among <strong>the</strong>mselves. 39For <strong>the</strong> farmer, <strong>the</strong> approach<strong>in</strong>g ra<strong>in</strong> as a phenomenon does not show itself fromitself; ra<strong>the</strong>r, it announces itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> through <strong>the</strong> appear<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> hence <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g37GA 2, p. 40; tr. 52.38GA 2, p. 41; tr. 54.39GA 2, p. 40; tr. 52.
92 M. Sena<strong>of</strong> a be<strong>in</strong>g that does show itself, that is, <strong>the</strong> south w<strong>in</strong>d. For <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>the</strong>n, <strong>the</strong>structure <strong>of</strong> Ersche<strong>in</strong>ung has a double significance. This can be seen <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> example<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ra<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> w<strong>in</strong>d, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong>re is (1) <strong>the</strong> appear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon thatdoes not show itself but ra<strong>the</strong>r announces itself, that is, <strong>the</strong> ra<strong>in</strong>; <strong>and</strong> (2) <strong>the</strong> appear<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> south w<strong>in</strong>d as such, as it shows itself <strong>in</strong> itself. The ra<strong>in</strong> not yet appear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>itself announces itself through <strong>the</strong> w<strong>in</strong>d that does appear. The double significance<strong>of</strong> Ersche<strong>in</strong>ung shows itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se two different senses <strong>of</strong> appear<strong>in</strong>g.The encounter with <strong>the</strong> so-called natural phenomena (<strong>and</strong> not signs that areformally produced or set up by Dase<strong>in</strong>) shows, <strong>the</strong>n, that sign-be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir mode <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g as reveal<strong>in</strong>g, when encountered from with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re”(Da), ultimately are <strong>the</strong> “carriers” <strong>and</strong> “bearers” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs.When <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mode <strong>of</strong> reveal<strong>in</strong>g, signs “co<strong>in</strong>cide with that which is <strong>in</strong>dicated.” 40 Here<strong>the</strong> sign is not a “substitute for what it <strong>in</strong>dicates;” ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> sign is already what is<strong>in</strong>dicated. 414 Conclusion<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s careful <strong>and</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>uous prob<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> phenomenological character<strong>and</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong> exhibits that it is by virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>referential character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world/be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) that be<strong>in</strong>gs are freedto “carry,” to “take on,” <strong>and</strong> “to bear” a significance that po<strong>in</strong>ts beyond <strong>the</strong>mselvesto both be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> to <strong>the</strong> significance <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs. By virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> differencebetween <strong>the</strong> referential referr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘referr<strong>in</strong>g’<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> sign-be<strong>in</strong>gs, be<strong>in</strong>gs are freed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>dicative capacityto be <strong>the</strong> bearers <strong>of</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g characteristic <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs. By trac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> structure<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>-order-to” back to <strong>the</strong> more primordial phenomenal tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs assigns that both <strong>in</strong>dicate, <strong>and</strong>, more primordially, “reveal,” <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s analyses <strong>of</strong>everydayness show that be<strong>in</strong>gs, when encountered from with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>world, appear <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own right <strong>and</strong> at times become <strong>the</strong> occasion for o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gsto phenomenally appear <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mode <strong>of</strong> an announcement. Indeed, be<strong>in</strong>g is not amatter <strong>of</strong> “soar<strong>in</strong>g speculation” accessible only to <strong>the</strong> philosopher. It ra<strong>the</strong>r issuesforth out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> attentiveness that approaches <strong>the</strong> so-called th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world out <strong>of</strong>a regard for <strong>the</strong> phenomenal basis (Grund) <strong>in</strong> which be<strong>in</strong>gs first appear <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ownrich <strong>in</strong>dicative capacity.In this way, my discussion reaffirms <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s emphasis on <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gsas a phenomenological precondition for <strong>the</strong>ir becom<strong>in</strong>g equipment through <strong>the</strong>dynamic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir “<strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g,” reveal<strong>in</strong>g potential, which ultimately presupposes<strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> world as <strong>the</strong> first nam<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>). I <strong>the</strong>reby expose <strong>the</strong>40GA 2, p. 110; tr. 113.41GA 2, p. 110; tr. 113.
A Purview <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g: The Ontological Structure <strong>of</strong> World, Reference (Verweisung)...93misconception <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> pragmatist attempt to construe be<strong>in</strong>gs exclusively <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong>ir uses, <strong>and</strong> to def<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong>ir appearance merely as a network <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>strumentality.Because <strong>of</strong> this misconception, <strong>the</strong> pragmatists overlook <strong>the</strong> subtlety <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s<strong>in</strong>sight that be<strong>in</strong>gs always occur “<strong>in</strong>,” ra<strong>the</strong>r than “as” a whole. The root <strong>of</strong> thismisunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> its corollary mistranslation <strong>of</strong> “das Seiende im Ganzen” as“be<strong>in</strong>g as a whole,” ra<strong>the</strong>r than “be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> a whole,” however, is not reserved to <strong>the</strong>pragmatists; <strong>in</strong>stead this error re-emerges <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r genre <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> scholarship,<strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong>deed, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> most recent literature. As one such example, we need to look n<strong>of</strong>ur<strong>the</strong>r than Michael Lewis’s new book, <strong>Heidegger</strong> Beyond Deconstruction. Whilediscuss<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> relation between world <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> “im” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>g isparamount to underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> s<strong>in</strong>gularity <strong>of</strong> its manifestness, Lewis proceedsfrom <strong>the</strong> same errancy as <strong>the</strong> pragmatists do, that is, <strong>of</strong> neglect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>“with” as <strong>the</strong> phenomenological preconditions for <strong>the</strong> manifestness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs.Specifically, he describes <strong>the</strong> realm <strong>of</strong> nature (with <strong>the</strong> emphasis <strong>of</strong> his own italics)as “<strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>itude <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as a whole.” 42By expos<strong>in</strong>g a failure that is endemic to, but not limited to pragmatism, I haveshown that <strong>the</strong> pragmatists’ misunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g provides an occasion to re-exam<strong>in</strong>e<strong>the</strong> thrust <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> primordiality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> worldas a prelim<strong>in</strong>ary phenomenological exposition <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>). In this way, mydiscussion elucidates both <strong>the</strong> phenomenal manifestation <strong>of</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> a whole”(das Seiende im Ganzen), <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “where<strong>in</strong>” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir appear<strong>in</strong>g through <strong>the</strong> open<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world itself. In this way, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s hermeneutic phenomenology paves <strong>the</strong>way for th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> “open,” <strong>and</strong>, conversely, <strong>the</strong> openness as <strong>the</strong> “clear<strong>in</strong>g”(Lichtung) <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g.ReferencesBernasconi, Robert. 1993. <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong> question: The art <strong>of</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g. Atlantic Highl<strong>and</strong>s:Humanities Press International.Dreyfus, Hubert. 1991. Be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-word: A commentary on <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time.Cambridge: The MIT Press.Dreyfus, Hubert. 1992. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> equipment. In <strong>Heidegger</strong>: A criticalreader, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus <strong>and</strong> Harrison Hall, 173–185. Oxford: Blackwell.Emad, Parvis. 1988. Reference, sign, <strong>and</strong> language: Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time, section 17. In The collegiumphaenomenologicum: The first ten years, ed. J. Sallis, G. Moneta, <strong>and</strong> J. Tam<strong>in</strong>iaux, 175–190.Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Emad, Parvis. 2007. On <strong>the</strong> way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s contributions to philosophy. Madison: TheUniversity <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press.42Michael Lewis, <strong>Heidegger</strong> Beyond Deconstruction: On Nature (London: Cont<strong>in</strong>uum, 2007),p. 31. For fur<strong>the</strong>r examples, see pp. 15, 19, 99. For a critique <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various problems that arisefrom this translation “be<strong>in</strong>gs as a whole,” see Parvis Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributionsto Philosophy (Madison; The University <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press, 2007), pp. 15–16.
94 M. SenaFell, Joseph P. 1992. The familiar <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> strange: On <strong>the</strong> limits <strong>of</strong> Praxis <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early <strong>Heidegger</strong>.In <strong>Heidegger</strong>: A critical reader, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus <strong>and</strong> Harrison Hall, 65–80. Cambridge:Blackwell.Haar, Michel. 1993. The enigma <strong>of</strong> everydayness. In Read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Commemorations, ed.John Sallis, 20–28. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1962. Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time. Trans. John Macquarrie <strong>and</strong> Edward Rob<strong>in</strong>son.New York: Harper & Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1977. Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1989. Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann. Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly. 1999. Contributions to philosophy(from enown<strong>in</strong>g). Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.Lewis, Michael. 2007. <strong>Heidegger</strong> beyond deconstruction: On nature. London: Cont<strong>in</strong>uum.Okrent, Mark. 1988. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s pragmatism: Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> critique <strong>of</strong>metaphysics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Rorty, Richard. 1992. <strong>Heidegger</strong>, cont<strong>in</strong>gency, <strong>and</strong> pragmatism. In <strong>Heidegger</strong>: A critical reader,ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus <strong>and</strong> Harrison Hall, 209–230. Oxford: Blackwell.Schalow, Frank. 2004. How viable is Dreyfus’s <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>? Anthropologism,pragmatism, <strong>and</strong> misunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> texts. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 20: 17–33.von Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm. 1985. Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Dase<strong>in</strong>s: E<strong>in</strong>eErläuterung von “Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit”, I. E<strong>in</strong>leitung: Die Exposition der Frage nach dem S<strong>in</strong>n vonSe<strong>in</strong>. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Experience with LanguageGeorge KovacsThis chapter explores <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g dimensions <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s hermeneutics <strong>of</strong>language: <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>and</strong> significance <strong>of</strong> his concern with language (1); his experiencewith language as <strong>the</strong> way to what is ownmost (Wesen) to language (2); histrans-ition to be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical language (3); <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic lessons <strong>in</strong> his experiencewith language (4).1 <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s attunement to language is endemic to his way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, to his entirejourney <strong>of</strong> thought. His lifelong attempt to reth<strong>in</strong>k (to reopen) <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> “tobe,” as <strong>the</strong> most primordial <strong>and</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>ound concern <strong>of</strong> philosophy, <strong>in</strong> fact <strong>of</strong> humanbe<strong>in</strong>g, is conditioned by <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g (Sagen), by <strong>the</strong> disclosive potential <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> word (Wort), <strong>of</strong> language (Sprache). As he observes <strong>in</strong> his 1939 summer semestersem<strong>in</strong>ar on language, focused on J. G. Herder’s treatise Über den Ursprung derSprache (On <strong>the</strong> Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> Language), “when <strong>the</strong> word breaks <strong>of</strong>f (gebricht)—be-<strong>in</strong>g(Seyn) refuses (versagt) itself,” reneges itself, 1 it does not come <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> word.1Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Vom Wesen der Sprache: Die Metaphysik der Sprache und die Wesung desWortes; Zu Herders Abh<strong>and</strong>lung “Über den Ursprung der Sprache” (upper level sem<strong>in</strong>ar atFreiburg, Summer Semester, 1939; notes <strong>and</strong> protocols), GA 85 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann,1999), p. 72 (hereafter: GA 85); On <strong>the</strong> Essence <strong>of</strong> Language: The Metaphysics <strong>of</strong> Language <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> Essenc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Word; Concern<strong>in</strong>g Herder’s Treatise “On <strong>the</strong> Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> Language,” trans.W<strong>and</strong>a Torres Gregory <strong>and</strong> Yvonne Unna (Albany, New York: State University <strong>of</strong> New York Press,2004), p. 62 (translation modified).G. Kovacs (*)Department <strong>of</strong> Philosophy, Florida International University,Tamiami Campus, 33199 Miami, FL, USAe-mail: Drgeorgekovacs@aol.comF. Schalow (ed.), <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad, Contributions To Phenomenology 65,DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0_5, © Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media B.V. 201195
96 G. KovacsThis concise statement is consistent with his earlier remark that <strong>the</strong> “word” orig<strong>in</strong>ates,arises “out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> essential sway<strong>in</strong>g (Wesung) <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g.” 2 In his 1957–1958 essay“Das Wesen der Sprache” (What is Ownmost to Language), <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> hisUnterwegs zur Sprache (1950–1959) (On <strong>the</strong> Way to Language), <strong>Heidegger</strong> concludesfrom his meditation on language, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g his assessment <strong>of</strong> StephanGeorge’s poetic say<strong>in</strong>g that “Where <strong>the</strong> word breaks <strong>of</strong>f (gebricht) no th<strong>in</strong>g maybe,” with <strong>the</strong> tell<strong>in</strong>g claim that “An ‘is’ (ist) gives itself (ergibt sich) where <strong>the</strong> wordbreaks up (zerbricht),” add<strong>in</strong>g his remark that this “break<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word is <strong>the</strong>s<strong>in</strong>gular (eigentliches; true, real) step back on <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.” 3 Thus, <strong>the</strong>break<strong>in</strong>g up, <strong>the</strong> failure, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word (<strong>the</strong> experience with language) says someth<strong>in</strong>gabout <strong>the</strong> “is” as well as about th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Beiträge zur Philosophie(Vom Ereignis) (1936–1938), language “arises (entspr<strong>in</strong>gt) from be-<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>and</strong> thusbelongs to be-<strong>in</strong>g; <strong>in</strong> fact, as <strong>Heidegger</strong> clearly expla<strong>in</strong>s, both language <strong>and</strong> humanbe<strong>in</strong>g “belong equally orig<strong>in</strong>arily (gleichursprünglich) to be-<strong>in</strong>g.” 4 These ideas gobeyond (<strong>the</strong>y radicalize) <strong>the</strong> metaphysical underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> languageto human be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> to be<strong>in</strong>gs (Seienden), <strong>and</strong> thus ultimately to be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>); <strong>the</strong>ylead (are on <strong>the</strong> way) to <strong>the</strong> discernment <strong>and</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic-enown<strong>in</strong>gth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relationship <strong>of</strong> language to be-<strong>in</strong>g (Seyn), to human be<strong>in</strong>g asDa-se<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> to be-<strong>in</strong>gs (Seyenden).For <strong>Heidegger</strong>, as <strong>the</strong>se considerations <strong>in</strong>dicate, <strong>the</strong> discovery (assessment) <strong>of</strong>what language truly is, <strong>of</strong> what is ownmost (Wesen) to language, is <strong>in</strong>tertw<strong>in</strong>ed(historically as well as <strong>the</strong>matically) with <strong>the</strong> depth <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g “to be” (esse; be<strong>in</strong>g;be-<strong>in</strong>g), with <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> human be<strong>in</strong>g as Da-se<strong>in</strong> (as “more” than subjectivity,as o<strong>the</strong>r than animal rationale, as different from <strong>the</strong> metaphysically def<strong>in</strong>edrational animal), as well as with <strong>the</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs (<strong>and</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>gs) <strong>in</strong> light<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir relationship to (root <strong>in</strong>) “to be.” The exp<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, even if limited, <strong>in</strong>teractionbetween cultures <strong>in</strong> our life-world, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g diverse languages <strong>and</strong> ways <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g,renders <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> language (<strong>of</strong> language as such, not merely <strong>the</strong> concernwith a particular language <strong>and</strong> with <strong>the</strong> diversity <strong>of</strong> languages, not just <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong> comparative l<strong>in</strong>guistics) more <strong>and</strong> more <strong>in</strong>trigu<strong>in</strong>g, urgent, <strong>and</strong> significant (existentially<strong>and</strong> philosophically). The hermeneutics <strong>of</strong> language <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> (as wellas <strong>in</strong> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Lev<strong>in</strong>as, Mart<strong>in</strong> Buber, <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs)2GA 85, p. 65; tr. 55 (translation modified).3Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Unterwegs zur Sprache, GA 12 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann, 1985),p. 204 (hereafter: GA 12); On <strong>the</strong> Way to Language, trans. Peter Herz <strong>and</strong> Joan Stambaugh(New York: Harper <strong>and</strong> Row, 1971), p. 108 (translation modified).4Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Klostermann, 1989), pp. 501, 497 (hereafter: GA 65); Contributions to Philosophy (FromEnown<strong>in</strong>g), trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1999),pp. 352, 350 (referred to <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text with Contributions).
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Experience with Language97reopens <strong>the</strong> entire question <strong>of</strong> language; it raises <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> wonder, astonishment,as well as suspicion <strong>and</strong> anxiety, about <strong>the</strong> “place” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “future” (<strong>the</strong> dest<strong>in</strong>y) <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> “word,” about <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> “say<strong>in</strong>g,” about <strong>the</strong> disclosive potential <strong>of</strong> humanlanguage <strong>and</strong> speech. <strong>Heidegger</strong> speaks <strong>of</strong> his own experience with language <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>age <strong>of</strong> technology. He remarks <strong>in</strong> his letter to Elisabeth Blochmann, dated Oct. 12,1968, that much <strong>of</strong> his thought becomes more simple (e<strong>in</strong>fach), that is, more readilyunderst<strong>and</strong>able, with <strong>the</strong> passage <strong>of</strong> time, <strong>and</strong> with <strong>the</strong> work put <strong>in</strong>to it; however, hecont<strong>in</strong>ues, it becomes, at <strong>the</strong> same time, “more difficult to say (zu sagen)” it, to putit <strong>in</strong>to language, <strong>in</strong> an age, <strong>in</strong> our technological age <strong>and</strong> culture, where human be<strong>in</strong>gs“lose <strong>the</strong> true relation with language <strong>and</strong> become slaves <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> computer.” 5 He isconcerned with <strong>the</strong> loss <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> “say<strong>in</strong>g,” with <strong>the</strong> underm<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>disclosive potential <strong>of</strong> language <strong>in</strong> technologized culture, with <strong>the</strong> alienation <strong>of</strong>human be<strong>in</strong>g from what language really is. In his first lecture course at Marburg,given <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> w<strong>in</strong>ter semester <strong>of</strong> 1923–1924, published as E<strong>in</strong>führung <strong>in</strong> die phänomenologischeForschung (Introduction to Phenomenological Research), <strong>Heidegger</strong>perceptively observes that language is “<strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> becom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> human be<strong>in</strong>ghimself,” that <strong>the</strong> genesis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word is not <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> physiology but <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> genu<strong>in</strong>e,actual “existence <strong>of</strong> human be<strong>in</strong>g.” 6 Language, he expla<strong>in</strong>s, is “a specific way <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> human be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world.” 7 Thus, concern with language entailscar<strong>in</strong>g for human be<strong>in</strong>g, attend<strong>in</strong>g to Da-se<strong>in</strong> as be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world.2 <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s concern with language is existential <strong>and</strong> hermeneutic; it is not al<strong>in</strong>guistic <strong>the</strong>ory, not a preoccupation with mere semiotic issues or semiology. Hisown experience with language is hermeneutic disclosure; it is an <strong>in</strong>tegral part <strong>of</strong> hisphilosophy <strong>of</strong> language, <strong>of</strong> his way <strong>of</strong> unearth<strong>in</strong>g what is ownmost to language,what language really is. The diversity <strong>and</strong> depth <strong>of</strong> his actual work with languagebecome an opportunity for learn<strong>in</strong>g about <strong>and</strong> for discern<strong>in</strong>g (discover<strong>in</strong>g) language assuch, thus much more than exp<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> knowledge <strong>of</strong> a (or any) particularlanguage. His <strong>in</strong>sights <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> life <strong>and</strong> place <strong>of</strong> language <strong>in</strong> human culture, <strong>in</strong> humanexistence, lead to <strong>the</strong> reth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary, traditional underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>language, <strong>and</strong> to <strong>the</strong> assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> uses <strong>and</strong> abuses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> language<strong>in</strong> human history, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> thought, as well as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> realm <strong>of</strong> politics.5Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> und Elisabeth Blochmann, Briefwechsel 1918–1969, edited by JoachimW. Storck (Marbach am Neckar: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 1989), p. 117.6Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, E<strong>in</strong>führung <strong>in</strong> die phänomenologische Forschung, GA 17 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Klostermann, 1994b), p. 16 (hereafter: GA 17); Introduction to Phenomenological Research, trans.Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 2005), p. 12.7GA 17, p. 317; tr. 240 (translation modified).
98 G. KovacsAccord<strong>in</strong>gly, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s experience with language ought torespond to <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g two questions: What is his experience with language?What does it mean to have (to undergo, to live through) an experience with languageaccord<strong>in</strong>g to his underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g? The next phase <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se reflections is focused on<strong>the</strong> issues at stake <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se questions.<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s experience with language, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g his care for <strong>and</strong> sensitivityabout speech <strong>and</strong> language, accompanies (cuts across) his entire journey <strong>of</strong> thought.He clearly states that “m<strong>in</strong>dfulness (Bes<strong>in</strong>nung) <strong>of</strong> language, <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, hasdeterm<strong>in</strong>ed my pathway <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g from early on.” 8 His entire body <strong>of</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>gsgives ample evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> depth <strong>of</strong> his persistent concern with language. Theemergence <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> language, <strong>of</strong> his hermeneutic sensitivityabout language, may be seen <strong>in</strong> his read<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> (work<strong>in</strong>g with) Aristotle’s texts, <strong>in</strong>his alertness to <strong>the</strong> basic words <strong>and</strong> concepts <strong>of</strong> Aristotle’s philosophy, <strong>and</strong> not just<strong>in</strong> his (<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s) background <strong>in</strong> (<strong>in</strong> his acqua<strong>in</strong>tance with) biblical <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ologicalhermeneutics. His work with <strong>the</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> great th<strong>in</strong>kers (from <strong>the</strong> pre-Socratics to Nietzsche) surely made him <strong>in</strong>to a perceptive, <strong>in</strong>sightful, astute observer<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “play” (life), <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g, disclosive power <strong>of</strong> language, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g(def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g) function <strong>of</strong> basic, dist<strong>in</strong>ctive (hermeneutically-situated) words <strong>and</strong> tell<strong>in</strong>gexpressions. His vocabulary <strong>and</strong> diction, though <strong>in</strong>ventive, are rooted, at least <strong>in</strong>part, <strong>in</strong> his encounter (dialogue) with <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>sights <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> language(s) <strong>of</strong> sem<strong>in</strong>alth<strong>in</strong>kers, with <strong>the</strong> disclosive power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir words, say<strong>in</strong>g (sagen), <strong>and</strong> language. Itis not accidental at all that he reta<strong>in</strong>s his persistent claim that language (speak<strong>in</strong>g,say<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g are bound toge<strong>the</strong>r, that we as mortals <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>kers “dwell <strong>in</strong>language,” that “to say what is worthy <strong>of</strong> thought” is (means) “th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.” 9Thus, language, <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own experience with it, is more, or ra<strong>the</strong>r o<strong>the</strong>r,than <strong>the</strong> expression <strong>of</strong> ready-made ideas, more than a simple communication <strong>of</strong>ideas, more <strong>and</strong> deeper than <strong>the</strong> exteriorization <strong>of</strong> human subjectivity, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Ith<strong>in</strong>k.” Even his fasc<strong>in</strong>ation (work) with etymology (Greek, Lat<strong>in</strong>, German; <strong>and</strong>occasionally o<strong>the</strong>r languages) comes from his underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> (existential,hermeneutic) connection between speak<strong>in</strong>g (language) <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g (thought), fromhis attunement to <strong>the</strong> “tw<strong>of</strong>oldness” <strong>of</strong> lógoV as ratio (reason, th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g) et (<strong>and</strong>)oratio (speak<strong>in</strong>g, discourse), from <strong>the</strong> richness <strong>of</strong> his experience (work <strong>in</strong> learn<strong>in</strong>g,read<strong>in</strong>g, research, teach<strong>in</strong>g) with language. There is no doubt that his careful, <strong>in</strong>novative,<strong>in</strong>ventive work with (“use” <strong>of</strong>) language <strong>and</strong> his elucidations <strong>of</strong> Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’spoetry, as well as <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r poetic texts <strong>and</strong> works <strong>of</strong> art, enriched <strong>and</strong> reawakened<strong>the</strong> genius, power, <strong>and</strong> beauty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German language. His words (not engenderedby <strong>the</strong> established dictionary or lexicography) <strong>and</strong> philosophical, <strong>of</strong>ten poietic diction,<strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>saurus” <strong>of</strong> his thought <strong>and</strong> language, illustrate, embody, <strong>and</strong> enact <strong>the</strong>aff<strong>in</strong>ity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German language, <strong>of</strong> its disclosive power (potential), with nature,8GA 12, p. 88; tr. 7 (translation modified). See also GA 12, p. 89; tr. 8.9GA 12, pp. 34, 224; tr. 161 (translation modified), 155 (translation modified). See also GA 12,pp. 168, 169; tr. 74, 75.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Experience with Language99earth, <strong>and</strong> sky, with existential experiences, with <strong>the</strong> emergence <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g, with itsprimal orig<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> with its pre-semiotic life <strong>and</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g. This experience withlanguage does not lead (surely not <strong>Heidegger</strong>) to <strong>the</strong> glorification, to <strong>the</strong> affirmation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> superiority (supremacy) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German language (culture <strong>and</strong> thought); it,much ra<strong>the</strong>r, accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s assessment, opens up <strong>the</strong> way to <strong>the</strong> primordiality<strong>of</strong> language (<strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> speech) to <strong>the</strong> discernment <strong>and</strong> discovery <strong>of</strong> whatis ownmost (Wesen) to language, <strong>of</strong> what language truly is or can be.Thus, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s experience with (<strong>in</strong> fact his extensive encounter with or exposureto) language amounts to a hermeneutic disclosure <strong>and</strong> discovery, to <strong>the</strong>(<strong>the</strong>matic <strong>and</strong> existential) source <strong>of</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> (background) <strong>of</strong> his own language; it isnei<strong>the</strong>r a chronometric-developmental genesis nor a biographical-<strong>in</strong>fluential account(derivative explanation) <strong>of</strong> his <strong>in</strong>ventive, unique language. As his hermeneuticphenomenologicalanalysis <strong>of</strong> what is ownmost to language as such (thus not simplyto <strong>the</strong> German or Greek language) amply shows (demonstrates), <strong>the</strong> range <strong>of</strong> hisexperience (work<strong>in</strong>g, th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g) with language moves from ontic language to more<strong>and</strong> more ontological language, from <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> metaphysics to be-<strong>in</strong>g-historicallanguage; it runs up aga<strong>in</strong>st, <strong>and</strong> breaks through, <strong>the</strong> bounds <strong>and</strong> endemic limitations<strong>of</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary, accepted, accustomed language <strong>and</strong> speech. Fac<strong>in</strong>g up to <strong>the</strong>limitations <strong>of</strong> lexicographically <strong>and</strong> dictionary-based prefixed language is part <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s lifelong experience with language. Gadamer rightly claims (<strong>in</strong> 1962)that accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>Heidegger</strong> “all th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is conf<strong>in</strong>ed to language, as a limit as wellas a possibility.” 10 This observation, support<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s claim, captures well<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s experience with language as <strong>the</strong> discernment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> limitations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>language <strong>of</strong> metaphysics, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> metaphysical tradition <strong>of</strong> thought, <strong>and</strong> as <strong>the</strong>discovery <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> need for ano<strong>the</strong>r, unique language for th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> “tobe” entirely o<strong>the</strong>rwise than metaphysics, o<strong>the</strong>rwise than representational th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.For <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s hermeneutic phenomenology, as Gadamer expla<strong>in</strong>s, language is “amode <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> world that precedes all reflective attitudes.” 11 The hermeneuticapproach (way) to language is concerned with <strong>the</strong> primordial orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong>“nature” <strong>of</strong> language, with its disclosive potential, as well as with <strong>the</strong> obstructions<strong>of</strong> its disclosive power as what is ownmost to it, prior (structurally <strong>and</strong> even historically)to its semiotic <strong>and</strong> lexicographic solidification, fixation, <strong>and</strong> manipulation.<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy <strong>of</strong> language is (it is based on <strong>and</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>s) his experiencewith language, <strong>and</strong> not a <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong>, not a speculative or ideational construct about,language; it transcends, breaks out <strong>of</strong>, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>strumentalization (<strong>and</strong> objectification)<strong>of</strong> language, <strong>and</strong> opens <strong>the</strong> way to <strong>the</strong> discovery <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> (hermeneutic) ontologicalstatus <strong>and</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> language (its orig<strong>in</strong>ally belong<strong>in</strong>g to be-<strong>in</strong>g), 12 to what is trulyownmost (Wesen) to language as such.10Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, translated <strong>and</strong> edited by David E. L<strong>in</strong>ge(Berkeley: University <strong>of</strong> California Press, 1977), p. 127.11Ibid., p. 126.12GA 65, p. 497; tr. 350.
100 G. KovacsThe language <strong>of</strong> metaphysics ultimately cannot say (speak) be-<strong>in</strong>g; it objectifiesbe<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> language, <strong>and</strong> lacks <strong>the</strong> “grammar” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> appropriate words for be-<strong>in</strong>g,for speak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> reth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> “to be.” 13 Be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical, enown<strong>in</strong>glanguage is able to say <strong>and</strong> speak be-<strong>in</strong>g accord<strong>in</strong>g to its essential sway (unfold<strong>in</strong>g).This language is <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s f<strong>in</strong>al, most ambitious, unique, ontological language,as his Unterwegs zur Sprache (GA 12) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> works lead<strong>in</strong>g up to it quite powerfullydemonstrate. His unique, as well as difficult, language (diction, say<strong>in</strong>g, words) is<strong>the</strong> gift <strong>and</strong> promise <strong>of</strong> his experience with language, his response to <strong>the</strong> beckon<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>timation <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g, to <strong>the</strong> call <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g as dwell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> language, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> word<strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g.3 The very idea <strong>of</strong> experience with language <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, accord<strong>in</strong>g to his own claim<strong>and</strong> analysis, is not reducible to (is not identical with) external, genetic, developmental<strong>in</strong>fluences on his language, on his way <strong>of</strong> “say<strong>in</strong>g” (speak<strong>in</strong>g, writ<strong>in</strong>g,diction, vocabulary) or th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g; it is an <strong>in</strong>-depth, <strong>in</strong>tra-l<strong>in</strong>gual (not <strong>in</strong>ter-l<strong>in</strong>gual)event, <strong>the</strong> attunement to <strong>the</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g power <strong>of</strong> language, <strong>the</strong> observation <strong>and</strong> enactment<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> way(s) language as such (not simply a given particular language) speaks,<strong>the</strong> discovery <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> thus learn<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> belong<strong>in</strong>gness <strong>of</strong> language (as well as <strong>of</strong>human be<strong>in</strong>g as Da-se<strong>in</strong>) to be-<strong>in</strong>g (as enown<strong>in</strong>g). 14 <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s experience withlanguage is “<strong>in</strong>ternal” <strong>and</strong> not “external”; it is <strong>the</strong> lett<strong>in</strong>g emerge (speak) <strong>of</strong> languagefrom with<strong>in</strong> (as what is ownmost to it), <strong>and</strong> not <strong>the</strong> appropriation (adoption)<strong>and</strong> manipulation <strong>of</strong> its utilitarian function, not <strong>the</strong> accumulation <strong>of</strong> eruditionderived from external observation. His experience with language, <strong>the</strong>n, is quite radical,orig<strong>in</strong>ary, <strong>and</strong> transformative; it is a disclosive, hermeneutic event.Language, like th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, is always on <strong>the</strong> way (unterwegs), on <strong>the</strong> move to becomemore disclosive, to say (speak) more <strong>and</strong> more radically, more be-<strong>in</strong>g-historically; itmay not be reduced to (transformed <strong>in</strong>to) a fixture ready to h<strong>and</strong>, well established<strong>and</strong> preserved <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> dictionary, <strong>in</strong> a fixed grammar <strong>of</strong> a particular language. 1513Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, GA 2 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann, 1977), p. 52 (hereafter:GA 2); Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, trans. John Macquarrie <strong>and</strong> James Rob<strong>in</strong>son (New York: Harper <strong>and</strong>Row, 1962), p. 63. See also: GA 65, pp. 497–503; tr. 350–354; Bes<strong>in</strong>nung, GA 66 (Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997), p. 103; M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Thomas Kalary(London: Cont<strong>in</strong>uum Press, 2006), p. 86 (hereafter: GA 66); <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Die Geschichte desSeyns, GA 69 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann, 1998a), p. 153 (hereafter: GA 69).14GA 12, pp. 149–155, 246–251; tr. 57–63, 126–131. Cf. also Parvis Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy (Madison, Wiscons<strong>in</strong>: University <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press,2007), pp. 21–37.15GA 12, p. 181, Wort; Wörterbuch; tr. 87 (“…a dictionary can nei<strong>the</strong>r grasp nor shelter <strong>the</strong>word…”) [translation modified]. See also <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen derSprache, GA 38 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann, 1998b), pp. 24 (we do not f<strong>in</strong>d language <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>dictionary), 19–28 (hereafter: GA 38).
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Experience with Language101Thus, <strong>the</strong>re are many dimensions <strong>and</strong> implications <strong>of</strong> undergo<strong>in</strong>g an experience withlanguage. There is no doubt, however, that <strong>the</strong> core (<strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al horizon) <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sexperience with language is education for be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical language, a tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> hermeneutics <strong>of</strong> language. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, <strong>the</strong> culm<strong>in</strong>ation or “substance” <strong>of</strong> hisexperience with language is <strong>the</strong> trans-ition, <strong>the</strong> cross<strong>in</strong>g over, from <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong>metaphysics to (or at least toward) be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical language. 16 The “ideal” <strong>of</strong> thistrans-ition, that is, be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical, enown<strong>in</strong>g language (hermeneutics <strong>of</strong> language),toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> “idea” <strong>of</strong> experience with language, is well explored <strong>and</strong> expla<strong>in</strong>ed<strong>in</strong> Unterwegs zur Sprache (GA 12) <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> several related works; <strong>the</strong> trans-ition(cross<strong>in</strong>g over), <strong>the</strong> dynamics (difficulties, struggle; boundaries, transgress<strong>in</strong>g boundaries)<strong>of</strong> this movement (go<strong>in</strong>g over) is conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> thus observable <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’swrit<strong>in</strong>gs lead<strong>in</strong>g toward <strong>the</strong> “ideal.” Contributions (GA 65) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> texts composed<strong>in</strong> its “vic<strong>in</strong>ity,” for example, M<strong>in</strong>dfulness (GA 66) <strong>and</strong> Die Geschichte des Seyns(GA 69), embody <strong>and</strong> document his experience with language <strong>in</strong> trans-ition, hisjourney toward <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic discovery <strong>of</strong> what is ownmost to language, towardhis unique language. What does <strong>the</strong> trans-ition to be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical, enown<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong>ontological language, accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>and</strong> based on observ<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s experiencewith language <strong>in</strong>-transition, can teach, “say,” <strong>and</strong> show (disclose) about language?How does <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> trans-ition pave <strong>the</strong> way toward what is ownmost tolanguage? What is <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic connection between language <strong>and</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g? Thema<strong>in</strong> thrust <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> this study, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se considerations, is an attempt to grasp,to shed some light on, <strong>the</strong> issues that are at stake <strong>and</strong> entailed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se questions.(a) The depth <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s hermeneutics <strong>of</strong> language may be seen <strong>and</strong> observed<strong>in</strong> his concise, though well-expressive claim <strong>in</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness that “basically languageis determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>itially only from out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g” (aus demWesen des Seyns). 17 Thus, for <strong>Heidegger</strong>, language is not, as <strong>the</strong> conventionalview ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s, merely <strong>the</strong> expression, articulation or communication <strong>of</strong> “mean<strong>in</strong>g”(Bedeutung) that is spoken or written, not a system <strong>of</strong> signs <strong>of</strong> fixed significations.Language, as he <strong>in</strong>sists, is determ<strong>in</strong>ed, def<strong>in</strong>ed “firstly <strong>and</strong> only” out<strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> based on <strong>the</strong> essential sway (unfold<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g. The essential sway <strong>of</strong>be-<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> not <strong>the</strong> speak<strong>in</strong>g subject, shapes language. Language is grounded,anchored <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g, not <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> story <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> speak<strong>in</strong>g or writ<strong>in</strong>gsubject, that is, not <strong>in</strong> merely express<strong>in</strong>g or stat<strong>in</strong>g a mean<strong>in</strong>g, not <strong>in</strong> fix<strong>in</strong>g asignification; language is closer to (has its ground <strong>and</strong> shap<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>) be-<strong>in</strong>g thanto expression (statement, enunciation) <strong>of</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g. Thus, language is prior to(deeper than) its function as signification (signifier), as sign, as expression <strong>of</strong>mean<strong>in</strong>g; <strong>the</strong> very “nature” <strong>of</strong> language is determ<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> history, by <strong>the</strong>essential sway <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g, not by <strong>the</strong> semiotic mastery <strong>of</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g. Language,16The dynamics <strong>of</strong> this “trans-ition” is quite discernable <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s 1939 summer semestersem<strong>in</strong>ar on Herder (GA 85). A discussion <strong>of</strong> this issue may be found <strong>in</strong> George Kovacs, “<strong>Heidegger</strong><strong>in</strong> Dialogue with Herder: Cross<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Language <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics toward Be-<strong>in</strong>g-historicalLanguage,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 17 (2001): 45–63.17GA 66, p. 127; tr. 107.
102 G. Kovacs<strong>the</strong>n, accord<strong>in</strong>gly, is orig<strong>in</strong>arily <strong>the</strong> language (speak<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> from, <strong>and</strong> not,not firstly, <strong>the</strong> speak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> “writ<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> about be<strong>in</strong>gs. <strong>Heidegger</strong> retraces(“drives”) language back to be-<strong>in</strong>g, to <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> “to be,” to <strong>the</strong> littleword “is”; he does not b<strong>in</strong>d (tie) or cha<strong>in</strong> it (language) to be<strong>in</strong>gs; he does notconf<strong>in</strong>e (he does not consign) it to conveyor <strong>of</strong> fixed mean<strong>in</strong>g or signifier(announcer) <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. This means, <strong>the</strong>n, that language is (basically, accord<strong>in</strong>gto its own ground <strong>and</strong> dest<strong>in</strong>y) be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical, ontological, <strong>and</strong> not (surely notmerely, not firstly) ontic. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s experience with language is more thanontic (not reducible to <strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong> a tool, <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>strument), more than semiotic,more than cultural; it is ontological, be-<strong>in</strong>g-attuned, be-<strong>in</strong>g-dimensional, notbe<strong>in</strong>gs-bound; it is liberat<strong>in</strong>g, not conf<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. His be-<strong>in</strong>g-on-<strong>the</strong>-way to languageis cross<strong>in</strong>g over from be<strong>in</strong>gs-bound (metaphysical) language <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g tobe-<strong>in</strong>g-historical language <strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>dfulness. This is <strong>the</strong> deepest or f<strong>in</strong>al experiencewith language def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g (embrac<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s lifework.(b) It may be said, based on <strong>the</strong>se considerations, that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s experience withlanguage amounts to a rediscovery <strong>of</strong> language as such. His lifelong experiencewith language br<strong>in</strong>gs language <strong>in</strong>to language, lets language speak <strong>in</strong> a greaterdepth. He shows <strong>and</strong> attempts to enact language accord<strong>in</strong>g to what is ownmostto it. To “br<strong>in</strong>g language as language <strong>in</strong>to language,” 18 as he says <strong>in</strong> Unterwegszur Sprache, means lett<strong>in</strong>g language come <strong>in</strong>to its own (Ereignis; enown<strong>in</strong>glanguage) as say<strong>in</strong>g; language speaks as say<strong>in</strong>g; what is ownmost to language is“<strong>the</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g as show<strong>in</strong>g,” lett<strong>in</strong>g appear. 19 The dignity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word may bedescribed as “<strong>the</strong> well <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>),” as <strong>the</strong> founta<strong>in</strong> or spr<strong>in</strong>g that wells <strong>and</strong>spr<strong>in</strong>gs (that comes) from “to be” 20 ; language, as <strong>Heidegger</strong> likes to say, is “<strong>the</strong>house <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g.” 21 His experience with language <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>and</strong> shows, accompaniedby, a deeper, more radical experience <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (esse), <strong>of</strong> “to be.” Thishermeneutic, ontological “ideal” <strong>of</strong> language is <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> hisexperience with language. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Contributions, language “belongs tobe-<strong>in</strong>g,” is related to be-<strong>in</strong>g, because it “arises from be-<strong>in</strong>g.” 22 Thus, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sexperience with language, quite clearly <strong>in</strong> this text, is mov<strong>in</strong>g toward, cross<strong>in</strong>gover to ontological, be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical language. The same experience withlanguage speaks <strong>in</strong> his say<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> Die Geschichte des Seyns (GA 69), that “<strong>the</strong>word is <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> stillness <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g.” 23 Be-<strong>in</strong>g sh<strong>in</strong>es fort (shows itself)<strong>and</strong> sounds through <strong>in</strong> its stillness.18GA 12, p. 250; tr. 130 (translation modified).19GA 12, p. 242; tr. 123 (translation modified). See also: GA 12, p. 255; tr. 234, 235; <strong>and</strong> KennethMaly, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Possibility: Language, Emergence, Say<strong>in</strong>g Be-<strong>in</strong>g (Toronto: University <strong>of</strong>Toronto Press, 2008), p. 57.20GA 12, p. 159; tr. 66 (translation modified).21GA 12, p. 156; tr. 63 (translation modified).22GA 65, p. 501; tr. 352–353. See also <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Grundbegriffe, GA 51 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Klostermann, 1981), p. 64 (das Se<strong>in</strong> als die Verschweigung auch der Ursprung der Sprache;Verbergung, Sagen) (hereafter: GA 51).23GA 69, p. 153.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Experience with Language103(c) The experience with language as cross<strong>in</strong>g over, as trans-ition, to be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical,enown<strong>in</strong>g language, to <strong>the</strong> discovery <strong>and</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> what is ownmost tolanguage, that is, to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s “ideal” or hermeneutics <strong>of</strong> language <strong>and</strong> to ourunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> it, is not a smooth sail<strong>in</strong>g; it <strong>in</strong>cludes recogniz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> fac<strong>in</strong>gup to boundaries, obstacles, <strong>and</strong> difficulties. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy <strong>of</strong> languageis as exact<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>trigu<strong>in</strong>g as is his attempt to th<strong>in</strong>k be-<strong>in</strong>g. He rightlyremarks that mere clarification <strong>of</strong> words is not enough for underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g language,mean<strong>in</strong>g, be-<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs; what is required for grasp<strong>in</strong>g, for reth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g“to be,” <strong>and</strong> for rediscover<strong>in</strong>g language, thus for a disclosive experiencewith language, is “to be m<strong>in</strong>dful <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g”; however, he adds,such m<strong>in</strong>dfulness “<strong>in</strong>deed is difficult.” 24 <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s lifelong experience withlanguage clearly knows <strong>and</strong> is m<strong>in</strong>dful <strong>of</strong> this serious difficulty. 25The ground<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> language <strong>in</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g (its belong<strong>in</strong>g to be-<strong>in</strong>g) is part <strong>of</strong>, it isconnected with, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>trans-ition (cross<strong>in</strong>g over) to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> “beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> cross<strong>in</strong>g over from <strong>the</strong> preem<strong>in</strong>ence (Vorrang) <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs” to(<strong>in</strong>to) <strong>the</strong> “stillness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mastery (Herrschaft) <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g.” 26 In th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g (more radically<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> depth) as be-<strong>in</strong>g, that is, <strong>in</strong> know<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> becom<strong>in</strong>g aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that“be<strong>in</strong>g is be-<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>the</strong> word “be-<strong>in</strong>g” is no longer a “statement, an expression,<strong>and</strong> a sign,” not simply a semiotic phenomenon or function; it is, as <strong>Heidegger</strong>expla<strong>in</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> “susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, elevat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> comport<strong>in</strong>g power <strong>of</strong> resonance (verhaltendeSw<strong>in</strong>gungsmacht) <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g itself.” 27 The power <strong>of</strong> “resonance” at work<strong>in</strong> radicaliz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>) as be-<strong>in</strong>g (Seyn) shatters <strong>the</strong> metaphysicalconcept <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g; <strong>in</strong> this shatter<strong>in</strong>g, “to be” (be-<strong>in</strong>g) is not (not anymore) a be<strong>in</strong>g, not simply (<strong>the</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>arily understood) noth<strong>in</strong>g, not someth<strong>in</strong>gmanifest or taken for granted, not someth<strong>in</strong>g at all, not a (particular) be<strong>in</strong>g, notanyth<strong>in</strong>g. Be-<strong>in</strong>g is more primordial than all this, be-<strong>in</strong>g as orig<strong>in</strong>, that is, as“prime-leap” (Ur-sprung), shatters, breaks apart prefixed concepts about “tobe,” calls (prompts) us to th<strong>in</strong>k <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g beyond all this (beyond all be<strong>in</strong>gs). 28This shatter<strong>in</strong>g is clearly a historical event <strong>and</strong> phenomenon; <strong>the</strong> word “be<strong>in</strong>g”shatters (lets fall apart) <strong>the</strong> previous, accustomed words for be<strong>in</strong>g, for “tobe” (<strong>and</strong> ultimately for be<strong>in</strong>gs as well), it is <strong>the</strong> very com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong>word; <strong>the</strong> word <strong>of</strong> language (<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last analysis) is com<strong>in</strong>g from be-<strong>in</strong>g, notfrom be<strong>in</strong>gs. The be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical word is anchored or grounded <strong>in</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g, not<strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, not <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs-based mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> expression. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s experiencewith language takes place at <strong>the</strong> edge <strong>of</strong> (beyond) be<strong>in</strong>gs, accord<strong>in</strong>g to his24GA 66, p. 127; tr. 108.25GA 2, section 7 concludes with remarks on language; GA 65 <strong>and</strong> GA 66, as well as his manyo<strong>the</strong>r texts, confront this difficulty.26GA 66, p. 254; tr. 223.27GA 66, p. 254; tr. 224.28GA 66, p. 254; tr. 224.
104 G. Kovacsdescription, as “prime-leap” that shatters <strong>the</strong> conf<strong>in</strong>es <strong>and</strong> habits <strong>of</strong> ontic,be<strong>in</strong>gs-bound language <strong>and</strong> frame <strong>of</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d. His experience with languagebecomes <strong>the</strong> com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> word (“to be” makes us speak <strong>and</strong> “say”);it orig<strong>in</strong>ates <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> with be-<strong>in</strong>g. Thus, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s language becomes (is cross<strong>in</strong>gover to) liberat<strong>in</strong>g, be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical language; it reaches <strong>and</strong> resonates(resounds, sounds through) far beyond (that is, speaks entirely o<strong>the</strong>rwise than)be<strong>in</strong>gs-dom<strong>in</strong>ated, historiological, chronometric, ontic language, <strong>and</strong> diction.<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s expression “<strong>the</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical word” clearly dist<strong>in</strong>guishes(separates) be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical language (say<strong>in</strong>g, speak<strong>in</strong>g, vocabulary, nam<strong>in</strong>g,diction) from <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> metaphysics (speak<strong>in</strong>g about <strong>and</strong> denot<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>gs,objects, be<strong>in</strong>gs with prefixed mean<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> conf<strong>in</strong>ed boundaries). The be-<strong>in</strong>ghistoricalword is “ambiguous” (mehrdeutig); it does not “mean,” however, different“objects,” it does not signify or st<strong>and</strong> for any object or th<strong>in</strong>g at all, but“says be-<strong>in</strong>g nonobjectively (ungegenständlich).” 29 Thus, <strong>the</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g-historicalword does not mean any object(s) at all, because be-<strong>in</strong>g, “<strong>the</strong> susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g enown<strong>in</strong>g”essentially sways (unfolds) <strong>in</strong> manifold ways particularly (specifically) <strong>and</strong>ceaselessly, <strong>and</strong>, never<strong>the</strong>less, “dem<strong>and</strong>s simpleness from its word.” 30 The be<strong>in</strong>g-historicalword is simple, though be-<strong>in</strong>g sways (essentially unfolds) <strong>in</strong> manyways <strong>in</strong> its history <strong>and</strong> as history. Symbolic speak<strong>in</strong>g (s<strong>in</strong>nbildliches Reden),that is, symbolic language, through signs <strong>and</strong> explanatory def<strong>in</strong>itions, as wellas <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>ite (undef<strong>in</strong>ed, cryptic, esoteric) speak<strong>in</strong>g through signs, are uselesshere (<strong>in</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical speak<strong>in</strong>g, say<strong>in</strong>g, language); <strong>the</strong>y cannot function asbe-<strong>in</strong>g-historical words or speech (speak<strong>in</strong>g); <strong>the</strong>y fail to measure up to <strong>the</strong>“ideal” <strong>of</strong> “simpleness” (E<strong>in</strong>fachheit; simplicity, pla<strong>in</strong>ness) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g-historicalword (e.g., fissure, enown<strong>in</strong>g, be-<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical speech (Rede) asdem<strong>and</strong>ed (called forth) by be-<strong>in</strong>g. Thus, for <strong>Heidegger</strong>, be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical wordsare not symbolic, not signifiers <strong>of</strong> objects, not explanatory def<strong>in</strong>itions.(d) The be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical word, as <strong>Heidegger</strong> expla<strong>in</strong>s, speaks entirely o<strong>the</strong>rwisethan <strong>the</strong> words <strong>and</strong> language <strong>of</strong> metaphysics, <strong>of</strong> metaphysical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Thoughit is simple, <strong>the</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical word speaks (says) <strong>in</strong> many ways; it is notprefixed, not one-dimensional, not conf<strong>in</strong>ed, not tied to a particular object orbe<strong>in</strong>g, not a tool <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> h<strong>and</strong>s (at <strong>the</strong> service) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> speak<strong>in</strong>g subject. Accord<strong>in</strong>gto <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s analysis <strong>and</strong> description, <strong>the</strong> manifold say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>ghistoricalwords is “creative with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> stillness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contexts that are <strong>in</strong>accessibleto a calculative systematization.” 31 Thus, <strong>the</strong> diverse, manifold say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical words orig<strong>in</strong>ates (comes forth) <strong>in</strong> stillness, not <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> noise<strong>of</strong> calculative systematization, not <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> calculative, manipulative construction<strong>of</strong> systems, not <strong>in</strong> philosophical <strong>and</strong> scientific system-build<strong>in</strong>gs (systematizations).As Contributions states, “language is grounded <strong>in</strong> silence.” 32 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to29GA 66, p. 103; tr. 86.30GA 66, p. 103; tr. 86.31GA 66, p. 103; tr. 86.32GA 65, p. 510; tr. 359.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Experience with Language105M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, historical contexts (Zusammenhänge), <strong>the</strong>ir stillness, cont<strong>in</strong>uously<strong>and</strong> necessarily “reserve” (zurückhalten; hold back) what is “sheltered-hidden”(Verborgenes) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>m <strong>and</strong> what is still “undecided” (noch Unentschiedenes) <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong>m. This undecided, hidden, <strong>and</strong> unsayable (dies Unsagbare), however, is notsometh<strong>in</strong>g irrational, “not <strong>the</strong> irrational <strong>of</strong> metaphysics”; it is, much ra<strong>the</strong>r, that“which <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ground <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g is ‘first to be decided.’” 33 The sheltered,<strong>the</strong> hidden held back <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ultimately be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical contexts is nei<strong>the</strong>rsometh<strong>in</strong>g irrational, nor someth<strong>in</strong>g that can be calculated, measured; it issometh<strong>in</strong>g yet to be decided based on, accord<strong>in</strong>g to, <strong>and</strong> as grounded <strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong>truth <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g, not <strong>in</strong> a calculative system, not <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> irrational <strong>of</strong> metaphysics.This analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> manifoldness <strong>of</strong> “say<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical word,is an expression (description, narrative) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> experience with language, with<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>adequacies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> metaphysics, as well as with <strong>the</strong> language<strong>of</strong> science, <strong>of</strong> calculative th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiry. The say<strong>in</strong>g or language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>truth <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g does not orig<strong>in</strong>ate from calculation, from irrational obfuscationor anticipation; it comes about, arises <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> becom<strong>in</strong>g attentive to <strong>the</strong>unsayable, to <strong>the</strong> yet to be decided, to <strong>the</strong> realm beyond <strong>the</strong> readily graspable<strong>and</strong> calculable, to <strong>the</strong> stillness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> historical contexts, to <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic situatedness<strong>in</strong> (<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong>) say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s experience with language <strong>in</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>g (e.g., <strong>in</strong> Contributions <strong>and</strong>M<strong>in</strong>dfulness) <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> teach<strong>in</strong>gs (<strong>in</strong> his university lecture courses, <strong>in</strong> his numerousconferences) amounts to an encounter with <strong>the</strong> endemic limits <strong>of</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary,established language, with <strong>the</strong> bounds <strong>and</strong> closures <strong>of</strong> culturally fixed (especiallymetaphysical) language, with <strong>the</strong> fixtures <strong>of</strong> any given (at least Occidental)language, <strong>and</strong> even with <strong>the</strong> conf<strong>in</strong>es <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> so-called mo<strong>the</strong>r tongue. Theencounter with <strong>the</strong> limit, with <strong>the</strong> conf<strong>in</strong>ements <strong>and</strong> limitations <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary,taken-for-granted, accustomed language, however, is not negative, notfailure-bound; it is positive, liberat<strong>in</strong>g, promis<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> hermeneutic. Thus,reach<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> limit, at least for <strong>Heidegger</strong>, is not a closure; it does not end <strong>in</strong>failure; it is break<strong>in</strong>g-through, open<strong>in</strong>g, a new beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> disclosure <strong>and</strong>possibility <strong>of</strong> a deeper, liberat<strong>in</strong>g-ontological, be-<strong>in</strong>g-disclos<strong>in</strong>g-surmis<strong>in</strong>glanguage <strong>and</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g.4 There are some hermeneutic lessons (directives) <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s experience withlanguage for more fully grasp<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> thus for more discern<strong>in</strong>gly assess<strong>in</strong>g, hishermeneutics <strong>of</strong> language <strong>and</strong> his way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. The attunement to his unique,ontological language is <strong>in</strong>dispensable for surmis<strong>in</strong>g his attempt to th<strong>in</strong>k “to be”33GA 66, p. 103; tr. 86. (Regard<strong>in</strong>g decision, see also GA 69, p. 61).
106 G. Kovacs(be-<strong>in</strong>g) entirely o<strong>the</strong>rwise (that is, not simply aga<strong>in</strong>st, but ra<strong>the</strong>r beyond) <strong>the</strong>metaphysical tradition. His words <strong>and</strong> names for “to be,” <strong>and</strong> quite <strong>in</strong>tently for be-<strong>in</strong>g(e.g., enown<strong>in</strong>g; fissure; <strong>the</strong> little word “is” as sway<strong>in</strong>g; be-<strong>in</strong>g as o<strong>the</strong>r than be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> any be<strong>in</strong>gs), are not concepts, not self-enclosed, speculative assertions orassumptions; <strong>the</strong>y are, much ra<strong>the</strong>r, hermeneutic beckon<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial surmis<strong>in</strong>gs<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unsayable, <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g; <strong>the</strong>y do not coalesce <strong>in</strong>to a technical, abstract, elusive,esoteric construct or system. The words for be-<strong>in</strong>g, as <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong>sists, are nei<strong>the</strong>rsymbolic (filled with metaphysical assumptions) nor explanatory (compact, selfencloseddef<strong>in</strong>itions); <strong>the</strong>y <strong>in</strong> fact are simple, more <strong>and</strong> more disclosive; <strong>the</strong>y speak,<strong>the</strong>y say “someth<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g, as long as we listen with <strong>the</strong> disposition <strong>of</strong> openness,as long as we acknowledge that language is say<strong>in</strong>g (speak<strong>in</strong>g) as show<strong>in</strong>g. 34 Thehermeneutic attunement to language is liberat<strong>in</strong>g, open<strong>in</strong>g, not clos<strong>in</strong>g, not conf<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g.The greatest obstacle to <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic attunement to language is selective, selfassuredlisten<strong>in</strong>g, that is, “to hear only what we already underst<strong>and</strong>.” 35 The simplicity<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> (be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical) word preempts vagueness <strong>and</strong> lets (allows) be-<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong>primordiality <strong>of</strong> “to be,” speak <strong>and</strong> sound-through it.The openness <strong>and</strong> multi-dimensionality (manifoldness) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g-historicalword, <strong>of</strong> its orig<strong>in</strong>ary disclosive power <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g, its aris<strong>in</strong>g from be-<strong>in</strong>g beyond<strong>the</strong> conf<strong>in</strong>es <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ontological difference, may be observed <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s hermeneuticstrategy <strong>of</strong> us<strong>in</strong>g paradoxical words (expressions) for speak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gbe-<strong>in</strong>g. In his Grundbegriffe (Basic Concepts; lecture course at Freiburg,summer semester, 1941), he describes (speaks <strong>of</strong>) be<strong>in</strong>g as: “<strong>the</strong> emptiest <strong>and</strong> at<strong>the</strong> same time <strong>the</strong> abundance” (overflow<strong>in</strong>g), “<strong>the</strong> most common <strong>and</strong> at <strong>the</strong> sametime <strong>the</strong> most unique,” “<strong>the</strong> most underst<strong>and</strong>able <strong>and</strong> at <strong>the</strong> same time <strong>the</strong> conceal<strong>in</strong>g,”“<strong>the</strong> most worn-out <strong>and</strong> at <strong>the</strong> same time <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>,” “<strong>the</strong> most spoken(<strong>of</strong>) <strong>and</strong> at <strong>the</strong> same time <strong>the</strong> kept <strong>in</strong> silence,” “<strong>the</strong> most forgotten <strong>and</strong> at <strong>the</strong> sametime <strong>the</strong> most remembered.” 36 These paradoxical juxtapositions are not dialecticaloppositions dest<strong>in</strong>ed for sublation (Aufhebung), for speculative-metaphysical (orsymbolic) resolution; <strong>the</strong>y function as hermeneutic strategy <strong>of</strong> disclosure, <strong>of</strong>attempts to say (to show) <strong>the</strong> ultimately unsayable (<strong>the</strong> concealed). In a simplesay<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> his brief essay <strong>in</strong> 1945, “Die Armut,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> exemplifies this strategyby echo<strong>in</strong>g Friedrich Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s turn <strong>of</strong> phrase: “we became poor, <strong>in</strong> order tobecome rich.” 37The simple words speak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g, as appropriated (adopted) <strong>and</strong> function <strong>in</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s more <strong>and</strong> more ontological (from be-<strong>in</strong>g-aris<strong>in</strong>g) language, even whenparadoxical, are not explanatory, not conclud<strong>in</strong>g or pre-secur<strong>in</strong>g def<strong>in</strong>itions, notvague <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>ite, obscure, esoteric expressions. They say “someth<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong>34GA 12, p. 242; tr. 132.35GA 12, p. 150; p. 58 (translation slightly modified).36GA 51, pp. 60–66. See also George Kovacs, “The Ontological Difference <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sGrundbegriffe,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 3/4 (1987/88): 70 (new language).37<strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Poverty,” trans. Thomas Kalary <strong>and</strong> Frank Schalow, <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> this volume.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Experience with Language107be-<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong>y speak <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g, even when <strong>the</strong>y “fail” <strong>in</strong> attempt<strong>in</strong>g to “say” <strong>the</strong> unsayable.These hermeneutic strategies manifest <strong>and</strong> document <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s “struggle”(experience) with <strong>the</strong> bounds <strong>and</strong> conf<strong>in</strong>es <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> metaphysics <strong>and</strong> with<strong>the</strong> pretensions <strong>of</strong> (modern, technological) “scientific” language, with objectify<strong>in</strong>gspeak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> grammar. The simpleness <strong>and</strong> uniqueness <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g dem<strong>and</strong> (call for<strong>and</strong> call forth) <strong>the</strong> simpleness <strong>and</strong> uniqueness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word(s) for its say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>speak<strong>in</strong>g. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s attempt to f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong> (proper, disclosive) word(s) for (say<strong>in</strong>g,nam<strong>in</strong>g, th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g) be-<strong>in</strong>g, accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> manifoldness <strong>of</strong> its essential sway<strong>in</strong>g(unfold<strong>in</strong>g) as enown<strong>in</strong>g, that is, <strong>in</strong> (based on) its historical com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to its own, is<strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al range <strong>and</strong> concern <strong>of</strong> his experience with language from his earlier writ<strong>in</strong>gsto Contributions, to M<strong>in</strong>dfulness <strong>and</strong> beyond.These considerations, <strong>the</strong>n, lead to <strong>the</strong> conclusion, to a hermeneutic lesson basedon <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s experience with language, that <strong>in</strong>deed his be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical, ontologicallanguage is someth<strong>in</strong>g unique; it is to be sheltered, treasured; it is to bepreserved as <strong>in</strong>dispensable for underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, for truly grasp<strong>in</strong>g his unique way <strong>of</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, his dist<strong>in</strong>ct experience <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. William J. Richardson foretell<strong>in</strong>gly<strong>and</strong> apprehensively observed, based on his pioneer<strong>in</strong>g work with <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s texts,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> arduous labor <strong>of</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g his thought <strong>in</strong> English, that <strong>the</strong>re is “<strong>the</strong>dreadful difficulty <strong>in</strong> read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>” (<strong>the</strong> Germans claim<strong>in</strong>g no exception), thathis language “presents a special problem <strong>of</strong> translation,” 38 that <strong>Heidegger</strong> “has rendereda service by <strong>in</strong>terrogat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> relationship between thought <strong>and</strong> language.” 39<strong>Heidegger</strong> himself (<strong>in</strong> 1963), <strong>in</strong> his letter to William J. Richardson, S. J., recognizes“an almost <strong>in</strong>surmountable difficulty <strong>in</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g” himself “understood.” 40 WalterBiemel rightly claims <strong>in</strong> his book, highly regarded by <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong> his July 29,1973 letter to Hannah Arendt, 41 that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s retrieval <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g is“ga<strong>the</strong>red toge<strong>the</strong>r” (takes place, occurs) <strong>in</strong> his experience with <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> language. 42 Parvis Emad <strong>in</strong>sightfully demonstrates that <strong>the</strong> attunement to<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s unique, liberat<strong>in</strong>g, ontological language is <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic preconditionfor grasp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> assess<strong>in</strong>g his thought, as well as for render<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>in</strong> English (<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>38William J. Richardson, S.J., <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Through Phenomenology to Thought (Preface by Mart<strong>in</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>), Phaenomenologica vol. 13 (The Hague: Mart<strong>in</strong>us Nijh<strong>of</strong>f, 1963), pp. xvii, xviii.39Ibid., p. 635.40Ibid., p. viii. See also <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Identität und Differenz, GA 11 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Klostermann, 2006), p. 145. Cf., GA 66, p. 427, 428; tr. 37.41Hannah Arendt <strong>and</strong> Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Briefe 1925–1975 und <strong>and</strong>ere Zeugnisse, ed. Ursula Ludz(Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann, 1998), p. 245.42Walter Biemel, Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>: An Illustrated Study, trans. J. L. Mehta (New York <strong>and</strong>London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 156. For helpful explorations <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’shermeneutics <strong>of</strong> language, see <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g studies: Alfred W. E. Hübner, Existenz und Sprache:Überlegungen zur hermeneutischen Sprachauffassung von Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> und Hans Lipps(Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), pp. 1–117; Ingeborg Schüssler, “Le langage comme ‘fondsdisponible’ (Best<strong>and</strong>) et comme ‘événement-appropriement’ (Ereignis) selon Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>,”<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 22 (2006): 71–92.
108 G. Kovacsany o<strong>the</strong>r language). 43 <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s experience with language calls <strong>the</strong> attention to <strong>the</strong>dem<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> difficulties endemic to his attempt to say (to utter) be-<strong>in</strong>g accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong>manifold essential sway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> its simplicity <strong>and</strong> uniqueness, that is, as enown<strong>in</strong>g,as history.It is worth not<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s unique, liberat<strong>in</strong>g, ontological language wouldbe pr<strong>of</strong>oundly misunderstood by reduc<strong>in</strong>g it to <strong>the</strong> confluence <strong>of</strong> diverse <strong>in</strong>fluenceson <strong>the</strong> history (pathway) <strong>of</strong> his thought <strong>and</strong> language. The recognition <strong>and</strong> treasur<strong>in</strong>g(shelter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> preserv<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>of</strong> his unique, be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical, enown<strong>in</strong>g languagecondition <strong>the</strong> disclosive power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translations <strong>of</strong> his texts, as well as <strong>the</strong> worth<strong>and</strong> depth <strong>of</strong> scholarly appropriations <strong>of</strong> his lifework, <strong>and</strong> thus <strong>the</strong> future <strong>and</strong>dest<strong>in</strong>y <strong>of</strong> his unique way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.ReferencesBiemel, Walter. 1976. Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>: An illustrated study. Trans. J.L. Mehta. New York/London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.Emad, Parvis. 2007. On <strong>the</strong> way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s contributions to philosophy. Madison: University<strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press.Fédier, François. 1995. Regarder voir. Paris: Les Belles Lettres/Archimbaud.Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1977. Philosophical Hermeneutics, ed. <strong>and</strong> Trans. David E. L<strong>in</strong>ge.Berkeley: University <strong>of</strong> California Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1962. Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time. Trans. John Macquarrie <strong>and</strong> Edward Rob<strong>in</strong>son.New York: Harper & Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1971. On <strong>the</strong> way to language. Trans. Peter Herz <strong>and</strong> Joan Stambaugh.New York: Harper & Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1977. Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, GA 2. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1981. Grundbegriffe, GA 51. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1985. Unterwegs zur Sprache, GA 12. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1989. Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann. Contributions to philosophy (from enown<strong>in</strong>g). Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong>Kenneth Maly. 1999. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1994a. Die Armut. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 10:5–11. Trans. Thomas Kalary <strong>and</strong>Frank Schalow “Poverty” [<strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> this volume].<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1994b. E<strong>in</strong>führung <strong>in</strong> die phänomenologische Forschung, GA 17. Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann. Trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom. 2005. Introduction to phenomenologicalresearch. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.43Parvis Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 1–42, 135–155.Regard<strong>in</strong>g this issue, see also <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g studies: François Fédier, Regarder voir (Paris: LesBelles Lettres/Archimbaud, 1995), pp. 83–117; Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Wege <strong>in</strong>sEreignis: Zu <strong>Heidegger</strong>s “Beiträgen zur Philosophie” (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann, 1994),pp. 307–323; George Kovacs, “<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Failure <strong>of</strong> ‘AGrassroots Archival Perspective,’” Studia Phaenomenologica, 6 (2006): 319–345; Kenneth Maly,<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Possibility: Language, Emergence—Say<strong>in</strong>g Be-<strong>in</strong>g, pp. 83–100; Frank Schalow,“Locat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Place <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>,” Studia Phaenomenologica, 7 (2007): 523–533.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Experience with Language109<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1997. Bes<strong>in</strong>nung, GA 66. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann. Trans.Pavis Emad <strong>and</strong> Thomas Kalary. 2006. M<strong>in</strong>dfulness. London: Cont<strong>in</strong>uum.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1998a. Die Geschichte des Se<strong>in</strong>s, GA 69. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1998b. Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache, GA 38. Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1999. Vom Wesen der Sprache. Die Metaphysik der Sprache und die Wesungdes Wortes. Zu Herders Abh<strong>and</strong>lung “Über den Ursprung der Sprache”, GA 85. Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann. Trans. W<strong>and</strong>a Torres Gregory <strong>and</strong> Yvonne Unna. 2004. On <strong>the</strong>essence <strong>of</strong> language: The metaphysics <strong>of</strong> language <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> essenc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word; Concern<strong>in</strong>gHerder’s treatise “On <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> Language.” Albany, New York: State University <strong>of</strong>New York Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2006 Identität und Differenz, GA 11. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.Hübner, Alfred W.E. 2001. Existenz und Sprache: Überlegungen zur hermeneutischenSprachauffassung von Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> und Hans Lipps. Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot.Kovacs, George. 1987–1988. The ontological difference <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Grundbegriffe. <strong>Heidegger</strong>Studies 3/4: 61–74.Kovacs, George. 2001. <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong> dialogue with Herder: Cross<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> metaphysicstoward be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical language. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 17: 45–63.Kovacs, George. 2006. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s contributions to philosophy <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> ‘a grassrootsarchival perspective’. Studia Phaenomenologica 6: 319–345.LLudz, Ursula. ed. 1998. Hannah Arendt und Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>. Briefe 1925–1975 und <strong>and</strong>ereZeugnisse. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann.Maly, Kenneth. 2008. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s possibility: Language, emergence—say<strong>in</strong>g be-<strong>in</strong>g, 83–100.Toronto: University <strong>of</strong> Toronto Press.Richardson, William J., S.J. 1963. <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Through phenomenology to thought (Preface byMart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>), Phaenomenologica, vol. 13. The Hague: Mart<strong>in</strong>us Nijh<strong>of</strong>f.Schalow, Frank. 2007. Locat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> place <strong>of</strong> translation. Studia Phaenomenologica 7: 523–533.Schüssler, Ingeborg. 2006. Le langage comme ‘fonds disponible’ (Best<strong>and</strong>) et comme ‘événementappropriement’(Ereignis) selon Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 22: 71–92.Storck, Joachim. ed. 1989. Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> und Elisabeth Blochmann, Briefwechsel 1918–1969.Marbach am Neckar: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft.von Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm. 1994. Wege <strong>in</strong>s Ereignis: Zu <strong>Heidegger</strong>s “Beiträgen zurPhilosophie”. Vittorio Klostermann: Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>of</strong> Difference<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> God-QuestionThomas KalaryThe general tendency until recently has been to br<strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> as someone,who – <strong>in</strong> spite <strong>of</strong> his Christian orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> upbr<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> even some early unsuccessfulattempts at elaborat<strong>in</strong>g a religious phenomenology – was conv<strong>in</strong>ced about<strong>the</strong> a<strong>the</strong>istic character <strong>of</strong> philosophy, broke away from <strong>the</strong> Catholic Church, <strong>and</strong>bracketed out religion not only from his philosophy but from his personal life aswell. For, had he not publicly argued for <strong>the</strong> “fundamental a<strong>the</strong>ism” 1 <strong>of</strong> philosophy;considered faith <strong>and</strong> philosophy as “deadly enemies” <strong>and</strong> described Christianphilosophy as “wooden steel”? 2 However, with <strong>the</strong> availability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> key texts <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g such as Contributions to Philosophy 3 <strong>and</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness 4where <strong>the</strong> god-question is shown to belong to <strong>the</strong> heart <strong>of</strong> this very th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, arenewed enthusiasm surfaces <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> research for tak<strong>in</strong>g a radical re-look at<strong>the</strong> possible place <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god-question <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy. It is ironic that1<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. E<strong>in</strong>führung <strong>in</strong> die phänomenologischeForschung, GA 61 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994), p. 196.2Both <strong>the</strong>se expressions are found <strong>in</strong> Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Phänomenologie und Theologie,” <strong>in</strong>:Wegmarken, GA 9 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), p. 66. Hereafter referred toas GA 9, page number, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text.3Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann, 1989) <strong>and</strong> its English translation as: Contributions to Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g),trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1999). The referencesto this work will be <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> text <strong>and</strong> German pag<strong>in</strong>ation will be followed by <strong>the</strong>English as GA 65, page/CP page.4Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Bes<strong>in</strong>nung, GA 66 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997) <strong>and</strong> itsEnglish translation as: M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Thomas Kalary (London: Cont<strong>in</strong>uum,2006). The references to this work will be <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> text <strong>and</strong> German pag<strong>in</strong>ation willbe followed by <strong>the</strong> English as GA 66, page/M page.T. Kalary (*)Department <strong>of</strong> Philosophy, Suvidya College, Electronics City, Bangalore,Karnataka 5601000, Indiae-mail: kalary@gmail.comF. Schalow (ed.), <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad, Contributions To Phenomenology 65,DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0_6, © Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media B.V. 2011111
112 T. Kalarydespite <strong>the</strong> earnestness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various efforts, fundamental flaws are equally evident<strong>in</strong> many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> elucidations <strong>of</strong> god-question <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, ei<strong>the</strong>r because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>flaws <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic presuppositions with which <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy isapproached <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpreted, or because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> burden <strong>of</strong> some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unexam<strong>in</strong>ed<strong>and</strong> unfounded prejudices that one already br<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>to discussion while exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gthis question. It is aga<strong>in</strong>st this background, that <strong>the</strong> present essay concentrates on akey aspect <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, viz. <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> difference <strong>and</strong> its relevancefor <strong>the</strong> god-question <strong>in</strong> his philosophy.Consider<strong>in</strong>g its place with<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s entire thought <strong>and</strong> especially with regardto his treatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god-question, <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> difference is yet to attract appropriateattention. What is fundamental to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s treatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god-question isthat it is determ<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> difference as such encompass<strong>in</strong>g both <strong>the</strong>“ontological difference” as well as “<strong>the</strong>ological difference.” What is significant <strong>in</strong>this context is an immanent transformation occurr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g that<strong>in</strong>troduces specific nuances to his underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> elucidation <strong>of</strong> this tw<strong>of</strong>olddifference. However, <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t to keep <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d is that both, that transformation <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong>se nuances have strong bear<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s treatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> god.The present study is an attempt at highlight<strong>in</strong>g three dimensions that are <strong>of</strong> vitalimportance to any <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>to <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> god-question. These dimensionsare as follows: (1) <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> difference with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fundamental ontologicalpathway <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> systematic place <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> god with<strong>in</strong> it; (2) <strong>the</strong> transformation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> difference <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> its relation to <strong>the</strong>“last god”; <strong>and</strong> (3) The actual legacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s “last god.”1 It can be said without any exaggeration that accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> problemwith <strong>the</strong> Occidental metaphysical tradition has been its <strong>in</strong>ability to th<strong>in</strong>k <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> essential difference that prevails between be<strong>in</strong>g, be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>and</strong> god. Although <strong>the</strong>formulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g rema<strong>in</strong>ed fundamental to almost every attempt <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> Occidental tradition, everyone <strong>of</strong> those attempts rema<strong>in</strong>ed faithful to <strong>the</strong> Aristotelian<strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as essence (οÛσία, be<strong>in</strong>gness, Seiendheit). In <strong>the</strong> seventh book<strong>of</strong> Metaphysics, Aristotle says that <strong>the</strong> question that was asked from <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g,that is still asked <strong>in</strong> his time, <strong>and</strong> will always be asked <strong>and</strong> will disturb us eternally, is<strong>the</strong> question, what is <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. Aristotle himself sets <strong>the</strong> tone for <strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>terpretation that was to follow when he explicated be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gness or <strong>in</strong>terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. 5 This decisive directive for <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gensured that <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g rema<strong>in</strong>ed always a question <strong>of</strong> essence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> succeed<strong>in</strong>gOccidental metaphysical tradition. This l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> elucidat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gness (οÛσία, essence <strong>and</strong> Seiendheit) found its apex <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>5Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle (Gr<strong>in</strong>nell, IA: The Peripatetic Press, 1979),1028b–2 ff.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>of</strong> Difference <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> God-Question113Scholastic Tradition that identified be<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> Highest Be<strong>in</strong>g qua God, what<strong>Heidegger</strong> terms onto-<strong>the</strong>o-logy. His objection to this “onto-<strong>the</strong>o-logical” approach <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> tradition, however, is not an effort at prov<strong>in</strong>g that such an approach is totallywrong, but that this metaphysical determ<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as be<strong>in</strong>gness, <strong>of</strong> man asrational animal, <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> god as <strong>the</strong> highest be<strong>in</strong>g is not orig<strong>in</strong>ary enough <strong>in</strong> experienc<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> articulat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, man <strong>and</strong> god. On his part, <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong>itiatesa pathway <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> a framework provided by bothontological <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ological difference.Max Müller credits <strong>Heidegger</strong> with hav<strong>in</strong>g “discovered” <strong>the</strong> “ontological difference.”He says that although it is present <strong>in</strong> every great philosophy, it is somehowpushed aside <strong>and</strong> identified with someth<strong>in</strong>g else. “It is actually never taken as itself,always it has its place somewhere else, while it is <strong>in</strong> effect <strong>the</strong> place <strong>of</strong> everyth<strong>in</strong>gelse.” 6 Towards elucidat<strong>in</strong>g how <strong>Heidegger</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>s ontological difference with<strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> pathway <strong>of</strong> fundamental ontology, let us beg<strong>in</strong> with a passage from a letter that<strong>Heidegger</strong> wrote to Max Müller <strong>in</strong> 1947. In this letter, <strong>Heidegger</strong> speaks <strong>of</strong> a threefolddifference, viz. transcendence-ak<strong>in</strong> 7 difference, a transcendental difference, <strong>and</strong> atranscendent difference. While subscrib<strong>in</strong>g to Müller’s elucidations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ontologicaldifference <strong>in</strong> his letter to <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Heidegger</strong> adds after a cautionary note: “In <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>itial work<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> III Division <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first part <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, where a turn<strong>in</strong>gto “Time <strong>and</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g” unfolds itself, I have called what is <strong>in</strong>tended <strong>the</strong>re (Geme<strong>in</strong>te)a transcendence-ak<strong>in</strong> difference <strong>in</strong> relation to transcendental (ontological <strong>in</strong> a narrowsense) <strong>and</strong> transcendent (<strong>the</strong>ological) difference.” 8 It has been customary up to now to<strong>in</strong>terpret <strong>the</strong> transcendence-ak<strong>in</strong> difference as a difference between extant be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>gness, whereas transcendental difference has been <strong>in</strong>terpreted as a differencebetween be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> extant be<strong>in</strong>gs. But a closer read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> concerned textswould show that this l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation has already missed <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t. 96Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Briefe an Max Müller und <strong>and</strong>ere Dokumente, eds. Holger Zaborowski <strong>and</strong>Anton Bösl (Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 2003), p.15.7I am <strong>in</strong>debted to Parvis Emad for <strong>the</strong> rendition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> key German word “tranzendenzhafte” <strong>in</strong>to“transcendence-ak<strong>in</strong>.”8<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Briefe an Max Müller und <strong>and</strong>ere Dokumente, p.10.9Throughout his book Existenzphilosophie, Max Müller had already made <strong>the</strong> topic <strong>of</strong> ontological<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ological difference public, which he had learned from <strong>Heidegger</strong> through his discussions<strong>and</strong> correspondence. Although he reproduces <strong>in</strong> his book all <strong>the</strong> three titles (cf. Max Müller,Existenzphilosophie, 4th ed, Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 1986, p. 86), his explanation seems tohave taken a wrong direction. He elucidates transcendental difference (ontological difference <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> narrow sense) as <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction between a be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>gness, whereas <strong>the</strong> difference <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> manner <strong>of</strong> transcendence (ontological difference <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> broad sense) as a dist<strong>in</strong>ction <strong>of</strong> a be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>gness from be<strong>in</strong>g itself. It is my considered op<strong>in</strong>ion that <strong>the</strong> error is not simply an<strong>in</strong>terchang<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> terms for <strong>the</strong> wrong matter as Cori<strong>and</strong>o op<strong>in</strong>es (cf. P. Cori<strong>and</strong>o, Der letzteGott als Anfang. Zur abgründigen Zeit-Räumlichkeit des Übergangs <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>s “Beiträge zurPhilosophie” (München: F<strong>in</strong>k, 1998), p. 117, footnote 2.), but it is a misunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> verymatter itself. Go<strong>in</strong>g by <strong>the</strong> textual evidences, <strong>Heidegger</strong> is not concerned <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 3rd division <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>first <strong>of</strong> part <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time with <strong>the</strong> difference between be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>gness at all. Thus,<strong>the</strong> differentiation here has to be between <strong>the</strong> pre-<strong>the</strong>matized, enactmental ontological difference<strong>and</strong> transcendental-horizonally disclosed <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>matized ontological difference.
114 T. KalaryTo underst<strong>and</strong> what this transcendence-ak<strong>in</strong> difference <strong>and</strong> transcendentaldifference actually st<strong>and</strong> for, first <strong>of</strong> all we need to see <strong>the</strong> context itself. For this, wehave a relevant clue <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Letter on Humanism. There, he po<strong>in</strong>ts out that“The subsequent <strong>and</strong> ongo<strong>in</strong>g unfold<strong>in</strong>g [Nach- und Mit-Vollzug] <strong>of</strong> this o<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gthat ab<strong>and</strong>ons subjectivity <strong>in</strong> an adequate manner is surely made more difficultby <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time <strong>the</strong> third division <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> firstpart “Time <strong>and</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g” was held back (cf. Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, p. 39). Here [<strong>in</strong> this thirddivision] <strong>the</strong> whole [das Ganze] turns around. The division <strong>in</strong> question was heldback because th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g failed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> adequate say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> this turn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> did notsucceed with <strong>the</strong> help <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> metaphysics” (GA 9, 327–328). 10Comment<strong>in</strong>g on this particular text, <strong>Heidegger</strong> clarifies <strong>in</strong> his letter to Richardsonthat <strong>the</strong> expression used <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter on Humanism refers to a dynamism “<strong>in</strong>herent<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> very matter designated by <strong>the</strong> head<strong>in</strong>gs: ‘Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time,’ ‘Time <strong>and</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g’.”The expression “<strong>the</strong> whole” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> abovementioned text refers to “<strong>the</strong> matter[<strong>in</strong>volved] <strong>in</strong> ‘Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time’, ‘Time <strong>and</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g’. A ‘turn<strong>in</strong>g around’ is <strong>in</strong> playwith<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> matter itself,” 11 a turn<strong>in</strong>g around with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> third division <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time.After hav<strong>in</strong>g unfolded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> second division ecstatic temporality as <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>care – <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> – , <strong>the</strong> third division has <strong>the</strong> assigned task <strong>of</strong> elucidat<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as such. This is to be unfolded <strong>in</strong> two fur<strong>the</strong>r steps: firstly, <strong>the</strong>horizonal time that belongs to <strong>the</strong> existential temporality is to be brought out as <strong>the</strong>mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as such. Secondly, <strong>the</strong> manifold modes <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g are to be <strong>in</strong>quiredas to how <strong>the</strong>y receive <strong>the</strong>ir temporal determ<strong>in</strong>ation from this time-horizon. Up to<strong>the</strong> explication <strong>of</strong> horizonal time, that is, through <strong>the</strong> first two divisions as well asthrough <strong>the</strong> first step <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> third division, <strong>the</strong> perspective moves <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> same direction.It is directed towards Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> its ecstatic temporality with its horizonal time.After that, “<strong>the</strong> whole turns around.” Understood <strong>in</strong> this sense, <strong>the</strong> expression “<strong>the</strong> whole”here, as well as <strong>the</strong> expression “what is <strong>in</strong>tended” [das Geme<strong>in</strong>te] <strong>in</strong> his letter toMüller, refers to <strong>the</strong> hi<strong>the</strong>rto obta<strong>in</strong>ed matter <strong>of</strong> “Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time” <strong>in</strong> its belong<strong>in</strong>gnessto “Time <strong>and</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g.” After this, <strong>the</strong> phenomenological vision re-orients itself<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>of</strong> a turn<strong>in</strong>g around from out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> horizonal time towards <strong>the</strong> modes<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that are determ<strong>in</strong>ed from out <strong>of</strong> this horizonal time. This is necessary forshow<strong>in</strong>g that all <strong>the</strong> modes <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g such as “<strong>the</strong> h<strong>and</strong>y,” “<strong>the</strong> extant,” “life,” “stock,”etc. have <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong> presence. Thus, turn<strong>in</strong>g as used here is a turn<strong>in</strong>g around ora re-orientation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> perspective with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fundamental ontological <strong>in</strong>quiry thattakes place with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> third step <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal approach to <strong>the</strong>question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> it is <strong>the</strong>refore aptly termed a fundamental ontological turn<strong>in</strong>g.It is <strong>in</strong> this turn<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal disclosure <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as such issubjected to a systematic <strong>the</strong>matization.10Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Brief über den ‘Hümanismus’,” <strong>in</strong> Wegmarken, GA 9 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), p. 328. Hereafter referred to as GA 9, page number, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> runn<strong>in</strong>g text.11William J. Richardson, <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Mart<strong>in</strong>usNijh<strong>of</strong>f, 1963), p. xix.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>of</strong> Difference <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> God-Question115In what way does this reference to <strong>the</strong> fundamental ontological turn<strong>in</strong>g becomesignificant for <strong>the</strong> clarification <strong>of</strong> transcendence-ak<strong>in</strong> ontological difference asdifferent from transcendental ontological difference? This becomes clear when weturn to ano<strong>the</strong>r text The Basic Problems <strong>of</strong> Phenomenology, <strong>the</strong> text that presents<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s renewed attempt at work<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>the</strong> third division <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first part <strong>of</strong>Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time. In this text, <strong>Heidegger</strong> makes an explicit differentiation that isdecisive to our elucidations. He says: “The dist<strong>in</strong>ction between be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gsis pre-ontological, that means, without explicit concept <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, latent <strong>the</strong>re <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>existence <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>. As such it can become an explicitly understood difference”(GA 24, 454). This text makes it very obvious that <strong>the</strong> ontological difference can beunderstood at two levels: (1) <strong>the</strong> pre-ontological, enactmental level that belongs to<strong>the</strong> very fundamental ontological constitution <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> as existence <strong>and</strong> (2) <strong>the</strong>explicitly understood <strong>and</strong> fundamental ontologically <strong>the</strong>matized level. We have afur<strong>the</strong>r confirmation <strong>of</strong> this l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> treatise Vom Wesen desGrundes. 12 While mak<strong>in</strong>g a dist<strong>in</strong>ction between ontic truth as <strong>the</strong> unconcealedness<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> ontological truth as <strong>the</strong> unconcealment <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>Heidegger</strong> says that <strong>the</strong>y belong essentially toge<strong>the</strong>r on account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>irrelation to <strong>the</strong> ontological difference, that is, “<strong>the</strong> difference between be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs.” He <strong>the</strong>n goes on to add fur<strong>the</strong>r that if “what dist<strong>in</strong>guishes Dase<strong>in</strong> consists<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that it comports to be<strong>in</strong>gs by underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong>n this be<strong>in</strong>g-ableto-differentiate,<strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> ontological difference becomes factic, has to havethrust <strong>the</strong> root <strong>of</strong> its own possibility <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ground <strong>of</strong> what is ownmost to Dase<strong>in</strong>”(GA 9, 134–135).Thus, <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction between transcendence-ak<strong>in</strong> difference <strong>and</strong> transcendentaldifference is this: <strong>the</strong> former is <strong>the</strong> pre-<strong>the</strong>oretical, enactmental difference betweenbe<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, which can be called <strong>the</strong> ontological difference <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> broad sense.This is a pre-requisite for Dase<strong>in</strong>’s everyday encounter with <strong>in</strong>nerworldly be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong>ir worldl<strong>in</strong>ess (Weltlichkeit as its Bedeutsamkeit). Only because Dase<strong>in</strong> has apre-<strong>the</strong>oretical underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, that is, only because <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>nerworldly be<strong>in</strong>g is always already disclosed to Dase<strong>in</strong>, it can discoverthat be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its worldly character. Let us expla<strong>in</strong> this difference between <strong>the</strong> pre<strong>the</strong>oreticaldisclosure <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> pre-<strong>the</strong>oretical discovery <strong>of</strong> an entity with anexample. I encounter or discover a pen as an <strong>in</strong>strument for writ<strong>in</strong>g. It worlds for me<strong>in</strong> its “<strong>in</strong>-order-to-write” reference. This <strong>in</strong>-order-to reference is part <strong>of</strong> a referentialtotality like pen referr<strong>in</strong>g to paper, paper to learn<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> learn<strong>in</strong>g as a possibility <strong>of</strong>man. Unless this totality is already pre-<strong>the</strong>oretically disclosed to me, I would not beable to discover that entity before me <strong>in</strong> its <strong>in</strong>strument character as someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>order to write. When this difference is specifically taken <strong>in</strong> to <strong>the</strong> phenomenologicalvision, <strong>and</strong> phenomenologically, that is, fundamental ontologically, <strong>the</strong>matized <strong>in</strong>12Vom Wesen des Grundes was written <strong>in</strong> 1929 as a contribution to <strong>the</strong> Husserl Festschrift, <strong>and</strong> isstill anchored <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal perspective <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>s on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> queryGrundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1927) <strong>and</strong> Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik (1928),<strong>the</strong> last Marburg lecture-course.
116 T. Kalaryits structure <strong>of</strong> transcendental-horizonal disclosure without, however, los<strong>in</strong>g itspre-<strong>the</strong>oretical character, it is called <strong>the</strong> ontological difference <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> strict sense.Thus, <strong>the</strong> transcendence-ak<strong>in</strong> difference <strong>and</strong> transcendental difference refer to one<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> same difference, <strong>the</strong> difference between be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. When, however,<strong>Heidegger</strong> speaks <strong>of</strong> ontological difference <strong>in</strong> general without mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> abovementioneddist<strong>in</strong>ction between un<strong>the</strong>matized enactmental <strong>and</strong> phenomenologically<strong>the</strong>matized difference, difference st<strong>and</strong>s for <strong>the</strong> transcedental-horizonally disclosedfundamental difference between be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>the</strong> utmost ground <strong>of</strong> metaphysicsthat cont<strong>in</strong>ues to rema<strong>in</strong> un<strong>in</strong>quired throughout <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> Occidentalmetaphysics.This br<strong>in</strong>gs us to <strong>the</strong> transcendent or <strong>the</strong>ological difference, which is <strong>in</strong>deed <strong>the</strong>difference between be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> god. But <strong>the</strong> question that we need to look <strong>in</strong>to isthis: what actual role does <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ological difference play <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fundamentalontological unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. While speak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’suse <strong>of</strong> transcendent or <strong>the</strong>ological difference <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1920s, it is imperative to keep<strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that it is <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ological difference as grasped with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fundamental ontologicalframework. That is to say that with<strong>in</strong> that framework, <strong>the</strong>ological differenceis <strong>the</strong> difference between be<strong>in</strong>g – as disclosed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonalmanner – <strong>and</strong> a god, whose place with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> scheme <strong>of</strong> fundamental ontology weare yet to specify.It is to be recalled that <strong>Heidegger</strong> wanted to work out fundamental ontology onits own without appeal<strong>in</strong>g to any <strong>the</strong>o-logical grounds. His conviction that philosophy<strong>in</strong> itself is essentially “a-<strong>the</strong>istic” <strong>in</strong> character prompted him to make <strong>the</strong> consciousmethodological “decision” to <strong>in</strong>quire <strong>in</strong>to “factic life from out <strong>of</strong> itself, from out <strong>of</strong>its own factic possibilities” 13 without any reference to god, <strong>in</strong> order <strong>the</strong>n to <strong>in</strong>quire<strong>in</strong>to “Dase<strong>in</strong>’s ontological relation to god” (GA 9, 159). Thus, <strong>the</strong> fundamentalontological pathway <strong>of</strong> elucidat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal disclosure <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g took place under <strong>the</strong> methodological decision <strong>of</strong> what von Herrmann calls a<strong>the</strong>ological epoché. 14 Thus, <strong>the</strong> “fundamental a<strong>the</strong>ism” <strong>of</strong> philosophy is essentially13Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. (Anzeige der hermeneutischenSituation),” Dil<strong>the</strong>y-Jahrbuch, VI (1989): 246.14Cf. F.-W. von Herrmann, “Stationen der Gottesfrage im frühen und späten Denken <strong>Heidegger</strong>s,”<strong>in</strong>: Die Gottesfrage <strong>in</strong> der europäischen Philosophie und Literatur des 20. Jahrhunderts, eds.R. Lanthaler <strong>and</strong> W. Treitler (Wien, Köln, Weimar: Böhlan Verlag, 2007), pp. 24f. This is perhaps<strong>the</strong> best essay to have appeared <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>t so far that gives a comprehensive orientation to <strong>the</strong> place<strong>the</strong> god-question occupies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> entirety <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. The same <strong>the</strong>me is aga<strong>in</strong>elaborately treated by <strong>the</strong> same author <strong>in</strong>: Die Metaphysik im Denken <strong>Heidegger</strong>s (Rome: UrbaniaUniversity Press, 2004), pp. 105f. Hereafter referred to as von Herrmann, Die Metaphysik, followedby page number. This is aga<strong>in</strong> a remarkable contribution by <strong>the</strong> author from two perspectives.It throws for <strong>the</strong> first time rare light <strong>in</strong>to what is actually happen<strong>in</strong>g when <strong>Heidegger</strong> describes hisphilosophy as an attempt at overcom<strong>in</strong>g metaphysics. As long as th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g underst<strong>and</strong>s <strong>the</strong> metaphysicaltradition as <strong>the</strong> first beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same history <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g forms <strong>the</strong> onefold with<strong>in</strong> whichboth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> questions <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g fundamentally belong-toge<strong>the</strong>r. This shows that all talk <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g as “post-metaphysical” <strong>and</strong> “post-modern” is senseless talk.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>of</strong> Difference <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> God-Question117a hermeneutic a-<strong>the</strong>ism, a methodological procedure as different from a<strong>the</strong>ism as a<strong>the</strong>oretical position. Why such a methodological decision was necessary at all isclarified <strong>in</strong> Vom Wesen des Grundes where we are told that “with <strong>the</strong> ontological<strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> as be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world, no positive or negative decision ismade concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> possible be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> god. However, by illum<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g transcendencewe first <strong>of</strong> all obta<strong>in</strong> an adequate concept <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>, with reference to whichwe can now ask, <strong>in</strong> what ontological relation does Dase<strong>in</strong> st<strong>and</strong> towards god”(GA 9, p. 159, footnote 56). Thus, while <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> traditional metaphysics, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiry<strong>in</strong>to be<strong>in</strong>g as be<strong>in</strong>gness culm<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> god as <strong>the</strong> highest be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> fundamentalontology ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> difference between <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonally disclosedbe<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> god. Consequently, <strong>the</strong> god-question can be taken up only after <strong>the</strong> truth<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g is sufficiently illum<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> itself.Now, <strong>the</strong> question we need to look <strong>in</strong>to is, whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Heidegger</strong> had foreseen anyplace for <strong>the</strong> god-question with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fundamental ontological pathway or was <strong>the</strong><strong>the</strong>ological epoché his f<strong>in</strong>al word on <strong>the</strong> matter? Had <strong>the</strong>re been no place whatsoeverfor it <strong>in</strong> his version <strong>of</strong> philosophy as fundamental ontology <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>? Inanswer<strong>in</strong>g this question, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> research has by <strong>and</strong> large let <strong>the</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>readership hopelessly down. As long as metaphysics understood its lead<strong>in</strong>g questionas <strong>in</strong>quir<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to be<strong>in</strong>gness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> worked out this question <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> general pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as well as <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> highest div<strong>in</strong>e be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong>god-question formed an <strong>in</strong>tegral part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lead<strong>in</strong>g question <strong>of</strong> metaphysics. With<strong>the</strong> outbreak <strong>of</strong> fundamental ontology, however, <strong>the</strong> lead<strong>in</strong>g question <strong>of</strong> metaphysicsconcern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs gets transformed <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g questionconcern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> more orig<strong>in</strong>ary phenomenon, <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal disclosure<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. Along with this transformation, <strong>the</strong> place <strong>the</strong> god-question occupies<strong>in</strong> philosophy also undergoes a substantial transformation.A clue towards envision<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> place <strong>Heidegger</strong> had foreseen for <strong>the</strong> god-questionwith<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fundamental ontological perspective is available <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s lecturecoursegiven <strong>in</strong> Marburg <strong>in</strong> 1928. In this lecture-course, <strong>Heidegger</strong> clearly <strong>in</strong>dicatesthat only on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> an already elucidated fundamental ontology <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong>god-question can be taken up. Thus we read: “This whole [dynamics] <strong>of</strong> found<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g out ontology is fundamental ontology; it is (1) <strong>the</strong> analysis <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>,<strong>and</strong> (2) <strong>the</strong> analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> temporality <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. But <strong>the</strong> temporal analysis is at <strong>the</strong>same time a turn<strong>in</strong>g, where ontology itself expressly turns back <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> metaphysicalontic <strong>in</strong> which it implicitly always rema<strong>in</strong>s. Through this dynamics <strong>of</strong> radicaliz<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> universaliz<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> aim is to br<strong>in</strong>g ontology to its latent turn<strong>in</strong>g over [Umschlag].Here a turn<strong>in</strong>g is enacted, <strong>and</strong> it leads to a turn<strong>in</strong>g over, <strong>in</strong>to metontology” (GA 26, 201).The abovementioned “analysis <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>” <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>the</strong> analysis <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> terms<strong>of</strong> its temporality that is carried out <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first two divisions <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time.The usage “<strong>the</strong> analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> temporality <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g” refers to <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>matic that was<strong>in</strong>tended for <strong>the</strong> third division under <strong>the</strong> title “Time <strong>and</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g.” Now, <strong>Heidegger</strong>says that this analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> temporality <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g is at <strong>the</strong> same time a “turn<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong>which <strong>the</strong> fundamental ontology expressly turns back <strong>in</strong>to metaphysical ontic asa turn<strong>in</strong>g over <strong>in</strong>to metontology. Metontology st<strong>and</strong>s for <strong>the</strong> ontological <strong>the</strong>matization<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs ak<strong>in</strong> to Dase<strong>in</strong> as well as be<strong>in</strong>gs o<strong>the</strong>r than Dase<strong>in</strong>. This <strong>in</strong> turn
118 T. Kalarypresupposes an explication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> full phenomenon <strong>of</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>ary time. This meansthat <strong>the</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g over <strong>in</strong>to metontology takes place, after <strong>the</strong> ecstatic temporality isrevealed as <strong>the</strong> ontological mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> care – <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> – <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> horizonaltime as <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs o<strong>the</strong>r than Dase<strong>in</strong> is revealed <strong>and</strong>manifold modes <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs o<strong>the</strong>r than Dase<strong>in</strong> are laid free <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir temporal mean<strong>in</strong>gthrough a fundamental ontological turn<strong>in</strong>g. And this turn<strong>in</strong>g over <strong>in</strong>to metontologyis called <strong>the</strong> metontological turn<strong>in</strong>g. This is what <strong>Heidegger</strong> had <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d, when hestated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Introduction to Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time that “<strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g thus aims atan a priori condition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> possibility not only <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sciences which <strong>in</strong>vestigatebe<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> such <strong>and</strong> such a type . . . but it aims also at <strong>the</strong> condition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> possibility<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ontologies which precede <strong>the</strong> ontic sciences <strong>and</strong> found <strong>the</strong>m” (GA 2, 15). 15While highlight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> priority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicates thatonly under <strong>the</strong> orientation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as such regional ontologies canbe developed, which <strong>in</strong> turn lay <strong>the</strong> ground for positive sciences.Thus, it was <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s stated <strong>in</strong>tention first to work out <strong>the</strong> fundamentalontology <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n <strong>in</strong> a metontological turn<strong>in</strong>g take up all specific questions likeman, ethics, god, etc., which were to be unfolded <strong>in</strong>to various regional ontologies,which <strong>in</strong> turn would serve as <strong>the</strong> condition for <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> ontic or positivesciences. It is a fact that <strong>Heidegger</strong> did not come to an explicit <strong>and</strong> detailed work<strong>in</strong>gout <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> such regional ontologies, <strong>and</strong> as a result we do not have an ontology<strong>of</strong> god, which would have gone <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> god from <strong>the</strong> fundamental ontologicalperspective. Yet, we f<strong>in</strong>d a number <strong>of</strong> elements that concern such an effort <strong>in</strong>his lecture “Phenomenology <strong>and</strong> Theology.” <strong>Heidegger</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> op<strong>in</strong>ion, as hasbeen his wont right from <strong>the</strong> early 1920s, that from <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> antiquity, through <strong>the</strong>neo-Platonic, Aristotelian, <strong>and</strong> medieval times not only was <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g questionidentified with <strong>the</strong> god-question, but <strong>the</strong> whole Christian <strong>the</strong>ology on its part wasgiven an essentially Hellenistic formulation. In this lecture, he makes an attempt ata de-Hellenized Christian <strong>the</strong>ology, because he wants to concretely show thatmov<strong>in</strong>g away from <strong>the</strong> essentially onto-<strong>the</strong>ological framework <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Greek tradition,a de-Hellenized <strong>the</strong>ology can provide a different <strong>and</strong> perhaps more mean<strong>in</strong>gfulframework for a Christian account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e.Let us s<strong>in</strong>gle out a few important <strong>in</strong>sights <strong>Heidegger</strong> provides <strong>in</strong> this lecturedelivered <strong>in</strong> 1927 <strong>in</strong> Tüb<strong>in</strong>gen. 16 Here, he takes “philosophy” as “phenomenology”<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> “hermeneutic phenomenology <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>” <strong>and</strong> “<strong>the</strong>ology” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>narrow sense <strong>of</strong> “Christian <strong>the</strong>ology.” As <strong>the</strong> first <strong>in</strong>sight, we should note that <strong>the</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> difference provides <strong>the</strong> framework for his entire discussion. As heexam<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> relation between two sciences, “hermeneutic phenomenology <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>”<strong>and</strong> “Christian <strong>the</strong>ology,” he stresses <strong>the</strong>ir “absolute difference.” Philosophy for15Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, GA 2 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), hereafterreferred to as GA 2, followed by page number.16Cf. F.-W. von Herrmann, <strong>Heidegger</strong>s tüb<strong>in</strong>ger und marburger Vortrag von 1927 “Phänomenologieund Theologie,” unpublished manuscript. Insights from this text are made use <strong>of</strong> for <strong>the</strong> elucidationshere.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>of</strong> Difference <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> God-Question119<strong>Heidegger</strong> is existential ontology <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>, where <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiry is based purely onbe<strong>in</strong>g’s self-disclosure <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> t/here <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>. And faith as a specific possibility <strong>of</strong>existence, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as it takes its bear<strong>in</strong>gs from revelation st<strong>and</strong>s <strong>in</strong> “existentialopposition” to philosophy. They “are sworn enemies” <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> this sense a Christianphilosophy is like “wooden steel,” a contradiction <strong>in</strong> terms. Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong> framework<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir respective <strong>in</strong>quiries is fundamentally different, <strong>the</strong>y cannot be <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>cipleidentified.While stress<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “absolute difference” between philosophy <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ology,<strong>Heidegger</strong> po<strong>in</strong>ts out that what makes <strong>the</strong>ology a positive science, is “Christianness”(Christlichkeit), which is <strong>in</strong>itially grasped as “Christian faith,” which is articulatedas a “way <strong>of</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> human Dase<strong>in</strong>” (GA 9, 52). What is decisive here is that“faith” is already viewed from <strong>the</strong> perspective <strong>of</strong> philosophy as fundamentalontology <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>, whose be<strong>in</strong>g as existence has a specific ontological structure.Thus “Christian faith” is not someth<strong>in</strong>g ly<strong>in</strong>g outside <strong>the</strong> ontological structure <strong>of</strong>Dase<strong>in</strong>, but ra<strong>the</strong>r it “is itself a manner <strong>of</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> t/here.” 17 In Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time,<strong>Heidegger</strong> shows that depend<strong>in</strong>g on how Dase<strong>in</strong> enacts its possibilities <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>each case, whe<strong>the</strong>r from <strong>the</strong> possibilities <strong>of</strong> itself or from that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, it exists<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> modes <strong>of</strong> ownedness (Eigentlichkeit), unownedness (Uneigentlichkeit), oreveryday <strong>in</strong>difference. While <strong>the</strong>se modes rema<strong>in</strong> what <strong>the</strong>y are, with <strong>the</strong> enactment<strong>of</strong> faith as a possibility <strong>of</strong> existence, <strong>the</strong>re comes an additional mode, which<strong>Heidegger</strong> calls “re-birth.” Faith as a possibility <strong>of</strong> existence is such that <strong>the</strong>believ<strong>in</strong>g Dase<strong>in</strong> cannot be <strong>in</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> this possibility, because <strong>in</strong> it, Dase<strong>in</strong>“has become a servant, brought before god <strong>and</strong> thus re-born” (GA 9, 53). Importantis <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s usage <strong>of</strong> pre-believ<strong>in</strong>g or un-believ<strong>in</strong>g existence <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>. Thetransition to <strong>the</strong> new mode <strong>of</strong> faith takes place on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> religiously undifferentiatedmode <strong>of</strong> existence. Existence as such is a-religious, or, to use <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sterm<strong>in</strong>ology, it is pre-Christian existence. This existence <strong>in</strong> its pre-Christianness isovercome with <strong>the</strong> transition to Christianness, but even <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> mode <strong>of</strong> existenceis itself not overcome, but ra<strong>the</strong>r Christianness itself can be understood only as afur<strong>the</strong>r modification <strong>of</strong> existence. Even after <strong>the</strong> modification <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> existence<strong>in</strong>to Christian existence, man cont<strong>in</strong>ues to reta<strong>in</strong> his fundamental existential ontologicalconstitution as Da-se<strong>in</strong>. Through careful analysis, <strong>Heidegger</strong> shows that <strong>the</strong>Christian concept <strong>of</strong> s<strong>in</strong> is rooted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> existential phenomenon <strong>of</strong> guilt. He takesthis as an example to illustrate that <strong>the</strong> religious content <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong>ological conceptsshelters <strong>in</strong> itself an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. For this reason, <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong>ology as a science with <strong>the</strong> help <strong>of</strong> such concepts requires philosophy as existentialontology <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>.By way <strong>of</strong> summ<strong>in</strong>g up, let <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g be made clear. First, even <strong>in</strong> this lecture“Phenomenology <strong>and</strong> Theology” <strong>Heidegger</strong> is not concerned with elucidat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>details <strong>of</strong> a th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> god with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fundamental ontology. He had, while speak<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> metontological turn<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>dicated <strong>the</strong> site where such a th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g should berooted <strong>and</strong> with<strong>in</strong> what framework such a th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g should unfold. Yet, two th<strong>in</strong>gs17Ibid., p. 2.
120 T. Kalaryneed special mention here. Fundamental ontology has to unfold itself under a <strong>the</strong>ologicalepoché <strong>and</strong> only on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> what is so unfolded, one can turn to <strong>the</strong>god-question as one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regional ontologies, which would provide <strong>the</strong> ontologicalbasis for a specific <strong>the</strong>ology as a positive science like Christian <strong>the</strong>ology. Second,when <strong>Heidegger</strong> speaks <strong>of</strong> God <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ology with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fundamental ontologicalperspective, he is still concerned with Christian <strong>the</strong>ology <strong>and</strong> Christian underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> God. By shift<strong>in</strong>g his focus from <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretic-reflexive, onto-<strong>the</strong>o-logical basis <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> hi<strong>the</strong>rto Occidental philosophical tradition to a more orig<strong>in</strong>ary basis, namely <strong>the</strong>pre-<strong>the</strong>oretical basis <strong>of</strong> philosophy that is rooted both <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ontological <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong>ological difference, <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong>tends to provide a more orig<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>and</strong> ade-Hellenized philosophical basis for a fruitful <strong>the</strong>ological reflection. He showsconcretely, perhaps without manifest<strong>in</strong>g his own personal stance, how a Christian<strong>the</strong>ology could re-<strong>in</strong>vent itself <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process rediscover its own unique experiencesthat got lost <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> Hellenization. In trac<strong>in</strong>g such a possibility, heprovides a number <strong>of</strong> important <strong>in</strong>sights <strong>in</strong>to what could form <strong>the</strong> essential basis <strong>of</strong>a religious ontology, thought out <strong>of</strong> fundamental ontology <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>. But withtransition to <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical perspective, <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> difference <strong>in</strong> its bothforms, namely <strong>the</strong> ontological difference <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ological difference undergoes atransformation. And <strong>the</strong> location <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god-question also undergoes a radical change.The sway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as enown<strong>in</strong>g becomes <strong>the</strong> very site for <strong>the</strong> self-manifestation <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e phenomenon. Or to put it differently, <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>re is fundamentaldifference between be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> god rema<strong>in</strong>s decisive for <strong>the</strong> entire th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>. But this fundamental difference is experienced <strong>and</strong> articulated quitedifferently <strong>in</strong> both perspectives. While <strong>the</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fundamental ontology <strong>of</strong>Dase<strong>in</strong> takes place under a strict <strong>the</strong>ological epoché, where <strong>the</strong> god-question is amatter <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regional ontologies, <strong>the</strong> god-question is very much a co-dimension<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as enown<strong>in</strong>g. 1818There is an age-old, but totally absurd <strong>the</strong>sis, propped up <strong>and</strong> vigorously defended eventoday by em<strong>in</strong>ent <strong>Heidegger</strong> scholars, that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s turn<strong>in</strong>g was a ‘re-turn’ to his earlyposition, after hav<strong>in</strong>g had to concede <strong>the</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> project that Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time was.Accord<strong>in</strong>g to this l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation, <strong>the</strong>re was already a “turn before <strong>the</strong> turn.” In tune withthis l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation, Benjam<strong>in</strong> D. Crowe, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Phenomenology <strong>of</strong> Religion:Realism <strong>and</strong> Cultural Criticism (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 2008), believes thata project <strong>of</strong> a phenomenology <strong>of</strong> religion was present <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought throughout. Theso-called differences between <strong>the</strong> ‘early’ <strong>and</strong> ‘later’ <strong>Heidegger</strong> ra<strong>the</strong>r “represent shifts <strong>of</strong>emphasis <strong>in</strong> a more or less stable, well-established project <strong>of</strong> critically address<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> religioussituation <strong>of</strong> late modernity through a phenomenological methodology.” The evidences“are not sufficient to warrant <strong>the</strong> claim that his later work is a radical departure” from <strong>the</strong>earlier one (p. 99). From our elucidations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> difference <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> god,it becomes clear that Crowe has not been able to ga<strong>in</strong> an access to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>“div<strong>in</strong>e,” especially when he makes statements like: “The ‘holy’ is <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s term for <strong>the</strong>objective side <strong>of</strong> an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that anchors <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>telligibility <strong>of</strong> religious concepts <strong>and</strong>practices” (p. 115).
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>of</strong> Difference <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> God-Question1212 Let us beg<strong>in</strong> aga<strong>in</strong> with <strong>the</strong> first dimension <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> difference 19 <strong>and</strong> askwhat happens to <strong>the</strong> ontological difference with <strong>the</strong> immanent transformation thatoccurs <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g? The first clue towards answer<strong>in</strong>g this question isavailable <strong>in</strong> a marg<strong>in</strong>al note <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time that <strong>in</strong> a retrospective glance <strong>Heidegger</strong>jotted down to <strong>the</strong> third division “Time <strong>and</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g.” It reads: “The transcendentaldifference. Overcom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> horizon as such. Turn<strong>in</strong>g back unto <strong>the</strong> provenance.Presence from out <strong>of</strong> provenance” (GA 2, 53). The immanent transformation is aturn<strong>in</strong>g back or return<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> provenance, a turn<strong>in</strong>g back that “overcomes” both<strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal approach as well as that specific characterization <strong>of</strong>ontological difference that is rooted <strong>in</strong> this approach. An appropriate underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> usage “overcomes” is important <strong>in</strong> grasp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> direction th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g takes here.The experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> provenance prompts th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g to realize <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>adequacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal perspective <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcendentalhorizonallyunderstood characterization <strong>of</strong> ontological difference. When <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g is experienced as provenance, it reveals itself no longer as horizon for <strong>the</strong>disclosure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> praesens, but as <strong>the</strong> counterresonance<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> forth-throw <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>.Section 132 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Contributions clarifies this po<strong>in</strong>t fur<strong>the</strong>r by referr<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong>counter-resonance <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. On <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>Heidegger</strong> says, that this transcendentalhorizonallyconceived dist<strong>in</strong>ction between a be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g was “necessary” <strong>in</strong>provid<strong>in</strong>g “a prelim<strong>in</strong>ary perspective for <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g.” as well as <strong>in</strong>“safeguard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g from all confusion” (GA 65, 250/CP 176). It was precisely because <strong>the</strong> traditional metaphysics did not preserve<strong>the</strong> ontological difference <strong>in</strong> its <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, that this differencegot confused with <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as well as with <strong>the</strong> highest be<strong>in</strong>g. Thus,it was vital for <strong>Heidegger</strong> to underl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> ontological difference <strong>in</strong>order to keep <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>to be<strong>in</strong>g free from all such confusions. But, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rh<strong>and</strong>, <strong>Heidegger</strong> felt that <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> this difference was not adequately graspedby <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as ontological difference wasconceived as <strong>the</strong> “condition for <strong>the</strong> possibility” for <strong>the</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as such.The transcendentally <strong>and</strong> horizonally structured dist<strong>in</strong>ction had a “torment<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>discord<strong>in</strong>g character” as it was still <strong>in</strong>adequate to reveal <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its orig<strong>in</strong>aryonefold. Therefore, however “necessary” <strong>the</strong> ontological difference was, itcont<strong>in</strong>ued to be “disastrous” to <strong>the</strong> extent this dist<strong>in</strong>ction “does arise from a question<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as such (<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gness)” [GA 65, 250/CP 177]. Although <strong>the</strong> traditional19For an excellent account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> difference <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as enown<strong>in</strong>g, cf.Parvis Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy (Madison, WI: University<strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press, 2007), p. 127 f. This is <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>comparable work <strong>in</strong> its effort to th<strong>in</strong>k <strong>and</strong> co-enact<strong>the</strong> various nuances <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its both ways <strong>of</strong> disenown<strong>in</strong>gas well as enown<strong>in</strong>g. For fur<strong>the</strong>r elucidations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> difference, especially <strong>in</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, cf. von Herrmann, Die Metaphysik, p. 107 f.
122 T. Kalarymetaphysics was leapt over <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> through <strong>the</strong> fundamental ontology as <strong>the</strong> latterwas concerned with go<strong>in</strong>g beyond be<strong>in</strong>gness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, fundamental ontology stillcont<strong>in</strong>ued to move with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> perspective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> transcendence <strong>and</strong>horizon <strong>and</strong> to that extent <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> that sense it could still be considered metaphysical,<strong>in</strong> so far as this ontology unfolded <strong>the</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as a transcend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs.The transcendental-horizonal perspective proposed to arrive at <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g bytranscend<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>gs, not realiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> fact that this procedure itself was <strong>in</strong>adequate.When <strong>the</strong> ontological difference is so conceived, “this dist<strong>in</strong>ction itself becomes <strong>the</strong>real barrier” because it actually “misplaces <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g,<strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as, by pre-suppos<strong>in</strong>g this dist<strong>in</strong>ction, one attempts to go fur<strong>the</strong>r than thisdist<strong>in</strong>ction <strong>and</strong> to <strong>in</strong>quire <strong>in</strong>to its onefold. This onefold can never be anyth<strong>in</strong>g but <strong>the</strong>mirror<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction <strong>and</strong> can never lead to <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> view <strong>of</strong> which thisdist<strong>in</strong>ction can no longer be seen as orig<strong>in</strong>ary”(GA 65, 250/CP 177). What is deniedhere is not <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction between be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, but <strong>the</strong> transcendentally <strong>and</strong>horizonally elucidated structure <strong>of</strong> this dist<strong>in</strong>ction <strong>and</strong> its <strong>in</strong>appropriateness.Therefore, <strong>the</strong> so conceived dist<strong>in</strong>ction becomes a h<strong>in</strong>drance <strong>in</strong> reach<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its orig<strong>in</strong>ary onefold: “Therefore <strong>the</strong> task is not to surpass be<strong>in</strong>gs (transcendence)but ra<strong>the</strong>r to leap over this dist<strong>in</strong>ction <strong>and</strong> thus over transcendence <strong>and</strong> to <strong>in</strong>quire<strong>in</strong>ceptually <strong>in</strong>to be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> truth” (GA 65, 250–51/CP 177). What was still <strong>in</strong>appropriatewith<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal approach, must be leapt over.Thus, it would be a misunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, if one were to th<strong>in</strong>k that <strong>the</strong> “ontologicaldifference” <strong>and</strong> with it <strong>the</strong> “th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> difference” as such is “overcome” <strong>and</strong> isirrelevant for <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g. <strong>Heidegger</strong> himself says very clearly that“vary<strong>in</strong>g attempts were needed to master <strong>the</strong> “ontological difference,” to grasp itsvery orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> that means its genu<strong>in</strong>e onefold” (GA 65, 250/CP 176). The termused here is to “master” <strong>and</strong> not “ab<strong>and</strong>on.” Even <strong>the</strong> transcendentally <strong>and</strong> horizonallyconceived ontological difference was an attempt at master<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “ontologicaldifference,” an attempt that proved “<strong>in</strong>adequate.” Thus it is our task to follow <strong>the</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> difference as it unfolds <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical perspective. Let it be said <strong>in</strong>anticipation: while <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal perspective, both <strong>the</strong> ontologicaldifference as well as <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ological difference were used as <strong>the</strong> spr<strong>in</strong>gboard (as <strong>the</strong>condition for <strong>the</strong> possibility) to follow <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>in</strong> which be<strong>in</strong>g as such disclosesitself, be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g unfolds as <strong>the</strong> counter-resonance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>, where <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e phenomenon shows itselfas a co-dimension <strong>of</strong> this counter-resonance. That means, <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> differencehas its provenance <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>timacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> onefold <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g asenown<strong>in</strong>g.With <strong>the</strong>se prelim<strong>in</strong>ary clarifications, we can now follow <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historicalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> ontological difference. Be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g as leap has a tw<strong>of</strong>olddimension. First <strong>of</strong> all, it leaps over not only <strong>the</strong> metaphysical tradition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Occidental th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, but also <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> transcendental-horizonally conceivedontological difference. Secondly, this leap is a leap <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as enown<strong>in</strong>g,which shows itself to th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a new light. Contributions articulates this asfollows: “<strong>the</strong> thrower <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open experiences itself as thrown – i.e., asenowned by be-<strong>in</strong>g” (GA 65, 239/CP, 169). We recall here that, while elaborat<strong>in</strong>g
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>of</strong> Difference <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> God-Question123<strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal perspective, <strong>Heidegger</strong> had explicated thrownness <strong>and</strong>project<strong>in</strong>g-open as <strong>the</strong> two equally-orig<strong>in</strong>al ontological structural moments <strong>of</strong>Dase<strong>in</strong>. In be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g presents to th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g thisontological structure <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> a new light, provid<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> veryorig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> existential thrownness. By experienc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> provenance <strong>of</strong> thrownnessfrom out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> forth-throw<strong>in</strong>g truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> thrower <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g,that is, Dase<strong>in</strong>, no longer experiences itself merely as <strong>the</strong> one thrown “<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong>facticity <strong>of</strong> disclosedness” <strong>and</strong> projects-open what is pre-given, but ra<strong>the</strong>r as <strong>the</strong> one“thrown <strong>in</strong>to <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g en-owned” 20 by <strong>the</strong> en-own<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g. With this experience, Dase<strong>in</strong> experiences itself as <strong>the</strong> ownhood <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. However, this experience <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g thrown <strong>in</strong>to <strong>and</strong> en-owned by <strong>the</strong>truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g does not <strong>in</strong> any way level <strong>of</strong>f <strong>the</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open. If that were to beso, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> actual dist<strong>in</strong>ction between be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> would have been totallycompromised. The fact is, <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g-forth-throw is just one dimension <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>sway <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as enown<strong>in</strong>g. There is no enown<strong>in</strong>g without <strong>the</strong> receiv<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> what is thrown-forth. But, with this experience <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> ownhood <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> does no longerproject-open <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>of</strong> a project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g upon a horizon, but ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>manner <strong>of</strong> an en-owned project<strong>in</strong>g-open. It projects open what is en-own<strong>in</strong>glythrown-forth to it from out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g.This turn<strong>in</strong>g-relationship <strong>of</strong> en-owned project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>en-own<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g is characterized fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>in</strong> Section 133<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Contributions, as a relationship <strong>of</strong> “need<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> belong<strong>in</strong>g.” This dimension<strong>of</strong> “need<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> belong<strong>in</strong>g” builds up fur<strong>the</strong>r on <strong>the</strong> co-relationality betweenthrownness <strong>and</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open as explicated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcendentalhorizonalperspective. Specifically, <strong>Heidegger</strong> says: “Be-<strong>in</strong>g needs man <strong>in</strong> order tohold sway; <strong>and</strong> man belongs to be-<strong>in</strong>g so that he can accomplish his utmost dest<strong>in</strong>yas Da-se<strong>in</strong>” (GA 65, 251/CP, 177). The turn<strong>in</strong>g-relation <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g to Dase<strong>in</strong>, as Emadrightly po<strong>in</strong>ts out, is “a turn<strong>in</strong>g unto th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g” because be<strong>in</strong>g “needs th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g” toproject-open <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g’s self-unfold<strong>in</strong>g. 21 To this need <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, Dase<strong>in</strong>responds by act<strong>in</strong>g, which act<strong>in</strong>g as th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g susta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> self-unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g byproject<strong>in</strong>g it open. This demonstrates that <strong>the</strong> en-owned project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g Dase<strong>in</strong>belongs to <strong>the</strong> sway<strong>in</strong>g dynamics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> en-own<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g.With its need<strong>in</strong>g, be<strong>in</strong>g is turned unto th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g or <strong>the</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g Dase<strong>in</strong>.By act<strong>in</strong>g, that is, by open<strong>in</strong>g-project<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, Dase<strong>in</strong> respondsto this need.With this dynamics <strong>of</strong> need<strong>in</strong>g–belong<strong>in</strong>g relationship between be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>Dase<strong>in</strong>, Dase<strong>in</strong> shows itself <strong>in</strong> a new light. Dase<strong>in</strong> no longer shows itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>manner <strong>of</strong> “ex-sistere,” that is, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>of</strong> transcend<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>gs for <strong>the</strong> horizonaldisclosure <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, but as an <strong>in</strong>abid<strong>in</strong>g (Inständigkeit) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>timacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>onefold <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. The aforementioned dynamics <strong>of</strong> sway<strong>in</strong>g enacts itself20Ibid., p. 199.21Ibid., pp.190f.
124 T. Kalary<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> wholeness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g-relationship. This co-relationality <strong>of</strong> need<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>belong<strong>in</strong>g between be<strong>in</strong>g’s en-own<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw <strong>and</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s en-owned project<strong>in</strong>gopen<strong>in</strong>gis what <strong>Heidegger</strong> calls “counter-resonance” (GA 65, 251 /CP, 177). Thisdynamics <strong>in</strong> its wholeness is what <strong>Heidegger</strong> calls enown<strong>in</strong>g. Be<strong>in</strong>g-historicalturn<strong>in</strong>g st<strong>and</strong>s for <strong>the</strong> resonance <strong>of</strong> this counter-resonance, for <strong>the</strong> alternat<strong>in</strong>gco-relationality between <strong>the</strong> en-own<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> en-ownedproject<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>. This relationship is called “turn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g”(GA 65, 57 /CP, 40).To sum up: <strong>in</strong> fundamental ontology, it is <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> ontological differencethat takes us to <strong>the</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as such. Even <strong>the</strong>re, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong>re is a “belong<strong>in</strong>g-toge<strong>the</strong>r” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> as long as t/here (“Da-”)<strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> st<strong>and</strong>s for <strong>the</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. But <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonallyconceived structure <strong>of</strong> ontological difference could not provide an adequate account<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> actual dynamics <strong>of</strong> this “belong<strong>in</strong>g-toge<strong>the</strong>r.” On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical perspective glimpses first <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> dynamics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gas enown<strong>in</strong>g. This sway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g comes to pass as a counter-resonance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>enown<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> enowned project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>. Thus,<strong>the</strong> dynamics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g shows itself <strong>in</strong> a genu<strong>in</strong>e onefold <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir need<strong>in</strong>g–belong<strong>in</strong>g relationship. Both <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonallyconceived structure <strong>of</strong> ontological difference as <strong>the</strong> condition for <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> very term “Differenz” seemed to overemphasize <strong>the</strong>difference so much so that <strong>the</strong> actual “belong<strong>in</strong>g-toge<strong>the</strong>r” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> wasnot adequately <strong>the</strong>matized. Be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g levels <strong>of</strong>f such <strong>in</strong>adequacies<strong>and</strong> provides a more orig<strong>in</strong>ary account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “belong<strong>in</strong>g-toge<strong>the</strong>r” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>Dase<strong>in</strong>, on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> which <strong>the</strong> ontological differentiation can be carried out. Onaccount <strong>of</strong> this, be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g uses <strong>in</strong>stead <strong>of</strong> “Differenz” o<strong>the</strong>r term<strong>in</strong>ologieslike “Unterscheidung” or “Unter-schied” <strong>in</strong> order to <strong>in</strong>dicate this transformation<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> ontological difference. While “Differenz” couldsound like a permanently prevalent state <strong>of</strong> affair that would preclude any genu<strong>in</strong>e“belong<strong>in</strong>g-toge<strong>the</strong>r,” <strong>the</strong> usage “Unterscheidung” has an enactmental tone, imply<strong>in</strong>ga dynamics <strong>of</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g eventually differentiated. And it is to this dynamicsthat <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s usage <strong>of</strong> “Unter-schied” refers. He writes <strong>the</strong> word “Unter-schied”with <strong>the</strong> separat<strong>in</strong>g hyphen <strong>in</strong> order to <strong>in</strong>dicate that <strong>the</strong> first part “unter-” st<strong>and</strong>s for<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>timacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> onefold <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, while “-schied” names <strong>the</strong>separateness <strong>and</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction between be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. It is <strong>the</strong> dynamism <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>“differentiation” that can appropriately be made only “<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>timacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> onefold” 22that is expressed with <strong>the</strong> term “Unterscheidung.” Elucidat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historicallyunderstood ontological difference, von Herrmann sums it up say<strong>in</strong>g: “Difference<strong>and</strong> belong<strong>in</strong>g-toge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> what is differentiated are grasped differently from <strong>the</strong>sway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g as enown<strong>in</strong>g.” 2322F.-W. von Herrmann, Wege <strong>in</strong>s Ereignis: Zu <strong>Heidegger</strong>s “Beiträge zur Philosophie” (Frankfurtam Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994), p. 79.23Ibid.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>of</strong> Difference <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> God-Question125After hav<strong>in</strong>g sufficiently dealt with <strong>the</strong> nuances <strong>of</strong> how <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> ontologicaldifference, upon which <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal disclosure <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g was <strong>in</strong>vestigated,gets transformed <strong>in</strong>to a th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> differentiation rooted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> onefold <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>timacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, we now turn to <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> what becomes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>the</strong>ological difference with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g as enown<strong>in</strong>g. To what extent,if at all, is <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ological difference relevant for <strong>the</strong> treatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god-question with<strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical perspective? To put <strong>the</strong> same matter from a different perspective,let us recall that <strong>the</strong> fundamental ontological perspective unfolds <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ontologicaldifference. With<strong>in</strong> this perspective, <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ological difference also played a crucialrole <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>to be<strong>in</strong>g from not gett<strong>in</strong>g mixed up with <strong>the</strong> question<strong>of</strong> god. Thus, fundamental ontology unfolds strictly under a <strong>the</strong>ological epoché. Now,<strong>the</strong> situation <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is quite different. On <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>and</strong>, as we havealready seen, ontological difference is grasped differently <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong> god-dimension is an <strong>in</strong>tegral element <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historicalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, as what is thought under <strong>the</strong> title “<strong>the</strong> last god” is one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> six “Jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gs” <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>ture <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as enown<strong>in</strong>g. In what way, <strong>the</strong>n, does <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ologicaldifference come <strong>in</strong>to play <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> as enown<strong>in</strong>g? What is unfortunately overlookedby <strong>the</strong> hi<strong>the</strong>rto <strong>Heidegger</strong> research is <strong>the</strong> fact that an appropriate underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> this question is crucial to <strong>the</strong> very underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.Let us beg<strong>in</strong> our considerations with <strong>the</strong> very term “<strong>the</strong> last god,” 24 <strong>the</strong> title<strong>Heidegger</strong> gives to <strong>the</strong> sixth “Jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> Contributions. He sums up <strong>the</strong> immediateapprehensions <strong>the</strong> readers would possibly have when confronted with such an oddtitle by ask<strong>in</strong>g, is not <strong>the</strong> expression “<strong>the</strong> last god” a matter <strong>of</strong> “debas<strong>in</strong>g god” or even“<strong>the</strong> greatest blasphemy”? Rul<strong>in</strong>g out an obvious tone <strong>the</strong> title may sound, he hastensto add that it is not an <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>of</strong> calculative th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g where “last” means someth<strong>in</strong>glike “cessation” or “end.” The first important <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> expression “<strong>the</strong> last god”is provided <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> a question: “but what if <strong>the</strong> last god has to be so namedbecause <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> end <strong>the</strong> decision about gods br<strong>in</strong>gs under <strong>and</strong> among gods <strong>and</strong> thusmakes what is ownmost to <strong>the</strong> uniqueness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e be<strong>in</strong>g [Gottwesen] most prom<strong>in</strong>ent?”(GA 65, 406/CP 286). To be specially noted here, as von Herrmann cautions,is <strong>the</strong> usage <strong>of</strong> “<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> end” <strong>in</strong> this passage: “‘<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> end’ when be<strong>in</strong>g shows itself nolonger only as be<strong>in</strong>gness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, but also as <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its jo<strong>in</strong>ture <strong>of</strong>enown<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong>re arises <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> an experiential manner <strong>the</strong> ownmost<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> uniqueness <strong>of</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> with it <strong>the</strong> last god as <strong>the</strong> godly god.” 25 Ifwe focus our attention on <strong>the</strong> word “last” <strong>in</strong> “<strong>the</strong> last god,” we cannot miss <strong>the</strong> implicit24Although Polt’s recent work The Emergency <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g: On <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions toPhilosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006) is a thoroughly researched book, excellent onmany counts, giv<strong>in</strong>g a lot <strong>of</strong> praiseworthy <strong>in</strong>sights <strong>in</strong>to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong>re are key areaswhere his elucidations struggle unsuccessfully to come to terms with some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> key aspects <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. One such area is his elucidations <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s “last God.” Translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>term “last” as “f<strong>in</strong>al,” he makes such claims as: “The f<strong>in</strong>al god, <strong>the</strong>n, is an ‘end’ as a goal” (p. 209.)“<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s ‘pass<strong>in</strong>g’ <strong>in</strong>dicates that our relation to <strong>the</strong> god is an event <strong>and</strong> advent, not a fixedstructure” (p. 210). His elucidations have not been able to get hold <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> difference atall (pp. 211 f.) rooted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> onefold <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g.25von Herrmann, Die Metaphysick, p. 109.
126 T. Kalaryyet obvious <strong>in</strong>terplay <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “first beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g” with <strong>the</strong> “o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g.” For <strong>Heidegger</strong>,<strong>the</strong> hi<strong>the</strong>rto history <strong>of</strong> philosophy with its long metaphysical tradition <strong>and</strong> its lead<strong>in</strong>gquestion <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g qua be<strong>in</strong>gness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs forms <strong>the</strong> first beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g. But this first beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> first beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g alreadyplays forth <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that beg<strong>in</strong>swith <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g that th<strong>in</strong>ks <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g question <strong>of</strong> philosophy as<strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. Allud<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> god-question occupied a central place<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> god-question received a specific l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>terpretation with<strong>in</strong> this so-called onto-<strong>the</strong>o-logical tradition, with <strong>the</strong> usage “<strong>the</strong> lastgod,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> wants to convey straight away that <strong>the</strong> reference is purely to <strong>the</strong>“god” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g. Implied fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> usage is that <strong>the</strong> “god” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g is grasped totally <strong>and</strong> fundamentally differently from <strong>the</strong> “god”as thought <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> yet, like <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> god-questionhas a central place with<strong>in</strong> this th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. That calls our attention to <strong>the</strong> word “god” <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> usage “<strong>the</strong> last god.” How are we to underst<strong>and</strong> this “god” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g?It is <strong>in</strong> this context that <strong>the</strong> significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> guid<strong>in</strong>g dictum given to sixth “Jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g”<strong>of</strong> Contributions immediately after <strong>the</strong> title “The Last God” becomes obvious: “Thetotally o<strong>the</strong>r over aga<strong>in</strong>st gods who have been, especially over aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> ChristianGod” (GA 65, 403/CP 283). Even before <strong>Heidegger</strong> elaborates on <strong>the</strong> god-questionwith<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g, he absolutely demarcates, as a first hermeneutic step,<strong>the</strong> last god from all <strong>the</strong> specific forms <strong>of</strong> god <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> entire history <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, especially<strong>the</strong> biblically revealed Christian God. All <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m are for <strong>Heidegger</strong> some modifications<strong>of</strong> a god <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gness <strong>and</strong> highest be<strong>in</strong>g. In contrast to such historicalforms <strong>of</strong> god, <strong>the</strong> last god, <strong>the</strong> god <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, is “totally o<strong>the</strong>r.” We shouldremember that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1920s, <strong>Heidegger</strong> had made a dist<strong>in</strong>ction between <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>ary“Christianness” <strong>and</strong> its formulation <strong>in</strong>to a “system” <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> Hellenistic philosophicalconceptuality. On <strong>the</strong> fundamental ontological pathway, he spoke <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> need torediscover this orig<strong>in</strong>ary Christianness through a process <strong>of</strong> de-Hellenization. Now,<strong>the</strong> “totally o<strong>the</strong>r god” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g should not be identified with evensuch a de-Hellenized Christian God. For, even such a god is still a form <strong>of</strong> historicalspecification. The godly god as <strong>the</strong> “totally o<strong>the</strong>r” st<strong>and</strong>s for <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e phenomenonthat is free <strong>of</strong> any such concretizations.It is for this reason that be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, while referr<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>ephenomenon, uses different but unusual expressions such as “<strong>the</strong> last god,” “godly god,”“godd<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> gods,” “<strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e” [das Gott-hafte], <strong>the</strong> plural form “gods,” etc. <strong>and</strong> takescare to avoid all customary term<strong>in</strong>ologies for it. We have here <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own clarification:“The talk <strong>of</strong> ‘gods’ here does not <strong>in</strong>dicate decided assertion on <strong>the</strong> extantness<strong>of</strong> a plurality over aga<strong>in</strong>st a s<strong>in</strong>gular but is ra<strong>the</strong>r meant as <strong>the</strong> allusion to <strong>the</strong> undecidability<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> gods, whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> one s<strong>in</strong>gle god or <strong>of</strong> many gods. This undecidabilityholds with<strong>in</strong> itself what is question-worthy, namely, whe<strong>the</strong>r anyth<strong>in</strong>g at alllike be<strong>in</strong>g dare be attributed to gods without destroy<strong>in</strong>g everyth<strong>in</strong>g that is div<strong>in</strong>e. Theundecidability concern<strong>in</strong>g which god <strong>and</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r a god can, <strong>in</strong> utmost distress, onceaga<strong>in</strong> arise, from which way <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> man <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> what way – this is what is namedby <strong>the</strong> name ‘gods’” (GA 65, 437/CP 308). Thus, it becomes clear that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s<strong>in</strong>terest consist <strong>in</strong> lett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “godly” to manifest itself <strong>in</strong> its uniqueness, withoutalready destroy<strong>in</strong>g what is div<strong>in</strong>e by beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiry itself with some already
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>of</strong> Difference <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> God-Question127prevalent historical specifications. The “Jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g” entitled “The Last God” essentially<strong>and</strong> exclusively unfolds <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>ary div<strong>in</strong>e dimension factically from out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, becom<strong>in</strong>g thus <strong>the</strong> utmost god, “<strong>the</strong> totally o<strong>the</strong>r god” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g,show<strong>in</strong>g itself <strong>in</strong> its orig<strong>in</strong>ary dimension that is before every form <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuation <strong>and</strong>concretization as experienced <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> by any particular religious tradition.This br<strong>in</strong>gs us to <strong>the</strong> next question: how does be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>k this“totally o<strong>the</strong>r god”? 26 Toward answer<strong>in</strong>g this question, we turn to a crucial passagefrom <strong>the</strong> Contributions. “The last god is not enown<strong>in</strong>g itself; ra<strong>the</strong>r, it needsenown<strong>in</strong>g as that to which <strong>the</strong> founder <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> t/here [Dagründer] belongs” (GA 65,409/CP 288). Here, we have <strong>the</strong> clearest formulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historicallygrasped occurrence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ological difference. Thereby, <strong>Heidegger</strong> is giv<strong>in</strong>g an<strong>in</strong>itial expression <strong>of</strong> how be<strong>in</strong>g, man, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e are related, but related <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong>ir unique differences. First <strong>of</strong> all, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>in</strong>deed a reaffirmation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> need<strong>in</strong>g–belong<strong>in</strong>g relationship between be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>, a reaffirmation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>ghistoricallyconceived occurrence <strong>of</strong> ontological difference. As <strong>the</strong> grounder <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as enown<strong>in</strong>g, man <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> belongs to be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a ground<strong>in</strong>g-responseto <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g through an act <strong>of</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g what isthrown-forth to it. Then comes <strong>the</strong> crucial part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> statement, an unequivocalaffirmation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>re is an essential difference between be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> god,that <strong>the</strong> “last god is not enown<strong>in</strong>g itself.” As we have already seen, <strong>Heidegger</strong> hasshown, how be<strong>in</strong>g as enown<strong>in</strong>g unfolds <strong>in</strong> a counter-resonance <strong>of</strong> forth-throw <strong>and</strong>project<strong>in</strong>g-open. The first hermeneutic orientation is given here that <strong>the</strong> “totallyo<strong>the</strong>r god” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g is “totally o<strong>the</strong>r” than be<strong>in</strong>g also. Be-<strong>in</strong>gdoes not hold sway as god itself (GA 65, 26), be<strong>in</strong>g is never a determ<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> goditself (GA 65, 240/CP 169), <strong>and</strong> god is also not enown<strong>in</strong>g itself (GA 65, 409). 27 Thesecond hermeneutic orientation is that <strong>the</strong> “totally o<strong>the</strong>r god” ra<strong>the</strong>r “needs” be<strong>in</strong>g.26Excellent treatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “last god” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is available <strong>in</strong>: vonHerrmann, Wege <strong>in</strong>s Ereignis, especially pp. 351 ff.; P.-L. Cori<strong>and</strong>o, Der letzte Gott als Anfang;same author, “Zur Er-mittlung des Übergangs. Der Wesungsort des ‘letzten Gottes’ im se<strong>in</strong>sgeschichtlichenDenken,” <strong>in</strong>“Herkunft aber bleibt stets Zukunft”: Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> und dieGottesfrage, ed. P.-L. Cori<strong>and</strong>o (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998), pp. 101–116.;C. Müller, Der Tod als W<strong>and</strong>lungsmitte: Zur Frage nach Entscheidung, Tod und letztem Gott <strong>in</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>s “Beiträge zur Philosophie” (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot, 1999).27Jason Powell’s book, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy: Life <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Last God, (London:Cont<strong>in</strong>uum, 2007), which is written with <strong>the</strong> all too noble <strong>in</strong>tention <strong>of</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> readers with aneasy access to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s second masterpiece, makes <strong>in</strong>stead a total mess <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> bybe<strong>in</strong>g as unfolded <strong>in</strong> Contributions. The preface itself betrays <strong>the</strong> actual problem with <strong>the</strong> book,where <strong>the</strong> author states that s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong>re is a lack <strong>of</strong> agreement among specialists concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> key words <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> work, he has “provided . . . [his] own underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong>se words.” (p. ix) And any diligent reader will soon realize that this book is just that, an account<strong>of</strong> his total mis-underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Contributions. What disastrous consequences suchan account will have on an unsuspect<strong>in</strong>g reader can only be imag<strong>in</strong>ed when one is confronted, pageafter page, with statements like: “Gods are reflections <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> a new sort <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g means anew sort <strong>of</strong> god...... <strong>the</strong> name ‘last’ or ‘ultimate’ is <strong>the</strong> essential name <strong>of</strong> god, s<strong>in</strong>ce it highlights <strong>the</strong>‘oneness’ <strong>and</strong> unique transience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god. Besides, ‘last’ means that this god, too, would be f<strong>in</strong>ite”(p. 115). If only one were to familiarize oneself adequately with <strong>the</strong> very dynamics <strong>of</strong> such a th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gbefore embark<strong>in</strong>g upon such ambitious projects like <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g it to o<strong>the</strong>rs, one would havetruly served <strong>the</strong> cause <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g better <strong>and</strong> spared <strong>the</strong> readers a whole lot <strong>of</strong> trouble!
128 T. KalaryCom<strong>in</strong>g as we are from hav<strong>in</strong>g seen <strong>the</strong> need<strong>in</strong>g–belong<strong>in</strong>g relationship betweenbe<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>, we already have an <strong>in</strong>kl<strong>in</strong>g that this usage “gods need be<strong>in</strong>g”presents an attempt to capture <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical relationship between be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> godly phenomenon. So we read: “be-<strong>in</strong>g is that which <strong>the</strong> godd<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> godsneeds, <strong>in</strong> order none<strong>the</strong>less to rema<strong>in</strong> totally differentiated from be-<strong>in</strong>g” (GA 65,240 /CP 169). Gods need be<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong>ir “godd<strong>in</strong>g.” In order that <strong>the</strong>y can appear as<strong>the</strong>y are <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir orig<strong>in</strong>ary “godly” or “div<strong>in</strong>e” character, <strong>the</strong>y need<strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as enown<strong>in</strong>g. Here it is by no means a question <strong>of</strong> putt<strong>in</strong>g be-<strong>in</strong>gover god, or devalu<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> some way <strong>the</strong> supremacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e. Such talk wouldmake sense only as long as <strong>the</strong> ontological difference <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ological difference areforgotten. It is not one entity fight<strong>in</strong>g for supremacy over ano<strong>the</strong>r, it is not about achronological priority ei<strong>the</strong>r. What is at issue is <strong>the</strong> unveil<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> that primordialregion where <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e comes to show itself <strong>in</strong> its uniqueness.After hav<strong>in</strong>g given <strong>the</strong> first two hermeneutic orientations, namely that <strong>the</strong>“totally o<strong>the</strong>r god” is “totally o<strong>the</strong>r than be<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>and</strong> that this god st<strong>and</strong>s <strong>in</strong> a relationship<strong>of</strong> “need<strong>in</strong>g” to be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>Heidegger</strong> gives <strong>the</strong> third hermeneutic orientation<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> abovementioned passage. It is about <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> man as <strong>the</strong> “grounder <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>t/here (Da)” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “godd<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> gods.” If <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as enown<strong>in</strong>g comes topass as <strong>the</strong> counter-resonance <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’sground<strong>in</strong>g response <strong>of</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g what is thrown-forth, <strong>and</strong> if <strong>the</strong> godlygod needs enown<strong>in</strong>g for its “godd<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>the</strong>n “<strong>the</strong> last god” also needs man. A clearstatement <strong>of</strong> this is given <strong>in</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness: “ground<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> godhood <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lastgod already needs <strong>the</strong> man <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>” (GA 66, 244/M 215). The “totally o<strong>the</strong>r”god needs man <strong>in</strong> his capacity as <strong>the</strong> grounder <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> t/here: “In participat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> t/here, Da-se<strong>in</strong> as enowned project<strong>in</strong>g-open prepares <strong>the</strong> sitefor <strong>the</strong> possible appearance <strong>of</strong> god, which <strong>Heidegger</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g Hölderl<strong>in</strong> calls <strong>the</strong>“pass<strong>in</strong>g-by” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last god.” 28 Be<strong>in</strong>g-historical appearance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> godly god iswhat <strong>Heidegger</strong> calls <strong>the</strong> “pass<strong>in</strong>g-by <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last god.” It st<strong>and</strong>s for <strong>the</strong> possible<strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historically transformed re-reappearance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> holy, godhood, <strong>and</strong>god. The project<strong>in</strong>g-open <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> belongs necessarily to this appearance orpass<strong>in</strong>g-by <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last god with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> happen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g, that is, <strong>the</strong> pass<strong>in</strong>gby<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last god needs man because <strong>of</strong> his role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g. That is, man has also a share <strong>in</strong> prepar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> site for <strong>the</strong> appearance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>godly god.In order to underst<strong>and</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r this phenomenon <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> appearance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> goldlyphenomenon with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> site <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g grounded by man, we turn to ano<strong>the</strong>rpassage from <strong>the</strong> Contributions: “Enown<strong>in</strong>g owns god over to man <strong>in</strong> that enown<strong>in</strong>gowns man to god. This “own<strong>in</strong>g-to” that “owns-over” is enown<strong>in</strong>g, where<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g is grounded … <strong>and</strong> where<strong>in</strong> history takes its o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g frombe-<strong>in</strong>g” (GA 65, 26/CP 19). We have already elucidated how <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gcomes to pass as a counter-resonance <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>enowned project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>. With <strong>the</strong> above-cited passage, <strong>Heidegger</strong>28von Herrmann, “Stationen der Gottesfrage,” pp. 28–29.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>of</strong> Difference <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> God-Question129illum<strong>in</strong>ates fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> moment <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g’s enown<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw <strong>in</strong> two additionaldimensions: (1) that <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw is an enown<strong>in</strong>g own<strong>in</strong>g god over toman <strong>and</strong> (2) that <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw is an enown<strong>in</strong>g own<strong>in</strong>g man to god.Now, what is enown<strong>in</strong>gly thrown-forth has to be acted upon by Dase<strong>in</strong> by project<strong>in</strong>git open. Thus, enowned project<strong>in</strong>g-open, be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> co-dimension <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> counterresonat<strong>in</strong>gsway <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g has to respond also to <strong>the</strong>se two dimensions <strong>of</strong>“own<strong>in</strong>g god over to man” <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> “own<strong>in</strong>g man to god” for <strong>the</strong> actual sway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>enown<strong>in</strong>g. In this way, <strong>Heidegger</strong> locates <strong>the</strong> god-question, <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> a“totally o<strong>the</strong>r god,” with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> heart <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as enown<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> thus at<strong>the</strong> center <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. It is decisive to his be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> god that only when thought out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as grounded by <strong>the</strong> man <strong>of</strong>Dase<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong> godly god, <strong>in</strong> its difference from both be<strong>in</strong>g as well as be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>irbe<strong>in</strong>gness, can show itself as it is <strong>in</strong> itself, <strong>in</strong> its <strong>in</strong>comparable uniqueness.This br<strong>in</strong>gs us to a few vital aspects, which can only be broadly <strong>in</strong>dicated here.Hav<strong>in</strong>g explicated <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its two dimensions <strong>of</strong>“own<strong>in</strong>g-over” <strong>and</strong> “own<strong>in</strong>g-to” <strong>in</strong> conjunction with <strong>the</strong> enowned project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> as a response to both, it becomes clear that without <strong>the</strong> godd<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>godly god <strong>the</strong> whole phenomenon <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g is not taken <strong>in</strong>to account. Or to putdifferently, as long as “<strong>the</strong> last god” is one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>ture <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g,grasp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> entirety <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> happen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>cludes also <strong>the</strong> dimension<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> godly god. Thus, it is one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> central <strong>in</strong>sights <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gthat a godless enown<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>in</strong>conceivable. For this reason, borrow<strong>in</strong>g an expressionfrom von Herrmann, we can also speak <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as well as man st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> need <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> godly god for a “god-filled” ra<strong>the</strong>r than “god-less enown<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>and</strong> a “god-filledDase<strong>in</strong>” ra<strong>the</strong>r than a “dis-humanized Dase<strong>in</strong>.” Von Herrmann po<strong>in</strong>ts out that “<strong>the</strong>truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that comes to pass as enown<strong>in</strong>g needs also god <strong>and</strong> its pass<strong>in</strong>g-by, ifenown<strong>in</strong>g is to come to its fulfilment: not <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g that is ab<strong>and</strong>oned by god,but filled by god. If enown<strong>in</strong>g comes to pass filled by god, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> unconcealment<strong>of</strong> each be<strong>in</strong>g is not only <strong>the</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> its “be<strong>in</strong>g-what” <strong>and</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>ghow,”but also <strong>the</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god-filled enown<strong>in</strong>g.” 29 Let us try to underst<strong>and</strong>this fur<strong>the</strong>r. Any calculatively thought god, as found <strong>in</strong> various forms <strong>of</strong> both mono<strong>the</strong>ism<strong>and</strong> pan<strong>the</strong>ism, is noth<strong>in</strong>g but a “dis-enowned god” as long as <strong>the</strong> godlyphenomenon is not thought out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. The div<strong>in</strong>e phenomenon canshow itself <strong>in</strong> its uniqueness only <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> light provided by be<strong>in</strong>g. Thus, <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>ephenomenon does st<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> need <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g for its self-manifestation.When <strong>the</strong> various historical articulations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> godly phenomenon do not take thisfundamental dimension as a guid<strong>in</strong>g orientation, but let <strong>the</strong>mselves be guided byo<strong>the</strong>r calculative considerations, what <strong>the</strong>y eventually arrive at is a “dis-enownedgod.” Entirely different from this, speak<strong>in</strong>g from with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g itself, <strong>and</strong>try<strong>in</strong>g to underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its entirety, any attempt to elucidate <strong>the</strong>sway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g keep<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “godd<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> goldly god” out <strong>of</strong> consideration is<strong>in</strong>complete <strong>and</strong> to that extend it is a “god-less” enown<strong>in</strong>g, which follows <strong>the</strong> attempt29von Herrmann, Die Metaphysik, p. 121.
130 T. Kalaryat grasp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g without one <strong>of</strong> its constitutive dimensions. In o<strong>the</strong>rwords, placed under a methodological <strong>the</strong>ological epoché, <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> asenown<strong>in</strong>g cannot unfold <strong>in</strong> its fullness.In <strong>the</strong> same ve<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong>re is a def<strong>in</strong>ite sense <strong>in</strong> which man also needs god. Onlywhen he recognizes that his be<strong>in</strong>g is owned-over-to god, he has an <strong>in</strong>kl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>full depth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> uniqueness <strong>of</strong> his ownmost <strong>and</strong> only <strong>the</strong>n he can truly overcomeall forms <strong>of</strong> dis-humanization: “The same ground that gives rise to <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> godhood <strong>of</strong> gods also gives rise to <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respective fundamentalworth<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>of</strong> man by virtue <strong>of</strong> which he overcomes <strong>the</strong> “dis-humanization”as <strong>the</strong> most acute danger to his ownmost” (GA 66, 245/M 216–17). Be<strong>in</strong>ghistoricalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g shows that only when <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> man is thought out <strong>of</strong><strong>and</strong> understood from out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> counter-resonance <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> grounder <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, we grasp <strong>the</strong> uniqueness <strong>of</strong> man. S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>gnecessarily <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>the</strong> godd<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> godly god, grasp<strong>in</strong>g man’s ownmost necessarilyimplies grasp<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>in</strong> its god-permeated character. This <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>ghistoricalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g has far-reach<strong>in</strong>g consequences. To be human <strong>the</strong>n would meanto be grounded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> embraced by <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e. Understoodfrom this perspective, <strong>the</strong> full phenomenon <strong>of</strong> dis-humanization implies that <strong>the</strong>dis-humanized human existence, ab<strong>and</strong>oned by be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> devoid <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> godd<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> goldly god, unfolds itself <strong>in</strong> a forgottenness both <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as well as <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>godly god.To sum up our elucidations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ologicaldifference <strong>and</strong> “<strong>the</strong> last god,” we can say that on <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>and</strong>, as thought out <strong>of</strong> thisdifference, be<strong>in</strong>g-historical god is not a be<strong>in</strong>g, nor <strong>the</strong> highest be<strong>in</strong>g. Nei<strong>the</strong>r is itbe<strong>in</strong>g itself, or <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its sway as enown<strong>in</strong>g. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, with<strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> space illum<strong>in</strong>ated by be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> grounded by Dase<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> only with<strong>in</strong> that, <strong>the</strong>godly god that is as yet untouched <strong>in</strong> its unique div<strong>in</strong>e character <strong>and</strong> undifferentiated<strong>in</strong>to specific historical forms can <strong>and</strong> does appear. It means, even <strong>in</strong> all its difference,<strong>the</strong> last god has its orig<strong>in</strong>ary space with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>timacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> onefold <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g,<strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as enown<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>in</strong>complete without <strong>the</strong> “pass<strong>in</strong>g-by” <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> “last god.” This is <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historically transformed phenomenon <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ologicaldifference, <strong>the</strong> difference between god <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. In <strong>the</strong> same ve<strong>in</strong>,be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g grasps also <strong>the</strong> relation between <strong>the</strong> “last god” <strong>and</strong> m<strong>and</strong>ifferently. The utterly o<strong>the</strong>r god needs <strong>the</strong> site prepared by Dase<strong>in</strong> for its appearance.But <strong>the</strong>reby, be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g does not carry out a reversal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>traditional priorities. In be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, such calculative considerationshave def<strong>in</strong>itely no place. Be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g just shows <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>in</strong>timacy<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, ground<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> man, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> godd<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> gods. This th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g isconcerned with <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>timacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> onefold <strong>of</strong> an occurrence, <strong>and</strong> only out <strong>of</strong> thisonefold differentiations can be genu<strong>in</strong>ely made. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly a key passage <strong>in</strong>M<strong>in</strong>dfulness gives a very precise expression to this: “Nei<strong>the</strong>r do gods create man nordoes man <strong>in</strong>vent gods. The truth <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g decides “on” both but not by prevail<strong>in</strong>gover <strong>the</strong>m but by enown<strong>in</strong>g itself between <strong>the</strong>m <strong>and</strong> thus by first enown<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m<strong>the</strong>mselves unto <strong>the</strong> counter<strong>in</strong>g” (GA 66, 235/M 208).
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>of</strong> Difference <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> God-Question1313 Hav<strong>in</strong>g traversed <strong>the</strong> path <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> order to ga<strong>in</strong> an experience <strong>of</strong>how <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> difference <strong>in</strong> both its ontological <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ological dimensionsshapes his <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g; how this th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> difference undergoesa transformation along with <strong>the</strong> immanent transformation his very th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g undergoes<strong>and</strong> how <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> god unfolds with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> dynamics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>difference, it is important to conclude this essay with a fur<strong>the</strong>r question: what is <strong>the</strong>significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “last god,” <strong>the</strong> “totally o<strong>the</strong>r” god <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g? We should be aware <strong>of</strong> efforts that still refuse to concede that<strong>Heidegger</strong> has someth<strong>in</strong>g significant to contribute to <strong>the</strong> discussion on god. Ourelucidations above, however brief, suffice to make one realize that such claims areborn out <strong>of</strong> an actual ignorance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> very th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> as well as <strong>the</strong>unwill<strong>in</strong>gness to let go <strong>the</strong> popular prejudices that have been built <strong>and</strong> even consciouslynurtured over <strong>the</strong> decades. Serious efforts are also made to approach especially<strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> angle <strong>of</strong> its possible relation to Christian<strong>the</strong>ology. However attractive such efforts may <strong>in</strong>itially appear to be, <strong>the</strong>y sadly miss<strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy as such as well as what is outst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>glyunique to his contributions to <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> god. It is <strong>the</strong>reforeimportant to highlight what is unique to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s “last god.”Philosophical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its orig<strong>in</strong>ary shap<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g as enown<strong>in</strong>g necessarily implies <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e. After hav<strong>in</strong>gpursued fundamental ontology with<strong>in</strong> a <strong>the</strong>ological epoché as a necessary hermeneuticmeasure, th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g ga<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> realization that <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>timacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> onefold <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>sway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as enown<strong>in</strong>g lights itself up as a belong<strong>in</strong>g-toge<strong>the</strong>r first <strong>of</strong> all <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> man <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>, a belong<strong>in</strong>g-toge<strong>the</strong>r that at <strong>the</strong> same timeopens up <strong>the</strong> space for <strong>the</strong> self-revelation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e. Secondly, <strong>the</strong> onefold <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>sway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g becomes thus not only <strong>the</strong> source <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>ary relatedness <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> godd<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> gods, but a relatedness <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir essentialdifference.With<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g, th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g opens thus <strong>the</strong> space <strong>and</strong> method toth<strong>in</strong>k <strong>of</strong> a “totally o<strong>the</strong>r” god under <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. In my considered op<strong>in</strong>ion,what is exceptionally unique to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god-question, <strong>and</strong> whatis absolutely missed by practically all <strong>the</strong> studies on <strong>the</strong> matter, is his th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>“div<strong>in</strong>e” [das Gotthafte]. If we take <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s contribution on <strong>the</strong> topic as anillustration <strong>of</strong> a th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> post-metaphysical, post-modern god, or as an essentialcriticism <strong>of</strong> some particular religious tradition, show<strong>in</strong>g a way out <strong>of</strong> it, especiallythat <strong>of</strong> Christian tradition, we may be miss<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> essential po<strong>in</strong>t. In <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>timacy <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> onefold <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as enown<strong>in</strong>g, th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g opens a site for <strong>the</strong>“godd<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> godly god,” where <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e shows itself <strong>in</strong> its undifferentiatedorig<strong>in</strong>ary div<strong>in</strong>e character: “The last god has its most unique uniqueness <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>soutside those calculat<strong>in</strong>g determ<strong>in</strong>ations meant by titles such as “mono-<strong>the</strong>ism,”“pan-<strong>the</strong>ism,” <strong>and</strong> “a-<strong>the</strong>ism.” .... <strong>the</strong> multitude <strong>of</strong> gods cannot be quantified, butra<strong>the</strong>r is subjected to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ner richness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> grounds <strong>and</strong> abgrounds <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> site for
132 T. Kalary<strong>the</strong> moment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sh<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g-conceal<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> h<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last god”(GA 65, 411/CP 289). Be<strong>in</strong>g lights up to th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ur-dimension <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e, asun-decided <strong>and</strong> un-differentiated <strong>in</strong> its nature <strong>and</strong> specific historical manner <strong>of</strong>manifestation. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s legacy <strong>the</strong>n would be <strong>the</strong> open<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>of</strong> a doma<strong>in</strong> that isstill untouched by any form <strong>of</strong> concretizations <strong>and</strong> objectifications, decisions <strong>in</strong>favor <strong>of</strong> one or many, male or female gods. This ur-doma<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e shows itselfas <strong>the</strong> provenance from which every religious tradition could experience its <strong>in</strong>dividuation.Thus, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s “o<strong>the</strong>r god” perhaps need not be seen as tak<strong>in</strong>g a wayout <strong>of</strong> any particular religious tradition, let alone <strong>the</strong> Christian tradition, but asprovid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> common site that leads <strong>in</strong>to every specific religious traditions. Thus,<strong>Heidegger</strong> provides us with a common philosophical, yet factic basis for a mean<strong>in</strong>gfuldialogue between all historical religious traditions <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir specific god-experiences.Thus, <strong>Heidegger</strong> can truly say that “<strong>the</strong> last god is not <strong>the</strong> end but <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> immeasurable possibilities for our history” (GA 65, 411/CP 289).Illum<strong>in</strong>ated by <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> understood from out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>timacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>onefold <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, man atta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> realization that <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> hisfacticity is always already permeated by <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e character. The div<strong>in</strong>e is nolonger located <strong>in</strong> some unreachable metaphysical heights, nor is it man’s ownillusory creation. The div<strong>in</strong>e prevails with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> very core <strong>of</strong> one’s ownmost, notseek<strong>in</strong>g some form <strong>of</strong> forced artificial relationship, but shows itself <strong>in</strong> an alwaysalready prevalent relationship that calls for <strong>and</strong> calls forth a cont<strong>in</strong>uous response.It is <strong>the</strong> type <strong>of</strong> human response that would decide whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e “passes by”or “stays away,” whe<strong>the</strong>r man rema<strong>in</strong>s god-less <strong>and</strong> thus dis-humanized or god-filled<strong>and</strong> thus genu<strong>in</strong>ely humanized. Thus, we can say that with <strong>the</strong> “last god” <strong>Heidegger</strong><strong>of</strong>fers an answer to his own compla<strong>in</strong>t about <strong>the</strong> god <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> metaphysics, when hesaid that “to this god man can nei<strong>the</strong>r pray or <strong>of</strong>fer sacrifice. Before <strong>the</strong> causa suiman can nei<strong>the</strong>r kneel down <strong>in</strong> deep awe, nor can he musicise or dance before thisgod.” In any case, if only one underst<strong>and</strong>s <strong>the</strong> depth <strong>and</strong> wealth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> “last god,” one can underst<strong>and</strong> what he meant, when he emphasized that, “<strong>the</strong>god-less th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, that sacrifices <strong>the</strong> god <strong>of</strong> philosophy, <strong>the</strong> god as causa sui, isperhaps closer to <strong>the</strong> godly god.” 30ReferencesAristotle. 1979. Metaphysics. Trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle. Gr<strong>in</strong>nell: The Peripatetic.Cori<strong>and</strong>o, Paola Ludovika. 1998. Der letzte Gott als Anfang. München: Wilhelm F<strong>in</strong>k Verlag.Zur Er-mittlung des Übergangs. 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Substance <strong>and</strong> Empt<strong>in</strong>ess: Preparatory StepsToward a <strong>Translation</strong>al Dialogue BetweenWestern <strong>and</strong> Buddhist PhilosophyPaola-Ludovika Cori<strong>and</strong>o, Translated by Virg<strong>in</strong>ia Lyle Jenn<strong>in</strong>gs Colombo1 IntroductionIs philosophy as <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “be-<strong>in</strong>g” exclusively Greek <strong>and</strong> Western? Do <strong>the</strong>onsets <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r traditions allow <strong>the</strong>mselves to be translated <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong>Western horizon <strong>of</strong> experience? Can such a translation rema<strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>dful <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ownmost<strong>of</strong> what is irreconcilably foreign, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> spite <strong>of</strong> this foreignness <strong>in</strong>itiatea dialogue?In its classical, metaphysical form, Western philosophy is rational <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>sense <strong>of</strong> logical <strong>and</strong> discursive knowledge. Its conclusions are (1) obta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>and</strong>disproved argumentatively, <strong>and</strong> (2) only secondarily, <strong>the</strong>y possess a practical relevanceto life. In fact <strong>the</strong> Eastern tradition does also possess discursive thought, aswell as a highly sophisticated <strong>and</strong> elaborate logic, <strong>and</strong> a systematic ontology, whichunlike Western metaphysics always encompasses an ethic. Never<strong>the</strong>less, both traditionsare characterized by fundamentally different impulses. Whereas <strong>in</strong> Westernphilosophy <strong>the</strong> (rational) knowledge <strong>of</strong> reality assumes <strong>the</strong> position <strong>of</strong> a primaphilosophia (first philosophy), <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eastern tradition, it always serves <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation,preparation, or <strong>the</strong> possible br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g-about <strong>of</strong> a condition (Zust<strong>and</strong>) thatitself has a pre-rational <strong>and</strong> extral<strong>in</strong>guistic character. Knowledge is not achieved <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> rational cognition as such, but <strong>in</strong> a “conditional” experience (“enlightenment”),which (1) is atta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>tuitively <strong>and</strong> not discursively, (2) has direct consequences forlife experience, <strong>and</strong> (3) is always soteriologically oriented. Here, knowledge is asynonym <strong>of</strong> salvation <strong>and</strong> transformation. While <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> a metaphysical propositionco<strong>in</strong>cides with <strong>and</strong> is exhausted by <strong>the</strong> spoken word, <strong>the</strong> discursive thought <strong>of</strong>P.-L. Cori<strong>and</strong>o (*)Institut fur Philosophie, Universitat Innsbruck, Innra<strong>in</strong> 52,A-6020 Innsbruck, Austriae-mail: Paola-Ludovika.Cori<strong>and</strong>o@uibk.ac.atV.L.J. ColomboF. Schalow (ed.), <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad, Contributions To Phenomenology 65,DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0_7, © Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media B.V. 2011135
136 P.-L. Cori<strong>and</strong>o<strong>the</strong> Eastern tradition is directed toward a conditionality that is not <strong>the</strong>oreticallycommunicable (whe<strong>the</strong>r it be its source or its ultimate goal). Eastern thought is<strong>the</strong>refore directed toward a level <strong>of</strong> experience that from <strong>the</strong> Western perspectivewould be attributed more to psychology <strong>and</strong>/or religious experience.These fundamentally opposed approaches have essential consequences. Whereas<strong>the</strong> metaphysical, Western question<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenal world leads to an essentialdeterm<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as substantial realities <strong>and</strong> to <strong>the</strong> sett<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>of</strong> a “trueworld” with its features <strong>of</strong> eternity, immutability, <strong>and</strong> absoluteness (whe<strong>the</strong>r it be a<strong>the</strong>oretically ascerta<strong>in</strong>able “true world” or, as with Kant, one postulated <strong>in</strong> practicalreason), Eastern philosophy is completely open ended. This manifests itself especiallyclearly <strong>in</strong> Indian philosophy, <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> “metaphysical” doctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> Ātman(soul), <strong>of</strong> Vedist orig<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Buddhist approach confront each o<strong>the</strong>r—lead<strong>in</strong>g to<strong>the</strong> overcom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> all metaphysical concepts <strong>and</strong> all categories <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g.In what follows, I would like to <strong>in</strong>itiate a dialogue between Western (metaphysical)<strong>and</strong> Eastern (Buddhist) thought concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “ultimate reality.” In this connection,I will first address <strong>the</strong> classical, metaphysical concept <strong>of</strong> substance us<strong>in</strong>gAristotle <strong>and</strong> Descartes as examples. In <strong>the</strong> next step, I turn to Nāgārjuna, <strong>the</strong> mostimportant figure <strong>in</strong> Mahayana Buddhism, <strong>and</strong> present somewhat more extensivelyhis <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> empt<strong>in</strong>ess. F<strong>in</strong>ally, I will attempt to show <strong>the</strong> paths that a dialoguewith Buddhist philosophy can open toward a new self-conception <strong>of</strong> Westernphilosophy.2 Theories <strong>of</strong> Substance <strong>in</strong> Western Philosophy2.1 AristotlePhilosophy as metaphysics is susta<strong>in</strong>ed by a <strong>the</strong>oretical fore-grasp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unconditioned,<strong>in</strong>dependent absolute. For Aristotle, <strong>the</strong>ory means observation <strong>and</strong> comprehension<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> entity, with <strong>the</strong> goal <strong>of</strong> conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g it by nam<strong>in</strong>g it (ÒrismόV).Accord<strong>in</strong>g to its dist<strong>in</strong>ctive character, qεwrίa leads to multifarious determ<strong>in</strong>ations<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, which are grounded <strong>in</strong> oÛsίa as <strong>the</strong> ultimate, logically-ontologically, irreduciblecore essence <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, which can never<strong>the</strong>less be conceptualized <strong>in</strong> manyways. The concept <strong>of</strong> oÛsίa is itself multifaceted, <strong>and</strong> bears with<strong>in</strong> itself <strong>the</strong> tensionbetween <strong>the</strong> particular <strong>and</strong> absolute. OÛsίa is that which cannot be predicated <strong>of</strong>ano<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>and</strong> which, as endur<strong>in</strong>g substrate ßpokείmεnon, supports chang<strong>in</strong>g qualities.OÛsίa, however, is no generality; ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>in</strong> one respect, it is <strong>the</strong> tόdε ti as sύnolon,<strong>the</strong> concrete that <strong>in</strong>dividuates be<strong>in</strong>gs through its specific materiality. In ano<strong>the</strong>rrespect, though, oÛsίa is <strong>the</strong> tò tί µn εÉnai <strong>of</strong> this be<strong>in</strong>g or its εÉdoV, by which itcompletes as it were <strong>the</strong> tension between <strong>the</strong> general <strong>and</strong> particular, <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ally leadsto <strong>the</strong> first oÛsίa, <strong>the</strong> qεόn, which as <strong>the</strong> ultimate unconditioned resides with<strong>in</strong> itself,<strong>and</strong> grounds <strong>the</strong> teleological organiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> order<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> all be<strong>in</strong>gs. Because <strong>the</strong>oreti-
Substance <strong>and</strong> Empt<strong>in</strong>ess: Preparatory Steps Toward a <strong>Translation</strong>al Dialogue...137cal fore-grasp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> reality determ<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong> advance be<strong>in</strong>g-extant as <strong>the</strong> highest value,<strong>the</strong> levels <strong>and</strong> ranks <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs obta<strong>in</strong> completion <strong>in</strong> qεόn as <strong>the</strong> most extant <strong>and</strong>highest be<strong>in</strong>g.2.2 DescartesIn Descartes, for <strong>the</strong> first time, <strong>the</strong> ultimate knowledge <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs is atta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> arational meditation, which by reductionistically fore-grasp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ego cogito with aview toward certitudo (certa<strong>in</strong>ty) discloses <strong>the</strong> ego cogito (I th<strong>in</strong>k) as <strong>the</strong> fundamentum<strong>in</strong>concussum (unshakeable foundation). Here, meditation means self-reflection <strong>and</strong>rational self-knowledge guided by clara et dist<strong>in</strong>cta perceptio (clear <strong>and</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ctideas). The Cartesian def<strong>in</strong>ition <strong>of</strong> substance as “ita existit, ut nulla alia re <strong>in</strong>digeatad existendum” (it exists such that no o<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>in</strong>g is required for its existence) confirms<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to absoluteness <strong>and</strong> autonomy. These obta<strong>in</strong> completion only <strong>in</strong>God as causa sui, but <strong>in</strong> such a way that first <strong>the</strong> res cogitans (th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>and</strong>res extensa (extended th<strong>in</strong>g) can be posited as f<strong>in</strong>al <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ite certum (certa<strong>in</strong>ty),need<strong>in</strong>g no o<strong>the</strong>r entity “o<strong>the</strong>r than God” <strong>in</strong> order to exist as endur<strong>in</strong>g substrate.Here too, as <strong>in</strong> Aristotle, ontology leads <strong>in</strong>to a <strong>the</strong>ology that never<strong>the</strong>less rema<strong>in</strong>s –on this level – untouched by <strong>the</strong> contents <strong>of</strong> Christian soteriology. Thus, <strong>the</strong> human“I” atta<strong>in</strong>s rational knowledge <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>of</strong> God, <strong>and</strong> thus provides <strong>the</strong> foundationfor <strong>the</strong> separation <strong>of</strong> philosophy <strong>and</strong> faith.3 Buddhist Antisubstantialism: Nāgārjuna’s Philosophy<strong>of</strong> Empt<strong>in</strong>ess3.1 The Initial Situation: Pre-Buddhist Metaphysics (Ātman)<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Debate Between Eternalism (Sarvastivād<strong>in</strong>)<strong>and</strong> Instantaneousness (Sautrāntikas)Nāgārjuna’s philosophy shows some parallels to Kant’s critical philosophy, <strong>and</strong> notonly formally. His Fundamental Wisdom <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Middle Way, 1 on <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>and</strong>, turnsaga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> pre-Buddhist (Vedist/H<strong>in</strong>du) tradition <strong>and</strong> its ma<strong>in</strong> positions, whichwere still alive <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> second century A.D.: <strong>the</strong> system <strong>of</strong> Sāṁkhya with its <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong>identity <strong>of</strong> cause <strong>and</strong> effect, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> emphasis on <strong>the</strong> potential conta<strong>in</strong>ment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>1For an English translation <strong>of</strong> Nāgārjuna’s text, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, see The FundamentalWisdom <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Middle Way, trans. Jay L. Garfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).Translator’s Note—<strong>the</strong> translator would like to thank Dr. Guy Beck for provid<strong>in</strong>g this reference aswell as <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sanskrit terms.
138 P.-L. Cori<strong>and</strong>oeffect <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> cause (satkāryavāda), <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> converse <strong>the</strong>sis, advanced by Vaiśesִika,accord<strong>in</strong>g to which cause <strong>and</strong> effect are two different ontological factors(asatkāryavāda). On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side, two Buddhist schools from <strong>the</strong> Hīnayāna traditionfaced each o<strong>the</strong>r with comparable views: <strong>the</strong> Sarvastivād<strong>in</strong> (from sarvam asti,all exists) advanced <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>sis that all exist<strong>in</strong>g elements (dharmas) possess eternalsubstantiality <strong>and</strong> peculiar be<strong>in</strong>g (svabhāva), while <strong>the</strong> Sautrāntikas, appeal<strong>in</strong>g toBuddha’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> not-oneself (anatta), attributed to exist<strong>in</strong>g elements only amomentary, substanceless existence (ksanikavāda), which flickers <strong>and</strong> is ext<strong>in</strong>guishedwith <strong>the</strong> com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> pass<strong>in</strong>g away <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenal nexus.Vis-à-vis <strong>the</strong> ontological eternity belief (eternalism) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first school, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>doctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> annihilation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> second, Nāgārjuna, strives for a restoration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>orig<strong>in</strong>al, essential core <strong>of</strong> Buddhist doctr<strong>in</strong>e, which he connects to <strong>the</strong> thought <strong>of</strong>not-oneself (anatta), substancelessness (asvabhāva), <strong>and</strong> dependent orig<strong>in</strong>ation(pratītyasamutpāda).3.2 Nāgārjuna’s “Fundamental Wisdom <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MiddleWay”: The Destruction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Concept <strong>of</strong> Substance<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Soteriological Application <strong>of</strong> Empt<strong>in</strong>essIn <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g, I refer to <strong>the</strong> Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK), Nāgārjuna’s mostimportant treatise on <strong>the</strong> philosophy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> middle way. Nāgārjuna’s antimetaphysicaldoctr<strong>in</strong>e centers on <strong>the</strong> destruction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> substance (svabhāva). Inorder to underst<strong>and</strong> his argument, <strong>the</strong> ontological character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong>svabhāva must be expla<strong>in</strong>ed more precisely. The Indian philosophy conceives substanceor <strong>the</strong> proper nature <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> absolute sense <strong>of</strong> causa sui <strong>and</strong> absolute<strong>in</strong>dependence. Svabhāva literally means that which bears its own (sva) existence(bhāva) <strong>in</strong> itself, <strong>and</strong> is thus self-subsist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>of</strong> external conditions,bear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ground <strong>of</strong> its com<strong>in</strong>g to be <strong>and</strong> subsistence with<strong>in</strong> itself. Svabhāva (selfexist<strong>in</strong>g)is absolute self-identity, referr<strong>in</strong>g to noth<strong>in</strong>g o<strong>the</strong>r than its own exist<strong>in</strong>g.In order to demonstrate <strong>the</strong> non-existence <strong>of</strong> substance, Nāgārjuna appeals toempirical experience, which he scrut<strong>in</strong>izes with <strong>the</strong> help <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘four sided logic’ orBuddhist Tetralemma (catus.kot.i). His approach is <strong>of</strong> an empirical, phenomenologicalnature <strong>and</strong> is based on <strong>the</strong> exam<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> evidence perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to a state <strong>of</strong>affairs. He arrives at <strong>the</strong> conclusion that, s<strong>in</strong>ce noth<strong>in</strong>g escapes <strong>the</strong> causal nexus <strong>and</strong>conditionality; because everyth<strong>in</strong>g is transient <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ual development,<strong>the</strong>re is noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong> self-existence.Svabhāva is a l<strong>in</strong>guistic convention aris<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>of</strong> nom<strong>in</strong>alization <strong>and</strong> lack<strong>in</strong>g anyreal magnitude. (Thus Nāgārjuna’s direction is similar to that <strong>of</strong> Aristotle’s, butleads to opposite results). In similar ve<strong>in</strong>s, he also rejects <strong>the</strong> thought that everyth<strong>in</strong>gcan be grounded <strong>in</strong> a foreign nature (parabhāva), or, as it were, <strong>in</strong> pure o<strong>the</strong>rness<strong>and</strong> difference; because a foreign nature carries with<strong>in</strong> itself a reference to <strong>the</strong>“own,” <strong>and</strong> can only be thought <strong>of</strong> as its negation. Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as existence cannot beattributed to ei<strong>the</strong>r (absolute) self-identity or to (absolute) self-difference, or to
Substance <strong>and</strong> Empt<strong>in</strong>ess: Preparatory Steps Toward a <strong>Translation</strong>al Dialogue...139(absolute) be<strong>in</strong>g or to (absolute) non-be<strong>in</strong>g, an ontological ground<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> reality <strong>in</strong> asubstance-pr<strong>in</strong>ciple becomes untenable. Consequently, everyth<strong>in</strong>g that comes to be,becomes dependent on someth<strong>in</strong>g else <strong>and</strong> as a result lacks a self (nairātmya), <strong>and</strong>an essence (asvabhāva), <strong>and</strong> is “empty” (śūnya).Dependent (conditional) com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> empt<strong>in</strong>ess (śūnyatā) are <strong>in</strong>terchangeableconcepts hav<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>dicative character. With <strong>the</strong>se concepts, Nāgārjunadoes not <strong>in</strong>tend to nihilistically destroy <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world butra<strong>the</strong>r to overcome <strong>the</strong> duality <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> non-be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>of</strong> existence <strong>and</strong> non-existence.Oppos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> absolutization <strong>and</strong> substantialization <strong>of</strong> empt<strong>in</strong>ess, Nāgārjunastresses <strong>the</strong> methodical <strong>and</strong> soteriological character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> empt<strong>in</strong>ess.“Empt<strong>in</strong>ess” is not a statement made about <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g or non-be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>whole. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, “empt<strong>in</strong>ess” always refers only to a particular th<strong>in</strong>g: all this is empty(sarvam idam śūnyam), <strong>and</strong> not all is empty (sarvam śūnyam). The notion <strong>of</strong> empt<strong>in</strong>essis understood as a methodical means <strong>of</strong> overcom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> differentiat<strong>in</strong>g thought(vikalpa), caught <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> duality <strong>of</strong> existence <strong>and</strong> non-existence. Empt<strong>in</strong>ess itselfmust f<strong>in</strong>ally become emptied <strong>of</strong> all ideas adherent to be<strong>in</strong>g or non-be<strong>in</strong>g. At <strong>the</strong>very end, though, this step leads <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> realm <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nonverbal: language accompaniesth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g up to <strong>the</strong> prelim<strong>in</strong>ary stages <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> highest <strong>in</strong>sight (prajñā) only toretreat at its threshold (sigetic).3.3 The Two Levels <strong>of</strong> Truth (Satyadvaya) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Identity<strong>of</strong> Nirvān. a <strong>and</strong> SamsāraWith this strong emphasis on <strong>the</strong> extral<strong>in</strong>guistic character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> highest <strong>in</strong>sight<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> sharp dist<strong>in</strong>ction between a conventional truth (saṁvṛtisatya) that uses language,<strong>and</strong> a highest truth (paramārthasatya), which withdraws from all spoken <strong>and</strong>discursive argumentation, Nāgārjuna radicalizes <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al thrust <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Buddhistdist<strong>in</strong>ction between phenomenal reality <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> highest reality <strong>of</strong> dharmatā (<strong>the</strong>nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> elements <strong>of</strong> existence). The highest truth is no longer conceived as anontological magnitude whose be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> fact can be <strong>in</strong>tuitively but not l<strong>in</strong>guisticallygrasped. The highest truth is empt<strong>in</strong>ess itself, this, however, is <strong>the</strong> self-overcom<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>dicator <strong>of</strong> a condition (salvation or Nirvāṇa), unto which empt<strong>in</strong>ess itself isdynamically emptied. At this level <strong>of</strong> truth not only discursive th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g but also <strong>the</strong>differentiation between conventional <strong>and</strong> highest truth becomes untenable. Samֹsāra(<strong>the</strong> phenomenal world with its circle <strong>of</strong> suffer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> rebirth) <strong>and</strong> nirvāṇa (<strong>the</strong>completed turn<strong>in</strong>g back unto empt<strong>in</strong>ess) prove to be <strong>the</strong> same. These two are not realities,but conditions correspond<strong>in</strong>g to no ontological objectivity. Nāgārjuna writes: “Thereis noth<strong>in</strong>g that would dist<strong>in</strong>guish samֹsāra from nirvā nִ a, <strong>and</strong> nirvā nִ a from samֹsāra.The border <strong>of</strong> nirvā nִ a is at <strong>the</strong> same time <strong>the</strong> border <strong>of</strong> samֹsāra. Between <strong>the</strong>se twonot even <strong>the</strong> most subtle difference can be found” (MMK 25, 19–20). 22See The Fundamental Wisdom <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Middle Way, Chapter 25, verse 19–20 (p. 75).
140 P.-L. Cori<strong>and</strong>oWhere <strong>the</strong>n is <strong>the</strong> border between <strong>the</strong> conventional <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> highest, betweenbe<strong>in</strong>g entangled <strong>in</strong> sam . sāra <strong>and</strong> salvation <strong>in</strong> nirvāṇa? Does <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> end prajñā(<strong>in</strong>sight), <strong>the</strong> highest experiment with <strong>the</strong> “ultimate reality,” dissolve itself <strong>in</strong>toan <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate psychological condition, which withdraws from every form <strong>of</strong>communicability <strong>and</strong> verifiability?Seen from <strong>the</strong> Western po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> view, this question must be answered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> affirmative.Determ<strong>in</strong>ateness, communicability, <strong>and</strong> verifiability are criteria <strong>of</strong> argumentativeth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Because from <strong>the</strong> Buddhist (<strong>and</strong> generally Eastern) perspective, conditionality,not rational cognition, is <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al goal <strong>of</strong> knowledge, <strong>the</strong> question whe<strong>the</strong>r thisconditionality is a true experience or an illusion cancels itself out. For <strong>the</strong> true experience<strong>and</strong> illusion both presuppose a reality exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> itself as object <strong>of</strong> cognition, withwhich <strong>the</strong> experience itself could be measured. Because <strong>the</strong> highest goal <strong>of</strong> prajñā is <strong>the</strong>overcom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “obsession with <strong>in</strong>dividuality” (prapañca) <strong>and</strong> with it <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> difference, <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> content, prajñā must rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate. At <strong>the</strong> end, anyattempt to grasp this “highest” knowledge with rational arguments founders on this<strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ateness <strong>and</strong> unverifiability. In <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ultimate reality, <strong>the</strong> boundariesbetween th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g feel<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> belief become permeable.But <strong>the</strong> pathway traversed by Nāgārjuna also <strong>of</strong>fers decisive <strong>in</strong>sights to be used<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Western” approach. His thought resembles a balanc<strong>in</strong>g act between twoplanes <strong>of</strong> experience, which complement <strong>and</strong> relativize each o<strong>the</strong>r. By discursivelydem<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g that one should become free from all (conditional) attachments not onlyto <strong>the</strong> phenomenal truth, but also to <strong>the</strong> highest truth (nirvānִa), he does not allow<strong>the</strong> highest <strong>in</strong>sight to lead to an ascetic escape from <strong>the</strong> world. Because <strong>the</strong> experience<strong>of</strong> empt<strong>in</strong>ess transcends all axiological ideas <strong>and</strong> dwells <strong>in</strong> pure reception <strong>of</strong>(emptied) be<strong>in</strong>g, it becomes <strong>the</strong> realization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world as world. A much citedsay<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Mahāyāna Buddhism reads, “samֹsāra-as-it-is is nirvānִa.”4 Nāgārjuna <strong>and</strong> Western MetaphysicsWithout any claim to completeness, I would now like to address briefly some parallelsthat appear to me to be fruitful for a dialogue between Western <strong>and</strong> Easterntraditions.For <strong>the</strong> first time <strong>in</strong> Western philosophy, David Hume subjected <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong>substance to a systematic destruction. He criticized <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> substance moreradically than that <strong>of</strong> causality, to which he <strong>in</strong>deed did not concede any necessity, buta validity, which is guaranteed through <strong>in</strong>duction <strong>and</strong> habit. Substance is a merefiction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> faculty <strong>of</strong> imag<strong>in</strong>ation: “noth<strong>in</strong>g but a collection <strong>of</strong> simple ideas, that areunited by <strong>the</strong> imag<strong>in</strong>ation, <strong>and</strong> have a particular name assigned to <strong>the</strong>m, by which weare able to recall, ei<strong>the</strong>r to ourselves or o<strong>the</strong>rs, that collection” (Treatise, I, 1, sect. 6). 3Admittedly, Hume’s criticism <strong>of</strong> substance is determ<strong>in</strong>ed solely destructively.3David Hume, A Treatise <strong>of</strong> Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 16.
Substance <strong>and</strong> Empt<strong>in</strong>ess: Preparatory Steps Toward a <strong>Translation</strong>al Dialogue...141This criticism sets limits to <strong>the</strong> knowable <strong>and</strong>, as is <strong>the</strong> case later with Kant, entailsa rational self-constra<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> discursive thought, <strong>and</strong> not <strong>the</strong> open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>rsource <strong>of</strong> experience.It is different with Nāgārjuna. Rem<strong>in</strong>iscent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Kantian “as if,” Nāgārjuna’ssamֹsāra <strong>and</strong> nirvā nִ a overcomes ultimate reality as an ontological magnitude at<strong>the</strong> same time as he w<strong>in</strong>s it back <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> practical conduct <strong>of</strong> life. To put it <strong>in</strong>Western metaphysical categories, <strong>the</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g, “samֹsāra-as-it-is is nirvā nִ a,”means that <strong>the</strong> (conditional) grasp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> reality as such (ens qua ens) [Ðn Á Ðn],that is, be<strong>in</strong>gs as be<strong>in</strong>gs, transcends <strong>and</strong> transfigures <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> reality <strong>and</strong>“lives” (lebt) this as empt<strong>in</strong>ess that empties itself. To be sure, Nāgārjuna’s postulatesrema<strong>in</strong> undeterm<strong>in</strong>ed. For <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction between a world <strong>of</strong> appearances<strong>and</strong> a world <strong>of</strong> empt<strong>in</strong>ess, made on <strong>the</strong> plane <strong>of</strong> l<strong>in</strong>guistic, conventional truth,which is rem<strong>in</strong>iscent <strong>of</strong> Kant’s dist<strong>in</strong>ction between appearance <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>itself(here with a complete reversal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> premises), is <strong>in</strong> truth <strong>the</strong> self-overcom<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>dication <strong>of</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g ungraspable, that lies beyond be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> non-be<strong>in</strong>g.Nāgārjuna’s th<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-itself is <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>uous process <strong>of</strong> resolution <strong>of</strong> any <strong>in</strong>itself.Never<strong>the</strong>less, even this process conta<strong>in</strong>s an <strong>in</strong>ner obligation. Whereas <strong>in</strong>Kant, <strong>the</strong> postulates <strong>of</strong> pure practical reason lead to <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “as-if” <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> absolute moral law: (live <strong>in</strong> such a way as if God, freedom, <strong>and</strong> immortalitywere <strong>the</strong>oretically knowable), <strong>in</strong> Nāgārjuna, <strong>the</strong> separation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “as-if” vanishesat <strong>the</strong> end <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> liv<strong>in</strong>g identity (or non-difference) <strong>of</strong> samֹsāra <strong>and</strong> nirvā nִ a.However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ner tension between <strong>the</strong>se two rema<strong>in</strong>s present <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> practicalconduct <strong>of</strong> life as ethical <strong>in</strong>stance, <strong>and</strong> concretizes itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> dem<strong>and</strong> to shapelife accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> empt<strong>in</strong>ess (<strong>in</strong> accordance with <strong>the</strong> eightfoldpath <strong>of</strong> Buddhism).Nietzsche’s project <strong>of</strong> an antimetaphysical anthropology also seems to lead tosimilar results. If one reads Nietzsche not as <strong>the</strong> last metaphysician, but as <strong>the</strong> sign<strong>of</strong> a rift, <strong>and</strong> thus takes <strong>the</strong> “overman” (Übermensch) as a balanc<strong>in</strong>g act betweenself-atta<strong>in</strong>ment <strong>and</strong> self-loss, between <strong>the</strong> post-metaphysical dissolution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> self<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stantaneous self-<strong>in</strong>dividuation via affirmation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> eternal return, <strong>the</strong>n<strong>the</strong> eternal return appears as <strong>the</strong> transform<strong>in</strong>g glance at <strong>the</strong> world <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>itude <strong>and</strong>transitor<strong>in</strong>ess, transfigur<strong>in</strong>g both <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> middle holds samֹsāra<strong>and</strong> nirvānִa toge<strong>the</strong>r as <strong>the</strong> same. Nietzsche too dist<strong>in</strong>guishes between two planes<strong>of</strong> truth, which <strong>in</strong> a note <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nachlaß he sums up <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> two concepts exoteric <strong>and</strong>esoteric. What exoterically must be conceived as will to power (<strong>in</strong>stead <strong>of</strong> exotericNāgārjuna would say “conventional”) stat<strong>in</strong>g “all is will aga<strong>in</strong>st will,” turns <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>esoteric “redeemed” view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> overman read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to its opposite stat<strong>in</strong>g “<strong>the</strong>re isno will at all.” And yet Nietzsche’s “esoteric” truth also rema<strong>in</strong>s an affirmation – <strong>the</strong>highest affirmation – <strong>of</strong> eternally return<strong>in</strong>g reality (<strong>the</strong> reality <strong>of</strong> samֹsāra as such,not its overcom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> nirvānִa).In both Western <strong>and</strong> Buddhist philosophy, <strong>the</strong> talk about ultimate reality or <strong>the</strong>attempt to live accord<strong>in</strong>g to it shows an <strong>in</strong>ner tension <strong>and</strong> a waver<strong>in</strong>g between twoplanes <strong>of</strong> experience. This framework <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dual truth, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “as-if,” proves to be<strong>of</strong> decisive importance for <strong>the</strong> philosophy <strong>of</strong> religion. In <strong>the</strong> early Christian tradition,it is above all <strong>the</strong> Paul<strong>in</strong>e hos me [ñV mή] (“as if not”) that po<strong>in</strong>ts to a similar
142 P.-L. Cori<strong>and</strong>odirection. The dem<strong>and</strong> put to <strong>the</strong> Christians to live <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world <strong>and</strong> to take part <strong>in</strong> it“as if” <strong>the</strong>y do not partake <strong>of</strong> it br<strong>in</strong>gs toge<strong>the</strong>r two dimensions, similar toNāgārjuna’s dual truth, which despite <strong>the</strong> ontologically orig<strong>in</strong>al chasm separat<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong>m are referred to each o<strong>the</strong>r. The hos me (ñV mή) [“as if not”] <strong>in</strong>deed “negates”“<strong>the</strong> world” as absolute reality, but at <strong>the</strong> same time ga<strong>in</strong>s it back, by ground<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> world <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> realm <strong>of</strong> God, <strong>and</strong> so transfigured directly validat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> world <strong>in</strong>its be<strong>in</strong>g.Like Nāgārjuna, <strong>the</strong> Christian mystics, <strong>and</strong> above all Meister Eckhart too seek toovercome <strong>the</strong> adherence to <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> highest (God or nirvānִa). In fact, Eckhart’sthoughts on empt<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>and</strong> rel<strong>in</strong>quish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> self lead to becom<strong>in</strong>g-fulfilled by God.Rel<strong>in</strong>quish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> self <strong>and</strong> rel<strong>in</strong>quish<strong>in</strong>g even God happen for <strong>the</strong> sake <strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>rexperience <strong>of</strong> God, which is no longer oriented toward possession <strong>and</strong> objectification,but ra<strong>the</strong>r toward <strong>the</strong> birth <strong>of</strong> Christ <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> soul, which is emptied <strong>of</strong> all that hasto do with be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuation. And yet this “emptied” fullness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> experience<strong>of</strong> God is not a wealth <strong>of</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ations, but ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> simplicity <strong>of</strong> rel<strong>in</strong>quish<strong>in</strong>gall determ<strong>in</strong>ations.Is that which is encountered <strong>in</strong> this empt<strong>in</strong>ess not <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> end <strong>the</strong> simple urground<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> self <strong>and</strong> world? In <strong>the</strong> end, do not <strong>the</strong> mystics <strong>and</strong> does not Nāgārjuna’s way<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> middle strive for a conditional experience <strong>of</strong> that which <strong>the</strong>ory attemptsargumentatively to grasp <strong>and</strong> describe with <strong>the</strong> name “substance?” Substance <strong>and</strong>empt<strong>in</strong>ess: do <strong>the</strong>se two names ultimately <strong>in</strong>dicate two different experiences with<strong>the</strong> same phenomenon?4.1 A Perspective: Substance <strong>and</strong> Empt<strong>in</strong>ess BeyondOppositionalitySubstance as thought metaphysically (<strong>and</strong> also <strong>the</strong> Vedist svabhāva) is <strong>in</strong>deed connectedwith <strong>the</strong> ontological fullness <strong>of</strong> true be<strong>in</strong>gs. This fullness, however, is not afullness <strong>of</strong> qualities, it is not a manifold; on <strong>the</strong> contrary, it is simple subsistence, <strong>the</strong>sub-sistere, that on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> this simple self-subsistence can above all exist assubstrate (sub-stare) for chang<strong>in</strong>g qualities. Śūnyatā, empt<strong>in</strong>ess, is on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>no vacuum, no lack, but is ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> free <strong>and</strong> free<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> unfree, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> dependent. If empt<strong>in</strong>ess appears to conceptual thought as <strong>the</strong> negation <strong>of</strong>positivity, <strong>the</strong>n as a condition, it <strong>of</strong>fers itself beyond all oppositionality. This empt<strong>in</strong>essis nei<strong>the</strong>r pure noth<strong>in</strong>gness nor its negation but an attunement <strong>and</strong> a be<strong>in</strong>gseized, that cannot be thought <strong>of</strong> as pathos (for pathos presupposes <strong>in</strong>dividuality)—an attunement that affects <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> whole human be<strong>in</strong>g precisely bydissolv<strong>in</strong>g his <strong>in</strong>dividual self-position<strong>in</strong>g.Substance is disclosed by <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical gaze <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> exists for humansonly as an object <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory. Is an experience <strong>of</strong> substance that surpasses ratio possible?Is a conditional comprehension <strong>of</strong> substantiality conceivable at all? The simpleexistence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>oria, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> simple dissolution <strong>of</strong> all existence <strong>in</strong> prajñā: are<strong>the</strong>y perhaps two ways <strong>of</strong> view<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> same th<strong>in</strong>g, which is disclosed <strong>the</strong>oretically
Substance <strong>and</strong> Empt<strong>in</strong>ess: Preparatory Steps Toward a <strong>Translation</strong>al Dialogue...143as substance (or its negation), but which is conditionally experienced as empt<strong>in</strong>ess?Do Western philosophy <strong>and</strong> Buddhist philosophy perhaps agree on <strong>the</strong> experience<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> simple fullness <strong>of</strong> a free vision—a vision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> simple existence <strong>of</strong> substance(<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> end: <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> silence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ion) [qεόn], <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dissolution <strong>in</strong> empt<strong>in</strong>ess (<strong>the</strong>silence <strong>of</strong> nirvānִa)? Is this vision <strong>the</strong> freedom that lets everyth<strong>in</strong>g go, <strong>in</strong> order toga<strong>in</strong> everyth<strong>in</strong>g back <strong>in</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r way—healed <strong>and</strong> simple?I would like to leave this question open. It is not meant to usher <strong>in</strong> a conclusive<strong>the</strong>ory, but only to be a directive toward an open field <strong>of</strong> work. Knowledge <strong>and</strong> conditionalityare two possibilities <strong>of</strong> human self-experience <strong>and</strong> world-experience thatshould no longer be seen as oppositional, but complementary.<strong>Heidegger</strong> expresses his own underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> his dissociative exposition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>tradition when he says: “[The great philosophies] are tower<strong>in</strong>g mounta<strong>in</strong>s, unclimbed<strong>and</strong> unclimbable. But <strong>the</strong>y endow <strong>the</strong> l<strong>and</strong> with what is highest <strong>and</strong> show its primevalbedrock.” 4 Can this experience, that shapes <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g,be carried over to <strong>the</strong> non-Western traditions, assum<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> carry<strong>in</strong>g over isunderstood <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> essential sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translational delimitation (übersetzendenEntgrenzens)? Is <strong>the</strong>re an unreflective reference to this delimitation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>ghistoricalconcepts <strong>of</strong> reservedness (Verhaltenheit) <strong>and</strong> comportment, <strong>the</strong> characteristictraits <strong>of</strong> preparatory th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g—a delimitation occurr<strong>in</strong>g on this side <strong>of</strong>knowledge <strong>and</strong> conditionality, where <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> Western experience may bebrought to light more clearly, <strong>and</strong> that is: more freely?References<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1989. Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann. Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly. 1999. Contributions to philosophy(From enown<strong>in</strong>g). Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.Hume, David. 1975. A treatise <strong>of</strong> human nature. Oxford: Claredon Press.Nāgārjuna. 1995. The fundamental wisdom <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> middle way. Trans. Jay L. Garfield. Oxford:Oxford University Press.4<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann, 1989), p. 187. Contributions to Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g), trans. Parvis Emad<strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 131.
Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Notes on Div<strong>in</strong>e Images<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Light <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-Historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>Bernhard Radl<strong>of</strong>fΆλλά τót∈ mέν οÛk ∈Ædót∈V q∈ón, έdoύl∈usat∈ toÃV mή fύs∈i oÞs<strong>in</strong> q∈oÃV(Gal. 4:8)1 Introduction<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s brief text <strong>of</strong> 1955 on Raphael’s Sist<strong>in</strong>e Madonna (1513–1514) raisessignificant questions regard<strong>in</strong>g his underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Christianity <strong>and</strong> his sense <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> image <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e as a mode <strong>of</strong> presence. 1 The text implies <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction between historical <strong>and</strong> aes<strong>the</strong>ticmodes <strong>of</strong> analysis, on <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “essential knowledge” (das wesentlicheWissen), which arises out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>dfulness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> consummation <strong>of</strong>modernity, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. The art-historical appreciation <strong>of</strong> Western pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g“religious art,” is put <strong>in</strong>to question, along with <strong>the</strong> aes<strong>the</strong>tics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> museum <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> entire critical apparatus which supports it. The text speaks <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g-historical works <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> late 1930s, especially <strong>the</strong> Contributions to Philosophy(From Enown<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>and</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, <strong>and</strong> implicates <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s hermeneutic critique<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mobilization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> artwork, which follows from <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>of</strong> art1Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Über die Sixt<strong>in</strong>a” (1955), <strong>in</strong> Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, 1910–1976,GA13 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983), pp. 119–21. Cited <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text as GA13.<strong>Translation</strong>s by <strong>the</strong> author. Instances <strong>of</strong> emphasis <strong>in</strong> quotations st<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al.B. Radl<strong>of</strong>f (*)Faculty <strong>of</strong> Arts/English, University <strong>of</strong> Ottawa, 70 Laurier E, K1N 6N5 Ottawa, ON, Canadae-mail: bernhard@uottowa.caF. Schalow (ed.), <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad, Contributions To Phenomenology 65,DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0_8, © Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media B.V. 2011145
146 B. Radl<strong>of</strong>f<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> will-to-power <strong>of</strong> Nietzsche’s metaphysics. 2 The possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> art-workas a found<strong>in</strong>g moment <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> is taken up <strong>in</strong>a way which recalls “The Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Work <strong>of</strong> Art.” All <strong>of</strong> this is complicated,evidently, by <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Madonna <strong>of</strong> Raphael speaks to us <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>carnation<strong>of</strong> a god, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>carnate God <strong>of</strong> Christian belief, <strong>and</strong> that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s confrontationwith this heritage is <strong>in</strong>timately related to his attempt to reth<strong>in</strong>k <strong>the</strong> Greek <strong>in</strong>ception<strong>of</strong> Western th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> to open up <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> an o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g.The first key dist<strong>in</strong>ction that <strong>Heidegger</strong> makes <strong>in</strong> his discussion <strong>of</strong> Raphael’sMadonna is between an aes<strong>the</strong>tic <strong>and</strong> art-historical appreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> uniqueness <strong>of</strong> its character as Bild. The fact that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> its history <strong>the</strong>pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g has been placed <strong>in</strong> a museum <strong>and</strong> thus <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to art-historical categoriesreveals, <strong>in</strong> a covert way, “<strong>the</strong> actual historical course <strong>of</strong> Occidental art s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong>Renaissance” (GA13, 119). This already raises <strong>the</strong> question as to what <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitution<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> museum reveals about <strong>the</strong> history (Geschichte) <strong>of</strong> art <strong>in</strong> modernity. Thedist<strong>in</strong>ction between Geschichte, <strong>and</strong> Seynsgeschichte, on <strong>the</strong> one h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Historie,on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, is also implicit <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s dist<strong>in</strong>ction between <strong>the</strong> exhibition-space(Ausstellung) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> museum <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> site (Ort) to which <strong>the</strong> pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g belongs. Thissite is a church <strong>in</strong> Piacenza, not <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> historical sense, but accord<strong>in</strong>g to its ownpresenc<strong>in</strong>g as Bild. The mode <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-present <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> museum-exhibition-spacedeterm<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g accord<strong>in</strong>g to a temporality quite dist<strong>in</strong>ct from <strong>the</strong> temporality<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> site. For this reason, Theodor Hetzer’s contention that <strong>the</strong> picture does notrequire, or belong to, a specific “Aufstellung” (i.e., <strong>in</strong> a specific church) is characterizedby <strong>Heidegger</strong> as aes<strong>the</strong>tically correct, but not true. The aes<strong>the</strong>tics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> museumis a form <strong>of</strong> re-presentation which reduces all works to <strong>the</strong>ir “position” with<strong>in</strong>exhibition-space. This space conceals <strong>the</strong> site <strong>the</strong> pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its own Bildwesenunfolds (GA13, 120). This uniform distancelessness conceals <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction <strong>of</strong> near<strong>and</strong> far, <strong>the</strong> movement <strong>of</strong> withdrawal <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> presenc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work, <strong>and</strong> subjects it tobe<strong>in</strong>g-present for representation. The site, conversely, is not someth<strong>in</strong>g already-given,for it is determ<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> picture itself, out if its own way <strong>of</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g (Bildwesen).Fail<strong>in</strong>g this, <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> historical-aes<strong>the</strong>tic <strong>in</strong>stitution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> museum, <strong>the</strong>picture is estranged from itself. The museum, as aes<strong>the</strong>tic-historical <strong>in</strong>stitution,presupposes <strong>the</strong> representation <strong>and</strong> objectification <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, which is <strong>in</strong>tegral toHistorie. The self-estrangement spoken <strong>of</strong> here recalls <strong>the</strong> ab<strong>and</strong>onment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs (Se<strong>in</strong>sverlassenheit) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> epoch <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> consummation <strong>of</strong> metaphysics.Historie, <strong>Heidegger</strong> writes <strong>in</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, represents <strong>and</strong> produces <strong>the</strong> past with aview to <strong>the</strong> secur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> future (GA66, 233/207). Secur<strong>in</strong>g grounds<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> representational th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, which <strong>in</strong>augurates modernity. “This objectify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>whatever is, is accomplished <strong>in</strong> a sett<strong>in</strong>g-before, a represent<strong>in</strong>g, that aims at br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g2Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Klostermann, 1989); Contributions to Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g), trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong>Kenneth Maly (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1999). Cited <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text as GA 65. Mart<strong>in</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>, Bes<strong>in</strong>nung, GA 66 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann, 1997); M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, trans.Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Thomas Kalary, (New York: Cont<strong>in</strong>uum, 2006). Cited as GA 66. Reference to<strong>the</strong> translation, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se <strong>and</strong> all similar citations, follows reference to <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al.
Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Notes on Div<strong>in</strong>e Images <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Light <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-Historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>147each particular be<strong>in</strong>g before it <strong>in</strong> such a way that man who calculates can be sure, <strong>and</strong>that means certa<strong>in</strong>, <strong>of</strong> that be<strong>in</strong>g.” 3 Historie <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple blocks every access to <strong>the</strong>experience <strong>of</strong> what is not represented as an object.In On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, Parvis Emad writesthat <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s “complex relationship to Christianity… po<strong>in</strong>ts directly to <strong>the</strong> verycore <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g-historical approach to <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> God.” <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s“perception <strong>of</strong> his relationship to Christianity is closely tied to his be<strong>in</strong>g-historical<strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> ‘flight <strong>of</strong> gods’” as articulated <strong>in</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness. 4 Insight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong>“flight <strong>of</strong> gods” emerges “out <strong>of</strong> hermeneutic phenomenology” <strong>and</strong> depends on its“method <strong>and</strong> presuppositions.” This method itself, moreover, has to be understoodas <strong>the</strong> gift <strong>of</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g-historical-enown<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g” as unfolded <strong>in</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> Contributions; <strong>the</strong>refore, if we wish to ga<strong>in</strong> access to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s relationshipto Christianity as a “hermeneutic-phenomenological issue,” we “must keep <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d<strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical-enown<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> flight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gods <strong>and</strong> its implications.”5 With respect to our consideration <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s text on <strong>the</strong> Sist<strong>in</strong>e Madonna,Parvis Emad’s comments <strong>of</strong>fer us two <strong>in</strong>terrelated clues: <strong>the</strong> methodological issue<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> hermeneutic phenomenology to be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g; <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> flight <strong>of</strong> gods.I propose to consider <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> flight or arrival <strong>of</strong> gods <strong>in</strong> relation to<strong>the</strong>ir sh<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g-forth, or conversely <strong>the</strong>ir absence, from art. I have already <strong>in</strong>timatedthat <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s comments on <strong>the</strong> Madonna <strong>of</strong> Raphael <strong>of</strong>fer an experience <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> god, given <strong>in</strong> or through <strong>the</strong> image, with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> passage from <strong>the</strong>consummation <strong>of</strong> modernity <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g. This leads us to back to <strong>the</strong>methodological problem <strong>of</strong> how our hermeneutic situation is to be characterized,with specific reference to art <strong>and</strong> artworks. In an effort to elucidate this question, Iwill turn, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first <strong>in</strong>stance, to <strong>the</strong> text <strong>of</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> particular, toSection 11, entitled “Die Kunst im Zeitalter der Vollendung der Neuzeit,” as wellas to Sections 70 <strong>and</strong> 71, both <strong>of</strong> which directly raise <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g (Seyn)<strong>and</strong> gods. The elucidation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e image <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> artwork isevidently tied to <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical dest<strong>in</strong>y <strong>of</strong> art. In <strong>the</strong> first <strong>in</strong>stance, we areconstra<strong>in</strong>ed to approach <strong>the</strong> Madonna <strong>of</strong> Raphael through <strong>the</strong> categories <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>consummation <strong>of</strong> aes<strong>the</strong>tics, as <strong>in</strong>timated <strong>in</strong> Section 11 <strong>of</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness. Yet, be<strong>in</strong>ghistoricalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is enjo<strong>in</strong>ed to th<strong>in</strong>k <strong>the</strong> passage <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g. Toga<strong>in</strong> a foothold on this path <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g means, among o<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>in</strong>gs, to ga<strong>in</strong> a betterunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> consummation <strong>of</strong> modernity to its <strong>in</strong>ception.With this <strong>in</strong> view, I propose to exam<strong>in</strong>e a specific, early modern trace <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “flight3Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Die Zeit des Weltbildes,” <strong>in</strong> Holzwege, GA 5 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Klostermann, 1977a), p. 85. For a translation <strong>of</strong> this essay, see “The Age <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> World Picture,”The Question Concern<strong>in</strong>g Technology <strong>and</strong> O<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Essays</strong>, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper<strong>and</strong> Row, Publishers, 1977b), p 127. The English translation is cited <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text as AW.4Parvis Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy (Madison, Wiscons<strong>in</strong>:University <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press, 2007), pp. 175, 176.5Ibid., pp. 177–178.
148 B. Radl<strong>of</strong>f<strong>of</strong> gods”: <strong>the</strong> iconoclasm <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Reformation. Iconoclasm experiences <strong>the</strong> image <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> art as an idol. 6 How can a phenomenological explication <strong>of</strong> Reformationiconoclasm illum<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>the</strong> temporality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> presenc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e that is properto modernity? What is <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical import <strong>of</strong> iconoclasm as an event <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>history <strong>of</strong> truth? An explication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> iconoclasm has to grasp thisphenomenon <strong>in</strong> its temporality. In what follows, I argue that <strong>the</strong> idol <strong>of</strong> Reformationexperience signifies <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-present <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image as an object <strong>of</strong> representationalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> its truth. Understood <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ception <strong>of</strong> modernity, this truthis <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> certitude as anticipated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> will to assurance <strong>of</strong> salvation. Thedecision regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> truth or untruth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e image <strong>in</strong> art is one, essentialway <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> flight or arrival <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gods is decided.The be<strong>in</strong>g-historical grasp <strong>of</strong> iconoclasm, considered as a manifestation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>flight <strong>of</strong> god(s), implicates an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> our own hermeneutic situation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>history <strong>of</strong> truth <strong>in</strong> its possible cross<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> consummation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ception <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g. “<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> cross<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> writes,“accomplishes <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g project<strong>in</strong>g-open <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g as historicalm<strong>in</strong>dfulness” (GA65, 5/4). The “debasement” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image <strong>in</strong> general <strong>in</strong>to a manipulatedobject <strong>of</strong> consumption, its <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> technical apparatus <strong>of</strong> mass consciousness,as well as its aes<strong>the</strong>tic-historical exhibition-value, all belong to a situationmarked by <strong>the</strong> availability <strong>and</strong> functionality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image. This suggests that <strong>the</strong> iconoclasm<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Reformation <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> technically produced proliferation <strong>of</strong> images <strong>in</strong> ourown time are correlative events <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g: <strong>in</strong> effect, that modern <strong>and</strong>post-modern image production is itself a form <strong>of</strong> iconoclasm. The image <strong>in</strong> its poweras a gateway to <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e, as <strong>the</strong> sett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unconcealment <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g,is broken. What rema<strong>in</strong>s is <strong>the</strong> image as a be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its mere actuality, understood as afunction <strong>of</strong> technicity, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> lived experience that belongs to it. The image, oncereduced to <strong>the</strong> temporality <strong>of</strong> availability <strong>and</strong> functionality, is, <strong>in</strong> a transformed sensearis<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> consummation <strong>of</strong> modernity, an “idol.” In this sense, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’snote on Raphael’s Madonna, which explicitly raises <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical question <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> museum <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> exhibition-value <strong>of</strong> pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g, itself leads us back <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ception<strong>of</strong> modernity, <strong>and</strong> hence to iconoclasm as one manifestation <strong>of</strong> this <strong>in</strong>ception.2 <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s account <strong>of</strong> formal <strong>in</strong>dication as a component <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenologicalmethod, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> period lead<strong>in</strong>g up to Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, dist<strong>in</strong>guishes three directions<strong>of</strong> sense <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> explication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenon: <strong>the</strong> content-sense, <strong>the</strong> relation-sense,<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> enactment-sense (Gehalts-, Bezugs-, <strong>and</strong> Vollzugss<strong>in</strong>n). 7 Phenomenology6The <strong>the</strong>ological emphasis on idolatry <strong>and</strong> idol-worship is central to Reformation iconoclasm.See Margaret Aston, Engl<strong>and</strong>’s Iconoclasts, Vol. I: Laws Aga<strong>in</strong>st Images (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 2000), p. 343ff.7See Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Phänomenologie des Religiösen Lebens (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann,1995); The Phenomenology <strong>of</strong> Religious Life, trans. Matthias Fritsch <strong>and</strong> Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei
Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Notes on Div<strong>in</strong>e Images <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Light <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-Historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>149“is <strong>the</strong> explication <strong>of</strong> this totality <strong>of</strong> sense” with a view to determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g how temporalityis factically lived <strong>in</strong> its orig<strong>in</strong>ality (GA 60, 63, 65, 83-4/43, 44, 58). Thephenomenon is <strong>the</strong> temporal, which has to be won from <strong>the</strong> complex <strong>of</strong> relations <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> object-historical situation. The phenomenological situation is not a situation <strong>in</strong>time, but a situation <strong>of</strong> enactment that founds a time, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> a decision,which <strong>in</strong>itiates a beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g (GA60, 90-3/63-5). The enactment-sense implicates <strong>the</strong>existential appropriation <strong>of</strong> what is <strong>in</strong>dicated by <strong>the</strong> content <strong>and</strong> relational-senses;this, <strong>in</strong> turn, implies a turn away from <strong>the</strong> abstracted concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> content-senseunderstood as an objectification <strong>of</strong> what is <strong>in</strong>dicated, toward <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>. 7With reference to <strong>the</strong> explication <strong>of</strong> language <strong>in</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, this signifies a movementaway from <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> statement <strong>and</strong> from <strong>the</strong> assumption that be<strong>in</strong>g is tobe understood as be<strong>in</strong>g-present <strong>in</strong> order to open up a site for enactment <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> veryexistence <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>. Cori<strong>and</strong>o has shown how <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal <strong>in</strong>dicationis taken up <strong>in</strong>to <strong>and</strong> transformed by be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. 8 The nonobjectify<strong>in</strong>glanguage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicative speaks as directive (Weisung), <strong>in</strong>dicativesign, or h<strong>in</strong>t (W<strong>in</strong>k), <strong>of</strong> how <strong>the</strong> passage from <strong>the</strong> first to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g is to beenacted by Da-se<strong>in</strong> (GA65, 7, 383-85/6, 267-9). The “present” <strong>of</strong> enactment is held<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>ture <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> movement away from <strong>the</strong> first beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> its metaphysicalhistory, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> movement-<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g. The “present” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Augenblick<strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>’s enactment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> passage enacts <strong>the</strong> historicity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ab<strong>and</strong>onment <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, which is experienced as <strong>the</strong> Anklang (GA65, 383-4/268).“Ab<strong>and</strong>onment <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g must be experienced as <strong>the</strong> basic event <strong>of</strong> our history <strong>and</strong>be elevated <strong>in</strong>to a know<strong>in</strong>g awareness that shapes <strong>and</strong> guides” (GA65, 112/78). Theenactment <strong>of</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g-away <strong>and</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>to, as well <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>gtoward<strong>the</strong> Augenblick <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> endurance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> passage, is <strong>the</strong> way <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>formal <strong>in</strong>dication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenological method is grasped <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historicalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Inasmuch as Da-se<strong>in</strong> enacts <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se movements, it takesup what has been played toward it by <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> projects <strong>and</strong> opens<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, which is <strong>in</strong>timated by <strong>the</strong> refusal (Verweigerung) <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g; thisrefusal phenomenologically shows itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ab<strong>and</strong>onment <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs.(Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 2004), esp. sections 11–13. Cited <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text as GA 60.For an overview <strong>of</strong> “formal <strong>in</strong>dication,” see T. Kisiel, The Genesis <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time(Berkeley: University <strong>of</strong> California Press, 1993), pp.164-170; John van Buren, The Young<strong>Heidegger</strong>. Rumor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hidden K<strong>in</strong>g (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana UP, 1994), pp. 324–42; RyanStreeter, “<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Formal Indication: A Question <strong>of</strong> Method <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time”, Man <strong>and</strong>World 30 (1997): 413–30; <strong>and</strong> Daniel O. Dahlstrom, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Concept <strong>of</strong> Truth (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2001), esp. pp. 231–55.8On <strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> formal <strong>in</strong>dication <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, see Emad, op. cit., pp. 114–15;<strong>and</strong> Paola-Ludovica Cori<strong>and</strong>o, “Die ‘formale Anzeige’ und das Ereignis: VorbereitendeÜberlegungen zum Eigencharakter se<strong>in</strong>sgeschichtlicher Begrifflichkeit mit e<strong>in</strong>em Ausblick aufden Unterscheid von Denken und Dichten,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 14 (1998): 27–43. As Cori<strong>and</strong>onotes: “Die Bestimmung des Denkens als formale Anzeige auf das Se<strong>in</strong> weist h<strong>in</strong> auf dievollzugshafte Ver-legung der vergegenständlichen Sprache des Subjektes <strong>in</strong> die freigebende desDase<strong>in</strong>s” (32).
150 B. Radl<strong>of</strong>fWhat is <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> art <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> artwork <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> age <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>consummation <strong>of</strong> metaphysics <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> ab<strong>and</strong>onment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs? Oneway <strong>in</strong> which this ab<strong>and</strong>onment manifests itself is <strong>in</strong> art. In this epoch, <strong>the</strong> metaphysicalconsummation <strong>of</strong> art po<strong>in</strong>ts back to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ception <strong>of</strong> modernity. Thedis-<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pre-modern artwork, <strong>the</strong> mobilization <strong>of</strong> art, <strong>and</strong> its <strong>in</strong>tegration<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> exhibition-space <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> museum are all <strong>in</strong>tegral to <strong>the</strong> posit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>world as picture. The “break<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> essential image is founded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> eventwhich founds modernity: <strong>the</strong> becom<strong>in</strong>g-picture <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world. The (post-)modernactualization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world picture, however, <strong>in</strong> itself <strong>in</strong>timates a turn <strong>in</strong>asmuch assubject <strong>and</strong> object cease to st<strong>and</strong> over aga<strong>in</strong>st each o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong> become functions <strong>of</strong>each o<strong>the</strong>r. This opens a possible space <strong>of</strong> withdrawal from representation <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong>refore a possible space for <strong>the</strong> art-work <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> an o<strong>the</strong>rbeg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g. We recall that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” is not adescription <strong>of</strong> what art is today, but a remembrance <strong>of</strong> what it once was, <strong>and</strong> ananticipation <strong>of</strong> what it could be aga<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> a transformed sense. In <strong>the</strong> phenomenologicalterms <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, <strong>the</strong> essay calls for a deconstruction (Destruktion)<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> aes<strong>the</strong>tics. This prepares <strong>the</strong> reduction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> art-work to itsessential be<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> sett<strong>in</strong>g-to-work <strong>of</strong> unconcealment <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> work, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>construction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> found<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>. 9With<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Contributions, <strong>the</strong> overcom<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> metaphysics, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ception <strong>of</strong> an o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> art-work isthought <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> passage <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g. The artwork essay enactsa contribution to <strong>the</strong> Gründ<strong>in</strong>g. As such, it is a turn-away from <strong>the</strong> metaphysicaltradition <strong>of</strong> aes<strong>the</strong>tics, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Entwurf <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> found<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g. Thisleads us back to <strong>the</strong> questions <strong>of</strong> how is art experienced metaphysically, <strong>the</strong> provenance<strong>of</strong> this way <strong>of</strong> experience <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ception <strong>of</strong>modernity. The section <strong>of</strong> Bes<strong>in</strong>nung entitled, <strong>in</strong> translation, as “Art <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Epoch <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Completion <strong>of</strong> Modernity” addresses <strong>the</strong>se questions. Be<strong>in</strong>g-historically itbelongs to <strong>the</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>ture <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Anklang as laid out <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Contributions, that is, ittestifies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “echo <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g as refusal <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ab<strong>and</strong>onment <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs by be<strong>in</strong>g”(GA65, 108/75).In l<strong>in</strong>e with <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s commentary on Nietzsche’s aes<strong>the</strong>tics <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nietzschelectures, “art” is conceived broadly to <strong>in</strong>clude all forms <strong>of</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g-manifest <strong>and</strong>giv<strong>in</strong>g form <strong>in</strong> accordance with <strong>the</strong> will to power. 10 The dis-<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> artwork,<strong>and</strong> its <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to technicity, takes <strong>the</strong> constitution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>stallation”(Anlage). The dist<strong>in</strong>ction between art <strong>and</strong> nature, moreover, no longer holds, because“nature” – <strong>the</strong> l<strong>and</strong>scape, for example – is already seen <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> a “technical”potential, which <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>the</strong> aes<strong>the</strong>tic <strong>in</strong>tensification <strong>of</strong> life through <strong>the</strong> heightened9Cordi<strong>and</strong>o, op cit., pp. 33–38.10See Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,” <strong>in</strong> Holzwege (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Klostermann, 1977), pp. 4–15, 43–50; trans. Albert H<strong>of</strong>stadter, “The Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Work <strong>of</strong>Art,” <strong>in</strong> Basic Writ<strong>in</strong>gs, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper <strong>and</strong> Row, Publishers, 1993),pp. 146–156, 182–89.
Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Notes on Div<strong>in</strong>e Images <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Light <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-Historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>151affect <strong>of</strong> its “beauty.” As a “natural resource,” it is thought <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> its potentialfor <strong>the</strong> enhancement <strong>of</strong> lived experience as well as its economic utility. The <strong>in</strong>stallation,as <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>of</strong> subject <strong>and</strong> object, encompasses both “culture”<strong>and</strong> “nature.” With<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> movement <strong>of</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, <strong>the</strong> mutual <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>of</strong> subject<strong>and</strong> object, which <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stallation exemplifies, serves as an elucidation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>consummation <strong>of</strong> modernity as conceived by be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g (GA66,31-35/23-7). What art <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> narrow sense is today is determ<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> dissolution<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> artwork <strong>in</strong>to <strong>in</strong>stallation-systems <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mobilization <strong>of</strong> art with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> operational th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> socio-technical humanity. The museum is one form <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stallation.Section 11 <strong>of</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, as a m<strong>in</strong>dful meditation on art <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> era <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> consummation<strong>of</strong> metaphysics, presupposes a reflection on our hermeneutic situation <strong>in</strong>respect to art. How is this situation won? In <strong>the</strong> first <strong>in</strong>stance, by way <strong>of</strong> a phenomenologicalexplication wrested from <strong>the</strong> object-historical situation. This object-historicalsituation, which can be empirically <strong>and</strong> historically established, is dom<strong>in</strong>ated by <strong>the</strong>art market, by art history <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> aes<strong>the</strong>tic categories proper to it, <strong>and</strong> by <strong>the</strong> “reception”<strong>of</strong> art <strong>in</strong> all its forms, from <strong>the</strong> private collector, dealer, <strong>and</strong> speculator to <strong>the</strong>collective subject <strong>of</strong> national <strong>in</strong>stitutions dedicated to <strong>the</strong> preservation <strong>of</strong> nationalidentity. Central to this <strong>in</strong>terrelated complex determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g what art “is” is <strong>the</strong> gallery<strong>and</strong> ultimately <strong>the</strong> museum, which grants to <strong>the</strong> artwork <strong>the</strong> exhibition-value <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong> remnants <strong>of</strong> an “aura,” which allows it to manifest itself as a dist<strong>in</strong>ctclass <strong>of</strong> entity. 11 The “museum” is one essential phenomenological <strong>in</strong>dication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> art <strong>in</strong> this epoch. Key to <strong>the</strong> phenomenological explication is <strong>the</strong> lay<strong>in</strong>gbare <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> temporality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> art <strong>in</strong> its <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stallation.The temporal determ<strong>in</strong>ations <strong>of</strong> availability (be<strong>in</strong>g-present as stock-on-call), functionality(its Ersatz, <strong>and</strong> E<strong>in</strong>satz-character), 12 <strong>and</strong> its auratic exhibition-value, asforms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tensification <strong>of</strong> lived experience, reveal <strong>the</strong> phenomenologicallydeterm<strong>in</strong>ed be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> art. The museum as <strong>in</strong>stallation is <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>aes<strong>the</strong>tic, <strong>in</strong>stitutional, <strong>and</strong> historical-critical apparatus that toge<strong>the</strong>r determ<strong>in</strong>eshow “art” will be experienced. The <strong>in</strong>stallation is <strong>the</strong> active <strong>in</strong>stall<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>in</strong>tegration)<strong>of</strong> sectors <strong>of</strong> production <strong>in</strong>to each o<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>in</strong> such a way as to make <strong>the</strong>m more functional,efficient, more fully operational. The <strong>in</strong>stallation serves <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tensification <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> lived experience (Erlebnis) <strong>of</strong> art through an <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>of</strong> consciousness <strong>and</strong>technical-historical objectivity. Lived experience is <strong>the</strong> way <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> essentialsway <strong>of</strong> technology – that is, mach<strong>in</strong>ation (Machenschaft) – is experienced. Inspeak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Erlebnis <strong>and</strong> Machenschaft, it is clear that <strong>the</strong> phenomenological explication<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stallation has to be <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> movement <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical11This is <strong>the</strong> extended argument <strong>of</strong> Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Nietzsche, I: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst(Pfull<strong>in</strong>gen: Neske, 1961).12The term “aura” (Aura) as I use it here derives from Walter Benjam<strong>in</strong>’s essay “Das Kunstwerk imZeitalter se<strong>in</strong>er technischen Reproduzierbarkeit,” <strong>in</strong> Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter se<strong>in</strong>er technischenReproduzierbarkeit, pp. 15–6; trans. Harry Zohn, “The Work <strong>of</strong> Art <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Age <strong>of</strong> MechanicalReproduction,” <strong>in</strong> Illum<strong>in</strong>ations. <strong>Essays</strong> <strong>and</strong> Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: SchockenBooks, 1969), pp. 222–3.
152 B. Radl<strong>of</strong>fth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g: <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stallation is <strong>in</strong>separable from <strong>the</strong> way <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> truth<strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g is sent to us <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> passage from <strong>the</strong> first to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rbeg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g. What art is <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> era <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stallation is not unfolded as a historicalculturalcritique <strong>of</strong> this k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> entity, but is already thought <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g (Entwurf) <strong>of</strong> a site <strong>of</strong> “Seyn als Verweigerung.” 13The rise <strong>of</strong> lived experience as <strong>the</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g mode <strong>of</strong> consciousness <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> era<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> consummation <strong>of</strong> modernity encompasses all political directions, all <strong>of</strong> whichare directed by <strong>the</strong> drive to make-secure, to calculate, <strong>and</strong> direct <strong>in</strong> advance <strong>the</strong>“mood” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “masses.” The “masses” are “mach<strong>in</strong>ationally planned” (GA 66,33/25-6), that is, <strong>the</strong>y are “constructed” <strong>in</strong> accordance with <strong>the</strong> uniformity <strong>of</strong> a norm<strong>of</strong> experience, <strong>and</strong> each <strong>in</strong>dividual is equal to every o<strong>the</strong>r as an <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> norm.The <strong>in</strong>stallation is <strong>the</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g apparatus <strong>of</strong> uniformity <strong>and</strong> normalization. Ins<strong>of</strong>ar asart is <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to this paradigm <strong>of</strong> truth, it loses all power <strong>of</strong> decision because itcan no longer <strong>of</strong>fer an alternative to <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g-secure <strong>of</strong> humanresources for <strong>the</strong> processes <strong>of</strong> production; nor can it <strong>of</strong>fer an alternative experience<strong>of</strong> nature; nor can it <strong>of</strong>fer a h<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> presence or <strong>the</strong> flight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gods becausewhat is not calculable as a potential resource is excluded from what is real. 14 If allbe<strong>in</strong>gs are understood <strong>in</strong> advance as producible – <strong>and</strong> this is <strong>the</strong>ir uniform way <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g – <strong>the</strong>n no fundamental decision is possible. The question <strong>of</strong> decision leads usto <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god(s) as unfolded <strong>in</strong> Sections 70 <strong>and</strong> 71 <strong>of</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness.3 In Section 70, entitled, “Götter. Das wesentliche Wissen,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> del<strong>in</strong>eatesthree possibilities <strong>of</strong> know<strong>in</strong>g-awareness – das wesentliche Wissen – as ways <strong>in</strong>which <strong>the</strong> “differentiation between be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g is kept open as <strong>the</strong> decision”(GA66, 229/204). The question “about” <strong>the</strong> gods is raised as a possibility from with<strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> horizon opened up by <strong>the</strong> fundamental know<strong>in</strong>g-awareness <strong>of</strong> m<strong>in</strong>dfulness.Only <strong>the</strong>n does <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduce <strong>the</strong> “gods” <strong>in</strong>to his text <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>gnamed,for <strong>the</strong> gods are thought <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir “distress<strong>in</strong>g need<strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g” (GA 66, 321/205). Know<strong>in</strong>g-awareness is directed toward <strong>the</strong> question<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se three ways for <strong>the</strong> sake <strong>of</strong> becom<strong>in</strong>g “strong <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> still com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>toremember<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> decision between <strong>the</strong> exclusive predom<strong>in</strong>ance <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>orig<strong>in</strong>ary ground<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g” (GA 66, 231/205). As <strong>the</strong> know<strong>in</strong>gawareness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> necessity <strong>of</strong> this decision, know<strong>in</strong>g-awareness enacts be<strong>in</strong>g-historicalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. “Indeed, know<strong>in</strong>g is fundamental know<strong>in</strong>g only when it prepares what13See Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Die Geschichte des Seyns, GA 69 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann,1998a), p.185.14It should be noted that <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stallation-be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> art does not cease to function when it moves out<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> museum, <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> c<strong>in</strong>ema, <strong>and</strong> ‘onto <strong>the</strong> street,’ <strong>in</strong>to corporate <strong>of</strong>fices, <strong>in</strong>to ‘nature’ <strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>teractive displays—it is only more fully mobilized as art, that is, <strong>in</strong> accordance with its essenceas a form <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘<strong>in</strong>teractive’ <strong>in</strong>terface <strong>of</strong> mach<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>and</strong> lived-experience.
Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Notes on Div<strong>in</strong>e Images <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Light <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-Historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>153is known for transformation <strong>in</strong>to what is to be <strong>in</strong>ceptually grounded” (GA66,232/206). As such, it is be<strong>in</strong>g-historical knowledge, <strong>and</strong> while it does not calculate“progress,” it does recognize signs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> completion <strong>of</strong> modernity. This recognition<strong>of</strong> what is calls for <strong>the</strong> phenomenological explication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> manifestations <strong>of</strong>modernity <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. In <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cross<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g distances itself from <strong>the</strong> actual (GA66, 232-3/206).As <strong>in</strong>abid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, it does not th<strong>in</strong>kbe<strong>in</strong>gs comparatively with o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> fundamental know<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>consummation <strong>of</strong> modernity is a remembrance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> modernity: it gives<strong>the</strong>m over to <strong>the</strong> decisions <strong>of</strong> Se<strong>in</strong>sgeschichte. Remembrance br<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>to what ishistorically present <strong>and</strong> its calculable permutations <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> an au<strong>the</strong>nticfuture, because as remembrance, it is not a plann<strong>in</strong>g arrangement <strong>of</strong> current actualities,but holds itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> already-sent <strong>and</strong> projects open a site <strong>of</strong> essential decisions(GA66, 233/207).The first possibility holds that <strong>in</strong> “lay<strong>in</strong>g claim on be<strong>in</strong>g, be<strong>in</strong>gs are aga<strong>in</strong>grounded <strong>in</strong>ceptually” (GA66, 230/204). This way signifies <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>Da-se<strong>in</strong> through which history (Geschichte) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore also <strong>the</strong> artwork f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong>irway <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Ursprung <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir Wesen <strong>in</strong> open<strong>in</strong>g up a site <strong>of</strong> truth as <strong>the</strong> site <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>encounter <strong>of</strong> mortals <strong>and</strong> gods. This is <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> “The Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Work <strong>of</strong> Art,”which is itself thought <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical jo<strong>in</strong>tures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Contributions.With<strong>in</strong> this context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical, <strong>the</strong> Sist<strong>in</strong>e text reads as a historicalremembrance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e that opens a future possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> artwork, <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>div<strong>in</strong>e as manifested <strong>in</strong> art. <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> “about” <strong>the</strong> gods does not describe an entity:it is a question<strong>in</strong>g open<strong>in</strong>g-project<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> what has been sent to thought as <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>arygift <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tradition. The <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> first way st<strong>and</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fundamentalknow<strong>in</strong>g-awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> second <strong>and</strong> third, for as preparatory it cannot thrust<strong>the</strong>m aside (GA 66, 231-2/205).In <strong>the</strong> second possibility, be<strong>in</strong>gs are def<strong>in</strong>ed accord<strong>in</strong>g to a confused fusion <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> historical categories <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gness (Seiendheit). This results <strong>in</strong> “total lack <strong>of</strong>decision” <strong>in</strong> respect to <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong> differentiation. With<strong>in</strong> this realm <strong>of</strong> decisionlessness,be<strong>in</strong>gs are <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to <strong>and</strong> made operational for “ever-newerarrangements <strong>and</strong> ever-faster controllability” (GA 66, 230/204). This way signifies<strong>the</strong> triumph <strong>of</strong> actuality <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> mobilization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> actual <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tensification <strong>of</strong>life. In reference to art <strong>and</strong> artworks, this is <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stallation. Def<strong>in</strong>ed by<strong>the</strong> primacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g-operational <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>the</strong> second way gives be<strong>in</strong>gs overto <strong>the</strong>ir ab<strong>and</strong>onment by be-<strong>in</strong>g. This hermeneutic situation has to be raised <strong>in</strong>toknow<strong>in</strong>g-awareness. “The know<strong>in</strong>g awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> second possibility means <strong>in</strong>abid<strong>in</strong>g(Inständigkeit) <strong>the</strong> ‘epoch’ <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> completion <strong>of</strong> modernity<strong>and</strong> thus <strong>the</strong> term<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first Occidental history” (GA 66, 232/206).Know<strong>in</strong>g-awareness cannot close itself <strong>of</strong>f to <strong>the</strong> second way “because <strong>the</strong> ‘actual’<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> second possibility does transform itself <strong>in</strong>to what is passed over when <strong>the</strong>decision occupies <strong>the</strong> first or even <strong>the</strong> third possibility” (GA 66, 232/206). Withthis <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d, is it possible that <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stallation is a way <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> passage from<strong>the</strong> first to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g manifests itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> realm <strong>of</strong> art <strong>and</strong> artwork?Does <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> artwork <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stallation <strong>of</strong>fer evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> flight
154 B. Radl<strong>of</strong>f<strong>of</strong> god(s)? These questions lead us to <strong>the</strong> third way <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> fundamental attunement<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> passage <strong>in</strong>to an o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g.With<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> second possibility – governed by <strong>the</strong> know<strong>in</strong>g-awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> operationalization<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs – <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> concealed found<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> its truth<strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs comes to word <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> solitary <strong>and</strong> rare ones. This is <strong>the</strong> thirdpossibility. After <strong>the</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national socialist revolution as he himself conceivedit, <strong>Heidegger</strong> appears to have understood <strong>the</strong> third way as <strong>the</strong> path <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>ghistoricalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> epoch <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> consummation <strong>of</strong> modernity. Is <strong>the</strong> third wayour own hermeneutical situation? If so, what does this mean for our experience <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> god(s), <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> particular, for an art <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e? In response to <strong>the</strong>se questions,we have to consider more precisely what is at stake <strong>in</strong> all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> three ways: <strong>the</strong>fundamental attunement proper to <strong>the</strong> differentiation <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. Thisattunement is Entsetzen (dismay). In <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ab<strong>and</strong>onment <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs,Entsetzen as dismay is <strong>the</strong> govern<strong>in</strong>g attunement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> leap away (Ent-setzung)from <strong>the</strong> primacy <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. This alone first opens a space for <strong>the</strong> thought <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g,<strong>and</strong> for <strong>the</strong> nam<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gods (GA 66, 231-32/204-6). In <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> sett<strong>in</strong>g-free,dismay is already a distanc<strong>in</strong>g understood as a leap-away from <strong>the</strong> primacy <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ontological “ground” <strong>in</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> as Seiendheit, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore an open<strong>in</strong>g tobe-<strong>in</strong>g. The leap away from be<strong>in</strong>gs to be-<strong>in</strong>g is attuned to <strong>the</strong> refusal (Verweigerung)<strong>of</strong> all onto<strong>the</strong>ological grounds <strong>and</strong> as leap abides <strong>in</strong> this Ab-grund. Thought <strong>in</strong> terms<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ab-grund that belongs to Seyn, <strong>the</strong> ab<strong>and</strong>onment <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs po<strong>in</strong>ts to <strong>the</strong>enown<strong>in</strong>g refusal <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> thus to <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> found<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>grefusal <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs to open a site for “<strong>the</strong> pass<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last god” (GA 65,7-8/6). The Ab-grund is to be founded as Ab-grund (GA 66, 236/209; GA 65,379/264-5). 15 The Ent-setzen, which lets go <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, opens a space for <strong>the</strong> Entwurf.It is <strong>in</strong> this light that <strong>the</strong> artwork <strong>in</strong> “The Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Work <strong>of</strong> Art” is thought – asone way <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> Ab-grund is founded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> site <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>.The title <strong>of</strong> Part XVIII <strong>of</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, to which Section 70 <strong>and</strong> Section 71 (“Gods<strong>and</strong> Be-<strong>in</strong>g”) <strong>in</strong> fact belong, reads <strong>in</strong> translation as “Project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g [Entwurf]What is to be Thought Beforeh<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> Every Inquir<strong>in</strong>g Nam<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Godhood <strong>of</strong>Gods” (GA 66, 227/201). <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s question<strong>in</strong>g about gods is raised from with<strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> know<strong>in</strong>g-awareness <strong>of</strong> m<strong>in</strong>dfulness <strong>and</strong> follows upon <strong>the</strong> lay<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> threeways: as I noted, only <strong>the</strong>n is <strong>the</strong> god-question explicitly <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g-named. The reason for this is that <strong>the</strong> gods are thought <strong>in</strong>terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “distress<strong>in</strong>g need <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g.” The question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gods is understoodbe<strong>in</strong>g-historically <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ab<strong>and</strong>onment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs(Se<strong>in</strong>sverlassenheit). It is <strong>the</strong> decision for be-<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> turn away from be<strong>in</strong>gs,which opens a space for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> thus also for <strong>the</strong> encounter(Entgegnung) <strong>of</strong> humans <strong>and</strong> gods. Does this mean that <strong>the</strong> artwork has to be experienced<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> turn away from be<strong>in</strong>gs, hence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> turn away from <strong>the</strong> aes<strong>the</strong>tics <strong>of</strong>15As Emad, op. cit., pp. 118–19, argues, <strong>the</strong> giv<strong>in</strong>g-stay<strong>in</strong>g-away <strong>of</strong> “Ab-grund” as ground cannotbe captured, <strong>and</strong> is <strong>in</strong> fact quite covered up, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> Ab-grund as “abyss.” Hence <strong>the</strong>translation favored <strong>the</strong> Contributions: “ab-ground.”
Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Notes on Div<strong>in</strong>e Images <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Light <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-Historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>155representation? Yes, for <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> thought <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> know<strong>in</strong>g-awareness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historicalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, “a work <strong>of</strong> art is nei<strong>the</strong>r a symbolic object, nor <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stallation thatorganizes be<strong>in</strong>gs, but is <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g as such which holds <strong>the</strong> decision forman’s o<strong>the</strong>r way <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. Now art has <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>....‘Artwork’ is now<strong>the</strong> ga<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> purest solitude unto <strong>the</strong> ab-ground <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g” (GA 66, 37/28). Thisturn away from metaphysical art <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g is already signaled by <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>stallation, for <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stallation, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> functional mobilization <strong>of</strong> artas <strong>the</strong> production <strong>of</strong> affect, also withdraws <strong>the</strong> work from representation. This doublewithdrawal (<strong>the</strong> dis-<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> refusal <strong>of</strong> representation)is itself a phenomenological <strong>in</strong>dication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> implosion <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs conceived metaphysically<strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> Seiendheit. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s discourse on <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stallation is a be<strong>in</strong>ghistoricalreflection on <strong>the</strong> primacy <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir operational transformation.The <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> art-work <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stallation manifests <strong>the</strong> ab<strong>and</strong>onment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. This implies that <strong>in</strong> order to th<strong>in</strong>k <strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “art-work” <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> “gods,” or <strong>the</strong> “nam<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> gods,” <strong>the</strong> artwork will have to be thought <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, as opposed to <strong>the</strong> aes<strong>the</strong>tic categories <strong>of</strong> metaphysics. In this regard,<strong>the</strong> question also arises how <strong>the</strong> flight <strong>of</strong> gods is related to, <strong>and</strong> manifested <strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong>metaphysical-aes<strong>the</strong>tic underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> art, <strong>and</strong> how this relation is revealed be<strong>in</strong>ghistorically<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> truth. This question will lead us to <strong>the</strong> matter <strong>of</strong> iconoclasmunderstood as an event <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> found<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>ception <strong>of</strong> modernity.4 How is <strong>the</strong> Bildwesen, <strong>the</strong> sway (wesen) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image as image, to be understood?<strong>Heidegger</strong> gives us this <strong>in</strong>dication: Bild is to be understood as “countenance <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>sense <strong>of</strong> en-counter<strong>in</strong>g look<strong>in</strong>g as arrival” (Antlitz im S<strong>in</strong>ne von Entgegenblick alsAnkunft) (GA13, 119). Entgegenblick h<strong>in</strong>ts at Blick <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> aspect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>god sh<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to what is; Entgegen h<strong>in</strong>ts at <strong>the</strong> mutual exchang<strong>in</strong>g glance <strong>of</strong> god<strong>and</strong> man where<strong>in</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> as <strong>the</strong> site <strong>of</strong> encounter is opened. In Contributions, thisrealm is <strong>in</strong>timated as follows: “But be-<strong>in</strong>g holds sway as enown<strong>in</strong>g (Ereignis), as <strong>the</strong>site for <strong>the</strong> moment <strong>of</strong> decision (Augenblickstätte) about <strong>the</strong> nearness <strong>and</strong> remoteness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last god” (GA 65, 230/163). In <strong>the</strong> Raphael text, <strong>the</strong> site <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> moment <strong>of</strong> decisionis experienced as counter<strong>in</strong>g (Ent-gegnung) arrival (Ankunft) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historicalsense. Arrival is <strong>the</strong> sudden, <strong>in</strong>calculable enown<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Augenblick <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>mutual encounter <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god <strong>and</strong> man <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> through <strong>the</strong> site opened up by <strong>the</strong>sh<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g-forth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god. Antlitz <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> face or countenance isnot a representation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god, but <strong>the</strong> moment (Augenblick) <strong>of</strong> arrival <strong>and</strong> mutual“recognition” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> exchang<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> a glance. This implies a mutual openness with<strong>in</strong>a site <strong>of</strong> openness. The image as Bildwesen refuses <strong>the</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ations <strong>of</strong> subject<strong>and</strong> object, <strong>of</strong> subjectivity <strong>and</strong> world picture.<strong>Heidegger</strong> writes that <strong>the</strong> pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> its Bildwesen, has its orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> a realm morefundamental than <strong>the</strong> art-historical dist<strong>in</strong>ction between “Fenstergemälde” <strong>and</strong>“Tafelbild.” If we underst<strong>and</strong> it as a Fenstergemälde, <strong>the</strong>n what is a “w<strong>in</strong>dow”?
156 B. Radl<strong>of</strong>fA w<strong>in</strong>dow is def<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> frame, which limits <strong>and</strong> ga<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>the</strong> openness <strong>of</strong> sh<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gthrough:it is through <strong>the</strong> boundary (Grenze) that openness is given free <strong>and</strong> ga<strong>the</strong>redas <strong>the</strong> sh<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g it is. “The w<strong>in</strong>dow as admission <strong>of</strong> a sh<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g-forth br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>gcloseness is glimpse <strong>of</strong> arrival” (Das Fenster als E<strong>in</strong>lass des nahenden Sche<strong>in</strong>ens istAusblick <strong>in</strong> die Ankunft) [GA 13, 120]. The “w<strong>in</strong>dow” which <strong>the</strong> pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g is, isbrought forth by <strong>the</strong> pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g itself, as this image <strong>of</strong> sh<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g-arrival (GA13, 12). Thepicture itself is a communion, not <strong>the</strong> representation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god who <strong>of</strong>fers himself<strong>in</strong> communion. In <strong>the</strong> image, as this image, <strong>the</strong> sh<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g-forth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>carnation(Menschwerdung Gottes) happens; <strong>the</strong> transformation (Verw<strong>and</strong>lung) that enownsitself (sich ereignet) on <strong>the</strong> altar as <strong>the</strong> consecration (“die heilige W<strong>and</strong>lung”) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>of</strong>fer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Mass enowns itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> as image (GA13, 121). But <strong>in</strong> what sensecould <strong>the</strong> image be communion? In what sense is <strong>the</strong> image a transformation <strong>and</strong>consecration? As <strong>the</strong> sh<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g-forth <strong>of</strong> arrival – <strong>the</strong> Augenblick <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> reciprocal,enown<strong>in</strong>g counter-glimpse <strong>of</strong> god <strong>and</strong> man? In <strong>the</strong> sense that this counter-glimpsetransforms what “man” has been <strong>and</strong> consecrates him to <strong>the</strong> service <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g, mak<strong>in</strong>ghim steward <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> preserver <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs? With <strong>the</strong> art-work <strong>the</strong> leap <strong>in</strong>toDa-se<strong>in</strong> enowns itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> few: “those who ground Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> creat<strong>in</strong>g-sacrific<strong>in</strong>g –Dase<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> whose time-space be<strong>in</strong>gs are preserved as be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> with that <strong>the</strong> truth<strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g is sheltered” (GA 65, 236/167).The image is <strong>the</strong> sh<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g-forth, or manifestation, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> play <strong>of</strong> time-spaceunderstood as <strong>the</strong> site <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> celebration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> service <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Mass (GA 13, 121).The arrival (Ankunft) that sh<strong>in</strong>es-forth <strong>in</strong> its sudden <strong>in</strong>calculability <strong>in</strong> itself br<strong>in</strong>gswith it <strong>the</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g concealment <strong>of</strong> its provenance (das verborgen Bergende ihrerHerkunft) (GA 13, 120). This <strong>of</strong>fers a h<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> how <strong>the</strong> communion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> god is to be thought: as <strong>the</strong> celebration <strong>of</strong> unconceal<strong>in</strong>g shelter<strong>in</strong>g. For <strong>Heidegger</strong>explicitly <strong>in</strong>terprets, <strong>in</strong> a be<strong>in</strong>g-historical sense, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>carnate god <strong>of</strong> Christianity <strong>in</strong>terms <strong>of</strong> a classical Greek underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> truth as άlήq∈ia: “so <strong>the</strong> image opens<strong>and</strong> composes <strong>the</strong> site <strong>of</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g unconcealment (<strong>of</strong> Ά-lήq∈ia), <strong>the</strong> unconcealmentthrough which <strong>the</strong> image holds sway” [So bildet das Bild den Ort des entbergendenBergens (der Ά-lήq∈ia), als welches Entbergen das Bild west] (GA 13,121). The god is not <strong>the</strong> represented object <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work; nor does <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s evocation<strong>of</strong> Raphael’s pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g historically represent a god as constructed or reconstructedfrom <strong>the</strong> confluence <strong>of</strong> Greek <strong>and</strong> Christian tradition. The pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g, ra<strong>the</strong>r,as work, puts all <strong>of</strong> this <strong>in</strong> question <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> call<strong>in</strong>g for a decision. In Section 11<strong>of</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, <strong>Heidegger</strong> writes: “it is only work that with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mutual call<strong>in</strong>gforth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway (Wesen) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> earth <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world puts to decision <strong>the</strong>sway <strong>of</strong> gods <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> man” (GA 66, 38/29). As <strong>the</strong> “clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g,”<strong>the</strong> work “holds <strong>the</strong> decision for man’s o<strong>the</strong>r way <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. Now, art has <strong>the</strong> character<strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> moves out <strong>of</strong> all striv<strong>in</strong>g concerned with ‘culture’” (GA66,37/28). As such, <strong>the</strong> god spoken <strong>of</strong> here is nei<strong>the</strong>r “Christian” nor “Greek,” but <strong>in</strong>know<strong>in</strong>g-awareness <strong>of</strong> both be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dicates a way <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>image <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e is to be founded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ab-grund <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g.While <strong>the</strong> object-historical situation <strong>of</strong> Raphael’s pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g is implicated by<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s reference to <strong>the</strong> museum-exhibition-space, this situation is understood,clearly, out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ab<strong>and</strong>onment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs
Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Notes on Div<strong>in</strong>e Images <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Light <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-Historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>157(Anklang der Se<strong>in</strong>sverlassenheit). The be<strong>in</strong>g-historical, open<strong>in</strong>g-project<strong>in</strong>g (Entwurf)<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> text consists <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> movement away from aes<strong>the</strong>tic-metaphysical categories <strong>of</strong>art, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> movement-toward <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> movement-<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong>Inständigkeit <strong>of</strong> endur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Ab-grund <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> refusal <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g as ground<strong>in</strong>g-found<strong>in</strong>gAb-grund (cf. GA 65, 380/265). The relation <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> art-work, is grasped <strong>in</strong> a fundamentally different way by <strong>the</strong> know<strong>in</strong>gawareness<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, as dist<strong>in</strong>guished from aes<strong>the</strong>tics: “nowhere<strong>and</strong> never can be<strong>in</strong>gs count as mere image <strong>and</strong> reflected splendor <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g”(GA66 92/77). Be-<strong>in</strong>g does not “give away its sway<strong>in</strong>g (Wesung) to be<strong>in</strong>gs, butfulfills this sway<strong>in</strong>g as itself <strong>and</strong> thus lights itself up as <strong>the</strong> ab-ground (Ab-grund),where<strong>in</strong>, on <strong>the</strong> same plane, that which man calls be<strong>in</strong>gs may tower, may fall away<strong>and</strong> may l<strong>in</strong>ger” (GA 66, 92/76). In “Plato’s Doctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> Truth,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> arguesthat <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> mimesis conceals a more orig<strong>in</strong>ary sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image (∈ÉdoV)implicit <strong>in</strong> Plato’s underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> •lήq∈ia. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> copy <strong>and</strong> representation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> atemporal form, <strong>the</strong> image is understood as <strong>the</strong> arrival <strong>of</strong> presenc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> darken<strong>in</strong>g-withdrawal <strong>of</strong> presenc<strong>in</strong>g. 16 This withdrawal shelters <strong>the</strong> image fromconceptualization <strong>and</strong> objectification. Unconcealment (•lήq∈ia) manifests itself<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> through <strong>the</strong> limit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> historical specificity <strong>of</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>g. With<strong>the</strong> project <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> site <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> manifestation <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs,thought <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g as •lήq∈ia, is projected-open as “<strong>the</strong> ab-ground <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g,” which as <strong>the</strong> “‘free play <strong>of</strong> time-space’” opens <strong>the</strong> sites “which allow<strong>the</strong> settlement (Austrag) between counter<strong>in</strong>g (Entgegnung) <strong>and</strong> strife to become <strong>the</strong>moment (Augenblick) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> ground <strong>of</strong> history” (GA 66, 91-92/76). The Entgegnung<strong>of</strong> man <strong>and</strong> gods, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Streit <strong>of</strong> earth <strong>and</strong> world are given free as Seyn “enownsitself as enown<strong>in</strong>g unto <strong>the</strong> ab-ground <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g” (GA 66, 91/76). What doesthis mean for our underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god?“Only <strong>in</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> is that truth founded for be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> which all be<strong>in</strong>gs are only for<strong>the</strong> sake <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g – be-<strong>in</strong>g that lights up as <strong>the</strong> trace <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last god” (GA65, 230/163). This implies a non-metaphysical experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image as a “w<strong>in</strong>dow”through which <strong>the</strong> trace <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god can manifest itself out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ab-grund <strong>of</strong>be-<strong>in</strong>g. 17 The art-work is not, for “a be<strong>in</strong>g is not”: only Be-<strong>in</strong>g is. The truth <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>gis experienced “only through a leap as <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g (Lichtung) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> ab-ground thatlights up” (GA 66, 91/76). This truth <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g excludes <strong>the</strong> re-presentational truth <strong>of</strong>an object. It excludes all “idolatry.” The clear<strong>in</strong>g that lights up as Ab-grund gives free<strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g counter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> gods <strong>and</strong> mortals <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> through which <strong>the</strong> god sh<strong>in</strong>esforth<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> image, not as a represented be<strong>in</strong>g, but as a way <strong>of</strong> attun<strong>in</strong>g. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’stext is itself a leap-away from <strong>the</strong> art-image <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e as represented be<strong>in</strong>g.16See Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit,” <strong>in</strong> Wegmarken , GA 9 (Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann, 1976), pp. 212–16; “Plato’s Doctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> Truth,” trans. John Barlow <strong>in</strong> WilliamBarrett <strong>and</strong> Henry D. Aiken, eds., Philosophy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Twentieth Century (New York: R<strong>and</strong>omHouse, 1962), vol. 3, pp. 254–57.17The question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> sensuousness to <strong>the</strong> possible experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e is posed <strong>in</strong> an<strong>in</strong>structive way <strong>in</strong> Marylou Sena’s “Nietzsche’s New Ground<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Metaphysical: Sensuousness<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Subversion <strong>of</strong> Plato <strong>and</strong> Platonism,” Research <strong>in</strong> Phenomenology, 34 (2004): 139–59.
158 B. Radl<strong>of</strong>f5 How can <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> gods, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir flight, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> attunement bebrought <strong>in</strong>to relation with <strong>the</strong> first beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g? It is noteworthy that <strong>in</strong> his Parmenides(GA 54), <strong>in</strong> speak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Greek gods, <strong>Heidegger</strong> suggests that <strong>the</strong> daίmwn is anattun<strong>in</strong>g god, as dist<strong>in</strong>ct from <strong>the</strong> comm<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g God <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Jews <strong>and</strong> Christians. Thedaίmwn gives signs, po<strong>in</strong>ts out, <strong>and</strong> conceals, but does not comm<strong>and</strong>. The daίmwngives itself to <strong>the</strong> glance <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong>fers itself <strong>in</strong> an aspect, it looks <strong>in</strong> on us to open a viewfor us, but it does not comm<strong>and</strong>. The comm<strong>and</strong> belongs to <strong>the</strong> realm <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> imperial<strong>and</strong> its truth, <strong>the</strong> conceal<strong>in</strong>g-reveal<strong>in</strong>g h<strong>in</strong>t, or directive, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> daίmwn does not. 18The daίmwn is not a be<strong>in</strong>g, but a way <strong>of</strong> attunement. The gods are “<strong>the</strong> attun<strong>in</strong>gones” [die Stimmenden] (GA 54, 164/111). The look<strong>in</strong>g (Blicken) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> daίmon∈V,“<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al sense <strong>of</strong> emergent self-presentation” is “determ<strong>in</strong>ed from •lήq∈ia”(GA 54, 159/107). For <strong>in</strong> all <strong>the</strong>se respects, <strong>the</strong> “self-show<strong>in</strong>g, po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g ones, arewho <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>and</strong> are <strong>the</strong> way <strong>the</strong>y are only <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> essential doma<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> disclosure <strong>and</strong><strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> self-disclos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g [•lήq∈ia] itself” (GA 54, 102/151). This also h<strong>in</strong>tsat a way <strong>of</strong> experienc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> image <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e that would no longer be <strong>in</strong>formedby <strong>the</strong> aes<strong>the</strong>tics <strong>of</strong> representation. The look is <strong>the</strong> ga<strong>the</strong>red, self-emergent selfpresentation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god. As such, it is determ<strong>in</strong>ed by unconcealment as <strong>the</strong> event <strong>of</strong>open<strong>in</strong>g self-manifest<strong>in</strong>g. Άlήq∈ia <strong>in</strong> this sense names be<strong>in</strong>g. “Therefore, <strong>the</strong> look(Blick) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god who stems from Be<strong>in</strong>g can emerge ‘<strong>in</strong>’ man <strong>and</strong> can look out from<strong>the</strong> form (Gestalt) <strong>of</strong> ‘man’ as ga<strong>the</strong>red <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> look” (GA54, 161/109). The work <strong>of</strong>art, thought <strong>in</strong> a non-metaphysical way, “lets be<strong>in</strong>g appear <strong>and</strong> br<strong>in</strong>gs be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tounconcealment” <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> through <strong>the</strong> gestalt given to <strong>the</strong> god <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> work (GA54, 170-1/115). Hence, we are led to two <strong>in</strong>terrelated dist<strong>in</strong>ctions: <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction between<strong>the</strong> comm<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g god as opposed to <strong>the</strong> attun<strong>in</strong>g, self-emergent god that gives itself<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> look; <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction between <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e image as <strong>the</strong> emergent self-presentationthat <strong>of</strong>fers a “w<strong>in</strong>dow” for <strong>the</strong> light<strong>in</strong>g-up <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> image asobject. These dist<strong>in</strong>ctions, <strong>in</strong> turn, help prepare <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> flight or arrival<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god(s). The remembrance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Greek div<strong>in</strong>ities belongs to <strong>the</strong> play<strong>in</strong>g-forth(Zuspiel) <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g (GA65, 169/119). We have seen that <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ctionbetween be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>the</strong> realm <strong>of</strong> decision out <strong>of</strong> which <strong>the</strong> question<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> flight <strong>of</strong> god(s) emerges. The “appearance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e,” <strong>Heidegger</strong>writes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Parmenides, cannot f<strong>in</strong>d its site <strong>of</strong> unconcealment as long as “be<strong>in</strong>g isforgotten.” A “decision about <strong>the</strong> gods or <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gods” can only be preparedout <strong>of</strong> “an experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> essential sway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g” (GA54, 167/112-13)[trans. modified].The “historical,” that is, be<strong>in</strong>g-historical, read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Greek div<strong>in</strong>ities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>Parmenides lectures would <strong>of</strong>fer a remembrance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gods as a way<strong>in</strong>to an attunement to <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. This relation to <strong>the</strong> image has its own ethos18Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Parmenides, GA54 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann, 1982), pp. 151, 154;trans. by André Schuwer <strong>and</strong> Richard Rojcewicz as Parmenides (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana UniversityPress, 1992), pp. 102, 104.
Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Notes on Div<strong>in</strong>e Images <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Light <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-Historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>159(ἦqoV): as opposed to <strong>the</strong> fixation upon an object <strong>of</strong> representation, <strong>and</strong> consequently<strong>the</strong> evaluation <strong>and</strong> secur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> representations, <strong>the</strong> image becomes, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sist<strong>in</strong>e text, a “w<strong>in</strong>dow” (Fenster) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sh<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g-appear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>presenc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a be<strong>in</strong>g. The (ἦqoV) ethos proper to this, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historicalread<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Parmenides, is <strong>the</strong> Ent-schlossenheit <strong>of</strong> an openness to be-<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> awe (Scheu/aἰdώV), which belongs to it (GA 54, 111/75). Tak<strong>in</strong>g up a h<strong>in</strong>tfrom Parvis Emad, Ent-schlossenheit already <strong>in</strong>timates a be<strong>in</strong>g-historical appropriation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Entschlossenheit <strong>of</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense that <strong>the</strong> resoluteness <strong>of</strong>Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time is thought as un-closedness, that is, as openness, to be-<strong>in</strong>g’s “thrownproject<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g.”19 For “while <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g projectsopen<strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal disclosure <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g’s self-show<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>Contributions to Philosophy <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness his th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g projects-open be<strong>in</strong>g’shistorically self-transform<strong>in</strong>g show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> manifest<strong>in</strong>g.” 20 Inasmuch as <strong>the</strong> “historical”lectures, such as Parmenides, belong to play<strong>in</strong>g-forth as one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> six articulations<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Contributions, what <strong>Heidegger</strong> has to say about <strong>the</strong> Greek gods wouldalso have to be understood as “conferred upon th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g by be-<strong>in</strong>g,” hence as <strong>the</strong>enactment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>dfulness proper to be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. 21 The <strong>in</strong>terpretation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> daίmwn as a way <strong>of</strong> attun<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong>refore, is not an object-historical statement,but essential to <strong>the</strong> passage <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g. Moreover, s<strong>in</strong>cebe<strong>in</strong>g-attuned is <strong>in</strong>tegral to m<strong>in</strong>dfulness itself, 22 <strong>and</strong> because attunement itself isbe<strong>in</strong>g-historical enown<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> Ent-schlossenheit <strong>of</strong> Parmenides already <strong>in</strong>timates<strong>the</strong> leap away from be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> openness <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g. The underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gsas representations, <strong>and</strong> hence as “idols,” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> leap-away <strong>in</strong> dismay <strong>in</strong> face <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>irab<strong>and</strong>onment by be-<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong>ir mach<strong>in</strong>ational production is <strong>the</strong> way <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>play<strong>in</strong>g-forth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g resound <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Anklang <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> consummation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g.What h<strong>in</strong>t does <strong>the</strong> attun<strong>in</strong>g aspect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> daίmwn <strong>of</strong>fer for our underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> image? In <strong>the</strong> Sist<strong>in</strong>e text, <strong>the</strong> evocation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> daίmwn is still audible: <strong>the</strong>Madonna <strong>of</strong> Raphael, as a Fenstergemälde <strong>in</strong> an essential sense, ga<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>and</strong> givesfree <strong>the</strong> sh<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g-forth <strong>of</strong> god to <strong>of</strong>fer Ausblick <strong>in</strong> die Ankunft. It is <strong>in</strong> this sense that<strong>the</strong> image (Bild) is what it is – <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> suddenness <strong>and</strong> unexpectedness <strong>of</strong> its sh<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gappear<strong>in</strong>g(das Bild “ist nichts <strong>and</strong>eres als die Jähe dieses Sche<strong>in</strong>ens”) [GA13, 120].<strong>Heidegger</strong> speaks <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>to-appearance <strong>of</strong> Maria <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>Jesus-child <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g, a br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g, which ga<strong>the</strong>rs its happen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> encounter<strong>in</strong>gemergent look (“das blickende Schauen”) <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> both takegestalt (GA13, 121). Is “das blickende Schauen” spoken <strong>of</strong> here no less an echo, orremembrance, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical sense, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>ities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Greeks than <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>carnate God <strong>of</strong> Christianity? Does <strong>the</strong> way toward a be<strong>in</strong>g-historical “retrieval”<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Christian tradition lead through <strong>the</strong> first <strong>in</strong>ception <strong>of</strong> Occidental th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g,19Emad, op cit., p. 155.20Ibid., p. 157.21Ibid., p. 159.22Ibid., p. 153.
160 B. Radl<strong>of</strong>f<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore through an encounter with <strong>the</strong> Greek underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>of</strong>•lήq∈ia, <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> daίmwn? <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historicalwould seem to support this. For only with <strong>the</strong> leap away from be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> truth<strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g as Ab-grund, only with <strong>the</strong> leap away from <strong>the</strong> onto<strong>the</strong>ological god, does<strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> a decision regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> gods open up. The o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g canonly be thought <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical relation to <strong>the</strong> first, Greek beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g. Given that<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s early lectures on St Paul focus on <strong>the</strong> temporality <strong>and</strong> historicity <strong>of</strong>primordial Christianity, <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical itself, <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought, evidentlyhas “Christian” orig<strong>in</strong>s (GA 60, Sections 23–33). However, if Greek philosophyconcealed this orig<strong>in</strong>al Christian experience <strong>of</strong> historicity as lived temporality(GA 60, 104/73), <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tradition also holds that <strong>the</strong> Judeo-Christian God <strong>of</strong> creation <strong>and</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> covered up <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al Greek experience<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e as attun<strong>in</strong>g daίmwn. Moreover, because <strong>the</strong> second comm<strong>and</strong>ment(<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Reformed numeration) forbids images, <strong>the</strong> image was required to justifyitself, <strong>and</strong> hence to reveal itself <strong>in</strong> conformity with <strong>the</strong> articles <strong>of</strong> accusation. Theattun<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> releas<strong>in</strong>g power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense that it releasesus from “representations” <strong>and</strong> attunes us to <strong>the</strong> openness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ab-ground (Ab-grund)<strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g, rema<strong>in</strong>s concealed as long as <strong>the</strong> image rema<strong>in</strong>s under <strong>the</strong> ban <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>comm<strong>and</strong>ment. The ontological conjunction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> comm<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g god <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> imageas representation blocks all access to <strong>the</strong> image as a way <strong>of</strong> attunement to <strong>the</strong>attun<strong>in</strong>g god(s). 23If it is <strong>in</strong>deed true, as has been argued, that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s early lectures on St Paul<strong>and</strong> August<strong>in</strong>e st<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> light (or shadow, as some aver) <strong>of</strong> his engagementwith Lu<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong> Protestant <strong>the</strong>ology more generally, this still does little to support<strong>the</strong> notion that Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit constitutes a “secularization” <strong>of</strong> Lu<strong>the</strong>r’s <strong>the</strong>ology <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> cross, with particular reference to <strong>the</strong> fallenness <strong>and</strong> unownedness <strong>of</strong> existence. 24The fundamental problem with this <strong>the</strong>sis, as I see it, is that <strong>the</strong> method <strong>of</strong> formal<strong>in</strong>dication, which guides Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit as well as <strong>the</strong> lectures on religion, is misconceived.The procedure <strong>of</strong> abstract<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> concept-senses <strong>of</strong> key elements <strong>of</strong> Christianexistence from <strong>the</strong> lectures on St Paul <strong>and</strong> August<strong>in</strong>e, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g parallel orcomparable concepts <strong>in</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, ignores <strong>the</strong> enactment-sense <strong>of</strong> what isformally <strong>in</strong>dicated. 25 The enactment-sense <strong>of</strong> “ownedness,” for example, as called for23It should be noted that <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Greek gods (as articulated <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Parmenides) to <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Christian God(as articulated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Raphael text) leaves open <strong>the</strong> issues <strong>of</strong> many gods or one god. This perta<strong>in</strong>sto <strong>the</strong> “undecidability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> gods”: see Emad, op. cit., 129–30.24On Lu<strong>the</strong>r’s <strong>the</strong>ology <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cross <strong>in</strong> relation to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s (supposed) appropriation <strong>and</strong> secularization<strong>of</strong> it, see Rudolf Bultmann, Kerygma und Mythos. E<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ologisches Gespräch, ed. HansWerner Bartsch (Hamburg-Volksdorf, 1951), pp. 15ff; S.J. McGrath, The Early <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong>Medieval Philosophy. Phenomenology for <strong>the</strong> Godforsaken (Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, D.C: The CatholicUniversity <strong>of</strong> America Press, 2006), pp. 159–68, 185; John van Buren, op. cit. p. 151; <strong>and</strong> Benjam<strong>in</strong>D. Crowe, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Religious Orig<strong>in</strong>s. Destruction <strong>and</strong> Au<strong>the</strong>nticity (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: IndianaUniversity Press, 2006), pp. 15–66.25For example, Brian Elliott, “Existential Scepticism <strong>and</strong> Christian Life <strong>in</strong> Early <strong>Heidegger</strong>,”Heythrop Journal XLV/2 (2004): 276–81 <strong>and</strong> van Buren, op. cit., pp. 170–95, both follow thisdoubtful method.
Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Notes on Div<strong>in</strong>e Images <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Light <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-Historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>161by Se<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> Zeit, is quite dist<strong>in</strong>ct from <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> “liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Christ” <strong>in</strong> St Paul.But this methodological issue also raises <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enactment<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formally <strong>in</strong>dicated to <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical remembrance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> already-sent <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> tradition. If <strong>the</strong> “Christian elements” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tradition are not “secularized,” <strong>the</strong>n whatk<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> non-conceptual, enactment-related reality do <strong>the</strong>y have for m<strong>in</strong>dfulness?What is <strong>Heidegger</strong> “do<strong>in</strong>g” with <strong>the</strong> Sist<strong>in</strong>e Madonna <strong>of</strong> Raphael? Is <strong>the</strong>re any sense<strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>carnation” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e still reverberates for <strong>Heidegger</strong>, even if <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>carnation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> onto<strong>the</strong>ological God <strong>of</strong> Christian dogma <strong>in</strong> Jesus <strong>of</strong> Nazareth nolonger <strong>in</strong>duces belief? It may be that <strong>in</strong> some transformed, be<strong>in</strong>g-historical sense,<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s phenomenology is “<strong>in</strong>carnational”: <strong>the</strong> found<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ab-grund <strong>of</strong>be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> site (Da-se<strong>in</strong>) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> encounter (Entgegnung) <strong>of</strong> “mank<strong>in</strong>d”<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> god(s). As we have seen, <strong>the</strong> Sist<strong>in</strong>e-text evokes <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>carnation <strong>in</strong> twosenses: <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>carnation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Christ-child as brought-forth <strong>in</strong> Raphael’s work, <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>carnation given <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eucharist. Is this passage to be read as a formal <strong>in</strong>dication,or W<strong>in</strong>k, with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> a be<strong>in</strong>g-historical overcom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> onto<strong>the</strong>ology<strong>of</strong> creation <strong>and</strong> created? Perhaps, it is such a formal <strong>in</strong>dication, one that po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>direction <strong>of</strong> attunement to be-<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>abid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> Ab-grund <strong>of</strong> an “<strong>in</strong>carnation,”which is no longer thought <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> created <strong>and</strong> uncreated, nor <strong>in</strong> terms<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> body or life conceived metaphysically. Conversely, <strong>the</strong> reduction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>carnation to <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-represented <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> refusal <strong>of</strong> thisrepresentation, reveals <strong>the</strong> onto<strong>the</strong>ological ground <strong>of</strong> iconoclasm <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcendentlife <strong>of</strong> God-creator. This is a god <strong>of</strong> comm<strong>and</strong>ments.6 The imperial Christianity specific to modernity calls for a requisite attunement,which <strong>Heidegger</strong> holds is founded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> certitude that <strong>in</strong>augurates modernity.This attunement, understood as <strong>the</strong> modern form <strong>of</strong> resoluteness (Entschlossenheit)<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> will, is def<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> drivenness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> will, by fanaticism (GA 54, 111/76).How is <strong>the</strong> attunement <strong>of</strong> imperial Christianity <strong>and</strong> iconoclasm related? The secondcomm<strong>and</strong>ment forbids “graven images.” Because <strong>the</strong> God <strong>of</strong> Christianity is a comm<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gGod, <strong>and</strong> because God forbids graven images, <strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e is <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple questionable. The Reformation debate was preceded by<strong>the</strong> great iconoclastic controversy <strong>in</strong>itiated by Byzant<strong>in</strong>e Emperor Leo III <strong>in</strong> 726 AD.Arguably, <strong>the</strong> most sophisticated <strong>the</strong>ological defense <strong>of</strong> icons, that <strong>of</strong> John <strong>of</strong>Damascus, dates from this era. 26 The question arises none<strong>the</strong>less if Reformationiconoclasm is not <strong>of</strong> a historically specific quality, <strong>and</strong> if so, what this quality is. Theobject-historical attempt to determ<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> causes <strong>of</strong> iconoclasm is dist<strong>in</strong>ct from,although not unrelated to, a be<strong>in</strong>g-historical underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> iconoclasm, <strong>and</strong>26St. John <strong>of</strong> Damascus, Three Treatises on <strong>the</strong> Div<strong>in</strong>e Images, trans. <strong>and</strong> Introduction by AndrewLouth (Chestwood, New York: St Vladimir’s Sem<strong>in</strong>ar Press, 2003).
162 B. Radl<strong>of</strong>fReformation iconoclasm <strong>in</strong> particular. Because <strong>the</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> is <strong>in</strong>timately related toimperial truth, <strong>the</strong> rejection <strong>of</strong> images <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e, as well as <strong>the</strong>ir acceptance <strong>and</strong>propagation implicates a relation to <strong>the</strong> imperial.My discussion <strong>of</strong> iconoclasm presupposes <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction between object-historicaldeterm<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> causes <strong>and</strong> effects <strong>and</strong> a phenomenological explication, it be<strong>in</strong>gunderstood that this explication is historical <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> Se<strong>in</strong>sgeschichte. It alsopresupposes, moreover, that with<strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical history <strong>and</strong> hence <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terplay <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> first <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong>re are two major cross<strong>in</strong>gs or transformations <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>history <strong>of</strong> truth: <strong>the</strong> cross<strong>in</strong>g from άlήq∈ia to veritas; <strong>and</strong> from verum to certum <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ception <strong>of</strong> modernity (cf. GA 54, 75-6/51). Tak<strong>in</strong>g a clue from <strong>Heidegger</strong>, thisbrief discussion also assumes that <strong>the</strong> formation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> early modern English stateplays an exemplary be<strong>in</strong>g-historical role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ception <strong>of</strong> modernity.<strong>Heidegger</strong> notes that one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ways metaphysics takes shape with <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ception<strong>of</strong> modernity is that <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> art is <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to aes<strong>the</strong>tics <strong>and</strong> art becomes anexpression <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> life <strong>of</strong> humanity (GA 5, 73/AW, 115-6). Of particular significance<strong>in</strong> this context is <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> how <strong>the</strong> fate <strong>of</strong> art is related to de-div<strong>in</strong>ization(Entgötterung) as a “manifestation <strong>of</strong> modernity.” De-div<strong>in</strong>ization means that <strong>the</strong>world picture is “Christianized” “<strong>in</strong>asmuch as <strong>the</strong> cause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world is posited as<strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite, unconditional, absolute,” even as “Christendom transforms Christi<strong>and</strong>octr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong>to a world view” (GA 5, 74/AW, 116-7). The transformation <strong>of</strong> Christianity<strong>in</strong>to a world view becomes manifest <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Reformation, <strong>in</strong>asmuch as <strong>the</strong> regulation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Christian confession becomes a matter <strong>of</strong> state policy. In Engl<strong>and</strong>, this<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>of</strong> religious confession <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> power <strong>and</strong> legitimacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state is <strong>in</strong>itiatedby Henry VIII <strong>and</strong> carried through with <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g rigorousness by Elizabeth I <strong>and</strong>James I. The national-collective identity is constructed with <strong>the</strong> aid <strong>of</strong> a nationalreligion. For de-div<strong>in</strong>ization does not mean lack <strong>of</strong> religiosity, but ra<strong>the</strong>r that <strong>the</strong>relation to <strong>the</strong> god is transformed <strong>in</strong>to religious experience (Erleben), both private<strong>and</strong> collective (GA 5, 74/AW, 117). In this respect, it is tell<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> iconoclasticmovement that swept Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> accordance with <strong>the</strong> decree <strong>of</strong> 1548, which led to<strong>the</strong> removal <strong>of</strong> images from <strong>the</strong> churches, ultimately culm<strong>in</strong>ated, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> reign <strong>of</strong>Elizabeth I, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> replacement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> crucifix above <strong>the</strong> alter with <strong>the</strong> royal arms. 27In Elizabethan Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong> cult <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Virg<strong>in</strong> Mary, regarded as an abuse by reformers,was replaced by <strong>the</strong> cult <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Virg<strong>in</strong> Queen as <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>carnation <strong>of</strong> truth, justice,<strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong>’s imperial ambitions. 28 While local devotional cult images <strong>and</strong>pilgrimage sites <strong>of</strong> pre-Reformation Engl<strong>and</strong> supported de-centralization, <strong>the</strong>Reformation <strong>in</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> thus <strong>the</strong> iconoclastic movement <strong>in</strong>tegral to it, centralized<strong>and</strong> concentrated power. 29 James I will claim <strong>the</strong> “div<strong>in</strong>e right” <strong>of</strong> rule for <strong>the</strong>27Michael O’Connell, The Idolatrous Eye: Iconoclasm <strong>and</strong> Theater <strong>in</strong> Early-Modern Engl<strong>and</strong>(New York; Oxford UP, 2000), p. 57.28Frances A. Yates, Astraea: The Imperial Theme <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sixteenth Century (London: Ark Paperbacks,1985), pp. 76–81, 87.29O’Connell, op. cit., pp. 59–61. For details on <strong>the</strong> primacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> local cult <strong>in</strong> late medieval religion,see also Joseph Leo Koerner, The Reformation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Image (Chicago: University <strong>of</strong> Chicago Press,2008), pp. 346–8.
Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Notes on Div<strong>in</strong>e Images <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Light <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-Historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>163English sovereign. 30 The English experience shows that <strong>the</strong> refusal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> image is <strong>in</strong>timately related to <strong>the</strong> elevation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sovereign <strong>in</strong> imperial pomp, <strong>and</strong>that this, <strong>in</strong> turn, has its ground <strong>in</strong> collective subjectivity <strong>and</strong> its imperial truth. Themetaphysical mobilization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image, as a function <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national, collectivesubject, is already pre-figured <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> discourse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> elected nation,<strong>the</strong> refusal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e image, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> elevation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sovereign.Know<strong>in</strong>g-awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ception <strong>of</strong> modernity is a remembrance <strong>of</strong> what this<strong>in</strong>ception sends us, thus to reveal <strong>the</strong> truth that founds it. This truth is <strong>the</strong> imperialtruth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> conjo<strong>in</strong>ed sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Roman <strong>and</strong> Christian (cf. GA 54,57-72/39-49). On <strong>the</strong> ground established by subjectivity, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth that belongs toit, both nature <strong>and</strong> historical be<strong>in</strong>g are conceived <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir calculability, <strong>and</strong> are madecalculable<strong>in</strong> service to <strong>the</strong> commonality (GA 66, 233-34/206-7). Be<strong>in</strong>g-historicalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g does not close itself <strong>of</strong>f from <strong>the</strong> “actual” <strong>of</strong> what is today, nor from whatcan be established object-historically concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ception <strong>of</strong> early modernEurope: ra<strong>the</strong>r, it “preserves from be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> h<strong>and</strong>s overthis truth to <strong>the</strong> decisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g” (GA 66, 233/207). In this regard,it is <strong>in</strong>dicative that <strong>Heidegger</strong> explicitly l<strong>in</strong>ks <strong>the</strong> consummation <strong>of</strong> modernity <strong>in</strong>metaphysical “communism” to its <strong>in</strong>ception with <strong>the</strong> “modern history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Englishstate.” 31 What is at sake <strong>in</strong> this judgement is <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>orig<strong>in</strong>s <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> planetary secur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> mobilization <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs – a process commonlyknown as “European imperialism.”In The Idolatrous Eye: Iconoclasm <strong>and</strong> Theater <strong>in</strong> Early-Modern Engl<strong>and</strong>,O’Connell states his fundamental <strong>the</strong>sis as follows: “The iconoclasm <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Reformation was not a mere change <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> style <strong>and</strong> emphasis <strong>of</strong> worship <strong>of</strong> ChristianEurope. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, it emerged from <strong>the</strong> tensions <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> word <strong>and</strong> image that<strong>in</strong>here <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> central doctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> Christianity, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>carnation, <strong>the</strong> belief that God, <strong>in</strong>tak<strong>in</strong>g human form, became subject to representation <strong>in</strong> an image.” 32 This evaluation<strong>of</strong> representation is supported by Calv<strong>in</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>junctions aga<strong>in</strong>st images. Calv<strong>in</strong>’sInstitutes clearly condemn images <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e as false representations: “In short,if it were not true that whatever knowledge <strong>of</strong> God is sought from images is fallacious<strong>and</strong> counterfeit, <strong>the</strong> prophets would not so generally have condemned it.” 33The falsity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> representation is rooted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> representation itself. For<strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image as idol is to be found <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “natural” tendency <strong>of</strong> humanbe<strong>in</strong>gs to represent what is to <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d; <strong>and</strong> representation arises <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> desire tobr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> spiritual near to us by represent<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> visible <strong>and</strong> material (Institutes,I. xi. vii). The m<strong>in</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> effect, by its very nature produces “idols.” Consequently, <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ctionderiv<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> Byzant<strong>in</strong>e defense <strong>of</strong> images, that is, <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction between30In this regard, see Bernard Bourd<strong>in</strong>, La genèse théologico-politique de l’État moderne (Paris:PUF, Bourd<strong>in</strong> 2004).31GA 69, p. 208.32In this regard, see Bourd<strong>in</strong>, La genèse théologico-politique de l’État moderne .33John Calv<strong>in</strong>, Institutes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Christian Religion. 2 vol. The Library <strong>of</strong> Christian Classics, ed.John T. McNeill. Trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: The Westm<strong>in</strong>ster Press, 1960), I. xi. v.Cited <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text as Institutes.
164 B. Radl<strong>of</strong>fidol worship (latria/lar∈ίa), <strong>and</strong> idol service (dulia/doul∈ίa), is categorically rejected,for not only is dulia no less pernicious than latria, but <strong>the</strong> representation as representationrema<strong>in</strong>s an idol <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g-material <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> spiritual(Institutes, I. xi. xi; I. xi. xiii–xiv; I. xii. iii). This onto<strong>the</strong>ology <strong>of</strong> re-presentation<strong>and</strong> image-devaluation, which goes back to Plato, is supported by an elevation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>scriptures (<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Word) as an object <strong>of</strong> subjective certa<strong>in</strong>ty. As O’Connell argues,<strong>the</strong> shift <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> word <strong>and</strong> image <strong>in</strong>volves a mak<strong>in</strong>g-certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Wordassociated with <strong>the</strong> historical-critical method <strong>of</strong> humanism, as exemplified byErasmus’s edition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> New Testament (1516); it also implicates, accord<strong>in</strong>g toO’Connell, <strong>the</strong> change to our relation to language brought about by pr<strong>in</strong>t culture. 34The “role <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>t culture,” O’Connell writes, “was to give a new confidence to <strong>the</strong>verbal formulation <strong>of</strong> God’s self-revelation, to provide <strong>the</strong> word <strong>of</strong> God, spoken <strong>and</strong>preached, with a secure ground<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> to w<strong>in</strong>now from it <strong>the</strong> accretions <strong>of</strong> myth <strong>and</strong>tradition. This altered status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word st<strong>and</strong>s beh<strong>in</strong>d Reformation anxiety aboutbiblical representation generally.” 35 The “secure ground<strong>in</strong>g” referred to here leadsus to <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> how truth is experienced, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> what sense <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> scripturepresupposes <strong>the</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g-secure <strong>of</strong> scripture. “It is no accident,” <strong>Heidegger</strong>writes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Parmenides lectures, “that <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vention <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g press co<strong>in</strong>cideswith <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ception <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> modern period” (GA 54, 124-5/85). For with this <strong>in</strong>vention,<strong>the</strong> word is moved <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> realm <strong>of</strong> technicity, <strong>and</strong> hence <strong>the</strong> calculable <strong>and</strong>secured realm <strong>of</strong> subjectivity.The question <strong>of</strong> truth also arises <strong>in</strong> respect to <strong>the</strong> representation <strong>of</strong> God <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>image: why would <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> language, conceived as <strong>the</strong> secured text <strong>of</strong> scripture,implicate a devaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image, <strong>and</strong> its reduction to <strong>the</strong> untruth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g an idol?The image as “representation” is apparently less secure, less true, than language asrepresented. 36 The image <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>carnated God is treated as a representation, ra<strong>the</strong>rthan a self-manifestation or revelation. In this respect, <strong>the</strong> platonic <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> mimesissupports <strong>the</strong> second comm<strong>and</strong>ment <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> devaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image. The key to both<strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> represented language <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> untruth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image as representation is <strong>the</strong>underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> underly<strong>in</strong>g ground <strong>of</strong> represent<strong>in</strong>g subject <strong>and</strong> representedobject that breaks through to found modernity. In this light, <strong>the</strong> fundamental significance<strong>of</strong> iconoclasm consists <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g-certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> God <strong>of</strong> Christianity for <strong>the</strong>represent<strong>in</strong>g subject.In “The Age <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> World Picture,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> asks what underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>and</strong> what <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> truth underlies <strong>the</strong> modern age (GA 5, 74/AW,117). For <strong>the</strong> Christianity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Middle Ages, <strong>the</strong> highest truth is given <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>the</strong>ological explication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Word <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e revelation, as laid down <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>34O’Connell, op. cit., pp. 36, 51.35O’Connell, op. cit., p. 29.36Even when, as <strong>in</strong> Lu<strong>the</strong>r’s view, <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e image is not rejected as idolatrous, but treated as adiaphora,<strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> text <strong>and</strong> image, <strong>and</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image itself, changes. The relation <strong>of</strong> text<strong>and</strong> image is transformed <strong>in</strong> Lu<strong>the</strong>ran iconography. See Joseph Leo Koerner, op. cit., with referenceto <strong>the</strong> example <strong>of</strong> Lucas Cranach <strong>the</strong> Elder’s Crucifixion with <strong>the</strong> Converted Centurion (1536),pp. 226–29.
Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Notes on Div<strong>in</strong>e Images <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Light <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-Historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>165scriptures (GA 5, 79/AW, 122). In this light, <strong>the</strong> Renaissance doctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> ad fontes,<strong>and</strong> Reformation doctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> sola scriptura can both be seen as transformations <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Word, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> particular, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Scriptures as freed from <strong>the</strong> accretions<strong>of</strong> (false) tradition <strong>and</strong> “verified” by a return to <strong>the</strong> sources. This transformationshifts <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> truth onto ano<strong>the</strong>r ground: <strong>the</strong> ground <strong>of</strong> subjectivity,which will judge revealed truth by <strong>the</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard <strong>of</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>g a secure representationfor a subject. The mak<strong>in</strong>g-secure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> scriptures through an evaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>sources presupposes <strong>the</strong> historical-critical method as founded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> objectification<strong>and</strong> explanation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> past as a system <strong>of</strong> causal <strong>in</strong>ter-relations (GA 5, 81/AW,122-3). In <strong>the</strong> early sixteenth century, <strong>the</strong> historical-critical edition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>New Testament <strong>of</strong> Erasmus exemplified this return to <strong>the</strong> sources <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Christiantradition through a thorough attempt to establish <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al text <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NewTestament <strong>and</strong> to produce a revised translation. The so-called “biblical humanism”<strong>of</strong> Erasmus <strong>and</strong> his Reformation followers is founded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> Historieas <strong>the</strong> representation <strong>and</strong> objectification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Holy Scriptures, a fact that wasalready uneasily noted (although not <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se terms) <strong>in</strong> his own time. 37 If humanismis a form <strong>of</strong> philosophical anthropology, this means that man will be philosophicallyunderstood on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> man <strong>and</strong> all be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> respect toman. The condition <strong>of</strong> humanism, however, is <strong>the</strong> world picture <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> subjectivism<strong>in</strong>tegral to it (GA 5, 91/AW, 133). The Word that is established <strong>in</strong> this light, aswell as <strong>the</strong> emphasis on <strong>the</strong> Word alone (sola scriptura) will st<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> a differentrelation to <strong>the</strong> embodiment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e image than <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>carnational” tradition<strong>of</strong> medieval Catholicism. 38 The opposition between <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>carnational <strong>the</strong>ology <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Church <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> historical text <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gospel, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> eyes <strong>of</strong> iconoclasts,is <strong>the</strong> opposition between <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> Christianity <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> falsity <strong>of</strong> mere representations.Not only is <strong>the</strong> image, <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with platonism, reduced to a second-orderreproduction, but <strong>the</strong> word is elevated on <strong>the</strong> grounds <strong>of</strong> its truth for <strong>the</strong> represent<strong>in</strong>gsubject.While <strong>the</strong> philosophical grounds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> certitude are first laid out <strong>and</strong> laiddown by Descartes, whose philosophy founds science as research <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>certitude <strong>of</strong> representation (GA 5, 85/AW, 127), <strong>Heidegger</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> certitude <strong>of</strong>subjectivity was prepared by <strong>the</strong> certa<strong>in</strong>ty <strong>of</strong> salvation <strong>of</strong> Christian experience (GA5, 109/AW, 153). “The <strong>in</strong>ception <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> metaphysics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> modern age rests on <strong>the</strong>transformation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> veritas <strong>in</strong>to certitudo.” With reference to Lu<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong>question <strong>of</strong> justification <strong>and</strong> certa<strong>in</strong>ty, <strong>Heidegger</strong> notes that “<strong>the</strong> doctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> justification,<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>deed as <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> certa<strong>in</strong>ty <strong>of</strong> salvation, becomes <strong>the</strong> center <strong>of</strong> evangelical<strong>the</strong>ology” (GA 54, 75-6/51). Assurance <strong>of</strong> salvation, for both Lu<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong>37C. A. L. Jarrott, “Erasmus’ Biblical Humanism,” Studies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Renaissance 17 (1970), pp. 119–25, 149–50.38See Carlos M. N. Eire, War Aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> Idols: The Reformation <strong>of</strong> Worship from Erasmus toCalv<strong>in</strong> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 1–27. The concept <strong>of</strong> “<strong>in</strong>carnational”<strong>the</strong>ology <strong>and</strong> religiosity refers to <strong>the</strong> sacramental <strong>the</strong>ology codified by <strong>the</strong> Fourth Lateran Council(1215). See also O’Connell, op. cit., pp. 37–8.
166 B. Radl<strong>of</strong>fCalv<strong>in</strong>, as Zachman argues, is a “form <strong>of</strong> reflexive self-knowledge.” 39 Themak<strong>in</strong>g-certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> biblical text as <strong>the</strong> true text, moreover, is <strong>in</strong>timately related to<strong>the</strong> subjective self-certa<strong>in</strong>ty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> believer, for assurance <strong>of</strong> salvation is won from apersonal, unmediated relation to <strong>the</strong> Scriptures. Assurance is lived <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> through <strong>the</strong>biblical text, for it is through <strong>the</strong> Word that <strong>the</strong> Holy Spirit illum<strong>in</strong>ates <strong>the</strong> believer. 40The mak<strong>in</strong>g-present <strong>of</strong> an object for a subject (believer) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> doctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> solascriptura as founded on <strong>the</strong> “certified” historical text are related on <strong>the</strong> commonground <strong>of</strong> subjectivity. “Biblical humanism” as anthropology is already a form <strong>of</strong>lived experience, for what is has its be<strong>in</strong>g only <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g “referred back to this life, i.e.,[it] is lived out, <strong>and</strong> becomes life-experience (Er-lebnis)” (GA 5, 92/AW, 134).Iconoclasm is directed aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> “idolization” <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> any representation,be it pictorial, sculptural, or <strong>the</strong>atrical. Does <strong>the</strong> “representational” conception <strong>of</strong>religious art, as aris<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world picture <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ception <strong>of</strong> modernity, <strong>of</strong>feran <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> flight <strong>of</strong> gods understood be<strong>in</strong>g-historically as an essential event<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> found<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> modernity? Picture (Bild) refers to how be<strong>in</strong>gs are represented(vorgestellt) for us; “world,” <strong>in</strong>cludes nature, history, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Weltgrund. “Worldpicture”refers to how be<strong>in</strong>gs are represented <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to a comprehensivesystem <strong>of</strong> relations <strong>in</strong>to which we ourselves are <strong>in</strong>tegrated. <strong>Heidegger</strong> holds thatmodernity, <strong>in</strong> contradist<strong>in</strong>ction to <strong>the</strong> Middle Ages <strong>and</strong> its doctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> analogiaentis, is <strong>in</strong>augurated by <strong>the</strong> becom<strong>in</strong>g-picture <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world: “What is, <strong>in</strong> its entirety,is now taken <strong>in</strong> such a way that it first is <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> only <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, to <strong>the</strong> extentthat it is set up by man, who represents <strong>and</strong> sets forth” (GA 5, 87/AW, 129). Whenthis happens, humans set <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> scene, that is, go on stage <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> openrealm <strong>of</strong> what is represented <strong>and</strong> established as <strong>the</strong> open. Hence that “<strong>the</strong> worldbecomes picture is one <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> same event with <strong>the</strong> event <strong>of</strong> man’s becom<strong>in</strong>g subiectum<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> midst <strong>of</strong> that which is” (GA 5, 90/AW, 132). This suggest that iconoclasm<strong>in</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>g-historical import is an <strong>in</strong>dication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> flight <strong>of</strong> gods from <strong>the</strong>“world.” The break<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image <strong>in</strong> its Bildwesen is <strong>in</strong>tegral to <strong>the</strong> dis-<strong>in</strong>tegration<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenal world <strong>of</strong> medieval <strong>in</strong>carnational Christianity—<strong>the</strong> world <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>correspondences—<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject-object “paradigm,” whichreplaces it, <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> world picture. Besançon suggests that what “changed withCalv<strong>in</strong>,” to constitute <strong>the</strong> ground <strong>of</strong> his iconoclasm, was not “<strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> God but<strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, which was de-deified.” Now “heaven <strong>and</strong> earth, ra<strong>the</strong>r thantell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e glory, are <strong>the</strong> deserted <strong>and</strong> neutral <strong>the</strong>ater on whose stage <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>dividual subject, if he has <strong>the</strong> gift <strong>of</strong> grace, can experience God as he declareshimself though his Word.” This “neutral stage” is <strong>in</strong>deed, as Besançon adds, <strong>the</strong>39R<strong>and</strong>all C. Zachman, Conscience <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Theology <strong>of</strong> Mart<strong>in</strong> Lu<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong> John Calv<strong>in</strong>. TheAssurance <strong>of</strong> Faith (M<strong>in</strong>neapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), summarizes <strong>the</strong> key po<strong>in</strong>t as follows: “Inorder to be fully assured <strong>of</strong> salvation, we must not only trust <strong>in</strong> Jesus Christ, but we must know wetrust <strong>in</strong> Jesus Christ....For both Lu<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong> Calv<strong>in</strong>, this <strong>in</strong>volves not only our know<strong>in</strong>g that we f<strong>in</strong>dassurance <strong>and</strong> peace <strong>of</strong> conscience <strong>in</strong> Jesus Christ alone – which is itself a form <strong>of</strong> reflexive selfknowledge,even if its object is outside ourselves – but we must also know that our faith is s<strong>in</strong>cere<strong>and</strong> not hypocritical, by f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> ourselves both <strong>the</strong> fear <strong>of</strong> God <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> testimony <strong>of</strong> a goodconscience” (230).40See Zachman, op. cit., pp. 217–18.
Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Notes on Div<strong>in</strong>e Images <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Light <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-Historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>167“almost Cartesian context” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> iconoclastic argument <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Institutes. 41 Ineffect, <strong>the</strong> world picture com-poses <strong>the</strong> stage <strong>of</strong> subjectivity upon which subject<strong>and</strong> image as object must appear. The world picture is <strong>the</strong> horizon <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>telligibility<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stallation. The world picture is evidently quite dist<strong>in</strong>ct from <strong>the</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> “world” <strong>Heidegger</strong> unfolds <strong>in</strong> “The Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Work <strong>of</strong> Art” <strong>and</strong>which guides his reflection on <strong>the</strong> Madonna <strong>of</strong> Raphael. 42 The world picture isfounded <strong>in</strong> re-presentation, which makes it clear that <strong>the</strong> relation between world<strong>and</strong> world picture is ultimately a be<strong>in</strong>g-historical relation. The co-ord<strong>in</strong>ated st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g-toge<strong>the</strong>r<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, that is, <strong>the</strong>ir systematic <strong>in</strong>ter-relation, <strong>Heidegger</strong> holds,belongs to <strong>the</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world picture (GA 5, 98/AW 141). System means:“<strong>the</strong> unity <strong>of</strong> structure <strong>in</strong> that which is represented as such, a unity that developsout <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> projection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> objectivity <strong>of</strong> whatever is” (GA 5, 98/AW, 141).Conversely, <strong>the</strong> Middle Ages did not allow for system, because all be<strong>in</strong>gs are governedby <strong>the</strong> order <strong>of</strong> correspondences. <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong>sists that <strong>the</strong> medieval <strong>the</strong>ory<strong>of</strong> correspondences, understood as <strong>the</strong> fundamental trait <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs,<strong>of</strong>fered determ<strong>in</strong>ed ways <strong>of</strong> sett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g to work <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. The art <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Middle Ages can only be thought <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> a world picture(GA 5, 100/AW, 143). The becom<strong>in</strong>g-picture <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “world” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> devaluation <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> images <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e “<strong>in</strong>” <strong>the</strong> world, <strong>and</strong> thus <strong>the</strong>ir reduction to be<strong>in</strong>g possibleobjects <strong>of</strong> iconoclasm, are correlative events <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ception <strong>of</strong> modernity. Theunity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> represented cannot allow <strong>the</strong> image as essential image, as this uniquemutual encounter <strong>of</strong> man <strong>and</strong> god(s), to be. Both past <strong>and</strong> future become objects <strong>of</strong>calculation, <strong>of</strong> Historie.The <strong>in</strong>carnation <strong>of</strong> Christ as an event <strong>in</strong> time conceived chronologically as a pastevent led to <strong>the</strong> valuation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> historically secured biblical text as <strong>the</strong> site <strong>of</strong> experience<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>carnation. The phenomenal world, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong> image, cannot“provide access to <strong>the</strong> sacred” because <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>carnation <strong>of</strong> Christ perta<strong>in</strong>s only to hisembodied historical existence. The <strong>in</strong>carnation speaks to us solely through <strong>the</strong>scriptures. Incarnational <strong>the</strong>ology, conversely, implies <strong>the</strong> transformation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> creationitself. 43 The objectification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> past by historical-critical research would<strong>the</strong>refore be <strong>in</strong>tegral to <strong>the</strong> reduction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image to an idol. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s argument <strong>in</strong> “The Age <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> World Picture,” <strong>and</strong> aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness,<strong>the</strong> representation <strong>of</strong> nature <strong>and</strong> history determ<strong>in</strong>e both as objects, <strong>and</strong> only asobjects are <strong>the</strong>y allowed to be (GA 5 84-5/AW, 126-7; GA 66, 234/107). As anobject <strong>the</strong> image <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e is <strong>in</strong> fact an idol. Temporally it is determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> terms<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Now <strong>of</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>g-present. This Now is an event “<strong>in</strong>” time. The <strong>in</strong>carnation <strong>of</strong>Christ is a past event “<strong>in</strong>” time <strong>and</strong> his second com<strong>in</strong>g is an anticipated event “at” afuture time – <strong>the</strong> event that ends time. Tak<strong>in</strong>g a clue from <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s lectures on41Alan Besançon, The Forbidden Image: An Intellectual History <strong>of</strong> Iconoclasm, trans. Jane MarieTodd (Chicago: University <strong>of</strong> Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 186–87.42Jürgen Gediant <strong>of</strong>fers an illum<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> agonistic relation between world <strong>and</strong> worldpicture<strong>in</strong> “Zur Geschichtlichkeit der Kunst,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 14, (1998): 85–92. See esp.pp. 87–9.43See O’Connell, op cit, p. 47.
168 B. Radl<strong>of</strong>fSt Paul we can see that what is at stake here are two different underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>parousίa. The orig<strong>in</strong>al sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> parousίa signifies that Christian factical lifelives historicity itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> one’s hav<strong>in</strong>g-become called to Christ. Theenactment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “past” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “future” as promise, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Now <strong>of</strong> serv<strong>in</strong>g(doul∈ύ∈<strong>in</strong>) <strong>and</strong> wait<strong>in</strong>g (άnamέn∈<strong>in</strong>), signifies <strong>the</strong> comportment <strong>of</strong> a turn<strong>in</strong>gawayfrom <strong>the</strong> idols <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world toward God (GA 60, 95, 112/65, 79). Theparousίa, <strong>the</strong>refore, is not understood as an expected end-time, but is <strong>the</strong> Now <strong>of</strong>witness<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> presence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Messiah through one’s comportment. One does notmake God an object <strong>of</strong> speculation <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> expectation <strong>of</strong> an event “<strong>in</strong>”objective-historical time: “To <strong>the</strong> Christian, only his tò nØn [now] <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> complex<strong>of</strong> enactment <strong>in</strong> which he really st<strong>and</strong>s is decisive, but not <strong>the</strong> anticipation <strong>of</strong> a specialevent that is futurally situated <strong>in</strong> temporality” (GA 60, 114/81).Iconoclasm, <strong>the</strong>refore, is only possible for Reformation <strong>the</strong>ology on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> found<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world picture. Only <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> wake <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> reduction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image toits be<strong>in</strong>g-present for a subject can it be conceived an idol, for to be an idol signifiesmistak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>g-present for <strong>the</strong> God toward which it “po<strong>in</strong>ts.” But assuch, <strong>in</strong> its mere be<strong>in</strong>g-present, <strong>the</strong> image as <strong>the</strong> refusal <strong>of</strong> objectivity, <strong>and</strong> as <strong>the</strong>withdrawal <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-present, is concealed. The consummation <strong>of</strong> modernity acceleratesits <strong>in</strong>ception: <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-present <strong>of</strong> an object is transformed <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> actuality<strong>of</strong> a function. The image is experienced <strong>in</strong> its pure actuality for consciousness, <strong>and</strong>serves <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tensification <strong>of</strong> consciousness. In Walter Benjam<strong>in</strong>’s dialectical <strong>in</strong>terpretation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> mass consciousness, aes<strong>the</strong>tics, <strong>and</strong> technology, <strong>the</strong>image loses <strong>the</strong> “distance” that allows it to unfold its “aura”; what it ga<strong>in</strong>s is <strong>the</strong>“revolutionary” power <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> transformation <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual contemplation<strong>in</strong>to collective agitation. Liberated from “parasitical” dependence on religious ritual,<strong>the</strong> image can be fully <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to technology – hence <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>film, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> collective experience it <strong>of</strong>fers, for Benjam<strong>in</strong>. 44 The consummation <strong>of</strong>modernity, under <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> (post-)modern <strong>in</strong>formation technologies, manifests<strong>the</strong> degradation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word to a “sound-byte” <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> elevation <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> image <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> imploded form <strong>of</strong> its mere actuality as affect. Information <strong>and</strong>affect are mutually attuned to each o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> production <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>tegrated whole.The functional unity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world picture overshadows both word <strong>and</strong> image asways <strong>of</strong> reveal<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> phenomena as phenomena. The <strong>in</strong>ceptualobjectification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image is consummated <strong>in</strong> its functional <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong>44In his account <strong>of</strong> modern art, Benjam<strong>in</strong> emphasizes <strong>the</strong> dialectical relationship <strong>of</strong> technology <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> generation <strong>of</strong> mass, collective consciousness, especially <strong>in</strong> his discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> c<strong>in</strong>ema. See“Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter se<strong>in</strong>er technischen Reproduzierbarkeit,” op. cit., pp.31–41; trans. pp.229–40. Benjam<strong>in</strong>’s essay on art <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s “Die Kunst im Zeitalter der Vollendung derNeuzeit” could be brought <strong>in</strong>to fruitful contact with particular reference to <strong>the</strong> fate <strong>of</strong> religious art<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> shadow <strong>of</strong> modernity. While <strong>the</strong>ir premises are radically dist<strong>in</strong>ct, one will f<strong>in</strong>d a perhapssurpris<strong>in</strong>g similarity <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenological ‘results’ <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> explication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> death <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> artwork.This only makes <strong>the</strong> fundamental difference between Benjam<strong>in</strong>’s underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> consummation<strong>of</strong> modernity <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> an o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g founded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>dist<strong>in</strong>ction <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs (<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs) all <strong>the</strong> more extreme <strong>and</strong>unbridgeable.
Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Notes on Div<strong>in</strong>e Images <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Light <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-Historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>169<strong>in</strong>stallation. This is one essential way <strong>in</strong> which god withdraws from a world that isno world. In <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> primacy <strong>of</strong> representationalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g evidences <strong>the</strong> triumph <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir functionality <strong>and</strong> loss <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g,<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> oblivion <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g. The iconoclasm <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ception <strong>of</strong> modernity <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>techno-iconoclasm <strong>of</strong> its consummation both, <strong>in</strong> different ways, manifest this triumph<strong>and</strong> oblivion: <strong>the</strong> one, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> reduction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image to an idol, <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image <strong>in</strong>to mach<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>and</strong> lived experience.7 Gods do not create humans; humans did not <strong>in</strong>vent <strong>the</strong> gods (GA 66, 235/208). Ra<strong>the</strong>r,<strong>Heidegger</strong> writes, <strong>the</strong> “truth <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g decides ‘on’ both but not by prevail<strong>in</strong>g over<strong>the</strong>m but by enown<strong>in</strong>g itself between <strong>the</strong>m <strong>and</strong> thus by first enown<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong>mselvesunto <strong>the</strong> counter<strong>in</strong>g [Ent-gegnung]” (GA 66, 235/208). Therefore, everyth<strong>in</strong>gdepends on how be-<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>in</strong>to its truth <strong>and</strong> on how this truth is grounded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>en-counter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> man <strong>and</strong> god(s). Only thus, accord<strong>in</strong>gly, will <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>nam<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> gods be fulfilled (GA 66, 235/208-9). The gift<strong>in</strong>g-refusal <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g shelters<strong>the</strong> mystery (Geheimnis), which historically comes to pass as <strong>the</strong> flight <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> arrival<strong>of</strong> gods. As mentioned at <strong>the</strong> outset, Emad’s two <strong>in</strong>terrelated clues – <strong>the</strong> methodologicalissue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> hermeneutic phenomenology to be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g,<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> flight <strong>of</strong> gods – po<strong>in</strong>t to <strong>the</strong> “undecidability” <strong>of</strong> “decid<strong>in</strong>g”Da-se<strong>in</strong>’s place on <strong>the</strong> earth through its openness to this mystery.Every objectification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “explanatory reckon<strong>in</strong>g” with <strong>the</strong> god, forexample, as creator, has its ground <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gness (Seiendheit) as <strong>the</strong> production <strong>of</strong>presence (GA 66, 236/209). When this happens, be<strong>in</strong>g-a-cause as such is made <strong>the</strong>criterion <strong>of</strong> div<strong>in</strong>ity, <strong>and</strong> God as highest cause constitutes <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>ization <strong>of</strong> causalityitself (GA 66, 240/212). This creates <strong>the</strong> appearance <strong>of</strong> transcendent spirituality,<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore, <strong>in</strong> respect to iconoclasm, every “material” representation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> god <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> image must be mis-apprehended as a degradation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e. For <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gness<strong>of</strong> God as highest cause is presupposed <strong>in</strong> this experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image; <strong>the</strong> imageitself is represented for a subject; <strong>and</strong> this constitutes a be<strong>in</strong>g-lost to be<strong>in</strong>gs, even if<strong>and</strong> when <strong>the</strong> image is “broken” <strong>and</strong> cast aside, for it is cast aside as a false image <strong>of</strong>God. The cast<strong>in</strong>g-aside presupposes <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction <strong>of</strong> true <strong>and</strong> false images <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>this way degrades God to be<strong>in</strong>g a representation. Calv<strong>in</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>junctions aga<strong>in</strong>st imagesillustrate this clearly, for he proposes that <strong>the</strong> Eucharist <strong>and</strong> Baptism, both revealed<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> scriptures, are <strong>the</strong> sole true images <strong>of</strong> God (Institutes I. xi. xiii). 45 Re-presentation<strong>in</strong> fact reduces <strong>the</strong> image to its be<strong>in</strong>g-present; no longer a “w<strong>in</strong>dow” to <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e,45“The notion that <strong>the</strong> Eucharist should be <strong>the</strong> only worthy image – an iconoclastic pr<strong>in</strong>ciple parexcellence – had been refuted by <strong>the</strong> common belief that <strong>the</strong> holy species were not <strong>the</strong> image but<strong>the</strong> reality <strong>of</strong> God himself: Calv<strong>in</strong>, who did not have such an unconditional faith <strong>in</strong> real Presence,was consequently able to assign <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong> an image, this time <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> strongest <strong>and</strong> almosticonic sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term.” Besançon, op. cit., p. 188.
170 B. Radl<strong>of</strong>fit loses its unique character as Bild. The subjective posit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image as idol aswell as <strong>the</strong> destruction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image-idol are both exemplary evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> flight <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Christian God: “God” as causal ground signifies that be<strong>in</strong>gs are to be understoodas produced, <strong>and</strong> as produced <strong>the</strong>y not only suffer a loss <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g but also, by presuppos<strong>in</strong>gGod to be a causal ground, God is deprived <strong>of</strong> his godhood, <strong>the</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g,<strong>and</strong> safeguard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> a mystery.ReferencesAston, Margaret. 2000. Engl<strong>and</strong>’s iconoclasts, Laws aga<strong>in</strong>st images, vol. 1. 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Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly Contributions to philosophy (Fromenown<strong>in</strong>g). Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1993. In Basic writ<strong>in</strong>gs, ed. D.F. Krell. New York: Harper & Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1995. Phänomenologie des Religiösen Lebens. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann.Trans. Matthias Fritsch <strong>and</strong> Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei. 2004. The phenomenology <strong>of</strong> religiouslife. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.
Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Notes on Div<strong>in</strong>e Images <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Light <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-Historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>171<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1997. Bes<strong>in</strong>nung. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>. 2007. Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> ThomasKalary. M<strong>in</strong>dfulness. London: Cont<strong>in</strong>uum.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1998a. Die Geschichte des Seyns, GA 69. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1998b. In Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.Jarrott, C.A.L. 1970. Erasmus’ biblical humanism. Studies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Renaissance 17: 119–150.Kisiel, Theodore. 1993. The genesis <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time. Berkeley: University <strong>of</strong>California Press.Koerner, Joseph Leo. 2008. The reformation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> image. Chicago: University <strong>of</strong> Chicago Press.McGrath, S.J. 2006. The early <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> medieval philosophy. Phenomenology for <strong>the</strong>godforsaken. Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, D.C: The Catholic University <strong>of</strong> America Press.O’Connell, Michael. 2000. The idolatrous eye: Iconoclasm <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ater <strong>in</strong> early-modern Engl<strong>and</strong>.New York: Oxford University Press.Sena, Marylou. 2004. Nietzsche’s new ground<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> metaphysical: Sensuousness <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>subversion <strong>of</strong> plato <strong>and</strong> platonism. Research <strong>in</strong> Phenomenology 34: 139–159.St. John <strong>of</strong> Damascus. 2003. Three treatises on <strong>the</strong> div<strong>in</strong>e images. Trans. Andrew Louth. Crestwood:St Vladimir’s Sem<strong>in</strong>ar Press.Streeter, Ryan. 1997. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s formal <strong>in</strong>dication: A question <strong>of</strong> method <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time.Man <strong>and</strong> World 30: 413–430.van Buren, John. 1994. The young <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Rumor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hidden k<strong>in</strong>g. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: IndianaUniversity Press.Yates, Frances A. 1985. Astraea: The imperial <strong>the</strong>me <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sixteenth century. London: ArkPaperbacks.Zachman, R<strong>and</strong>all C. 1993. Conscience <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ology <strong>of</strong> Mart<strong>in</strong> Lu<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong> John Calv<strong>in</strong>. Theassurance <strong>of</strong> faith. M<strong>in</strong>neapolis: Fortress Press.
Part IIIThe Place <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>
A Conversation with Parvis Emadon <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong><strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>Frank SchalowThe publication <strong>of</strong> Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) <strong>in</strong> 1989, <strong>and</strong> its translationa decade later under <strong>the</strong> title, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g), hasdramatically transformed <strong>the</strong> l<strong>and</strong>scape for underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> appropriat<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought. Because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pivotal importance <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’stext, <strong>the</strong> English translation has also assumed special prom<strong>in</strong>ence, if only as a result<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> degree <strong>of</strong> controversy it has stirred.Given <strong>the</strong> highly volatile character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dispute over this <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r translations,it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to counterbalance all <strong>the</strong> various disagreements.With<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> this Festschrift, however, we have <strong>the</strong> unique opportunityto re-exam<strong>in</strong>e some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> key translation “decisions” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> precise words <strong>of</strong>one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translators <strong>of</strong> Contributions to Philosophy. The follow<strong>in</strong>g reproduces atranscript <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad’s responses to many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se decisions, as well as his own<strong>in</strong>sights <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> methodology <strong>of</strong> translation. It is hoped that this “Conversation,”when read with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g papers, will cast light on <strong>the</strong> aforementioned“controversy.”As <strong>Heidegger</strong> repeatedly emphasizes, th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is always a gift <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g (Seyn),which, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> wake <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g’s “gift<strong>in</strong>g refusal,” necessarily is ushered with a genu<strong>in</strong>esense <strong>of</strong> thankfulness. In M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, among o<strong>the</strong>r places, <strong>Heidegger</strong> reiterates thisview when he says: “<strong>the</strong> splendor <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> rests upon <strong>the</strong> alternat<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> overreach<strong>in</strong>gstruggle that consumes with<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> belongs to <strong>the</strong> self, shelters <strong>and</strong> conceals<strong>the</strong> most reticent <strong>and</strong> yet rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong>expressibly grateful for every little help.” 11<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Bes<strong>in</strong>nung, GA 66 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997), p. 428.M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Thomas Kalary (London: Cont<strong>in</strong>uum Press, 2006), p. 378.F. Schalow (*)Department <strong>of</strong> Philosophy, University <strong>of</strong> New Orleans, 2000 Lakeshore Dr.,70148 New Orleans, LA, USAe-mail: fschalow@uno.eduF. Schalow (ed.), <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad, Contributions To Phenomenology 65,DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0_9, © Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media B.V. 2011175
176 F. SchalowLet me beg<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong>n, by say<strong>in</strong>g that I am grateful, Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Emad, for your will<strong>in</strong>gnessto engage <strong>in</strong> this conversation, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby provide an occasion to project-open <strong>the</strong>question <strong>of</strong> translation, not merely as an academic exercise, but as a signpost along <strong>the</strong>path <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. As we proceed with this dialogue, I will put several questions to you,<strong>and</strong> present your responses to <strong>the</strong>m for <strong>the</strong> benefit <strong>of</strong> an audience who is both steeped<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> challenged by <strong>the</strong> complex issues <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir translation.***Frank Schalow: Ever s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time <strong>in</strong> 1962, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>to English has establisheditself as a pivotal issue <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> study <strong>of</strong> his thought. Yet, while over <strong>the</strong> years,various discussions have gravitated toward that issue, only with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past decadehas it become <strong>the</strong> axis around which <strong>the</strong> entire <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sphilosophy revolves. The catalyst for this dramatic change <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> focus <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>studies has occurred as <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong> Contributions to Philosophy:(From Enown<strong>in</strong>g), <strong>and</strong> its sequel M<strong>in</strong>dfulness. As <strong>the</strong> co-translator <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se translations,you have helped to spearhead this change by draw<strong>in</strong>g attention to <strong>the</strong> directsynergy between <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic method govern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’swrit<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g his philosophy. At <strong>the</strong> forefront <strong>of</strong> this developmentis your pioneer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> difference between <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation lead<strong>in</strong>g specifically to <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> how <strong>the</strong> former, which is<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own way <strong>of</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g words(Grundworte) <strong>of</strong> his philosophy, guides <strong>the</strong> latter when <strong>the</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> wordsfrom <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s German <strong>in</strong>to English takes shape. What at first sight had beenconstrued as represent<strong>in</strong>g two separate endeavors – one aim<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r devoted to translat<strong>in</strong>g his writ<strong>in</strong>gs – you have,through <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation, <strong>in</strong>terwoven <strong>in</strong>to aunified task <strong>and</strong> mission.Beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> obvious, <strong>the</strong>re are different views <strong>of</strong> translation, even with<strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> hermeneutic tradition. In this regard, what do you consider to be s<strong>in</strong>gular, unique,<strong>and</strong> decisive about <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s hermeneutic method govern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation,that sets it apart from o<strong>the</strong>r approaches, for example, that <strong>of</strong> Paul Ricoeur?Parvis Emad.: Let me first address <strong>the</strong> last part <strong>of</strong> this question by say<strong>in</strong>g thatRicoeur’s views on translation belong to <strong>the</strong> vast stock <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ories on <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation advanced from Cicero <strong>and</strong> Goe<strong>the</strong> to Walter Benjam<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> beyond.Common to all <strong>the</strong>se <strong>the</strong>ories is <strong>the</strong>ir concern with <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> validity <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation. This concern is expressed <strong>in</strong> three dist<strong>in</strong>ct positions: (1) that<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation “produces” noth<strong>in</strong>g but a distorted version <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al,(2) that basically an <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation is possible that “produces” an absolutelyidentical version <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al, <strong>and</strong> (3) that <strong>the</strong> “products” <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation need not be rejected or accepted wholesale, for <strong>the</strong>y take <strong>the</strong>ir place nextto <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al <strong>and</strong> do not replace it. These three positions also shape Ricouer’sviews on translation as laid out <strong>in</strong> his book, Sur la traduction. 22Paul Ricoeur, Sur la traduction (Paris: Bayard, 2004).
A Conversation with Parvis Emad on <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>177Exposed to <strong>the</strong> overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g (das Denkendes Se<strong>in</strong>s) as this th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is nurtured <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g orSe<strong>in</strong>sfrage, <strong>the</strong>se positions undergo a pr<strong>of</strong>ound transformation <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>. Just asthis th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g transforms our underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> mortality, space, time, technology,<strong>and</strong> science (to name only a few), <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g also transforms ourunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> validity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation. To br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>to view <strong>the</strong> most salient feature <strong>of</strong> this transformation, we need to recall that<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s hermeneutic method govern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation beg<strong>in</strong>s <strong>and</strong> endswith what he calls “<strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> language” or “das Wesen der Sprache.” This“ownmost” is not <strong>the</strong> property <strong>of</strong> any given language nor is it <strong>the</strong> universal “essence”<strong>of</strong> all languages. Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> mo<strong>the</strong>r tongue nor <strong>the</strong> entries <strong>in</strong> a dictionarypossess <strong>and</strong> thus provide an access to this “ownmost,” <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s hermeneuticmethod govern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation questions <strong>the</strong> supremacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mo<strong>the</strong>rtongue, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> authority <strong>of</strong> a dictionary. It is <strong>in</strong> his Hölderl<strong>in</strong> lecture course text <strong>of</strong>1942 that <strong>Heidegger</strong> shows why <strong>the</strong> authority <strong>of</strong> a dictionary should be questioned,<strong>and</strong> it is <strong>in</strong> his Parmenides lecture course text <strong>of</strong> 1942/43 that he addresses <strong>the</strong>supremacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mo<strong>the</strong>r tongue. 3Orig<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g from with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> language, <strong>and</strong> freed from <strong>the</strong> supremacy<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mo<strong>the</strong>r tongue <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> authority <strong>of</strong> a dictionary, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s hermeneuticmethod govern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation assigns a derivative status to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation, while giv<strong>in</strong>g a more orig<strong>in</strong>al <strong>and</strong> prom<strong>in</strong>ent status to <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation. It is this orig<strong>in</strong>al <strong>and</strong> prom<strong>in</strong>ent status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation that<strong>in</strong> my view def<strong>in</strong>es what is s<strong>in</strong>gular, unique, <strong>and</strong> decisive about <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s hermeneuticmethod govern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation <strong>and</strong> sets this method apart formo<strong>the</strong>r approaches to translation like that <strong>of</strong> Paul Ricoeur. Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as Ricoeur is stuck<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> validity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as he has no<strong>in</strong>kl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> de facto occurrence <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, wecannot expect Ricoeur to make any contribution to our underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong>translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs.F.S. Paul Ricouer may not have been <strong>the</strong> first, <strong>and</strong> probably will not be <strong>the</strong> last,to suggest that every “translation <strong>in</strong>volves an <strong>in</strong>terpretation.” On <strong>the</strong> surface, thisstatement makes sense. But <strong>the</strong>n aga<strong>in</strong>, appearances can sometimes be mislead<strong>in</strong>g.We must remember that <strong>Heidegger</strong> construes “<strong>in</strong>terpretation” ontologically as <strong>the</strong>disclosedness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, as a way <strong>of</strong> “project<strong>in</strong>g open” its “mean<strong>in</strong>g.” That is, <strong>in</strong>terpretationis a fundamental way <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpreter belongs to this disclosedness,<strong>and</strong> is claimed by it, ra<strong>the</strong>r than simply <strong>of</strong>fer<strong>in</strong>g one subjective viewpo<strong>in</strong>tamong o<strong>the</strong>rs. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, we must also recall that with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>Time <strong>Heidegger</strong> outl<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation from <strong>the</strong> “transcendentalhorizonalperspective.” Could it be <strong>the</strong> case that, conversely, translation – understood<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gually (as <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong> transmitt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “ground<strong>in</strong>g words”) as3<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Parmenides, GA 54 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982), p. 18.Parmenides, trans. André Schuwer <strong>and</strong> Richard Rojcewicz (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana UniversityPress, 1992), p. 12.
178 F. Schalowwell as <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gually (understood as transmitt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “ground<strong>in</strong>g words”from German <strong>in</strong>to English) – actually provides both <strong>the</strong> directive <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>alimpetus for <strong>in</strong>terpretation? By pos<strong>in</strong>g this question, we enter <strong>the</strong> orbit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>ghistoricalperspective” (lack<strong>in</strong>g by Ricoeur <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs), <strong>in</strong> which case orig<strong>in</strong>arytranslation would itself be an enactment <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, which provides <strong>the</strong> hermeneuticguidel<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> thrust <strong>of</strong> “returnership” with<strong>in</strong> any act <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation.P.E.: By outl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>in</strong> which both <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>and</strong> translation are housed<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical perspectives, you show clearlythat when it comes to <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>the</strong>se two issues assume special status <strong>and</strong> requirespecial treatment. It seems to me that we will overlook this special status <strong>and</strong> specialtreatment when we apply Ricouer’s position to <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> hold that “every translation<strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s key words <strong>and</strong> phrases <strong>in</strong>volves an <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m.” Wealso overlook this special status <strong>and</strong> special treatment when we hold that “translation<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation are not dist<strong>in</strong>ct moments but are like a wave <strong>and</strong> its crest.” 4 Both<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se views come with dangerous consequences, <strong>the</strong> most important <strong>of</strong> which is<strong>the</strong> complete disregard for mistranslations that beset <strong>the</strong> renditions <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’skeywords <strong>and</strong> phrases. If, for example, <strong>the</strong> renditions <strong>of</strong> die Kehre as “reversal” <strong>and</strong><strong>of</strong> Wesen as “essence” are translations <strong>in</strong>dist<strong>in</strong>ct from <strong>in</strong>terpretation, <strong>the</strong>n nei<strong>the</strong>rreversal nor essence is a mistranslation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s keywords <strong>and</strong> phrases:“reversal” is as good <strong>and</strong> appropriate a rendition <strong>of</strong> die Kehre as is “turn<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>and</strong>essence is as accurate <strong>and</strong> acceptable a rendition <strong>of</strong> Wesen as is “ownmost.” Themoment we assume that translation <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation are not dist<strong>in</strong>ct moments butare like “a wave <strong>and</strong> its crest,” we also assume that <strong>in</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s keywords<strong>and</strong> phrases, everyth<strong>in</strong>g goes: “oblivion <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g” for <strong>in</strong>stance is as good as“forgetfulness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> latter as good as “forgottenness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g.” Themoment we assume that translation <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation are not dist<strong>in</strong>ct moments, wealso assume that “essentialism” is as precise <strong>and</strong> appropriate a characterization <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought as is its characterization as <strong>the</strong> “th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g.”The o<strong>the</strong>r danger, which ensues from overlook<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> special status <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s keywords <strong>and</strong> phrases, lies <strong>in</strong> fail<strong>in</strong>g to realize that translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>mrequires that each be projected-open. To relativize <strong>the</strong> connection between translation<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation by ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g that translation <strong>in</strong>volves <strong>in</strong>terpretation, or toabolish <strong>the</strong> differences between translation <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation by suggest<strong>in</strong>g that<strong>the</strong>y are not dist<strong>in</strong>ct moments, amounts to fail<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’skeywords <strong>and</strong> phrases by project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m. And <strong>the</strong> full enactment <strong>of</strong> suchproject<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g refers <strong>the</strong> translator as th<strong>in</strong>ker to what <strong>Heidegger</strong> calls“returnership.” Project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g each key word <strong>and</strong> phrase <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gcannot be achieved by seek<strong>in</strong>g recourse <strong>in</strong> dictionaries. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, it must take itsorientation from <strong>the</strong> words hidden <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> treasury <strong>of</strong> “returnership.” As I have statedelsewhere, “ra<strong>the</strong>r than th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> translation as a means lead<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>terpretation,4For a fur<strong>the</strong>r discussion <strong>of</strong> this issue, see Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Ivo De Gennaro, “Putt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Seed:‘Say<strong>in</strong>g Aga<strong>in</strong>’ or ‘Approximat<strong>in</strong>g’ <strong>and</strong> O<strong>the</strong>r Questions Concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Interl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong><strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Keywords,” Existentia, 19/3–4 (2009): 186.
A Conversation with Parvis Emad on <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>179we necessarily have to th<strong>in</strong>k <strong>of</strong> translation as a permanent, <strong>and</strong> perhaps as a thrustpowerfully present with<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation.” 5 The mere exegencies <strong>of</strong> “returnership”not only enliven, susta<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g to fruition <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> translation, but also doexactly <strong>the</strong> same <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation.F.S.: There are certa<strong>in</strong> keywords <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be-<strong>in</strong>gwhose <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation seems to be almost impossible. One such word isEreignis. How does <strong>the</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Ereignis as “enown<strong>in</strong>g” both orig<strong>in</strong>ate from,<strong>and</strong> confirm your key <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> de facto occurrence <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation?P.E.: To respond to this question, I must beg<strong>in</strong> with address<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> two different<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> keyword Ereignis. At two junctures <strong>in</strong> his path <strong>of</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>Heidegger</strong> comes upon this word Ereignis, translates it <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gually, <strong>and</strong>gives it two entirely new <strong>and</strong> different mean<strong>in</strong>gs. We f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong> first juncture <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>War Emergency lecture course text <strong>of</strong> 1919, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> second one <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1936–1938written text Contributions to Philosophy. In <strong>the</strong> first juncture, <strong>Heidegger</strong> shows howlived-experience atta<strong>in</strong>s its structure when <strong>the</strong> environ<strong>in</strong>g world (Umwelt) lights up,<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> second juncture, he is concerned with <strong>the</strong> question “How does be-<strong>in</strong>g(Seyn) sway?”In <strong>the</strong> first juncture, he shows that when <strong>the</strong> environ<strong>in</strong>g world lights up, <strong>the</strong> livedexperience(Erlebnis) will be “made one’s own.” However, this “mak<strong>in</strong>g one’s own”<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lived-experience resonates along with <strong>the</strong> “I”: it is not someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “I”accomplishes. Consider<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> lived-experience <strong>of</strong> see<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> lectern <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> lecturehall, <strong>Heidegger</strong> says:In see<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> lectern I am fully <strong>the</strong>reby with my I, which …resonates along with this see<strong>in</strong>gas a lived-experience specifically for me … However, this lived-experience is not a processbut a mak<strong>in</strong>g one’s own (e<strong>in</strong> Ereignis) …....The lived-experience does not pass by <strong>in</strong> front<strong>of</strong> me like a th<strong>in</strong>g that I place before myself as an object. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, I myself make it my own(er-eigne es mir) as it comes to pass accord<strong>in</strong>g to its ownmost. 6In <strong>the</strong> War Emergency lecture course text <strong>of</strong> 1919 <strong>the</strong>n <strong>Heidegger</strong> translatesEreignis <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gually as “mak<strong>in</strong>g one’s own.” This means that <strong>in</strong> this lecture coursetext, Ereignis has rel<strong>in</strong>quished its familiar mean<strong>in</strong>g, “event,” <strong>and</strong> has acquired a newmean<strong>in</strong>g to which <strong>Heidegger</strong> alludes when he hyphenates er-eigne <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> phrase“er-eigne es mir,” “mak<strong>in</strong>g it my own.”In <strong>the</strong> second juncture, <strong>Heidegger</strong> is exclusively concerned with <strong>the</strong> question“How does be-<strong>in</strong>g sway?” to which he responds by say<strong>in</strong>g that be-<strong>in</strong>g sways asEreignis. Here too he focuses on <strong>the</strong> syllable “eignis,” <strong>and</strong> rel<strong>in</strong>quishes <strong>the</strong> familiarmean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word “Ereignis,” that is, “event.” However, while <strong>in</strong> 1919 <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>of</strong> this syllable reflects <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phrase “er-eignees mir”or “mak<strong>in</strong>g it my own,” which is a process tak<strong>in</strong>g shape when <strong>the</strong> environ<strong>in</strong>g5Ibid., p. 187.6<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, GA 56/57 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann,1987), p. 75. For a fur<strong>the</strong>r discussion <strong>of</strong> this passage, see Parvis Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sContributions to Philosophy (Madison, WI: The University <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press, 2007), pp. 25–26.
180 F. Schalowworld lights up, <strong>in</strong> 1936–1938, his <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>of</strong> this syllable eignis isshaped by <strong>the</strong> word “ownhood” (Eigentum), which comes to pass when be-<strong>in</strong>g’ssway lights up as an “enabl<strong>in</strong>g own<strong>in</strong>g.” 7 As erroneous as it is to take Ereignis asmean<strong>in</strong>g an “event,” it is equally erroneous to take Eigentum or “ownhood” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>sense <strong>of</strong> property <strong>and</strong> possession. Here, Eigentum rem<strong>in</strong>ds us <strong>of</strong> Reichtum,Königstum, Dichtertum, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> like: <strong>in</strong> this word, <strong>the</strong> construct “tum” <strong>in</strong>dicates adoma<strong>in</strong>, a realm, <strong>and</strong> sometimes a sphere.To capture <strong>and</strong> reflect this “enabl<strong>in</strong>g own<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>of</strong>“Ereignis” from German <strong>in</strong>to English, I heeded this “enabl<strong>in</strong>g own<strong>in</strong>g” to which<strong>Heidegger</strong> calls attention by hyphenat<strong>in</strong>g “Er-eignis,” <strong>and</strong> brought this word <strong>in</strong>toEnglish with <strong>the</strong> word “en-own<strong>in</strong>g.” This word is m<strong>in</strong>utely constructed <strong>in</strong> accordancewith, <strong>and</strong> reflects <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>of</strong> “Er-eignis” <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>aras <strong>the</strong> prefix “en” st<strong>and</strong>s for <strong>the</strong> prefix “Er-,” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> word “own<strong>in</strong>g” for <strong>the</strong> syllable“eignis.” Consider<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> significantly different mean<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> Ereignis <strong>in</strong> 1919 <strong>and</strong>1936–1938, it should not be difficult to realize how erroneous <strong>and</strong> mislead<strong>in</strong>g itwould be to follow those who, while proclaim<strong>in</strong>g “<strong>the</strong> demise” <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time,see no difference between <strong>the</strong> 1919 <strong>and</strong> 1936–1938 renditions <strong>of</strong> Ereignis, <strong>and</strong> thusadopt Gadamer’s misconception by wrongly assum<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong>Contributions to Philosophy returns to his 1919 usage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word Ereignis. Thebe<strong>in</strong>g-historical mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word Er-eignis should not be confused with <strong>the</strong>mean<strong>in</strong>g this word had <strong>in</strong> 1919, that is, a time when <strong>Heidegger</strong> was tak<strong>in</strong>g a fewprelim<strong>in</strong>ary steps that by 1927 would lead him to <strong>the</strong> path <strong>of</strong> transcendentalhorizonalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g culm<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time.You ask to what extent “enown<strong>in</strong>g” orig<strong>in</strong>ates from, <strong>and</strong> confirms <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to<strong>the</strong> de facto occurrence <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>.My answer is that given <strong>the</strong> correspondence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> prefix “en-” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> syllable“own<strong>in</strong>g” to <strong>the</strong> prefix “Er-” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> syllable “eignis,” it is <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation <strong>of</strong> Ereignis that susta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>of</strong> Ereignis as“enown<strong>in</strong>g.” Hav<strong>in</strong>g said this, I must hasten to add that what an appropriate <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation attempts to achieve is an approximation <strong>and</strong> never an exact substitutionor an absolute transfer. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, <strong>the</strong> word “enown<strong>in</strong>g” approximates <strong>the</strong>dynamism as captured through <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>of</strong> Ereignis, without pretend<strong>in</strong>gto replace <strong>the</strong> word Ereignis. To pretend that “enown<strong>in</strong>g” replaces <strong>the</strong> wordEreignis is to ignore two th<strong>in</strong>gs: (1) that <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, Ereignis,much like <strong>the</strong> Greek lόgoV is a s<strong>in</strong>gulare tantum, <strong>and</strong> (2) that as an approximaterendition, “enown<strong>in</strong>g” emerges out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> doma<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> stillness (die Stille) <strong>and</strong> freedom,which is a far cry from <strong>the</strong> sphere where <strong>the</strong> dispute over <strong>the</strong> validity <strong>of</strong> an<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> keyword Ereignis actually takes place. An <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation <strong>of</strong> this keyword purport<strong>in</strong>g to be valid at all costs should be a replacement,an exact substitute <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al, <strong>and</strong> should function as a vehicle for an absolutetransfer. But as I have shown elsewhere, none <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se terms – replacement, exact7On <strong>the</strong> matter <strong>of</strong> designat<strong>in</strong>g eignis as a syllable <strong>and</strong> its <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation, see F.-W. vonHerrmann, Hermeneutik und Reflexion (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000), pp. 49–52.
A Conversation with Parvis Emad on <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>181substitute, absolute transfer – applies to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> key words<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Ereignis. 8Those who submit to <strong>the</strong> authority <strong>of</strong> a dictionary by render<strong>in</strong>g Ereignis as“event,” or opt for “appropriation” or “event <strong>of</strong> appropriation” or use <strong>the</strong> neologism“properiz<strong>in</strong>g event,” overlook <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>in</strong> his writ<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>Heidegger</strong> is alwaysengaged <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation. The renditions <strong>of</strong> Ereignis just mentioned notonly are based on a total lack <strong>of</strong> awareness <strong>of</strong> an ongo<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>in</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>, but also demonstrate that those renditions, each claim<strong>in</strong>g to be an exactsubstitute <strong>of</strong> Ereignis, are entrenched <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> dispute over <strong>the</strong> validity <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s keywords. Would those who propose such renditions<strong>of</strong> Ereignis as “appropriation,” “event <strong>of</strong> appropriation,” or “properiz<strong>in</strong>g event,” stillhold on to <strong>the</strong>se renditions; <strong>and</strong> would <strong>the</strong>y perpetuate <strong>the</strong> dispute over <strong>the</strong> validity<strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> keywords, if <strong>the</strong>y knew that <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs,<strong>the</strong> keywords <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g – such as Ereignis, Dase<strong>in</strong>,Abgrund, Wesen to name only a few – have irrevocably lost <strong>the</strong> familiar mean<strong>in</strong>gs<strong>the</strong>y had with<strong>in</strong> German language?F.S.: In Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, <strong>Heidegger</strong> states that philosophy’s unique mission is to “protect<strong>the</strong> power (Kraft) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most elemental words <strong>in</strong> which Dase<strong>in</strong> expresses itselffrom becom<strong>in</strong>g pla<strong>in</strong> by common underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n function as <strong>the</strong> source <strong>of</strong>pseudo-problems.” 9 How <strong>in</strong> your view does a renewed grasp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s key words such as Ereignis, Abgrund, Wesen provide us with a hermeneuticfoothold on underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g this unique mission <strong>of</strong> philosophy?P.E: Let me preface my response to your question concern<strong>in</strong>g a hermeneutic footholdby say<strong>in</strong>g first that it is important not to mistake <strong>the</strong> passage you quote fromSe<strong>in</strong> und Zeit with one that has a programmatic <strong>in</strong>tent. Mak<strong>in</strong>g this statement rightafter <strong>the</strong> two paragraphs <strong>in</strong> Section 44 b <strong>of</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit where he has already protected<strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> one elemental word, namely άlήJeia, by translat<strong>in</strong>g this word<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gually as Unverborgenheit, <strong>Heidegger</strong> draws attention to three th<strong>in</strong>gs: (1)that <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> elemental words is de facto protected <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g, (2) that <strong>in</strong> some highly significant <strong>in</strong>stances, this protectionhappens through <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation, <strong>and</strong> (3) that accomplish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> unique mission<strong>of</strong> philosophy via protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> elemental words is not a task ly<strong>in</strong>gahead <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> future, but one that is achieved whenever <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>gis enacted.Now, turn<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> question you raise right after quot<strong>in</strong>g that passage from Se<strong>in</strong>und Zeit, I would say that <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic foothold you <strong>in</strong>quire about is already <strong>in</strong>place when we, guided by <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation,realize (1) that <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g is not just a8For a discussion <strong>of</strong> terms such as replacement, exact substitute, absolute transfer <strong>in</strong> connectionwith <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s keywords, see Parvis Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy (Madison, WI: The University <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press,2007), pp. 10–16.9<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, GA 2 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), p. 291.
182 F. Schalowproliferation <strong>and</strong> extension <strong>of</strong> German language but an autonomous languagerequir<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual enactment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g, (2) that meet<strong>in</strong>gthis requirement is not entirely <strong>in</strong> our discretion <strong>and</strong> up to us but depends onreceiv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g’s enown<strong>in</strong>g throw (ereignender Zuwurf ), 10<strong>and</strong> (3) that it is this project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g that allows <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> elemental words,such as Er-eignis, Ab-grund, <strong>and</strong> Wesen (to mention only a few) to echo <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>approximate renditions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se words as en-own<strong>in</strong>g, ab-ground, <strong>and</strong> ownmost.I advisedly say “echo,” because as approximations, <strong>the</strong>se renditions can onlyafford to echo <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se elemental words. It is by afford<strong>in</strong>g to echo thispower that <strong>the</strong>se approximate renditions protect <strong>the</strong> elemental words from becom<strong>in</strong>gpla<strong>in</strong> by common underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> thus give rise to pseudo-problems. Here,we should recall how <strong>the</strong> mistranslation <strong>of</strong> Wesen as “essence” failed to protect thiselemental word from becom<strong>in</strong>g pla<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> gave rise to <strong>the</strong> pseudo-problem known as<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s essentialism. The unique mission <strong>of</strong> philosophy will be accomplishedonly when <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> elemental words is preserved, leav<strong>in</strong>g no room for pseudoproblems.The characterization <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought as essentialism, however, not onlycreates a pseudo-problem, it also br<strong>in</strong>gs to <strong>the</strong> fore <strong>the</strong> distortion <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sconcept <strong>of</strong> truth. Let me briefly address this issue. Far more consequential <strong>and</strong> farreach<strong>in</strong>gthan creat<strong>in</strong>g a pseudo-problem is <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> rendition <strong>of</strong> Wesen as“essence” completely obfuscates <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s account <strong>of</strong> •lήq∈ia. One typical<strong>in</strong>stance <strong>of</strong> this obfuscation is to be found <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> English translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Parmenideslectures <strong>of</strong> 1942/43. In <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al German, this account appears as follows: “In derUn-verborgenheit selbst west noch diese Gegenerschaft. Im Wesen der Wahrheit alsder Un-verborgenheit waltet irgende<strong>in</strong>e Art von Streit mit der Verborgenheit undder Verbergung.” 11 In <strong>the</strong> English translation, this account appears as follows: “Thisopposition resides <strong>in</strong> un-concealedness itself. In <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> truth as unconcealedness<strong>the</strong>re holds sway some sort <strong>of</strong> conflict with concealedness <strong>and</strong> concealment.”12 Let us contrast this translation with <strong>the</strong> one I shall venture: “Thiscounteraction sways <strong>in</strong> un-hidden-shelteredness itself. There prevails <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong>truth as un-hidden-shelteredness some k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> strife with hidden-shelteredness <strong>and</strong>hidden-shelter<strong>in</strong>g.”By contrast<strong>in</strong>g this translation with <strong>the</strong> version that appears <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> English translation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Parmenides lecture course text, several distortions come to <strong>the</strong> fore.(1) The word west, <strong>the</strong> present tense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> verb Wesen, is totally mistranslated whenit is brought <strong>in</strong>to English as “resides.” The counteraction to which <strong>Heidegger</strong> alludescannot be conceived as someth<strong>in</strong>g “resid<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong> •lήqeia because <strong>the</strong> word “resid<strong>in</strong>g”obfuscates <strong>the</strong> strange, sole, <strong>and</strong> unique occurrence, which is •lήq∈ia.10For “ereignender Zuwurf,” (enown<strong>in</strong>g throw) see, F.-W. von Herrmann, Wege <strong>in</strong>s Ereignis: Zu<strong>Heidegger</strong>s “Beiträge zur Philosophie,” pp. 1, 6, 17, 23, 30, 33, 34, 36, 40, 56, 59, <strong>and</strong> 94.11<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Parmenides, GA 54 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982), p. 20.12<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Parmenides, trans. A. Schuwer <strong>and</strong> R. Rojcewicz (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana UniversityPress, 1992), p. 14.
A Conversation with Parvis Emad on <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>183The def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g moment with<strong>in</strong> •lήq∈ia called “counteraction” requires th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g toapproach •lήq∈ia <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> “action,” “activity,” “mobility,” “movement,” <strong>and</strong> “dynamism.”This “counteraction,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> says, west, that is, “sways” <strong>in</strong> •lήq∈ia – itdoes not “set up camp,” “get settled for good,” “became rigid <strong>and</strong> solidified,” <strong>in</strong>short, “reside <strong>in</strong> •lήq∈ia.” (2) S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> English word “essence” is totally mutewhen it comes to express<strong>in</strong>g action, activity, mobility, movement, dynamism, <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> like, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s concept <strong>of</strong> das Wesen der Wahrheit cannot be brought <strong>in</strong>toEnglish as “<strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> truth.” How could one overlook <strong>the</strong> fact that •lήq∈ia ortruth cannot have an “essence” s<strong>in</strong>ce it is •lήq∈ia itself that bequeaths to th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> very word “essence”? By render<strong>in</strong>g “Un-verborgenheit” as “un-concealedness,”<strong>the</strong> English translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Parmenides lectures sets a formulation <strong>in</strong> circulation(mechanically repeated <strong>in</strong> all <strong>the</strong> translations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gesamtausgabe by <strong>the</strong> sametransaltor) that leaves out <strong>the</strong> moments <strong>of</strong> Verborgenheit, namely shelteredness <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> moment <strong>of</strong> Verbergung, that is, shelter<strong>in</strong>g. What is s<strong>in</strong>gular <strong>and</strong> unique about•lήq∈ia is not only un-hiddenness – called <strong>in</strong> this translation un-concealedness –but also <strong>and</strong> equally importantly, <strong>the</strong> moment <strong>of</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> shelteredness. Incontrast to <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>in</strong> which “essence” <strong>and</strong> all its proliferations lie <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> day, •lήq∈ia is dist<strong>in</strong>guished by be<strong>in</strong>g un-hidden, while sheltered by <strong>and</strong> withdrawn<strong>in</strong>to hiddenness.F.S: <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s view <strong>of</strong> language, contrasted with that <strong>of</strong> major philosophers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>“analytic” <strong>and</strong> “Cont<strong>in</strong>ental” traditions is radically unique. Indeed, when <strong>Heidegger</strong>emphasizes that “language speaks,” <strong>and</strong> that human be<strong>in</strong>gs speak only by first “corespond<strong>in</strong>gto language,” he returns to <strong>the</strong> ownmost dimension <strong>of</strong> language, <strong>in</strong> a waythat st<strong>and</strong>s apart from <strong>the</strong> “analytic” <strong>and</strong> “Cont<strong>in</strong>ental” attempts that conceive languageas a “tool” <strong>and</strong> as <strong>the</strong> human capacity for communication. In this connection,I want to draw upon <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g passage from Contributions to Philosophy <strong>and</strong>raise a few questions:What is ownmost to language can never be determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> any o<strong>the</strong>r way than by nam<strong>in</strong>g itsorig<strong>in</strong>. Thus, one cannot give out essential def<strong>in</strong>itions <strong>of</strong> language <strong>and</strong> declare <strong>the</strong> questionconcern<strong>in</strong>g its orig<strong>in</strong> unanswerable. The question concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> course <strong>in</strong>cludeswith<strong>in</strong> it <strong>the</strong> essential determ<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>ation itself. But orig<strong>in</strong>ationmeans: belong<strong>in</strong>g to be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last formulated question: How does languagesway <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> essential sway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g? 13Aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> backdrop <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>Heidegger</strong> raises at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> this passage,let me ask: how <strong>in</strong> your view does <strong>the</strong> “sway <strong>of</strong> language” imply its hermeneutic<strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation? Or put ano<strong>the</strong>r way, if at its most orig<strong>in</strong>al leveltranslation <strong>in</strong>volves respond<strong>in</strong>g to language, <strong>and</strong> nurtur<strong>in</strong>g its disclosive power, howcould translation be at <strong>the</strong> service <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g?P.E.: Taken at its core this question is ma<strong>in</strong>ly concerned with <strong>the</strong> relationshipprevail<strong>in</strong>g between <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> language <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> keywords13<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann, 1989), p. 501. Contributions to Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g), trans. Parvis Emad<strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 352.
184 F. Schalow<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g. First, let me say that this relationshipis not one brought to bear from <strong>the</strong> outside upon <strong>the</strong> two poles named “ownmost <strong>of</strong>language” <strong>and</strong> “<strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> keywords <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g.” Ra<strong>the</strong>r, this relationship itself orig<strong>in</strong>ates from with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ownmost<strong>of</strong> language, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>her<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>re<strong>in</strong> guides <strong>and</strong> shapes <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> keywords<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g. Second, let me also note thatthis relationship is de facto made possible by <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> language with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> essentialsway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. In short, <strong>the</strong> relationship prevail<strong>in</strong>g between <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong>language <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> keywords <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong><strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g is one that is susta<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> language with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> essentialsway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. To highlight this po<strong>in</strong>t requires that I briefly discuss <strong>the</strong> twodeterm<strong>in</strong>ations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> language <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, one unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> Time <strong>and</strong> thus belong<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> On <strong>the</strong> Way to Language <strong>and</strong> belong<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historicalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.Transcendental-horizonal th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g determ<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> language as Rede.To underst<strong>and</strong> Rede, we must keep <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g characteristics <strong>of</strong> it. (1) Theword Rede is <strong>the</strong> outcome <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>transcendental-horizonal th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, this word no longer reta<strong>in</strong>s its familiar mean<strong>in</strong>gssuch as speech, discourse, talk, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> like. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, as I have shown elsewhere, as<strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> language, Rede “enters <strong>the</strong> speech without permanently resid<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong>re.” 14 (2) Enter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> speech, or <strong>the</strong> discourse, or <strong>the</strong> talk without permanentlyresid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>m, Rede is <strong>the</strong> power to divide, jo<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> articulate (<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s wordhere is Gliedern) <strong>the</strong> Da (t/here), while rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g dist<strong>in</strong>ct from <strong>the</strong> Da. (3) This is<strong>the</strong> case because as <strong>the</strong> power to divide, jo<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> articulate, Rede co-orig<strong>in</strong>allydeterm<strong>in</strong>es disposition (Bef<strong>in</strong>dlichkeit) <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g (Verstehen), while unfold<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> Da. (4) F<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>the</strong> fact that Rede is <strong>the</strong> power to divide, jo<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> articulateshows that this transcendental-horizonal determ<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> languagesways with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> Da.Consider<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> abovementioned characteristics <strong>of</strong> Rede <strong>in</strong> connection with <strong>the</strong>question <strong>of</strong> translation, we arrive at <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sight. As <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> language,Rede allows for <strong>and</strong> guides both <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation occurr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s transcendental-horizonal th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Instances <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translations occurr<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> transcendental-horizonal th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g areEreignis, Dase<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Wesen. Intral<strong>in</strong>gually translated, <strong>the</strong>se keywords lose <strong>the</strong>irlexicographic familiar mean<strong>in</strong>gs. Instances <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translationmade possible <strong>and</strong> guided by Rede occurr<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> his transcendental-horizonalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g are •lήJeia as Unverborgenheit <strong>and</strong> lόgoV as Aussage.Be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g determ<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> language as “<strong>the</strong> r<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>stillness” (das Gelaüt der Stille). However, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> passage from <strong>the</strong> Contributions to14For a fur<strong>the</strong>r discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong> Rede, <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> its implications for <strong>the</strong> three follow<strong>in</strong>gpo<strong>in</strong>ts, see Parvis Emad, “The Significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> New Edition <strong>of</strong> Subjekt und Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>Fundamental Ontology <strong>of</strong> Language,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 2 (1986): 142.
A Conversation with Parvis Emad on <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>185Philosophy that you cite, this determ<strong>in</strong>ation has not yet achieved its full conceptualform. But this does not mean that at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Contributions toPhilosophy, <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> language, that is, “<strong>the</strong> r<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> stillness,” has not yetentered <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s purview <strong>and</strong> is not yet operational <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gunfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> that work. How else would <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong> that work succeed <strong>in</strong>translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gually <strong>the</strong> word Ereignis if he did not have this ownmost <strong>in</strong> hispurview? However, <strong>the</strong> important po<strong>in</strong>t here is this: “<strong>the</strong> r<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> stillness” tooenters <strong>the</strong> speech, without permanently resid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>re. In <strong>the</strong> same ve<strong>in</strong>, “<strong>the</strong> r<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> stillness” too constitutes <strong>the</strong> Da except that <strong>the</strong> Da now unfolds be<strong>in</strong>g-historically.When <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> passage you quote, <strong>Heidegger</strong> asks “How does language sway <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>essential sway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g?,” he has <strong>in</strong> his purview this be<strong>in</strong>g-historically unfold<strong>in</strong>gDa. The fact that <strong>Heidegger</strong> after <strong>the</strong> lapse <strong>of</strong> several decades <strong>in</strong> On <strong>the</strong> Way toLanguage obta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> full conceptualization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> language <strong>and</strong> calls it“<strong>the</strong> r<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> stillness” shows that when <strong>in</strong> Contributions to Philosophy, he formulates<strong>the</strong> question concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> sway <strong>of</strong> language with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> essential sway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g, he has this determ<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> language <strong>in</strong> his purview. Put alittle differently, when <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong> On <strong>the</strong> Way to Language determ<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> ownmost<strong>of</strong> language with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historically unfold<strong>in</strong>g Da as “<strong>the</strong> r<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> stillness,”he articulates <strong>the</strong> appropriate conceptual determ<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> language, whichwas already operational <strong>in</strong> Contributions to Philosophy.You ask “how could translation be at <strong>the</strong> service <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g?” My answer is that <strong>the</strong> possibility (as dist<strong>in</strong>guished from <strong>the</strong> actuality)<strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> keywords <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g lies sheltered with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> relationship prevail<strong>in</strong>g between <strong>the</strong>ownmost <strong>of</strong> language <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> keywords. It is important todist<strong>in</strong>guish an <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation that orig<strong>in</strong>ates from with<strong>in</strong> that shelteredpossibility, <strong>and</strong> an <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation that arises out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> forgottenness <strong>of</strong>that possibility. To be cognizant <strong>of</strong> that sheltered possibility, an <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> keywords <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g must take<strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong>to account. (1) Ra<strong>the</strong>r than operat<strong>in</strong>g under <strong>the</strong> assumptionthat <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s language is merely ano<strong>the</strong>r proliferation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German language,albeit shaped by his “idiosyncratic” use <strong>of</strong> this language, <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translationshould acknowledge <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>sight that <strong>the</strong>re is such a th<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g. The majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> actually exist<strong>in</strong>g English translations do nottake this <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to account. The obst<strong>in</strong>acy with which one still sticks to <strong>the</strong> translation<strong>of</strong> Wesen as “essence,” <strong>the</strong> bl<strong>in</strong>dness toward <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word Ereignis <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> naive <strong>in</strong>sistence <strong>of</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g this keyword asevent, show that <strong>the</strong> actually exist<strong>in</strong>g English translations make no dist<strong>in</strong>ctionbetween translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>, say, translat<strong>in</strong>gJürgen Habermas or, for that matter, translat<strong>in</strong>g Gün<strong>the</strong>r Grass. (2) By acknowledg<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>sight that <strong>the</strong>re is such a th<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> bybe<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation ab<strong>and</strong>ons <strong>the</strong> “biographical,” “subjective” dimensions<strong>and</strong> along with <strong>the</strong>se <strong>the</strong> deep-seated predilection toward “historiciz<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sthought as is evident <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prejudice toward search<strong>in</strong>g for its “genesis,” <strong>and</strong> as isconspicuous <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> urge to identify <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n to elaborate on “<strong>the</strong> received <strong>in</strong>fluences.”
186 F. SchalowTo acknowledge <strong>the</strong> special status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g isnot <strong>the</strong> same as what French déconstruction calls “privileg<strong>in</strong>g”: it is simply recogniz<strong>in</strong>ga philosophical necessity. (3) Ab<strong>and</strong>on<strong>in</strong>g those dimensions <strong>and</strong> this predilection,<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translator also rel<strong>in</strong>quishes <strong>the</strong> naive assumption that bysubmitt<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> authority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dictionary, <strong>the</strong> translator would f<strong>in</strong>d exact substitutes<strong>in</strong> English for <strong>the</strong> keywords <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g.An example that comes to m<strong>in</strong>d is <strong>the</strong> naive assumption that “essency,” supposedlyfound <strong>in</strong> some dictionaries, is an exact substitute <strong>of</strong> Wesung. If “essence” fails tobr<strong>in</strong>g Wesen <strong>in</strong>to English, add<strong>in</strong>g a “y” to “essence” <strong>and</strong> com<strong>in</strong>g up with “essency”will not <strong>of</strong>fer a new possibility for br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g Wesung <strong>in</strong>to English. (4) By acknowledg<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>re is such a th<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> bybe<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translator realizes that <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> keywords <strong>of</strong>this language refers him to <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g. With this realization, <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translator becomes impervious to <strong>the</strong> lures <strong>of</strong> “associative” th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>stead places his work under <strong>the</strong> guidance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “pr<strong>in</strong>ciples” govern<strong>in</strong>g hermeneuticphenomenology. Thus, his work unfolds with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> language,which belongs nei<strong>the</strong>r to German nor to English nor to Greek, but enters <strong>the</strong>selanguages without permanently resid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>m. Henceforth, whenever <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslator <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> keywords <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>gth<strong>in</strong>ks <strong>and</strong> translates, he does so because he listens to <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> language <strong>and</strong>attempts an approximate translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> keywords.F.S.: If <strong>the</strong> ability to “listen,” as you suggest, is as central to <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translationas it is to <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong>n is <strong>the</strong> translator, like <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>ker, also “calledthrough listen<strong>in</strong>g” to his unique vocation?P.E.: If <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic preconditions for <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> keywords <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g are properlyunderstood <strong>and</strong> heeded, <strong>the</strong>n it is also understood that <strong>the</strong>re is no difference whatsoeverbetween <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> by extension nodifference between <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>ker <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> translator. We tend to separate <strong>the</strong> two aslong as we fail to recognize that <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>ker <strong>and</strong> translator both depend on be<strong>in</strong>g’senown<strong>in</strong>g throw <strong>and</strong> both are called upon to project-open that throw. Fail<strong>in</strong>g torecognize <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>in</strong> which both th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g are referred to be<strong>in</strong>g’senown<strong>in</strong>g throw, we also fail to realize that <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> bybe<strong>in</strong>g is not just ano<strong>the</strong>r extension <strong>and</strong> proliferation <strong>of</strong> German language, but is anautonomous language requir<strong>in</strong>g enactment <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslat<strong>in</strong>g.F.S.: The publication <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Gesamtausgabe, beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 1975, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> subsequentneed to translate <strong>the</strong>se volumes, has cont<strong>in</strong>ually thrust <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>ghis writ<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> forefront. Yet, as you stated above, <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>actually exist<strong>in</strong>g translations are not aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>re is such a th<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong>language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g. Indeed, prior to <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong> Contributionsto Philosophy <strong>and</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, <strong>the</strong>re was little appreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> direct synergy,which occurs between <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>of</strong> translation <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> essential sway<strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, a grow<strong>in</strong>g awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation
A Conversation with Parvis Emad on <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>187has not necessarily followed from <strong>the</strong> fact that more <strong>and</strong> more <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s workshave been now translated <strong>in</strong>to English. As <strong>Heidegger</strong> states <strong>in</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness:This m<strong>in</strong>dfulness puts <strong>in</strong>to question <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> philosophy <strong>and</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>s unaffected by<strong>the</strong> affirmations <strong>and</strong> negations <strong>of</strong> what is ‘historically’ current, that is, <strong>the</strong> un-ownmost <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> philosophy-<strong>in</strong>dustry.Philosophy’s m<strong>in</strong>dfulness <strong>of</strong> itself is philosophy itself, is <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g that is en-owned bybe-<strong>in</strong>g. M<strong>in</strong>dfulness is always historical <strong>and</strong> enacts a decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g. 15Regardless <strong>of</strong> our evaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various English translations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Gesamtausgabe, how does <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical perspective, <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>dfulness <strong>of</strong> this perspective, <strong>in</strong> your view, change our future approach, bothto translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g his thought?P.E.: It seems to me that <strong>the</strong> question you raise at <strong>the</strong> end aims at identify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>impact that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, along with <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historicalperspective <strong>in</strong> Contributions to Philosophy, may have on <strong>the</strong> current state <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g his work <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> doma<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> English language. I shall attemptto respond to this question by address<strong>in</strong>g what I take to be <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic preconditionsfor answer<strong>in</strong>g this question. We f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong> first hermeneutic precondition <strong>in</strong> aremark that <strong>Heidegger</strong> makes about <strong>the</strong> present epoch <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> availability <strong>of</strong> hisM<strong>in</strong>dfulness – a remark whose hermeneutic range <strong>in</strong> my view extends beyondM<strong>in</strong>dfulness to all his works. He states:And more erroneous still would be <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> epoch <strong>of</strong> as<strong>the</strong>nia for <strong>and</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> joy<strong>in</strong> foundational word one could ever elim<strong>in</strong>ate this state <strong>of</strong> affairs overnight by publish<strong>in</strong>ga “book.” 16Are not that as<strong>the</strong>nia <strong>and</strong> this lack <strong>of</strong> joy <strong>in</strong> foundational word what lead to <strong>the</strong>mislead<strong>in</strong>g view circulat<strong>in</strong>g now <strong>in</strong> full force that Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time has met itsdemise? Is not that as<strong>the</strong>nia beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong> prevail<strong>in</strong>g bifurcation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought<strong>in</strong>to a “Dase<strong>in</strong>-oriented” (“<strong>Heidegger</strong> I”) versus a “be<strong>in</strong>g-oriented” (“<strong>Heidegger</strong>II”) periods – a bifurcation which to this day shapes <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretations<strong>of</strong> his philosophy? Is not that as<strong>the</strong>nia what leads to <strong>the</strong> bl<strong>in</strong>dness toward <strong>the</strong>question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g evident <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> misconception <strong>of</strong> it as an “e<strong>the</strong>real question”? Is notthat as<strong>the</strong>nia what leads to <strong>the</strong> assumption that by rais<strong>in</strong>g this question, <strong>Heidegger</strong>privileges question<strong>in</strong>g versus o<strong>the</strong>r mental <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tellectual activities such as judg<strong>in</strong>g,perceiv<strong>in</strong>g, etc.? Are not <strong>the</strong>se very same misconceptions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g responsible for <strong>the</strong> failure to recognize that, ra<strong>the</strong>r than be<strong>in</strong>g created byth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, this question is h<strong>and</strong>ed to th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g via be<strong>in</strong>g’s enown<strong>in</strong>g throw? I raise<strong>the</strong>se questions because <strong>the</strong>y lead to <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g question. When <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> passagejust quoted, <strong>Heidegger</strong> casts serious doubt on <strong>the</strong> efficacy <strong>of</strong> his writ<strong>in</strong>gs, does he<strong>the</strong>reby deny that <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction <strong>of</strong> those writ<strong>in</strong>gs via transcendental-horizonal aswell as be<strong>in</strong>g-historical perspectives, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>dfulness <strong>of</strong> what he conveys <strong>in</strong>those writ<strong>in</strong>gs via both perspectives, amount to noth<strong>in</strong>g?15GA 66, pp. 57–58; tr. 47.16GA 66, p. 74; tr. 60.
188 F. SchalowIf philosophical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is seriously concerned with <strong>the</strong> question whe<strong>the</strong>r<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs may have any claim to efficacy, <strong>the</strong>n such th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g shouldmeet <strong>the</strong> second hermeneutic precondition for <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> appropriat<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought, <strong>and</strong> steadfastly avoid what I have called “associative th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.”17 In my view, <strong>the</strong> present imperiousness <strong>of</strong> philosophical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g via-à-vis <strong>the</strong>language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> ensu<strong>in</strong>g mis<strong>in</strong>terpretations <strong>of</strong> thislanguage <strong>and</strong> by extension <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs, directly stem from <strong>the</strong> deepseatedproclivity <strong>of</strong> philosophical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g to succumb to associative th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Onlywhen we associate question<strong>in</strong>g with perceiv<strong>in</strong>g, judg<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> like can we cometo <strong>the</strong> conclusion that <strong>Heidegger</strong> privileges question<strong>in</strong>g. Had we avoided this associativepath, <strong>the</strong>re would have been a good chance that we would recognize that <strong>the</strong>word question <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> phrase, “question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g” is not one <strong>of</strong> many <strong>in</strong>tellectualactivities, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g is h<strong>and</strong>ed to th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g via be<strong>in</strong>g’s enown<strong>in</strong>gthrow. Only when we associate fundamental ontology <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> with anthropologycan we come to <strong>the</strong> conclusion that <strong>the</strong>re are two periods <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought,one “Dase<strong>in</strong>-oriented,” <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r “be<strong>in</strong>g-oriented.” Had we avoided this associativepath, <strong>the</strong>re would have been a good chance that we would recognize that fundamentalontology <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> is all about <strong>the</strong> Da, that is, <strong>the</strong> disclosedness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>assumption <strong>of</strong> two periods <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought is an untenable assumption. Onlywhen we associate Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time with <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> speculat<strong>in</strong>g on man’sexistence as someth<strong>in</strong>g bereft <strong>of</strong> any exposure to <strong>and</strong> know<strong>in</strong>g awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, do we rema<strong>in</strong> oblivious <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic range <strong>of</strong> this work, misconceiveit as a patchwork put toge<strong>the</strong>r from <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Marburg lectures, <strong>and</strong> misconstrue<strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as an e<strong>the</strong>real question, thus rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g ignorant <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> fact that this work is devoted to an analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da, that is, disclosedness <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g. Had we avoided this associative path, <strong>the</strong>re would have been a good chancethat we would recognize <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g vitality (not demise) <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time.<strong>Heidegger</strong> alludes to this vitality <strong>in</strong> his “Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Remark” (Vorbemerkung) to<strong>the</strong> seventh edition <strong>of</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit when he po<strong>in</strong>ts out that <strong>the</strong> path traversed bythis work, “rema<strong>in</strong>s even today a necessary one if <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g is to moveour Dase<strong>in</strong> (wenn die Frage nach dem Se<strong>in</strong> unser Dase<strong>in</strong> bewegen soll).” 18Hav<strong>in</strong>g laid out <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic preconditions for answer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> question youraised at <strong>the</strong> end, let me now ask what would we ga<strong>in</strong>, if philosophical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is17On this po<strong>in</strong>t, see, Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 4 <strong>and</strong> 22.18See <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Vorbemerkung zur Siebenten Auflage 1953,” <strong>in</strong> GA 2, p. vii. For a groundbreak<strong>in</strong>gcommentary on Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, demonstrat<strong>in</strong>g once aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last<strong>in</strong>g vitality <strong>of</strong> this work seeF.-W. von Herrmann’s` multi volume commentary <strong>of</strong> which so far three volumes have appeared:Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Dase<strong>in</strong>s. E<strong>in</strong> Kommentar zu “Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit,” vol. 1,“E<strong>in</strong>leitung: die Frage nach dem S<strong>in</strong>n von Se<strong>in</strong>” (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987);E<strong>in</strong> Kommentar zu “Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit,” vol. 2, “Erster Abschnitt: Die vorbereitende Fundamentalanalysedes Dase<strong>in</strong>s,” §9–27 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005); HermeneutischePhänomenologie des Dase<strong>in</strong>s. E<strong>in</strong> Kommentar zu “Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit,” vol. 3 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann, 2008). For an excellent discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> second volume <strong>of</strong> this commentary,see Thomas Kalary, “New Access to Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time: Focus<strong>in</strong>g on Friedrich-Wilhelm vonHerrmann’s Commentary on Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 24 (2008): 183–195.
A Conversation with Parvis Emad on <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>189strong enough to heed those hermeneutic preconditions, <strong>and</strong> avoids <strong>the</strong> pitfalls <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> associative th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g? To answer this question I would have to return to <strong>the</strong> firstfew pages <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time <strong>and</strong> say as straightforwardly as possible that by avoid<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> associative th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> by tak<strong>in</strong>g its orientation from <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciples govern<strong>in</strong>ghermeneutic phenomenology, philosophical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g will be prepared for“what shows itself <strong>in</strong> itself, <strong>the</strong> manifest.” Subsequent to this preparedness, philosophicalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g becomes receptive to <strong>the</strong> efficacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>and</strong>ready to adopt new approaches, both to translat<strong>in</strong>g those writ<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>ghis thought.ReferencesEmad, Parvis. 1986. The significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new edition <strong>of</strong> Subjekt und Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> fundamentalontology <strong>of</strong> language. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 2: 141–151.Emad, Parvis. 2007. On <strong>the</strong> way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s contributions to philosophy. Madison: TheUniversity <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press.Emad, Parvis, <strong>and</strong> Ivo De Gennaro. 2009. Putt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> seed: ‘Say<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>’ or ‘approximat<strong>in</strong>g’<strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r questions concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s keywords. Existentia19(3–4): 161–192.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1977. Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, GA 2. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1982. Parmenides, GA 54. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann. Trans.A. Schuwer <strong>and</strong> R. Rojcewicz. 1992. Parmenides. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1987. Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, GA 56/57. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1989. Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann. Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly. 1999. Contributions to philosophy(From enown<strong>in</strong>g). Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1997. Bes<strong>in</strong>nung, GA 66. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann. Trans.Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Thomas Kalary. 2006. M<strong>in</strong>dfulness. London: Cont<strong>in</strong>uum.Kalary, Thomas. 2008. New access to be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time: Focus<strong>in</strong>g on Friedrich-Wilhelm vonHerrmann’s commentary on Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 24: 183–195.Ricouer, Paul. 2004. Sur la traduction. Paris: Bayard.von Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm. 1987. Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Dase<strong>in</strong>s. E<strong>in</strong>Kommentar zu “Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit,” vol. 1, “E<strong>in</strong>leitung: die Frage nach dem S<strong>in</strong>n von Se<strong>in</strong>”. Frankfurtam Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.von Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm. 2000. Hermeneutik und Reflexion. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.von Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm. 2005. E<strong>in</strong> Kommentar zu “Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit,” vol. 2. “ErsterAbschnitt: Die vorbereitende Fundamentalanalyse des Dase<strong>in</strong>s,” §9–27. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann.von Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm. 2008. Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Dase<strong>in</strong>s. E<strong>in</strong>Kommentar zu “Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, vol. 3. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy:The Challenge <strong>of</strong> Its <strong>Translation</strong>George Kovacs1 It is worth not<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>Heidegger</strong> scholarship <strong>in</strong> English, <strong>in</strong> spite <strong>of</strong> its occasionaldistractions <strong>and</strong> seem<strong>in</strong>g wear<strong>in</strong>ess, made significant progress dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> last twodecades, thus clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> way toward a deeper grasp, a more thoughtfully measuredassessment <strong>of</strong> his thought. The susta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> his attempt to th<strong>in</strong>k entirelyo<strong>the</strong>rwise than <strong>the</strong> long-solidified frame <strong>of</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d is clearly manifest <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> persistent attention to his now available lecture courses <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r substantialwrit<strong>in</strong>gs published <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last two decades. Thus, elucidations <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thoughtventure “beyond” <strong>the</strong> gravitational pull <strong>of</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, 1 his sem<strong>in</strong>al ground-work;<strong>the</strong>y <strong>in</strong>tend <strong>and</strong> claim to become more <strong>and</strong> more attuned to <strong>the</strong> thought <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g(Ereignis), to ano<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, to his Beiträge zur Philosophie (VomEreignis), 2 his second ma<strong>in</strong> work, to <strong>the</strong> long-range hesitat<strong>in</strong>g-shelter<strong>in</strong>g dimension<strong>of</strong> his thought. Ano<strong>the</strong>r, perhaps even more tell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> promis<strong>in</strong>g omen <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>future <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> wonder about <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s lifework is <strong>the</strong> steady <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>of</strong>better <strong>and</strong> better translations <strong>of</strong> his writ<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g translations <strong>in</strong>to English. 31Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, GA 2 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann, 1977b). Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>Time, trans. John Macquarrie <strong>and</strong> Edward Rob<strong>in</strong>son (Harper <strong>and</strong> Row: New York, 1962).2Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Klostermann, 1989a), p. xvii, (hereafter: GA 65, referred to <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text as Beiträge). Contributionsto Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g), trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: IndianaUniversity Press, 1999), p. xlix (hereafter referred to <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text as Contributions).3Theodore Kisiel, “Review <strong>and</strong> Overview <strong>of</strong> Recent <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>s <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir GermanOrig<strong>in</strong>als: A Grassroots Archival Perspective,” Studia Phaenomenologica, 5 (2005): 277–278 (hereafter:“Review <strong>and</strong> Overview,” referred to <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text occasionally as Kisiel’s essay on translation).G. Kovacs (*)Department <strong>of</strong> Philosophy, Florida International University, Tamiami Campus,33199 Miami, FL, USAe-mail: Drgeorgekovacs@aol.comF. Schalow (ed.), <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad, Contributions To Phenomenology 65,DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0_10, © Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media B.V. 2011191
192 G. Kovacs<strong>Translation</strong> <strong>and</strong> scholarly research are <strong>in</strong>terconnected, <strong>in</strong>separable, even when <strong>the</strong>research is based on <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al, primary source <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al language; bo<strong>the</strong>ntail <strong>and</strong> enact hermeneutic practices. William J. Richardson’s pioneer<strong>in</strong>g magnumopus <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Through Phenomenology to Thought 4 is as much <strong>the</strong> prob<strong>in</strong>glabor <strong>of</strong> translation as <strong>the</strong> persistent work <strong>of</strong> scholarly exploration. Read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>explor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s texts, as Richardson warns his readers, are tantamountto somehow mak<strong>in</strong>g one’s way “over <strong>the</strong> rocks.” 5 He observes that “<strong>Heidegger</strong>’slanguage, <strong>of</strong> course, presents a special problem <strong>of</strong> translation.” 6 These remarksbecome even more <strong>in</strong>timidat<strong>in</strong>g when <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong> turn, <strong>in</strong> his letter to Richardson,speaks <strong>of</strong> his own experience <strong>of</strong> express<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> communicat<strong>in</strong>g his thought aslead<strong>in</strong>g him to “<strong>the</strong> recognition <strong>of</strong> an almost <strong>in</strong>surmountable difficulty <strong>in</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>goneself understood.” 7 One ought to acknowledge that <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>studies, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> translations <strong>of</strong> his writ<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>to English <strong>and</strong> numerous o<strong>the</strong>rlanguages, gives ample testimony to defy<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> odds, to <strong>the</strong> actual overcom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>or successful deal<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> difficulties that are endemic to th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g-question<strong>in</strong>g,to philosophical <strong>in</strong>quiry; this history shows, <strong>in</strong> actu exercito, that it is possible t<strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>d one’s way “over <strong>the</strong> rocks,” to make one’s way “over <strong>the</strong> rocks.” The success<strong>of</strong> Richardson’s pioneer<strong>in</strong>g render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s work <strong>in</strong>to English (as translation<strong>and</strong> as scholarly labor) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit <strong>in</strong>to many languages,not to mention <strong>the</strong> extensive scholarly writ<strong>in</strong>gs, surely demonstrate <strong>the</strong> timidityentailed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early despair<strong>in</strong>g assessment that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought is “extremelycomplex <strong>and</strong> subtle,” that “it is set down <strong>in</strong> a style which might be characterized asdeliberately untranslatable.” 8The publication <strong>of</strong> Contributions, <strong>the</strong> English translation <strong>of</strong> Beiträge, <strong>in</strong> 1999,10 years after <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German orig<strong>in</strong>al, ought to be recognized as amajor event <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> scholarship <strong>in</strong> English. The first Englishtranslation <strong>of</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, was published <strong>in</strong> 1962, 36 years after<strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German orig<strong>in</strong>al. The experience <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’slecture courses 9 <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> ventures <strong>of</strong> scholarship no doubt have contributed to <strong>the</strong>shortness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> passage <strong>of</strong> time between <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong> Beiträge <strong>and</strong> its Englishtranslation, Contributions. In th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g through <strong>and</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> German text4William J. Richardson, <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Through Phenomenology to Thought, Preface by Mart<strong>in</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>, Phaenomenologica vol. 13 (The Hague: Nijh<strong>of</strong>f, 1963).5Ibid., p. xxviii.6Ibid., p. xxvii.7Ibid., p. xiii.8Quent<strong>in</strong> Lauer, Phenomenology: Its Genesis <strong>and</strong> Prospect (New York: Harper <strong>and</strong> Row, 1965), p. 169.9Among <strong>the</strong>m his: Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes (lecture course at Freiburg, W<strong>in</strong>terSemester, 1930–1931), GA 32 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann, 1980); Hegel’s Phenomenology<strong>of</strong> Spirit, trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1988);Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der re<strong>in</strong>en Vernunft (lecture course at Marburg,W<strong>in</strong>ter Semester, 1927–1928),GA 25 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann, 1977c); PhenomenologicalInterpretation <strong>of</strong> Kant’s Critique <strong>of</strong> Pure Reason, trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly(Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1997).
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy: The Challenge <strong>of</strong> Its <strong>Translation</strong>193(<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Parvis Emad’s sem<strong>in</strong>ar on it with Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann,editor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German orig<strong>in</strong>al), with <strong>the</strong> help <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir experience <strong>in</strong> translation <strong>and</strong>scholarship, fight<strong>in</strong>g all <strong>the</strong> odds <strong>and</strong> apprehensiveness about <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> textat h<strong>and</strong>, 10 Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly made <strong>the</strong>ir “way over <strong>the</strong> rocks,” broughtforth a pioneer<strong>in</strong>g, scholarly, thoughtful <strong>and</strong> thought-provok<strong>in</strong>g render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>Beiträge <strong>in</strong> English: Contributions to Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g).Contributions came about through a dar<strong>in</strong>g, “<strong>in</strong>novative struggle” with <strong>the</strong>“matter” (die Sache) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> language(s) <strong>of</strong> thought sound<strong>in</strong>g through (echo<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>)<strong>the</strong> “texts” under consideration. 11 This English text, like any o<strong>the</strong>r scholarly translation,is nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al nor <strong>the</strong> only possible way <strong>of</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Germanorig<strong>in</strong>al. It should not be regarded as a substitute for <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s orig<strong>in</strong>al. Thistranslation is an attempt to recapture <strong>in</strong> English a measure <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s way <strong>of</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> his struggle with his own language, with its bounds <strong>and</strong> potentials.A good translation never becomes detached from its orig<strong>in</strong>al; it, ra<strong>the</strong>r, paves <strong>the</strong>way toward <strong>and</strong> is marked by <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terplay with <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al experience <strong>of</strong> thought<strong>and</strong> language. Translat<strong>in</strong>g, like read<strong>in</strong>g, is <strong>the</strong> labor <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g; itentails an immersion <strong>in</strong>to, not <strong>the</strong> expropriation <strong>of</strong>, <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al text.Admittedly, Beiträge ought to be regarded as <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s most difficult, exact<strong>in</strong>g,as well as though-provok<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> puzzl<strong>in</strong>g work, even without necessarily agree<strong>in</strong>gwith <strong>the</strong> hyperbolic claim that it may force us “<strong>in</strong>to a new paradigm,” <strong>in</strong>to a “morefruitful way” <strong>of</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> “read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s texts.” 12 The impatience forsolutions <strong>and</strong> quick exits out <strong>of</strong> difficulties should be tempered by keep<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>dthat Beiträge (Contributions) is a “preparatory” work, that, as Friedrich-Wilhelm vonHerrmann observes,A hermeneutically cogent <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> Contributions should hold open <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>ghistoricalperspective, which is worked out <strong>in</strong> this treatise, as a perspective which is <strong>in</strong>dispensablefor an <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s later writ<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fifties <strong>and</strong> sixties. 13Thus, it should be recognized that <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> “a paradigm shift” or ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>conclusion (f<strong>in</strong>al underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g) regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> weight <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> significance <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s work ought to follow (ought to be derived from), <strong>and</strong> not to run ahead<strong>of</strong> (not to be posited as an a priori assumption or desideratum) its <strong>in</strong>terpretation.The discernment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al significance <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> exploration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> full depth, aswell as <strong>the</strong> critical assessment, <strong>of</strong> this text, rightly described as <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s second10“Translators’ Foreword,” Contributions, pp. xix, xlv (“Acknowledgment”).11See William J. Richardson, “Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ground <strong>of</strong> Negativity: A Note on <strong>the</strong> FourthMovement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Beiträge-Symphony,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 9 (1993): 35, 37.12Thomas Sheehan, “A Paradigm Shift <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> Research,” Cont<strong>in</strong>ental Philosophy Review,34 (2001): 185, see also 183.13Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, “Contributions to Philosophy <strong>and</strong> Enown<strong>in</strong>g-Historical<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>,” trans. Parvis Emad, Companion to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, ed. byCharles E. Scott et al. (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 2001), p. 125. See also pp. 107–108.See also William J. Richardson, “Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ground <strong>of</strong> Negativity: A Note on <strong>the</strong> FourthMovement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Beiträge-Symphony,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 9 (1993): 36.
194 G. Kovacsma<strong>in</strong> work, 14 are yet to come; such exploration <strong>and</strong> assessment constitute an arduoustask to be accomplished. The publication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> Beiträge <strong>in</strong>to English<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g scholarly attention to it are promis<strong>in</strong>g signs <strong>of</strong> courage <strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>timations <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess to endure <strong>the</strong> exactions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work to be done. Contributionsis a clear, faithful, thoughtful, scholarly render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> its German orig<strong>in</strong>al; it lets<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s text (his thought <strong>and</strong> struggle with say<strong>in</strong>g) speak <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> sound through<strong>the</strong> English language. The translators’ judicious decisions <strong>in</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g basic, difficult,subtle terms (e.g., “enown<strong>in</strong>g” for Ereignis; “what is ownmost” for Wesen), <strong>the</strong>irgrasp <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir attention to (familiarity with) <strong>the</strong>treasures <strong>and</strong> work<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> languages <strong>in</strong>volved (German, English, Greek, Lat<strong>in</strong>),as well as <strong>the</strong>ir experience <strong>in</strong> contend<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs, account for<strong>the</strong> philosophical depth <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> expressive power (<strong>the</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g-potential) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>translation under consideration. A (if not <strong>the</strong>) most remarkable achievement (quality)<strong>of</strong> this translation is its sensitivity to <strong>the</strong> difference between <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong>metaphysics <strong>and</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical language. 15 A fair-m<strong>in</strong>ded <strong>and</strong> philosophicalassessment <strong>of</strong> recent <strong>Heidegger</strong> translations, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Contributions, would notobviate <strong>the</strong> conclusion that <strong>the</strong> English render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Beiträge made its way “over<strong>the</strong> rocks,” that it represents a substantial, decisive contribution to a deeper grasp<strong>and</strong> exploration <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought, especially to <strong>the</strong> attempt to “hold open <strong>the</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g-historical perspective” <strong>of</strong> his (later) way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. 162 The ideal <strong>of</strong> translation, one ought to admit, ought not to be ignored, not to beobscured, <strong>in</strong> exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> evaluat<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> “measur<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>the</strong> worth <strong>and</strong> success <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>translation, <strong>of</strong> its ability to render <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al text <strong>in</strong>to ano<strong>the</strong>r language. The worth<strong>and</strong> fairness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translated text are cont<strong>in</strong>gent on keep<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>view <strong>the</strong> significance (<strong>the</strong> “weight,” for example, Beiträge as <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s secondma<strong>in</strong> work) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> nature (e.g., <strong>the</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical perspective <strong>in</strong> Beiträge) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>orig<strong>in</strong>al (<strong>in</strong> this case German) text, as well as <strong>the</strong> actual accomplishment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>translation, that is, its relationship to <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al text <strong>of</strong> Beiträge, its ability to allow<strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g at work <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al language <strong>of</strong> this text to come14GA 65, p. 511; dust jacket <strong>of</strong> GA 65. See also George Kovacs, “An Invitation to Th<strong>in</strong>k through<strong>and</strong> with <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Beiträge zur Philosophie,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 12 (1996): 20. Cf. also<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Bes<strong>in</strong>nung (1938–1939), GA 66 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann, 1997), pp. 424,427 (hereafter: GA 66); M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Thomas Kalary (London: Cont<strong>in</strong>uum,2006), pp. 375, 378.15For more about this difference, see George Kovacs, “<strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong> Dialogue with Herder:Cross<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Language <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics toward Be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical Language,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 17(2001): 45–63.16Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, “Contributions to Philosophy <strong>and</strong> Enown<strong>in</strong>g-Historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>,”Companion to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s’ ‘Contributions to Philosophy,’ ed. by Charles E. Scott et al., p. 125.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy: The Challenge <strong>of</strong> Its <strong>Translation</strong>195through <strong>and</strong> re-emerge, to “play forth,” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation, to “play forth” <strong>in</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>rsay<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r (<strong>in</strong> this case English) language. These three (significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>orig<strong>in</strong>al work, its nature or basic perspective, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>the</strong>translation <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al) are <strong>in</strong>terconnected; <strong>the</strong>y belong to <strong>the</strong> hermeneuticsituatedness that conditions <strong>the</strong> assessment, a genu<strong>in</strong>e re-view, a fair <strong>and</strong> open view,<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> degree <strong>of</strong> success <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> translation. It is underst<strong>and</strong>able, <strong>the</strong>n, that<strong>the</strong> misperception <strong>of</strong> (underestimation <strong>of</strong> what is at stake <strong>in</strong>) any one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se three(i.e., <strong>of</strong> any one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> three elements or dimensions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hermeneutical situatednessjust <strong>in</strong>dicated) leads to a distorted glance at, narrows <strong>the</strong> view <strong>of</strong>, <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs.The criticisms by various scholars, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Theodore Kisiel, pa<strong>in</strong>ts a portrait <strong>of</strong>substantive deficiencies, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> cumbersome use <strong>of</strong> “neologisms” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>fractured use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> English language—<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al assessment that <strong>the</strong> translation<strong>of</strong> Beiträge is itself “disastrous.” 17 This attack itself on <strong>the</strong> English translation <strong>of</strong>Beiträge, however, respondeo dicendum, is a disaster, a major disappo<strong>in</strong>tment; itsfragile <strong>and</strong> self-assured claims (lengthy <strong>and</strong> obtuse Translators’ Foreword; proliferation<strong>of</strong> neologisms; en-co<strong>in</strong>ages not found <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Oxford English Dictionary; <strong>the</strong>translators’ contempt for readable English prose) collapse under <strong>the</strong>ir own weight.As suggested earlier, <strong>the</strong> depth <strong>of</strong> explor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>the</strong> translation<strong>of</strong> Beiträge <strong>and</strong> its German orig<strong>in</strong>al requires more than a “comparative l<strong>in</strong>guistics”;such an exploration is affected by <strong>the</strong> significance (“<strong>the</strong> weight”) <strong>of</strong>, by <strong>the</strong>“momentum” granted to, Beiträge, as well as by keep<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d (th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong>)<strong>the</strong> perspective (<strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g) embedded <strong>in</strong> this work. In this regard, wemust, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> spirit <strong>of</strong> judiciousness <strong>and</strong> fairness, acknowledge “constructive” assessment<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> English translation <strong>of</strong> Beiträge, <strong>of</strong> which Lars Iyer’s review <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> Journal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> British Society for Phenomenology is a foremost example. As <strong>the</strong>follow<strong>in</strong>g quote from Iyer illustrates, <strong>the</strong> very feature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation, which onereviewer rebukes <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r praises: “Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly reactivate <strong>the</strong>memory <strong>of</strong> forgotten words, revive dormant mean<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g words <strong>and</strong> evenco<strong>in</strong> new ones <strong>in</strong> accordance with <strong>the</strong> dem<strong>and</strong> that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought enacts.” 18The elements or dimensions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic situatedness are <strong>in</strong>terconnected, as<strong>the</strong> above reviewer suggests. To restore a sense <strong>of</strong> balance <strong>and</strong> perspective, <strong>the</strong>re issometh<strong>in</strong>g to be learned from Albert Camus’ remark that, <strong>in</strong> deal<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> absurd,(<strong>in</strong> this case) with <strong>the</strong> “disaster” at h<strong>and</strong> (as conjured by Kisiel), “everyth<strong>in</strong>g beg<strong>in</strong>swith consciousness <strong>and</strong> noth<strong>in</strong>g is worth anyth<strong>in</strong>g except through it.” 19Indeed, a fair-m<strong>in</strong>ded (ra<strong>the</strong>r than polemical), hermeneutically well-groundedassessment <strong>of</strong> translation <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>the</strong> awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>of</strong> evaluation,requires clarity about <strong>the</strong> “measurement” adopted <strong>and</strong> used <strong>in</strong> “measur<strong>in</strong>g” to what17Theodore Kisiel, “Review <strong>and</strong> Overview,” Studia Phaenomenologica, 5 (2005): 277–285.18Lars Iyer, “Review <strong>of</strong> Contributions to Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g), by Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>,trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly.” Journal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> British Society for Phenomenology (January2002): 95–96 (p. 95).19Albert Camus, The Myth <strong>of</strong> Sisyphus <strong>and</strong> O<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Essays</strong>, trans. Just<strong>in</strong> O’Brien (New York: V<strong>in</strong>tageInternational, 1991), p. 13.
196 G. Kovacsextent <strong>the</strong> translation measures up to <strong>the</strong> very ideal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> translation. Thequestion, <strong>the</strong>n, that is called forth <strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> arises out <strong>of</strong>, <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> striv<strong>in</strong>g fora fair-m<strong>in</strong>ded <strong>and</strong> hermeneutically-grounded, truly critical (κρίνÎιν; separat<strong>in</strong>g,sort<strong>in</strong>g-out, del<strong>in</strong>eat<strong>in</strong>g limits, judg<strong>in</strong>g, divid<strong>in</strong>g) assessment (more than an “overview”or a survey) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> Beiträge is this: With what measure is thistranslation to be measured? In o<strong>the</strong>r words, what is <strong>the</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard for judg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>translation <strong>of</strong> this text, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> degree <strong>of</strong> success or failure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic labor<strong>in</strong> listen<strong>in</strong>g to, <strong>in</strong> reth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al (<strong>in</strong> this case <strong>the</strong> German)text <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> with (translat<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>in</strong>to) English? The answer: <strong>the</strong> (orig<strong>in</strong>al) text if it isread, thought-through, <strong>and</strong> listened-to, <strong>and</strong> thus comes <strong>in</strong>to (sounds across) <strong>the</strong>words <strong>of</strong>, <strong>in</strong> fact <strong>in</strong>to, ano<strong>the</strong>r language. Thus, <strong>the</strong> measure (<strong>the</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard) for judg<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> Beiträge is <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al text, <strong>the</strong> relationship thatobta<strong>in</strong>s between <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al <strong>and</strong> its translation. <strong>Translation</strong> is not transmigration <strong>of</strong>words from one dictionary <strong>in</strong>to ano<strong>the</strong>r; it comes about as a lived experience withlanguage, not as an extraction from or contribution to an archive (as repository <strong>of</strong>some ideal, fixed language, <strong>of</strong> a fully transparent dictionary). Translat<strong>in</strong>g meansreth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, read<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> re-say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al, it is a creative experience with <strong>the</strong>thought sheltered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>ker <strong>in</strong> (with) ano<strong>the</strong>r language. The ambition<strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g is not <strong>the</strong> procurement <strong>of</strong> adequation (adaequatio; representationalagreement) between two contents <strong>in</strong> different languages; it is <strong>the</strong> struggle <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>happen<strong>in</strong>g (movement, play) <strong>of</strong> unconcealment, <strong>the</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong> what is sheltered<strong>in</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r language.Contributions, <strong>the</strong> English render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Beiträge, surely, one canreadily admit, does not have <strong>the</strong> fluency or diction <strong>of</strong> a novel; it reads (sounds)nei<strong>the</strong>r as a poem nor as an editorial essay published <strong>in</strong> a journal or newspaper.This translation is a venture <strong>in</strong> explor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g; it is an approximation to <strong>and</strong>an appropriation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s experience <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, it is a philosophicalhermeneuticalcontention with <strong>the</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical perspective <strong>of</strong> his journey <strong>of</strong>thought, <strong>and</strong> not <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> a representational, “archival perspective.” In thistranslation language, diction, <strong>and</strong> vocabulary are called forth by th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>question<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong>y are not prescribed to th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> question<strong>in</strong>g. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sexistential analysis, that is, <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, stretches <strong>the</strong> boundaries<strong>and</strong> constra<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> established, prevail<strong>in</strong>g language. He observes about <strong>the</strong>“awkwardness” (das Ungefüge) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>elegance” (Unschöne) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language(expression, style, diction) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> existential analysis, <strong>of</strong> his text, he po<strong>in</strong>ts out thatit is one th<strong>in</strong>gto give a report <strong>in</strong> which we tell (erzählend berichten) about be<strong>in</strong>gs (Seiendes), but [it is]ano<strong>the</strong>r [th<strong>in</strong>g] to grasp be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>). 20He cont<strong>in</strong>ues even more tell<strong>in</strong>gly: “For <strong>the</strong> later task we lack not only most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>words, but above all, <strong>the</strong> ‘grammar’.” 21 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to this remark, <strong>the</strong> search for <strong>the</strong>20GA 2, p. 52; tr. 63 (translation slightly modified).21GA 2, p. 52; tr. 63.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy: The Challenge <strong>of</strong> Its <strong>Translation</strong>197appropriate, fitt<strong>in</strong>g language <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>the</strong> contention with <strong>the</strong> “harshness <strong>of</strong> expressions,”as well as with <strong>the</strong> “troublesomeness” (die Umständlichkeit; complicatedness)<strong>of</strong> “concept-formation” (Begriffsbildung). 22 Translators <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s texts,especially <strong>in</strong> attend<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical perspective (<strong>in</strong> Contributions <strong>and</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r related writ<strong>in</strong>gs) <strong>of</strong> his way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, no doubt are familiar with <strong>and</strong> share<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> struggle with language, with expression, <strong>and</strong> concept-formation <strong>in</strong> German,<strong>and</strong> surely more exact<strong>in</strong>gly, more <strong>in</strong>tensely <strong>in</strong> English. The transition to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rbeg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g entails ano<strong>the</strong>r experience with language, <strong>the</strong> cross<strong>in</strong>g-overto be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical language, <strong>the</strong> burst<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> boundaries <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong>metaphysics. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s acknowledgement <strong>in</strong> his Über den Anfang(1941), already <strong>the</strong> first preparation for cross<strong>in</strong>g-over to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g st<strong>and</strong>sbefore (runs up aga<strong>in</strong>st) “hardly surmountable obstacles” <strong>in</strong> “becom<strong>in</strong>g enowned bybe-<strong>in</strong>g (Seyn),” <strong>in</strong> ventur<strong>in</strong>g to th<strong>in</strong>k based on <strong>and</strong> out <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g. 23 As he states <strong>in</strong>Bes<strong>in</strong>nung (1938–1939), “<strong>in</strong>quir<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g” transforms “<strong>the</strong>manner <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g.” 24 Thus, language is to be grasped (understood)based on (from, out <strong>of</strong>) its relation to <strong>the</strong> “truth <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>and</strong> as “go<strong>in</strong>g beyond”(overcom<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>the</strong> “prevail<strong>in</strong>g grammar,” beyond <strong>the</strong> prefixed bounds <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g. 25The be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical word “says be-<strong>in</strong>g non-objectively,” thus o<strong>the</strong>rwise thanobjectify<strong>in</strong>g, representational language; it is simple, <strong>and</strong> different from “<strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>ite<strong>and</strong> symbolic speak<strong>in</strong>g through signs.” 26 These explanations by <strong>Heidegger</strong> clearly<strong>in</strong>dicate that <strong>the</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>the</strong> language) <strong>of</strong> Contributions is more exact<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> difficultthan <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time.3 What dist<strong>in</strong>guishes <strong>the</strong> English translation <strong>of</strong> Beiträge is precisely its sensitivity tobe-<strong>in</strong>g-historical language, to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own experience <strong>in</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> express<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> thought <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g. The translation’s vocabulary, diction, that is, its power <strong>of</strong>expression <strong>and</strong> manner <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g, are conditioned by <strong>the</strong>ir hermeneutic situation. Thewords adopted, <strong>the</strong> “style” <strong>of</strong> l<strong>in</strong>guistic construction, <strong>the</strong> (“new”) concept-formations,as endemic to <strong>the</strong> labor <strong>of</strong> translation, do not “pop-out” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dictionary, <strong>the</strong>y arenei<strong>the</strong>r simply borrowed from nor fixed (controlled) by <strong>the</strong> “treasury” <strong>of</strong> an archive;<strong>the</strong>y are brought forth by <strong>and</strong> constitute <strong>the</strong> residue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> venture <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g “someth<strong>in</strong>g” that is, never<strong>the</strong>less, not fully sayable. Withoutattend<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g at work (embedded) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation (<strong>in</strong> this22GA 2, p. 52; tr. 63 (translation modified).23Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Über den Anfang, GA 70 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann, 2005), p. 94(hereafter: GA 70).24GA 66, p. 385; tr. 341.25GA 66, p. 425; tr. 376.26GA 66, pp. 103, 299; tr. 86, 267–268.
198 G. Kovacscase, <strong>in</strong> Contributions), <strong>the</strong> assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> accomplishments <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translationis dest<strong>in</strong>ed to become a mere “reaction aga<strong>in</strong>st” it, that is, a misguided evaluation dueto failed, <strong>the</strong>oretical, a priori expectations (on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> evaluator). One isimpelled to conclude that <strong>the</strong> reactive, not text-based, assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translationunder discussion <strong>in</strong> Theodore Kisiel’s essay <strong>in</strong>timates <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> frustration with<strong>the</strong> very failure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> adopted “manner” (<strong>the</strong> way <strong>and</strong> methodology; unexam<strong>in</strong>edcriteria or guid<strong>in</strong>g st<strong>and</strong>ard <strong>and</strong> “measure”) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> assessment, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> evaluation. Thesense <strong>of</strong> frustration with this failure at work (lurk<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “manner” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> assessmentleads to (shows itself <strong>in</strong>) hyperbolic generalizations (contempt for readableEnglish, disastrous translation, deluge <strong>of</strong> neologisms), as well as to <strong>the</strong> tendency toacerbic, unyield<strong>in</strong>g fixation on selected words, basic terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation(“enow<strong>in</strong>g,” “en-th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g,” “what is ownmost,” “be<strong>in</strong>g-history,” “<strong>in</strong>abid<strong>in</strong>g”).Respond<strong>in</strong>g to Theodore Kisiel’s reactions to <strong>the</strong> English translation <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Beiträge, as <strong>the</strong> preced<strong>in</strong>g considerations suggest, entails more than“react<strong>in</strong>g” aga<strong>in</strong>st his “reactions.” It amounts to recogniz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> obstacles <strong>and</strong>discern<strong>in</strong>g possibilities on <strong>the</strong> way to render<strong>in</strong>g sayable <strong>and</strong> audible “<strong>the</strong> matter” <strong>of</strong>thought <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text (<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation) at h<strong>and</strong>. The attention <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> this “essay<strong>in</strong> response” is focused on some concrete, <strong>in</strong>dividual issues, <strong>and</strong> claims <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong>Theodore Kisiel’s reactions to Contributions based on, <strong>in</strong> fact governed by, his“archival perspective” as paradigmatically proclaimed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> very title <strong>of</strong>, <strong>and</strong>unwaver<strong>in</strong>gly enacted <strong>in</strong>, his review <strong>and</strong> overview <strong>of</strong> this translation.(a) The “Translators’ Foreword” to Contributions alerts <strong>the</strong> reader to <strong>the</strong> philosophicalsignificance as well as to <strong>the</strong> unusual, unique nature <strong>of</strong> this work by<strong>Heidegger</strong>. It is a fitt<strong>in</strong>g, scholarly <strong>and</strong> clear explanation <strong>and</strong> justification <strong>of</strong> manytranslation decisions based on <strong>the</strong> exam<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> alternative possibilities for render<strong>in</strong>gmany, though not all, basic, technical terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s German <strong>in</strong> English.The translators open <strong>the</strong> range <strong>of</strong> possibilities for explor<strong>in</strong>g, say<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gthrough <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>sights <strong>and</strong> claims with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> bounds (limitations <strong>and</strong> potentials)<strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>in</strong> this case <strong>the</strong> English, language; <strong>the</strong>y never claim f<strong>in</strong>al, unsurpassableauthority or wisdom (e.g., based on some a priori pr<strong>in</strong>ciple or perspective) for<strong>the</strong>ir <strong>of</strong>ten difficult translation decisions (e.g., “enown<strong>in</strong>g” for Ereignis; “en-th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g”for er-denken; “sway<strong>in</strong>g” for Wesung), nor do <strong>the</strong>y relegate it to a preferred dictionary,or to an archive <strong>of</strong> wisdom <strong>and</strong> dictionaries. In fact, <strong>the</strong>y acknowledge, <strong>the</strong>y do notclose down (<strong>the</strong>y do not exclude) different, possible alternative render<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> same term or diction. They certa<strong>in</strong>ly can agree with William J. Richardson’ssuggestion that <strong>the</strong> formation or establishment <strong>of</strong> a “term<strong>in</strong>ology that will match<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own <strong>in</strong>novative struggle with German,” <strong>in</strong> Beiträge, is not someth<strong>in</strong>g tobe fixed easily or quickly, not even “provisionally.” 27 The full extent <strong>of</strong> a common,basic vocabulary, a set <strong>of</strong> complete <strong>and</strong> relatively “f<strong>in</strong>al,” “agreed upon” technicalterms <strong>in</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g Beiträge <strong>in</strong>to English, its comprehensive, <strong>in</strong>-depth grasp with<strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> bounds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> English language (as with<strong>in</strong> those <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs) are dem<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g tasks.27William J. Richardson, “Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ground <strong>of</strong> Negativity: A Note on <strong>the</strong> Fourth Movement<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Beiträge-Symphony,” 37.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy: The Challenge <strong>of</strong> Its <strong>Translation</strong>199The successful work toward <strong>the</strong>ir accomplishment is clearly manifest <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> scholarlytranslation by Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly, as well as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> systematic explorations<strong>of</strong> this unique, difficult text <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>. 28(b) A dist<strong>in</strong>ct, yet common, characteristic <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> translations is <strong>the</strong> recourseto neologisms, especially for render<strong>in</strong>g (recreat<strong>in</strong>g, re<strong>in</strong>vent<strong>in</strong>g) decisive, technicalterms. Ano<strong>the</strong>r general characteristic <strong>of</strong> English translations <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gsis <strong>the</strong> generous use <strong>of</strong> hyphenated expressions for reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> unity <strong>of</strong> multiword-dictions.A third characteristic <strong>of</strong> many English render<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’stexts is <strong>the</strong> strategic use <strong>of</strong> hyphenated s<strong>in</strong>gle words, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> adoption <strong>of</strong>hyphenated prefixes, for ref<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g, def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> safeguard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>tended. These three characteristics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> English translations, <strong>in</strong> fact l<strong>in</strong>guistic,hermeneutic strategies (practices) adopted by <strong>the</strong> translators, one ought to admit, are<strong>in</strong>spired by, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y are consistent with (found <strong>in</strong>), <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own creative use,<strong>and</strong> struggle with <strong>the</strong> resources, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German language. One should acknowledgethat <strong>the</strong> adoption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r helpful strategies by <strong>the</strong> translators as well as by<strong>Heidegger</strong> himself are quite underst<strong>and</strong>able; <strong>the</strong>y are practically <strong>in</strong>dispensableespecially <strong>in</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s second ma<strong>in</strong> work, <strong>in</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> explor<strong>in</strong>gthis substantial <strong>and</strong> difficult text.There is a unique, dist<strong>in</strong>ctive “style” <strong>of</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>g endemic to <strong>the</strong> significant, <strong>and</strong>great texts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> philosophy (<strong>the</strong> fragments <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pre-Socratics, <strong>the</strong> dialogues<strong>of</strong> Plato, <strong>the</strong> works <strong>of</strong> Aqu<strong>in</strong>as, Hegel’s Phenomenology <strong>of</strong> Spirit, Nietzsche’sThus Spoke Zarathustra); this style is <strong>in</strong>separable, though dist<strong>in</strong>guishable, from <strong>the</strong>way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g embedded <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> com<strong>in</strong>g forth through <strong>the</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>g. How did<strong>Heidegger</strong> himself choose or came to <strong>in</strong>vent his words, especially <strong>the</strong> more technicalterms? How did he found, came to <strong>the</strong> discernment <strong>of</strong>, his l<strong>in</strong>guistic, hermeneuticstrategies, his diction <strong>and</strong> language? These are nei<strong>the</strong>r idle nor merely tantaliz<strong>in</strong>gquestions. Their answers may be found, discerned, <strong>and</strong> not only conjectured or surmised,through careful read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> thoughtful work with his writ<strong>in</strong>gs (his diversetexts). His etymological explanations <strong>and</strong> his strategy to unearth <strong>and</strong> grasp <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>alroots <strong>and</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> basic words <strong>in</strong>dicate that he consulted <strong>and</strong> judiciouslyused dictionaries (German, Greek, Lat<strong>in</strong>) <strong>in</strong> his dialogue with sem<strong>in</strong>al texts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>tradition, with <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> thought. These practices show that his “l<strong>in</strong>guistic”decisions, choices <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> words, his concept-formations, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>vention(creation) <strong>of</strong> technical terms, do consider alternative possibilities <strong>of</strong> expression,<strong>the</strong>y are not made <strong>in</strong> a historical, cultural vacuum. The Pre-Socratics, MeisterEckhart, <strong>and</strong> Hölderl<strong>in</strong>, that is, philosophers <strong>and</strong> poets, <strong>in</strong>fluenced his choice <strong>of</strong>words, “style” <strong>and</strong> diction <strong>in</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>g, th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> speak<strong>in</strong>g; <strong>the</strong>y awakened <strong>and</strong>nourished his fasc<strong>in</strong>ation with (“what is ownmost” to) language, with its connectionwith th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> “to be.” He surely treasured <strong>and</strong> creatively, <strong>in</strong>ventively appropriated<strong>the</strong> liv<strong>in</strong>g history (Geschichte, not Historie) <strong>of</strong> language <strong>and</strong> thought, withoutsublat<strong>in</strong>g (or absorb<strong>in</strong>g) it <strong>in</strong>to an a priori “archival perspective,” without view<strong>in</strong>g28Examples <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>teraction between translation <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r scholarly endeavors may be seen <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>collected volume entitled Companion to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy. See CharlesE. Scott et al. (eds.), Companion to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy.
200 G. Kovacs<strong>and</strong> us<strong>in</strong>g it as <strong>the</strong> prefixed norm <strong>and</strong> measure <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, as <strong>the</strong> safety(safe treasure <strong>and</strong> harbor) <strong>of</strong> regressive, retro-gressive, backward-look<strong>in</strong>g, historiciz<strong>in</strong>gunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation (reductionism), as hermetic-hermeneuticalclosure (shelter<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>the</strong>oretical ideal or paradigm for language <strong>and</strong> thought). Heappropriated <strong>and</strong> used <strong>the</strong> words chosen without obviat<strong>in</strong>g or <strong>in</strong>terrupt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> com<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> “to be,” <strong>of</strong> “<strong>the</strong> matter” <strong>of</strong> thought at stake, <strong>in</strong>to language (<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> words <strong>of</strong> hislanguage), without preempt<strong>in</strong>g or controll<strong>in</strong>g (narrow<strong>in</strong>g, pre-fix<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>the</strong> “manner”<strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g. The words, expressions, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>tended mean<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sexperience <strong>of</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>in</strong> his texts) are not simply “extracts” from a “dictionary” or“<strong>the</strong>saurus.” They were adopted <strong>and</strong> used by him <strong>in</strong>ventively <strong>and</strong> spontaneously,though judiciously, as <strong>in</strong>spired by <strong>and</strong> acquired through his work with (read<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong>)philosophical, poetic, as well as biblical texts; his words <strong>and</strong> diction, his “style,” onemight rightly suggest, emerged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> course, came to him (to his m<strong>in</strong>d) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>experience, <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.The manner <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>in</strong>separable from <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Say<strong>in</strong>g, words,<strong>and</strong> language are not prefabricated receptacles (structures) for thoughts <strong>and</strong> ideasmigrat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong>m; <strong>the</strong>y emerge <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> belong to <strong>the</strong> movement (experience) <strong>of</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s basic <strong>in</strong>sights or ideas (e.g., Er-eignung; en-ownment) cameabout through his way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, through “recogniz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> signs,”even if from afar, that lead to <strong>the</strong>m <strong>and</strong> thus “preserv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong> simple words.” 29<strong>Heidegger</strong> translations <strong>and</strong> scholarship may not capture (render) his way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gwithout be<strong>in</strong>g attuned to his thoughtful say<strong>in</strong>g, to his experience with language, to<strong>the</strong> way-quality <strong>of</strong> his say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, to his thought <strong>and</strong> language. Translat<strong>in</strong>ghis texts, <strong>the</strong>n, is a hermeneutic ground-work, a basic experience <strong>in</strong> pav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> wayto <strong>the</strong>ir underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>terpretation, <strong>and</strong> assessment.<strong>Translation</strong> entails a f<strong>in</strong>al decision, a f<strong>in</strong>al choice from among alternative possibilitiesfor render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s German <strong>in</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r language; o<strong>the</strong>r scholarly works(exploration, <strong>in</strong>terpretation, assessment) do have <strong>the</strong> luxury <strong>of</strong> exploit<strong>in</strong>g alternativepossibilities for render<strong>in</strong>g basic terms <strong>and</strong> expressions, even reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> us<strong>in</strong>gmore than one render<strong>in</strong>g—this <strong>in</strong> addition to <strong>the</strong> availability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relative safety <strong>of</strong>explanation. <strong>Translation</strong> delimits <strong>the</strong> range <strong>of</strong> l<strong>in</strong>guistic strategies adopted (chosen);explanation <strong>and</strong> scholarly exploration (research) exp<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> range <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>adoption <strong>of</strong> l<strong>in</strong>guistic alternatives <strong>and</strong> possibilities.(c) A thorough study <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Translators’ Foreword” is an <strong>in</strong>dispensable preparation(prerequisite) for a mean<strong>in</strong>gful read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> text <strong>of</strong> Contributions, as well asfor a fair-m<strong>in</strong>ded, <strong>in</strong>structive assessment <strong>of</strong> it as a work <strong>of</strong> translation. These two(i.e., <strong>the</strong> foreword by <strong>the</strong> translators <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> text <strong>of</strong> Contributions itself) are as much<strong>in</strong>terrelated (<strong>in</strong>tertw<strong>in</strong>ed) (pedagogically <strong>and</strong> philosophically, not only l<strong>in</strong>guistically)as <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s “Preview” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “rest” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> text <strong>of</strong> his second ma<strong>in</strong> work.In fact <strong>the</strong> “Translators’ Foreword” amounts to an <strong>in</strong>troduction to (a way lead<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>to) <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> to his “manner” <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g (language, syntax) <strong>in</strong> this29GA 66, p. 349; tr. 310.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy: The Challenge <strong>of</strong> Its <strong>Translation</strong>201unique, difficult text. The guid<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple, one might say, <strong>the</strong> “ideal,” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work<strong>of</strong> this translation is concisely def<strong>in</strong>ed as an endeavor, as “an act <strong>of</strong> disclos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>orient<strong>in</strong>g power” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical words (<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ctive say<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> uniquelanguage), thus <strong>of</strong> alert<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> reader to <strong>the</strong> same power (<strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unique,especially be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical words <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g) that shapes <strong>and</strong> holds toge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>order, <strong>the</strong> systematic unity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> six divisions (called <strong>the</strong> six jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gs) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> text, <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g exposition (<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> thought, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> surmis<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g as enown<strong>in</strong>g. 30This means that it was <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> text <strong>of</strong> Beiträge itself, that is, <strong>the</strong> systematicunity (<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terrelated “jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>the</strong> order) <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, that is, <strong>the</strong>ma<strong>in</strong> perspective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g embedded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al source,that governed, “guided this translation toward disclos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> orient<strong>in</strong>g power <strong>in</strong>herent<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> key words” <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s text at h<strong>and</strong>. 31 This is a very significant explanatorystatement by <strong>the</strong> translators; it is <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple at work <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir translationdecisions, <strong>in</strong> account<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> specific choices (discuss<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “how” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disclos<strong>in</strong>gpower <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> given <strong>in</strong>stance) for render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> English ma<strong>in</strong>, key philosophicalwords <strong>and</strong> phrases <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German text. There is nei<strong>the</strong>r ambiguity nor obfuscation<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir explanations. The translators, as if anticipat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> respond<strong>in</strong>g to questions<strong>and</strong> misperceptions, clearly <strong>in</strong>dicate <strong>the</strong> weight <strong>and</strong> implications <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir adopted“pr<strong>in</strong>ciple,” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir approach at work, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> course <strong>and</strong> activity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation:Thus <strong>the</strong> source from which this translation received directive <strong>and</strong> guidance was not primarily<strong>the</strong> lexicographical settlement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relation between <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s German <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>English words. 32The relation between <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s German <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> English words, that is, <strong>the</strong>relation between <strong>the</strong> German text <strong>and</strong> its render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to English (or any o<strong>the</strong>r language),is deeper <strong>and</strong> more comprehensive than “simply lexicographical.” It is, as<strong>the</strong> translators rightly claim, <strong>and</strong> as <strong>the</strong> preced<strong>in</strong>g considerations (i.e., <strong>the</strong> claims <strong>of</strong>this “essay <strong>in</strong> response”) <strong>in</strong>dicate, hermeneutical, philosophical, not simply“archival.”(d) How can <strong>the</strong> translator render <strong>in</strong>to English <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s be-<strong>in</strong>g-historicalGerman words, phrases, <strong>and</strong> manner <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g? Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> very idea <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historicallanguage <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s German does not by itself guarantee its “reenactment”<strong>in</strong> (<strong>in</strong>to) ano<strong>the</strong>r language. The translator, <strong>in</strong> addition to <strong>the</strong> immersion<strong>in</strong>to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s experience <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> creative say<strong>in</strong>g, is <strong>in</strong>evitably prompted(compelled) to devise appropriate strategies that open up <strong>and</strong> appropriate <strong>the</strong> disclosivepower <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> English, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> second or ra<strong>the</strong>r o<strong>the</strong>r, language. The range <strong>of</strong>alternative say<strong>in</strong>gs, toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> horizon <strong>and</strong> dimensions <strong>of</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g, opens up<strong>and</strong> becomes discernible <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> experience, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> course, <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g as attuned30Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly, “Translators’ Foreword,” <strong>in</strong> Contributions, pp. xvii, xviii.31Ibid., p. xviii.32Ibid., p. xviii.
202 G. Kovacsthrough listen<strong>in</strong>g, through lett<strong>in</strong>g (allow<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> “new” language orig<strong>in</strong>ate(emerge) out <strong>of</strong>, <strong>and</strong> as “grounded <strong>in</strong>,” “silence.” 33 For, as <strong>Heidegger</strong> expla<strong>in</strong>s,silence is <strong>the</strong> most sheltered measure-hold<strong>in</strong>g (das verborgenste Mass-halten). It holds(hält) <strong>the</strong> measure, <strong>in</strong> that it first sets up measures (Masstäbe). And so language is measuresett<strong>in</strong>g(Mass-setzung).... 34The act or work <strong>of</strong> translation (translat<strong>in</strong>g), <strong>the</strong>n, is an orig<strong>in</strong>ation that is governedby measure-sett<strong>in</strong>g; it is not (surely not lexicographical) adequation between twodifferent languages (as preserved <strong>in</strong> an archive, as accumulated treasure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> paststored <strong>and</strong> ready-to-h<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> a museum, as souvenir <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> past); it is an experiencewith language, a thoughtful say<strong>in</strong>g. 35The translation <strong>of</strong> even <strong>the</strong> simplest words is more than an exchange <strong>of</strong> words,more than a mere lexicographic event. The word “th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g” harbors with<strong>in</strong> itselfdiverse <strong>and</strong> tell<strong>in</strong>g shades <strong>of</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> different languages. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s German,for <strong>in</strong>stance, connects it with (hears <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>s it as) “thank<strong>in</strong>g” (Denken:Dank, Danken, Gedanc, Andenken), 36 while <strong>in</strong> Hungarian it is connected with(it means) “car<strong>in</strong>g” (gondolkodás). 37 <strong>Heidegger</strong> was quite <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> know<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “care” (gond; gondolat) <strong>and</strong> “car<strong>in</strong>g” (gondolkodás; gondolkodni) connotations(underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, mean<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word “th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r (<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>Hungarian) language.The word Denken (th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g) is no doubt a key yet simple <strong>and</strong> hermeneuticallyrich word <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s German, <strong>in</strong> all his writ<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>and</strong> perhaps more so <strong>in</strong> Beiträge.Thus, even <strong>the</strong> simple <strong>and</strong> more rout<strong>in</strong>ely translated words (e.g., denken as “th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g”)can give pause to (<strong>in</strong>terrupt <strong>the</strong> labor <strong>of</strong>) <strong>the</strong> translator <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> (<strong>in</strong> both) languages<strong>in</strong>volved. This pause or <strong>in</strong>terruption becomes more prob<strong>in</strong>g, thought-provok<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong>perplex<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> more <strong>in</strong>ventive (creative) words <strong>and</strong> constructions <strong>in</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s German, <strong>in</strong> lett<strong>in</strong>g resound his be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> (<strong>and</strong> through)<strong>the</strong> English language. The translator has no choice but to decide which l<strong>in</strong>guistic <strong>and</strong>hermeneutic strategies contribute more fully to <strong>the</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g-historicalmean<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s words <strong>and</strong> expressions) <strong>in</strong> English. The translator cannotwait; <strong>the</strong> translator ought (is bound) to venture, to make a f<strong>in</strong>al choice.33GA 65, p. 510; tr. 359.34GA 65, p. 510; tr. 359.35For <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s concise discussion <strong>of</strong> translation, see his Was heißt Denken? (lecture course atFreiburg, W<strong>in</strong>ter Semester, 1951–1952 <strong>and</strong> Summer Semester, 1952), GA 8 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Klostermann, 2002), pp. 236–237 (hereafter: GA 8).36GA 8, pp. 142–147, 247. See also <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950–1959), GA 12(Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann, 1985), p. 256 (Gedanke, Dank). For an <strong>in</strong>sightful discussion <strong>of</strong>this issue, see Samuel IJssel<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Denken en Danken–Geven en Zijn (Antwerp:Neerl<strong>and</strong>sche Boeckh<strong>and</strong>el, 1964), passim.37Regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> this, see Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Költemények:A Gondolkodás Tapsztalatából (“Poems: From <strong>the</strong> Experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>.” In German <strong>and</strong>Hungarian), ed. Gábor Ferge, trans. Kerszturi Idő (Budapest: Societas Philosophia Classica, 1995),back cover (dust jacket) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> book, with reference to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terview with <strong>Heidegger</strong> published <strong>in</strong>Mérleg, 12 (1976, no. 3), 200–201. See also Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Lét és Idő, tr. by M. Vajda et al.(Budapest: Gondolat, 1989b), p. 708.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy: The Challenge <strong>of</strong> Its <strong>Translation</strong>203Er-denken is clearly a be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical word <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s second ma<strong>in</strong> work,as well as <strong>in</strong> his o<strong>the</strong>r related writ<strong>in</strong>gs. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly opted forrender<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>in</strong>to English as “en-th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.” This word does not fit <strong>in</strong>to a metaphysicallexicography; Er-denken is not about th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g someth<strong>in</strong>g, not about figur<strong>in</strong>g out orrepresent<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> conceptualiz<strong>in</strong>g someth<strong>in</strong>g. Er-denken st<strong>and</strong>s for ano<strong>the</strong>r thanmetaphysical way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g; it “says” <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>timates <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g proper toor orig<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g at ano<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>ception <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g; it conveys <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>and</strong> accomplishment(enactment) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> very way, <strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r way, <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g; it re-th<strong>in</strong>ksth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g itself. Thus, <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Er-denken becomes more familiar, morediscernible, audible, <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>able through work<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> text, throughhermeneutic labor, not through some “archival illum<strong>in</strong>ation” or erudition detached(at a distance) from <strong>the</strong> text, from its context.<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Er-denken is at work, thus it may be observed,<strong>in</strong> his practice, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> way it functions <strong>in</strong> his text, <strong>in</strong> his writ<strong>in</strong>g; this “observation” is<strong>in</strong>dispensable for, it is part <strong>of</strong>, <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic labor (act) <strong>of</strong> thoughtful translation.Translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>cludes read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g; it entails attend<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>mean<strong>in</strong>g harbored, sheltered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text <strong>in</strong> question. This part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> act <strong>of</strong> translationis not an esoteric adventure; it is a way <strong>of</strong> attend<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> disclos<strong>in</strong>g power <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s words <strong>and</strong> explanations, especially to his elucidations <strong>of</strong> his basic words,key terms. There is no worthy, reliable translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> that does not grasphis own explanations <strong>of</strong> his basic expressions, concepts, <strong>and</strong> claims. His explanation(a dictionary would codify it as <strong>the</strong> “def<strong>in</strong>ition”) <strong>of</strong> Er-denken is quite descriptive <strong>and</strong>thought-provok<strong>in</strong>g. An <strong>in</strong>structive example <strong>of</strong> his elucidation (descriptive analysis) <strong>of</strong>Er-denken may be found <strong>in</strong> his discussion <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Section 98<strong>of</strong> Bes<strong>in</strong>nung, written <strong>in</strong> 1938–1939, on <strong>the</strong> heels <strong>of</strong> Beiträge. Here, he clearlyexpla<strong>in</strong>s that Er-denken refers to be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, that be-<strong>in</strong>g-historicalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is Er-denken <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g (des Seyns), that Er-denken is a dist<strong>in</strong>ct way <strong>of</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g be-<strong>in</strong>g. This may give <strong>the</strong> impression, he observes, that be-<strong>in</strong>g is someth<strong>in</strong>g“arbitrary” (eigenmächtig) <strong>and</strong> somehow just “figured out” (ausgedacht; thought out)<strong>and</strong> found, that it is <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>ker who “figures out” (th<strong>in</strong>ks out) <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ds be-<strong>in</strong>g. What<strong>Heidegger</strong> has <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d here, however, is quite <strong>the</strong> opposite: “The word Er-denken,”rendered <strong>in</strong>to English as en-th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g,wants to say: th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g that is en-owned (er-eignet ist) beforeh<strong>and</strong> by be-<strong>in</strong>g—by what is tobe thought—<strong>and</strong> becomes enactable only <strong>in</strong> a history <strong>and</strong> as <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g. 38Er-denken is not reducible to (it is not identical with) <strong>the</strong> exertion (activity,imag<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, contriv<strong>in</strong>g, arbitrarily figur<strong>in</strong>g out someth<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>ker, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g subject; it comes <strong>in</strong>to its own (enowned, appropriated, takes place) beforeh<strong>and</strong>(first) by what is to be thought (by <strong>the</strong> matter or issue <strong>of</strong> thought itself), bybe-<strong>in</strong>g; it becomes accomplishable, enactable (it can be brought to completion)only <strong>in</strong> a history (Geschichte) <strong>and</strong> as (belong<strong>in</strong>g to) <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g; it doesnot take place, it cannot be enacted, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ahistorical vacuum <strong>of</strong> abstraction, but <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> “to be,” <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g, thus not <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> historiological (l<strong>in</strong>ear chronological,“scientific”) realm or ontic history as history <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs.38GA 66, p. 357; tr. 317.
204 G. KovacsEr-denken, <strong>the</strong>n, is understood here as enownment (event, occurrence) <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> bybe-<strong>in</strong>g, as th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g based on <strong>and</strong> out <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g; 39 it is <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>sense <strong>of</strong> double genitive) <strong>in</strong> history <strong>and</strong> as history. For <strong>Heidegger</strong>, it is <strong>the</strong> enownment<strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g that takes place <strong>in</strong> history (what history is all about); it (enownment) iswhat is ownmost (Wesen) to history, thus, one might say, def<strong>in</strong>es history; <strong>in</strong> fact,history (Geschichte) “is be-<strong>in</strong>g itself.” 40 This concise explanation unmistakably<strong>in</strong>dicates that <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Er-denken <strong>in</strong>tended by <strong>Heidegger</strong> is different from itseveryday usage, from its common, average underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g. Thus, he adds that if it is“…understood accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary l<strong>in</strong>guistic usage, it is thoroughly mislead<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> should, <strong>the</strong>refore, be avoided.” 41 The mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Er-denken, <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’susage, as he concludes <strong>the</strong> explanation under consideration, is be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical, thatis, understood as “en-owned by be-<strong>in</strong>g,” as a th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g that orig<strong>in</strong>ates <strong>and</strong> is enactedout <strong>of</strong> (based on) be-<strong>in</strong>g; it is a way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g that is different from metaphysical,representational th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, from “metaphysical represent<strong>in</strong>g that places be<strong>in</strong>gs assuch before itself,” 42 from be<strong>in</strong>gs-based th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. The difference between <strong>the</strong>se twoways <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, as <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong>sists, is radical, substantial. Its recognition, <strong>the</strong>n,is <strong>in</strong>dispensable for read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s German text <strong>and</strong> for its render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>toano<strong>the</strong>r language.The “Translators’ Foreword” to Contributions recognizes <strong>and</strong> takes <strong>in</strong>to account <strong>the</strong>philosophical <strong>and</strong> l<strong>in</strong>guistic issues entailed <strong>in</strong> translation decisions. It <strong>in</strong>cludes a clear,concise, <strong>and</strong> scholarly explanation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “significant role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> prefix er-” <strong>in</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s text (<strong>in</strong> his th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g), 43 <strong>and</strong> justifies its render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> English as en- <strong>and</strong> thus<strong>the</strong> adoption <strong>of</strong> en-th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g for er-denken. This option reta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g-historicalmean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “er-” as <strong>in</strong>tended by <strong>Heidegger</strong> (er- <strong>in</strong> er-denken, but also <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> correspond<strong>in</strong>ggroup <strong>of</strong> words with <strong>the</strong> prefix “er”), <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> function <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “er-” <strong>in</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s German (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g his creative use <strong>of</strong> German philology), that is, <strong>the</strong>nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>the</strong> prefix “er-” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> conjo<strong>in</strong>ed word (<strong>in</strong> this casedenknen) <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s text, <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g orig<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>and</strong> enabl<strong>in</strong>g (enact<strong>in</strong>g, accomplish<strong>in</strong>g).The English “en-” st<strong>and</strong>s for <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g power (orig<strong>in</strong>ation, enabl<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> German “er-.” 44 The same strategy (based on be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical <strong>and</strong> l<strong>in</strong>guistic sensitivities)accounts for translat<strong>in</strong>g many German words with <strong>the</strong> prefix “er-” <strong>in</strong>to Englishwith <strong>the</strong> prefix “en-” (erbr<strong>in</strong>gen as enbr<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g; Eröffnung as enopen<strong>in</strong>g; erzittern asenquiver<strong>in</strong>g; ersehen as ensee<strong>in</strong>g), except when <strong>the</strong> prefix “er-” is conjo<strong>in</strong>ed with aGerman word <strong>in</strong> common usage with established, accepted mean<strong>in</strong>g (erfahren; ermessen)<strong>and</strong> rendered <strong>in</strong> English without <strong>the</strong> prefix “en-” (experienc<strong>in</strong>g; measur<strong>in</strong>g). The“Translators’ Foreword” <strong>in</strong>dicates, quite astutely, that render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> prefix “er-” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>words with this prefix, as expla<strong>in</strong>ed above, <strong>in</strong> English as “en-” discloses <strong>the</strong> connection39Cf. GA 66, p. 357; tr. 318.40GA 66, pp. 357, 358; tr. 318.41GA 66, p. 357; tr. 317.42GA 66, p. 357; tr. 317.43Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly, “Translators’ Foreword,” pp. xxxvii–xxxix; see also p. xxi.44Ibid., p. xxxix.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy: The Challenge <strong>of</strong> Its <strong>Translation</strong>205with “Ereignis” <strong>and</strong> “enown<strong>in</strong>g” respectively <strong>and</strong> calls attention to <strong>the</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical,enown<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g (as well as language <strong>and</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g) as <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> perspective <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s second ma<strong>in</strong> work. 45 It may be claimed, <strong>the</strong>n, that <strong>the</strong> very read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>translation (Contributions) is a participation <strong>in</strong>, an approximation or gett<strong>in</strong>g closer to,<strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g embodied <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> express<strong>in</strong>g itself through (com<strong>in</strong>g across)<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s German.(e) Thus, as <strong>the</strong>se considerations suggest, <strong>the</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> er-denken <strong>in</strong>to English as“en-th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g” may be regarded as paradigmatic, as typify<strong>in</strong>g (illustrat<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>the</strong> hermeneuticaldirectives (strategies <strong>and</strong> sensitivities) adopted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> translation, <strong>in</strong>mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ten difficult f<strong>in</strong>al choices, <strong>the</strong> translation decisions. This paradigmaticexample shows beyond doubt that <strong>the</strong> English render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Beiträge was guided bysound hermeneutic <strong>and</strong> l<strong>in</strong>guistic considerations based on <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s German, as wellas on <strong>the</strong> related suitable options available <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> English language. This means, <strong>the</strong>n,that <strong>the</strong> “measure” (criterion, st<strong>and</strong>ard) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “ideal” (ambition) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translationunder discussion (Contributions) are grounded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text; <strong>the</strong>y are not based on, notextracted from, a priori, extra-textual, <strong>the</strong>oretical, historiciz<strong>in</strong>g assumptions, expectations;<strong>the</strong>y are not prisoners <strong>of</strong> a prefixed (e.g., archival) perspective.There are yet some additional, practical hermeneutic strategies that becameavailable, viable through <strong>the</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “er-” <strong>in</strong> er-denken (as well as <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rwords with <strong>the</strong> prefix “er-”) as “en” <strong>and</strong> thus er-denken as “en-th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g” (<strong>and</strong> similarly<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r words <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> same group) <strong>in</strong> English. Admittedly, “en-” isa simple term <strong>and</strong> “en-th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g” is a simple word; <strong>the</strong>y are not convoluted, not contrived,though <strong>in</strong>ventive. Their simplicity contributes to <strong>the</strong> clarity <strong>of</strong>, <strong>and</strong> to <strong>the</strong>discernment <strong>of</strong> consistency <strong>in</strong>, say<strong>in</strong>g. One could have adopted or thought <strong>of</strong> someo<strong>the</strong>r strategy that might have provided, guaranteed, a priori assured (prefixed)greater conformity to <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g ord<strong>in</strong>ary language <strong>and</strong> l<strong>in</strong>guistic practices. Itwould not have been impossible to render <strong>the</strong> German prefix “er-” <strong>in</strong> erdenken (<strong>and</strong>similarly <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r words with <strong>the</strong> same prefix) with an adjective (!) <strong>in</strong> English <strong>and</strong>thus, for example, as “radical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g,” “primordial th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g,” or, horribile dictu,as “th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g-2” as different from “th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g-1,” <strong>the</strong> latter st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g for “metaphysical,representational th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g” (one could have attempted render<strong>in</strong>g erdenken <strong>in</strong> Englishwith “th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g” as a crossed-out word). The adjectival strategy (technique), a form<strong>of</strong> paraphras<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> disguise, surely would have led to ambiguities, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last analysis,to obfuscation <strong>of</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g, to convoluted <strong>and</strong> thoughtless text <strong>in</strong> English. Thisstrategy is simply not practical, not viable; it is preempted by <strong>the</strong> usage <strong>of</strong> manydiverse, alternative adjectives preced<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> word denken (th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sGerman (e.g., ursprüngliches Denken, orig<strong>in</strong>ary th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g; wesentliches Denken,essential th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g; anfängliches Denken, <strong>in</strong>ceptional th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g; vorstellendes Denken,representational th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g; erdenkendes Denken, thoughtful th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g). The adjectivalstrategy may be useful <strong>in</strong> elucidat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> word with <strong>the</strong> prefix <strong>in</strong> question; it may behelpful for mak<strong>in</strong>g more discernible <strong>and</strong> graspable <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tended (at times hidden)mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word with <strong>the</strong> prefix (e.g., render<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> fact replac<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> prefix45Ibid., pp. xx, xxxix.
206 G. Kovacswith a suitable adjective <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> given context); but this strategy is useless, destructive<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German text, <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case (<strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> work) <strong>of</strong> translation. This example calls <strong>the</strong> attention to <strong>the</strong> economy <strong>of</strong> translation.“En-th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>the</strong>n, is a strategic, simple, <strong>and</strong> faithful English render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>German er-denken. This translation is <strong>in</strong>ventive, but not awkward; it is not withoutprecedent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> English language, for example, en-compass<strong>in</strong>g, en-clos<strong>in</strong>g, encampment,en-chant<strong>in</strong>g, en-trust<strong>in</strong>g. These <strong>and</strong> many o<strong>the</strong>rs can be found <strong>in</strong> dictionaries.Hav<strong>in</strong>g exam<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> function <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> prefix “er-” <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s German<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> senses <strong>and</strong> function <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> English usage <strong>of</strong> “en-,” Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> KennethMaly opted for “en-” <strong>in</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g erdenken as “enth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g,” as well as <strong>in</strong> render<strong>in</strong>gersehen as “ensee<strong>in</strong>g.” 46 Work<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> translation (Contributions) <strong>and</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong> justifications <strong>of</strong> translation decisions br<strong>in</strong>g about familiarity with <strong>the</strong>“en-words.” The simplicity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “new” word <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation signals its special,fuller mean<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> reta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> disclos<strong>in</strong>g power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “German say<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong> English.The consistent usage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same word (for render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> same orig<strong>in</strong>al German),once grasped to <strong>the</strong> extent feasible, contributes to <strong>the</strong> “readability” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> text (<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>translation). Work<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> translation renders more <strong>and</strong> more familiar, more <strong>and</strong>more tell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itially new or seem<strong>in</strong>gly unusual words <strong>and</strong> expressions (as wellas <strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>guistic strategies at play); it opens up <strong>and</strong> preserves <strong>the</strong> disclosive power <strong>of</strong>say<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> thus <strong>the</strong> experience (movement) <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, harbored with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text.(f) Learn<strong>in</strong>g ano<strong>the</strong>r way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>cludes discern<strong>in</strong>g, work<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> becom<strong>in</strong>gfamiliar with new words, expressions, <strong>and</strong> ways <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g; <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gis (br<strong>in</strong>gs with it) at <strong>the</strong> same time an experience with language. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s sem<strong>in</strong>ar on Herder’s treatise on <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> language, λóγος meansratio (Vernunft, Denken; reason, th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>and</strong> oratio (Sprechen, Rede; speak<strong>in</strong>g,discourse). 47 <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> language belong toge<strong>the</strong>r. <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g are“equally-orig<strong>in</strong>ary” (gleichursprünglich) <strong>and</strong> share what is “ownmost” (Wesen) to<strong>the</strong>m 48 ; “<strong>the</strong> ‘word’ is word ‘<strong>of</strong>’ be-<strong>in</strong>g.” 49 As <strong>Heidegger</strong> expla<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> his 1949 Bremenlecture “Die Kehre” (The Turn<strong>in</strong>g), language is <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g, primal dimensionwith<strong>in</strong> which human be<strong>in</strong>g “is first able to correspond at all to Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> its claim,<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> correspond<strong>in</strong>g, to belong to Be<strong>in</strong>g.” 50 He concludes that “This primal46Ibid., pp. xxxvii–xxxix.47Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Vom Wesen der Sprache: Die Metaphysik der Sprache und die Wesung desWortes; Zu Herders Abh<strong>and</strong>lung “Über den Ursprung der Sprache” (sem<strong>in</strong>ar at Freiburg, SummerSemester, 1939), GA 85 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann, 1999), p. 4 (hereafter: GA 85). On <strong>the</strong>Essence <strong>of</strong> Language: The Metaphysics <strong>of</strong> Language <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Essenc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Word; Concern<strong>in</strong>gHerder’s Treatise “On <strong>the</strong> Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> Language,” trans. W<strong>and</strong>a Torres Gregory <strong>and</strong> Yvonne Unna(New York: State University <strong>of</strong> New York Press, 2004), p. 4. This translation is not evaluated <strong>in</strong>Theodore Kisiel’s “Review <strong>and</strong> Overview,” 277–278.48GA 85, p. 35; tr. 29 (trans. modified).49GA 85, p. 72; tr. 61 (trans. slightly modified).50Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Die Kehre,” Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge: 1. E<strong>in</strong>blick <strong>in</strong> das was ist. BremerVorträge (1949); 2. Grundsätze des Denkens. Freiburger Vorträge (1957), GA 79 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Klostermann, 1994a), p. 71 (hereafter: GA 79); “The Turn<strong>in</strong>g,” The Question Concern<strong>in</strong>g Technology<strong>and</strong> O<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Essays</strong>, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977a), p. 41.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy: The Challenge <strong>of</strong> Its <strong>Translation</strong>207correspond<strong>in</strong>g, expressly carried out (eigens vollzogen), is th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.” 51 Language,<strong>the</strong>n, is “never primarily <strong>the</strong> expression <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g”; it “is th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.” 52 <strong>Translation</strong> asan experience with language is th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Its hermeneutic labor with <strong>the</strong> (at least two)languages <strong>in</strong>volved (but even <strong>the</strong> work with one language) cannot be reduced to read<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> exchang<strong>in</strong>g, compar<strong>in</strong>g dictionaries. Consequently, <strong>the</strong> assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>accomplishments <strong>and</strong> shortcom<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation is more than a contention withits lexicography, more than a judicial application <strong>of</strong> an “archival perspective.” It is, orshould amount to, a hermeneutic project, a hermeneutic labor.The neologisms, <strong>the</strong> style <strong>of</strong> expression, <strong>the</strong> strategies <strong>of</strong> disclosure, <strong>the</strong> translationdecisions embedded <strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> thus accountable for, <strong>and</strong> def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g (<strong>the</strong> text <strong>of</strong>)Contributions, as <strong>the</strong>se considerations <strong>in</strong>dicate, are not <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> arbitrary choicesor a priori preferences <strong>and</strong> perspectives. They came about through work<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>and</strong>as based on <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s text.One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most significant <strong>and</strong> thought-provok<strong>in</strong>g decisions made by ParvisEmad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly is <strong>the</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German Ereignis <strong>in</strong>to English as“enown<strong>in</strong>g.” O<strong>the</strong>r creative, advantageous, <strong>and</strong> ventur<strong>in</strong>g translation decisions<strong>in</strong>clude Wesen <strong>and</strong> related words 53 ; admittedly, as <strong>the</strong> translators suggest, “<strong>the</strong>words Wesen <strong>and</strong> Wesung are <strong>the</strong> most crucial words for translat<strong>in</strong>g Contributions.” 54The English render<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se terms, toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> decision regard<strong>in</strong>gEreignis, one might suggest, “def<strong>in</strong>e” <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “style” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> English text,<strong>of</strong> Contributions. Theodore Kisiel’s assertions (<strong>in</strong> his review <strong>of</strong> recent <strong>Heidegger</strong>translations referred to <strong>in</strong> this study) notwithst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> KennethMaly came to <strong>the</strong>ir f<strong>in</strong>al translation decisions (render<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> strategies adopted)through a scholarly, <strong>in</strong>sightful discernment <strong>and</strong> analysis <strong>of</strong> possible alternatives.They carefully exam<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> usage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> words <strong>in</strong> question <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s German,especially <strong>the</strong>ir rich <strong>and</strong> subtle mean<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>the</strong>ir disclosive power <strong>and</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g. Thefocused, meditative read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ensu<strong>in</strong>g English text, which is supported by <strong>the</strong>habit <strong>of</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g with it, lets us see at work <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic <strong>and</strong> l<strong>in</strong>guistic strategiesadopted. Read<strong>in</strong>g this text becomes, when susta<strong>in</strong>ed, an experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>say<strong>in</strong>g-power <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s words <strong>in</strong> English; it becomes <strong>the</strong> recognition <strong>in</strong> actuexercito <strong>of</strong> convey<strong>in</strong>g (reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g forth, as well as toge<strong>the</strong>r) his thought<strong>and</strong> language, <strong>the</strong>reby lead<strong>in</strong>g back to, <strong>and</strong> not away (not astray) from, <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>alGerman text.In <strong>the</strong> last analysis, every translation <strong>of</strong> a given text is <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> a f<strong>in</strong>al choice(from compet<strong>in</strong>g alternatives) made by <strong>the</strong> translator(s) <strong>in</strong> question. Contributionsis no exception <strong>in</strong> this regard. The ma<strong>in</strong> issue here is <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> text (<strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s German) as <strong>the</strong> “measure” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> act <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation,<strong>and</strong> thus <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> text <strong>in</strong> assess<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>in</strong> critically review<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>the</strong> translation, <strong>in</strong>51GA 79, p. 79; tr. 41.52GA 70, p. 71; tr. 41.53Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly, “Translators’ Foreword,” pp. xxiv–xxvii.54Ibid., p. xxiv.
208 G. Kovacsthis case, <strong>the</strong> English text. The so-called “archival perspective,” as <strong>the</strong>se reflectionshave expla<strong>in</strong>ed, obfuscates or obviates <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> text itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> as <strong>the</strong>criterion <strong>of</strong> translation, <strong>and</strong> as belong<strong>in</strong>g to its assessment. The proclivity to giv<strong>in</strong>gprimacy to <strong>the</strong> “archival perspective,” at least <strong>in</strong> actu exercito, displaces <strong>and</strong> undercuts(underm<strong>in</strong>es) <strong>the</strong> more comprehensive hermeneutics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> text-based criterion(st<strong>and</strong>ard) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> translation; it preempts <strong>the</strong> rais<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> translation,<strong>the</strong> critical <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> “measure” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “ideal” <strong>of</strong> translation.There is nei<strong>the</strong>r space nor need here to review (to rehearse) <strong>the</strong> translators’detailed, scholarly explanations (accounts) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al decisions regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>render<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> Ereignis, Wesen, <strong>and</strong> Wesung, as mentioned above, <strong>in</strong>to English <strong>and</strong>various criticisms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m. However, a concise response to <strong>the</strong> critical assertionsmay be worthwhile. The translation <strong>of</strong> Ereignis as “enown<strong>in</strong>g” is surely moredescriptive (be-<strong>in</strong>g com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to its own) than its render<strong>in</strong>g as “event” (no matterhow much one tries to “def<strong>in</strong>e” <strong>the</strong> unique mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tended); its translation as“appropriation” (appropriat<strong>in</strong>g event, properiz<strong>in</strong>g) conveys more <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’ssense <strong>of</strong> it than <strong>the</strong> term “event.” However, “appropriation” reta<strong>in</strong>s a subjectivisticconnotation (appropriat<strong>in</strong>g agent or subject), as well as, at least for some, an economical-political(not to say “capitalistic”) configuration (implication). Theserender<strong>in</strong>gs, no doubt, fail to convey <strong>and</strong> tend to obfuscate <strong>the</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g-historicalmean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tended by <strong>Heidegger</strong>. The translation <strong>of</strong> Wesen is quite strategic <strong>and</strong>helpful: when its mean<strong>in</strong>g (usage) is enow<strong>in</strong>g-be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical, it is translated as“what is ownmost”; when its mean<strong>in</strong>g (usage) is traditional metaphysical, it is renderedas “essence.” 55 These two render<strong>in</strong>gs clearly convey <strong>and</strong> preserve <strong>the</strong> twodifferent mean<strong>in</strong>gs (functions) <strong>of</strong> Wesen <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s German. The adoption <strong>of</strong>“essential sway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g,” “essential sway <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>and</strong> “essential sway/sway<strong>in</strong>g”for translat<strong>in</strong>g Wesung des Se<strong>in</strong>s, Wesen des Seyns, <strong>and</strong> Wesen/wesen respectively,one ought to recognize, 56 def<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> basic language <strong>and</strong> diction <strong>of</strong> Contributions. 5755Ibid., p. xxvi–xxvii.56Ibid., pp. xvi, xxiv–xxvii.57Theodore Kisiel suggests (<strong>in</strong> his “Review <strong>and</strong> Overview,” 283–285) that reconnect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se(as well as some o<strong>the</strong>r) words with <strong>the</strong>ir Lat<strong>in</strong> heritage (essentia; proprius) would lead toano<strong>the</strong>r, supposedly more acceptable, better render<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> words <strong>in</strong> question, <strong>and</strong> thus to amore “readable” text.The primacy given to this strategy without know<strong>in</strong>g its limits, a return to<strong>the</strong> “Lat<strong>in</strong> archives,” notwithst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g its helpfulness <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> right context, would distract from(would be contrary to) <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own strategy, from his “return” to <strong>the</strong> Greek, not to <strong>the</strong>Lat<strong>in</strong>, roots <strong>of</strong> words. It would amount to a dangerous forgett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> his criticism <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation<strong>of</strong> Greek philosophy (especially <strong>of</strong> its basic concepts) <strong>in</strong>to Lat<strong>in</strong>, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> significance <strong>of</strong> thistransformation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. For some references <strong>in</strong> this regard, see <strong>the</strong>follow<strong>in</strong>g works <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Identität und Differenz (1955–1963), GA 11 (Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006), pp. 9–11, 13–16, 23–24, 65–67, 76–79; Vorträge undAufsätze (1936–1954), GA 7 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann, 2000), pp. 44, 48, 49, 177–178; GA 2, section 6; GA 8, pp. 236–237; E<strong>in</strong>führung <strong>in</strong> die phänomenologische Forschung(lecture course at Marburg, W<strong>in</strong>ter Semester 1923–1924), GA 17 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Klostermann, 1994b), pp. 187–194.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy: The Challenge <strong>of</strong> Its <strong>Translation</strong>2094 A fair- <strong>and</strong> open-m<strong>in</strong>ded assessment <strong>of</strong> Contributions as a work <strong>of</strong> translationentails more than a lexicographical, l<strong>in</strong>guistic adjudication; it ought to <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>the</strong>attention to <strong>the</strong> disclosive power <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> to <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g at work <strong>in</strong> it.A translation text, like any great, sem<strong>in</strong>al philosophical text, is not a one-waystreet, not one-directional, not monological; it is multi-dimensional, <strong>in</strong>teractive,hermeneutic, dialogical. For <strong>Heidegger</strong>, language, that is, speak<strong>in</strong>g, (<strong>the</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g-power<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> text, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al) is th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. The possibility, viability,<strong>and</strong> suitability <strong>of</strong> alternative translations, thus <strong>the</strong> differences between diverserender<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same orig<strong>in</strong>al (e.g., German) text <strong>in</strong>to ano<strong>the</strong>r (e.g., English)language, orig<strong>in</strong>ate from what is ownmost to language, from <strong>the</strong> dynamics <strong>of</strong>thoughtful say<strong>in</strong>g, from <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g embodied (at work) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> textitself. Criticism without clarity about its “measure” (st<strong>and</strong>ard) generates more heatthan light; it underm<strong>in</strong>es, it does not deepen, <strong>the</strong> “hermeneutic circle” <strong>of</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g,<strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. The assessment <strong>of</strong> translation, if it is to be morethan a contention about self-assured preferences, ought to contend with <strong>the</strong> very“ideal” <strong>of</strong> translation as a hermeneutic-phenomenological labor, with <strong>the</strong> equalorig<strong>in</strong>ality(primordiality; orig<strong>in</strong>ar<strong>in</strong>ess) <strong>of</strong> language <strong>and</strong> thought, with <strong>the</strong> “manner”<strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Assess<strong>in</strong>g translation teaches about, deepens <strong>the</strong>underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> work <strong>and</strong> act <strong>of</strong> translation.The question <strong>of</strong> translation, toge<strong>the</strong>r with its ideal <strong>and</strong> criticism, reawakens(raises) <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> wonder about what is ownmost to <strong>the</strong> human word, to say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>language. The say<strong>in</strong>g, disclos<strong>in</strong>g power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> human word is <strong>in</strong>exhaustible. As<strong>Heidegger</strong> expla<strong>in</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> “word <strong>of</strong> utterance” (das Wort der Sage), <strong>the</strong> word that sayssometh<strong>in</strong>g, is “<strong>in</strong>exhaustible”; it says each time someth<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>ceptually “shelter<strong>in</strong>g”<strong>the</strong> very <strong>in</strong>ception <strong>and</strong> historically ground<strong>in</strong>g its truth <strong>and</strong> “<strong>in</strong>terpretation”(Auslegung). 58 The say<strong>in</strong>g-power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> human word does not dim<strong>in</strong>ish with <strong>the</strong> passage<strong>of</strong> time. The “word <strong>of</strong> utterance,” <strong>the</strong> word <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g, is <strong>in</strong>exhaustible, alwayssay<strong>in</strong>g more <strong>and</strong> more deeply, more <strong>in</strong>ceptually; it is attuned through <strong>and</strong> to <strong>the</strong>“voice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unsaid” (durchstimmt…von der Stimme des Ungesagten); <strong>the</strong> word <strong>of</strong>say<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong>n, is a listen<strong>in</strong>g word, a word that hears <strong>the</strong> unsaid; thus say<strong>in</strong>g is listen<strong>in</strong>geven to <strong>the</strong> unsaid sheltered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> said, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g. 59 For <strong>Heidegger</strong>, as well as for<strong>the</strong> translator, words are not fixed treasures <strong>of</strong> an archive, <strong>of</strong> a guarded collection;<strong>the</strong>y are “wellspr<strong>in</strong>gs” (Brunnen; founta<strong>in</strong>s), not like “buckets <strong>and</strong> kegs” filled withfixed contents to be drawn (m<strong>in</strong>ed), but liv<strong>in</strong>g founta<strong>in</strong>s that “well up” <strong>and</strong> must be“found <strong>and</strong> dug up anew aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>.” 60 Thus, we need to pay attention to <strong>the</strong>ir“say<strong>in</strong>g” (Sagen) <strong>and</strong> to what <strong>the</strong>y say. 61 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s expression, “it is58GA 70, p. 32.59GA 70, p. 32; see also GA 8, p. 82.60GA 8, p. 135.61GA 8, p. 135.
210 G. Kovacslanguage alone that speaks au<strong>the</strong>ntically (eigentlich).” 62 The translation, <strong>the</strong>n, merelyallows, paves <strong>the</strong> way for, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last analysis, language to speak.Thus Contributions is not a substitution for, but <strong>the</strong> enabl<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> open<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g-power <strong>of</strong> Beiträge <strong>in</strong> English. Language is <strong>the</strong> “house <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g becauselanguage as say<strong>in</strong>g is a manner (Weise) <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g”; it “belongs to enown<strong>in</strong>g.” 63 Itis underst<strong>and</strong>able, <strong>the</strong>n, as <strong>the</strong> translators rightly claim, that <strong>the</strong> sensitivity to enown<strong>in</strong>g,be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical language determ<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g-power <strong>of</strong> Contributions, <strong>the</strong>thoughtful, faithful, scholarly render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Beiträge <strong>in</strong>to English. One ought toadmit that <strong>the</strong> striv<strong>in</strong>g for measur<strong>in</strong>g up to this ideal <strong>of</strong> translation <strong>and</strong> research is agood omen, a sign <strong>of</strong> hope, for <strong>the</strong> future <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> studies <strong>in</strong> English.ReferencesCamus, Albert. 1991. The myth <strong>of</strong> Sisyphus <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r essays. Trans. Just<strong>in</strong> O’Brien. New York:V<strong>in</strong>tage International.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1977a. The question concern<strong>in</strong>g technology <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r essays. Trans. WilliamLovitt. New York: Harper & Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1977b. Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, GA 2. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann. Trans.John Macquarrie <strong>and</strong> Edward Rob<strong>in</strong>son. 1962. Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time. New York: Harper <strong>and</strong> Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1977c. Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der re<strong>in</strong>en Vernunft,GA 25. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann. Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly.1997. Phenomenological Interpretation <strong>of</strong> Kant’s Critique <strong>of</strong> Pure Reason. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton:Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1980. Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes. GA 32. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann. Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly. 1988. Hegel’s Phenomenology <strong>of</strong> Spirit.Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1985. Unterwegs zur Sprache. GA 12. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1989a. Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann. Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly. 1999. Contributions to philosophy(From enown<strong>in</strong>g). Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1989b. Lét és Idő. Trans. M. Vajda et al. Budapest: Gondolat.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1994a. Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge: 1. E<strong>in</strong>blick <strong>in</strong> das was ist. BremerVorträge (1949); 2. Grundsätze des Denkens. Freiburger Vorträge (1957), GA 79. Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1994b. E<strong>in</strong>führung <strong>in</strong> die phänomenologische Forschung, GA 17. Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1995. Költemények: A Gondolkodás Tapsztalatából (“Poems: From <strong>the</strong>experience <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.” In German <strong>and</strong> Hungarian), ed. Gábor Ferge <strong>and</strong> trans. KerszturiIdő. Budapest: Societas Philosophia Classica.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1997. Bes<strong>in</strong>nung, GA 66. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann. Trans.Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Thomas Kalary. 2006. M<strong>in</strong>dfulness. London: Cont<strong>in</strong>uum.62GA 12, p. 254.63GA 12, p. 255. Note: All translations <strong>in</strong> this study, unless o<strong>the</strong>rwise <strong>in</strong>dicated, are by <strong>the</strong> author.
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Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>Contributions to Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g)Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Translated By Bernhard Radl<strong>of</strong>f1 Transcendental-Horizonal Concept <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>In Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> is <strong>in</strong>troduced for <strong>the</strong> first time <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> course<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigation, <strong>in</strong> paragraph 9 <strong>of</strong> Section 2 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Introduction” entitled “TheFormal Structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g.” There we read: “This be<strong>in</strong>g which <strong>in</strong>each case we ourselves are <strong>and</strong> which among o<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>in</strong>gs may be engaged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiry, we grasp term<strong>in</strong>ologically as Da-se<strong>in</strong>.” 1 Regard<strong>in</strong>g what ishenceforth term<strong>in</strong>ologically designated as Dase<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong> text immediately cont<strong>in</strong>ues asfollows: “To pose clearly <strong>and</strong> explicitly <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g requires<strong>in</strong> advance an appropriate explication <strong>of</strong> a be<strong>in</strong>g (Da-se<strong>in</strong>) with regard to its be<strong>in</strong>g”(GA 2/10). In paragraph 4 <strong>of</strong> Section 4 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Introduction <strong>the</strong> term<strong>in</strong>ologicaldesignation for <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that is called Dase<strong>in</strong> is <strong>in</strong>troduced: “We shallcall <strong>the</strong> very be<strong>in</strong>g to which Da-se<strong>in</strong> can relate <strong>in</strong> one way or ano<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>and</strong> somehowalways does relate, existence” (GA 2/16). Thus “Dase<strong>in</strong>” seems to be exclusively <strong>the</strong>name for a “be<strong>in</strong>g” dist<strong>in</strong>guished by <strong>the</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, while “existence”1M. <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, GA 2, ed. F.-W. v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann, 1977). Published separately as Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, 15th edition, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g marg<strong>in</strong>al notesto <strong>the</strong> text by <strong>the</strong> author (Tüb<strong>in</strong>gen: Max Niemeyer, 1979). For a commentary on <strong>the</strong> textualpassages cited <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpreted here, see F.-W. v. Herrmann, Hermeneutische Phänomenologie desDase<strong>in</strong>s. E<strong>in</strong> Kommentar zu Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987, 2005,2008), esp. vol. 1, Sec. 1–8; vol. 2, Sec. 9–27; <strong>and</strong> vol. 3, Sec. 28–44.F.-W. von Herrmann (*)Philosophisches Sem<strong>in</strong>ar II, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg i.Br.,79085 Freiburg, Germanye-mail: Friedrich-Wilhelm.von.Herrmann@sonne.uni-freiburg.deTranslated by B. Radl<strong>of</strong>fFacult <strong>of</strong> Arts/English, University <strong>of</strong> Ottawa, 70 Laurier E.,K1N 6N5 Ottawa, ON, Canadae-mail: bernhard@uottowa.caF. Schalow (ed.), <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad, Contributions To Phenomenology 65,DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0_11, © Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media B.V. 2011213
214 F.-W. von Herrmannappears to name <strong>the</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> this be<strong>in</strong>g. But what motivates us to grasp <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>ghav<strong>in</strong>g an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as “Dase<strong>in</strong>”? What does this word <strong>in</strong> its term<strong>in</strong>ologicalsignification mean? How is <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that underst<strong>and</strong>s be<strong>in</strong>g characterized, ifthis be<strong>in</strong>g is designated as “Dase<strong>in</strong>”? What does <strong>the</strong> term “Dase<strong>in</strong>” name consider<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g itself <strong>of</strong> that be<strong>in</strong>g that underst<strong>and</strong>s be<strong>in</strong>g? Does <strong>the</strong> designation “Dase<strong>in</strong>”grasp that aspect <strong>of</strong> this be<strong>in</strong>g that underst<strong>and</strong>s be<strong>in</strong>g, which makes it “a be<strong>in</strong>g,” asdist<strong>in</strong>ct from its be<strong>in</strong>g? Follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term existence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>paragraph 4, we read: “And because <strong>the</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> this be<strong>in</strong>gcannot be achieved by <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g an objective – what-content; because its ownmostis accessible <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>in</strong> each <strong>in</strong>stance it has to be its be<strong>in</strong>g as its own, <strong>the</strong> termDa-se<strong>in</strong>, as a pure expression <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, has been chosen to designate this be<strong>in</strong>g”(GA 2/16–17). Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, Dase<strong>in</strong> is a pure expression <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, an expression forbe<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> which <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> respect to which <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g hav<strong>in</strong>g an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g is designated as “Dase<strong>in</strong>.” In this way, <strong>the</strong> designation “Dase<strong>in</strong>” moves closeto <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> existence as <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs that underst<strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. For likeexistence, “Dase<strong>in</strong>” also has to do with <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g designated as Dase<strong>in</strong>.In connection with existence, we have to ask none<strong>the</strong>less what does <strong>the</strong> word“Dase<strong>in</strong>” name beyond existence.The clarification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term<strong>in</strong>ological significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word Dase<strong>in</strong>, one thatis decisive for <strong>the</strong> entire existential-ontological analytic <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>, follows <strong>in</strong>Section 28, “The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> a Thematic analysis <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>.” In paragraph 5, we read:“The be<strong>in</strong>g which is abid<strong>in</strong>gly constituted by be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world is itself always its‘Da’” (GA 2/176). Here, <strong>the</strong> two syllables <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word Dase<strong>in</strong> are taken apart <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong>ir term<strong>in</strong>ological significance is <strong>in</strong>dicated. “Dase<strong>in</strong>” consequently signifies that<strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g hav<strong>in</strong>g an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> its fundamental constitution asbe<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world, always “is” itself its “Da.” But this “is” means “exists,” suchthat <strong>the</strong> “-se<strong>in</strong>” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> word Dase<strong>in</strong> has <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “existence.” But <strong>the</strong>n, whatterm<strong>in</strong>ological mean<strong>in</strong>g does <strong>the</strong> Da <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> now have? The paragraph 5 gives us<strong>the</strong> answer: “This be<strong>in</strong>g (that is always its Da) bears <strong>in</strong> its ownmost be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> itsexistence <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong> not be<strong>in</strong>g closed <strong>of</strong>f” (GA 2/176). 2 The “Da” <strong>in</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>means nei<strong>the</strong>r “here” nor “<strong>the</strong>re,” nor does it mean someth<strong>in</strong>g present (anwesend)or extant: it is solely <strong>the</strong> designation for <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> “unclosedness,” that is,for “openness.” But what k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> openness? “The expression ‘Da’ means this abid<strong>in</strong>gdisclosedness (Erschlossenheit)” (GA 2/176–177). The “Da” <strong>of</strong> “Dase<strong>in</strong>” has <strong>the</strong>purely ontological significance <strong>of</strong> disclosedness, which is said to belong toDase<strong>in</strong> abid<strong>in</strong>gly. The last sentence <strong>of</strong> paragraph 5 <strong>of</strong>fers an important clarificationconcern<strong>in</strong>g disclosedness <strong>and</strong> its <strong>in</strong>ner constitution: “By means <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> (abid<strong>in</strong>g)disclosedness this be<strong>in</strong>g (Da-se<strong>in</strong>), along with <strong>the</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, is for itself‘(da)’” (GA 2/177). 3 Put <strong>in</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r way: by means <strong>of</strong> disclosedness, which alonefulfills <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Da” <strong>of</strong> “Dase<strong>in</strong>,” <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g designated as Dase<strong>in</strong> is “Dafor itself,” is “disclosed” (erschlossen) for itself, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> fact is disclosed “toge<strong>the</strong>r2Author’s paren<strong>the</strong>tical additions – Translator’s Note.3Author’s paren<strong>the</strong>tical additions – Translator’s Note.
Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> Contributions to Philosophy...215with <strong>the</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world,” with <strong>the</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g-disclosed” “<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world.” Thereby,two th<strong>in</strong>gs are brought to light <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da as disclosedness: be<strong>in</strong>g-disclosed-for-itself,<strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-disclosed <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world. Be<strong>in</strong>g-disclosed-for-itself means <strong>the</strong> way <strong>in</strong> whichexistence, constituted as be<strong>in</strong>g a self, is open <strong>in</strong> itself <strong>and</strong> for itself. We call this“self-like” disclosedness’ (selbsthafte Erschlossenheit). In this self-like disclosedness,existence that has underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g is removed unto (entrückt) <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-disclosed(Erschlossense<strong>in</strong>) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world. Inasmuch as <strong>the</strong> self <strong>in</strong> its openness, <strong>in</strong> its self-likedisclosedness is <strong>in</strong> itself a be<strong>in</strong>g-removed unto, that is, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as it is ecstaticallyconstituted, we can speak <strong>of</strong> self-like-ecstatic disclosedness. That unto-which(woh<strong>in</strong>) <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g self is ecstatically disclosed is first <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> “world.” InSection 18, world is determ<strong>in</strong>ed as <strong>the</strong> totality <strong>of</strong> significance. <strong>Heidegger</strong> calls <strong>the</strong>“unto-which” <strong>of</strong> ecstatic be<strong>in</strong>g-disclosed “horizon” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> a field <strong>of</strong> vision.The world-horizon <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>the</strong> existential for-<strong>the</strong>-sake-<strong>of</strong>-which <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong>a possibility <strong>of</strong> existence <strong>in</strong> each case hav<strong>in</strong>g a specific content. Consequently, <strong>the</strong>disclosedness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world for <strong>the</strong> self-like-ecstatic disclosedness <strong>of</strong> existence(<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> self) is ecstatically-horizonally constituted. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, two dimensions<strong>of</strong> disclosedness (<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da) now come to light: self-like-ecstatic <strong>and</strong> ecstatichorizonaldisclosedness. Thus, we may say that as a whole, disclosedness (or <strong>the</strong> Da)is <strong>in</strong> itself constituted as self-like-ecstatic-horizonal. In self-like-ecstatic disclosedness,existence, toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> existentials that constitute it, is held open(aufgeschlossen); while <strong>in</strong> ecstatic-horizonal disclosedness, unto-which <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>gunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g self is removed, world as significance <strong>and</strong> all non-existential, <strong>and</strong>thus also categorial modes <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (such as h<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>ess <strong>and</strong> extantness) are heldopen. Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g underst<strong>and</strong>s all be<strong>in</strong>gs o<strong>the</strong>r than Dase<strong>in</strong> as<strong>in</strong>nerworldly be<strong>in</strong>gs only from out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> antecedent ecstatic-horizonal disclosedness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world as significance <strong>and</strong> its categorial modes <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> ecstatic-horizonaldisclosedness (<strong>the</strong> Da) shows to have a range <strong>and</strong> expanse that encompasses notonly <strong>in</strong>nerworldly be<strong>in</strong>gs, but also <strong>the</strong> whole <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs.We take <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g formulation from <strong>the</strong> paragraph 6 <strong>of</strong> Section 28: <strong>the</strong>existential be<strong>in</strong>g “is <strong>in</strong> such a way as to be its Da” (GA 2/177). For this reason, thisbe<strong>in</strong>g is grasped term<strong>in</strong>ologically as “Dase<strong>in</strong>,” where<strong>in</strong> “Dase<strong>in</strong>” signifies: to exist<strong>in</strong> such a way as to be “its Da,” its disclosedness. The possessive pronoun “its”could give rise to <strong>the</strong> op<strong>in</strong>ion that <strong>the</strong> Da is only <strong>the</strong> disclosedness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> existence<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> its existentials. This widespread op<strong>in</strong>ion, however, misses<strong>the</strong> mark. The exist<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g is “its” Da, is “its” disclosedness, because Da asdisclosedness is held open only <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> with <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> this be<strong>in</strong>g, that is, with <strong>the</strong>enactment <strong>of</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>g. But disclosedness is not only held open as self-like-ecstatic,but also, at <strong>the</strong> same time, as ecstatic-horizonal. Ecstatic-horizonal disclosedness<strong>in</strong>deed belongs abid<strong>in</strong>gly to self-like-ecstatic disclosedness, but is to be dist<strong>in</strong>guishedfrom it as <strong>the</strong> disclosed “unto-which” <strong>of</strong> self-like-ecstatic disclosedness.“Dase<strong>in</strong> is its disclosedness” (GA 2/177) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense that <strong>the</strong> enjo<strong>in</strong>ed self-likeecstatic <strong>and</strong> horizonal disclosedness as such is held open <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>exist<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its own be<strong>in</strong>g.Here, <strong>in</strong> paragraph 6, disclosedness is for <strong>the</strong> first time also called “clear<strong>in</strong>g”(GA 2/ 177). The exist<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> with its existence <strong>and</strong> its fundamental
216 F.-W. von Herrmannconstitution <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world, is “cleared,” <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> such a way “that it is itself<strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g” (GA 2/177). Sections 29 <strong>and</strong> 31, follow<strong>in</strong>g up on Section 28, eachtake up a fundamental existential <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> with<strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g is cleared,disclosedness is held open. Thus, we read <strong>in</strong> paragraph 9: “In attunement <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, we see <strong>the</strong> two equally orig<strong>in</strong>al constitutive ways to be <strong>the</strong> Da”(GA 2/177). The existential structure <strong>of</strong> attunement (Bef<strong>in</strong>dlichkeit) is thrownness(Geworfenheit), that <strong>of</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g (Verstehen) is project<strong>in</strong>g-open (Entwurf).“Thrownness” signifies that <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g always already experiences itselfas placed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> factical disclosedness (clear<strong>in</strong>g). The factical self-disclos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>disclosedness occurs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mode <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g called thrownness. In this throwndisclosedness, <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g enacts <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mode <strong>of</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open what isenactable on disclos<strong>in</strong>g. In <strong>the</strong> equally orig<strong>in</strong>al occurrences <strong>of</strong> factical self-disclos<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> enactable disclos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> disclosedness <strong>the</strong> Da is open, <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g is cleared,disclosedness held open, but held open as self-like-ecstatic <strong>and</strong> ecstatic-horizonaldisclosedness.Section 28, which is decisive for an adequate underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term<strong>in</strong>ologicalmean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “Dase<strong>in</strong>,” states most clearly that <strong>the</strong> term “Dase<strong>in</strong>” always has to be read<strong>and</strong> understood as <strong>the</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da,” also <strong>and</strong> specifically <strong>in</strong> those cases where itis used as designation for <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g. (By no means, however, should we read<strong>the</strong> “Da” without fur<strong>the</strong>r differentiation as “disclosedness”; for as we pursue <strong>the</strong>hermeneutic-phenomenological <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> analytic <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> – as <strong>the</strong> analytic<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da – we have to arrive at <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>sight that <strong>the</strong> self-like-ecstatic<strong>and</strong> ecstatic-horizonal disclosedness are enjo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da). But if “Da-se<strong>in</strong>” alwayshas to be thought as <strong>the</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da,” <strong>the</strong>n it makes sense to write Dase<strong>in</strong> witha hyphen (Da-se<strong>in</strong>) ra<strong>the</strong>r than without <strong>the</strong> hyphen, that is, “Dase<strong>in</strong>.” <strong>Heidegger</strong>already did this once before, at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> paragraph 5 <strong>of</strong> Section 28, when hespoke <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> world.” But <strong>Heidegger</strong> also writes “Da-se<strong>in</strong>” with a hyphen<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> titles <strong>of</strong> those Sections <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> fundamental <strong>and</strong> equally orig<strong>in</strong>al modes<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> existence are laid open, that is, modes <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g where<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>gholds open <strong>the</strong> Da as disclosedness. Those are Sections 29 (“Da-se<strong>in</strong> as Attunement”),31 (“Da-se<strong>in</strong> as Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g”), <strong>and</strong> 34 (“Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> Discourse: Language”). Thefact that Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit is also written with a hyphen (i.e., “Da-se<strong>in</strong>”) ismostly overlooked. The secondary literature ma<strong>in</strong>ly tells us that <strong>in</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit,<strong>Heidegger</strong> writes “Dase<strong>in</strong>” without a hyphen, <strong>and</strong> that he hyphenates Dase<strong>in</strong> for <strong>the</strong>first time <strong>in</strong> Beiträge zur Philosophie <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical writ<strong>in</strong>gs. 4 This<strong>the</strong>sis rests on a superficial observation that is not even correct, because it overlooks<strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hyphen <strong>in</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit. But with this <strong>the</strong>sis one wants to say that<strong>in</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, “Dase<strong>in</strong>” is solely <strong>the</strong> designation for <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g, whereasonly <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g does “Da-se<strong>in</strong>” written with a hyphen have <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> “st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g-forth <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g4Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (GA 65) (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann, 1989); Contributions to Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g), trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong>Kenneth Maly (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1999). Cited <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text <strong>in</strong> square bracketsas CP – Translator’s Note.
Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> Contributions to Philosophy...217(be-<strong>in</strong>g [Seyn]).” Implied <strong>in</strong> this view is <strong>the</strong> assumption that <strong>the</strong> “Da” <strong>of</strong> “Da-se<strong>in</strong>”receives <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “clear<strong>in</strong>g” only <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. However, thiswidely-held <strong>and</strong> apparently self-evident view overlooks (despite <strong>the</strong> unequivocalevidence presented <strong>in</strong> Section 28!) that <strong>the</strong> Da <strong>in</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit exclusively meansunclosedness, disclosedness, <strong>and</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g. Moreover, this view overlooks that <strong>in</strong>Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit too <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g as self-like-ecstatically-clearedbe<strong>in</strong>g st<strong>and</strong>s forth unto <strong>the</strong> horizonal clear<strong>in</strong>g. Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>Heidegger</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>es<strong>the</strong> thrown-project<strong>in</strong>g – open <strong>of</strong> disclos<strong>in</strong>g as a surpass<strong>in</strong>g, that is, as <strong>the</strong> transcend<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> ecstatic-horizonal disclosedness, we canspeak <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal dimensionality <strong>and</strong> constitution <strong>of</strong> disclosednessor clear<strong>in</strong>g. Only when we have come upon <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ner jo<strong>in</strong>ture<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da, as <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ner jo<strong>in</strong>ture <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g, are we <strong>in</strong> a position to see <strong>and</strong> to th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>the</strong> difference between <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da <strong>in</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> Beiträge zurPhilosophie. However, what fundamental-ontological <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g-historicalconceptions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da hold <strong>in</strong> common is <strong>the</strong>ir st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g-openfor <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g. It is important above all to bear <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d this commonality. For selflike-ecstaticremovedness unto <strong>the</strong> horizonal disclosedness is itself an ecstaticallyst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g-open for <strong>the</strong> horizonal clear<strong>in</strong>g.The beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> paragraph 10 <strong>of</strong> Section 31 announces: “The project<strong>in</strong>gopenhas always to do with <strong>the</strong> complete disclosedness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong> world”(GA 2/194). The phrase “complete disclosedness” is <strong>of</strong> great significance. In thisve<strong>in</strong>, we could also speak <strong>of</strong> a wholly enjo<strong>in</strong>ed (ganzheitliche) disclosedness.The talk <strong>of</strong> “complete disclosedness” aims at <strong>the</strong> difference between self-likeecstaticdisclosedness <strong>of</strong> existence <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> horizonal disclosedness <strong>of</strong> world. The“complete” disclosedness is not only disclosedness <strong>of</strong> existence <strong>and</strong> its “be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>,”but also, toge<strong>the</strong>r with existence, <strong>the</strong> non-self-like, horizonal disclosednessunto which existence <strong>and</strong> its existentials are removed (for which <strong>the</strong>y st<strong>and</strong>open). With <strong>the</strong> significant statement made at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> paragraph 5 <strong>of</strong> Section 28,namely “by means <strong>of</strong> disclosedness is this be<strong>in</strong>g (Da-se<strong>in</strong>), along with <strong>the</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong><strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world for itself ‘(da)’” (GA 2/177), <strong>the</strong> “complete” disclosedness, with its<strong>in</strong>ternal differentiations came <strong>in</strong>to focus.Horizonal disclosedness, however, is not only <strong>the</strong> dimension <strong>of</strong> disclosedness forworld <strong>in</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world,” but also for “be<strong>in</strong>g as such,” for be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> modes<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g o<strong>the</strong>r than existence, which are understood – <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g – by existence <strong>in</strong> its removedness unto <strong>the</strong> horizonal dimension <strong>of</strong>disclosedness. At <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> paragraph 16 <strong>of</strong> Section 31, we are told:The disclosedness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da <strong>in</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g is itself a manner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ability <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>-tobe (Se<strong>in</strong>können). The disclosedness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> general lies <strong>in</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-openness(Entworfenheit) <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g unto <strong>the</strong> for-<strong>the</strong>-sake-<strong>of</strong>-which <strong>and</strong> simultaneously untomean<strong>in</strong>gfulness (Bedeutsamkeit) [world]. An underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g is already anticipated<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g unto possibilities (GA 2/196).This is to say that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-openness (disclosedness) <strong>of</strong> existence unto apossibility <strong>of</strong> existence (for <strong>the</strong> sake <strong>of</strong> which Dase<strong>in</strong> exists), as well as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-openness(disclosedness) unto <strong>the</strong> world as mean<strong>in</strong>gfulness belong<strong>in</strong>g to it,<strong>the</strong>re lies project<strong>in</strong>g-openness <strong>and</strong> thus disclosedness “<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> general,” that is,
218 F.-W. von Herrmannnot just disclosedness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as existence <strong>and</strong> as world, but “be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> general,” thatis, disclosedness <strong>of</strong> non-existential, categorial be<strong>in</strong>g such as h<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>ess <strong>and</strong> extantness.This allusion to <strong>the</strong> Da <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> as not only <strong>the</strong> disclosedness <strong>of</strong> existence <strong>and</strong><strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, but also as <strong>the</strong> disclosedness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> general (as a whole) whosemean<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>in</strong>quired by fundamental ontology, is <strong>of</strong> paramount importance. For thisallusion makes clear that <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>me <strong>of</strong> “Zeit und Se<strong>in</strong>,” <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> temporalmean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> all categorial be<strong>in</strong>g, does not have its place outside <strong>of</strong> “Da-se<strong>in</strong>” as laidopen <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> analytic <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>, but with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>, with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> horizonaldisclosedness, which is retro-related to <strong>the</strong> self-like-ecstatic disclosedness. ThusDase<strong>in</strong> as <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da means <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> self-like-ecstatic-disclosedness<strong>of</strong> existence, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> horizonal disclosedness <strong>of</strong> world, <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> horizonal disclosedness<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> general.Because from <strong>the</strong> very beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> throughout, “Dase<strong>in</strong>” <strong>in</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, has<strong>the</strong> term<strong>in</strong>ological mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> could have writtenDa-se<strong>in</strong> with a hyphen from <strong>the</strong> first <strong>in</strong>troduction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>and</strong> throughout<strong>the</strong> entire treatise. Even if <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial stages <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit <strong>the</strong>fundamental phenomenon <strong>of</strong> disclosedness <strong>and</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> ontological mean<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da is not demonstrated (disclosedness is first mentioned <strong>in</strong> paragraph 10 <strong>of</strong>Section 16), had <strong>Heidegger</strong> from <strong>the</strong> outset consistently used <strong>the</strong> hyphenated spell<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>, he would have <strong>in</strong>dicated that this word has completely rel<strong>in</strong>quished itsusual mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> received an entirely new mean<strong>in</strong>g. The new English translation<strong>of</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit by Joan Stambaugh, follows <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s directive that “Da-se<strong>in</strong>”has <strong>the</strong> ontological mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da” <strong>and</strong> writes <strong>the</strong> untranslatedword “Da-se<strong>in</strong>” throughout <strong>the</strong> text with a hyphen. 5 No objection should be raisedaga<strong>in</strong>st Stambaugh’s decision to write “-se<strong>in</strong>” with a capital S <strong>in</strong> contrast to<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s hyphenated spell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “Da-se<strong>in</strong>,” because she thus takes up <strong>the</strong> spell<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> with a capital S from <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s explication <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’ as <strong>the</strong> “Se<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Da.” For even when <strong>the</strong> word Se<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> “Da-Se<strong>in</strong>,” is written with a capital S thisword does not mean be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> general but only be<strong>in</strong>g as existence. But when <strong>the</strong>translator translates <strong>the</strong> “Da” as “<strong>the</strong>re” – for example, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> important paragraph5 <strong>of</strong> Section 28 – <strong>the</strong>n given everyth<strong>in</strong>g we have said so far about <strong>the</strong> specific mean<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Da,” we must view this translation as unacceptable. Because from <strong>the</strong> outset<strong>the</strong> word “Da” receives <strong>the</strong> purely ontological mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> disclosedness, <strong>the</strong> word“<strong>the</strong>re” should not at all appear <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation. And yet, Stambaugh translates <strong>the</strong>follow<strong>in</strong>g sentences (already elucidated by us) by us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> word “<strong>the</strong>re”: “DerAusdruck ‘Da’ me<strong>in</strong>t diese wesenhafte Erschlossenheit. Durch sie ist dieses Seiende(das Dase<strong>in</strong>) <strong>in</strong> e<strong>in</strong>s mit dem Da-se<strong>in</strong> von Welt für es selbst ‘da.’” In her translation,<strong>the</strong>se sentences read: “The expression ‘<strong>the</strong>re’ means this essential disclosedness.Through disclosedness this be<strong>in</strong>g (Da-se<strong>in</strong>) is ‘<strong>the</strong>re’ for itself toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong>Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world” (BT/125). Now, if <strong>the</strong> word “Dase<strong>in</strong>” is taken over untranslated,<strong>the</strong>n one would also have to let <strong>the</strong> word Da <strong>in</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> rema<strong>in</strong> untranslated.5M. <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1996), hereafterreferred to <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text as BT followed by page number.
Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> Contributions to Philosophy...219Should this be <strong>the</strong> case, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> English translation would have <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>gformulation: “The expression ‘Da’ means this essential disclosedness. Throughdisclosedness this be<strong>in</strong>g (Da-se<strong>in</strong>) is ‘da’ for itself toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>world.” To translate <strong>the</strong> word Da from Da-se<strong>in</strong> with “<strong>the</strong>re” while tak<strong>in</strong>g over <strong>the</strong>concept <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>, untranslated, is <strong>in</strong>consistent. Thus, for example, <strong>the</strong> translation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> title <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sub-section “A” <strong>of</strong> chapter five <strong>of</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, namely, “Dieexistenziale Konstitution des Da,” as “The Existential Constitution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> There” isextraord<strong>in</strong>arily annoy<strong>in</strong>g. There too <strong>the</strong> word Da should have been left untranslated.But if one wants <strong>the</strong> translation to reflect <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word Da, <strong>the</strong>n oneshould, <strong>in</strong>asmuch as this word means noth<strong>in</strong>g o<strong>the</strong>r than Erschlossenheit, speak <strong>of</strong>“disclosedness” or “disclosure” ra<strong>the</strong>r than “<strong>the</strong>re.” 6 Although from early on<strong>Heidegger</strong> repeatedly emphasized that <strong>the</strong> term “das Dase<strong>in</strong>” is not translatable,none<strong>the</strong>less we have to see clearly that each component <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word has a mean<strong>in</strong>gthat is translatable <strong>and</strong> which <strong>in</strong> fact have been translated. The component “-se<strong>in</strong>”<strong>of</strong> “Da-se<strong>in</strong>” is translated as “be<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong> component “Da” has <strong>the</strong>mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “Erschlossenheit,” it is translated as disclosure. 7 In this ve<strong>in</strong>, one couldraise <strong>the</strong> question whe<strong>the</strong>r one could f<strong>in</strong>d a rendition <strong>of</strong> “Da-se<strong>in</strong>,” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong>“Erschlossenheit se<strong>in</strong>.”The Da <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> has <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> self-like-ecstatic <strong>and</strong> ecstatic-horizonaldisclosedness, <strong>and</strong> this is disclosedness <strong>of</strong> existence, world, <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> general.Section 44 <strong>of</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit shows that as clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> fundamental phenomenon <strong>of</strong>disclosedness, constitutes “<strong>the</strong> primordial phenomenon <strong>of</strong> truth,” cf., <strong>the</strong> sub-section b,entitled “The Primordial Phenomenon <strong>of</strong> Truth <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Derivative Character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Traditional Concept <strong>of</strong> Truth” (BT 201). Now, if “be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> general” means “be<strong>in</strong>g(Se<strong>in</strong>) as a whole” <strong>and</strong> if be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> general encompasses existence, world, <strong>and</strong> categorialbe<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> disclosedness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> general reveals <strong>the</strong> “truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g,”truth understood here as disclosedness or clear<strong>in</strong>g. Thus, with <strong>the</strong> words “<strong>the</strong> truthcharacter<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g” (GA 24, p. 33), <strong>the</strong> fourth basic problem <strong>of</strong> hermeneuticalphenomenologicalfundamental ontology is spelled out – <strong>the</strong> problem that belongsto <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>me <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> third Division (“Zeit und Se<strong>in</strong>”) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first Part <strong>of</strong> Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit. 8Section 44 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> existential-ontological analytic <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> sets <strong>the</strong> stage for <strong>the</strong>treatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong> that third Division, whose “new,” that is, its secondelaboration appears <strong>in</strong> Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 24, p. 1), that is,<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marburg lectures course text <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> summer semester 1927. Thus, it behoovesto keep <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>me <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g” does not appear for <strong>the</strong> firsttime with <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g-historical unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Beiträgezur Philosophie. This <strong>the</strong>me belongs already to <strong>the</strong> fundamental-ontological unfold<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. The fundamental question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>6All three words, ‘disclosedness,’ ‘disclosure,’ <strong>and</strong> ‘<strong>the</strong>re’ <strong>in</strong> English <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al – Translator’sNote.7The two words, ‘be<strong>in</strong>g,’ <strong>and</strong> ‘disclosure’ <strong>in</strong> English <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al – Translator’s Note.8M. <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 24, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann(Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975).
220 F.-W. von Herrmanngeneral, which from a systematic po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> view receives its answer <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> thirdDivision, “Zeit und Se<strong>in</strong>” encompasses <strong>the</strong> fundamental problem <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “truth <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g” with <strong>the</strong> difference that <strong>in</strong> fundamental ontology, <strong>the</strong> “truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g” isstructured transcendental-horizonaly, while <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “truth<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g,” ra<strong>the</strong>r than hav<strong>in</strong>g a transcendental-horizonal structure has an enown<strong>in</strong>g-structure.Follow<strong>in</strong>g this immanent transformation, <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonalconcept <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> also changes <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g-ak<strong>in</strong> (ereignishaft)concept <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>.2 The Enown<strong>in</strong>g-ak<strong>in</strong> Concept <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>The passage from <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal to <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical or enown<strong>in</strong>ghistoricalpos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g is preceded by <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g,that not only exist<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> possibilities <strong>of</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world, butabove all, <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g itself, is historical (geschichtlich). This is experienc<strong>in</strong>gthat <strong>the</strong> historicity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “-se<strong>in</strong>” <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> is founded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> historicity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Da”as <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. To <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> historicity <strong>of</strong> truth as <strong>the</strong> historicity <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g belongs <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> provenance <strong>of</strong> thrownness (unto<strong>the</strong> truth or clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g) from out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> primary forth-throw <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g. The clear<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw is dist<strong>in</strong>guished by <strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> enownment to <strong>the</strong>throw<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>. From out <strong>of</strong> this enown<strong>in</strong>g relation, “untowhich” <strong>the</strong> throw<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g (Da-se<strong>in</strong>) is first <strong>of</strong> all thrown unto <strong>the</strong> forththrow<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> throw<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g (Da-se<strong>in</strong>), <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as it is athrown project<strong>in</strong>g-open, becomes an enowned project<strong>in</strong>g-open aris<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>enown<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw. The enown<strong>in</strong>g relation (Bezug) to <strong>the</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>gbe<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> enowned relationship (Verhältnis) <strong>of</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open <strong>the</strong> forth-throw<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g – this counter-resonance <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g relation <strong>and</strong> enownedrelationship receives <strong>the</strong> term<strong>in</strong>ological name “enown<strong>in</strong>g” (Ereignis) [cf., <strong>in</strong> thisregard Section 122 <strong>of</strong> Beiträge zur Philosophie, p. 239]. 9Hold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> our regard <strong>the</strong> formally <strong>in</strong>dicated structural relations <strong>of</strong> “enown<strong>in</strong>g”;<strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g-ak<strong>in</strong> belong<strong>in</strong>gness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>and</strong> “Da-se<strong>in</strong>,” we shallnow proceed to elucidate <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g-ak<strong>in</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> to dist<strong>in</strong>guishit from <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal concept <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>. We shall draw upona key passage from Section 140 <strong>of</strong> Beiträge entitled, “Die Wesung des Seyns.” Thepassage chosen for our purpose beg<strong>in</strong>s as follows: “The truth <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> thusbe-<strong>in</strong>g itself holds sway only where <strong>and</strong> when <strong>the</strong>re is Da-se<strong>in</strong>” (GA 65, 261, CP 184).First comment<strong>in</strong>g on this passage, we observe: truth as truth for be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> thisbe<strong>in</strong>g itself as <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> truth – <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g understood <strong>in</strong> this way unfoldsits sway as <strong>the</strong> happen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> its essential sway<strong>in</strong>g only where <strong>and</strong> when Da-se<strong>in</strong> is,9Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Beiträge zur Philosophie, GA 65, ed. F.-W. v. Herrmann (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann, 1989).
Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> Contributions to Philosophy...221that is, exists. Truth as <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g does not prevail (waltet) withoutDa-se<strong>in</strong>, not without <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da. This also holds true <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple for <strong>the</strong>fundamental-ontological position<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> for <strong>the</strong> fundamentalontologicalposition<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>. But while, with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal<strong>in</strong>quiry, it is <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that becomes apparent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>enown<strong>in</strong>g-historical <strong>in</strong>quiry it is <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> truth, or <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> clearedness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>lighten<strong>in</strong>g-clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (der lichtenden Lichtung des Se<strong>in</strong>s) that at a given time(jeweilig) shows itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>. The clear<strong>in</strong>g lights up at a given time <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw <strong>of</strong> a historical way <strong>of</strong> clearedness. So we have to dist<strong>in</strong>guishbetween <strong>the</strong> lighten<strong>in</strong>g-clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da as <strong>the</strong> happen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>a way <strong>of</strong> clearedness happen<strong>in</strong>g at a given time. The lighten<strong>in</strong>g-clear<strong>in</strong>g itself doesnot exhaust itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> historicity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> at a given time. The way <strong>of</strong>clearedness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g – historical at a given time <strong>and</strong> hence historically selftransform<strong>in</strong>g– is as thrown-forth also projected-open. Truth as <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gsways (prevails) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw. But it belongs to its abid<strong>in</strong>g happen<strong>in</strong>gthat <strong>the</strong> forth-thrown way <strong>of</strong> clearedness be received <strong>and</strong> enopened through <strong>the</strong>project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>. Besides <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g relation, <strong>the</strong>re belongsto <strong>the</strong> abid<strong>in</strong>g happen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> truth as <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> relationship to <strong>the</strong>ways <strong>of</strong> clearedness. This relationship comes from <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g relation, <strong>and</strong> isenowned <strong>and</strong> only as enowned is projected-open. As an enown<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw, <strong>the</strong>truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g does not prevail without <strong>the</strong> enowned project<strong>in</strong>g-open.But “Da-se<strong>in</strong> ‘is’ (exists) only where <strong>and</strong> when <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> truth” (where<strong>and</strong> when <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g sways or prevails) [CP 184, <strong>in</strong>terpolations by <strong>the</strong> author].This means: Da-se<strong>in</strong> can exist only as be<strong>in</strong>g, as <strong>the</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>aras <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> truth lights up <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw as <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> clearedness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da for <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that projects-open. Truth as <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g prevails <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> clearedness that is thrown-forth at a given time, but only <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as thisway <strong>of</strong> clearedness, is projected-open by <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that projects-open.That <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its enown<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw prevails only if <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong>clearedness is seized <strong>and</strong> enopened by <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> enowned Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> projectedopen<strong>and</strong> that, conversely, Da-se<strong>in</strong> as <strong>the</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Daonly exists <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> truth throws itself forth <strong>in</strong> a way <strong>of</strong> clearedness for<strong>the</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open; this is “<strong>the</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g, which po<strong>in</strong>ts out precisely <strong>the</strong> essentialsway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g itself as <strong>the</strong> counter-resonat<strong>in</strong>g enown<strong>in</strong>g” (CP 184 ). Da-se<strong>in</strong>, as <strong>the</strong>project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da, does not exist over-aga<strong>in</strong>st (Gegenüber)<strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g; ra<strong>the</strong>r, as <strong>the</strong> enowned project<strong>in</strong>g-open that counterresonateswith <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw, <strong>the</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Da belongs <strong>in</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g. Enowned project<strong>in</strong>g-open <strong>and</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw are<strong>the</strong> two counter-resonat<strong>in</strong>g relations that – <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir counter-resonance – make up <strong>the</strong>turn<strong>in</strong>g, that is, <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g that is <strong>in</strong> itself turn<strong>in</strong>g (das <strong>in</strong> sich kehrige Ereignis).Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, we can say: “Enown<strong>in</strong>g grounds Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> itself” (CP 184).Because <strong>the</strong> Da is cleared <strong>and</strong> thrown unto <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g relation, <strong>and</strong> because <strong>the</strong>project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g, as thrown unto a forth-thrown way <strong>of</strong> clearedness is anenowned be<strong>in</strong>g that belongs to <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g relation <strong>and</strong> so along with this relation,makes up <strong>the</strong> complete, counter-resonat<strong>in</strong>g turn<strong>in</strong>g-enown<strong>in</strong>g, enown<strong>in</strong>g
222 F.-W. von Herrmanngrounds <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da not vis-à-vis itself, but “<strong>in</strong> itself.” Conversely, we haveto say: “Da-se<strong>in</strong> grounds enown<strong>in</strong>g” (CP 184). That is, through <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong>Dase<strong>in</strong>’s project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g, Dase<strong>in</strong> grounds a way <strong>of</strong> clearedness that isthrown-forth <strong>in</strong> enownment. In enown<strong>in</strong>g, a tw<strong>of</strong>old counter-resonat<strong>in</strong>g ground<strong>in</strong>gis <strong>in</strong> play: <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw grounds by light<strong>in</strong>g up a way <strong>of</strong> clearedness.The enowned project<strong>in</strong>g-open <strong>in</strong> this play grounds <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as it takes over <strong>the</strong> way<strong>of</strong> clearedness grounded <strong>in</strong> enownment <strong>and</strong> allows it <strong>in</strong> enopen<strong>in</strong>g to prevail.Because <strong>the</strong> Da <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da are determ<strong>in</strong>ed from out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> forththrownenownment, enown<strong>in</strong>g as enownment grounds <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da <strong>in</strong> itself,<strong>and</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> as project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g grounds <strong>the</strong> Da that is enowned from out<strong>of</strong> enownment. In this sense, <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da grounds enown<strong>in</strong>g (enownment aswhat is enowned <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da).But why is <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g forth-throw <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> clearedness grasped as “enownment”?What is here <strong>the</strong> primary mean<strong>in</strong>g? Section 143 <strong>of</strong> Beiträge answers thisquestion: “Be<strong>in</strong>g as en-own<strong>in</strong>g. En-ownment determ<strong>in</strong>es man as owned by be-<strong>in</strong>g”(CP 185). The hyphenated spell<strong>in</strong>g – en-own<strong>in</strong>g, (Er-eignis), en-ownment(Er-eignen) – has an <strong>in</strong>dicative function. It <strong>in</strong>dicates that “-own<strong>in</strong>g” (−eignis) <strong>and</strong>“-ownment” (eignung) are to be experienced <strong>and</strong> thought with an eye to “ownhood(Eigentum).” En-own<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its en-ownment determ<strong>in</strong>es Da-se<strong>in</strong>-ak<strong>in</strong>-man (da-se<strong>in</strong>smäßigenMenschen) as its ownhood, as owned by be-<strong>in</strong>g that en-owns. The be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da – <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>-ak<strong>in</strong>-man – is thrown from <strong>the</strong> en-own<strong>in</strong>g forththrow<strong>of</strong> a way <strong>of</strong> clearedness unto this clearedness; <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> such a way that thisbe<strong>in</strong>g can enact itself as a project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g only out <strong>of</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>g-thrown<strong>in</strong>to a way <strong>of</strong> clearedness. As such a thrown be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da (way <strong>of</strong> clearedness), itis a be<strong>in</strong>g enowned out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cleared enownment <strong>and</strong> as such it is primarily ownedby <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g-enown<strong>in</strong>g-be-<strong>in</strong>g. Only as <strong>the</strong> enowned ownhood (ereignetesEigentum) <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da <strong>in</strong> itself <strong>and</strong> for itself enopened as a Self.Thus en-own<strong>in</strong>g (Er-eignen) means “to determ<strong>in</strong>e as ownhood”; be<strong>in</strong>g enownedmeans “to be determ<strong>in</strong>ed as ownhood”. En-own<strong>in</strong>g (Er-eignis) is primarily en-ownment“<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da as ownhood”; <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> counterresonat<strong>in</strong>g-be<strong>in</strong>g-en-owned(gegenschw<strong>in</strong>gendes Er-eignetse<strong>in</strong>) means to determ<strong>in</strong>e<strong>the</strong> project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da as ownhood.This fundamental mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g (Er-eignen) <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-enowned(Ereignetse<strong>in</strong>) – <strong>the</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ation-to-ownhood <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-determ<strong>in</strong>ed-to-ownhood –is strictly to be observed <strong>in</strong> every attempt to translate <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g word“Er-eignis” <strong>in</strong>to ano<strong>the</strong>r language. This <strong>in</strong>eluctable requirement has been outst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>glymet by Parvis Emad <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> English translation <strong>of</strong> Beiträge zur Philosophie(Vom Ereignis), entitled Contributions to Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g). 10 In <strong>the</strong>“Translators’ Foreword,” he shows on what grounds <strong>the</strong> attempts previously made10M. <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g), trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> KennethMaly (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana UP, 1999); see also Parvis Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sContributions to Philosophy (Madison, WI: University <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press, 2007), pp. 21–42.Regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> word “en-own<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>and</strong> its first time use, see <strong>the</strong> discussion <strong>of</strong> Zueignung on p. 82 ff.
Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> Contributions to Philosophy...223at translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> fundamental word “Ereignis” – “event,” “appropriation,” “event <strong>of</strong>appropriation,” “befitt<strong>in</strong>g” – are unsuitable for render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> peculiar movement <strong>of</strong>enown<strong>in</strong>g as enownment <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> “determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to ownhood.” 11 This philological<strong>and</strong> ultimately philosophical <strong>in</strong>sight leads him to take up <strong>the</strong> verb “to own”<strong>and</strong> to co<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> word “Enown<strong>in</strong>g.” Thus <strong>the</strong> first sentence <strong>of</strong> Section 143, uponwhich we drew to <strong>in</strong>terpret Ereignis, reads <strong>in</strong> English translation as follows: “Be-<strong>in</strong>gas en-own<strong>in</strong>g. En-ownment determ<strong>in</strong>es man as owned by be-<strong>in</strong>g” (CP 185). Wi<strong>the</strong>n-own<strong>in</strong>g as a po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> departure, we can also easily enact <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong>“Er-eignung” as “en-ownment.” 12We close this discussion by juxtaposition<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> transcendental-horizonal concept<strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g-ak<strong>in</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> by compar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m.In both concepts, Da-se<strong>in</strong> means: to be <strong>the</strong> Da, be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da. Consequently, <strong>the</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> Da is, <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da, has <strong>the</strong> ecstatic character <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-removedunto,or <strong>of</strong> st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g-open-for, <strong>the</strong> Da. In <strong>the</strong> fundamental-ontological as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>enown<strong>in</strong>g-historical concept <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong> Da has <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> unclosedness,openness, clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> general <strong>and</strong> as a whole. Therefore, it makes sense towrite not only <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g-historical but also <strong>the</strong> fundamental-ontological concept<strong>of</strong> “Da-se<strong>in</strong>” with a hyphen.In <strong>the</strong> fundamental-ontologically <strong>and</strong> thus transcendental-horizonaly constitutedDa-se<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da is determ<strong>in</strong>ed as be<strong>in</strong>g-thrown <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Da, <strong>and</strong> as <strong>the</strong>project<strong>in</strong>g-open <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da. In <strong>the</strong> horizonal dimension <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da, <strong>the</strong> thrown project<strong>in</strong>g-open(open<strong>in</strong>g up) is enacted as transcend<strong>in</strong>g while transcend<strong>in</strong>g is disclosed as<strong>the</strong> self-like-ecstatic Da. The Da as a whole is <strong>the</strong>refore transcendental-horizonaldisclosedness.In <strong>the</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g-historical determ<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>, be<strong>in</strong>g-thrown “unto” Dareceives <strong>the</strong> characterization <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-enowned out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> enownment.And correspond<strong>in</strong>gly, what is thrown becomes enowned project<strong>in</strong>g-open (to beproject<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g). From out <strong>of</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g enownment, transcend<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>horizon transforms itself <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> enowned project<strong>in</strong>g open <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da as <strong>the</strong> historicalway <strong>of</strong> clearedness. The horizon, <strong>the</strong> horizonal dimension <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da, disappearsunto <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g-enownment. Here, <strong>the</strong> Da <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> is thrown unto <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>genownment<strong>and</strong> is projected-open <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> enowned project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g. It is <strong>the</strong> Dathrown-forth unto enownment <strong>and</strong> projected-open <strong>in</strong> enowned project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g.ReferencesEmad, Parvis. 2007. On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy. Madison: TheUniversity <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1975. Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 25. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann.11Ibid., pp. xix ff.12In English <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al – Translator’s Note.
224 F.-W. von Herrmann<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1977. Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, GA 2. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1989. Beitrage zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann. 1999. Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly. Contributions to philosophy (Fromenown<strong>in</strong>g). Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1996. Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State University <strong>of</strong>New York Press.von Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm. 1987, 2005, 2008. Hermeneutische Phänomenologie desDase<strong>in</strong>s. E<strong>in</strong> Kommentar zu Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, vol 1–3. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.
Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Da-se<strong>in</strong>: Witha Suggestion for Its Interl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong> 1Ivo De GennaroTo renounce or banish a new word or a new mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> thisword (no matter how foreign <strong>and</strong> barbaric it may be), when our language does not have an equivalent, or does nothave it as precise, not hav<strong>in</strong>g received it <strong>in</strong> that own <strong>and</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ed sense, is (<strong>and</strong> cannot be less than) to renounce <strong>and</strong>banish, <strong>and</strong> treat as barbaric <strong>and</strong> illicit, a new idea <strong>and</strong> a newconcept <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> human spirit.Giacomo Leopardi, Zibaldone di pensieri, p. 2400As shall soon become clear, <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g text is not a “neutral” attempt to comparesystematically <strong>the</strong> positions <strong>of</strong> two th<strong>in</strong>kers with regard to a certa<strong>in</strong> concept orphenomenon called “Dase<strong>in</strong>.” In fact, such a comparison <strong>in</strong>evitably takes on <strong>the</strong>form <strong>of</strong> a computation, <strong>and</strong> thus <strong>of</strong> an evaluation, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> compared terms. In order to1Parvis Emad’s endur<strong>in</strong>g reflection on translation has some <strong>of</strong> its most significant passages <strong>in</strong> hisessay “<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> More Deeply <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>: Essential <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>Unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Language,” <strong>in</strong> John Sallis (ed.), Read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Commemorations (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton:Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 323–340, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Forewords” to his translations <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sPhänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der re<strong>in</strong>en Vernunft, GA 25 (Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977a), Phenomenological Interpretation <strong>of</strong> Kant’s Critique <strong>of</strong> PureReason, trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1997;Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (with Kenneth Maly) <strong>and</strong> Bes<strong>in</strong>nung (with ThomasKalary), as well as his essays on <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>and</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g from Ereignis,collected <strong>in</strong> On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy (Madison: The University <strong>of</strong>Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press, 2007; Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis), GA 65 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann, 1989a) [henceforth quotes as BPh]. Contributions to Philosophy (FromEnown<strong>in</strong>g), trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1999);<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Bes<strong>in</strong>nung, GA 66 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997); M<strong>in</strong>dfulness,trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Thomas Kalary (London: Cont<strong>in</strong>uum, 2006).I. De Gennaro (*)School <strong>of</strong> Economics <strong>and</strong> Management, Free University <strong>of</strong> Bozen-Bolzano,piazza Università 1, 39100 Bolzano, Italye-mail: idegennaro@unibz.itF. Schalow (ed.), <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad, Contributions To Phenomenology 65,DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0_12, © Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media B.V. 2011225
226 I. De Gennarocompute <strong>and</strong> evaluate <strong>the</strong>se terms, we need to have previously seized <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong> acomputable form, that is, as values. This is done by means <strong>of</strong> historical formats. Theformated 2 <strong>and</strong> thus computable terms are pure data, that is, given concepts depurated<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir philosophical stress. Moreover, <strong>in</strong> order to perform this format<strong>in</strong>g seizure,our th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g self must have acceded to <strong>the</strong> will that wills <strong>the</strong> computability, <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong>refore formatability, <strong>of</strong> all sense, so that this sense may function as a willablevalue with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> self-implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pure will to will.So much for <strong>the</strong> supposed neutrality <strong>of</strong> systematic comparisons.Instead <strong>of</strong> carry<strong>in</strong>g through such a comparison, <strong>the</strong> essay attempts to clarify <strong>the</strong>sense <strong>in</strong> which Da-se<strong>in</strong> is not a concept, or a thought, we could assign to a particularth<strong>in</strong>ker, but “<strong>the</strong> crisis between <strong>the</strong> first <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r onset (Anfang)” <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. 3However, <strong>the</strong> clarification requires that this crisis be not merely “known” <strong>and</strong>“expressed,” but actually said, that is, shown as a knowledge that language itself,here <strong>the</strong> English mo<strong>the</strong>r-language, has already left to be thought. F<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>the</strong> pathlead<strong>in</strong>g towards a tentative English word for Da-se<strong>in</strong> might show that <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong>translation, which is <strong>the</strong> same as <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, has noth<strong>in</strong>g to do with provid<strong>in</strong>goperative results, <strong>and</strong> is, <strong>in</strong>stead, a matter <strong>of</strong> ventur<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> path itself.1 IntroductionThe word Dase<strong>in</strong> was <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> eighteenth century as a German translation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> existentia. Grammatically, it is a noun formed from <strong>the</strong> verb dase<strong>in</strong>mean<strong>in</strong>g “to be <strong>the</strong>re.” Where English, Italian, <strong>and</strong> French philosophy say, respectively,“existence,” esistenza <strong>and</strong> existence, German philosophy, when it startsspeak<strong>in</strong>g German, says ei<strong>the</strong>r Existenz or Dase<strong>in</strong>, that is, “be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>re.” Hence, it isnot surpris<strong>in</strong>g that we f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong> word Dase<strong>in</strong> throughout German philosophy: <strong>in</strong> Kant<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel, <strong>in</strong> Schell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> Nietzsche, <strong>in</strong> Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>. However,<strong>the</strong> sense <strong>in</strong> which anyth<strong>in</strong>g is said to “be <strong>the</strong>re” changes accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> metaphysicalground<strong>in</strong>g-stance <strong>of</strong> each th<strong>in</strong>ker. Consequently, an enquiry entitled, forexample, “Kant <strong>and</strong> Hegel on Dase<strong>in</strong>” would have to show how <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>is modified accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> respective ground<strong>in</strong>g-thoughts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se two th<strong>in</strong>kers,namely, <strong>the</strong>ir determ<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’suse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word st<strong>and</strong>s out <strong>in</strong> at least two respects: firstly, Dase<strong>in</strong> here seems to havea more specific sense than that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> existentia. Secondly, <strong>in</strong> this more specificsense it is not merely a received concept undergo<strong>in</strong>g a certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation<strong>and</strong> thus f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g its place with<strong>in</strong> a philosophical system; ra<strong>the</strong>r, it is itself one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>names <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g-thought <strong>of</strong> this th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Indeed, <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Dase<strong>in</strong> doesnot have <strong>the</strong> generic mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “existence,” but refers to <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> man <strong>and</strong> only2This word, spelt with one “t,” is to be dist<strong>in</strong>guished from <strong>the</strong> technical term “formatted” used <strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>formation technology <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r fields.3See GA 65, p. 295; tr. 208–209.
Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Da-se<strong>in</strong>: With a Suggestion for Its Interl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong>227to that: man is said to exist, but <strong>in</strong> a unique sense <strong>of</strong> “exist<strong>in</strong>g.” A critical passage <strong>of</strong>Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time 4 reads: “Das ‘Wesen’ des Dase<strong>in</strong>s liegt <strong>in</strong> se<strong>in</strong>er Existenz”: “The‘Wesen’ <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> resides <strong>in</strong> its existence.” In this sentence, Wesen, Dase<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong>Existenz speak differently than <strong>the</strong>y do <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> tradition <strong>of</strong> philosophy. 5 This differenceis not merely <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> a diverg<strong>in</strong>g term<strong>in</strong>ological choice, but <strong>the</strong> consequence<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rise <strong>of</strong> a new phenomenon. This is why <strong>in</strong> one <strong>of</strong> his lecture courseson Nietzsche <strong>Heidegger</strong> states: “Was wir mit ‘Dase<strong>in</strong>’ bezeichnen, kommt <strong>in</strong> derbisherigen Geschichte der Philosophie nicht vor”: “That which we <strong>in</strong>dicate with <strong>the</strong>word ‘Dase<strong>in</strong>’ cannot be found <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>hi<strong>the</strong>rto Geschichte <strong>of</strong> philosophy.” 6Meanwhile, it seems that we have, so to speak <strong>in</strong> pass<strong>in</strong>g, already given an answerto <strong>the</strong> question implicit <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> title “Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Dase<strong>in</strong>,” namely <strong>the</strong>question: “What does Dase<strong>in</strong> mean, respectively, <strong>in</strong> Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>?.”The answer reads more or less as follows: While <strong>in</strong> Husserl Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicates <strong>the</strong>existence <strong>of</strong> any be<strong>in</strong>g whatsoever <strong>in</strong> a sense <strong>of</strong> existence that is to be determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>its pure <strong>in</strong>tentional constitution, <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> designates <strong>the</strong> peculiar be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> man, <strong>and</strong> it does so <strong>in</strong> a sense that, moreover, proves to be crucial for <strong>the</strong> one <strong>and</strong>only question <strong>of</strong> his th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, namely, <strong>the</strong> more general question <strong>of</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g itself.”However, if this answer is correct, <strong>the</strong>re seems to be hardly any po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> contrast<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se two th<strong>in</strong>kers. Once it is seen that, <strong>in</strong> us<strong>in</strong>g this word,Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicate two different matters, <strong>the</strong>re is not much left to bega<strong>in</strong>ed from contrast<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> two positions.However, despite its correctness, <strong>the</strong> answer is <strong>in</strong>sufficient. It is <strong>in</strong>sufficient <strong>in</strong>that it takes an external st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t vis-à-vis <strong>the</strong> question. From this st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t, wecompare two positions relatively to a concept named Dase<strong>in</strong>, <strong>of</strong> which we know that“somehow it means existence.” But where exactly is this st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t located? Can4Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit (Tüb<strong>in</strong>gen: Niemeyer, 16 1986), p. 42. Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, GA 2(Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977b), p. 56.5Wesen is written <strong>in</strong> quotation marks <strong>in</strong> order to <strong>in</strong>dicate <strong>the</strong> suspension <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> metaphysical sense<strong>of</strong> this word (i.e. Wesen as “essence”) <strong>in</strong> favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> same word speaks <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> Denkweg (i.e., Wesen <strong>in</strong> its so-called “verbal” underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g). In a fully exp<strong>and</strong>ed version, <strong>the</strong>citation should <strong>the</strong>refore read: “Dase<strong>in</strong>’s bid<strong>in</strong>g – which <strong>the</strong> (now broken) forgottenness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sake<strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g only allows to grasp as “essence” – resides <strong>in</strong> its existence.”6Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Nietzsche I (Pfull<strong>in</strong>gen: Neske, 5 1989b), p. 278. If we translate Geschichte with“history,” <strong>the</strong> quoted passage appears as a purely historical proposition, technically speak<strong>in</strong>g, as amere <strong>in</strong>formation. Alternatively, we can translate Geschichte, as a diction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Denkweg, with <strong>the</strong>old English word “wyrd” (from <strong>the</strong> I.E. [Indo-European] root *uer-, as <strong>in</strong> German werden; cf.weird). In this word resounds <strong>the</strong> abruptness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> self-absconc<strong>in</strong>g “giv<strong>in</strong>g to wit” (<strong>and</strong> thusassign<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>in</strong> which Geschichte consists. By say<strong>in</strong>g: “That which we <strong>in</strong>dicate with <strong>the</strong> word Dase<strong>in</strong>cannot be found <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> hi<strong>the</strong>rto wyrd <strong>of</strong> philosophy,” <strong>the</strong> sentence loses its merely propositional<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>formational character <strong>and</strong> reads as a say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. (On <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> Geschichte<strong>and</strong> schicken, respectively, with “wyrd” <strong>and</strong> “to weird” see below, footnote 24, <strong>and</strong> my article“Own<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> Belong<strong>in</strong>gness to Be-<strong>in</strong>g or <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> as Surrender: Parvis Emad’s Book onBeiträge <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> English Denkweg,” <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 25, 2009: 115–141.) – The “quasiadjectival”use <strong>of</strong> “hi<strong>the</strong>rto” is attested <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Oxford English Dictionary (“The hi<strong>the</strong>rto experience<strong>of</strong> men” – Green, Ethics).
228 I. De Gennaro<strong>the</strong>re be an external st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t to this matter? Certa<strong>in</strong>ly not, if <strong>the</strong> question is to bea philosophical one. As a matter <strong>of</strong> fact, philosophy is precisely <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stant <strong>in</strong> which<strong>the</strong>re is no more external st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t. Philosophy consists <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>terrogative stancethat, irrupt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> middle <strong>of</strong> waver<strong>in</strong>g cont<strong>in</strong>gency, <strong>and</strong> thus <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ever undecided<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite viewpo<strong>in</strong>ts that are based on it, susta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> want <strong>of</strong> that which provisionallywe may call a schismatic decision. Philosophy is <strong>the</strong> schismatic <strong>in</strong>stant,<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore has no external st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>ts that could serve as a basis for historicalvistas or <strong>the</strong> scann<strong>in</strong>g scrut<strong>in</strong>y <strong>of</strong> concepts. Hence, <strong>the</strong> answer we have just given to<strong>the</strong> question concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “use” Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> make <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word Dase<strong>in</strong>is not philosophical. Why? Because we were implicitly rely<strong>in</strong>g on an undecided,merely given, operative sense <strong>of</strong> “existence,” a sense that does without <strong>the</strong> schismthat <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first place asks for <strong>the</strong> assent<strong>in</strong>g philosophical word <strong>in</strong> order for a reign<strong>of</strong> sense (a world) to arise. Philosophy susta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> “schismatic decision” that yields<strong>the</strong> sense <strong>in</strong> which anyth<strong>in</strong>g is given. 7 It belongs to, <strong>and</strong> thus haunts <strong>and</strong> heeds,<strong>the</strong> awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial giv<strong>in</strong>g that not only lies <strong>in</strong> all givenness, but silentlytransforms it.2 HusserlAll <strong>of</strong> a sudden, we are set <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> middle <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs. In fact, givenness, be<strong>in</strong>g given,Gegebense<strong>in</strong>, is <strong>in</strong> Husserl a synonym <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>. For Husserl, philosophy is a decisionconcern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> natural, unreflected givenness <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs. This decisionorig<strong>in</strong>ates <strong>in</strong> phenomenological ¦pocή (epoché) <strong>and</strong> reduction, that is, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>methodical a priori element <strong>of</strong> evidence. Evidence as a norm-giv<strong>in</strong>g methodicalpr<strong>in</strong>ciple means: br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to view <strong>the</strong> transcendental constitution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong>th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> its (i.e., <strong>of</strong> this constitution) pure self-givenness. Husserl uses <strong>the</strong> wordsda, dase<strong>in</strong>d, Daseiendes, etc., chiefly for <strong>the</strong> givenness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> general<strong>the</strong>sis as carried out <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> natural stance. For <strong>in</strong>stance, <strong>in</strong> Ideas, we read <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g:“… alles aus der natürlichen Welt erfahrungsmäßig und vor jedem DenkenBewußte, trägt <strong>in</strong> se<strong>in</strong>er Gesam<strong>the</strong>it … den Charakter ‘da’, ‘vorh<strong>and</strong>en’”: “… anyth<strong>in</strong>gbelong<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> natural world, <strong>and</strong> conscious [i.e., given to consciousness] <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> experience, before any th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g takes place, bears, <strong>in</strong> its ga<strong>the</strong>redentirety, … <strong>the</strong> character ‘da’, ‘vorh<strong>and</strong>en’.” 8 Dase<strong>in</strong>, or, which for Husserl is <strong>the</strong>same, Vorh<strong>and</strong>ense<strong>in</strong>, is <strong>the</strong> achievement <strong>of</strong> a <strong>the</strong>sis (a position, a positive act), <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> first place <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> position we constantly perform, before any th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g takes place,<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> natural stance, that is, by <strong>the</strong> mere fact <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> conscious be<strong>in</strong>gs we are.7See my articles, “Own<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> Belong<strong>in</strong>gness to Be<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>and</strong> “Why Be<strong>in</strong>g Itself <strong>and</strong> Not JustBe<strong>in</strong>g?,” <strong>in</strong> The New Yearbook for Phenomenology <strong>and</strong> Phenomenological Philosophy VII, ed.Burt Hopk<strong>in</strong>s et. al (Seattle: Noesis Press, 2007): 157–195.8Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu e<strong>in</strong>er re<strong>in</strong>en Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie(Tüb<strong>in</strong>gen: Niemeyer, 5 1993), p. 53 [IRP].
Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Da-se<strong>in</strong>: With a Suggestion for Its Interl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong>229But <strong>the</strong>re are also o<strong>the</strong>r positions. For <strong>in</strong>stance, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> arithmetical stance, we obta<strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> arithmetical world with its arithmetical objects. This peculiarpositive or <strong>the</strong>tical stance coexists with <strong>the</strong> one that posits <strong>the</strong> natural world.Moreover, s<strong>in</strong>ce Dase<strong>in</strong> is existence (i.e., “positedness”) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> positive consciousness,it is, strictly speak<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> a relation, namely, <strong>the</strong> relationbetween man <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> world. Consequently, Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicates a certa<strong>in</strong> manner <strong>of</strong>“be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>re” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs toge<strong>the</strong>r with a certa<strong>in</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>re” <strong>of</strong> man – here, <strong>the</strong>“be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>re” as <strong>the</strong> naturally posit<strong>in</strong>g consciousness <strong>of</strong> natural experience.The sense <strong>of</strong> phenomenological epoché as a decision concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> naturalconscious Dase<strong>in</strong> is to refra<strong>in</strong> from straightforwardly carry<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>the</strong>tical acts, <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> first place <strong>the</strong> position <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> natural world. This counternatural refra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g(i.e., absta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, hold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>f, <strong>in</strong>hibit<strong>in</strong>g, putt<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>of</strong> play) <strong>in</strong>terrupts <strong>the</strong> exclusiveness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> general <strong>the</strong>sis. However, <strong>the</strong> negative sense <strong>of</strong> this <strong>in</strong>terruption –<strong>the</strong> fact <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g “no” to <strong>the</strong> position <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> natural world (i.e., <strong>of</strong> hold<strong>in</strong>g backfrom it) – consists <strong>in</strong> an em<strong>in</strong>ently positive phenomenon. This phenomenon is <strong>the</strong>break<strong>in</strong>g, or, we shall say, <strong>the</strong> irruption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dimension <strong>of</strong> pure transcendental<strong>in</strong>tentionality, that is, <strong>the</strong> realm <strong>of</strong> apodictic evidence. The irruption <strong>of</strong> this dimensionis positive <strong>in</strong> an orig<strong>in</strong>al sense, <strong>in</strong> that it primarily establishes, that is, “ur-posits”(<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> this sense decides) <strong>the</strong> likelihood (Möglichkeit) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> natural position.The <strong>in</strong>terruption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relative evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> general <strong>the</strong>sis <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> irruption <strong>of</strong>transcendental or absolute evidence are <strong>the</strong> same.Epoché <strong>the</strong>refore means: allow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> irruption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> realm <strong>of</strong> absolutely posit<strong>in</strong>gevidence. 9 This irruption implies a detachment from natural positivity, that is,from natural Dase<strong>in</strong>. The detachment is such that it leaves <strong>the</strong> givenness <strong>and</strong> thatwhich is given unchanged, literally untouched. And yet, noth<strong>in</strong>g is as it used to be.In fact, everyth<strong>in</strong>g now appears <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> its transcendental constitution with<strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> ga<strong>the</strong>red entirety <strong>of</strong> consciousness. Everyth<strong>in</strong>g is now overtly immanent <strong>in</strong> transcendentalsubjectivity, this immanence be<strong>in</strong>g ei<strong>the</strong>r noetic (reell) or, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong>that which transcends consciousness, noematic (ideell). 10 The da-hood <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> naturalworld is now supplemented (<strong>in</strong> a sense that shall soon be specified) by <strong>the</strong> absoluteda-hood <strong>of</strong> experienc<strong>in</strong>g life <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> modality <strong>of</strong> abst<strong>in</strong>ence. As a consequence,<strong>the</strong> natural faith <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world is not any more merely da, but, Husserlsays, “mit da,” 11 that is, it is “<strong>the</strong>re” – now as a “mere phenomenon” – toge<strong>the</strong>r with<strong>the</strong> sight <strong>of</strong> pure experience <strong>in</strong> which it is seized. Hence, Mit-da-se<strong>in</strong> is <strong>the</strong> trait <strong>of</strong>phenomenality <strong>of</strong> all natural objects as such.The supplementation accomplished thanks to phenomenological epoché canthus be characterized as a shift <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> da-character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs from <strong>the</strong>9We ought <strong>in</strong> fact to speak <strong>of</strong> an “allow<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>in</strong> that <strong>the</strong> Urphänomen <strong>of</strong> evidence consists <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ur-movement <strong>of</strong> appear<strong>in</strong>g as giv<strong>in</strong>g-itself by itself, which, though be<strong>in</strong>g ur-posited <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcendentalstance, is never<strong>the</strong>less not made but admitted.10The mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> ideell is: dar<strong>in</strong>se<strong>in</strong> als immanenter gegenständlicher S<strong>in</strong>n, that is, be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>rewith<strong>in</strong>as an immanent objective sense.11Edmund Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen (Hamburg: Me<strong>in</strong>er, 3 1995), p. 21 [CM].
230 I. De Gennaroda-hood <strong>of</strong> natural positivity to <strong>the</strong> da-hood <strong>of</strong> evident or absolute positivity, oraga<strong>in</strong>, with an even shorter formula, as a shift from da to selbst-da, where <strong>the</strong> first,natural da does not disappear, but becomes mit da. As we shall see, this shift, whichis constitutive for <strong>the</strong> self-be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs, is <strong>the</strong> liberation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> da-characteritself that before was, <strong>in</strong> a sense, caught <strong>in</strong> (<strong>and</strong> covered by) <strong>the</strong> straightforwardnatural stance. The beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> §24 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cartesian Meditations, 12 <strong>in</strong> whichHusserl characterizes <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> evidence, allows us to state this shift with hisown words: “Im weitesten S<strong>in</strong>ne bezeichnet Evidenz e<strong>in</strong> allgeme<strong>in</strong>es Urphänomendes <strong>in</strong>tentionalen Lebens …, die ganz ausgezeichnete Bewußtse<strong>in</strong>sweise derSelbstersche<strong>in</strong>ung, des Sich-selbst-Darstellens, des Sich-selbst-Gebens e<strong>in</strong>er Sache …im Endmodus des ‘Selbst da’, ‘unmittelbar anschaulich’, ‘orig<strong>in</strong>aliter’ gegeben”: “In<strong>the</strong> broadest sense, evidence <strong>in</strong>dicates a general orig<strong>in</strong>al phenomenon <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tentionallife …, <strong>the</strong> em<strong>in</strong>ent manner <strong>of</strong> consciousness <strong>the</strong> selfappearance,<strong>the</strong> self-position as itself, <strong>the</strong> self-giv<strong>in</strong>g as itself <strong>of</strong> a th<strong>in</strong>g … <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>almode <strong>of</strong> ‘itself da,’ ‘immediately <strong>in</strong>tuitive,’ given ‘orig<strong>in</strong>aliter’.”If it is true that Dase<strong>in</strong> implies a relation <strong>of</strong> man <strong>and</strong> world, <strong>the</strong> detachmentfrom natural Dase<strong>in</strong> must result <strong>in</strong> a transformation <strong>of</strong> this whole relation. Thetransformation that takes place, thanks to <strong>the</strong> lift-<strong>of</strong>f (or <strong>the</strong> free-throw) from <strong>the</strong>general <strong>the</strong>sis, is <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> all relations <strong>in</strong>to structures <strong>of</strong> pure <strong>in</strong>tentionality.As a consequence <strong>of</strong> this detachment, my own Dase<strong>in</strong> as a psycho-physical(i.e., animal) human be<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>in</strong>hibited <strong>in</strong> its exclusive natural validity <strong>in</strong> favor <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> open abid<strong>in</strong>g (Anwesen) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pure self-reflect<strong>in</strong>g transcendental I. In o<strong>the</strong>rwords, a sort <strong>of</strong> de-animalization takes place. The structures <strong>of</strong> pure <strong>in</strong>tentionalityarticulate <strong>the</strong> realm <strong>of</strong> evidence, which, <strong>in</strong> turn, is susta<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> evidenc<strong>in</strong>g eye<strong>of</strong> transcendental consciousness. The verb “evidenc<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong>dicates <strong>the</strong> act <strong>in</strong> whichevidence itself consists. In this sense, we say: evidence is evidenc<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> thatwhich ultimately evidences, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore is <strong>the</strong> ultimate, absolute evidence, is <strong>the</strong>pure I, that is, <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al <strong>and</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g, universally constitut<strong>in</strong>g subject. Hence,evidenc<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>the</strong> transcendental structure <strong>of</strong> natural positive acts. The transcendentalI is <strong>the</strong> absolute universal εÉdoV (eídos) for all εÇdη (eíde) as evidences. As a consequence,<strong>the</strong> relation between absolutely subjective evidenc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tentional evidenceis, <strong>in</strong> a formal sense, <strong>the</strong> same as that between <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> good <strong>and</strong> anys<strong>in</strong>gle idea <strong>in</strong> Plato. 13What exactly happens <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> shift <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> from natural to pure, from naïvely<strong>the</strong>tical to explicitly transcendental, from pre-phenomenological to phenomenological?A sufficient answer to this question requires <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first place that we fur<strong>the</strong>rcharacterize natural Dase<strong>in</strong> as it appears with<strong>in</strong> our ask<strong>in</strong>g. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> nextquestion is: What precisely does Husserl mean with “<strong>the</strong> character ‘da’”? How arewe to underst<strong>and</strong> this character borne by <strong>the</strong> entirety <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as such?12CM, pp. 58–59.13However, as far as I can see, even <strong>in</strong> this formal sense, <strong>the</strong>re rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> Plato an element that <strong>in</strong>Husserl we do not f<strong>in</strong>d, namely, <strong>the</strong> undecided relation between fύsιV (physis) <strong>and</strong> εÉdoV (eídos).
Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Da-se<strong>in</strong>: With a Suggestion for Its Interl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong>231As mentioned earlier, Husserl uses <strong>the</strong> words da, vorh<strong>and</strong>en, gegeben synonymously.However, <strong>the</strong>se words are not at all equal. In fact, gegeben says more than vorh<strong>and</strong>en,<strong>and</strong> da, <strong>in</strong> turn, says more than gegeben. If vorh<strong>and</strong>en <strong>in</strong>dicates <strong>the</strong> mere cont<strong>in</strong>gency(as a manner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> concreteness) <strong>of</strong> a th<strong>in</strong>g, 14 gegeben suggests that thisconcreteness has a provenance, that is, that it owes itself to <strong>and</strong> rests on a giv<strong>in</strong>g.However, gegeben, <strong>in</strong> turn, does not say anyth<strong>in</strong>g about <strong>the</strong> specific character <strong>of</strong> thisprovenance or <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> giv<strong>in</strong>g. This is, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, precisely what <strong>the</strong>word da does. In its primary sense, 15 <strong>the</strong> German word da <strong>in</strong>dicates <strong>the</strong> flagrantclearance (or simply <strong>the</strong> flagrancy) <strong>in</strong> which anyth<strong>in</strong>g may show itself as itself, fromitself <strong>and</strong> by itself, <strong>in</strong> which it may itself st<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> rest <strong>in</strong> its selfhood, <strong>in</strong> short, <strong>the</strong>clearance by virtue <strong>of</strong> which anyth<strong>in</strong>g (with a word <strong>of</strong> Gerald Manley Hopk<strong>in</strong>s, herem<strong>in</strong>ted anew for <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g) may itself selve. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, <strong>in</strong> daspeaks <strong>the</strong> trait <strong>of</strong> this “may” for (i.e., <strong>in</strong> favor <strong>of</strong>) selfhood, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore also <strong>the</strong>element <strong>in</strong> which someth<strong>in</strong>g like an ur-posited self-giv<strong>in</strong>g, that is, evidence, maytake place. Anticipat<strong>in</strong>g what will be shown below <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> elucidation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dimensionthat <strong>the</strong> Denkweg names Da, we can say that da, as <strong>the</strong> clearance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “may”for any show<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>dicates two orig<strong>in</strong>ally related traits: (a) pure, discont<strong>in</strong>gent(unseizable <strong>and</strong> unseiz<strong>in</strong>g) towardness or favorableness (i.e., a lik<strong>in</strong>g) with regard to<strong>the</strong> (likely) self-same abid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs; (b) <strong>the</strong> want<strong>in</strong>g truth <strong>of</strong> this towardness,namely, its (this truth’s) want <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g susta<strong>in</strong>ed (i.e., <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> turn, liked or believed)precisely <strong>in</strong> its seizelessness. Be<strong>in</strong>g, thus characterized as <strong>the</strong> liked lik<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> likely, that is, as <strong>the</strong> “may,” whose flagrant clearance is <strong>in</strong>dicated as da, can alsobe called likelihood. 16 As we shall soon see, evidence is itself likely only on <strong>the</strong>ground <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> forgottenness <strong>and</strong> unawareness <strong>of</strong> this likelihood as such, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sake (Sache) that <strong>Heidegger</strong> eventually names das Da. It is by no meansa contradiction if we say that, while evidence is likely only on <strong>the</strong> ground <strong>of</strong> thisforgottenness, this same forgottenness, once it becomes flagrant, implies <strong>the</strong> unlikelihood(Unmöglichkeit) <strong>of</strong> evidence as <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs.In <strong>the</strong> quotation from Ideas, we f<strong>in</strong>d a trace <strong>of</strong> this forgotten may-element <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>brightness <strong>and</strong> light – <strong>in</strong> this case, <strong>the</strong> natural light – <strong>of</strong> consciousness: “anyth<strong>in</strong>gconscious – Husserl says – bears <strong>the</strong> character ‘da’.” The detachment described asan <strong>in</strong>terruption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> general <strong>the</strong>sis <strong>and</strong> as <strong>the</strong> break<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> realm <strong>of</strong> apodicticevidence, liberates <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> consciousness, which, as long as it is trapped <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>natural relation <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>, rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong>visible as such. The name <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> liberated light<strong>of</strong> consciousness is: apodictically evidenc<strong>in</strong>g evidence. In <strong>the</strong> realm <strong>of</strong> evidence, <strong>the</strong>Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world is liberated <strong>in</strong>to its pure <strong>in</strong>tentional constitution, while th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gis, <strong>in</strong> turn, freed <strong>in</strong>to its highest self-reflective clarity. Both that constitution <strong>and</strong> this14On <strong>the</strong> rigorous mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “cont<strong>in</strong>gency” see below, p. 232.15The primary sense is <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g-trait that says itself <strong>in</strong> a word. This trait is <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> avariety <strong>of</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> tones, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore does not co<strong>in</strong>cide with any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>gs a dictionarymay record.16We need to keep <strong>the</strong> notion <strong>of</strong> likelihood clear both from <strong>the</strong> common <strong>and</strong> from <strong>the</strong> technical(statistical) mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> this word.
232 I. De Gennaroclarity are absolute. Hence, phenomenological epoché <strong>and</strong> reduction consist <strong>in</strong> acom<strong>in</strong>g-to-itself <strong>of</strong> transcendental subjectivity, which <strong>in</strong>itially liberates, successivelyexplores <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ally secures <strong>the</strong> pure da-character <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> whole, that is, <strong>the</strong>absolute light <strong>of</strong> consciousness <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>y appear.At this po<strong>in</strong>t, it becomes even more urgent that we ga<strong>in</strong> a sufficient <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to<strong>the</strong> da-character itself. For it is this character that <strong>the</strong> meditat<strong>in</strong>g eye becomes <strong>in</strong> acerta<strong>in</strong> manner aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ds, <strong>and</strong> that, <strong>in</strong> its pure form, is <strong>the</strong> very element <strong>of</strong>eidetic phenomenology. We said before that, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> triad <strong>of</strong> (apparent) synonymsvorh<strong>and</strong>en-gegeben-da, da is richer than gegeben, which, <strong>in</strong> turn, says more thanvorh<strong>and</strong>en. Never<strong>the</strong>less, as we shall now see, it is <strong>in</strong> fact <strong>the</strong> character “vorh<strong>and</strong>en”that will allow us to identify <strong>the</strong> decisive trait <strong>of</strong> Husserl’s underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong>re.” It can be shown that it is this character that – <strong>in</strong> a manner that is as kept frombe<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>ded as it is critical – determ<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> da-hood <strong>and</strong> thus <strong>the</strong> pureelement <strong>of</strong> evidence, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore, f<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>the</strong> entire scope <strong>of</strong> transcendental phenomenology.17 In formal terms, we will conclude that <strong>the</strong> traits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> da-characternecessarily only supplement <strong>the</strong> vorh<strong>and</strong>en-character <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> givenness thischaracter implies. Although it adds a “light” to mere Vorh<strong>and</strong>ense<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong> supplement<strong>in</strong>gis constra<strong>in</strong>ed with<strong>in</strong> this very manner <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, which rema<strong>in</strong>s, <strong>in</strong> somesense, unbroken. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, <strong>the</strong> da-character fundamentally reta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> trait <strong>of</strong>Vorh<strong>and</strong>ense<strong>in</strong>. Let us look at this matter more closely.Once aga<strong>in</strong>: What is concern<strong>in</strong>g Husserl’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g when he says: All be<strong>in</strong>gs assuch bear <strong>the</strong> character “da,” “vorh<strong>and</strong>en”? I shall tentatively, <strong>and</strong> specifically withregard to <strong>the</strong> guid<strong>in</strong>g character “vorh<strong>and</strong>en,” call this concern “(natural or pure)cont<strong>in</strong>gency.” In <strong>the</strong> present context – <strong>and</strong> it is <strong>of</strong> crucial importance that this beunderstood <strong>and</strong> kept <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d – <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> “cont<strong>in</strong>gency” is different from <strong>the</strong> traditionalphilosophical as well as from <strong>the</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> this word. Thus,cont<strong>in</strong>gency here does not refer to that which happens by chance or depends, that is,“is cont<strong>in</strong>gent,” upon someth<strong>in</strong>g else, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore is never essential. In o<strong>the</strong>rwords, “cont<strong>in</strong>gent” is not to be understood, as it is usually <strong>the</strong> case, <strong>in</strong> oppositionto “necessary,” “substantial,” or “absolute.” Instead, we now hear <strong>the</strong> word “cont<strong>in</strong>gent”(cum + tangere) as “be<strong>in</strong>g (already) contiguous, be<strong>in</strong>g (already) <strong>in</strong> contact.”Cont<strong>in</strong>gency is now <strong>the</strong> name for a manner <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>and</strong> precisely for a manner <strong>of</strong>concreteness or Wirklichkeit) that consists <strong>in</strong> a peculiar contiguity. In turn, this contiguityconsists <strong>in</strong> an impact that implies <strong>the</strong> stay<strong>in</strong>g away <strong>of</strong> what we shall callnearness. The nearness that, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sphere <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency, stays away (i.e., withholdsitself), is <strong>the</strong> open, impregnable nearness (that sways) between who man maybe <strong>and</strong> what be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong>mselves may show as. It is <strong>the</strong> nearness <strong>of</strong> this sheer “may,”that is, as we can now say, <strong>the</strong> nearness <strong>of</strong> sheer likelihood. The stay<strong>in</strong>g away means:<strong>the</strong> nearness refuses to afford itself (not “<strong>in</strong> general,” but) <strong>in</strong> its own onsett<strong>in</strong>g(anfänglich) “light,” that is, <strong>in</strong> a flagrancy claim<strong>in</strong>g to be grounded as such <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> its17Anticipat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> Section IV <strong>of</strong> this essay, we can say that <strong>the</strong> character “vorh<strong>and</strong>en”implies that <strong>the</strong> givenness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> given is cast <strong>in</strong>to cont<strong>in</strong>gency (i.e., that it is, <strong>in</strong> a manner <strong>of</strong> speak<strong>in</strong>g,“cont<strong>in</strong>gentated”) <strong>in</strong> such a way that <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al giv<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>the</strong> Es gibt) is not heard, as such, <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong>through <strong>the</strong> da.
Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Da-se<strong>in</strong>: With a Suggestion for Its Interl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong>233own right. 18 Where nearness stays away, <strong>the</strong> encounter <strong>of</strong> (cont<strong>in</strong>gent) man <strong>and</strong>(cont<strong>in</strong>gent) be<strong>in</strong>gs is a clash. This clash, which is <strong>the</strong> same as <strong>the</strong> refusal <strong>of</strong> nearness,is hidden, <strong>and</strong> this means: it shows <strong>the</strong> trait <strong>of</strong> an itself forgotten absconcedness(Verborgenheit). More precisely, <strong>the</strong> clash does not show itself as what it is,namely, that which absconcedly holds sway <strong>and</strong> attunes th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g where cont<strong>in</strong>gencyis broken, but not broken <strong>in</strong> a sufficient manner. The rigorous determ<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> this<strong>in</strong>sufficiency is: <strong>the</strong> break<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>the</strong> schism) itself does not flash (i.e., become flagrant)as such, <strong>and</strong> thus is not grounded <strong>in</strong> its own truth, that is, as <strong>the</strong> onset. 19 With referenceto <strong>the</strong> now elucidated phenomenon, we shall speak <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hidden clash (orimpact) <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency. 20 This hidden clash determ<strong>in</strong>es, <strong>in</strong> different manners, allmetaphysical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.In <strong>the</strong> doma<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>sufficiently broken cont<strong>in</strong>gency, man touches be<strong>in</strong>gs as such<strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs concern man as such, so that <strong>the</strong> two are <strong>in</strong>tertw<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> each o<strong>the</strong>r’sbe<strong>in</strong>g. However, precisely <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ter, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>-between <strong>of</strong> this <strong>in</strong>tertw<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, is <strong>in</strong>itially<strong>and</strong> ultimately consigned to <strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> self-conta<strong>in</strong>ed 21 givenness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> self-conta<strong>in</strong>ed givenness <strong>of</strong> man (e.g., man’s be<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gent subjectivity<strong>of</strong> consciousness). As a consequence, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>-between – namely, <strong>the</strong> nearnessitself – now only flashes as a character <strong>of</strong> self-conta<strong>in</strong>ed be<strong>in</strong>gs, that is, as a supplementto <strong>the</strong>ir self-conta<strong>in</strong>ed be<strong>in</strong>g. This flash<strong>in</strong>g is what our tradition knows as <strong>the</strong>light (lumen) <strong>in</strong> which be<strong>in</strong>gs appear as such, that is to say, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g or, as wemust more rigorously say, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>gness. However, <strong>the</strong> nearness that flashesfrom <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gent <strong>in</strong>tertw<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> man <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs not only refuses its own sway,it even keeps to itself this refusal as such.When we speak <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hidden impact, or clash, <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency, we are not referr<strong>in</strong>gto an ontical contact between given th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> given th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>gs. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>dicated phenomenon perta<strong>in</strong>s to <strong>the</strong> “natural” undecidedness <strong>of</strong> sense <strong>in</strong>to whichmank<strong>in</strong>d as such is cast. In <strong>the</strong> first onset <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, whence stems <strong>the</strong> metaphysicaldecision on <strong>the</strong> givenness <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore on <strong>the</strong> da-character <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>the</strong> clash <strong>of</strong>cont<strong>in</strong>gency is decided (<strong>and</strong> thus broken) <strong>in</strong> a unique manner, which, <strong>in</strong> an essentialsense, rema<strong>in</strong>s forever enigmatic. In fact, cont<strong>in</strong>gency now holds sway, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>described hidden manner, with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> schismatic decision <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> first onset <strong>of</strong>18As long as we underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “refus<strong>in</strong>g to afford itself” merely “<strong>in</strong> general,” we are underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> nearness itself as an object. The rigor <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> dimension <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-wyrd (Se<strong>in</strong>sgeschichte)consists <strong>in</strong> show<strong>in</strong>g how metaphysical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g atta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> nearness via cont<strong>in</strong>gency, namely, as <strong>the</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. See my “Own<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> Belong<strong>in</strong>gness to Be-<strong>in</strong>g,” p. 116, footnotes 3 <strong>and</strong> 4.19“Cont<strong>in</strong>gency is broken, but <strong>the</strong> break<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>the</strong> schism) is not grounded as such:” This formuladescribes <strong>the</strong> Greek onset <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> onset <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tradition <strong>of</strong> philosophy. What <strong>the</strong> Denkwegis <strong>the</strong>re to <strong>in</strong>dicate is that <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> schism’s own truth becomes both likely <strong>and</strong> a stress<strong>in</strong>gneed only <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> prompted by <strong>the</strong> Se<strong>in</strong>sfrage, whose flash<strong>in</strong>g has alreadyforethought, <strong>and</strong> thus opened, <strong>the</strong> depth <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> that th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, by itself, can never atta<strong>in</strong>.20See Ivo De Gennaro <strong>and</strong> G<strong>in</strong>o Zaccaria, Dase<strong>in</strong> : Da-se<strong>in</strong>. Tradurre la parola del pensiero(Milano: Christian Mar<strong>in</strong>otti Edizioni, 2007), p. 11. Many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> analyses <strong>of</strong> this essay are supported,precisely <strong>in</strong> what might be <strong>the</strong>ir genu<strong>in</strong>e contribution to <strong>the</strong> English Denkweg, by <strong>the</strong>attempt accomplished <strong>in</strong> this book.21“Self-conta<strong>in</strong>ed” implies: abid<strong>in</strong>g merely by impact <strong>and</strong> as an impact, without an openly susta<strong>in</strong>edschismatic decision.
234 I. De Gennaroth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g consists. This constellation can be <strong>in</strong>dicated by <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g traits, whichare critical for our attempt at clarify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> scope <strong>of</strong> transcendental phenomenology:(1) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prevail<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hidden impact <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency, <strong>the</strong> decision (i.e., <strong>the</strong>schism) as such refuses its flagrancy or open awareness, 22 <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore does not callfor an acknowledg<strong>in</strong>g human stance <strong>in</strong> this flagrancy; (2) as a result <strong>of</strong> its keep<strong>in</strong>gitself (its rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g contracted) <strong>in</strong> unawareness, <strong>the</strong> decision gives rise to a sphere<strong>of</strong> concreteness constituted as an opposition, a st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st each o<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>of</strong> man(<strong>and</strong> his th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> ga<strong>the</strong>red entirety <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>gness. This shows how<strong>the</strong> hidden impact <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency, if we underst<strong>and</strong> it as “act<strong>in</strong>g” with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> decision,decides <strong>the</strong> givenness <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> as a relational – or, <strong>in</strong> its pure form,<strong>in</strong>tentional – phenomenon. As a result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> prevail<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> this impact, <strong>the</strong> da-character<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs is precisely, as Husserl says, a character <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>and</strong> it does not cease tobe a character <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs even <strong>in</strong> its pure form. Why not? Because <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terruption <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> general <strong>the</strong>sis <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> irruption <strong>of</strong> evidence never reach back <strong>in</strong>to that whichrefuses <strong>and</strong> keeps itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial decision. On <strong>the</strong> contrary, <strong>the</strong>y are what <strong>the</strong>y areprecisely with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “sphere <strong>of</strong> decision” granted as <strong>and</strong> by this refusal.However, what exactly does it mean that da is a character <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs? It means thatthis character emanates from or, as we said, is a supplement 23 <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs that are<strong>the</strong>mselves undecided, unschismed, that is, be<strong>in</strong>gs not broken unto <strong>the</strong> tentativeclearance that consists <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> open want <strong>of</strong> a schismatic decision (a decision thatdoes not immediately concern be<strong>in</strong>gs), <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> schism itself is to be raised as<strong>the</strong> only ground. These be<strong>in</strong>gs are self-conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> that <strong>the</strong>y only deal with oneano<strong>the</strong>r, but never as <strong>the</strong>mselves. They are be<strong>in</strong>gs for whom <strong>the</strong> explicit grasp <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong>ir da-hood is but a posterior ground<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> an itself unschismatic subsist<strong>in</strong>g. Itshould be clear that, when we say “undecided,” “unschismatic,” etc., this does notimply an utter lack <strong>of</strong> decision. It ra<strong>the</strong>r means that <strong>the</strong> decision rema<strong>in</strong>s contracted<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> hidden impact <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> own light <strong>and</strong> brightness <strong>of</strong> this impact (<strong>the</strong> light thateventually becomes <strong>the</strong> lumen naturale), <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>and</strong> awareness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> schism rema<strong>in</strong> ungrounded. 2422This is not <strong>the</strong> subjective awareness <strong>of</strong> an already constituted, given th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, but, on <strong>the</strong> contrary,an awareness that onsett<strong>in</strong>gly determ<strong>in</strong>es what th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> who man may be. Awareness,here, is not a character <strong>of</strong> consciousness, but a synonym for Da (Lichtung).23In Ideas, Husserl speaks <strong>of</strong> pure consciousness as a “phenomenological [i.e. non-real] residual.”(IRP, p. 59; cf. also p. 108).24“Unschismatic” means: <strong>the</strong> schism itself (<strong>the</strong> only element <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g) is not <strong>the</strong> first sake forth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, but weirds itself unto a wyrd <strong>of</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g oblivion constituted by <strong>the</strong> “onto-schismatic”forms <strong>of</strong> philosophical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g that we encounter (but are still far from know<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir schismaticimplications) as <strong>the</strong> hi<strong>the</strong>rto determ<strong>in</strong>ations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. See my “Own<strong>in</strong>g to<strong>the</strong> Belong<strong>in</strong>gness to Be<strong>in</strong>g,” p. 135. – We know <strong>the</strong> word “weird” only as an adjective mean<strong>in</strong>g“strange, unusual.” The I.E. root that speaks <strong>in</strong> this word is *uer- “to turn, plait,” which also givesrise to <strong>the</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> vertere <strong>and</strong> to <strong>the</strong> German werden. The adjective “weird” is orig<strong>in</strong>ally a noun (O.E.“wyrd”) mean<strong>in</strong>g “<strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple, power, or agency by which events are predeterm<strong>in</strong>ed; fate, dest<strong>in</strong>y,”<strong>the</strong>n also: that which is dest<strong>in</strong>ed or fated to happen (one’s lot or dest<strong>in</strong>y), f<strong>in</strong>ally any event oroccurrence (as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> common say<strong>in</strong>g “after word comes weird”). The adjectival use stems from<strong>the</strong> “weird sisters” <strong>in</strong> Shakespeare’s Macbeth.
Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Da-se<strong>in</strong>: With a Suggestion for Its Interl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong>235Let us resume: <strong>the</strong> schismatic decision that gives rise to philosophy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense<strong>of</strong> metaphysics consists <strong>in</strong> a break<strong>in</strong>g that is <strong>in</strong> fact an abrupt refusal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>alnearness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “may.” This implies that this decision is left <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> grip <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hiddenimpact <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency. The abrupt refusal is, however, a flash<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> schismitself. This flash<strong>in</strong>g grants a sphere <strong>of</strong> brightness <strong>in</strong> which be<strong>in</strong>gs show as be<strong>in</strong>ggiven, that is, as hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir provenance <strong>in</strong> a certa<strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, or aga<strong>in</strong>, as hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ground <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir self-show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a flash<strong>in</strong>g evidence (namely, <strong>the</strong> Ædέa [idea]). Thisprovenance <strong>and</strong> this flash<strong>in</strong>g, though, are already seized <strong>in</strong> a contiguity <strong>in</strong> whichbe<strong>in</strong>gs are extant as a stock, <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r words, <strong>the</strong>se th<strong>in</strong>gs are left <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> grip <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>hidden impact <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore forsaken by <strong>the</strong> schismatic decision.Thus, <strong>the</strong> character “da,” once it is obta<strong>in</strong>ed as <strong>the</strong> evidenc<strong>in</strong>g evidence thanks to <strong>the</strong>detachment from natural cont<strong>in</strong>gency, cannot but itself reta<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> essential trait <strong>of</strong>this cont<strong>in</strong>gency, that is, it is, <strong>in</strong> turn, forsaken by <strong>the</strong> onsett<strong>in</strong>g schismatic “may.” Asa consequence, <strong>the</strong> da-character 25 <strong>of</strong> pure consciousness <strong>and</strong> eidetic <strong>in</strong>tentionality isitself absolutely cont<strong>in</strong>gent (<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> literal sense <strong>of</strong> its constitut<strong>in</strong>g an absolute cont<strong>in</strong>gency),while <strong>the</strong> pure constitution <strong>of</strong> givenness rema<strong>in</strong>s a subjective cont<strong>in</strong>gentground<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency. In ask<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> “th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong>mselves,” th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>the</strong>absolute cont<strong>in</strong>gency <strong>of</strong> evidence (<strong>the</strong> eíde qua pure possibilities), <strong>and</strong> necessarilyleaves <strong>the</strong> schismatic decision itself unthought. Why necessarily? Because <strong>the</strong>schismlessness is, as such, constitutive <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> da-character (<strong>the</strong> givenness) fromwhich <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiry sets out <strong>and</strong> which eventually it obta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> its pure form. Hence,<strong>the</strong> schism itself cannot break as <strong>the</strong> sake <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.Our provisional conclusion is that phenomenological epoché consists <strong>in</strong> adetachment from <strong>the</strong> immediacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> impact – <strong>the</strong> naïve general <strong>the</strong>sis <strong>of</strong> thatwhich appears as facts (<strong>the</strong> transcendent Zustände or “states <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs” 26 ) –, butdoes not <strong>and</strong> cannot know a sufficient detachment from <strong>the</strong> clash <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency,that is, a stance <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> flagrant schism itself. Therefore, cont<strong>in</strong>gency rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong>fundamental trait <strong>of</strong> all pure structures that are laid open <strong>in</strong> evidence. For aphenomenological critique <strong>of</strong> phenomenology, this implies that Husserl’s decisiondraws its likelihood from <strong>the</strong> forgottenness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> only orig<strong>in</strong>al decision, namely,<strong>the</strong> schism itself. Hence, <strong>the</strong> •rcή (arché) that is eventually found <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcendentalego is a cont<strong>in</strong>gent pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>and</strong> thus not capable <strong>of</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> element<strong>of</strong> self-giv<strong>in</strong>g or self-show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs, namely, <strong>the</strong> element (or dimension) Da.That which <strong>in</strong> Husserl constitutes <strong>the</strong> da-character, that is, <strong>the</strong> ultimate da-hood<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcendental self-giv<strong>in</strong>g ego (or monadic transcendental genesis), has <strong>the</strong>ground<strong>in</strong>g-character <strong>of</strong> a self-constitut<strong>in</strong>g, self-evidenc<strong>in</strong>g substance conf<strong>in</strong>ed to <strong>the</strong>(“enlightened”) sphere <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency. When Husserl says that <strong>the</strong> self-constitution<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcendental I is a reflection hav<strong>in</strong>g “<strong>the</strong> essential character <strong>of</strong> an evidentlyirremovable <strong>the</strong>sis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>,” 27 this <strong>the</strong>sis is <strong>in</strong> fact <strong>the</strong> self-position <strong>of</strong> an25da (small “d”): a character <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gent be<strong>in</strong>gs; das Da (capital “d”): <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gencyfreeelement.26IRP, p. 105.27IRP, p. 87.
236 I. De Gennaroabsolutely <strong>in</strong>dubitable cont<strong>in</strong>gency. The pure Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> transcendental phenomenologyis ultimately <strong>the</strong> self-experience <strong>of</strong> self-constitut<strong>in</strong>g selfhood <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ur-posit<strong>in</strong>gtranscendental I. In turn, <strong>the</strong> I <strong>in</strong> its evident self-experience is <strong>the</strong> absolutelycont<strong>in</strong>gent element, <strong>the</strong> stable uphold for <strong>the</strong> apodictic self-givenness, or <strong>the</strong> “Selbstda” <strong>of</strong> all <strong>in</strong>tentional objects, that is, <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> whole. Husserl’s phenomenologyis <strong>the</strong>refore an absolute transcendental self-reflection for <strong>the</strong> sake <strong>of</strong> sett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>absolute subjectivity <strong>of</strong> consciousness as <strong>the</strong> absolutely stable ground <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> absolutely evident Dase<strong>in</strong>.Before turn<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> elucidation <strong>of</strong> itscrisis-character, we can fur<strong>the</strong>r prepare this underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g by briefly consider<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g question: In what sense, if at all, does <strong>the</strong> character “da” show <strong>the</strong>trait <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>itude? Husserl’s transcendental idealism shows a trait <strong>of</strong> all post-Cartesian metaphysics <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong> fact, <strong>of</strong> metaphysics as a whole, to wit: <strong>the</strong>attempted step back from <strong>the</strong> immediacy <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency – <strong>the</strong> immediacy <strong>of</strong>τὰ fυσικά (ta physiká) – results <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> absolute cont<strong>in</strong>gency <strong>of</strong> an absolutefυσικόν (physikón), i.e., here, transcendental subjectivity as “das e<strong>in</strong>zige absoluteSeiende,” “<strong>the</strong> only absolute be<strong>in</strong>g.” 28 This step <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ally overcomeswhat <strong>the</strong> transcendental-phenomenological description <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> natural stance doesrecognize as a “f<strong>in</strong>ite” character <strong>of</strong> givenness, namely, <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> objects <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> natural world are given <strong>in</strong> Abschattungen or, as a suggested English translationsounds, “<strong>of</strong>f-shad<strong>in</strong>gs.” However, <strong>the</strong> scope <strong>of</strong> this f<strong>in</strong>iteness (“If I look atthis object from this side, I cannot at <strong>the</strong> same time see <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r sides,” etc.) isfrom <strong>the</strong> outset conta<strong>in</strong>ed with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> “horizon” (here, <strong>the</strong> horizon <strong>of</strong>potential perception), which helps to form <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> a conscious totality <strong>of</strong>perception constituted <strong>of</strong> partly dark <strong>and</strong> partly lightened regions, or, which is<strong>the</strong> same, <strong>of</strong> partly actual <strong>and</strong> partly potential perceptions. This implies that heref<strong>in</strong>iteness is merely a default <strong>of</strong> actuality, <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r words, it is not a trait <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gas such, but a privative phenomenon with<strong>in</strong> a sphere <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g uniformly determ<strong>in</strong>edas cont<strong>in</strong>gency.As a consequence, <strong>the</strong> “f<strong>in</strong>iteness” encountered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> natural da-hood can beovercome by virtue <strong>of</strong> a lift-<strong>of</strong>f that, exceed<strong>in</strong>g natural cont<strong>in</strong>gency, yields <strong>the</strong>pure region <strong>of</strong> consciousness. In fact, <strong>the</strong> lift-<strong>of</strong>f shifts <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>f-shaded “givennessto <strong>in</strong>tuition” to <strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong> Mit-da-se<strong>in</strong>, thus obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g pure da-hood. This impliesthat <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> pure consciousness does not depend on any reality. 29 In o<strong>the</strong>rwords, <strong>the</strong> immanence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcendental I knows no <strong>of</strong>f-shad<strong>in</strong>gs, that is, it isan absolute actuality. Husserl’s idea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> absolute foundation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subjectivity<strong>of</strong> consciousness is thus an idea <strong>of</strong> total apodictic evidence <strong>and</strong> clarity imply<strong>in</strong>g atotal seizure <strong>and</strong> assurance – thanks to a peculiar form <strong>of</strong> knowledge – <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>28Formale und transzendentale Logik, 1929, p. 240, quoted <strong>in</strong>: Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Zur Sache desDenkens (Tüb<strong>in</strong>gen: Niemeyer, 3 1988), p. 70 [ZSD].29“[K]e<strong>in</strong> reales Se<strong>in</strong> … ist für das Se<strong>in</strong> des Bewußtse<strong>in</strong>s selbst … notwendig.” (IRP, p. 92).
Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Da-se<strong>in</strong>: With a Suggestion for Its Interl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong>237cont<strong>in</strong>gent world, that is, <strong>of</strong> all reality or nature. 30 The possibly <strong>in</strong>adequate degree<strong>of</strong> clarity <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> necessary factual limitation <strong>of</strong> this evidence due to <strong>the</strong> essentially<strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite horizon <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcendental sphere <strong>of</strong> sense constitution does notalter <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite character <strong>of</strong> this idea. What is at <strong>the</strong> heart <strong>of</strong> Kant’s critical transcendentalism(namely, <strong>the</strong> reliance <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g on what is given <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>tuition, sothat th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g itself is at <strong>the</strong> service <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tuition), ground<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ite stance <strong>of</strong>man toward <strong>the</strong> given <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong> this sense, f<strong>in</strong>ite be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs, has f<strong>in</strong>ally no echo<strong>in</strong> Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong> reference toKant <strong>and</strong> to <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>itude may bear a clue to what arrested <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sattention, from <strong>the</strong> perspective <strong>of</strong> his own ask<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> Husserl’s concept <strong>of</strong> “categorial<strong>in</strong>tuition,” that is, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tuition <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g.3 <strong>Heidegger</strong>Let us now turn to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>. How can we make <strong>the</strong> transition?Where should we start look<strong>in</strong>g for differences <strong>and</strong> analogies? Despite <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>troductory remarks on comparison <strong>and</strong> its presuppositions, we risk once aga<strong>in</strong> t<strong>of</strong>all prey to <strong>the</strong> reflex <strong>of</strong> historical computation. However, <strong>the</strong> first th<strong>in</strong>g to be said isthat <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>in</strong> fact no likely transition from “Husserl’s” Dase<strong>in</strong> to “<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s.”The reason for this is that from with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> horizon <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> transcendentalsubjectivity, <strong>the</strong>re is no way out from <strong>the</strong> absolute cont<strong>in</strong>gency <strong>of</strong> evidence. On <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> as thought <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Denkweg is precisely this: <strong>the</strong>onsett<strong>in</strong>g, abrupt relief from cont<strong>in</strong>gency <strong>in</strong> favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> now flagrant already brokenonset that threatens <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong> a manner <strong>of</strong> speak<strong>in</strong>g, vexes itself <strong>in</strong> that <strong>and</strong> as thatcont<strong>in</strong>gency (for any manner <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency obta<strong>in</strong>s its temper from be<strong>in</strong>g itself as<strong>the</strong> onset). This implies not only cont<strong>in</strong>gency’s (hav<strong>in</strong>g already) collapse(d), but itsbe<strong>in</strong>g left to itself <strong>and</strong> thus held <strong>of</strong>f from occupy<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> impregnable onset <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. 31This is why <strong>the</strong>re is no way <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g an access to Da-se<strong>in</strong> by mov<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong>stance <strong>of</strong> transcendental phenomenology. Any step one might take from here – for<strong>in</strong>stance, by <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g a new “aspect” or an unthought-<strong>of</strong> presupposition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> evidence – cannot but lead to yet ano<strong>the</strong>r form <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency.The peculiar da-hood, for <strong>the</strong> sake <strong>of</strong> which transcendental phenomenologyth<strong>in</strong>ks, cannot know what has been called <strong>the</strong> “element Da.” In fact, it consists <strong>in</strong>this element’s keep<strong>in</strong>g itself from an awareness. The consequent unlikelihood <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> concern <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> “viewpo<strong>in</strong>t” <strong>and</strong> on <strong>the</strong>30As to <strong>the</strong> positivity <strong>of</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gent world, that is, nature as a correlate <strong>of</strong> absoluteconsciousness, is <strong>in</strong> itself noth<strong>in</strong>g. This be<strong>in</strong>g has <strong>the</strong> merely relative sense <strong>of</strong> a be<strong>in</strong>g for consciousness(form/soul/spirit/history as transcendental genesis), that is, <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>tentional be<strong>in</strong>g. Alltranscendence is conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> constituted by absolute Dase<strong>in</strong> (cf. IRP, § 85).31In all this, cont<strong>in</strong>gency rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong>elim<strong>in</strong>able.
238 I. De Gennarobasis <strong>of</strong> Husserl’s subjectivity should be borne <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d when read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sown elucidation 32 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relation between transcendental evidence <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g(Lichtung) <strong>in</strong>dicated as <strong>the</strong> com<strong>in</strong>g sake <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. In explicit reference to Husserl,<strong>Heidegger</strong> says that only <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g or openness – <strong>the</strong> Da – <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first place grantsany evidence <strong>the</strong> fair clearance (das Freie) <strong>in</strong> which it may sway. However, thishi<strong>the</strong>rto unthought openness is not to be understood as a presupposition <strong>of</strong> evidence,to wit, as a structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constitution <strong>of</strong> sense that, once it is unear<strong>the</strong>d, should beadded to <strong>the</strong> self-constitution <strong>of</strong> subjective transcendental genesis “as we know it.”It cannot be understood thus, because any presupposition <strong>of</strong> (that is, claimed by)cont<strong>in</strong>gency is necessarily itself a form <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency <strong>and</strong> can never be <strong>the</strong>cont<strong>in</strong>gency-free element that <strong>Heidegger</strong> calls Lichtung or Da.If <strong>the</strong>re is no likelihood <strong>of</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g toward Da-se<strong>in</strong> from with<strong>in</strong> a th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>transcendental Dase<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong> opposite is, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, not only likely, but has<strong>in</strong>deed already taken place. In fact, <strong>the</strong> preced<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong>evidence was entirely tuned by <strong>the</strong> hi<strong>the</strong>rto unthought Da-se<strong>in</strong>. The attempt atground<strong>in</strong>g transcendental Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> its own onset, guided by <strong>the</strong> clear forebod<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> “decision” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unknown o<strong>the</strong>r onset, has noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> common with a historiciz<strong>in</strong>gcomparison <strong>of</strong> two philosophical positions, but belongs to <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r onset itself, that is, to <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Ereignis. More specifically, it belongs tothat which <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>in</strong> Beiträge zur Philosophie, calls Zuspiel, that is, <strong>the</strong> mutual“Play<strong>in</strong>g-Forth” by which <strong>the</strong> stress<strong>in</strong>g need <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r onset is to be cleared“from out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al sett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first.” 33As little as <strong>the</strong> preced<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terpretation might have accomplished <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> thissett<strong>in</strong>g, it should help us to f<strong>in</strong>ally <strong>in</strong>dicate explicitly what <strong>the</strong> hi<strong>the</strong>rto unthoughtDa-se<strong>in</strong> consists <strong>in</strong>. For this purpose, we can refer to a brief remark concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>hyphenation <strong>of</strong> this word that <strong>Heidegger</strong> makes dur<strong>in</strong>g Eugen F<strong>in</strong>k’s 1972 sem<strong>in</strong>aron Heraclitus: “In Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, <strong>the</strong> word Dase<strong>in</strong> is written as follows: Da-se<strong>in</strong>.” 34What does <strong>the</strong> hyphenation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word Dase<strong>in</strong> mean? There is at least one read<strong>in</strong>gwe can rule out right away, namely, <strong>the</strong> one stat<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> hyphenation “stresses<strong>the</strong> da-component <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word Dase<strong>in</strong>.” We can exclude this read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as itpresupposes a given concept <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> as some form <strong>of</strong> “existence,” that is, <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency;however, stress<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> da-component <strong>of</strong> “Dase<strong>in</strong> as cont<strong>in</strong>gency” canonly result <strong>in</strong> yet ano<strong>the</strong>r form <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency, <strong>and</strong> precisely a form <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>da-character, <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gent “<strong>the</strong>re-ness” is stressed, whatever thisstress might imply <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> “existential” read<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> condition huma<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong>its supposed “horizontal openness.”What does <strong>the</strong> hyphen <strong>in</strong>dicate, if it is not <strong>the</strong> emphasis on <strong>the</strong> da-aspect <strong>of</strong> agiven sense <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> as cont<strong>in</strong>gency (i.e., as cont<strong>in</strong>gent life)? How can <strong>the</strong> hyphenatedform on <strong>the</strong> contrary <strong>in</strong>dicate, as has been anticipated, <strong>the</strong> onsett<strong>in</strong>g relief from32In his essay “The End <strong>of</strong> Philosophy <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>” (1964), <strong>in</strong> ZSD.33<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Contributions to Philosophy, p. 119 (see also p. 7); BPh, p. 169 (p. 9).34Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> – Eugen F<strong>in</strong>k, Heraklit (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970),p. 202 [H].
Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Da-se<strong>in</strong>: With a Suggestion for Its Interl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong>239cont<strong>in</strong>gency? We can answer this question by referr<strong>in</strong>g back to what has been saidon <strong>the</strong> da-character as it appears <strong>in</strong> Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology. The Da, wesaid, “<strong>in</strong>dicates <strong>the</strong> flagrant clearance <strong>in</strong> which someth<strong>in</strong>g may show itself.”Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, it has been said that precisely <strong>the</strong> contraction <strong>of</strong> this flagrancy (<strong>and</strong>thus <strong>the</strong> forgottenness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “may-element”) yields <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gent light for Husserl’sask<strong>in</strong>g for evidence as <strong>the</strong> pure “character ‘da’.” F<strong>in</strong>ally, this contraction has beenshown to consist <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> refusal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> schismatic decision as such, that is, <strong>in</strong> its refus<strong>in</strong>gto afford itself unto its own, open <strong>and</strong> want<strong>in</strong>g flagrancy <strong>and</strong> awareness. However,only <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>ed awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> schismatic decision <strong>the</strong> openness grants <strong>the</strong>selfhood for <strong>the</strong> self-show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs. The awareness, <strong>the</strong> flash<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> schism,is <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency-free clear<strong>in</strong>g toward <strong>the</strong> self-show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> that which, thanks tosuch show<strong>in</strong>g, we call “a th<strong>in</strong>g.” Hence, <strong>the</strong> hyphenation does not stress <strong>the</strong> dacomponent<strong>of</strong> a given sense <strong>of</strong> existence: on <strong>the</strong> contrary, it names – <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first place<strong>and</strong> for <strong>the</strong> first time – <strong>the</strong> element Da as <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency-free (or discont<strong>in</strong>gent)flash<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> schismatic decision that grants <strong>the</strong> broken ground (i.e., <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>f-ground[Abgrund] <strong>of</strong> time-space) for <strong>the</strong> sheltered self-show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir sphere <strong>of</strong>wholeness. More precisely still: <strong>the</strong> hyphen <strong>in</strong>dicates (ex abrupto <strong>and</strong> as an onset,not by “extract<strong>in</strong>g” it from Dase<strong>in</strong>) <strong>the</strong> element Da as <strong>the</strong> flash<strong>in</strong>g or flagrancy <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> withdraw<strong>in</strong>g schism, that is, <strong>the</strong> flagrancy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> very withdraw<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>schism itself consists.However, we might ask, what justifies <strong>the</strong> claim that a self-giv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> selfshow<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs may take place (i.e., is likely) only with<strong>in</strong> this discont<strong>in</strong>gentflash<strong>in</strong>g? And <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first place: What susta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> claim that this flash<strong>in</strong>g is discont<strong>in</strong>gent,that is, <strong>the</strong> claim that it consists <strong>in</strong> a relief from be<strong>in</strong>g as cont<strong>in</strong>gency, <strong>in</strong> anorig<strong>in</strong>al unburden<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> disencumber<strong>in</strong>g that lets th<strong>in</strong>gs ease <strong>the</strong>mselves untoshow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>mselves as <strong>the</strong>mselves, from out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>and</strong> by <strong>the</strong>mselves?What grants <strong>the</strong> collapse <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency, <strong>the</strong> deliverance from <strong>the</strong> order <strong>of</strong> “onlybe<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> da-character <strong>of</strong> a supplement<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>gness”? The likelihoodthat cont<strong>in</strong>gency might collapse rests entirely on <strong>the</strong> trait that, from <strong>the</strong> outset,we have called “schismatic decision.” We have called it thus <strong>and</strong> repeatedly <strong>in</strong>dicatedits traits. Yet, we have never asked: Does <strong>the</strong> word “decision” <strong>in</strong> fact fit, <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong>refore say, what it is supposed to say? Or does it merely st<strong>and</strong> for that whichneeds to be said? Is “(schismatic) decision” an English word <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r onset, <strong>and</strong>this means: is it <strong>the</strong> show<strong>in</strong>g-itself <strong>of</strong> that which is never a be<strong>in</strong>g, not even <strong>the</strong> highestor (as Husserl says <strong>of</strong> transcendental subjectivity) “<strong>the</strong> only absolute be<strong>in</strong>g,” butbe<strong>in</strong>g itself, that is, sheer discont<strong>in</strong>gency? As far as I can see, <strong>the</strong> answer to thisquestion is: no, it is not. From all we can say after hav<strong>in</strong>g, as it were, let <strong>the</strong> ear <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Se<strong>in</strong>sfrage try <strong>the</strong> speak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> English mo<strong>the</strong>r-language, “decision” does notsay aga<strong>in</strong> that which, <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> from out <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>, resounds <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Denkweg-wordthat it is supposed to translate, namely, Entscheidung. And if “decision” is not acommensurate word (namely, not commensurate to <strong>the</strong> ownmost word <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Englishmo<strong>the</strong>r-language tried by <strong>the</strong> soundless say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Se<strong>in</strong>sfrage), <strong>the</strong> mere addition<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> adjective “schismatic” cannot make it become one.The wanted word ought to be such that not only it does not rely on anyth<strong>in</strong>ggiven. It must be a word that <strong>in</strong>deed frees <strong>the</strong> language’s discont<strong>in</strong>gent, schismatic
240 I. De Gennarosay<strong>in</strong>g that already speaks <strong>in</strong> it. Differently put, it must be a schismatic word, thatis, a diction (as an alternative word for “word” sounds) <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> word <strong>of</strong> amo<strong>the</strong>r-language (i.e., its schismatic say<strong>in</strong>g) has already said <strong>and</strong> grounded itself,thus prepar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> store <strong>the</strong> ground for <strong>the</strong> schismatic speak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>language as a whole. The wanted word is, <strong>in</strong> this sense, a “word <strong>of</strong> words.” If “decision”is not such a word, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, all our languages must necessarily havesuch schismatic dictions. Why? Because language as such is, <strong>in</strong> its own bid<strong>in</strong>g(Wesen), <strong>the</strong> silent voice <strong>of</strong> sheer discont<strong>in</strong>gent be<strong>in</strong>g.In order to <strong>in</strong>dicate <strong>the</strong> flash<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency-free schismatic opennesstoward <strong>the</strong> un-cleared <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> yet-to-be cleared, we elect <strong>the</strong> diction “clear-cut.”This choice is not based on some l<strong>in</strong>guistic deduction, but on <strong>the</strong> forehear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to<strong>the</strong> same sake <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g that, from <strong>the</strong> outset, prompted us to speak not merely <strong>of</strong>a decision, but ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> a schismatic decision. To be sufficiently clear: we are nowsay<strong>in</strong>g that “clear-cut” is, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> English mo<strong>the</strong>r-language, a word <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same rankas “beзng” (Seyn). In “clear-cut,” we ought to hear <strong>the</strong> cut itself, as whose selfabsconc<strong>in</strong>gis generated (i.e., weirded), <strong>the</strong> clearance <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g. In this underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g,“clear-cut” may be said <strong>in</strong> answer to <strong>the</strong> Denkweg-word Ent-scheidung.Ent-scheidung, we read <strong>in</strong> Contributions to Philosophy, is <strong>the</strong> go<strong>in</strong>g-asunder thatsc<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>and</strong> thus orig<strong>in</strong>ates <strong>the</strong> clearance for that which absconces itself <strong>and</strong> is yetunentschieden, that is, un-(clear-)cut, namely, “man’s belong<strong>in</strong>gness to beзng, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>aras he is <strong>the</strong> grounder <strong>of</strong> its truth, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> weirdedness (<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> wit) <strong>of</strong> beзng (dieZugewiesenheit des Seyns) unto <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last God” (BPh, p. 88; English translationp. 61; tr. modified). 35How “weird” is this translation <strong>of</strong> Ent-scheidung? And what justifies that a word<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tradition <strong>and</strong> weight <strong>of</strong> “decision” be, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> present attempt, ab<strong>and</strong>oned <strong>in</strong>favor <strong>of</strong> a diction that seems to lack any immediate appeal? A justification can onlycome from be<strong>in</strong>g itself as “<strong>the</strong> say” (die Sage), <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as it may show that “clearcut”is what Ent-scheidung says <strong>in</strong> German, whereas “decision” merely st<strong>and</strong>s forit. As to <strong>the</strong> weirdness, a reference to <strong>the</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g metaphysics <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong>onsett<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g might help to get over <strong>the</strong> first perplexity caused by this choice.We might th<strong>in</strong>k, for <strong>in</strong>stance, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Greek words ÓroV (hóros) as it speaks <strong>in</strong>Aristotle, <strong>and</strong> kεcwrismέnon (kechôrisménon) as we hear it <strong>in</strong> Heraclitus’ fragment108 DK. In this fragment, it is said that <strong>the</strong> sojón (sophón) is pάntwn35In “clear-cut,” “clear” does not <strong>in</strong>dicate a quality <strong>of</strong> cutt<strong>in</strong>g or be<strong>in</strong>g cut (as it does <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> commonmean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> adjective “clear-cut,” which means “sharply def<strong>in</strong>ed”), but <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cutitself, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g yielded by this cut. This clear<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>the</strong>n also <strong>the</strong> ground for allEntscheidungen, for all “decisions,” which will, <strong>in</strong> turn, each time have <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g aclear-cut, that is, a cut that clears <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ei<strong>the</strong>r-or (cf. BPh, partitions 44 <strong>and</strong> 47). Here,“cut” speaks as a synonym <strong>of</strong> “schism,” both <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se words be<strong>in</strong>g translations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> DenkwegdictionUnterschied. – Concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> Seyn with beзng, note <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g: MiddleEnglish knows <strong>the</strong> letter з (“yogh”) for <strong>the</strong> sound “y” (as <strong>in</strong> “yes”). Moreover, this sign is used totranscribe “gyfu” (Proto-Germanic *gebô), which is <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Anglo-Saxon g-rune, a runemean<strong>in</strong>g “gift, generosity” (as that which susta<strong>in</strong>s [soo<strong>the</strong>s] <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> man when all be<strong>in</strong>gs fail),<strong>and</strong> whose shape is that <strong>of</strong> an “x.” For a more detailed justification <strong>of</strong> this translation <strong>of</strong> Seyn, seemy “Own<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> Belong<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>ess to Be-<strong>in</strong>g,” p. 125.
Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Da-se<strong>in</strong>: With a Suggestion for Its Interl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong>241kεcwrismέnon (pántôn kechôrisménon), that is, that which is separated or cut <strong>of</strong>ffrom <strong>the</strong> entirety <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, but not as ano<strong>the</strong>r, “absolute” be<strong>in</strong>g; <strong>in</strong> fact, tò s<strong>of</strong>ón(to sophón) is that which, <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs as such <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> whole, is <strong>the</strong> ga<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g separationor sett<strong>in</strong>g apart, <strong>the</strong> clear-cutt<strong>in</strong>g awareness that sways from out <strong>of</strong> its own openlywithdraw<strong>in</strong>g cώra (chôra) as <strong>the</strong> openness toward all clear-cut be<strong>in</strong>gs. Both ÓroV<strong>and</strong> kεcwrismέnon are not words <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g itself but “physical” words, that is, <strong>the</strong>yare dictions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. However, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se dictions resounds <strong>the</strong> unsusta<strong>in</strong>edschism that irrupts as <strong>the</strong> clearance for <strong>the</strong> clear-cut show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs, thatis, toward <strong>the</strong> show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> self-withhold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> thus be-hold<strong>in</strong>g awareness<strong>of</strong> Er-eignis.The flash<strong>in</strong>g or flagrancy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> clear-cut (i.e., <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g itself) is what<strong>the</strong> Denkweg names das Da. The word Da is now written with a capital, for it doesnot anymore speak as an adverb, but ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>dicates <strong>the</strong> withdrawn dimension fromwhich <strong>the</strong> different uses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> adverb da obta<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir mean<strong>in</strong>g, while all verbsobta<strong>in</strong> from it <strong>the</strong> nearness for <strong>the</strong>ir dis-absconc<strong>in</strong>g (entbergend) say<strong>in</strong>g. Hence, <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> hyphenated word Da-se<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong> hyphen is not a punctuation mark used to dividetwo syllables or word elements. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> hyphen is <strong>the</strong> cut (or schism) itself, <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong> first trait to be heard <strong>in</strong> this, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>deed <strong>in</strong> all hyphenated words thatwe f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs. All dictions <strong>of</strong> this th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g – first <strong>and</strong> foremost itsground<strong>in</strong>g-words (Se<strong>in</strong>, Dase<strong>in</strong>, Ereignis, Geschichte, etc.) – are schismatic wordsor “cut-words,” that is, dictions <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> discont<strong>in</strong>gency <strong>of</strong> beзng says itself <strong>in</strong>German. The clear-cut is <strong>the</strong> disencumber<strong>in</strong>g, open clear<strong>in</strong>g toward <strong>the</strong> self-giv<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs only because it is <strong>the</strong> flash<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sheer cut. The cut itself, however, isnei<strong>the</strong>r a be<strong>in</strong>g nor <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> whatever form, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>of</strong> absolutesubjective evidence. The cut is only itself: <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>wardly retreat<strong>in</strong>g sway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>orig<strong>in</strong>al “may” that onsett<strong>in</strong>gly affords itself unto – <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>deed as – <strong>the</strong> openness <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> clear-cut.If now we briefly turn back to <strong>the</strong> da-character <strong>in</strong> Husserl, we can state <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g:The natural da-hood as <strong>the</strong> immediate form <strong>of</strong> subjective consciousness thatengages phenomenological reflection; fur<strong>the</strong>r, its <strong>in</strong>terruption as <strong>the</strong> irruption orbreak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> pure evidence <strong>in</strong> phenomenological epoché; f<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite reductiveunveil<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> pure da-hood as <strong>the</strong> self-constitut<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> thus evidenc<strong>in</strong>g transcendentalI: all <strong>the</strong>se constitutive moments <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> science <strong>of</strong> phenomenology take place<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> unawareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> flagrant clear-cut unto which, from <strong>the</strong> outset, all cont<strong>in</strong>gencyhas already collapsed. Epoché <strong>and</strong> reduction are, <strong>in</strong> some sense, <strong>the</strong>mselves acut, or, as we said, a detachment from <strong>the</strong> clash<strong>in</strong>g immediacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> natural stance.However, all depends on <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>and</strong> scope <strong>of</strong> this “<strong>in</strong> some sense.” In fact, <strong>the</strong>detachment unto absoluteness – <strong>the</strong> “cut” between nature <strong>and</strong> pure consciousnessaccomplished thanks to transcendental epoché – rema<strong>in</strong>s with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> scope <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency,<strong>in</strong> that it constitutes itself as <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency <strong>of</strong> absolute subjective consciousness.This implies that <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that concerns th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g – <strong>the</strong>character “da” – owes itself to <strong>the</strong> unawareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al cut. Thus, <strong>the</strong> explicitground<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> this character <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> structures <strong>of</strong> pure consciousness enhances<strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency. In this manner, it serves its will to apodictic absoluteness<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g forgottenness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g itself.
242 I. De GennaroThe fact that Husserl th<strong>in</strong>ks <strong>the</strong> evidence <strong>of</strong> subjective cont<strong>in</strong>gency as <strong>the</strong> onlyabsolute be<strong>in</strong>g owes itself to <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> openness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cut has retreated unto<strong>the</strong> flash<strong>in</strong>g that yields <strong>the</strong> evidence <strong>of</strong> subjective consciousness. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>,<strong>the</strong> fact that for <strong>Heidegger</strong> this cut – or, as he would call it for a short time, <strong>the</strong>“ontological difference” – is <strong>the</strong> only thought, comes from <strong>the</strong> onset that tunes histh<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, to wit: <strong>the</strong> shock<strong>in</strong>g flagrancy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> absolute power <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency as <strong>the</strong>be<strong>in</strong>glessness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> man’s oblivion <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. In o<strong>the</strong>r words: if for Husserl’sth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> cut (i.e., be<strong>in</strong>g itself) refuses its own flagrancy <strong>and</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>s withheld <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> hidden impact that determ<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> natural <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> pure da-character <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs,for <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>the</strong> awareness <strong>of</strong> this very refusal is precisely that which <strong>in</strong>itiates histh<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. In fact, <strong>the</strong> flash<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> this refusal, its <strong>of</strong>fer<strong>in</strong>g an awareness that claims tobe borne as such (namely, <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>), is already <strong>the</strong> first flash<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> schism itself <strong>in</strong> its retreat<strong>in</strong>g sway, is already <strong>the</strong> clear-cut. The refusal thatrema<strong>in</strong>s unthought <strong>in</strong> Husserl’s Dase<strong>in</strong> flashes as <strong>the</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Se<strong>in</strong>sfrage. 36Dase<strong>in</strong> is, <strong>in</strong> Husserl, <strong>the</strong> relative or absolute position <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ga<strong>the</strong>red entirety <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>gs, respectively <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> natural light or <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> pure evidence <strong>of</strong> subjective consciousness.What, <strong>the</strong>n, does Dase<strong>in</strong> mean <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, if it is to be understood asDa-se<strong>in</strong>? In order to answer this question, we need to be attentive to two constitutivetraits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hyphenated Da:1. The spaciousness (Bereich) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da- as <strong>the</strong> flash<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cut – or, which is <strong>the</strong>same, as <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> beзng (Lichtung des Seyns) – is “durch und durch nichtmenschlich,” that is, “out-<strong>and</strong>-out [or: through <strong>and</strong> through] not human,” that is,“it can nei<strong>the</strong>r be determ<strong>in</strong>ed nor borne by <strong>the</strong> animal rationale <strong>and</strong> just as littleby <strong>the</strong> subject. This spaciousness is, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first place, not a be<strong>in</strong>g (…)”. 37 Thispassage br<strong>in</strong>gs us back to what has been said concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> de-animaliz<strong>in</strong>g trait<strong>of</strong> phenomenological epoché. The <strong>in</strong>terruption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> general <strong>the</strong>sis, thanks towhich <strong>the</strong> transcendental I obta<strong>in</strong>s itself <strong>in</strong> its pure form, implies that man, thatis, <strong>the</strong> psycho-physical nature, is left beh<strong>in</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense that <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that carriesout <strong>the</strong> naïve <strong>the</strong>tical acts shifts to <strong>the</strong> modality mit-da <strong>and</strong> thus becomes an<strong>in</strong>tentional object, which, <strong>in</strong> itself, is noth<strong>in</strong>g (i.e., it is only for <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tentionalconsciousness). 38 However, if we view <strong>the</strong> animality <strong>of</strong> man as his cont<strong>in</strong>gency,it appears that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> absolute subjectivity, not only someth<strong>in</strong>g like ade-animalization does not take place, but, on <strong>the</strong> contrary, <strong>the</strong> animalization <strong>of</strong> man(<strong>and</strong> thus <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency <strong>of</strong> all be<strong>in</strong>gs) is carried to a culm<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t. 39 Infact, absolute subjectivity is pure <strong>of</strong> all reality, but only because, as <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>man, it constitutes <strong>the</strong> absolute cont<strong>in</strong>gency <strong>of</strong> evidenc<strong>in</strong>g life-experience. We36The Da is itself <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>-between: not <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>-between <strong>of</strong> man (th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, but <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>between<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g itself <strong>and</strong> who man may be, <strong>and</strong> thus, eventually, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>-between toward <strong>the</strong>selv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs.37BPh, p. 490.38This po<strong>in</strong>t is crucial for <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction between <strong>the</strong> self-experience <strong>of</strong> transcendental subjectivity<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> psychological <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>of</strong> psychical acts.39This culm<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t is <strong>the</strong> computed-comput<strong>in</strong>g animality <strong>of</strong> man as historisches Tier.
Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Da-se<strong>in</strong>: With a Suggestion for Its Interl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong>243can call <strong>the</strong> reduction <strong>of</strong> man’s be<strong>in</strong>g – <strong>and</strong>, consequently, <strong>the</strong> reduction <strong>of</strong> all be<strong>in</strong>gness– to <strong>the</strong> absolute cont<strong>in</strong>gency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rational animal, “hom<strong>in</strong>ization”(Vermenschung). 40 In its modern subjective form, such hom<strong>in</strong>ization implies that<strong>the</strong> hidden clash <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency claims man himself, that is, pure consciousness,as <strong>the</strong> subjective assurance <strong>of</strong> absolute cont<strong>in</strong>gency, <strong>and</strong> thus as <strong>the</strong> warden <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>hibited selfhood. Husserl’s pure phenomenology is <strong>the</strong>refore a humanism <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> sense that it lays a transcendental subjective foundation for <strong>the</strong> absolute hom<strong>in</strong>ization<strong>of</strong> man <strong>and</strong>, as a consequence, <strong>of</strong> all be<strong>in</strong>gs. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, as weshall see, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is not anymore a humanism: <strong>in</strong> fact, <strong>the</strong> element<strong>in</strong> relation to which man may, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first place, become who he is, that is, <strong>the</strong> Da,is “out-<strong>and</strong>-out not human,” that is, not only o<strong>the</strong>r than any cont<strong>in</strong>gent man butalso o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> man, no matter how pure this be<strong>in</strong>g is thought. ThatDa-se<strong>in</strong> implies <strong>the</strong> collapse <strong>of</strong> all cont<strong>in</strong>gency is <strong>the</strong> same as say<strong>in</strong>g that, where<strong>the</strong> Da is grounded as <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> beзng, all abid<strong>in</strong>g is de-hom<strong>in</strong>ized(entmenscht).2. The ground<strong>in</strong>g-trait <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da as <strong>the</strong> flash<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> schism is its want<strong>in</strong>gness. Theverb “to want” is a prime <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>of</strong> what we have called “cut-words” or “schismaticwords,” that is, those em<strong>in</strong>ently translat<strong>in</strong>g dictions that readily, <strong>and</strong> earlierthan o<strong>the</strong>rs, translate a language unto its own word. In fact, not only does “towant” orig<strong>in</strong>ally mean: to be lack<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore to wish for; but this lack<strong>in</strong>g,<strong>in</strong> turn, rests on a more orig<strong>in</strong>al trait <strong>in</strong>dicated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> I.E. [Indo-European] base*eue (<strong>the</strong> same that speaks <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> words “wane” <strong>and</strong> “vanish”), which means “toleave, to ab<strong>and</strong>on,” that is, “to retreat, withdraw”. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, “to want”means: to desire out <strong>of</strong> a lack, which, however, is not a cont<strong>in</strong>gent deficiency (<strong>the</strong>lack<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g) that can eventually be made up for (namely, by supply<strong>in</strong>gthat someth<strong>in</strong>g). Ra<strong>the</strong>r, desir<strong>in</strong>g is here <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ward attractiveness <strong>of</strong> sheer withdraw<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> “lack” itself consists. Thus, “want<strong>in</strong>gness” is sheer withdraw<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as it withdraws <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong> such withdraw<strong>in</strong>g, needs to be susta<strong>in</strong>edas such. Therefore, when we say that <strong>the</strong> Da “wants” or “is want<strong>in</strong>g,” we are notimply<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> some mysterious entity endowed with a will <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>capacity for express<strong>in</strong>g it. Nor, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, does it mean that <strong>the</strong> Da ismiss<strong>in</strong>g from somewhere <strong>and</strong> needs to be restored or recovered from somewhereelse. The Da is <strong>in</strong>-itself want<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> that it is <strong>the</strong> flash<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cut, which, <strong>in</strong>turn, claims to be susta<strong>in</strong>ed as sheer withdraw<strong>in</strong>g. 41The cut, that is, beзng, wants to be susta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> grounded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> flash<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> itstruth, so that a th<strong>in</strong>g-borne world may come unto <strong>the</strong> open time-space <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> clearcut.In o<strong>the</strong>r words, <strong>the</strong> openness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cut requires to be suffered, borne <strong>and</strong> heldout, <strong>and</strong> thus set up <strong>in</strong> a firmness. This suffer<strong>in</strong>g firmness is a form <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong>precisely <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dicated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> se<strong>in</strong>-component <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word Da-se<strong>in</strong>. This form40Vermenschung (which, just as its opposite, i.e., Entmenschung, is a key word <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> late thirties) is not to be confused with Vermenschlichung (humanization).41This want <strong>and</strong> claim h<strong>in</strong>ts at that which provisionally may be called “<strong>the</strong> eros <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>ronset.”
244 I. De Gennaro<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, however, sways entirely <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> openness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> clear-cut, whose wantedfirmness it is. The latter po<strong>in</strong>t is crucial if we are to underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> what sense thatwhich <strong>the</strong> word Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicates “is not to be found <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> hi<strong>the</strong>rto wyrd <strong>of</strong> philosophy.”The form <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g we now ought to th<strong>in</strong>k is a suffer<strong>in</strong>g (bear<strong>in</strong>g) firmness that from<strong>the</strong> very first is formed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> openness or awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cut. It orig<strong>in</strong>ates from<strong>and</strong> bides (west) <strong>in</strong> its (i.e., <strong>the</strong> cut’s) want<strong>in</strong>g. It is native <strong>of</strong> its withdraw<strong>in</strong>g sway,<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore itself withdraw<strong>in</strong>g. In one word, it is <strong>the</strong> open cut’s own bear<strong>in</strong>g,before extant man or o<strong>the</strong>r be<strong>in</strong>gs come <strong>in</strong>to play. This allows us to see how Da-se<strong>in</strong>is a firmness or form <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, or simply: a be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> that yet it is nei<strong>the</strong>r (a given)man nor <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> (a given) man. This is what <strong>the</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g “durch und durch nichtmenschlich” implies.Man, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, comes <strong>in</strong>to play <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong> want<strong>in</strong>g cut beholds (soto speak, catches sight <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ds) a be<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> one that is claimed for ground<strong>in</strong>gits (i.e., <strong>the</strong> cut’s) openness by tak<strong>in</strong>g over <strong>the</strong> bear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> this openness, that is,Da-se<strong>in</strong>. This abruptly beheld be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as it does take on itself to bear, <strong>in</strong> itsown be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> flash<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cut, <strong>and</strong> thus grounds <strong>the</strong> ownhood <strong>of</strong> his be<strong>in</strong>g unto<strong>the</strong> belong<strong>in</strong>gness to <strong>the</strong> cut itself, we may call “man” or homo humanus. Thisimplies that man’s own be<strong>in</strong>g, that is, his k<strong>in</strong>d, is orig<strong>in</strong>ally (natively) <strong>of</strong>fered, <strong>and</strong>onsett<strong>in</strong>gly belongs to, <strong>the</strong> firmness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that we call Da-se<strong>in</strong>, whereas cont<strong>in</strong>gentman is, so to speak, cut <strong>of</strong>f from <strong>the</strong> ground <strong>of</strong> his own be<strong>in</strong>g, so that it is neverdecided nor decidable by man himself whe<strong>the</strong>r or not (<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> what manner) he f<strong>in</strong>dsan access to his own k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>and</strong> thus to his ownhood <strong>and</strong> selfhood. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>,beзng wants man to take a stance <strong>in</strong> his k<strong>in</strong>d, <strong>and</strong> thus beholds <strong>the</strong> “may be,” that is,man’s likelihood, from out <strong>of</strong> its (i.e., beзng’s) own want<strong>in</strong>g openness.An explicat<strong>in</strong>g translation <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> now reads as follows: bear<strong>in</strong>g (suffer<strong>in</strong>g,ek-sist<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>the</strong> flash<strong>in</strong>g (or <strong>the</strong> openness) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cut or schism (i.e., beзng) <strong>in</strong> itsown truth. However, a rigorous underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> this word starts with <strong>the</strong> hyphenas Da-se<strong>in</strong>’s most onsett<strong>in</strong>g trait. This results <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g translation: Da-se<strong>in</strong>,that is, <strong>the</strong> onsett<strong>in</strong>g cut engender<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> openness <strong>of</strong> beзng’s truth, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>re<strong>in</strong> abear<strong>in</strong>g firmness, to which is ab <strong>in</strong>itio <strong>of</strong>fered man-k<strong>in</strong>d’s openness- <strong>and</strong> truthsusta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gownhood. This read<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ally allows us to seize <strong>the</strong> unique sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>word “existence” as it speaks <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time. “Exist<strong>in</strong>g” – <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> man <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as he is onsett<strong>in</strong>gly translated <strong>in</strong>to Da-se<strong>in</strong> – means: bear<strong>in</strong>g out(“st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g”) <strong>and</strong> thus sett<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>the</strong> weird openness (<strong>the</strong> estrang<strong>in</strong>g “ek”) <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gitself. “Exist<strong>in</strong>g” means “ek-sist<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong> this rigorous sense. If, on <strong>the</strong> contrary, weunderst<strong>and</strong> “exist<strong>in</strong>g” as <strong>the</strong> peculiar manner <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gent, given man,“everyth<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time has been ga<strong>in</strong>ed as a new position is irrecoverablylost.” 42Da-se<strong>in</strong> thus shows as <strong>the</strong> ground for a transformation <strong>of</strong> man’s be<strong>in</strong>g from itsbe<strong>in</strong>g constra<strong>in</strong>ed to implement<strong>in</strong>g absolute subjective cont<strong>in</strong>gency to its tak<strong>in</strong>g on42H, p. 202.
Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Da-se<strong>in</strong>: With a Suggestion for Its Interl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong>245<strong>the</strong> attendance on beзng <strong>in</strong> man’s Da-bear<strong>in</strong>g k<strong>in</strong>d. 43 Moreover, Da-se<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar asit is taken on <strong>in</strong> man’s belong<strong>in</strong>g existence, is <strong>the</strong> grounded spaciousness toward <strong>the</strong>com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> self-giv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> concrete wholeness <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs. This leads us to conclusivelycontrast, as an exercise <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mutual play<strong>in</strong>g-forth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>ronset <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>:In Husserl, Dase<strong>in</strong> means “be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>the</strong>re.” In its pure form, this <strong>in</strong>dicates anabsolute transcendental cont<strong>in</strong>gency (-se<strong>in</strong>) characterized by <strong>the</strong> trait <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>reness(da-), that is, a cut-less doma<strong>in</strong> constituted as a potentially <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite radius <strong>of</strong>evidence enlightened by <strong>the</strong> rays <strong>of</strong> consciousness irradiat<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> evidenc<strong>in</strong>gpole <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> absolutely cont<strong>in</strong>gent monadic I (Ego). 44In <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Dase<strong>in</strong> – heard <strong>and</strong> written as Da-se<strong>in</strong> – means “<strong>the</strong>re-be<strong>in</strong>g.”This <strong>in</strong>dicates <strong>the</strong> want<strong>in</strong>g openness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cut or schism (Da-) as <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial concern<strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, which (this cut), <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as it is grounded <strong>in</strong> its own bear<strong>in</strong>gness(-se<strong>in</strong>) by a man-k<strong>in</strong>d that underst<strong>and</strong>s itself as onsett<strong>in</strong>gly belong<strong>in</strong>g to it, maybecome <strong>the</strong> open ground toward <strong>the</strong> fair self-show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> selv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> ath<strong>in</strong>g-borne world.There is no external viewpo<strong>in</strong>t whence <strong>the</strong>se two phenomena may become visible.In fact, Dase<strong>in</strong> as absolute subjective cont<strong>in</strong>gency becomes visible only for a th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gthat has taken a stance <strong>in</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> as <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ite ground <strong>of</strong> beзng shed <strong>in</strong>-between allth<strong>in</strong>gs toward <strong>the</strong>ir likely show<strong>in</strong>g. Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as it grounds <strong>the</strong> openness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> schism<strong>and</strong> thus has already broken <strong>the</strong> absoluteness <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency, Da-se<strong>in</strong> is “die Krisiszwischen dem ersten und dem <strong>and</strong>eren Anfang,” “<strong>the</strong> crisis between <strong>the</strong> first <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r onset.” However, “crisis” now means: <strong>the</strong> flash<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> schism itself, that is,<strong>the</strong> clear-cut <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> prevail<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> as cont<strong>in</strong>gency, <strong>and</strong> with it <strong>the</strong> metaphysicalstance, have already collapsed unto unlikelihood.4 M<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> EnglishHow are we to <strong>in</strong>dicate, <strong>in</strong> English, <strong>the</strong> sake that <strong>the</strong> Denkweg calls Da-se<strong>in</strong>?It seems strange we should ask this question after hav<strong>in</strong>g just declared that <strong>the</strong>English translation <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> reads “<strong>the</strong>re-be<strong>in</strong>g.” However, this word is as yetlittle more than a compound formed ra<strong>the</strong>r mechanically on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> elucidation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German word it is supposed to render. The simple mechanics consists <strong>in</strong>equat<strong>in</strong>g da <strong>and</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re,” <strong>and</strong> se<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>and</strong> assum<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> English components must, with some level <strong>of</strong> approximation, yield an equivalent43The thus obta<strong>in</strong>ed man-k<strong>in</strong>d is itself neutral <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> precise sense that, be<strong>in</strong>g grounded <strong>in</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>,it wants gender, that is, it always already wants man as an en-gendered be<strong>in</strong>g. Here is <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>,<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Se<strong>in</strong>sgeschichte, <strong>of</strong> what we know as “human gender” (“male,” “female”). One<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> places <strong>in</strong> which <strong>Heidegger</strong> treats <strong>the</strong> gender-want<strong>in</strong>g neutrality <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> is his 1928 lecturecourse E<strong>in</strong>leitung <strong>in</strong> die Philosophie, GA 27 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996).44This pole is <strong>the</strong> yoke that subjugates <strong>the</strong> cut <strong>and</strong> its flash<strong>in</strong>g.
246 I. De Gennaroexpression to that which results from <strong>the</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German parts. What,however, is <strong>the</strong> likelihood <strong>of</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re-be<strong>in</strong>g” as a word <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> English mo<strong>the</strong>r-language<strong>and</strong>, more precisely, as an English “word <strong>of</strong> words”? Not only have we notasked this question. In fact, we have just about prepared <strong>the</strong> ground on which thisquestion becomes compell<strong>in</strong>g. This ground is Da-se<strong>in</strong> itself as an echo <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> stress<strong>of</strong> Se<strong>in</strong>svergessenheit <strong>and</strong> Se<strong>in</strong>sverlassenheit, that is, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-obliviousness <strong>of</strong>man <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>glessness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. Both <strong>the</strong> want for an English diction that saysDa-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> capacity for test<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, a likely English translation, canonly come from <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> bear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> this stress.Suppos<strong>in</strong>g we wanted to follow a “literal” approach <strong>in</strong> order to f<strong>in</strong>d this Englishdiction, we could, much as we apparently did <strong>in</strong> first suggest<strong>in</strong>g a translation, proceedby analogy to German <strong>and</strong> start from <strong>the</strong> verb dase<strong>in</strong>. This verb yields <strong>the</strong> nounDase<strong>in</strong>, which f<strong>in</strong>ally allows <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>. The analogous Englishsequence would read: be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>re – (<strong>the</strong>) be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>the</strong>re – ???. The three questionmarks <strong>in</strong>dicate that it is <strong>in</strong> fact not clear how <strong>the</strong> German sequence could be “replicated”so as to produce a hyphenated word mirror<strong>in</strong>g Da-se<strong>in</strong>. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, ifwe <strong>in</strong>vert <strong>the</strong> order <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> parts, we obta<strong>in</strong> a differentiation that seems to respond to<strong>the</strong> manner <strong>in</strong> which Da-se<strong>in</strong> speaks <strong>in</strong> German. But aga<strong>in</strong>, is this a translation? Asa matter <strong>of</strong> fact, <strong>the</strong> question comes too late. Why? Because what is ra<strong>the</strong>r thoughtlesslycalled a “literal translation” simply cannot yield a sufficient English say<strong>in</strong>g.It cannot do so because “literal” translat<strong>in</strong>g operates on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “letter”<strong>in</strong>tended as a marker <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency (<strong>in</strong> this case, <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>formationalcontent). However, just as Da-se<strong>in</strong>, as a schismatic diction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Denkweg, isnot obta<strong>in</strong>ed on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency (i.e., by modify<strong>in</strong>g 45 <strong>the</strong>sense <strong>of</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>gency that this word <strong>in</strong>dicates), a “literal” transposition <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>to English (i.e., “be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>the</strong>re”) cannot provide <strong>the</strong> basis for an English say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>Da-se<strong>in</strong> as “<strong>the</strong> crisis between <strong>the</strong> first an <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r onset.”An English translation <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> can only come from <strong>the</strong> own say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>English language. In order to attempt this translation, <strong>in</strong> what follows, I shall take apath that <strong>in</strong>itially might appear as be<strong>in</strong>g itself merely “l<strong>in</strong>guistic.” It will howeversoon become clear that it is not. The attempt asks: What does (silently) resoundwhen <strong>the</strong> English language says “<strong>the</strong>re”? Whence are we to obta<strong>in</strong> a clear-cut directivefor hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> this diction? Can “<strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>re” f<strong>in</strong>ally translate das Da,<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> what sense?Da <strong>and</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re” are <strong>the</strong> same word, yet <strong>the</strong>y have different mean<strong>in</strong>gs. For <strong>in</strong>stance,as an adverb, da means both “here” (“<strong>in</strong> this place”) <strong>and</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re” (“<strong>in</strong> that place”).However, we know that <strong>the</strong> Da <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Denkweg is not obta<strong>in</strong>ed by transform<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>adverb da <strong>in</strong>to a noun. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> Da <strong>in</strong>dicates a dimension which is <strong>the</strong> withdrawnsource for all recorded mean<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> da, but also for its peculiar tone <strong>and</strong> its uniquecapacity for open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> spaciousness <strong>of</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g. As a consequence, a translation – <strong>and</strong>this implies: a schismatic diction – cannot be obta<strong>in</strong>ed by comb<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g as many as possible<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recorded mean<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> traits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German word. In fact, if it is true thatda means both “here” <strong>and</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re,” on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong> das Da does not mean both “<strong>the</strong>45…or <strong>in</strong> any way act<strong>in</strong>g upon…
Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Da-se<strong>in</strong>: With a Suggestion for Its Interl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong>247here” <strong>and</strong> “<strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>re,” nor <strong>the</strong> “horizontal space” <strong>of</strong> all “heres” <strong>and</strong> “<strong>the</strong>res” (or even,<strong>in</strong> addition, <strong>of</strong> all “nows” <strong>and</strong> “<strong>the</strong>ns”). Instead, das Da says <strong>the</strong> want<strong>in</strong>g openness <strong>and</strong>clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> schism as <strong>the</strong> irruption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al time-play-space (i.e., <strong>the</strong> truth)<strong>of</strong> beзng toward all likely th<strong>in</strong>g-borne “world-heres” <strong>and</strong> “world-<strong>the</strong>res,” “worldnows”<strong>and</strong> “world-<strong>the</strong>ns,” “world-thats” <strong>and</strong> “world-hows” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> whole.In fact, <strong>the</strong> earlier <strong>in</strong>dication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> guid<strong>in</strong>g sense <strong>of</strong> da (see above, p. 231) wasby no means <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> privileg<strong>in</strong>g or “generaliz<strong>in</strong>g” one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>gs that <strong>the</strong>dictionary records for <strong>the</strong> word da. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, it resulted from elect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al trait<strong>of</strong> its say<strong>in</strong>g. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> question is whe<strong>the</strong>r or not an equally orig<strong>in</strong>al say<strong>in</strong>gspeaks <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> English word “<strong>the</strong>re,” <strong>in</strong>dependently <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> degree to which this word“covers <strong>the</strong> semantic field” <strong>of</strong> da.Even at a superficial glance at <strong>the</strong> different uses <strong>of</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re,” one is stricken by <strong>the</strong>s<strong>in</strong>gular role this word plays <strong>in</strong> English. Much as da does <strong>in</strong> German, but even moreso, “<strong>the</strong>re” seems to speak everywhere <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> English language <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong> a sense, touphold its say<strong>in</strong>g as a whole. How can this be demonstrated? Answer: it cannot, norneed it be. In fact, here is <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t where it must show that <strong>the</strong> path we are follow<strong>in</strong>gis not a “l<strong>in</strong>guistic” one. This is why, ra<strong>the</strong>r than list<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> illustrat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> uses<strong>of</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re” <strong>in</strong> view <strong>of</strong> reconstruct<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> s<strong>in</strong>gularity <strong>of</strong> its role <strong>and</strong> scope as a sum <strong>of</strong>semantic <strong>and</strong> grammatical elements, I shall <strong>in</strong>stead <strong>in</strong>dicate <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al trait <strong>of</strong> thisword, which is, so to speak, responsible for its unique status. Aga<strong>in</strong>, it should beborne <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that this trait is not obta<strong>in</strong>ed by some <strong>in</strong>ductive or generaliz<strong>in</strong>g procedure,but strictly by forehear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> sake that <strong>the</strong> Denkweg names das Da. Ino<strong>the</strong>r words, that which authorizes <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dication <strong>of</strong> this trait is not a “l<strong>in</strong>guisticargument,” but <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Se<strong>in</strong>sfrage. 46The ground<strong>in</strong>g-trait that speaks <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> English word “<strong>the</strong>re” is <strong>the</strong> trait <strong>of</strong> sooth<strong>in</strong>gclearance.What does this mean?The foresight on <strong>the</strong> sake named das Da implies that what has been <strong>in</strong>dicated as“clearance” does not concern <strong>the</strong> appear<strong>in</strong>g, nor even “<strong>the</strong> appear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> appear<strong>in</strong>g,”<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> clearance refers to be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> to be<strong>in</strong>g only (i.e., to <strong>the</strong>only beзng), without any reference to be<strong>in</strong>gs. “Sooth,” <strong>in</strong> turn, means as much as“truth,” but aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> beзng, <strong>and</strong> more precisely still, this truth <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as itcalls for a ground<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> order for it to sway as <strong>the</strong> sooth<strong>in</strong>g (wholeness-grant<strong>in</strong>g)openness toward world <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs. Hence, “<strong>the</strong>re” as a name <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>-itself-want<strong>in</strong>gsooth<strong>in</strong>g-clearance says <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al openness <strong>and</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g (i.e., free<strong>in</strong>g, unburden<strong>in</strong>g,disencumber<strong>in</strong>g) unto which comes <strong>the</strong> sooth <strong>of</strong> beзng, so as to f<strong>in</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> thisopenness, <strong>the</strong> ground for its own bidance (Wesung).46This is not to authoritatively <strong>in</strong>voke some mysterious “voice <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g” issu<strong>in</strong>g directives to <strong>the</strong>ear <strong>of</strong> those who, be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> quest for be<strong>in</strong>g, are “elected” to receive <strong>the</strong>m. In fact, what <strong>the</strong> preced<strong>in</strong>gsentences articulate reflects <strong>the</strong> most elementary notion <strong>of</strong> what language <strong>and</strong> speak<strong>in</strong>g are. To thisnotion belongs <strong>the</strong> fact that a language does not say what it says by virtue <strong>of</strong> some natural or artificial,“magical” or “pragmatic” impr<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g, but thanks to an <strong>in</strong>ner (<strong>and</strong> just as well outer) sourcethat is not this language itself. <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>, <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong> a different manner, poetry, speak <strong>the</strong>ir language at<strong>the</strong> limit, namely, at <strong>the</strong> limit whence this language draws its capacity for say<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> speechlesstune <strong>of</strong> beзng. In fact, what poetry <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g have to say is precisely this tune, whichsilently tunes a language as such.
248 I. De GennaroWhat has just been said prepares <strong>the</strong> decisive <strong>in</strong>dication for measur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>astound<strong>in</strong>g uniqueness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> English word “<strong>the</strong>re.” In fact, this word, more dist<strong>in</strong>ctlythan <strong>the</strong> German da, already says <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> beзng <strong>in</strong> its relation to man,<strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as this sooth<strong>in</strong>g truth bears <strong>in</strong> itself <strong>the</strong> need for an assent<strong>in</strong>g, acknowledg<strong>in</strong>gbe<strong>in</strong>g that soothfastly grounds it. In what sense? In <strong>the</strong> sense that – as we can, onceaga<strong>in</strong>, only m<strong>in</strong>d <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicate, but never demonstrate – <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> diction “<strong>the</strong>re” silentlyspeaks, as its ground<strong>in</strong>g-trait, <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re is.” The fact that <strong>the</strong> dictionary records <strong>the</strong>expression “<strong>the</strong>re is” as one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> locutions <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> adverb “<strong>the</strong>re,” so that itwould seem that, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first place, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> word “<strong>the</strong>re” with its mean<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong>only <strong>the</strong>n, as a phrase that can be formed with this word, <strong>the</strong> expression “<strong>the</strong>re is,”does by itself not contradict <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>sight that <strong>the</strong> sake named “<strong>the</strong>re is” is <strong>in</strong> fact <strong>the</strong>ground<strong>in</strong>g-trait <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word “<strong>the</strong>re.” In fact, <strong>the</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g “<strong>the</strong>re is” explicitly names<strong>the</strong> silent orig<strong>in</strong>al trait <strong>of</strong> “<strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>re.” The consequence <strong>of</strong> this <strong>in</strong>sight is that, whenwe m<strong>in</strong>t “<strong>the</strong>re” as a translation <strong>of</strong> das Da, we explicitly form it as <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re” <strong>in</strong>which speaks, as its ground<strong>in</strong>g-trait, <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re is,” <strong>in</strong> short, we form it as <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re”<strong>of</strong> (i.e., deriv<strong>in</strong>g from) <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re is.”Meanwhile we have <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>the</strong> phrase “<strong>the</strong>re is” as if its sense were obvious.Yet, what <strong>the</strong> ear <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Se<strong>in</strong>sfrage has shown concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> word “<strong>the</strong>re” alreadybears an echo <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> own say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re is.” Here, we must limit ourselves toa succ<strong>in</strong>ct <strong>in</strong>dication. “There is” <strong>in</strong> some sense corresponds to <strong>the</strong> German es gibt<strong>and</strong> es ist, as well as to <strong>the</strong> French il y a. The phrase es gibt has a prom<strong>in</strong>ent role<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s 1962 lecture Zeit und Se<strong>in</strong>. This text <strong>in</strong>dicates <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>and</strong> provenance<strong>of</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>and</strong> “time,” soo<strong>the</strong>d <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir most onsett<strong>in</strong>g trait, from out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Es gibt (Es gibt Se<strong>in</strong>; Es gibt Zeit). In turn, <strong>the</strong> Es (written with a capital) says <strong>the</strong>sake <strong>the</strong> Denkweg has come to name Ereignis. Es gibt says <strong>the</strong> same as dasEreignis ereignet. Therefore, if we were to analyze es gibt <strong>and</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re is” by means<strong>of</strong> a formal analogy, we would have to conclude that, if “is” corresponds to gibt(or ist), “<strong>the</strong>re,” <strong>in</strong> turn, corresponds to es, so that “<strong>the</strong>re” would actually say <strong>the</strong>same as Ereignis.Indeed, <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re” we are m<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g as a translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Da does say <strong>the</strong> sameas Ereignis – as does <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re is,” which translates Es gibt. However, this result isnot satisfy<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> that it seems to conflate Da <strong>and</strong> Ereignis <strong>in</strong> a s<strong>in</strong>gle English word.On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, if it may well be strik<strong>in</strong>g to f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong> English “<strong>the</strong>re” to speak <strong>in</strong>this manner, we can certa<strong>in</strong>ly not be utterly surprised. In fact, <strong>the</strong> same as can besaid <strong>of</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re” – namely, that it says Ereignis – also holds true for Da <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong>ano<strong>the</strong>r sense, for Da-se<strong>in</strong>. We must however avoid to confuse this sameness with aformal identity or with <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>se words are <strong>in</strong>terchangeable. In fact, ano<strong>the</strong>rmanner <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g this sameness is: <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re” (as well as <strong>the</strong> Da) absconcedlybears <strong>in</strong> itself <strong>the</strong> say <strong>of</strong> Ereignis, namely, <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re is,” where “is” is <strong>the</strong> verb <strong>of</strong>beзng (so that, <strong>in</strong> fact, we should write not “is” but “зs”). This means that <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> Ereignis makes explicit, <strong>and</strong> grounds as such, <strong>the</strong> absconced sense <strong>of</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re”viz. da. What rema<strong>in</strong>s most strik<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>the</strong> s<strong>in</strong>gular manner <strong>in</strong> which Ereignis speaks<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re.” This s<strong>in</strong>gularity, which clearly sc<strong>in</strong>ds “<strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>re” from its Germancognate das Da, is <strong>in</strong>dicated by <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re is” as its silently tun<strong>in</strong>g tune.
Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Da-se<strong>in</strong>: With a Suggestion for Its Interl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong>249The follow<strong>in</strong>g traits characterize “<strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>re” as a translation <strong>of</strong> das Da that bears<strong>in</strong> a unique (which always implies, untranslatable) manner <strong>the</strong> say <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sake that<strong>the</strong> Denkweg has brought to <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> our mo<strong>the</strong>r-languages:1. As we have already seen, “<strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>re” orig<strong>in</strong>ally speaks from <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re is” (whichsilently tunes it). In turn, <strong>the</strong> “is” <strong>in</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re is” does not <strong>in</strong>dicate mere cont<strong>in</strong>gency(clash<strong>in</strong>g extancy, “existence”), but, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> most un-emphatic manner, beзngitself <strong>in</strong> its sheer schismatic giv<strong>in</strong>gness, 47 that is, <strong>in</strong> its afford<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> openness for<strong>the</strong> cross<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> strife <strong>of</strong> world <strong>and</strong> earth <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> counter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> gods <strong>and</strong> mortals.48 This giv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> afford<strong>in</strong>g has <strong>the</strong> trait <strong>of</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g itself from show<strong>in</strong>g (i.e.,from disabsconc<strong>in</strong>g itself), <strong>in</strong> short, it has <strong>the</strong> trait <strong>of</strong> withdraw<strong>in</strong>g. Such selfwithhold<strong>in</strong>ggiv<strong>in</strong>g, such <strong>in</strong>-itself withdraw<strong>in</strong>g afford<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> a fair spaciousness iswhat <strong>Heidegger</strong> calls schicken, we say: to weird. Such weird<strong>in</strong>g (i.e., <strong>the</strong> trait <strong>of</strong>Geschichte as Geschick) characterizes both <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re is” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re” itattunes. Hence, “<strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>re” may now be determ<strong>in</strong>ed as <strong>the</strong> break<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> timeplay-space<strong>of</strong> beзng, or aga<strong>in</strong>, as <strong>the</strong> weird openness <strong>of</strong> beзng toward <strong>the</strong> selv<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> world-ga<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>gs. This towardness def<strong>in</strong>es, on <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> beзng as a“thorough-fare” for world <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs, that which logical-l<strong>in</strong>guistic analysisrecognizes as <strong>the</strong> “preparatory” (or “anticipat<strong>in</strong>g”) character <strong>of</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re (is)” (its“com<strong>in</strong>g before”). The weirdness <strong>of</strong> “<strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>re” is <strong>the</strong> first sense <strong>in</strong> which, whenwe say “<strong>the</strong>re,” we are already imply<strong>in</strong>g a relation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> thus named dimensionto <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> man.2. The “<strong>the</strong>re (is)” is <strong>the</strong> “clear<strong>in</strong>g by absconcement” that constitutes <strong>the</strong> withheldschismatic nearness toward all cleared (clear-cut) abid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> dis-abid<strong>in</strong>g (i.e.,Anwesen <strong>and</strong> Abwesen). As such it bears, <strong>and</strong> grounds <strong>in</strong> its truth, that whichorig<strong>in</strong>ally likes all bid<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> short, <strong>the</strong> likelihood. Logical analysis records thistrait <strong>in</strong> phrases such as “<strong>the</strong>re is no say<strong>in</strong>g…,” where <strong>the</strong> negated “<strong>the</strong>re is”implies “impossibility.” While <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> beзng as likelihood is <strong>in</strong> itself light<strong>and</strong>soundless, beзng weirds itself unto <strong>the</strong> openness <strong>of</strong> light-<strong>and</strong>-sound, whoseunity is a temper, that is, a grounded truth <strong>of</strong> likelihood itself, <strong>and</strong> thus (thisweird temper is) <strong>the</strong> likely sphere toward <strong>the</strong> show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> schismaticuniqueness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir sense.There’s a certa<strong>in</strong> Slant <strong>of</strong> light,W<strong>in</strong>ter Afternoons—That oppresses, like <strong>the</strong> HeftOf Ca<strong>the</strong>dral Tunes—Heavenly Hurt, it gives us—We can f<strong>in</strong>d no scar,But <strong>in</strong>ternal difference,Where <strong>the</strong> Mean<strong>in</strong>gs, are—47By virtue <strong>of</strong> this un-emphatic <strong>in</strong>dication, we can say that, <strong>in</strong> turn, beзng is <strong>the</strong> sheer emphasis <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re is,” where “emphasis” means “<strong>the</strong> implicit, absconcedly tun<strong>in</strong>g say.”48On <strong>the</strong> cross<strong>in</strong>g, see, for example, partition 8 <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s treatise Bes<strong>in</strong>nung.
250 I. De GennaroNone may teach it—Any—‘Tis <strong>the</strong> Seal Despair—An imperial afflictionSent us <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Air—When it comes, <strong>the</strong> L<strong>and</strong>scape listens—Shadows—hold <strong>the</strong>ir breath—When it goes, ‘tis like <strong>the</strong> DistanceOn <strong>the</strong> look <strong>of</strong> Death— 49The likelihood <strong>of</strong> “<strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>re” as <strong>the</strong> openness for all sense <strong>and</strong> thus as <strong>the</strong> groundfor <strong>the</strong> gift <strong>of</strong> ensconced abid<strong>in</strong>g, is <strong>the</strong> second sense <strong>in</strong> which, when we say “<strong>the</strong>re,”we are already imply<strong>in</strong>g a relation <strong>of</strong> this dimension to <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> man.3. The “<strong>the</strong>re” as <strong>the</strong> bid<strong>in</strong>g, weird openness <strong>and</strong> clearance is sooth<strong>in</strong>g. This means:it is <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> beзng grounded unto <strong>the</strong> open, so that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re” resounds <strong>the</strong>silently sooth<strong>in</strong>g word <strong>of</strong> beзng itself. The trait <strong>of</strong> sooth<strong>in</strong>gness implies <strong>the</strong>“encouragement” that beзng itself is <strong>in</strong> its truth. In what sense? In <strong>the</strong> sense thatbeзng itself as sheer over-com<strong>in</strong>gness restores or regenerates <strong>the</strong> world <strong>in</strong> itsdis-absconc<strong>in</strong>g mirror-play <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ensconced selv<strong>in</strong>g, but (it sorestores) never before over-turn<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> thus free<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> own be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> man unto<strong>the</strong> absconced provenance <strong>of</strong> such over-com<strong>in</strong>g. By virtue <strong>of</strong> this overcom<strong>in</strong>gness“by” <strong>and</strong> “through” <strong>the</strong> own be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> man all abid<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>in</strong> turn regeneratedunto its own measure <strong>and</strong> allay. The semantic analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word “<strong>the</strong>re” recordsthis sense <strong>of</strong> sooth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terjectional uses <strong>of</strong> this adverb as well as <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> verb “to <strong>the</strong>re-<strong>the</strong>re,” mean<strong>in</strong>g “to soo<strong>the</strong> or comfort by say<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se words(i.e., ‘<strong>the</strong>re-<strong>the</strong>re’).”However, this trait <strong>of</strong> sooth<strong>in</strong>gness implies a fur<strong>the</strong>r trait, <strong>the</strong> need for ano<strong>the</strong>rk<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> sooth<strong>in</strong>g that must now be made explicit. It is <strong>the</strong> sooth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> assent<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>of</strong>fers a firmness <strong>and</strong> stead<strong>in</strong>ess, that is, a susta<strong>in</strong>ed ground to <strong>the</strong>sooth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> which beзng itself consists. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, implicit <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sooth<strong>in</strong>gness,whose openness is <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re,” is a be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rigorous sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> out-bear<strong>in</strong>gsoothfastness that is own to <strong>the</strong> bidance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> beзng grounded unto itsopenness. This soothfastness is a manner <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (e<strong>in</strong>e Weise zu se<strong>in</strong>), <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> thissense a be<strong>in</strong>g (e<strong>in</strong> Seiendes). As a consequence, <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re” (<strong>in</strong> which speaks <strong>the</strong>“<strong>the</strong>re is” <strong>of</strong> Ereignis) always already 50 bears this wanted soothfastness as a be<strong>in</strong>gthat may be owned by man <strong>in</strong> a regenerat<strong>in</strong>g over-turn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> his be<strong>in</strong>g. This (to-beowned)be<strong>in</strong>g, where<strong>in</strong>, by virtue <strong>of</strong> Ereignis, <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> beзng f<strong>in</strong>ds its ground,may <strong>the</strong>refore be named “<strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>re-be<strong>in</strong>g.” In accordance with <strong>the</strong> two senses <strong>of</strong>“be<strong>in</strong>g,” “<strong>the</strong>re-be<strong>in</strong>g” is to be read both <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>of</strong> “house-keep<strong>in</strong>g” (or“sooth-say<strong>in</strong>g”) <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> that <strong>of</strong> “(an) earth-be<strong>in</strong>g”.The <strong>in</strong>sight that susta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> this diction is that, when we say “<strong>the</strong>re”(<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re is”) we are already say<strong>in</strong>g “ <strong>the</strong>re
Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Da-se<strong>in</strong>: With a Suggestion for Its Interl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong>251<strong>of</strong> beзng <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as it wants <strong>the</strong> assent<strong>in</strong>g soothfastness <strong>of</strong> a> be<strong>in</strong>g.” The hyphen <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> word “<strong>the</strong>re-be<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong>dicates <strong>the</strong> schism or cut itself, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> schismturns <strong>the</strong> generous mutuality <strong>of</strong> want (i.e., <strong>the</strong> claim <strong>of</strong> beзng, or likelihood, forits truth) <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong>fered soothfastness (i.e., <strong>the</strong> be-liev<strong>in</strong>g belong<strong>in</strong>gness to <strong>the</strong> truth<strong>of</strong> beзng). Hence, <strong>the</strong> hyphen is <strong>the</strong> schismatic trait that, sway<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al<strong>of</strong>f-ground <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mutuality <strong>of</strong> claim <strong>and</strong> belong<strong>in</strong>gness, grants <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>re-be<strong>in</strong>g as<strong>the</strong> unitary ground for <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> beзng, that is, <strong>of</strong> wyrd’s sheer com<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> thusas <strong>the</strong> ground for beзng’s over-com<strong>in</strong>gness toward world <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs. Aga<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong>“<strong>the</strong>re”, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re-be<strong>in</strong>g” it attunes as <strong>the</strong> ground <strong>of</strong> beзng’s sooth, are be-fore<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> this towardness. The sooth<strong>in</strong>gness <strong>of</strong> “<strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>re” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>over-com<strong>in</strong>gness that onsett<strong>in</strong>gly soo<strong>the</strong>s all abid<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> assent<strong>in</strong>g abid<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> man, unto its own allay, is <strong>the</strong> third sense <strong>in</strong> which, when we say “<strong>the</strong>re,” weare already imply<strong>in</strong>g a relation <strong>of</strong> this dimension to <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> man.As <strong>the</strong> apparent redundancy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> preced<strong>in</strong>g determ<strong>in</strong>ations <strong>in</strong>dicates, all traitsshow <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> same, namely, <strong>the</strong> unsaid Er-eignis hold<strong>in</strong>g sway <strong>in</strong> “<strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>re.” Bylett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re” speak from <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re is” as its silent tun<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> thus fromEreignis, we have f<strong>in</strong>ally m<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>the</strong> English translation <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>. This translationis “<strong>the</strong>re-be<strong>in</strong>g.” This newly m<strong>in</strong>ted word now speaks not only as a genu<strong>in</strong>e diction,but <strong>in</strong>deed as a mo<strong>the</strong>r-diction, a “word <strong>of</strong> words” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> English mo<strong>the</strong>r-language,<strong>and</strong> has thus lost all traits <strong>of</strong> a merely formal equivalent that to some extent replicates<strong>in</strong> English <strong>the</strong> semantic structure <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong>. Hence, “<strong>the</strong>re-be<strong>in</strong>g” is not amore or less valid surrogate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German word Dase<strong>in</strong>, but a true translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Denkweg-word Da-se<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> this means: a schismatically unique, <strong>the</strong>refore itselfuntranslatable synonym <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> many-voiced say <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r onset <strong>of</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.ReferencesDe Gennaro, Ivo. 2007. Own<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> belong<strong>in</strong>gness to be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> why be<strong>in</strong>g itself <strong>and</strong> not justbe<strong>in</strong>g? In The new yearbook for phenomenology <strong>and</strong> phenomenological philosophy, vol. VII,ed. Hopk<strong>in</strong>s Burt, 157–195. Seattle: Noesis Press.De Gennaro, Ivo. 2009. Own<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> belong<strong>in</strong>gness to be-<strong>in</strong>g or th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g as surrender: ParvisEmad’s book on Beiträge <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> english Denkweg. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 25: 115–141.De Gennaro, Ivo, <strong>and</strong> Zaccaria G<strong>in</strong>o. 2007. Dase<strong>in</strong> : Da-se<strong>in</strong>. Tradurre la parola del pensiero.Milano: Christian Mar<strong>in</strong>otti Edizioni.Emad, Parvis. 1993. <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> more deeply <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> translation: Essential translation<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> language. In Read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Commemorations, ed. Sallis John.Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.Emad, Parvis. 2007. On <strong>the</strong> way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s contributions to philosophy. Madison: TheUniversity <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press, 2007.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1970. Eugen F<strong>in</strong>k, Heralkit. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1977a. Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der re<strong>in</strong>en Vernunft,GA 25. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann. Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly.1997. Phenomenological <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> Kant’s critique <strong>of</strong> pure reason. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton:Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1977b. Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, GA 2. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.
252 I. De Gennaro<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1988. Zur Sache des Denkens. Tüb<strong>in</strong>gen: Niemeyer 3 .<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1989a. Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann. Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly. 1999. Contributions to philosophy(from enown<strong>in</strong>g). Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1989b. Nietzsche I. Pfull<strong>in</strong>gen: Neske 5 .<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1996. E<strong>in</strong>leitung <strong>in</strong> die Philosophie, GA 27. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1997. Bes<strong>in</strong>nung, GA 66. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann. Trans.Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Thomas Kalary. 2006. M<strong>in</strong>dfulness. London: Cont<strong>in</strong>uum.Husserl, Edmund. 1993. Ideen zu e<strong>in</strong>er re<strong>in</strong>en Phänomenologie und phänomenologischenPhilosophie. Tüb<strong>in</strong>gen: Niemeyer 5.Husserl, Edmund. 1995. Cartesianische Meditationen. Hamburg: Me<strong>in</strong>er 3 .Leopardi, Giacomo. 1997. Zibaldone, vol. 2. Milano: Mondadori.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Eccentric <strong>Translation</strong>Julia A. Irel<strong>and</strong>“Translat<strong>in</strong>g” [“Übersetzen”] is not so much a “trans-lat<strong>in</strong>g”[“Über-setzen”] <strong>and</strong> pass<strong>in</strong>g over <strong>in</strong>to a foreign language with<strong>the</strong> help <strong>of</strong> one’s own. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, translat<strong>in</strong>g is more anawaken<strong>in</strong>g, clarification, <strong>and</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> one’s own languagewith <strong>the</strong> help <strong>of</strong> an encounter with <strong>the</strong> foreign language.––Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s Hymn “The Ister,” GA 53.Accord<strong>in</strong>gly <strong>the</strong>n, <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>[Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s P<strong>in</strong>dar] ‘translations.’ Trans-lat<strong>in</strong>g as sett<strong>in</strong>g-over[Über-setzen] – onto ano<strong>the</strong>r shore – onto <strong>the</strong> shore <strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r!!––Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Zu Hölderl<strong>in</strong>s Übersetzung derP<strong>in</strong>darfragmente,” “Zu Hölderl<strong>in</strong>”/Griechenl<strong>and</strong>reisen, GA 75.In his earlier article from 1993, “<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> More Deeply <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong><strong>Translation</strong>,” Parvis Emad dist<strong>in</strong>guishes between what he calls “<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation”(translation <strong>of</strong> a foreign language <strong>in</strong>to one’s own language) <strong>and</strong> “<strong>in</strong>nerl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation” (translation with<strong>in</strong> one’s own language), each <strong>of</strong> which is differentlybound up with what he generically calls “foreignness.” 1 Thus, after detail<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>significant ways, <strong>Heidegger</strong> comes <strong>in</strong>to contact with <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> translation1Parvis Emad, “<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> More Deeply <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>: Essential <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> Unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Language,” <strong>in</strong> Read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Commemorations, ed. John Sallis (IndianaUniversity Press: Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton, 1993), pp. 323–340. It clearly <strong>in</strong>forms Emad’s subsequent discussion<strong>of</strong> translation <strong>in</strong> his 2007 book On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to PhilosophyJ.A. Irel<strong>and</strong> (*)Department <strong>of</strong> Philosophy, Whitman College, 345 Boyer Ave, 99362Walla Walla, WA, USAe-mail: irelanja@whitman.eduF. Schalow (ed.), <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad, Contributions To Phenomenology 65,DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0_13, © Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media B.V. 2011253
254 J.A. Irel<strong>and</strong>(this <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>Heidegger</strong> himself consistently translates, that histranslations substantially depart from <strong>the</strong> available st<strong>and</strong>ard translations, <strong>and</strong> that<strong>Heidegger</strong> makes explicit remarks about <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> translation, which <strong>in</strong>cludehis underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> it as an <strong>in</strong>terpretation), Emad goes on to claim that what <strong>the</strong>seencounters share <strong>in</strong> common is that “<strong>the</strong>y explicate translation <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rootunfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> language (das Wesen der Sprache).” 2 “Root unfold<strong>in</strong>g” is, <strong>of</strong> course, aquite foreign translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German word “Wesen,” alternatively rendered as“essential sway” <strong>and</strong> “ownmost” <strong>in</strong> Contributions to Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g),<strong>and</strong> comes to locate what, follow<strong>in</strong>g a remark made by <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1942/1943Parmenides lecture course, Emad takes up as “essential” or “orig<strong>in</strong>al translation”(ursprüngliche Übersetzung).This dist<strong>in</strong>ction has important implications for underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> specific status<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> foreignness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> foreign language under translation <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> way Emad conceives<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>nerl<strong>in</strong>gual translation – what itis that governs <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> movement between <strong>the</strong> two – with respect to thatforeignness. He accord<strong>in</strong>gly goes on to identify what he calls <strong>the</strong> “two poles” <strong>of</strong>translation, which become <strong>the</strong> organiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>of</strong> his piece <strong>and</strong> what is, to mym<strong>in</strong>d, most philosophically (if also problematically) at stake <strong>in</strong> it. To quote Emad:<strong>Heidegger</strong> is not concerned with <strong>the</strong> problems that dom<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>the</strong> discussion <strong>of</strong> translation <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> “sciences” <strong>of</strong> language. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, he takes translation as a unique opportunity for <strong>the</strong> rootunfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> language. And this opportunity presents itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> way <strong>in</strong> which translationresponds to <strong>the</strong> very foreignness or strangeness which calls for a deeper translation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>root unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> language.In <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> translation has two poles. At one pole <strong>the</strong>re are translation’sundeniable attachments to <strong>the</strong> foreignness which rules between languages. At <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r poleis <strong>the</strong> root unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> language as a response to that foreignness. Our co-enactment with<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g on translation requires that we consider what ga<strong>the</strong>rs at each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>sepoles. 3As Emad goes on to elaborate, <strong>the</strong> encounter with foreignness that takes placethrough <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation “elicits” or “occasions” <strong>the</strong> encounter with <strong>the</strong>foreignness at issue <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> root unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> language. Thus, where <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation operates <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> specific differences between languages, Emadclaims that <strong>in</strong>nerl<strong>in</strong>gual translation “turns us away from [those] differences” through<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vitation it issues to respond to this still deeper level <strong>of</strong> foreignness. 4 In o<strong>the</strong>rwords, <strong>the</strong> specifically <strong>in</strong>itiatory dimension <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> foreignness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> foreign language(Madison, WI: The University <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press, 2007). Clearly <strong>and</strong> importantly, Emadab<strong>and</strong>ons <strong>in</strong> his book <strong>the</strong> translations <strong>of</strong> Wesen as “root-unfold<strong>in</strong>g.” For an alternative discussion<strong>of</strong> Emad that focuses on this later work <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> central role that <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation plays <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> key terms that govern <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, see Frank Schalow’s “Attunement<strong>and</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>,” which is also <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> this volume.2Emad, “<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> More Deeply <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>,” p. 324.3Ibid.4Emad, “<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> More Deeply <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>,” p. 337.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Eccentric <strong>Translation</strong>255moves us from <strong>the</strong> pole <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation to <strong>the</strong> pole <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>nerl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation, “translat<strong>in</strong>g” us, so to speak, <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> very movement <strong>of</strong> translation asthis is realized <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> root unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> language. After cit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> quotation from<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s “The Ister” lecture course <strong>in</strong>cluded as my first epigraph, Emad writes:…[T]here is more to translation than just a transfer <strong>of</strong> words from one language to ano<strong>the</strong>r.To <strong>in</strong>itiate <strong>the</strong> move <strong>in</strong> such a transfer is to face <strong>the</strong> difference between languages as <strong>the</strong>foreignness that rules between <strong>the</strong>m. By forc<strong>in</strong>g us to see <strong>the</strong> foreignness <strong>and</strong> unfamiliarity<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> languages under translation, <strong>the</strong> activity <strong>of</strong> translation clarifies our relationship to ourown language. Thus, ra<strong>the</strong>r than serv<strong>in</strong>g as a means for transport<strong>in</strong>g “mean<strong>in</strong>gs” across <strong>the</strong>so-called language barrier, translation <strong>in</strong>vites us to return to our own language. When we,<strong>in</strong> translation, turn back from <strong>the</strong> foreignness <strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r language, we discover ano<strong>the</strong>rtranslation, one that occurs with<strong>in</strong> our own language. 5While Emad acknowledges <strong>the</strong> “undeniable attachments to <strong>the</strong> foreignness,which rules between languages” <strong>and</strong> what, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> conclud<strong>in</strong>g paragraph <strong>of</strong> his article,he describes as “<strong>the</strong> unresolvable foreignness that always rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation,” <strong>the</strong> encounter with <strong>the</strong> foreignness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> foreign language is understoodto undo difference on <strong>the</strong> way to a deeper, but also curiously generic encounterwith <strong>the</strong> foreignness tak<strong>in</strong>g place at <strong>the</strong> root or core <strong>of</strong> language’s unfold<strong>in</strong>g. 6 Thespecific differences between languages at issue <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation would<strong>the</strong>reby seem to be subsumed under <strong>the</strong> foreignness <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>nerl<strong>in</strong>gual translation,which as <strong>the</strong> foreignness that governs <strong>the</strong> movement between <strong>the</strong> two poles <strong>of</strong> translationis <strong>the</strong> foreignness that matters for Emad.Emad’s unusual formulation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> above quotation provides an important cluehere. For Emad nowhere touches on what I want to explore as “<strong>the</strong> fact <strong>of</strong> difference”at stake for <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation, but <strong>in</strong>stead consistentlyrefers to <strong>the</strong> foreignness that “rules between languages.” But is not this “foreignnessthat rules between languages” already <strong>the</strong> foreignness <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>nerl<strong>in</strong>gual translation –<strong>the</strong> foreignness that <strong>the</strong> movement <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation is supposed to get usto, but that <strong>the</strong> specifically <strong>in</strong>itiatory dimension <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation also cannotbe reducible to, unless what we have here are not “poles” but a s<strong>in</strong>gle step with<strong>in</strong>a th<strong>in</strong>ly disguised dialectic? In o<strong>the</strong>r words, is not Emad try<strong>in</strong>g to have his cake <strong>and</strong>eat it too when it comes to <strong>the</strong> specific status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> foreignness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> foreignlanguage? Acknowledg<strong>in</strong>g Emad’s superb treatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relationship betweenorig<strong>in</strong>al translation <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> a way <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> language, what wouldit mean to br<strong>in</strong>g forward <strong>the</strong> “undeniable attachments” <strong>and</strong> “unresolvable foreignness”<strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>in</strong> order to f<strong>in</strong>d ourselves, as <strong>Heidegger</strong> writes, notjust set onto ano<strong>the</strong>r shore, but onto <strong>the</strong> shore <strong>of</strong> an o<strong>the</strong>r?To br<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>the</strong> foreignness at issue <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation, I want to make<strong>the</strong> case that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s comments on translation <strong>in</strong> “The Ister” <strong>and</strong> Parmenideslecture courses need to be located <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> his <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s Dec. 4th,1801 letter to Böhlendorff, which is <strong>the</strong> s<strong>in</strong>gle most important document for5Emad, “<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> More Deeply <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>,” p. 326.6Emad, “<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> More Deeply <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>,” p. 337.
256 J.A. Irel<strong>and</strong>clarify<strong>in</strong>g what <strong>Heidegger</strong> means by “foreign” (das Fremde) <strong>and</strong> “one’s own” (dasEigene) as well as <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>the</strong> two. 7 My <strong>in</strong>terpretation thus marksa significant departure from Emad <strong>in</strong> both its orientation <strong>and</strong> govern<strong>in</strong>g conception<strong>of</strong> foreignness by assert<strong>in</strong>g two work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ses.First, I want to make <strong>the</strong> claim that <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> translation for <strong>Heidegger</strong> specificallyconcerns <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>verted, but seem<strong>in</strong>gly symmetrical or reciprocal apportion<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> “endowments” (Mitgift) <strong>and</strong> “tasks” (Aufgabe) between <strong>the</strong> Greeks <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Germansas this is articulated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter to Böhlendorff. It is first with his 1934–1935 lecturecourse, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>s Hymnen “Germanien” und “Der Rhe<strong>in</strong>,” that <strong>Heidegger</strong> developsa framework with<strong>in</strong> which to underst<strong>and</strong> what is at stake <strong>in</strong> his own translations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Greeks – namely, a self-conscious violence <strong>and</strong> excess that serves to correct a deficiencywith<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> German’s endowment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “clarity <strong>of</strong> presentation” as this isaccomplishable only through <strong>the</strong> encounter with <strong>the</strong> Greek foreign. Emad, by contrast,goes back to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s 1931 translation <strong>of</strong> Plato’s Theatetus, schematicallytrack<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>the</strong> differences between <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>and</strong> Schleiermacher’s respectivetranslations as evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> movement between th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al translation. Insett<strong>in</strong>g aside crucial aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophical development, Emad missesboth how <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s comments on translation are directly <strong>in</strong>formed by his <strong>in</strong>terpretation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter to Böhlendorff <strong>and</strong> how his translations <strong>of</strong> Sophocles, <strong>the</strong> pre-Socratics, <strong>and</strong>, most particularly, Hölderl<strong>in</strong> enact that <strong>in</strong>terpretation.Second, I want to problematize Emad’s language <strong>of</strong> “two poles” as be<strong>in</strong>g overlyschematic <strong>in</strong> presuppos<strong>in</strong>g an essentialist (or at least unproblematically “given”)conception <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> difference between a foreign language <strong>and</strong> one’s own language.Essentialism cannot emerge as a problem for Emad because foreignness is notf<strong>in</strong>ally about <strong>the</strong> specific differences between languages at <strong>the</strong> same time thosespecific differences are understood to implicate <strong>the</strong> movement between <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual7At different junctures throughout his three Hölderl<strong>in</strong> lecture courses, <strong>Heidegger</strong> cites fromHölderl<strong>in</strong>’s two letters to his friend Casimir Böhlendorff. The first letter, which is dated Dec. 4 th ,1801, was written shortly before Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s departure for Bordeaux. It is this first letter toBöhlendorff that is <strong>the</strong> basis for this article, <strong>and</strong> is referred to throughout as <strong>the</strong> “Letter toBöhlendorff” or simply as <strong>the</strong> “Letter.” The second letter to Böhlendorff, which famously refersto Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s hav<strong>in</strong>g been “struck by Apollo,” is undated, but is generally thought to have beenwritten sometime dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> spr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> 1802. The first Letter to Böhlendorff plays a cruciallyimportant role <strong>in</strong> fram<strong>in</strong>g all three <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Hölderl<strong>in</strong> lecture courses. For <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s treatment<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1934/35 Hölderl<strong>in</strong>s Hymnen “Germanien” und “Der Rhe<strong>in</strong>”, GA39(Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1980), see pages 290–294 <strong>of</strong> that volume; for his discussion<strong>of</strong> it <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1941/42 Hölderl<strong>in</strong>s Hymne “Andenken”, GA52 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann, 1982), see <strong>the</strong> “Drittes Hauptstück: Die Suche nach dem freien Gebrauch desEigenen,” pages 123–150; <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> his 1942/42 Hölderl<strong>in</strong>s Hymne “Der Ister”, GA 53 (Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1984), pp. 168–170. Holderl<strong>in</strong>’s Hymn “The Ister,” trans. WilliamMcNeill <strong>and</strong> Julia Davis (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1997), pp. 135–37. The sem<strong>in</strong>aldiscussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s own biography <strong>and</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>gs is given byPeter Szondi, “Überw<strong>in</strong>dung des Klassizimus: Der Brief an Böhlendorff vom 4. Dezember 1801”<strong>in</strong> Schriften: I. (Suhrkamp Verlag: Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>, 1978), pp. 345–366. Szondi’s chapter discussesvarious Hölderl<strong>in</strong> scholars’ <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Norbert von Hell<strong>in</strong>grath’swith whose work <strong>Heidegger</strong> was clearly familiar.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Eccentric <strong>Translation</strong>257<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>nerl<strong>in</strong>gual translation. What <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter toBöhlendorff importantly shows is that <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> a foreign language <strong>in</strong>toone’s own language is not one-directional (<strong>and</strong> this <strong>in</strong>cludes underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>nerl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation as a “return”). Ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> movement <strong>of</strong> translation as a sett<strong>in</strong>goveris <strong>in</strong>stead <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>tersect<strong>in</strong>g” or “cross<strong>in</strong>g over” (Überkreuzung; emphasis m<strong>in</strong>e)<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> reciprocal, but also asymmetrical surpass<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> foreign <strong>and</strong> own, Greek <strong>and</strong>German, as a be<strong>in</strong>g given <strong>in</strong>to difference.This <strong>in</strong> turn changes how <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> movement between <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>nerl<strong>in</strong>gual translation might be conceived <strong>in</strong> ways that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>terpretation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter to Böhlendorff richly suggests, but also cannot quite account for given<strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>in</strong>nerl<strong>in</strong>gual translation for <strong>Heidegger</strong> traverses <strong>the</strong> dialogue betweenth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> poetiz<strong>in</strong>g as this is taken up <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s encounter with Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’sown dialogue with <strong>the</strong> Greeks. Instead, it is Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s effort to “correct”(verbessern) <strong>the</strong> Greek by way <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German through his “Orientalization” <strong>of</strong> keySophoclean odes that reveals that <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation is already an <strong>in</strong>nerl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation, one that <strong>in</strong> operat<strong>in</strong>g by way <strong>of</strong> a structure <strong>of</strong> transposition <strong>and</strong> excess –that is, by way <strong>of</strong> a certa<strong>in</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> eccentricity – succeeds <strong>in</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g forward <strong>the</strong>“undeniable attachments” <strong>and</strong> “unresolvable foreignness” <strong>in</strong> its accomplishment <strong>of</strong>a Greek that never was. Yet this is what it means to translate German <strong>in</strong>to German.Couldn’t such eccentricity also be <strong>the</strong> model for underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> root <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> foreignness<strong>and</strong> even violence <strong>of</strong> Emad’s translations <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> with respect towhat we underst<strong>and</strong> both English <strong>and</strong> translation to allow?1 Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s Dec. 4, 1801 Letter to BöhlendorffHölderl<strong>in</strong>’s Dec. 4, 1801 Letter to Böhlendorff was written on <strong>the</strong> eve <strong>of</strong> his departurefor Bordeaux <strong>and</strong> towards <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> what, <strong>in</strong> retrospect, would prove to have beenone <strong>of</strong> his richest creative years. While <strong>the</strong> letter is clearly <strong>in</strong>tended to praise <strong>and</strong>congratulate his friend Casimir Böhlendorff on <strong>the</strong> successful execution <strong>of</strong> his tragedy,Fern<strong>and</strong>o, by <strong>in</strong> part supply<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> terms for that success (“you have achieved somuch <strong>in</strong> precision <strong>and</strong> suppleness, <strong>and</strong> not lost anyth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> warmth”), Hölderl<strong>in</strong>scholars have read <strong>the</strong> Letter as addressed more to Hölderl<strong>in</strong> himself than toBöhlendorff. 8 In fall<strong>in</strong>g more than 2 years after his Sophocles translations (<strong>and</strong>likely shortly before his great P<strong>in</strong>dar translations), <strong>the</strong> Letter serves as <strong>the</strong> articulation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> poetic <strong>the</strong>ory Hölderl<strong>in</strong> came to work out <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> those translations.8A complete citation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter can be found <strong>in</strong> Hölderl<strong>in</strong>: Werke und Briefe, vol. 2. Edited byFriedrich Beißner <strong>and</strong> Jochen Schmidt (Insel Verlag: Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>, 1969), pp. 940–942. Fora translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter, see Friedrich Hölderl<strong>in</strong>: <strong>Essays</strong> <strong>and</strong> Letters on Theory, trans. <strong>and</strong> ed. byThomas Pfau (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1988), pp. 109–116, as well as Dennis J. Schmidt’s, OnGermans <strong>and</strong> O<strong>the</strong>r Greeks: Tragedy <strong>and</strong> Ethical Life (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press,2001), pp. 165–167. I have drawn from both translations <strong>in</strong> com<strong>in</strong>g up with my own translation <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Letter to Böhlendorff.
258 J.A. Irel<strong>and</strong>And, as his 1803 “Remarks” to <strong>the</strong> Oedipus <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Antigone fur<strong>the</strong>r reveal, it cont<strong>in</strong>uesto guide Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly radicalized attitude towards translationwhose logical, if also eccentrically extreme, extension is to “correct” <strong>the</strong> Greekorig<strong>in</strong>al as this is possible only through its translation <strong>in</strong>to German.<strong>Heidegger</strong> first cites <strong>the</strong> Letter to Böhlendorff at <strong>the</strong> conclusion <strong>of</strong> his 1934–1935Hölderl<strong>in</strong>s Hymnen “Germanien” und “Der Rhe<strong>in</strong>,” echo<strong>in</strong>g its words <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> conclud<strong>in</strong>gl<strong>in</strong>es <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> course by call<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> Germans to “learn <strong>the</strong> free use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>national.” 9 While <strong>Heidegger</strong> is generally unconcerned with <strong>the</strong> larger context thatsituates <strong>the</strong> Letter (<strong>and</strong> this <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>the</strong> debt it owes to Herder’s conception <strong>of</strong> apeople <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> answer it issues to Schiller on cultural formation), it is central to how<strong>Heidegger</strong> comes to underst<strong>and</strong> his own encounter with <strong>the</strong> pre-Socratics <strong>and</strong>Sophocles, beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> 1935 Introduction <strong>in</strong>to Metaphysics. Thus, although<strong>Heidegger</strong> does not make general statements that connect translation to <strong>the</strong> specificlanguage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter as, for example, he does <strong>in</strong> “The Ister” lecture course, his<strong>in</strong>terpretative “translation” <strong>of</strong> Sophocles’ Antigone with its emphasis on “violence”(Gewalt) carries through on <strong>the</strong> conceptual framework first developed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>Letter. <strong>Heidegger</strong> first starts translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> what might be called a “<strong>Heidegger</strong>ianmanner” beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g with his <strong>in</strong>famous translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Greek word de<strong>in</strong>on with“unheimlich” (uncanny, unhomely). I cite <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own citation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter toBöhldendorff from <strong>the</strong> “Germanien” und “Der Rhe<strong>in</strong>” lecture course – which althoughit <strong>in</strong>cludes only its first half – is his most complete reproduction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter 10 :We learn noth<strong>in</strong>g with greater difficulty than <strong>the</strong> free use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national. And, as I believe,that it is precisely <strong>the</strong> clarity <strong>of</strong> presentation [Klarheit der Darstellung] which is so orig<strong>in</strong>allynatural to us, as <strong>the</strong> fire from <strong>the</strong> heaven is to <strong>the</strong> Greeks. It is for that reason that <strong>the</strong>y willneed to be surpassed [übertreffen] <strong>in</strong> beautiful passion, which you too have reta<strong>in</strong>ed, ra<strong>the</strong>rthan <strong>in</strong> that Homeric presence <strong>of</strong> spirit <strong>and</strong> gift for presentation.9Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>s Hymnen “Germanien” und “Der Rhe<strong>in</strong>”, GA 39 (VittorioKlostermann: Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>, 1980), p. 294.10<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>s Hymnen “Germanien” und “Der Rhe<strong>in</strong>”, pp. 290–291. The portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Letter as cited by <strong>Heidegger</strong> reads:Wir lernen nichts schwerer als das Nationelle frei gebrauchen. Und wie ich glaube, istgerade die Klarheit der Darstellung uns ursprünglich so näturlich, wie den Griechen dasFeuer vom Himmel. Eben deswegen werden diese eher <strong>in</strong> schöner Leidenschaft, die Du Dirauch erhalten hast, als <strong>in</strong> jener homerischen Geistesgegenwart und Darstellungsgabe zuübertreffen se<strong>in</strong>.Es kl<strong>in</strong>gt paradox. Aber ich behaupt’ es noch e<strong>in</strong>mal, und stelle es De<strong>in</strong>er Prüfung undDe<strong>in</strong>em Gebrauche frei, das eigentlich Nationelle wird im Fortschritt der Bildung immer derger<strong>in</strong>gere Vorzug werden. Desswegen s<strong>in</strong>d die Griechen des heiligen Pathos weniger Meister,weil es ihnen angeboren war, h<strong>in</strong>gegen s<strong>in</strong>d sie vorzüglich <strong>in</strong> Darstellungsgabe, von Homeran, weil dieser ausserordentliche Mensch seelenvoll genug war, um die abendländischeJunonische Nüchternheit für se<strong>in</strong> Apollonsreich zu erbeuten, und so wahrhaft das Fremde sichanzueignen. Bei uns ists umgekehrt. Desswegen ists auch so gëfahrlich, sich die Kunstregelne<strong>in</strong>zig und alle<strong>in</strong> von griechischer Vortrefflichkeit zu abstrahiren. Ich habe lange daran laborirtund weiss nun, dass ausser dem, was bei den Griechen und uns das höchste se<strong>in</strong> muss, nemlichdem lebendigen Verhältniss und Geschik, wir nicht wohl etwas gleich mit ihnen habendürfen. Aber das Eigene muss so gut gelernt seyn, wie das Fremde. Desswegen s<strong>in</strong>d uns dieGriechen unentbehrlich. Nur werden wir ihnen gerade <strong>in</strong> unserm Eigenen, Nationellen nichtnachkommen, weil, wie gesagt, der freie Gebrauch des Eigenen das schwerste ist.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Eccentric <strong>Translation</strong>259It sounds paradoxical. But I will put it forward yet aga<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> submit it to your test <strong>and</strong>free employment, that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> progress <strong>of</strong> culture, <strong>the</strong> properly national always assumes lessprecedence. For that reason <strong>the</strong> Greeks are less masters <strong>of</strong> holy pathos because it was <strong>in</strong>born<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>m whereas, from Homer onward, <strong>the</strong>y excel <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> gift for presentation because thisextraord<strong>in</strong>ary man was sufficiently soulful to capture <strong>the</strong> Western Junonian sobriety for hisApollonian realm, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby to truly appropriate <strong>the</strong> foreign. With us it is <strong>the</strong> reverse.That is why it is also so dangerous to abstract <strong>the</strong> rules <strong>of</strong> art solely <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> isolation from <strong>the</strong>model <strong>of</strong> Greek excellence. I have long labored on this <strong>and</strong> now know that, with <strong>the</strong> exception<strong>of</strong> what must be <strong>the</strong> highest for <strong>the</strong> Greeks <strong>and</strong> for us, namely, to have a liv<strong>in</strong>g relation<strong>and</strong> dest<strong>in</strong>y [Geschick], we must not bear any resemblance to <strong>the</strong>m. But what is one’s own[das Eigene] must be learned just as well as what is foreign [das Fremde]. That is why <strong>the</strong>Greeks are unavoidable for us. Only we will not keep up with <strong>the</strong>m precisely <strong>in</strong> what is ourown, <strong>the</strong> national, because, as I said, <strong>the</strong> free use <strong>of</strong> one’s own is <strong>the</strong> most difficult.Though I will return to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Germanien”und “Der Rhe<strong>in</strong>” course, I want to clarify its basic structure by way <strong>of</strong> a schematicoutl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s fragmentary notes, “Zu Hölderl<strong>in</strong>s Übersetzung derP<strong>in</strong>darfragmente,” provisionally dated 1944. This schematic not only has <strong>the</strong> advantage<strong>of</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> basic moves <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter visually clear, its dat<strong>in</strong>g places itwith<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> same period as <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s most detailed remarks on translation <strong>in</strong>“TheIster” <strong>and</strong> Parmenides lecture courses. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ten-cited reference from <strong>the</strong>Parmenides course to translation as be<strong>in</strong>g “set onto a new shore” receives its more<strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g formulation <strong>in</strong> this set <strong>of</strong> notes (cited <strong>in</strong> my second epigraph as <strong>the</strong> “sett<strong>in</strong>goveronto <strong>the</strong> shore <strong>of</strong> an o<strong>the</strong>r”):“liv<strong>in</strong>g relation” (“dest<strong>in</strong>y”), “<strong>the</strong> highest”“free use”“<strong>the</strong> national,” “one’s own,” what has been endowed (E), what is↕ “orig<strong>in</strong>ally natural.” From whence, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first <strong>in</strong>stance, this difference? (Animalrationale? No! The cross<strong>in</strong>g over: what is ownmost <strong>and</strong> foreign.)“what is foreign.” A task (T) laid claim to.“<strong>the</strong> most difficult” to be achieved, <strong>and</strong> thus what is most readily “to besurpassed.what is easier — what? The “foreign” (taken <strong>in</strong> itself). — “What is mostdifficult”: <strong>the</strong> acquisition <strong>of</strong> what one possesses <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> service <strong>of</strong> itsdispensation.For <strong>the</strong> Greeks: E “<strong>the</strong> fire from <strong>the</strong> heaven.” “Apollonian realm.” “Holypathos” (“consumed <strong>in</strong> flames,” untamed)“Apollonian realm”T “Junonian sobriety,” “presence <strong>of</strong> spirit,” “gift forpresentation” (Homer)For <strong>the</strong> Germans E “clarity <strong>of</strong> presentation,” calculation, spiritual self-presence,“<strong>the</strong> reverse.” self-consciousness, ratio. (“boxed up <strong>in</strong> a c<strong>of</strong>f<strong>in</strong>.”)T “<strong>the</strong> fire from <strong>the</strong> heavens.” (Realm <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> liv<strong>in</strong>g.)E <strong>and</strong> T; own <strong>and</strong> foreign; both must be learned.That for us from out <strong>of</strong> T “fire” does not come <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> freedom <strong>of</strong> itsdest<strong>in</strong>ed order<strong>in</strong>g! 1111Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>. “Zu Hölderl<strong>in</strong>” <strong>in</strong> Griechenl<strong>and</strong>reisen, GA 75 (Vittorio Klostermann:Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>, 2000), pp. 346–347.
260 J.A. Irel<strong>and</strong>While this schematic helps make vivid <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>verted <strong>and</strong> seem<strong>in</strong>gly symmetricalapportion<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> foreign <strong>and</strong> own, Greek <strong>and</strong> German (Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s “with us it is <strong>the</strong>reverse”), <strong>the</strong> conceptual orig<strong>in</strong>ality <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter lies<strong>in</strong> his pos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question, “From whence, to beg<strong>in</strong> with, this difference? [Woher,zunächst, diese Unterscheidung?],” <strong>and</strong> his answer, “The cross<strong>in</strong>g over: what isownmost <strong>and</strong> foreign [die Überkreuzung: Eigenstes und Fremdes],” which is <strong>in</strong>dicatedgraphically, <strong>and</strong> no doubt <strong>in</strong>sufficiently, by <strong>the</strong> doubly directed arrow.As <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s adoption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> terms “Mitgift [endowment]” <strong>and</strong> “Aufgabe[task]” for Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s “Eigene” <strong>and</strong> “Fremde” suggest (Hölderl<strong>in</strong> twice uses <strong>the</strong>word “Darstellungsgabe”), what is one’s ownmost cannot be understood as simply“given” <strong>and</strong> thus as a function <strong>of</strong> what is native or “orig<strong>in</strong>ally natural.” The stillfur<strong>the</strong>r implication <strong>of</strong> this <strong>in</strong>sight is that <strong>the</strong> difference between Greek <strong>and</strong> Germanalso cannot be assumed as “given” <strong>in</strong>, for example, <strong>the</strong> way that a Goe<strong>the</strong> orW<strong>in</strong>kelman straightforwardly assumes <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al accomplishment <strong>of</strong> Greek culture as<strong>the</strong> basis for imitation by <strong>the</strong> Germans. Instead, if we follow what <strong>Heidegger</strong> is afterhere, <strong>the</strong> endowment, so to speak, “<strong>in</strong>vests” a task through which <strong>the</strong> givenness <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> endowment as an endowment is realized or comes <strong>in</strong>to its own only by way<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> task. Indeed, it is this “as” that reveals translation to be a movement not <strong>of</strong>encounter <strong>and</strong> return, but a transposition that is <strong>the</strong> “sett<strong>in</strong>g over” <strong>in</strong>to differentialrelation. With regard to this apportion<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> endowments <strong>and</strong> tasks between <strong>the</strong>Greeks <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Germans respectively, <strong>the</strong> Greek “fire from heaven” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> German“clarity <strong>of</strong> presentation” “<strong>in</strong>tersect” or “cross over” one ano<strong>the</strong>r as each “surpasses”<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r not <strong>in</strong> what is <strong>the</strong>ir own, but <strong>in</strong> what is <strong>in</strong> each case foreign to <strong>the</strong>m. Whatemerges from out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> peculiar “givenness” <strong>of</strong> this structure is not a logic <strong>of</strong> identitynor an easily mapped b<strong>in</strong>ary, but <strong>in</strong>stead <strong>the</strong> reciprocal exceed<strong>in</strong>g by <strong>the</strong> foreign<strong>in</strong> what is <strong>in</strong> each case o<strong>the</strong>r to <strong>the</strong>m. As we will see <strong>in</strong> Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s various translationexperiments, this excess serves to br<strong>in</strong>g forward <strong>the</strong> fact <strong>of</strong> difference betweenforeign <strong>and</strong> own, Greek <strong>and</strong> German, without <strong>the</strong>reby presuppos<strong>in</strong>g that differenceas ei<strong>the</strong>r essentially given or even fully accomplished as a difference.Hölderl<strong>in</strong> is acutely aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> counter-<strong>in</strong>tuitive nature <strong>of</strong> what it means for <strong>the</strong>Germans to surpass <strong>the</strong> Greeks <strong>in</strong> what is <strong>the</strong>ir own, characteriz<strong>in</strong>g it as “paradoxical.”While this paradox <strong>in</strong> part derives from, as <strong>Heidegger</strong> writes, <strong>the</strong> foreign “taken<strong>in</strong> itself” be<strong>in</strong>g “easier,” Hölderl<strong>in</strong> is positively <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> thisexcess as creatively, which is to say, differentially generative. As <strong>the</strong> subsequentcontent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter makes clear – <strong>and</strong> this is variously captured <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sparen<strong>the</strong>ticals – absent <strong>the</strong> encounter with <strong>the</strong> foreign, what is one’s own is subjectto a version <strong>of</strong> deficient excess that turns its orig<strong>in</strong>al tendency back onto itself. For<strong>the</strong> Greeks, <strong>the</strong> native “fire from heaven” is threatened by <strong>the</strong> impulse to be “consumed<strong>in</strong> flames” through which <strong>the</strong> desire for immediacy is recuperated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>undo<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> difference that itself constitutes self-consciousness.This is understood as <strong>the</strong> nostalgic desire for “unboundedness” or unification with<strong>the</strong> One, <strong>and</strong> it is exactly this repressed impulse that Hölderl<strong>in</strong> seeks to br<strong>in</strong>gforward <strong>in</strong> his “eccentrically enthusiastic” <strong>and</strong> corrective translation <strong>of</strong> Sophocles.For <strong>the</strong> Germans, by contrast, <strong>the</strong> native “clarity <strong>of</strong> presentation” is impelled by <strong>the</strong>tendency towards excessive conceptualization <strong>and</strong> self-consciousness – <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s
<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Eccentric <strong>Translation</strong>261o<strong>the</strong>rwise surpris<strong>in</strong>g reference to “ratio” – whose literally f<strong>in</strong>al manifestation is, asHölderl<strong>in</strong> later writes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter, be<strong>in</strong>g “boxed up <strong>in</strong> a c<strong>of</strong>f<strong>in</strong>.” Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s call<strong>in</strong>gon <strong>the</strong> Germans to surpass <strong>the</strong> Greeks <strong>in</strong> “holy pathos” is thus to serve as a k<strong>in</strong>dcorrective excess for <strong>the</strong> deficient excess to which what is one’s own is o<strong>the</strong>rwisesubject.<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Germanien” und “Der Rhe<strong>in</strong>”course is governed by this <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to deficient excess toge<strong>the</strong>r with his specificconcern for <strong>the</strong> German “national.” Though <strong>Heidegger</strong> does not cite Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s“Remarks to Antigone,” he <strong>in</strong>terprets <strong>the</strong> Letter <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> a passage that directlyresonates with its basic structural framework <strong>in</strong> contrast<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “primary tendency” –here described by Hölderl<strong>in</strong> as a “weakness” (Schwäche) – that dist<strong>in</strong>guishes <strong>the</strong>Greek <strong>and</strong> German styles <strong>of</strong> representation: “…our poetic art must be patriotic suchthat its materials are selected <strong>in</strong> accordance with our view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, <strong>and</strong> its representationspatriotic, differ<strong>in</strong>g from Greek representations <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong>ir primarytendency is to be able to grasp <strong>the</strong>mselves [sich fassen] because <strong>the</strong>ir weakness lies<strong>the</strong>re<strong>in</strong>; whereas, <strong>in</strong> contrast, <strong>the</strong> primary tendency <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> modes <strong>of</strong> representation <strong>in</strong>our time is <strong>the</strong> ability to hit on [treffen] someth<strong>in</strong>g, to have dest<strong>in</strong>y, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong>fate, dusmoron, is our weakness.” 12 Notably, however, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> a way that directlyanticipates his own 1935 <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> Sophocles, <strong>Heidegger</strong> not only approaches<strong>the</strong> Letter through <strong>the</strong> term<strong>in</strong>ology <strong>of</strong> this passage, he approaches this passagethrough Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s early translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> open<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>es from <strong>the</strong> second choralode <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Antigone <strong>in</strong> which Hölderl<strong>in</strong> translates <strong>the</strong> Greek word de<strong>in</strong>on with“gewältig” (violent). That is, <strong>Heidegger</strong> translates back <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Letter whatHölderl<strong>in</strong>’s translation <strong>and</strong> commentary on <strong>the</strong> Antigone enact as <strong>the</strong> German confrontationwith <strong>the</strong> Greek foreign, which is, <strong>of</strong> course, <strong>in</strong>formed by <strong>the</strong> Letter. In thisterm<strong>in</strong>ological cross<strong>in</strong>g over, <strong>the</strong> Greek endowment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “fire from heaven”becomes for <strong>Heidegger</strong> “<strong>the</strong> hav<strong>in</strong>g become struck by <strong>the</strong> violence <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g [dasBetr<strong>of</strong>fenwerden durch die Gewalt des Seyns]” <strong>and</strong> “<strong>the</strong> passion for <strong>the</strong> overpower<strong>in</strong>g[die Leidenschaft zum Überwältigenden],” while <strong>the</strong> Greek’s task is <strong>the</strong> “tam<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>untameable <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> struggle over <strong>the</strong> work, grasp<strong>in</strong>g, br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g-to-st<strong>and</strong> [die Bändigungdes Unbändigen im Erkämpfen des Werkes, das Fassen, Zum-St<strong>and</strong>-br<strong>in</strong>gen].” 1312In German this sentence reads:…und unsere Dichtkunst vaterländisch se<strong>in</strong> muß, so daß ihre St<strong>of</strong>fe nach unserer Weltansichtgewählt s<strong>in</strong>d, und ihre Vorstellungen vaterländisch, verändern sich die griechischenVorstellungen <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ern, als ihre Haupttendenz ist, sich fassen zu können, weil dar<strong>in</strong> ihreSchwäche lag, da h<strong>in</strong>gegen die Haupttendenz <strong>in</strong> den Vorstellungsarten unserer Zeit ist,etwas treffen zu können, Geschick zu haben, da das Schicksallose, das dusmoron, unsereSchwäche ist.In Hölderl<strong>in</strong>: Werke und Briefe, vol. 2., pp. 783–790. A full translation <strong>of</strong> Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s “Remarksto Antigone” can be found Friedrich Hölderl<strong>in</strong>: <strong>Essays</strong> <strong>and</strong> Letters on Theory. Translated <strong>and</strong>Edited by Thomas Pfau, pp. 109–116. For <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s brief discussion <strong>of</strong> this l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> “The Ister”lecture course, see p. 136 <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> English <strong>and</strong> p. 169 <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> German.13<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>s Hymnen “Germanien” und “Der Rhe<strong>in</strong>”, pp. 292–3.
262 J.A. Irel<strong>and</strong>The “Western Junonian sobriety” first captured by Homer is thus here be<strong>in</strong>g conceived<strong>in</strong> terms that <strong>Heidegger</strong> subsequently takes up <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Introduction to Metaphysics astέcnh (techne).While I will return to <strong>the</strong> problem Homer presents for Hölderl<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> nextsection, <strong>the</strong> latent connection between <strong>the</strong> “clarity <strong>of</strong> presentation” <strong>and</strong> tέcnh isimportant to keep <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d as <strong>Heidegger</strong> goes on to parse out what is endowed <strong>and</strong>tasked to <strong>the</strong> Germans. For <strong>in</strong> contrast to some <strong>in</strong>terpretations <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>the</strong>Greeks <strong>and</strong> translation, <strong>Heidegger</strong> is not about “out Greek<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>the</strong> Greeks, as though<strong>the</strong> surpass<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> foreign were someth<strong>in</strong>g that could be “taken <strong>in</strong> itself.” (Thiswould be simply to substitute how <strong>the</strong> foreign is “easier” for <strong>the</strong> “weakness” <strong>of</strong> whatis one’s own as a fur<strong>the</strong>r avenue to evade <strong>the</strong> difficulty <strong>of</strong> appropriat<strong>in</strong>g one’s own.)Ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> problem for <strong>Heidegger</strong> is precisely <strong>the</strong> deficient excess <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> whatis <strong>the</strong> German’s own as this is tied to his nascent <strong>in</strong>sights <strong>in</strong>to tέcnh. As <strong>Heidegger</strong>writes: “To <strong>the</strong> Germans it is endowed: <strong>the</strong> ability to grasp, <strong>the</strong> gett<strong>in</strong>g straight <strong>and</strong>plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> doma<strong>in</strong>s <strong>and</strong> spaces, order<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> extreme <strong>of</strong> organiz<strong>in</strong>g. <strong>Task</strong>ed to<strong>the</strong>m is <strong>the</strong> becom<strong>in</strong>g struck by beyng.” 14 As this passage reveals, <strong>the</strong> weakness<strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “grasp<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “clarity <strong>of</strong> presentation” shows up precisely <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> drive towards compartmentalization, which substitutes <strong>the</strong> buoyant aliveness <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> outl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work for a frame <strong>and</strong> framework. In his later <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Letter to Böhlendorff <strong>in</strong>“The Ister” lecture course, <strong>Heidegger</strong> thus comments on<strong>the</strong> danger <strong>of</strong> mistak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> excess that shows up <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sett<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>of</strong> limits for <strong>the</strong>sake <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sett<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>of</strong> limits for “<strong>the</strong> fire itself.” 15At this juncture, it is necessary to return to how <strong>Heidegger</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>s <strong>the</strong>endowment to be realized as an endowment only by way <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> task. Thus, wherewhat is one’s own is natively orig<strong>in</strong>al, this orig<strong>in</strong>ality curiously comes <strong>in</strong>to its ownonly by way <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> task, which as <strong>Heidegger</strong> repeatedly emphasizes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>“Germanien” und “Der Rhe<strong>in</strong>” course is someth<strong>in</strong>g “won through struggle”(erkämpfen). Acknowledg<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s martial language has a rhetoricalurgency <strong>in</strong> relation to <strong>the</strong> “national,” <strong>the</strong> task – though appo<strong>in</strong>ted – is someth<strong>in</strong>g that<strong>the</strong> Germans <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Greeks each freely give <strong>the</strong>mselves precisely <strong>in</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>g takenup as a task. While this, <strong>of</strong> course, <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>the</strong> appropriation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “fire from <strong>the</strong>heavens” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “clarity <strong>of</strong> presentation” respectively, <strong>the</strong> struggle to make <strong>the</strong> taskone’s own serves to transform <strong>the</strong> very structure <strong>of</strong> what it means for <strong>the</strong> endowmentto have been given as an endowment. This is simply to reiterate that for bothHölderl<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, it is <strong>the</strong> excess implicit <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> appropriation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> task thatuniquely opens up <strong>the</strong> space for “learn<strong>in</strong>g.”Where this certa<strong>in</strong>ly presupposes a k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> distance, <strong>the</strong> movement here is not <strong>the</strong>encounter with <strong>the</strong> foreign followed by <strong>the</strong> return to what is one’s own (this would beto reduce <strong>the</strong> generative creativity <strong>of</strong> Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s paradox to a dialectic), but <strong>the</strong>14Ibid.15<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s Hymn “The Ister”, p. 136 <strong>in</strong> English, p. 141 <strong>in</strong> German.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Eccentric <strong>Translation</strong>263transposition or, aga<strong>in</strong>, “cross<strong>in</strong>g over” <strong>of</strong> foreign <strong>and</strong> own as this is accomplished onlythrough <strong>the</strong> task. In an important but underdeveloped passage <strong>Heidegger</strong> writes,“Historical determ<strong>in</strong>ation is always about transform<strong>in</strong>g what has been given, <strong>the</strong>‘national,’ <strong>in</strong>to a task” – an <strong>in</strong>sight echoed <strong>and</strong> given a still more compell<strong>in</strong>g formulationat <strong>the</strong> conclusion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Work <strong>of</strong> Art”: “History is <strong>the</strong> ecstatictransport <strong>of</strong> a people <strong>in</strong>to its task as its return <strong>in</strong>to what has been endowed [Geschichteist die Entrückung e<strong>in</strong>es Volkes <strong>in</strong> se<strong>in</strong> Aufgegebenes als E<strong>in</strong>rückung <strong>in</strong> se<strong>in</strong>Mitgegebenes].” 16 This highlights a crucial po<strong>in</strong>t: The Germans’ encounter with <strong>the</strong>Greek foreign is never just <strong>the</strong> encounter with <strong>the</strong> Greek foreign. Instead, it is alwayssimultaneously <strong>the</strong> encounter with <strong>the</strong> Greeks’ own excessive appropriation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>“clarity <strong>of</strong> presentation” through which <strong>the</strong> Germans are transposed <strong>in</strong>to differentialrelation with what is <strong>the</strong>ir own, <strong>and</strong> transposed <strong>in</strong>to differential relation with whatis <strong>the</strong>ir own only by exceed<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Greeks’ <strong>in</strong> what is <strong>the</strong> Greeks’ own. (Here it isworth not<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> German word for “surpass” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter to Böhlendorff is“übertreffen,” suggest<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> Germans learn how to “hit <strong>the</strong> mark” (treffen)only by overshoot<strong>in</strong>g it.) It is first through <strong>the</strong> excess <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> task that <strong>the</strong> German’senter <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> learn<strong>in</strong>g what is <strong>the</strong>ir own not just as foreign, but from<strong>the</strong> position <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> foreign. This is what it means to be set over not just onto ano<strong>the</strong>rshore, but onto <strong>the</strong> shore <strong>of</strong> an o<strong>the</strong>r.This suggests an importantly different read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s 1935 <strong>in</strong>terpretation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> second choral ode from <strong>the</strong> Antigone <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Introduction to Metaphysics.While a number <strong>of</strong> scholars have called attention to <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ct pathos <strong>of</strong> that<strong>in</strong>terpretation, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s confrontation with Sophocles needs to be understood <strong>in</strong>terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> surpass<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Greek foreign through which <strong>the</strong> Germans are transposed<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own as this becomes uniquely available <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “yes” to<strong>the</strong> tragic downgo<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> capacity to grasp. Here, particular emphasis must begiven to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s conclud<strong>in</strong>g provocation from <strong>the</strong> “Germanien” und “DerRhe<strong>in</strong>” course that “<strong>the</strong> violence <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g must once aga<strong>in</strong> become a real questionfor <strong>the</strong> capacity to grasp.” 17 In o<strong>the</strong>r words, <strong>Heidegger</strong> is not engaged <strong>in</strong> what forsome is simply a heightened version <strong>of</strong> a typically idiosyncratic approach to <strong>the</strong>Greeks (<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> this case one complicated by his comments on <strong>the</strong> Greek polis[pόliV]). Instead, <strong>the</strong> excessive aspect <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s self-confessed <strong>in</strong>terpretiveviolence enacts <strong>the</strong> appropriation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Greek foreign accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> terms laidout <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter to Böhlendorff. The act <strong>of</strong> translation, <strong>the</strong>n, is not limited to<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s “actual” translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ode or even to his three-staged <strong>in</strong>terpretivecommentary on that translation, but is to be found <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tonal excess<strong>of</strong> that <strong>in</strong>terpretive translation, which exactly culm<strong>in</strong>ates with <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ability <strong>of</strong> tέcnhto overpower <strong>the</strong> overpower<strong>in</strong>g.16Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Holzwege, GA 5 (Vittorio Klostermann: Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>, 1977), p. 65.17<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>s Hymnen “Germanien” und “Der Rhe<strong>in</strong>”, p. 294.
264 J.A. Irel<strong>and</strong>2 Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s Eccentric <strong>Translation</strong>Where <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> German <strong>in</strong>to German is enacted for <strong>Heidegger</strong> throughhis dialogue with Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s poetry, which uniquely becomes <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, it is Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s “corrected” translation <strong>of</strong> Sophocles’Greek toge<strong>the</strong>r with his extraord<strong>in</strong>arily literalized experiments with P<strong>in</strong>dar thatprovide <strong>the</strong> best model for what it means to carry through on <strong>the</strong> “undeniable attachments”<strong>and</strong> “unresolvable foreignness” <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation. Such attachmentsare evidenced <strong>in</strong>, for example, not only Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s s<strong>in</strong>gular parataxis, <strong>the</strong>y are<strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sically related to <strong>the</strong> realization <strong>of</strong> what Hölderl<strong>in</strong> calls <strong>the</strong> “Hesperian.” Thatis, <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sically related to how German first comes to speak German through<strong>the</strong> achievement <strong>of</strong> specific poetic effects learned only <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> eccentric or literalizedtranslation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Greek, <strong>and</strong> whose traces Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s new “German” Germanbears. In attempt<strong>in</strong>g to show what is at stake <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se corrections as an extension <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Letter to Böhlendorff, I’ll be draw<strong>in</strong>g from Françoise Dastur’s article, “Hölderl<strong>in</strong><strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Orientalisation <strong>of</strong> Greece,” <strong>and</strong> from Wolfgang B<strong>in</strong>der’s, “Hölderl<strong>in</strong> undSophokles.” 18 In address<strong>in</strong>g Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s P<strong>in</strong>dar experiments, I refer <strong>the</strong> reader toDavid Constant<strong>in</strong>e’s outst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, “Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s P<strong>in</strong>dar: The Language <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>,”whose feel for Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s “translated” German exceeds what I myself am capable<strong>of</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> German. 19 This, <strong>of</strong> course, not only begs its own <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g set <strong>of</strong>questions with respect to translation, it directly perta<strong>in</strong>s to Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s effort to br<strong>in</strong>gforward a still o<strong>the</strong>r foreign <strong>in</strong> his “corrected” version <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Greek “orig<strong>in</strong>al” byway <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German.As I have attempted to show <strong>in</strong> my analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter to Böhlendorff, <strong>the</strong>Greeks <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Germans surpass<strong>in</strong>g appropriation <strong>of</strong> what is <strong>in</strong> each case <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’sown is to serve as a k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> corrective excess for <strong>the</strong> deficient excess <strong>of</strong> what isnative or “orig<strong>in</strong>ally natural” to each. While Hölderl<strong>in</strong>, as we have seen, characterizesthis reciprocal surpass<strong>in</strong>g as “paradoxical,” his 1803–1804 correspondencewith <strong>the</strong> publisher Friedrich Wilmans on his Sophocles translations reveals tha<strong>the</strong> came to see that <strong>the</strong> reversed or <strong>in</strong>verted symmetry between <strong>the</strong> Greeks <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>Germans was haunted by a still deeper <strong>and</strong> unaccounted for asymmetry. And <strong>the</strong>locus <strong>of</strong> this asymmetry is Homer’s literally be<strong>in</strong>g “full <strong>of</strong> soul [seelenvoll].”Carry<strong>in</strong>g through on <strong>the</strong> logic articulated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Letter, this soulfulness not onlyallowed Homer to capture “Western Junonian sobriety,” it <strong>in</strong>itiated <strong>the</strong> German“clarity <strong>of</strong> presentation” while simultaneously anticipat<strong>in</strong>g it as <strong>the</strong> foreign.Though <strong>the</strong> German word “erbeuten” (“to capture”) has connotations <strong>of</strong> “ensnar<strong>in</strong>g”ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>of</strong> “grasp<strong>in</strong>g” as conceptualiz<strong>in</strong>g (“fassen”), Homer’s radical <strong>in</strong>novation18Françoise Dastur, “Hölderl<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Orientalisation <strong>of</strong> Greece.” Pli 10 (2000): 156–173.Wolfgang B<strong>in</strong>der, “Hölderl<strong>in</strong> und Sophokles.” Hölderl<strong>in</strong> Jahrbuch 16 (1969): 19–37.19David Constant<strong>in</strong>e, “Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s P<strong>in</strong>dar: The Language <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>.” The Modern LanguageReview, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Oct., 1978): 825–834.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Eccentric <strong>Translation</strong>265lies, as it were, <strong>in</strong> his captur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “captur<strong>in</strong>g.” Yet what <strong>the</strong> Letter to Böhlendorffimportantly glosses over is how <strong>the</strong> Greeks are to enter <strong>in</strong>to relation with what is<strong>the</strong>ir own, which requires not <strong>the</strong> Germans as <strong>the</strong> foreign “taken <strong>in</strong> itself,” but <strong>the</strong>Germans’ surpass<strong>in</strong>g appropriation <strong>of</strong> what is <strong>the</strong> Greeks’ own. If, as Hölderl<strong>in</strong>writes, <strong>the</strong> Greeks are “unavoidable” for <strong>the</strong> Germans, <strong>the</strong> Germans might bedescribed as “<strong>in</strong>evitable” for <strong>the</strong> Greeks, for Homer’s <strong>in</strong>itiat<strong>in</strong>g by way <strong>of</strong> anticipat<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German foreign curiously presupposes <strong>the</strong> Greek as “given” withoutactually be<strong>in</strong>g able to accomplish it. As Hölderl<strong>in</strong> writes <strong>in</strong> fragment to a late hymncited by both B<strong>in</strong>der <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>:Namely, <strong>the</strong>y [<strong>the</strong> Greeks] wanted to foundA k<strong>in</strong>gdom <strong>of</strong> art. But <strong>in</strong> thisThe patriotic was neglectedby <strong>the</strong>m <strong>and</strong> wretchedly wentGreece, <strong>the</strong> most beautiful, to its downfall.The asymmetry that attaches to Homer’s radical <strong>in</strong>novativeness generates anunexpected symmetry between <strong>the</strong> Greeks <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Germans. Where <strong>the</strong> Germansare subject to deficient excess <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “clarity <strong>of</strong> presentation” as what is <strong>the</strong>ir own,<strong>the</strong> Greeks are subject to a still different excess <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir surpass<strong>in</strong>g appropriation <strong>of</strong>an as yet also unaccomplished foreign – a foreign who, <strong>in</strong> surpass<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Greeks <strong>in</strong>what is <strong>the</strong>ir own, first creates <strong>the</strong> differential excess that would allow <strong>the</strong> Greeks toenter <strong>in</strong>to relation with what is orig<strong>in</strong>ally native to <strong>the</strong>m. This is to say that <strong>the</strong>Greeks succumb to precisely that excess <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> clarity <strong>of</strong> presentation that alsothreatens <strong>the</strong> Germans.Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g awareness <strong>of</strong> this asymmetry leads him to transform bothwhere <strong>and</strong> how he locates a necessary <strong>and</strong> corrective excess at <strong>the</strong> same time hereta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> basic structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> letter to Böhlendorff, with regard to what is apportionedto <strong>the</strong> Greeks <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Germans respectively. In contrast, <strong>the</strong>n, to <strong>the</strong>reciprocal surpass<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Greek <strong>and</strong> German <strong>in</strong> what is <strong>in</strong> each case <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’s own,Hölderl<strong>in</strong> attempts to reach back beh<strong>in</strong>d Homer’s orig<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>novation <strong>in</strong> order tobr<strong>in</strong>g forward through <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> Greek <strong>in</strong>to German a still o<strong>the</strong>r foreignalready resid<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Greek foreign. As Hölderl<strong>in</strong> writes <strong>in</strong> his September 20th,1803 Letter to Wilmans: “I hope that Greek art, which is foreign for us due to <strong>the</strong>national conformism <strong>and</strong> deficiency which it has been able to abide, will thus bepresented <strong>in</strong> more a lively manner to <strong>the</strong> public than is customary by my br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>gout <strong>the</strong> Oriental it had always distanced itself from, <strong>and</strong> by correct<strong>in</strong>g its aes<strong>the</strong>ticdeficiency.”As Wolfgang B<strong>in</strong>der has shown <strong>in</strong> his article “Sophokles und Hölderl<strong>in</strong>,”Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s retranslations <strong>of</strong> key Sophoclen odes attempt to correct <strong>the</strong>se aes<strong>the</strong>ticfaults by restor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “aorgic pr<strong>in</strong>ciple” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> oriental – <strong>the</strong> wild passion <strong>and</strong> driveto undo <strong>in</strong>dividuation that Nietzsche will later designate <strong>the</strong> “Dionysian” – throughwhat Hölderl<strong>in</strong> calls “eccentric enthusiasm.” It is important to be clear that whatHölderl<strong>in</strong> is do<strong>in</strong>g here is not simply translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Greek <strong>in</strong>to German, but <strong>in</strong>steadbr<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Greek <strong>in</strong>to its own through <strong>the</strong> encounter with <strong>the</strong> German foreign,
266 J.A. Irel<strong>and</strong>which peculiarly entails <strong>the</strong> recuperation <strong>of</strong> a still o<strong>the</strong>r foreign. 20 Significantly,however, to “correct” <strong>the</strong> Greeks’ excessive appropriation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German foreignby way <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Oriental is simultaneously to “correct” <strong>the</strong> excess <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>“clarity <strong>of</strong> presentation” as what is <strong>the</strong> Germans own. This, <strong>the</strong>n, is to simultaneouslyaccomplish a Greek that never was, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> so do<strong>in</strong>g to br<strong>in</strong>g German <strong>in</strong>to itsown through <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> a still o<strong>the</strong>r foreign with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> foreign.This <strong>in</strong>vention <strong>of</strong> German through translation is made still more vivid <strong>in</strong>Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s translation experiments with P<strong>in</strong>dar, which come to transform Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’sown poetic language. As Constant<strong>in</strong>e elaborates <strong>in</strong> his article, “Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s P<strong>in</strong>dar:The Language <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>,” Hölderl<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> an extended translation experimentattempted to follow as exactly as possible Gottlob Heyne’s 1798 edition <strong>of</strong> P<strong>in</strong>dar,which divides P<strong>in</strong>dar’s poetry <strong>in</strong>to short <strong>and</strong> purely metrical l<strong>in</strong>es. (Interest<strong>in</strong>gly,this <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>in</strong>cluded Heyne’s divid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual words.) While Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s effortto render P<strong>in</strong>dar <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> most literal possible manner sometimes led to versions <strong>of</strong>poems at <strong>the</strong> limit <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>telligibility, Constant<strong>in</strong>e emphasizes Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s attempt t<strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>d a mechanism that would allow him to “m<strong>in</strong>imally deviate” from <strong>the</strong> Greek <strong>in</strong>order to best approximate <strong>the</strong> poetic effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Greek <strong>in</strong> German. This <strong>in</strong>cluded,for example, when <strong>and</strong> how Hölderl<strong>in</strong> choose to depart from <strong>the</strong> Greek word order<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> effort to achieve, as Constant<strong>in</strong>e writes, “<strong>the</strong> best possible effect for <strong>the</strong> smallestdeparture [from <strong>the</strong> Greek orig<strong>in</strong>al].” 21While Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s debt to P<strong>in</strong>dar has long been acknowledged, at <strong>the</strong> conclusion<strong>of</strong> his article Constant<strong>in</strong>e – who is himself both a poet <strong>and</strong> translator – calls attentionto how Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s translations come to <strong>in</strong>flect his poetry by <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g a k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong>strangeness. Comment<strong>in</strong>g on how Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s mature poetic language “bears <strong>the</strong>Greek <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> most Hölderl<strong>in</strong>ian <strong>of</strong> words, he writes:But my po<strong>in</strong>t is not that <strong>in</strong> read<strong>in</strong>g Hölderl<strong>in</strong> one frequently comes up with Graecisms.Ra<strong>the</strong>r, that his most characteristic <strong>and</strong> powerful usages have a strangeness about <strong>the</strong>m,<strong>the</strong>y shock <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d, almost as though <strong>the</strong>y had been translated — <strong>and</strong> from where? His use<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word ‘Gespräch’ for example…It is as though <strong>the</strong> word has connotations <strong>in</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>rlanguage — tones <strong>and</strong> overtones which <strong>the</strong> poet had appropriated, <strong>and</strong> was <strong>in</strong>duc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to hisnative German. 22While Constant<strong>in</strong>e does not connect Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s P<strong>in</strong>dar experiments with <strong>the</strong>Letter to Böhldendorff <strong>in</strong> this particular article (he <strong>in</strong>cludes a discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>20As Dastur writes <strong>in</strong> referr<strong>in</strong>g to B<strong>in</strong>der <strong>in</strong> “Hölderl<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Orientalisation <strong>of</strong> Greece”: “We aredeal<strong>in</strong>g with a triple project: That <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> transcription <strong>of</strong> one language <strong>in</strong>to ano<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>of</strong> Greek <strong>in</strong>toGerman; but also <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> transposition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>to a state <strong>of</strong> accomplishment it has missedby draw<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> oriental under <strong>the</strong> Greek; f<strong>in</strong>ally an accomplishment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hesperian itself, s<strong>in</strong>ce<strong>the</strong> oriental constitutes its cultural tendency. For Hölderl<strong>in</strong> this means nei<strong>the</strong>r transpos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>Greek <strong>in</strong>to German, which would no longer be Greek, nor carbon copy<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> German from<strong>the</strong> Greek, which would still be Greek, but unreadable to us. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, it means correct<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> excess<strong>of</strong> art which led Greece to its downfall by mak<strong>in</strong>g its oriental nature appear, which is to say, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>end translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Greek <strong>in</strong>to Greek by lett<strong>in</strong>g it pass <strong>in</strong>to ano<strong>the</strong>r language <strong>and</strong> accomplish<strong>in</strong>gwhat it could not br<strong>in</strong>g itself to good end,” p. 173.21Constant<strong>in</strong>e, “Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s P<strong>in</strong>dar: The Language <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>,” p. 831.22Constant<strong>in</strong>e, “Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s P<strong>in</strong>dar: The Language <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>,” p. 834.
<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Eccentric <strong>Translation</strong>267Letter <strong>in</strong> his book, Hölderl<strong>in</strong>), it is clear that this strangeness reflects <strong>the</strong> translation<strong>of</strong> German <strong>in</strong>to German as this is learned only through <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> Greek <strong>in</strong>toGerman. In contrast to Emad’s privileg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> a generic conception <strong>of</strong> “<strong>the</strong> foreignnessthat rules between languages,” this strangeness, toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> unplaceable, butfamiliar “connotation” would seem to po<strong>in</strong>t back to <strong>the</strong> “undeniable attachments”<strong>and</strong> “unresolvable foreignness” at issue <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation. This, f<strong>in</strong>ally, cannotbe separated from <strong>in</strong>nerl<strong>in</strong>gual translation. In answer to Constant<strong>in</strong>e’s question,“from where?,” <strong>the</strong> alternative to <strong>the</strong> silence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> root-unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> language wouldbe this very strangeness, which marks <strong>the</strong> presence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> foreign not just with<strong>in</strong>what is one’s own, but that has elicited or occasioned <strong>the</strong> movement <strong>of</strong> com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>toone’s own <strong>and</strong> whose irreducibility po<strong>in</strong>ts beyond itself <strong>in</strong> bear<strong>in</strong>g witness to <strong>the</strong>specificity <strong>of</strong> its attachments as difference.Acknowledgement I want to thank Tom Davis for his conversations about my work, <strong>and</strong> for hiscomments on an early draft <strong>of</strong> this paper. I also wish to acknowledge <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>of</strong> WilliamMcNeill, who first called my attention to <strong>the</strong> significance <strong>of</strong> Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s Dec. 4th, 1801 Letter toBöhlendorff while we were translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s Hymn “The Ister.”ReferencesB<strong>in</strong>der, Wolfgang. 1969. Hölderl<strong>in</strong> und Sophokles. Hölderl<strong>in</strong> Jahrbuch 16: 19–37.Constant<strong>in</strong>e, David. 1978. Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s P<strong>in</strong>dar: The language <strong>of</strong> translation. The Modern LanguageReview 73(4): 825–834.Dastur, Françoise. 2000. Hölderl<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> orientalisation <strong>of</strong> Greece. 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Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1980. Hölderl<strong>in</strong>s Hymnen “Germanien” und “Der Rhe<strong>in</strong>”, GA 39. Frankfurtam Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann..<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1982. Hölderl<strong>in</strong>s Hymne “Andenken”, GA 52. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1984. Hölderl<strong>in</strong>s Hymne “Der Ister”, GA 53. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann. Trans. William McNeill <strong>and</strong> Julia Davis. 1997. Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s Hymn “The Ister”.Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2000. Zu Hölderl<strong>in</strong>—Griechenl<strong>and</strong>reisen, GA 75. Vittorio Klostermann:Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>.Pfau, Thomas (ed.). 1988. Friedrich Hölderl<strong>in</strong>: <strong>Essays</strong> <strong>and</strong> letters on <strong>the</strong>ory. Albany: SUNY Press.Schmidt, Dennis J. 2001. On Germans <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Greeks: Tragedy <strong>and</strong> ethical life. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton:Indiana University Press.Szondi, Peter. 1978. Überw<strong>in</strong>dung des Klassizimus: Der Brief an Böhlendorff vom 4. Dezember1801. In Schriften: I, 345–366. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Individuation, Responsiveness, <strong>Translation</strong>:<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s EthicsEric Sean Nelson[T]he transcendence <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g is dist<strong>in</strong>ctive <strong>in</strong> that it implies <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>necessity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most radical <strong>in</strong>dividuation (GA 2, p. 51). 1ale<strong>the</strong>ue<strong>in</strong> (άlhq∈ύ∈<strong>in</strong>) means to be disclos<strong>in</strong>g, to remove <strong>the</strong> world from concealedness<strong>and</strong> coveredness. And that is a mode <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> human Dase<strong>in</strong>. It appears first <strong>of</strong> all <strong>in</strong>speak<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> speak<strong>in</strong>g with one ano<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>in</strong> lege<strong>in</strong> (lέg∈<strong>in</strong>). 21 IntroductionMart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time has been repeatedly criticized for ignor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>social <strong>and</strong> ethical dimensions <strong>of</strong> human existence. After discuss<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> possibility<strong>of</strong> an “ethics <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuation” based on passages from The Fundamental Concepts<strong>of</strong> Metaphysics, I argue that <strong>Heidegger</strong> is not concerned with develop<strong>in</strong>g a social ormoral philosophy as such but with <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> how <strong>in</strong>dividuation (Vere<strong>in</strong>zelung),with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> horizon <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>), is possible given <strong>the</strong> predom<strong>in</strong>ance1<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, GA 2 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977). Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>Time. Translated by J. Macquarrie <strong>and</strong> E. Rob<strong>in</strong>son (New York: Harper <strong>and</strong> Row, 1962) <strong>and</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> Time. Translated by Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY University Press, 1996).2<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Platon: Sophistes, GA 19 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1992c). Plato’s Sophist, trans.Richard Rojcewicz <strong>and</strong> André Schuwer (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1997), pp. 17–18;also compare GA 2, p. 44. All <strong>Heidegger</strong> references are to <strong>the</strong> pag<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gesamtausgabe(Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975–ongo<strong>in</strong>g) unless o<strong>the</strong>rwise noted.E.S. Nelson (*)Department <strong>of</strong> Philosophy, University <strong>of</strong> MassachusettsLowell, University Ave.,1854 Lowell, MA, USAe-mail: eric_nelson@uml.eduF. Schalow (ed.), <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad, Contributions To Phenomenology 65,DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0_14, © Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media B.V. 2011269
270 E.S. Nelson<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> social <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> fallenness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public sphere. 3 The priority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> questionconcern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuation <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> – <strong>and</strong> its explication through <strong>the</strong> alterity <strong>of</strong>uncann<strong>in</strong>ess, facticity, <strong>and</strong> death <strong>in</strong> relation to <strong>the</strong> identity <strong>of</strong> tradition <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>y”(das Man) – provides a basis for reth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ethical <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> Time, especially <strong>in</strong> light <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s earlier venture <strong>of</strong> a hermeneutics <strong>of</strong>facticity <strong>and</strong> related works <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> late 1920s. Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>Heidegger</strong> unfolds <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>itude<strong>and</strong> facticity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ethical, as a question to which ethical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g needs torespond, <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong>timates an ethics <strong>of</strong> facticity. In <strong>the</strong> conclusion, I consider <strong>the</strong>implications <strong>of</strong> such an ethics <strong>and</strong> responsibility for issues <strong>of</strong> language <strong>and</strong> translation<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s reversal <strong>of</strong> ethics <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time is not done <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong>ano<strong>the</strong>r ethical position or view, such as egoism, nor for <strong>the</strong> sake <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unethical.It is <strong>in</strong>stead a performance <strong>and</strong> stag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> very question <strong>of</strong> ethics <strong>in</strong> its facticity.<strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong>terrogates ethics as embodied <strong>in</strong> tradition <strong>and</strong> everyday life <strong>in</strong> order todisclose possibilities that rema<strong>in</strong> hidden <strong>in</strong> discourses appeal<strong>in</strong>g to axioms, pr<strong>in</strong>ciples,values, <strong>and</strong> virtues. 4 These unnoticed <strong>and</strong> suppressed possibilities are <strong>in</strong>timated<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s discussions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> existential structures <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> such asconscience, guilt, solicitude, or concern for o<strong>the</strong>rs, <strong>and</strong> care. The com<strong>in</strong>g to freedom<strong>and</strong> responsibility <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuation <strong>of</strong> human be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>the</strong>re – with itsthreefold equiprimordial structure <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-itself, be<strong>in</strong>g-with o<strong>the</strong>rs (Mitse<strong>in</strong>), <strong>and</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g-amidst th<strong>in</strong>gs – occurs or is enacted as a response to <strong>the</strong> facticity <strong>of</strong> one’s ownexistence, especially as disclosed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>escapability <strong>of</strong> one’s death.2 Ethics <strong>and</strong> IndividuationIn <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuation <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, we are confrontedwith <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial problem that it is habitually not seen as an issue at all. Individuationis already self-evident, s<strong>in</strong>ce we are all already <strong>in</strong>dividuals. If it is questioned at all,it is <strong>in</strong>terpreted as <strong>the</strong> particularization <strong>of</strong> a universal, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stantiation <strong>of</strong> a type,differentiation accord<strong>in</strong>g to a category, <strong>and</strong> affiliation with or alienation from some3I reta<strong>in</strong> “fallenness” as a translation <strong>of</strong> Verfallenheit, because (1) <strong>the</strong> word does not mean “fall<strong>in</strong>gprey” <strong>and</strong> (2) <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong>tentionally transforms reified <strong>the</strong>ological concepts, such as conscience,fallenness, <strong>and</strong> guilt by phenomenologically relat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m to concrete phenomena.4My read<strong>in</strong>g departs from <strong>in</strong>terpretations <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> that def<strong>in</strong>e ethics <strong>in</strong> an exclusively limited<strong>and</strong> negative sense. Gail Stenstad, for <strong>in</strong>stance, suggests that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g has no ethicaldimension <strong>and</strong> that imput<strong>in</strong>g any ethics would violate “what <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is try<strong>in</strong>g toaccomplish.” However, even as she rejects ethics as derivative <strong>and</strong> useless <strong>the</strong>oriz<strong>in</strong>g, as <strong>the</strong> opposite<strong>of</strong> dwell<strong>in</strong>g, she discusses claims that have a broader ethical dimension, such as hold<strong>in</strong>g oneselfopen to what is, listen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> respond<strong>in</strong>g to th<strong>in</strong>gs, etc., or that have a tacit ethical dimension<strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as be<strong>in</strong>g open, listen<strong>in</strong>g to, <strong>and</strong> dwell<strong>in</strong>g with th<strong>in</strong>gs suggests an ethos (e˝qoV), accustomedplace, or way <strong>of</strong> life ra<strong>the</strong>r than a secondary ontic fact <strong>of</strong> human existence. See Transformations:<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> After <strong>Heidegger</strong> (Madison: University <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press, 2006), especially 183–185,197–198.
Individuation, Responsiveness, <strong>Translation</strong>: <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Ethics271given authority or identity. It is accord<strong>in</strong>gly ei<strong>the</strong>r reduced to numerical, physical<strong>and</strong> spatial differentiation or a belong<strong>in</strong>g to a pregiven genus or fixed essence forwhich “becom<strong>in</strong>g oneself” is a redundant question.For <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuation is an issue concern<strong>in</strong>g not “what”but “who” one is. It is bound up with <strong>the</strong> enigma <strong>of</strong> how <strong>the</strong> self can know itself <strong>in</strong>its facticity, that is, that which resists <strong>the</strong> self <strong>and</strong> its appropriations, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g itsown self, compell<strong>in</strong>g factical-life to <strong>in</strong>terpret <strong>and</strong> translate itself. <strong>Heidegger</strong>described such questions, <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> self questions itself concern<strong>in</strong>g itself <strong>and</strong> asa whole (GA 29/30, p. 20), as existential or metaphysical. 5 They disclose myself asa question to myself.<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s employment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German word Vere<strong>in</strong>zelung (<strong>in</strong>dividuation) suggestsa break or separation <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> “becom<strong>in</strong>g one” or <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g reduced ontooneself. Although <strong>the</strong>y need not co<strong>in</strong>cide <strong>in</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary German, <strong>Heidegger</strong> identifiesVere<strong>in</strong>zelung with lonel<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>and</strong> solitude (E<strong>in</strong>samkeit) <strong>in</strong> The FundamentalConcepts <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics:This <strong>in</strong>dividuation is ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> solitar<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>in</strong> which each human be<strong>in</strong>g first <strong>of</strong> all enters<strong>in</strong>to a nearness to what is essential <strong>in</strong> all th<strong>in</strong>gs, a nearness to world. What is this solitude,where each human be<strong>in</strong>g will be as though unique? (GA 29/30, p. 8).Why does this <strong>in</strong>dividuation, <strong>the</strong> s<strong>in</strong>gularity that is not just a particular <strong>in</strong>stance<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> universal <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g as though unique, require solitude? In this need, is it noth<strong>in</strong>gbut a flight <strong>and</strong> escapism, such as that attributed to <strong>the</strong> Daoist hermit, <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong>illusory tranquility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rural solitude <strong>of</strong> some mounta<strong>in</strong> stream or forest path?Perhaps. Yet more significantly, for <strong>Heidegger</strong>, solitude is a condition not <strong>of</strong> escap<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> world but <strong>of</strong> encounter<strong>in</strong>g it. Solitar<strong>in</strong>ess is a prerequisite <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuationbecause <strong>the</strong> latter breaks with <strong>the</strong> constant noise <strong>of</strong> normal <strong>in</strong>difference <strong>in</strong> order tonear <strong>and</strong> hear <strong>the</strong> world. Individuation is a k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> transcendence (GA 2, p. 51), astepp<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>of</strong> oneself toward <strong>the</strong> world. The break <strong>of</strong> immanence (transcendence)is necessary for <strong>the</strong> happen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> a “step back from” that is equally a “stepp<strong>in</strong>g out<strong>in</strong>to” <strong>and</strong> allow<strong>in</strong>g to be seen. Solitude, as separation from participation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>uoushum <strong>of</strong> everydayness, is <strong>the</strong> breakdown <strong>of</strong> connection through encounter<strong>in</strong>gf<strong>in</strong>itude. The uniqueness <strong>of</strong> self <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs does not arise from <strong>the</strong> imposition <strong>of</strong> aview, prescription or imperative (i.e., “ethics” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> traditional sense) but emerges<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>dicative,” self-disclos<strong>in</strong>g moment <strong>of</strong> “com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to one’s own” – whicheven <strong>in</strong> his early lecture-courses is not merely an ontic occurrence – <strong>of</strong> lett<strong>in</strong>g worldbe encountered <strong>and</strong> said (i.e., “ethics” <strong>in</strong> a phenomenological sense). 65<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, GA 29/30 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann, 1992). The Fundamental Concepts <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics, trans. William McNeill <strong>and</strong>Nicholas Walker (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1995).6Parvis Emad speaks <strong>of</strong> “l<strong>in</strong>guistic event” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s later th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>, “<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>More Deeply <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>: Essential <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>Language,” <strong>in</strong> Read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Commemorations, ed. John Sallis (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: IndianaUniversity Press, 1993), p. 333. For a defense <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s early use <strong>of</strong> Ereignis alsoas “com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to one’s own,” see Parvis Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions toPhilosophy (Madison: University <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press, 2007), pp. 25–26.
272 E.S. NelsonAs a response to f<strong>in</strong>itude, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> facticity that one is, <strong>in</strong>dividuation is abecom<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ite. S<strong>in</strong>ce f<strong>in</strong>itude is <strong>the</strong> way <strong>in</strong> which humans exist or dwell, it is not amere “fact” about human nature. Nor is encounter<strong>in</strong>g one’s own f<strong>in</strong>itude equivalent toidealistically reduc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> world to <strong>the</strong> ego <strong>and</strong> its concerns, as such egoism is part <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> average everydayness that is <strong>in</strong> question. On <strong>the</strong> contrary, accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>Heidegger</strong>:F<strong>in</strong>itude is not some property that is merely attached to us, but is our fundamental way <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g. If we wish to become what we are, we cannot ab<strong>and</strong>on this f<strong>in</strong>itude or deceiveourselves about it, but must safeguard it. Such preservation is <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>nermost process <strong>of</strong> ourbe<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ite, i.e., it is our <strong>in</strong>nermost becom<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ite. F<strong>in</strong>itude only is <strong>in</strong> truly becom<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ite.In becom<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ite, however, <strong>the</strong>re ultimately occurs an <strong>in</strong>dividuation <strong>of</strong> man with respect tohis Dase<strong>in</strong>. Individuation – this does not mean that man cl<strong>in</strong>gs to his frail little ego that puffsitself up aga<strong>in</strong>st someth<strong>in</strong>g or o<strong>the</strong>r which it takes to be <strong>the</strong> world (GA 29/30, p. 8).This tak<strong>in</strong>g-up, safeguard<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> preserv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>itude can be seen as an “ethics<strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>itude.” It is not ethics <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard sense <strong>of</strong> prescrib<strong>in</strong>g universal rules <strong>and</strong>systems <strong>of</strong> axioms, values, or virtues to follow, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>Heidegger</strong> rejected “ethics” aslegislation <strong>and</strong> calculation. Such an ethics is not about <strong>the</strong> formation <strong>of</strong> a set <strong>of</strong>values, world-view, or ideology at all, much less some supposed “spiritual” <strong>and</strong>“cultural” warfare, but open<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>the</strong>ir questionability <strong>in</strong> expos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> self to itsworld. The possibility <strong>of</strong> this ethics should be separated from (while confront<strong>in</strong>g)<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own “fallen” ideological engagement, which was perhaps due to bl<strong>in</strong>dnessto <strong>the</strong> pervasiveness <strong>and</strong> power <strong>of</strong> ideology <strong>and</strong> value th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.The early <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s emphasis on <strong>the</strong> transformative moment – or s<strong>in</strong>gularization –<strong>of</strong> com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to one’s own (i.e., <strong>in</strong> his early usage <strong>of</strong> words such as Ereignis <strong>and</strong>Geschehen) <strong>and</strong> renewal <strong>in</strong> performative enactment (Vollzug), <strong>in</strong> contrast with <strong>the</strong>dom<strong>in</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> custom <strong>and</strong> op<strong>in</strong>ion that passes th<strong>in</strong>gs along, allows respond<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong>world out <strong>of</strong> its openness <strong>and</strong> givenness anew. Destructur<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> orderto attempt to trace that which throws views, values, <strong>and</strong> constructs <strong>in</strong>to question <strong>in</strong>order to let <strong>the</strong> world, self, <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r be encountered. This is not ethics <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> conventionalsense <strong>of</strong> legislat<strong>in</strong>g laws, moraliz<strong>in</strong>g about virtues, or prescrib<strong>in</strong>g values.However, it is deeply ethical <strong>in</strong> that such confrontation engages <strong>and</strong> potentiallyreleases its own tradition, historicity, hermeneutical situation, <strong>and</strong> generation. Theprospect <strong>of</strong> such a phenomenological ethics depends on whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>dividuation, as abreak that opens <strong>and</strong> discloses o<strong>the</strong>r possibilities for dwell<strong>in</strong>g, is even th<strong>in</strong>kable. 73 Indifference <strong>and</strong> IndividuationThe orient<strong>in</strong>g issue <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time is <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. Yet ra<strong>the</strong>rthan provid<strong>in</strong>g a classical philosophical analysis <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, or ontology, <strong>Heidegger</strong><strong>in</strong>terrogates <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g via <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> that be<strong>in</strong>g who exam<strong>in</strong>es its own7On <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> a different ethos <strong>and</strong> poetics <strong>of</strong> responsive dwell<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> its environmentalsignificance, see E. S. Nelson, “Respond<strong>in</strong>g to Heaven <strong>and</strong> Earth: Daoism, <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> Ecology,”Environmental Philosophy, 1/2 (Fall 2004): 65–74.
Individuation, Responsiveness, <strong>Translation</strong>: <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Ethics273way or mode <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time asks <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g but does so byaddress<strong>in</strong>g that be<strong>in</strong>g which questions itself. He calls this be<strong>in</strong>g, which we <strong>in</strong> eachcase are, Dase<strong>in</strong>. Far from be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> philosophical anthropology that Husserl feared,much less an encyclopedic or systematic account <strong>of</strong> human nature, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sanalytic <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> focused on a sparse number <strong>of</strong> aspects <strong>of</strong> human existence <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>an eccentric way from <strong>the</strong> perspective <strong>of</strong> modern social philosophy. <strong>Heidegger</strong> didnot beg<strong>in</strong> with <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual as an essence or atomic fact from which to constructsociety through power, markets, contracts, <strong>and</strong> convents. His analysis takes as itspo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> departure Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> its “neutrality,” <strong>in</strong> what he calls <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>difference” <strong>of</strong>everydayness, <strong>and</strong> proceeds to exam<strong>in</strong>e situations that broach <strong>the</strong> significance<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> self by plac<strong>in</strong>g this <strong>in</strong>difference <strong>in</strong> question.Average everyday life is not <strong>in</strong>different <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Kantian sense <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g dis<strong>in</strong>terestedor Stoic impartiality. It is not <strong>the</strong> absolute <strong>in</strong>difference experienced <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>oundboredom, unconcerned with all affairs, which <strong>Heidegger</strong> described <strong>in</strong> TheFundamental Concepts <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics. Instead, through its self-<strong>in</strong>terested concernwith everyday th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> affairs, it is <strong>in</strong>different to that which would throw light oncharacter <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> plight <strong>of</strong> its own existence. It is <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se situations, where <strong>the</strong>everyday <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary become questionable, that <strong>the</strong> grip <strong>of</strong> everyday <strong>in</strong>differenceis broken. The difference <strong>in</strong>dicated <strong>in</strong> this break<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> “one” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>“<strong>the</strong>y” (das Man) is doubled <strong>in</strong>to two <strong>in</strong> order to become <strong>the</strong> “one” <strong>of</strong> oneself(vere<strong>in</strong>zelt), is <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuation. Individuation as <strong>the</strong> break with<strong>in</strong>difference can take place because Dase<strong>in</strong>’s neutrality is already broken by <strong>the</strong>facticity <strong>of</strong> its existence: “The be<strong>in</strong>g that we <strong>in</strong> each case are, <strong>the</strong> human is <strong>in</strong> itsessence neutral. We call this be<strong>in</strong>g Dase<strong>in</strong>. Yet it belongs to what is ownmost toneutral Dase<strong>in</strong> that it has a necessarily broken neutrality, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as it <strong>in</strong> each casefactically exists” (GA 27, p. 146) [trans. modified]. 8The transition from be<strong>in</strong>g lost <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> facticity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>difference, conformity, <strong>and</strong>compulsion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>y” (das Man) to <strong>the</strong> self-<strong>in</strong>dividuation <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> what<strong>Heidegger</strong> calls au<strong>the</strong>nticity (Eigentlichkeit) requires that <strong>the</strong> self can be a questionto <strong>and</strong> for itself precisely <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> through its facticity. <strong>Heidegger</strong> accord<strong>in</strong>gly contends<strong>in</strong> §9 that <strong>the</strong> analytic <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> cannot beg<strong>in</strong> with Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> its difference,qua actually exist<strong>in</strong>g concrete <strong>in</strong>dividual, but ra<strong>the</strong>r with its common <strong>in</strong>difference oraverageness. For <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Dase<strong>in</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g “must be developed from <strong>the</strong> existentiality<strong>of</strong> its existence. This cannot mean, however, that ‘Dase<strong>in</strong>’ is to be construedfrom out <strong>of</strong> a concrete possible idea <strong>of</strong> existence. At <strong>the</strong> outset <strong>of</strong> our analysis, it isparticularly important that Dase<strong>in</strong> should not be <strong>in</strong>terpreted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> difference <strong>of</strong> adef<strong>in</strong>ite way <strong>of</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g, but that it should be uncovered <strong>in</strong> its <strong>in</strong>different characterwhich it is proximally <strong>and</strong> for <strong>the</strong> most part. This <strong>in</strong>difference is not noth<strong>in</strong>g, but apositive phenomenal characteristic <strong>of</strong> this be<strong>in</strong>g” (GA 2, p. 58, emphasis added).Although <strong>the</strong> goal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> analytic <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> will be Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> its difference (<strong>in</strong>dividuation),its factical possibilities (existence) are not straightforwardly available <strong>in</strong>average everydayness.8<strong>Heidegger</strong>, E<strong>in</strong>leitung <strong>in</strong> die Philosophie, GA 27 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 2001).
274 E.S. NelsonDifference rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong>visible to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>difference <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>y.” 9 Average ord<strong>in</strong>arylife dwells <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> familiarity <strong>of</strong> its self-underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g without see<strong>in</strong>g its possibilitiesor hear<strong>in</strong>g “who” (not “that”) it is. The familiarity <strong>and</strong> compulsion <strong>of</strong> common lifepresents itself as certa<strong>in</strong>, obvious, <strong>and</strong> unquestionable. In this context <strong>of</strong> conventionalhear<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> read<strong>in</strong>g, “we hear only what we already underst<strong>and</strong>.” 10 Thishabitual <strong>and</strong> customary reproduction <strong>of</strong> power <strong>in</strong> our very senses was analyzed byAdorno, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> music <strong>and</strong> – needless to say – from a different perspective,as a retrogression <strong>in</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g as listeners are transformed <strong>in</strong>to consumers. 11 Sucheveryday hear<strong>in</strong>g is all <strong>the</strong> more coercive, however, because it is not merely superimposedby an external system upon <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>nocent” lifeworld, <strong>and</strong> hence easilycorrectable through a new consensus, but already comprises <strong>the</strong> fabric <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> everydaylifeworld itself. Although <strong>Heidegger</strong> was not <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> ideology-critique orprescrib<strong>in</strong>g “ownedness” as a normative end or st<strong>and</strong>ard, s<strong>in</strong>ce he rejected ethics<strong>and</strong> critique <strong>in</strong> this sense, his thought still has consequences for such th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g giventhis account <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>herent non-<strong>in</strong>nocence <strong>of</strong> everydayness. Dom<strong>in</strong>ion achieved through<strong>the</strong> public sphere <strong>and</strong> civil society, through everyday beliefs <strong>and</strong> practices, is consequentlymuch more unquestioned <strong>and</strong> pervasive than any hegemony based on <strong>in</strong>stitutionsalone.It is repeatedly forgotten that fallenness, accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> logic <strong>of</strong> temporalizationat work <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, is not so much spatial – fallen from heaven – as it istemporal. Everyday existence is not simply a “social reality” but is itself a mode <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> time, it is fallenness <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> present. For fallen everydayness, accord<strong>in</strong>g toits temporality <strong>of</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> present without encounter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> moment, everyth<strong>in</strong>gis an extension <strong>of</strong> its own present. Although it underst<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> lives <strong>the</strong> past<strong>and</strong> future as mere extensions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present, <strong>and</strong> as guaranteed by history, memorial,<strong>and</strong> progress, <strong>the</strong> absolutized perspective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present is itself historicallyformed <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ite. The Augenblick, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stant or moment, is an encounter withone’s own temporal f<strong>in</strong>itude <strong>and</strong>, as such, potentially a break <strong>in</strong> which decision <strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>dividuation can occur. Yet human existence is not only challenged by its present.Be<strong>in</strong>g related to a past that cannot fully be mastered <strong>and</strong> a future that is not simplya reproduction <strong>of</strong> its own present, <strong>the</strong> identity <strong>of</strong> lifeworld <strong>and</strong> common sense are9Interest<strong>in</strong>gly, <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> nam<strong>in</strong>g difference rema<strong>in</strong>s deeply problematic for <strong>Heidegger</strong>. See,for example, Peter Trawny’s <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>appearance” or “<strong>in</strong>visibility” (Unsche<strong>in</strong>barkeit)<strong>of</strong> difference <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought. Trawny’s essay explores <strong>the</strong> complexity <strong>of</strong> difference, <strong>the</strong>multiple ways <strong>in</strong> which difference is enacted, <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought. Difference is itself no longerdifference when it is understood, accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> logic <strong>of</strong> identity, as a first pr<strong>in</strong>ciple or ground.This presents <strong>Heidegger</strong> with <strong>the</strong> impossibility <strong>of</strong> identify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> nam<strong>in</strong>g difference, s<strong>in</strong>ce differenceas difference withdraws <strong>and</strong> withholds itself. Peter Trawny, “Die unsche<strong>in</strong>bare Differenz.”Phénoménologie Française et Phénoménologie Allem<strong>and</strong>e, ed. E. Escoubas <strong>and</strong> B. Waldenfels(Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000), pp. 65–102.10Kenneth Maly, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Possibility: Language, Emergence – Say<strong>in</strong>g Be-<strong>in</strong>g (Toronto:University <strong>of</strong> Toronto Press, 2008), p. 85.11T. W. Adorno, “Über den Fetischcharakter <strong>in</strong> der Musik und die Regression des Hörens,” <strong>in</strong> GS14: Dissonanzen; E<strong>in</strong>leitung <strong>in</strong> die Musiksoziologie (Frankurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2003), p. 18.
Individuation, Responsiveness, <strong>Translation</strong>: <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Ethics275always implicitly questionable. Everyday existence avoids such questionability <strong>in</strong>its “flight” from this unknown past <strong>and</strong> unknowable future, because exposure to thistemporality, to <strong>the</strong> ecstatic character <strong>of</strong> time, throws its self-certa<strong>in</strong>ty <strong>and</strong> selfunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>to question.Dase<strong>in</strong> is first <strong>of</strong> all to be understood out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> social <strong>in</strong>difference <strong>in</strong> which it isusually affected <strong>and</strong> moved. Yet, via <strong>the</strong> very affectivity <strong>and</strong> motility <strong>in</strong>dicated <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> self’s average everydayness, <strong>Heidegger</strong> articulated Dase<strong>in</strong>’s possibilities forunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> enact<strong>in</strong>g its existence <strong>in</strong> its difference <strong>and</strong> s<strong>in</strong>gularity. Thisis done through <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terruption <strong>of</strong> everyday <strong>in</strong>difference, which allows <strong>the</strong> releasement<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> everyday. These <strong>in</strong>terruptions occur through experiences <strong>of</strong> limits,which Karl Jaspers had described as “boundary situations.” 12 These disruptions arenot merely negative <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>convenient, but disclose <strong>the</strong> very character <strong>of</strong> existence <strong>in</strong>its facticity <strong>and</strong> possibility. The differentiation <strong>of</strong> existence occurs through <strong>the</strong> possibilitiesdisclosed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> breaks <strong>and</strong> disruptions <strong>of</strong> everydayness itself. It is differenceitself that reveals possibilities for <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuation <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>. Although alterityis h<strong>in</strong>ted at <strong>in</strong> Jaspers’s notion <strong>of</strong> “boundary-situation,” it rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong>adequate for<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuation <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as it fails to enact <strong>the</strong> questionability<strong>of</strong> existence. As merely o<strong>the</strong>r, alterity <strong>and</strong> difference can always be re<strong>in</strong>tegratedback <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>difference <strong>of</strong> everydayness, just as <strong>the</strong>re is a k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> “newness” <strong>and</strong>apparent variety that is actually more <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same <strong>in</strong> contrast with <strong>the</strong> phenomenologicallynew (GA 20, pp. 32–33).Indifferent everydayness <strong>in</strong>volves a repetition without difference <strong>and</strong> withoutrenewal. The broken hammer can be replaced, anxiety can be forgotten, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>strangeness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> stranger can be <strong>in</strong>tegrated or excluded accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> norms <strong>of</strong>everydayness. Interruption alone cannot <strong>in</strong>dividuate <strong>the</strong> self, but ra<strong>the</strong>r how Dase<strong>in</strong>responds to <strong>in</strong>terruption is <strong>the</strong> key to its <strong>in</strong>dividuation: Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> break itself isrecognized as such <strong>and</strong> its questionability <strong>in</strong>tensified or whe<strong>the</strong>r it is excluded asnonsense – as <strong>the</strong> “noth<strong>in</strong>g” is habitually disclosed <strong>in</strong> average existence – or – likedeath – <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> identity <strong>of</strong> everydayness. The questionability <strong>of</strong> suchexperiences <strong>and</strong> situations needs to be embraced <strong>and</strong> deepened if radical <strong>in</strong>dividuationis to occur. This is why <strong>Heidegger</strong> emphasized <strong>the</strong> moment <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g pushed <strong>and</strong>shaken (Stoß) <strong>in</strong> his description <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> call <strong>of</strong> conscience: “In <strong>the</strong> disclosive tendency<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> call, lies <strong>the</strong> moment (Moment) <strong>of</strong> a push (Stoß), <strong>of</strong> an abrupt arousal(Aufrütteln). The call is from afar unto afar” (GA 2, p. 360). This be<strong>in</strong>g called is abe<strong>in</strong>g pushed <strong>and</strong> shaken <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> call, s<strong>in</strong>ce ord<strong>in</strong>ary hear<strong>in</strong>g does not listen to it.Dase<strong>in</strong>, as be<strong>in</strong>g-with o<strong>the</strong>rs, can listen to o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>and</strong> does so <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>of</strong>everydayness. The average self loses itself <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> undifferentiated talk <strong>of</strong> everydaynesssuch that it hears yet fails to listen. Thus, accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Dase<strong>in</strong> “failsto hear its own self <strong>in</strong> listen<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>y-self.” Lost <strong>in</strong> this average <strong>in</strong>different12<strong>Heidegger</strong> developed <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> death <strong>in</strong> proximity to Jaspers’ notion <strong>of</strong> “Grenzsituation” but<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly differentiates <strong>the</strong>m. See, for example, Der Begriff der Zeit, GA 64 (Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004), p. 48. I discuss <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>adequacy <strong>of</strong> Jaspers’“boundary-situation” for <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong> “Question<strong>in</strong>g Practice: <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Historicity <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>Hermeneutics <strong>of</strong> Facticity.” Philosophy Today, 44 (2001): 150–159.
276 E.S. Nelsonhear<strong>in</strong>g, Dase<strong>in</strong> “fails to hear <strong>in</strong> that it listens away to <strong>the</strong> ‘<strong>the</strong>y’” (GA 2, p. 360).The call <strong>of</strong> conscience <strong>in</strong>terrupts ord<strong>in</strong>ary hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> discloses ano<strong>the</strong>r possibilityfor hear<strong>in</strong>g: “This hear<strong>in</strong>g-to [or ‘listen<strong>in</strong>g away’ (H<strong>in</strong>hören) to <strong>the</strong> ‘<strong>the</strong>y’] must bebroken, i.e., <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>in</strong>terrupts it must be givenby Dase<strong>in</strong> itself. The possibility <strong>of</strong> such a break consists <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g called-onto(Angerufen) without mediation” (GA 2, p. 360).The <strong>in</strong>dividuation <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>, which is <strong>in</strong> each case a be<strong>in</strong>g with o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>world, is not enacted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> everyday relationship between self <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. This relationshipis itself usually characterized by <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>difference <strong>of</strong> everydayness. Instead,this enactment occurs only when <strong>the</strong> questionability <strong>of</strong> existence <strong>in</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>g-with isenacted. It is precisely such experiences <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terruption <strong>and</strong> uncann<strong>in</strong>ess that <strong>in</strong>dividuateDase<strong>in</strong>, when it hears <strong>the</strong> claim addressed to it <strong>in</strong> such experiences, <strong>and</strong> thuslets difference appear (GA 2, pp. 366–368, 372, 406–407). 13The call <strong>of</strong> conscience is a call by oneself onto be<strong>in</strong>g oneself. As such, it <strong>in</strong>terrupts<strong>the</strong> identity <strong>of</strong> everydayness to let s<strong>in</strong>gularity, responsiveness to it, <strong>and</strong> responsibilityfor it, appear. Angst, however, does not proceed from <strong>and</strong> back to oneself<strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as it, as possibility, <strong>in</strong>terrupts <strong>the</strong> very be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> self. Angst <strong>in</strong>dividuates<strong>in</strong> relation to <strong>the</strong> non-relational that can at any time strike (GA 2, pp. 250–251, 253–254).That is, it s<strong>in</strong>gularizes Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> regard to <strong>the</strong> ownmost (eigensten), non-relational(unbezüglichen), <strong>and</strong> unbeatable (unüberholbaren) possibility <strong>of</strong> its own death(GA 2, pp. 332–333). The unavoidable possibility <strong>of</strong> death confronts each thrownexistence as its own death, as a death that addresses “me” by end<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> thus radicallyplac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> question <strong>the</strong> very m<strong>in</strong>eness <strong>of</strong> my existence. This possibility is nonrelational<strong>in</strong> that it cannot be ordered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> relationality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world but placesrelationality itself <strong>in</strong>to question. Death is not ano<strong>the</strong>r relation; it appears as <strong>the</strong> relationlessas such. Death appears as someth<strong>in</strong>g that cannot be “outstripped” or “beaten.”Dase<strong>in</strong> runs <strong>in</strong> after or away from death, yet it does not overcome <strong>the</strong> death it isexpect<strong>in</strong>g or avoid <strong>the</strong> death it is flee<strong>in</strong>g. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than be<strong>in</strong>g someth<strong>in</strong>g Dase<strong>in</strong> canmaster, death masters Dase<strong>in</strong> each time. Death rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> its difference someth<strong>in</strong>gthat cannot be sublimated (unaufhebbar), mediated (unvermittelbar), <strong>and</strong> thoughtrelationally (unbezüglich; GA 2, pp. 332–333). 14 It <strong>in</strong>dicates <strong>the</strong> fundamentalthrownness <strong>in</strong>to facticity <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> limits <strong>of</strong> “transcendental-horizonalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g,” which is an issue that <strong>Heidegger</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ues to return to <strong>and</strong> reth<strong>in</strong>k <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>Contributions to Philosophy. 15 Dase<strong>in</strong> is <strong>in</strong>capable <strong>of</strong> conceptualiz<strong>in</strong>g or master<strong>in</strong>g13The <strong>in</strong>tersection <strong>of</strong> familiarity <strong>and</strong> unfamiliarity (proximity <strong>and</strong> distance) is already a topic <strong>in</strong>1919. The disruption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> familiar presupposes <strong>the</strong> stability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> familiar that is thrown <strong>in</strong>toquestion. Compare, for example, <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 58(Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992b), p. 251.14Compare David Wood’s argument that death <strong>and</strong> angst “make significance tremble” <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>ra<strong>the</strong>r than be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> naive virile mastery <strong>of</strong> death that Lev<strong>in</strong>as suggested. The Deconstruction <strong>of</strong>Time, 2nd edition (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001), p. xxiii.15Parvis Emad, “On ‘Be-<strong>in</strong>g:’ The Last Part <strong>of</strong> Contributions to Philosophy,” <strong>in</strong> C. Scott, et al.,Companion to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press,2001), p. 233.
Individuation, Responsiveness, <strong>Translation</strong>: <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Ethics277death, s<strong>in</strong>ce death withdraws from be<strong>in</strong>g understood (GA 2, pp. 332–333). It is <strong>in</strong>this sense that <strong>the</strong> death <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r cannot be represented (GA 2, pp. 319–321).For <strong>Heidegger</strong>, it is only <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> shadow <strong>of</strong> one’s own death <strong>in</strong> which this nonrelationalityoccurs <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> nexus <strong>of</strong> worldly significance is broken.At first, it seemed that average everydayness had <strong>the</strong> first <strong>and</strong> last word, <strong>and</strong> that<strong>in</strong>terruptions could always be reappropriated <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrated back <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> same. Yet,with <strong>the</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong> fundamental non-relationality <strong>in</strong> anxiety, <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s analysis is reversed. It is not uncann<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>and</strong> questionability that arederivatives <strong>of</strong> everydayness; it is everydayness that presupposes <strong>the</strong> uncann<strong>in</strong>ess<strong>and</strong> questionability that it suppresses: “That k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world which istranquilized <strong>and</strong> familiar is a mode <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s uncann<strong>in</strong>ess, not <strong>the</strong> reverse. Froman existential-ontological po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> view, <strong>the</strong> ‘not-at-home’ must be conceived as <strong>the</strong>more primordial phenomenon” (GA 2, p. 252). <strong>Heidegger</strong> would <strong>in</strong>sist on <strong>the</strong> fundamentalhomelessness <strong>of</strong> “man” almost 10 years later <strong>in</strong> his Contributions toPhilosophy: “Be-<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>the</strong> hearth-fire <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> midst <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> abode <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gods – anabode which is simultaneously <strong>the</strong> estrang<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> man (<strong>the</strong> ‘between’ [das Zwischen]<strong>in</strong> which he rema<strong>in</strong>s a (<strong>the</strong>) stranger, precisely when he is at home with be<strong>in</strong>gs)”[GA 65, pp. 486–487/343]. 16 Existence is primordially strange <strong>and</strong> foreign, we donot even know what “man” – or “<strong>the</strong> human” – is (GA 29/30, p.10), <strong>and</strong> we rema<strong>in</strong>strangers to ourselves (GA 29/30, p. 6). It is not <strong>the</strong> identity <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>difference <strong>of</strong>everydayness that is primary. S<strong>in</strong>gularity <strong>and</strong> difference are constitutive <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>through its openness as well as its uncann<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>and</strong> questionability. The self is eachtime a question to itself.4 Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> Its O<strong>the</strong>rLev<strong>in</strong>as criticized <strong>the</strong> primacy <strong>of</strong> one’s own death <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> proposed analternative approach <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> death <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r always takes precedence. 17Is <strong>the</strong>re not after all a testimony <strong>of</strong>/to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> her death, one that suggests <strong>the</strong>ethical relation to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r ra<strong>the</strong>r than absorption <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> egoism <strong>of</strong> self-concern?One could even formulate Lev<strong>in</strong>as’s po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> a way such as to alleviate some“<strong>Heidegger</strong>ian” concerns: Could <strong>the</strong>re not be a testimony to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r that is outside16<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Beiträge zur Philosophie: (Vom Ereignis), GA 65 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann, 1989). Contributions to Philosophy: From Enown<strong>in</strong>g, trans. Parvis. Emad <strong>and</strong>Kenneth Maly (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1999).17<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s presence haunts Lev<strong>in</strong>as’s thought such that it is frequently present even when<strong>Heidegger</strong> is not explicitly discussed. Lev<strong>in</strong>as’s most extensive discussion <strong>and</strong> critique <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>on issues such as death can be found <strong>in</strong> his later work God, Death, <strong>and</strong> Time, trans. Bett<strong>in</strong>a Bergo(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). Also, compare <strong>the</strong> discussions <strong>of</strong> Lev<strong>in</strong>as <strong>and</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong> by Berasconi, Raffoul, <strong>and</strong> Wood <strong>in</strong> Address<strong>in</strong>g Lev<strong>in</strong>as. Edited by Eric Sean Nelson,Antje Kapust, Kent Still (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005).
278 E.S. Nelson<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conceptuality <strong>and</strong> relationality <strong>of</strong> representational th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g; could <strong>the</strong>re be awitness<strong>in</strong>g that does not underm<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> non-relationality <strong>and</strong> non-identity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r’s death as <strong>in</strong> each case its own? This last question raises <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sreference to Tolstoy: “In his story ‘The Death <strong>of</strong> Ivan Ilyich’ Leo Tolstoy haspresented <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disruption <strong>and</strong> breakdown <strong>of</strong> hav<strong>in</strong>g someonedie” (GA 2, p. 338n). A simple statement, yet one that <strong>in</strong>dicates that testimony <strong>and</strong>witness<strong>in</strong>g are not necessarily <strong>the</strong> average everyday response to <strong>the</strong> death <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r, although <strong>the</strong>y can occur through <strong>the</strong> disruption <strong>and</strong> breakdown.The “ownmost” <strong>of</strong> death is not possessiveness <strong>and</strong> its “m<strong>in</strong>eness” is not egoism,s<strong>in</strong>ce possessiveness <strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>eness <strong>in</strong>dicate that <strong>the</strong>y are questions for oneself(myself) that place oneself (me) <strong>in</strong>to question <strong>and</strong> not some o<strong>the</strong>r person somewhereelse. Perhaps, follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> care, one needs to see one’s owndeath <strong>in</strong> order to care for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’s death, s<strong>in</strong>ce this breaks <strong>the</strong> uncar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>difference<strong>of</strong> everydayness that does not care for <strong>the</strong> self or <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. In that sense, it ismore than <strong>the</strong> recognition <strong>of</strong> not be<strong>in</strong>g able to live <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’s death. Death placesme <strong>in</strong>to question, addresses me as a question, precisely by be<strong>in</strong>g my death. If dea<strong>the</strong>scapes representation <strong>and</strong> relationality, <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’s death can be a question for mealthough I do not experience or live-through what it was like for her from her perspective.This is because death is a limit to experience ra<strong>the</strong>r than some content thatcould be reproduced from one m<strong>in</strong>d to ano<strong>the</strong>r. It is m<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> that it occurs to every“I” each time alone. It is not m<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> a possession that I control s<strong>in</strong>ce itcontrols me. Dase<strong>in</strong> does not possess itself <strong>in</strong> death but is, on <strong>the</strong> contrary, “shattered”(GA 2, p. 509). <strong>Heidegger</strong> would transform this claim <strong>in</strong> his Introduction toMetaphysics, where he described how <strong>the</strong> human be<strong>in</strong>g, who responds to <strong>the</strong> violence<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g through violence, shatters on death (GA 40, p. 167/168), <strong>and</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ueswith <strong>the</strong> claim that <strong>the</strong> violence-do<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> human Dase<strong>in</strong> “must shatter aga<strong>in</strong>st<strong>the</strong> excessive violence <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g” (GA 40, p. 171/173). 18 <strong>Heidegger</strong> also commented<strong>in</strong> his Contributions to Philosophy on <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>g shattered<strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time: “But underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g is throughout just <strong>the</strong> opposite,nay even essentially o<strong>the</strong>r than mak<strong>in</strong>g this underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g dependent uponhuman <strong>in</strong>tention. How is be<strong>in</strong>g still to be made subjective at that place when whatcounts is <strong>the</strong> shatter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject?” (GA 65, pp. 455–456/321).The self cannot have itself <strong>the</strong>n as a possession or consolidate itself as “<strong>the</strong> Self,”accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>Heidegger</strong>, s<strong>in</strong>ce it is already thrown <strong>in</strong>to a world <strong>in</strong> which it is not <strong>the</strong>center <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> which it is be<strong>in</strong>g decentered. Dase<strong>in</strong> is not only ek-static, it is essentiallydecentered or “ek-centric” (GA 27, p. 11). Even if Lev<strong>in</strong>as’s objection isunconv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> problem runs deeper. Dase<strong>in</strong> is not an identical subject that canonly be <strong>in</strong>terrupted by ano<strong>the</strong>r. Dase<strong>in</strong> is already distant <strong>and</strong> foreign to itself, suchthat <strong>the</strong> alterity <strong>and</strong> difference <strong>of</strong> uncann<strong>in</strong>ess constitute its very mode <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g.Dase<strong>in</strong> is thrown <strong>in</strong>to facticity not as a general self or subject (GA 27, p. 5) but as18<strong>Heidegger</strong>, E<strong>in</strong>führung <strong>in</strong> die Metaphysik, GA 40 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann,1983). For an English translation, see Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried <strong>and</strong>Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
Individuation, Responsiveness, <strong>Translation</strong>: <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Ethics279“each time” (je-weilig) <strong>and</strong> “<strong>in</strong> each case its own” (je-me<strong>in</strong>ig). It is <strong>the</strong>refore one’sown death, not <strong>the</strong> death <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, which <strong>in</strong>dicates <strong>the</strong> most radical alterity <strong>and</strong>s<strong>in</strong>gularity. Be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>the</strong>re is <strong>in</strong> each case “my own” each s<strong>in</strong>gular time without sublimation,mediation, or relationality (i.e., Unaufhebbarkeit, Unvermittelbarkeit <strong>and</strong>Unbezüglichkeit). 19 Death as <strong>the</strong> most extreme possibility determ<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> facticity <strong>of</strong>existence. 20 As facticity, it cannot be overcome or withstood.Dase<strong>in</strong> is constituted as be<strong>in</strong>g outside <strong>of</strong> itself <strong>and</strong> outside <strong>in</strong> a world, exist<strong>in</strong>g asthrown beyond itself as ek-static <strong>and</strong> outside itself as ek-centric (GA 27, p.11),which literally means be<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>of</strong> orbit. The self <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> is <strong>the</strong>n both near <strong>and</strong>distant to itself. This familiar <strong>and</strong> unfamiliar self occurs <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> through everydayness<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuation <strong>of</strong> uncann<strong>in</strong>ess. Individuation as Vere<strong>in</strong>zelung is a s<strong>in</strong>gularizationthrough <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terruption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> identity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>y,” <strong>the</strong> open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>difference that Dase<strong>in</strong> already is as each time its own. Yet, this s<strong>in</strong>gularization <strong>of</strong>Dase<strong>in</strong> as thrownness <strong>in</strong> a specific situation does not necessarily imply isolation if itbr<strong>in</strong>gs Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> entirety <strong>of</strong> its relations <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> midst <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs (GA 27, p. 334).The separation <strong>and</strong> solitude <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuation might be isolat<strong>in</strong>g but this does notby itself make it egoism or solipsism.One can describe Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>appropriable connectedness, thatis, a contextuality that centers, decenters, <strong>and</strong> recenters human existence. In this relationality,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g its “relation” to <strong>the</strong> non-relational, Dase<strong>in</strong> is both dependent <strong>and</strong>free <strong>in</strong> its relations to th<strong>in</strong>gs, o<strong>the</strong>rs, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> world. The relation to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r exemplifiesthis <strong>in</strong>appropriable relationality <strong>in</strong> that Dase<strong>in</strong> cannot take <strong>the</strong> place <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r.The o<strong>the</strong>r’s existence withdraws from appropriation <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as it is each time <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>each case its own. Thus, “I am never <strong>the</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, although I can be withhim.” 21 For <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “time is <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuation” <strong>and</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> is its ownway <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g its time. 22 Dase<strong>in</strong> is <strong>in</strong>herently s<strong>in</strong>gulariz<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> start, s<strong>in</strong>ce it is itstime. It is temporal. It is not only <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> moment but is each time its moment. 2319See François Raffoul’s analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “each time m<strong>in</strong>e” <strong>of</strong> Jeme<strong>in</strong>igkeit <strong>in</strong> his <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>Subject (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1998), 215–221. Also, compare John van Buren’s account<strong>of</strong> haecceitas <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> difference, facticity, <strong>and</strong> s<strong>in</strong>gularity <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s habilitation onDuns Scotus. The Young <strong>Heidegger</strong> (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 105–107.20<strong>Heidegger</strong> already connected facticity <strong>and</strong> death <strong>in</strong> 1924. See, for <strong>in</strong>stance, GA 64, p. 51.21I cannot be <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r but only be with her, this entails that Dase<strong>in</strong> cannot overcome <strong>the</strong> asymmetry<strong>of</strong> self <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. This not due to <strong>the</strong> “irrationality <strong>of</strong> lived experience” or “<strong>the</strong> limitedness<strong>and</strong> uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty <strong>of</strong> knowledge” but is constitutive <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g that Dase<strong>in</strong> is (GA 64, p. 47).The alterity seen by Lev<strong>in</strong>as <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> death <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r does not have <strong>the</strong> same power for <strong>Heidegger</strong>.Ra<strong>the</strong>r than plac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> self <strong>in</strong>to question, <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’s death is <strong>in</strong>differently re<strong>in</strong>tegrated accord<strong>in</strong>gto <strong>the</strong> maxim that “one dies” (GA 64: 49). However, as <strong>in</strong> his exam<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> The Death <strong>of</strong> IvanIlyich, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s description <strong>of</strong> such <strong>in</strong>difference does not entail that he is advocat<strong>in</strong>g it.22GA 64, pp. 57, 82–83.23Compare Frank Schalow’s analysis <strong>of</strong> temporality as diversity <strong>and</strong> plurality <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong> hisarticle “Decision, Dilemma, Disposition: The Incarnatedness <strong>of</strong> Ethical Action,” Existentia 12/3–4(2002), especially pp. 249–250. I would argue <strong>in</strong> addition that this follows <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s early strategy<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> formal <strong>in</strong>dication <strong>of</strong> facticity: Ontological difference opens up <strong>the</strong> plurality <strong>of</strong> ontic difference,time <strong>the</strong> s<strong>in</strong>gularity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> moment.
280 E.S. NelsonIn <strong>the</strong> relation <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> to its o<strong>the</strong>r, it can attempt to take this away from <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r by leap<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>, tak<strong>in</strong>g over, “underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g better,” or it can promote <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’s<strong>in</strong>dividuation. Thus, <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicated a different k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> relation <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r is to rema<strong>in</strong> free. In solicitude or car<strong>in</strong>g-for (Fürsorge) <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, as ownmostcare, Dase<strong>in</strong> does not leap <strong>in</strong> for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> order to take <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’s care away, butra<strong>the</strong>r is affected by it <strong>in</strong> order to give it back to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. Car<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> its“care” does not imply tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’s care away (abzunehmen), but <strong>in</strong>stead meansto overtake it (übernehmen) <strong>in</strong> order to return it (zurückzugeben). Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as Dase<strong>in</strong>leaps ahead for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>stead <strong>of</strong> leap<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>, it does so for <strong>the</strong> sake <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rra<strong>the</strong>r than for itself. It takes up <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r not to appropriate her but precisely <strong>in</strong>order to br<strong>in</strong>g her to her own be<strong>in</strong>g as care. Solicitude or car<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’s careis not <strong>the</strong> reduction <strong>of</strong> my responsibility to promot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> responsibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>stead <strong>of</strong>, for example, help<strong>in</strong>g someone <strong>in</strong> genu<strong>in</strong>e need. It is more than <strong>the</strong> moralm<strong>in</strong>imalism <strong>of</strong> abstract <strong>in</strong>dividualism <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as it <strong>in</strong>dicates <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> areciprocal <strong>in</strong>dividuation <strong>in</strong> which each has its own be<strong>in</strong>g, as freedom <strong>and</strong> care,promoted.Individuation <strong>in</strong>volves differentiat<strong>in</strong>g oneself from common life – <strong>in</strong> its averageness<strong>and</strong> fallenness – while tak<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>the</strong> responsibility <strong>of</strong> shar<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rfrom out <strong>of</strong> this difference. This difference is a between that separates <strong>and</strong> b<strong>in</strong>ds,suggest<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>in</strong>dividuation cannot be fulfilled. It happens only out <strong>of</strong> its impossibility.As <strong>Heidegger</strong> already argued <strong>in</strong> 1924, fallenness is constitutive <strong>of</strong> facticity(GA 64, p. 51). As such, it rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong>appropriable. If Dase<strong>in</strong> never overcomes,much less outlasts, its confrontation with its own death, <strong>the</strong>n au<strong>the</strong>nticity can atmost only be a modification <strong>of</strong> facticity: “The ownmost be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> is what itis only <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as it is unownedly owned, that is, ‘preserved’ <strong>in</strong> itself. [Ownedness] isnot anyth<strong>in</strong>g that should or could exist for itself next to <strong>the</strong> unowned” (GA 64, p. 81).Instead <strong>of</strong> transcendence be<strong>in</strong>g an o<strong>the</strong>rworldly condition or <strong>the</strong> formation <strong>of</strong> anisolated sovereign <strong>in</strong>dividual, ownedness <strong>in</strong>dicates an altered way <strong>of</strong> relat<strong>in</strong>g toone’s unowned everydayness. It is not to “shake <strong>of</strong>f” tradition <strong>and</strong> everydayness,which is constitutive <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>itude <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> thus <strong>in</strong>escapable, but to appropriateit more primordially (GA 2, p. 291). Yet, as this appropriation is always relatedto <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>appropriable, transcendence can only be a response to – <strong>and</strong> tak<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>of</strong>responsibility for – facticity. That is, freedom is tak<strong>in</strong>g up one’s responsibility <strong>in</strong> itsfacticity (GA 64, p. 54). If responsibility is <strong>in</strong>evitably each time one’s own yetenacted <strong>in</strong> relations with o<strong>the</strong>rs, <strong>and</strong> freedom is a response to facticity (<strong>the</strong> awaken<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> possibilities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> facticity that one is), <strong>the</strong>n ethics is always already <strong>the</strong> ethics<strong>of</strong> facticity.The “giv<strong>in</strong>g back” <strong>of</strong> care also clarifies <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>appropriable relatednessby reveal<strong>in</strong>g a relation <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r is not mediated by one’s own but is promotedprecisely as be<strong>in</strong>g o<strong>the</strong>r than myself: “This solicitude which essentially perta<strong>in</strong>sto au<strong>the</strong>ntic care; that is, <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>and</strong> not to a what which ittakes care <strong>of</strong>, helps <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r to become transparent to himself <strong>in</strong> his care <strong>and</strong> freefor it” (GA 2, p. 163). <strong>Heidegger</strong> clarified this “be<strong>in</strong>g-for-<strong>the</strong>-o<strong>the</strong>r” fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> his1928/1929 lecture course Introduction to Philosophy. There, he described how<strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-with-one-ano<strong>the</strong>r consists <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-open-for-one-ano<strong>the</strong>r
Individuation, Responsiveness, <strong>Translation</strong>: <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Ethics281(Für-e<strong>in</strong><strong>and</strong>er-<strong>of</strong>fenbar-se<strong>in</strong>), an openness for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r that allows reciprocity <strong>and</strong>its lack to be possible (GA 27, p. 88). As <strong>Heidegger</strong> later ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed, underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g(verstehen) is not an <strong>in</strong>different mutuality but a reciprocal plac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to question.Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g is not an encounter between two fixed positions that somehowrema<strong>in</strong> unchanged <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir communication, or concludes <strong>in</strong> conversion, but is differentiationthrough address<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> question<strong>in</strong>g both oneself <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r out <strong>of</strong>care (GA 13, pp. 17, 20). 24 Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g is enacted through a confrontation <strong>and</strong>conflict <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r places one’s own <strong>in</strong> question, <strong>and</strong> vice versa, transform<strong>in</strong>gthose who engage <strong>in</strong> it (GA 13, p. 20). Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g thus requires both (1) <strong>the</strong>long last<strong>in</strong>g will <strong>of</strong> listen<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong> (2) <strong>the</strong> courage to one’s own determ<strong>in</strong>ation(GA 13, p. 21).5 The Be<strong>in</strong>g-with <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>Lev<strong>in</strong>as <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs have criticized <strong>Heidegger</strong> for subjectivism <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividualism<strong>and</strong> argued that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought is <strong>in</strong>herently unable to th<strong>in</strong>k <strong>the</strong> social <strong>and</strong>ethical. 25 In response, I have argued that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s work h<strong>in</strong>ts at an “ethics <strong>of</strong>facticity” or f<strong>in</strong>itude <strong>in</strong> proceed<strong>in</strong>g from an <strong>in</strong>different commonality to <strong>the</strong> possibility<strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuation through <strong>the</strong> difference <strong>in</strong>/<strong>of</strong> experience itself. This <strong>in</strong>dividuationrequires <strong>the</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> what <strong>Heidegger</strong> describes as conscience, freedom, <strong>and</strong>responsibility. Although <strong>Heidegger</strong> rejected <strong>the</strong> terms “ethics” for various historicalreasons, it is clear that his project has an ethical dimension <strong>and</strong> significance. In addition,ra<strong>the</strong>r than exclud<strong>in</strong>g sociality, his account <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuation shows how it isuniquely possible as free from dom<strong>in</strong>ation (i.e., tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r over) <strong>and</strong> as promot<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’s Dase<strong>in</strong> as care, freedom, <strong>and</strong> responsibility. 26One should not forget that Dase<strong>in</strong> is “always already” be<strong>in</strong>g-with <strong>and</strong> that be<strong>in</strong>gwithis a fundamental equiprimordial determ<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>. The“with” occurs not because <strong>of</strong> identity or because Dase<strong>in</strong> is made alike but ra<strong>the</strong>rbecause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re” (GA 27, p. 137). Dase<strong>in</strong> encounters o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> how<strong>the</strong>y give <strong>the</strong>mselves because it is <strong>the</strong> open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>re (GA 27, p. 136). Becausebe<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>the</strong>re is be<strong>in</strong>g-with, be<strong>in</strong>g-with cannot be derived from <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject24<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (1910–1976), GA 13 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann, 1983).25Lev<strong>in</strong>as <strong>in</strong>terprets Dase<strong>in</strong> as a fundamentally non-<strong>in</strong>tersubjective subjectivity. See BernhardWaldenfels, Phänomenologie <strong>in</strong> Frankreich, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998), p. 236.26The owned (eigentliche) is related back to one’s own (eigene). Ownedness had an explicitlysocial as well as temporal dimension <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early1920s, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> relation to “one’s own” meansopen<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>the</strong> possibilities available to one to <strong>in</strong>dividuate oneself “<strong>in</strong> one’s own time <strong>and</strong> generation”(PIA, p. 248): <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige derhermeneutischen Situation),” H.U. Less<strong>in</strong>g (ed.), Dil<strong>the</strong>y-Jahrbuch, 6 (1989): 237–69.
282 E.S. Nelson(GA 27, p. 133), nor <strong>the</strong> self from <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r (GA 27, p. 135), nor <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “I/you” relationthat simply doubles <strong>the</strong> solipsistic subject (GA 27, pp. 141, 146). Sociality <strong>and</strong> community,<strong>and</strong> every form <strong>of</strong> “I/you” relation, are only possible because Dase<strong>in</strong> iseach time <strong>in</strong> its own way already with o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>and</strong> is, as such, a be<strong>in</strong>g-with-o<strong>the</strong>rs(GA 27, p. 141). Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>the</strong>re is be<strong>in</strong>g-with-o<strong>the</strong>rs, Dase<strong>in</strong> is alwaysalready spoken to <strong>and</strong> addressed by <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r (GA 29/30, p. 301). The self, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>aras it listens to <strong>and</strong> hearkens to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, is always already placed <strong>in</strong>to question by<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong> pulled out toward responsibility for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> care: Care as care for <strong>the</strong>self <strong>in</strong>herently is bound to <strong>the</strong> care for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. As owned, Dase<strong>in</strong> cannot step<strong>in</strong>, take over, <strong>and</strong> occupy its place but can only promote <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’s self-care. The answer,<strong>the</strong> b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g responsibility that br<strong>in</strong>gs Dase<strong>in</strong> to choice <strong>and</strong> decision (WDF, p. 169),is care. 27 Care discloses <strong>the</strong> difference <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> average be<strong>in</strong>g-with <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ownmost possibility <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-with, <strong>in</strong> which Dase<strong>in</strong> first st<strong>and</strong>s <strong>in</strong> relations directedtoward o<strong>the</strong>rs. 28The question <strong>of</strong> community <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuation is not <strong>the</strong>n a question <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>ferr<strong>in</strong>ga collective subject from an <strong>in</strong>dividual one or <strong>of</strong> deduc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual from <strong>the</strong>collective. It is nei<strong>the</strong>r about an ahistorical <strong>and</strong> worldless self nor a social organismthat allows no difference. 29 <strong>Heidegger</strong> had already suggested this <strong>in</strong> his W<strong>in</strong>tersemester 1921–1922 lecture course, when he made <strong>the</strong> case that <strong>the</strong> self-world isnei<strong>the</strong>r identical to <strong>the</strong> ego nor can it be isolated from be<strong>in</strong>g-with <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> environ<strong>in</strong>gworld (GA 61, p. 96). 30 The question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-with cannot be one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenologicalconstitution or construction <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-with from out <strong>of</strong> one’s own self consideredas an isolated ego or subject (GA 29/30, p. 302). Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as be<strong>in</strong>g-with is tobe understood as a structure <strong>of</strong> everydayness, it too must be transformed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>modification <strong>of</strong> everydayness that occurs through <strong>in</strong>dividuation. Dase<strong>in</strong> is <strong>in</strong> eachcase my own such that I am never <strong>the</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r but only with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r.Consequently, Dase<strong>in</strong> never becomes <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r but is ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>dividuated <strong>in</strong> such away that <strong>in</strong> becom<strong>in</strong>g itself, it becomes o<strong>the</strong>rwise than itself <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> becom<strong>in</strong>g o<strong>the</strong>rwisethan itself s<strong>in</strong>gularly becomes itself. Individuation is not a closed isolatedprocess such that <strong>the</strong> nearness to <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>y” would be lost. Dase<strong>in</strong> cannot comportitself as be<strong>in</strong>g-with without listen<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>y” <strong>and</strong> without cultivat<strong>in</strong>g its ability27WDF: <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Wilhelm Dil<strong>the</strong>ys Forschungsarbeit und der gegenwärtige Kampf um e<strong>in</strong>ehistorische Weltanschauung. 10 Vorträge.” Dil<strong>the</strong>y-Jahrbuch, 8 (1992–93): 143–180.28Dase<strong>in</strong> is, as Nancy <strong>and</strong> Raffoul have established, a s<strong>in</strong>gular-plural <strong>in</strong>dication. See Jean-LucNancy, Be<strong>in</strong>g S<strong>in</strong>gular Plural. Translated by R. Richardson <strong>and</strong> A. O’Byrne (Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 2000), 6–7 <strong>and</strong> Raffoul, 1998: 215–221. Br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to consideration Kisiel <strong>and</strong>van Buren’s work on <strong>the</strong> logic <strong>of</strong> formal <strong>in</strong>dication only streng<strong>the</strong>ns this argument. See TheodoreKisiel, The Genesis <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time (Berkeley: University <strong>of</strong> California Press,1993) <strong>and</strong> van Buren, 1994: 324–347.29<strong>Heidegger</strong> not only rejected <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> a “worldless ‘I’” but also would later criticize <strong>the</strong> moredangerous shapes <strong>in</strong> which this worldless subject is absorbed <strong>in</strong>to “someth<strong>in</strong>g greater,” such as lifeor <strong>the</strong> Volk (GA 65, p. 321/225; also compare IM: 54/74).30<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles, GA 61 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann, 1994).
Individuation, Responsiveness, <strong>Translation</strong>: <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Ethics283to hear beyond what is usually <strong>and</strong> for <strong>the</strong> most part said <strong>in</strong> order to achieve aresponsive hear<strong>in</strong>g that takes <strong>in</strong>to consideration a be<strong>in</strong>g-with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r that is also abe<strong>in</strong>g-for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r (GA 2, pp. 163, 217). Responsiveness thus implies responsibility,<strong>and</strong>, yet, it cannot occur without <strong>the</strong> confrontation <strong>and</strong> conflict with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r for <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r (GA 27, pp. 22–23, 327).6 Be<strong>in</strong>g-with o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Responsiveness <strong>of</strong> Hear<strong>in</strong>gFollow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation staked out <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> previous sections <strong>of</strong> this paper,<strong>Heidegger</strong> did not turn to <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> self or self-sameness to <strong>the</strong> exclusion<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r as well as <strong>the</strong> alterity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world <strong>and</strong> one’s own self. The <strong>in</strong>dividuation<strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>g-with unfolds through hear<strong>in</strong>g. This does not occur as a process<strong>of</strong> identification or empathy, but ra<strong>the</strong>r it only occurs through differentiation<strong>and</strong> becom<strong>in</strong>g o<strong>the</strong>r. All underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g is <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>in</strong> this sense differentiat<strong>in</strong>g confrontation(Ause<strong>in</strong><strong>and</strong>ersetzung). Dase<strong>in</strong> transforms itself <strong>in</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>g-with preciselythrough <strong>the</strong> responsibility for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> encounter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r.Individuation signifies more than recognition <strong>of</strong> difference <strong>and</strong> alterity. Individuation<strong>and</strong> differentiation occur not as a progressive teleological development but throughone’s own questionability <strong>and</strong> uncann<strong>in</strong>ess. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is thus a question<strong>in</strong>ganswer<strong>in</strong>gresponsiveness <strong>in</strong> relation to <strong>the</strong> facticity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> thrownness <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>.The historicity <strong>of</strong> thrownness <strong>in</strong>to one’s own generation <strong>and</strong> world signifies <strong>the</strong>impossibility <strong>of</strong> a pure responsiveness that would occur without <strong>in</strong>terruption <strong>and</strong>conflict, without <strong>the</strong> historicity <strong>and</strong> dest<strong>in</strong>y <strong>in</strong> which Dase<strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ds itself. This impliesthat Dase<strong>in</strong> cannot recognize ano<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>and</strong> by implication translate, without differentiat<strong>in</strong>gitself <strong>and</strong> its o<strong>the</strong>r. Difference occurs not as <strong>in</strong>different lack <strong>of</strong> contact <strong>and</strong>isolation but ra<strong>the</strong>r, as a turn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> language through <strong>the</strong> word, as <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> cross<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> between.Dase<strong>in</strong> is frequently referred to by <strong>Heidegger</strong> as an orig<strong>in</strong>ary unified phenomenon,but this unity belongs to difference itself. For example, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> late 1920s,<strong>Heidegger</strong> described it as <strong>the</strong> transcendence <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> its noth<strong>in</strong>gness <strong>and</strong> lack <strong>of</strong>bear<strong>in</strong>g (GA 27, p. 354). Dase<strong>in</strong> is thus <strong>in</strong> each case already betrayed <strong>and</strong> endangered<strong>in</strong> its transcendence-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world (GA 27, p. 358). It belongs to “<strong>the</strong> eachtime <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> facticity <strong>of</strong> transcendence” (GA 27, p. 367). As such, humans do not first<strong>of</strong> all observe <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>quire. Human Dase<strong>in</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>s o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>and</strong> “<strong>in</strong>tuits <strong>the</strong> world”through encounter <strong>and</strong> confrontation (GA 27, pp. 367–368, 382–390). Ontologicaldifference is not <strong>the</strong> monistic closure but opens up <strong>the</strong> radical diversity <strong>of</strong> onticdifferences <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g its formal <strong>in</strong>dication, which is not only a phenomenology<strong>of</strong> phenomena but a hermeneutics <strong>of</strong> read<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g texts. 3131On <strong>the</strong> hermeneutical context <strong>and</strong> character <strong>of</strong> formal <strong>in</strong>dication, see E. S. Nelson, “Question<strong>in</strong>gPractice,” 150–159; <strong>and</strong> “Die formale Anzeige der Faktizität als Frage der Logik,” <strong>in</strong> AlfredDenker <strong>and</strong> Holger Zaborowski, eds., <strong>Heidegger</strong> und die Logik (Amsterdam <strong>and</strong> Atlanta: EditionsRodopi BV, 2006a), pp. 31–48.
284 E.S. NelsonThe hermeneutic circle <strong>in</strong> its openness <strong>and</strong> deferral is already explicated as amovement <strong>of</strong> translation <strong>in</strong> Dil<strong>the</strong>y, for whom transposition between self <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>roperates as translation <strong>and</strong> retranslation. 32More radically, ownedness is not a psychological category <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>. Theau<strong>the</strong>nticity <strong>of</strong> existence, as a communicative enown<strong>in</strong>g, is only possible as address<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g addressed, hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> respond<strong>in</strong>g; that is, as a responsive hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore claims <strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time that “Listen<strong>in</strong>g to … is <strong>the</strong>existential be<strong>in</strong>g-open <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> as be<strong>in</strong>g-with for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. Hear<strong>in</strong>g even constitutes<strong>the</strong> primary <strong>and</strong> resolute openness <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong> for its ownmost possibility <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g, as <strong>in</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> voice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> friend whom every Dase<strong>in</strong> carries with it.Dase<strong>in</strong> hears because it underst<strong>and</strong>s. As be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world that underst<strong>and</strong>s, witho<strong>the</strong>rs, it ‘listens to’ (hörig) itself <strong>and</strong> Mitdase<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> this listen<strong>in</strong>g (Hörigkeit)belongs (zugehörig)” to <strong>the</strong>se (GA 2, p. 217). Listen<strong>in</strong>g to o<strong>the</strong>rs is a belong<strong>in</strong>g to<strong>the</strong>m. Yet, <strong>the</strong>re could be no belong<strong>in</strong>g as listen<strong>in</strong>g without difference, s<strong>in</strong>ce o<strong>the</strong>rwisenoth<strong>in</strong>g would need to be said or communicated. The necessity <strong>of</strong> language isbased <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> non-identity <strong>of</strong> its participants. S<strong>in</strong>ce Dase<strong>in</strong> listens to Mitdase<strong>in</strong> (<strong>the</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>re <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> all <strong>of</strong> its facticity <strong>and</strong> possibility) <strong>in</strong> addition to itself, itcannot simply be a listen<strong>in</strong>g to oneself. Despite <strong>the</strong> fragmentary character <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> Time <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> undeveloped character <strong>of</strong> Mitse<strong>in</strong>, be<strong>in</strong>g-with as constitutive <strong>of</strong>Dase<strong>in</strong>’s existence is repeatedly implied.Human existence always already belongs to o<strong>the</strong>rs; it is already with o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>world as a common significant with-world, out <strong>of</strong> which it underst<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> acts.Hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> listen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>form <strong>and</strong> attune a comportment that is directed toward <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as Dase<strong>in</strong> is open for <strong>the</strong> world <strong>in</strong> st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g out <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, that is, isecstatic (GA 2, p. 218). This means that <strong>the</strong> question is not whe<strong>the</strong>r but how we goalong with <strong>and</strong> do not go along with o<strong>the</strong>rs, <strong>and</strong> how <strong>the</strong> alterity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r can berecognized. <strong>Heidegger</strong> answers this question by po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g toward <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong>genu<strong>in</strong>e hear<strong>in</strong>g. This hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> hearken<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dicate <strong>the</strong> passivity <strong>of</strong> a lett<strong>in</strong>goccur. Both are necessary conditions for a responsive relation with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. Thisproblematic will be transformed through what <strong>Heidegger</strong> calls <strong>the</strong> “turn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>enown<strong>in</strong>g” (die Kehre im Ereignis) [GA 65, p. 407/286]. The listen<strong>in</strong>g confrontationoccurs out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “between” (Zwischen) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> place (Ort) <strong>of</strong> de-cision(Ent-scheidung), as <strong>the</strong> answer <strong>and</strong> question concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> violence <strong>and</strong> uncann<strong>in</strong>ess<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> human. <strong>Heidegger</strong> explored <strong>in</strong> his Introduction to Metaphysics this nexus<strong>of</strong> address <strong>and</strong> conflict, <strong>of</strong> logos (lógoV) <strong>and</strong> polemos (pól∈moV). More acutely,later <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> decade, <strong>Heidegger</strong> th<strong>in</strong>ks enown<strong>in</strong>g (Ereignis) beyond agon (άgώn) <strong>and</strong>32W. Dil<strong>the</strong>y, Der Aufbau der Geschichtlichen Welt <strong>in</strong> den Geisteswissenschaften, second edition.Ed. B. Groethuysen (Gött<strong>in</strong>gen: V<strong>and</strong>enhoeck & Ruprecht, 1956), p. 120. Interpretation is neverexclusively <strong>of</strong> an author, or his or her <strong>in</strong>tentions, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore cannot be translation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong>a psychological or reproductive copy<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> that it already <strong>in</strong>volves language, <strong>and</strong> history, as well aspsychology for Dil<strong>the</strong>y.
Individuation, Responsiveness, <strong>Translation</strong>: <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Ethics285polemos (pól∈moV), as <strong>the</strong> primordial difference (Austrag) <strong>and</strong> strife enactedbetween gods <strong>and</strong> humans, world <strong>and</strong> earth. 33<strong>Heidegger</strong> addressed <strong>in</strong> “Wege zur Aussprache” <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretiveconfrontation (verstehende Ause<strong>in</strong><strong>and</strong>ersetzung). <strong>Heidegger</strong> is concerned herewith a recognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, which does not forget <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> differencebetween self <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. This is understood as a conflict (Streit), not for <strong>the</strong> sake <strong>of</strong>strife – much less for <strong>the</strong> so-called “struggle for existence” – but for underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r (GA 13, pp. 15–21). 34 This is because difference (Unter-schied) isannounced <strong>in</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g. 35 For <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “we can truly hear only when we are hearken<strong>in</strong>g”(GA 40, p. 138). We can only hearken when we are responsive to what is said.Respond<strong>in</strong>g, however, is someth<strong>in</strong>g barely heard <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> word “correspondence”(GA 40, p. 132). Correspondence, <strong>and</strong> accord<strong>in</strong>gly translation as a co-respond<strong>in</strong>g,calls for be<strong>in</strong>g thought from out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g claimed <strong>and</strong> respond<strong>in</strong>g tothat claim. In this sense, <strong>Heidegger</strong> is articulat<strong>in</strong>g ano<strong>the</strong>r fundamentally differentk<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g that would be responsive to word <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>g. But, to tweak a statement<strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, we are not simply <strong>in</strong>experienced <strong>in</strong> such hear<strong>in</strong>g; our ears areovercome by what prevents responsive hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretive confrontation(GA 40, p. 138).7 Listen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> DifferenceWenn ke<strong>in</strong>er mehr wirklich reden kann, dann kann gewiß ke<strong>in</strong>er mehr zuhören.—T. W. Adorno 36Verständigung im eigentlichem S<strong>in</strong>ne ist der überlegene Mut zur Anerkennung des jeEigenen des <strong>and</strong>eren aus e<strong>in</strong>er übergreifenden Notwendigkeit.—Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>(GA 13, p. 16).<strong>Heidegger</strong> explicated <strong>the</strong> possibilities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> self’s be<strong>in</strong>g responsive to o<strong>the</strong>rs,<strong>the</strong> world, <strong>and</strong> itself. This complicates <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relationship between33For <strong>in</strong>stance, Metaphysik und Nihilismus, GA 67 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann,1999), p. 77. Also see GA 65, p. 510; tr. 359. I develop this account <strong>of</strong> logos (lógoV) <strong>and</strong> polemos(pól∈moV) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> questions <strong>of</strong> suffer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> violence <strong>in</strong> “Traumatic Life: Violence,Pa<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Responsiveness <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>,” <strong>in</strong> Kristen Brown <strong>and</strong> Bett<strong>in</strong>a Bergo, The TraumaControversy: Philosophical <strong>and</strong> Interdiscipl<strong>in</strong>ary Dialogues, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009).34Despite <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s rejection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pseudo-Darw<strong>in</strong>istic notion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “struggle for existence”(Kampf ums Dase<strong>in</strong>), Lev<strong>in</strong>as reduced his agonistic th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g to it as discussed by RobertBernasconi, “Lev<strong>in</strong>as <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Struggle for Existence” <strong>in</strong> E. S. Nelson, A. Kapust, K. Still, eds.,Address<strong>in</strong>g Lev<strong>in</strong>as (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005).35Note <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g discussions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> significance <strong>of</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Heraklit, GA 55(Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979), pp. 238–260; pp. 162–163, <strong>of</strong> Charles Scott,“Zuspiel <strong>and</strong> Entscheidung: A Read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Sections 81–82 <strong>in</strong> Die Beiträge zur Philosophie.”Philosophy Today, 41 (1997): 161–167; <strong>and</strong> Peter Trawny, <strong>Heidegger</strong>s Phänomenologie der Welt(Freiburg: Alber, 1994), pp. 90–96.36T. W. Adorno, GS 14, 15.
286 E.S. Nelson<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy <strong>and</strong> his <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> National Socialism, because <strong>the</strong>quick explanations <strong>of</strong> this seem <strong>in</strong>adequate to his thought <strong>and</strong> his action. In thissense, <strong>the</strong> critiques <strong>of</strong> Habermas <strong>and</strong> Lev<strong>in</strong>as have failed to meet <strong>the</strong> challenge <strong>and</strong>complexity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question. <strong>Heidegger</strong> had already <strong>in</strong> his early <strong>and</strong> later work placed<strong>the</strong> philosophy <strong>of</strong> identity <strong>and</strong> totality radically <strong>in</strong>to question. Ontology, which isalways <strong>the</strong> destructur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> ontology for <strong>Heidegger</strong>, is to be understood from out <strong>of</strong>its difference, that is, <strong>the</strong> ontological difference between be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> as<strong>the</strong> openness. But despite <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s use <strong>of</strong> this language, perhaps he did not g<strong>of</strong>ar enough s<strong>in</strong>ce he did not develop <strong>the</strong> ethical import <strong>of</strong> this difference <strong>and</strong> openness.If we consider Lev<strong>in</strong>as’ alternative to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought, ra<strong>the</strong>r than hiscriticism, <strong>the</strong> question emerges <strong>of</strong> why <strong>Heidegger</strong> did not take <strong>the</strong> step from responsivenessto <strong>the</strong> primacy <strong>of</strong> ethical responsiveness to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. Is it <strong>the</strong>n this ethicalunthought that rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> questionability <strong>of</strong> his political activity <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1930s?<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mid-1930s, if only as an unsaid to be said,already bears <strong>the</strong> mark <strong>and</strong> trace <strong>of</strong> a confrontation with National Socialism, <strong>and</strong>thus with his own philosophy. The critique <strong>of</strong> modernity <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Westthat began to emerge <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mid-1930s is not without its ethical <strong>and</strong> political implications.37 In his later thought, <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>mes we have considered <strong>in</strong> his work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>1920s will only become more pronounced: <strong>Heidegger</strong> himself will undertake <strong>the</strong>critiques <strong>of</strong> identity <strong>and</strong> presence that were later used to destructure his own thought.Yet, <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> difference is <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g also a question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>terdependence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tercross<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> between, a th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g from out <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> to<strong>the</strong> middle that resists dialectic – which <strong>in</strong> resist<strong>in</strong>g it cannot escape – <strong>and</strong> a mereopposition <strong>of</strong> identity <strong>and</strong> difference. <strong>Heidegger</strong> argued <strong>in</strong> “The Onto-<strong>the</strong>o-logicalConstitution <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics” that <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> difference as difference <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>“step back,” as opposed to recollection, characterizes his thought <strong>in</strong> contrast withHegel’s. However, one can never completely escape <strong>the</strong> dialectic, <strong>and</strong> difference asdifference always withdraws from be<strong>in</strong>g sayable <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>kable. As such, <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> difference as difference cannot escape <strong>the</strong> metaphysics <strong>of</strong> identity that itconfronts. There is <strong>the</strong>n no simple overcom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> metaphysics <strong>in</strong> which philosophyends <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g beg<strong>in</strong>s. 38<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s ontology, as <strong>the</strong> simultaneous critique <strong>and</strong> demystification <strong>of</strong> traditionalontology, signifies <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> fundamental openness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. Be<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>the</strong>open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> between, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tersect<strong>in</strong>g fourfold, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> openness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g is aclaim<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g claimed <strong>of</strong> human life, that is, be-<strong>in</strong>g is that which essentiallyaddresses <strong>and</strong> attunes our be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its fundamental capacity to hear. The forgottenness(Vergessenheit) <strong>of</strong> this <strong>in</strong>apparent <strong>and</strong> withdraw<strong>in</strong>g difference, that is, <strong>of</strong> differenceas difference, belongs to difference itself (GA 11, p. 55). Difference can <strong>the</strong>n37On <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> history <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Contributions <strong>and</strong> related works, see E. S. Nelson,“History as Decision <strong>and</strong> Event <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>.” Arhe, IV: 8 (2007), 97–115.38Compare John Sallis <strong>in</strong> “The End <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics: Closure <strong>and</strong> Transgression”: “The end <strong>of</strong> metaphysicsbr<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong> very sense <strong>of</strong> end – hence its own sense – <strong>in</strong>to question” <strong>in</strong> Delimitations:Phenomenology <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> End <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 17.
Individuation, Responsiveness, <strong>Translation</strong>: <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Ethics287not be used as a first pr<strong>in</strong>ciple or explanatory ground, s<strong>in</strong>ce difference itselfunderm<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong>se as difference. This question<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g from out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> openness<strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g occurs through <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tercross<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> between as responsive sett<strong>in</strong>g-apart<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretive conflict, which cannot be mediated or sublimated. This conflict isnei<strong>the</strong>r negative nor subjective; it is not for <strong>Heidegger</strong> an agon (άgώn) <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividualsnor <strong>the</strong> self-assertion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> will. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> early <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>the</strong> worldis encountered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> communicative enown<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> logos (lógoV), <strong>in</strong> address<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g addressed; “The world is always encountered <strong>in</strong> a specific way <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gaddressed, <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g claimed (lógoV)” (PIA, p. 241). Addressed <strong>and</strong> respond<strong>in</strong>g tothis be<strong>in</strong>g claimed, Ause<strong>in</strong><strong>and</strong>ersetzung <strong>and</strong> Widerstreit occur through <strong>the</strong> world<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> question<strong>in</strong>g that are constitutive for <strong>the</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> attuned comportmentthat is Dase<strong>in</strong>.8 Conclud<strong>in</strong>g Words: Ethics <strong>and</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>For <strong>the</strong> early <strong>Heidegger</strong>, logos (lógoV) means lege<strong>in</strong> (lέg∈<strong>in</strong>), to speak, <strong>and</strong> speak<strong>in</strong>g“is what most basically constitutes human Dase<strong>in</strong>”; speech, listen<strong>in</strong>g to Aristotle,“is a mode <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> life” (GA 19, pp. 17–18). In his early lecture courses,<strong>Heidegger</strong> th<strong>in</strong>ks existence as com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to one’s own <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> through lógoV, <strong>in</strong>which lógoV is responsive enactment <strong>and</strong> lett<strong>in</strong>g be <strong>of</strong> phenomena <strong>in</strong>stead <strong>of</strong> a universalcategory or identity that subsumes all particulars. 39 This enown<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> language,<strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tersection <strong>and</strong> transversal allows difference <strong>and</strong> thus <strong>the</strong> performativeneed for translation to appear. Difference shows <strong>the</strong> fundamental questionability <strong>of</strong>communicative existence, which is both itself <strong>and</strong> not itself, <strong>and</strong> thus calls for <strong>in</strong>terpretation<strong>and</strong> translation. 40 S<strong>in</strong>ce difference <strong>in</strong>dicates <strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>in</strong>terruption <strong>and</strong>plac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to question <strong>of</strong> one’s own, translation is a response to both <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r’s <strong>and</strong>one’s own foreignness. 41 <strong>Translation</strong> is not <strong>the</strong>n a derivative or secondary use <strong>of</strong>language added on to a supposed first use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> native tongue. Unfold<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong>language itself, <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation arises from, <strong>and</strong> resides with<strong>in</strong> “<strong>the</strong> ‘waymak<strong>in</strong>g’ that comes to pass with each ‘say<strong>in</strong>g.’” 42As Parvis Emad notes <strong>in</strong> “<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> More Deeply <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>,”“translation implies a cross<strong>in</strong>g over <strong>and</strong> transposition.” 43 <strong>Translation</strong> is a be<strong>in</strong>g under39On <strong>the</strong> more extensive senses <strong>of</strong> lόgoV <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, which is no mere “logocentrism” <strong>in</strong> prioritiz<strong>in</strong>gidentity or universality, see K. Maly, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Possibility, pp. 42–45.40On <strong>the</strong> mutuality <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>and</strong> translation <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, see K. Maly, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sPossibility, pp. 88–91.41On <strong>the</strong> foreign <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> native, <strong>and</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g one’s mo<strong>the</strong>r tongue, see Emad, “<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> MoreDeeply,” pp. 324, 331; <strong>and</strong> On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 23, 26.42Emad, “On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy,” p. 40.43Emad, “<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> More Deeply,” p. 324.
288 E.S. Nelsonway <strong>and</strong> a way mak<strong>in</strong>g, as Emad <strong>in</strong>dicates. 44 Or perhaps, to reemploy <strong>the</strong> language<strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s earliest writ<strong>in</strong>gs, it is <strong>in</strong>dividuation as explored <strong>in</strong> this paper.Existence is lived as language <strong>and</strong> logos (lógoV), <strong>the</strong> en-own<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> en-act<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>one’s own ex-istence through underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>terpretation, <strong>and</strong> translation.Entangled amidst th<strong>in</strong>gs with o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, factical existence enacts <strong>and</strong> articulatesits life <strong>in</strong> dialogue (Zwiesprache). Self-<strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>and</strong> self-reflection, <strong>in</strong>dividuation<strong>and</strong> translation, belong to <strong>the</strong> very facticity <strong>of</strong> human existence ra<strong>the</strong>r thanbe<strong>in</strong>g someth<strong>in</strong>g alien to or imposed on it. Yet, this translation does not consist <strong>in</strong>agency, much less <strong>in</strong> a set <strong>of</strong> techniques, rules, <strong>and</strong> prescriptions for go<strong>in</strong>g abouttranslat<strong>in</strong>g. There is no “ethics <strong>of</strong> translation” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> assign<strong>in</strong>g norms orst<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>of</strong> correctness to, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n prais<strong>in</strong>g or blam<strong>in</strong>g an isolated “Self.”<strong>Translation</strong> does not <strong>in</strong>volve an ethics – <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> conventional sense, but <strong>in</strong>stead is away <strong>of</strong> safeguard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> preserv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> disclosive power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word <strong>in</strong>to which <strong>the</strong>speaker is thrown <strong>and</strong> which <strong>in</strong>dividuates itself <strong>in</strong> one way or ano<strong>the</strong>r. Responsivenessto <strong>and</strong> responsibility for <strong>the</strong> word, which <strong>in</strong>dividuates it anew <strong>in</strong> order to address<strong>and</strong> encounter its matter, is <strong>the</strong> challenge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translator, as Emad <strong>in</strong>dicates so well<strong>in</strong> address<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> translator’s “hermeneutic responsibility.” 45Adopt<strong>in</strong>g Emad’s description <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s transformative th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>Contributions to Philosophy, it can fitt<strong>in</strong>gly be said that orig<strong>in</strong>ary translation “is at<strong>the</strong> same time a turn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> language.” 46 <strong>Translation</strong> occurs not only with<strong>in</strong>language, leav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> prevail<strong>in</strong>g structure <strong>of</strong> language <strong>in</strong>tact, but <strong>in</strong>stead extends to<strong>the</strong> uttermost limits <strong>of</strong> what can be said. Responsible translation is, as Emad <strong>in</strong>sists,a “happen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> ‘de-cision’” with<strong>in</strong> language itself. 47 Such responsible translation,prevail<strong>in</strong>g “<strong>in</strong> every conversation,” is “a response that lets language unfold itscore.” 48 Here<strong>in</strong> consists <strong>the</strong> “orig<strong>in</strong>ality” <strong>of</strong> translation. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, <strong>in</strong> Emad’swords,This means that it is language – <strong>and</strong> not <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpreter – that <strong>in</strong>itiates, carries through, <strong>and</strong>completes orig<strong>in</strong>ary translation. 49ReferencesAdorno, T.W. 2003. Über den Fetischcharakter <strong>in</strong> der Musik und die Regression des Hörens. In GS14: Dissonanzen; E<strong>in</strong>leitung <strong>in</strong> die Musiksoziologie. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.Bernasconi, Robert. 2005. Lev<strong>in</strong>as <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> struggle for existence. In Address<strong>in</strong>g Lev<strong>in</strong>as, ed. E.S.Nelson et al. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.44Emad, “<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> More Deeply,” p. 329.45See P. Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 37–40.46Emad, “On ‘Be-<strong>in</strong>g,’” p. 243.47Emad, “On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy,” p. 3.48Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 23, <strong>and</strong> “<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> MoreDeeply,” p. 332.49Emad, “<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> More Deeply,” p. 332.
Individuation, Responsiveness, <strong>Translation</strong>: <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Ethics289Dil<strong>the</strong>y, W. 1956. In Der Aufbau der Geschichtlichen Welt <strong>in</strong> den Geisteswissenschaften, 2nd ed,ed. B. Groethuysen. Gött<strong>in</strong>gen: V<strong>and</strong>enhoeck & Ruprecht.Emad, Parvis. 1993. <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> more deeply <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> translation: Essential translation<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> language. In Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Commemorations, ed. John Sallis.Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.Emad, Parvis. 2001. On ‘Be-<strong>in</strong>g:’ The last part <strong>of</strong> contributions to philosophy. In Companion to<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s contributions to philosophy, ed. Charles Scott et al., 229–245. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton:Indiana University Press.Emad, Parvis. 2007. On <strong>the</strong> way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s contributions to philosophy. Madison: TheUniversity <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1962. Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time. Trans. John Macquarrie <strong>and</strong> Edward Rob<strong>in</strong>son.New York: Harper & Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1977. Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, GA 2. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1979. Heraklit, GA 55. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1983a. Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (1910–1976), GA 13. Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1983b. E<strong>in</strong>führung <strong>in</strong> die Metaphysik, GA 40. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1989. Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischenSituation). Ed. H.U. Less<strong>in</strong>g. Dil<strong>the</strong>y Jahrbuch 6: 237–269.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1989. Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann. Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly. 1999. Contributions to philosophy(from enown<strong>in</strong>g). Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1992a. Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, GA 29/30. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann. Trans. William McNeill <strong>and</strong> Nicholas Walker. 1995. The fundamentalconcepts <strong>of</strong> metaphysics. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1992b. Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 58. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1992c. Platon: Sophistes, GA 19. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann. Trans. RichardRojcewicz <strong>and</strong> André Schuwer. 1997. Plato’s Sophist. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1992–1993. Wilhelm Dil<strong>the</strong>ys Forschungsarbeit und der gegenwärtige Kampfum e<strong>in</strong>e historische Weltanschauung. 10 Vorträge. Dil<strong>the</strong>y-Jahrbuch 8: 143–180.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1994. Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristotles. E<strong>in</strong>fhhrung <strong>in</strong> diephänomenogische Forschung, GA 61. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1996. Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1999. Metaphysik und Nihilismus, GA 67. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2000. Introduction to metaphysics. Trans. R. Polt <strong>and</strong> G. Fried. New Haven:Yale University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2001. E<strong>in</strong>leitung <strong>in</strong> die Philosophie, GA 27. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2004. Der Begriff der Zeit, GA 64. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.Kisiel, Theodore. 1993. The genesis <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time. Berkeley: University <strong>of</strong>California Press.Lev<strong>in</strong>as, Emmanuel. 2000. God, death, <strong>and</strong> time. Trans. Bett<strong>in</strong>a Bergo. Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press.Maly, Kenneth. 2008. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s possibility: Language, emergence – say<strong>in</strong>g be-<strong>in</strong>g. Toronto:University <strong>of</strong> Toronto Press.Nancy, Jean-luc. 2000. Be<strong>in</strong>g s<strong>in</strong>gular plural. Trans. R. Richardson <strong>and</strong> A. O’Byrne. Stanford:Stanford University Press.Nelson, Eric Sean. Fall 2004. Respond<strong>in</strong>g to heaven <strong>and</strong> earth: Daoism, <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> ecology.Environmental Philosophy 1(2): 65–74.
290 E.S. NelsonNelson, Eric Sean. 2006a. Die formale Anzeige der Faktizität als Frage der Logik. In <strong>Heidegger</strong>und die Logik, ed. Alfred Denker <strong>and</strong> Holger Zaborowski, 31–48. Amsterdam/Atlanta: EditionsRodopi BV.Nelson, Eric Sean. 2006b. Question<strong>in</strong>g practice. In <strong>Heidegger</strong> und die Logik, ed. Alfred Denker<strong>and</strong> Holger Zaborowski, 150–159. Amsterdam/Atlanta: Editions Rodopi BV.Nelson, Eric Sean. 2007. History as decision <strong>and</strong> event <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>. Arhe IV: 8, 97–115.Nelson, Eric Sean. 2009. Traumatic life: Violence, pa<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> responsiveness <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>. In Thetrauma controversy: Philosophical <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terdiscipl<strong>in</strong>ary dialogues, ed. Kristen Brown <strong>and</strong>Bett<strong>in</strong>a Bergo. Albany: SUNY Press.Raffoul, François. 1998. <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject. Atlantic Highl<strong>and</strong>s: Humanities Press.Sallis, John. 1995. Delimitations: Phenomenology <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> metaphysics. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton:Indiana University Press.Schalow, Frank. 2002. Decision, dilemma, disposition: The <strong>in</strong>carnatedness <strong>of</strong> ethical action.Existentia 12(3-4): 241–251.Scott, Charles. 1997. Zuspiel <strong>and</strong> Entscheidung: A read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> aections 81–82 <strong>in</strong> Die Beiträge zurPhilosophie. Philosophy Today 41: 160–167.Stenstad, Gail. 2006. Transformations: <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> after <strong>Heidegger</strong>. Madison: University <strong>of</strong>Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press.Trawny, Peter. 1997. <strong>Heidegger</strong>s Phänomenologie der Welt. Freiburg: Alber.Trawny, Peter. 2000. Die unsche<strong>in</strong>bare Differenz. In Phénoménologie Française et PhénoménologieAllem<strong>and</strong>e, ed. E. Escoubas <strong>and</strong> B. Waldenfels, 65–102. Paris: L’Harmattan.van Buren, John. 1994. The young <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Rumor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hidden k<strong>in</strong>g. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: IndianaUniversity Press.Waldenfels, Bernhard. 1998. Phänomenologie <strong>in</strong> Frankreich, 2nd ed. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.Wood, David. 2001. The deconstruction <strong>of</strong> time, 2nd ed. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Attunement <strong>and</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>Frank SchalowWas heißt “reich”, so daß wir <strong>in</strong> der Armut und durch sie erstreich werden?— Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Die Armut.”If <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> midst <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, humans would remember <strong>the</strong>relationship to be-<strong>in</strong>g that is hidden <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> forgottenness <strong>of</strong>be-<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong>n this relationship would permit humans to becomeaware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>calculable richness peculiar to be-<strong>in</strong>g’s turn<strong>in</strong>grelation. Needless to say, this richness has noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> commonwith <strong>the</strong> wealth, plenitude, <strong>and</strong> riches that belong to be<strong>in</strong>gs.— Parvis Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sContributions to Philosophy, p. 64.The factor that might easily be overlooked when we consider <strong>the</strong> key elements <strong>of</strong>translation is one that may <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> end prove to be <strong>the</strong> most reward<strong>in</strong>g, at least with<strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> perspective on this topic, which is unique to <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> hermeneuticmethod he employs. For <strong>in</strong> com<strong>in</strong>g to terms with <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s own views on translation,<strong>the</strong> decision as to how translate <strong>the</strong> key terms <strong>of</strong> his philosophy h<strong>in</strong>ges to agreat extent on heed<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> subtlety <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir nuances, <strong>the</strong> tonality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>flections,<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> richness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir idioms. With<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> his hermeneutics, <strong>Heidegger</strong>allows for this possibility <strong>in</strong> earmark<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> role that “attunement” (Stimmung)plays <strong>in</strong> any act <strong>of</strong> disclosedness. And <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> unconcealment isexpressly ga<strong>the</strong>red with<strong>in</strong> lógoV, language <strong>and</strong> attunement are <strong>in</strong>timately conjo<strong>in</strong>ed.If what is unique to <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation parallels language <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s sense,F. Schalow (*)Department <strong>of</strong> Philosophy, University <strong>of</strong> New Orleans, 2000 Lakeshore Dr.,70148 New Orleans, LA, USAe-mail: fschalow@uno.eduF. Schalow (ed.), <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad, Contributions To Phenomenology 65,DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0_15, © Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media B.V. 2011291
292 F. Schalow<strong>the</strong>n our way <strong>of</strong> resid<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> it, <strong>and</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g (erhören; yield<strong>in</strong>g to) its subtlesttonality, will also shape <strong>the</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es for translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> key terms <strong>of</strong> his philosophy.1 For attunement calls forth <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic priority <strong>of</strong> listen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as it isonly by first “listen<strong>in</strong>g” to language that we acquire <strong>the</strong> capacity for safeguard<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> word, <strong>and</strong> only by safeguard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> word that th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g can respond to <strong>the</strong> claim<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g.If we were to consider translation <strong>in</strong> its most elemental possibility, it would, for<strong>Heidegger</strong>, orig<strong>in</strong>ate at <strong>the</strong> cross<strong>in</strong>g where language <strong>and</strong> thought <strong>in</strong>tersect. As wewill discover, it is for this simple reason that <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s approach to translation isradically unique, <strong>and</strong>, by <strong>the</strong> same token, requires an element that is miss<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rviews on translation, namely <strong>the</strong> element <strong>of</strong> “attunement.” It is this element <strong>and</strong> itsrole that border both thought <strong>and</strong> language <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby allocates a space for translation.In mak<strong>in</strong>g this observation, I suggest that <strong>the</strong> attempt to translate <strong>Heidegger</strong>’swrit<strong>in</strong>gs already depends upon experienc<strong>in</strong>g his th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> hence that <strong>the</strong> tonality<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> attunement implied <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> former also guides <strong>the</strong> latter as <strong>the</strong> mission to evoke<strong>the</strong> subtlest nuances <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tonations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word. Yet, only by implement<strong>in</strong>g ParvisEmad’s pioneer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sight, can we make <strong>the</strong> transition from assum<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>kbetween translation <strong>and</strong> thought, to establish<strong>in</strong>g its necessity. Specifically, because<strong>of</strong> its <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> recover<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> roots <strong>of</strong> its most basic idioms, th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is alreadyengaged <strong>in</strong> an “<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual” form <strong>of</strong> translation; <strong>and</strong>, conversely, due to this provisionalsynergy, <strong>the</strong> prior guidance <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought is already implied <strong>in</strong> anyattempt to translate his writ<strong>in</strong>gs “<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gually” from German <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> English language.Through his pioneer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sight, Emad establishes that due to its hermeneuticsynergy with thought, <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation occurs <strong>in</strong> closest proximity to <strong>the</strong> claim<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. And <strong>the</strong> nearness <strong>of</strong> this proximity def<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic situatedness <strong>of</strong>translation <strong>in</strong> a tw<strong>of</strong>old respect, first, as a task preoriented by <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> allquestions, that is, “die Se<strong>in</strong>sfrage,” <strong>and</strong>, secondly, as preoriented toward <strong>the</strong> samereceptivity to be<strong>in</strong>g as th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is, that is, as a yield<strong>in</strong>g response via an “attunement”to <strong>the</strong> creative power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word. As “<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual,” translation is an endeavor thatis <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sically responsive, an act <strong>of</strong> “reciprocation,” an “attuned” comportment. Inthis way, <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation occurs <strong>in</strong> t<strong>and</strong>em with thought by heed<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> sameattunement, which acclimates <strong>the</strong> latter to <strong>the</strong> claim <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> its appearance <strong>in</strong>accord with <strong>the</strong> tonality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word.Through his pioneer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sight, Parvis Emad takes seriously <strong>the</strong> hermeneuticelements <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s approach to translation, which sets it apart from all o<strong>the</strong>rapproaches <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g those that comprise specific <strong>the</strong>ories, as <strong>in</strong> Paul Ricoeur’scase. 2 For however we “conceive” <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation, attunement is a crucial1For an outst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical ground <strong>of</strong> language as “hear<strong>in</strong>g,” see GeorgeKovacs, “<strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong> Dialogue with Herder: Cross<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Language <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics towardBe-<strong>in</strong>g-historical Language,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 17 (2001): 45–63.2For a different view <strong>of</strong> translation, one which is based on a <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> signs or a semiotics, see PaulRicoeur, On <strong>Translation</strong>, trans. Eileen Brennan, “Introduction” by Richard Kearney (London:Routledge, 2006), pp. x–xv, pp. 8–15.
Attunement <strong>and</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>293dynamic that we cannot discount, if we are to consider <strong>the</strong> reciprocity between <strong>the</strong>task <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> key words <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> his thought as aresponse to <strong>the</strong> “claim” (Anspruch) or “voice” (Stimme) <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. 3 Indeed, <strong>the</strong> difficultywith <strong>the</strong> so-called “<strong>the</strong>ories” <strong>of</strong> translation is that <strong>the</strong>y are not aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> deny thisreciprocity, <strong>and</strong> hence <strong>the</strong> centrality <strong>of</strong> attunement (Stimmung), preferr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stead toview <strong>the</strong> “mean<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> words upon <strong>the</strong> model <strong>of</strong> a text. This model, however, falselyconstrues <strong>the</strong> text as a “semiotic” construct or a system <strong>of</strong> signs, which, <strong>in</strong> Ricouer’s<strong>the</strong>ory, at least, becomes mean<strong>in</strong>gful only with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> narrow purview <strong>of</strong> a culturalhorizon, but not, as <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s case, through a “clear<strong>in</strong>g,” which projects open <strong>the</strong>“mean<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most perennial word <strong>of</strong> all, that is, “be<strong>in</strong>g.”This essay will be divided <strong>in</strong>to three parts. First, I will outl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> hermeneuticsituation <strong>of</strong> translation, as aris<strong>in</strong>g from th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g’s dual response to <strong>the</strong> “claim” <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> tonality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word. Secondly, I will characterize translation as a form<strong>of</strong> “attuned comportment” (Verhalten), by outl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g “reservedness” (Verhaltenheit),that is, <strong>the</strong> responsiveness to heed what is unsaid by <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>ton<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> an attunement, 4<strong>the</strong> latter understood not as a subjective state <strong>of</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d, but as “echo<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>the</strong> claim <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g. Thirdly, I will show how <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>tonement” <strong>of</strong> any translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sworks should orig<strong>in</strong>ate from <strong>the</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> silence, which, <strong>in</strong> contrast to <strong>the</strong> presumption<strong>of</strong> “textuality,” dist<strong>in</strong>guishes <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> departure for any attempt totranslate <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs. In this way, I will establish how Emad’s pioneer<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terdependence <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation contrastssharply with various <strong>the</strong>ories <strong>of</strong> translation, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Paul Ricoeur’s.1 The Responsiveness <strong>of</strong> Intral<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong>Let me beg<strong>in</strong> by mak<strong>in</strong>g a po<strong>in</strong>t whose importance might easily rema<strong>in</strong> overlookedif it were not for Parvis Emad’s pioneer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sight, specifically, <strong>the</strong> fundamentall<strong>in</strong>k between <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s strategy for formulat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. When we return to <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, to <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>augural remarks with which <strong>Heidegger</strong> opens this ground<strong>in</strong>g work, we discovera simple, yet provocative query. Follow<strong>in</strong>g his citation <strong>of</strong> a statement from Plato’sSophist that echoes <strong>the</strong> perennial perplexity about <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>Heidegger</strong>asks: “Do we today have an answer to <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> what we actually mean by <strong>the</strong>word ‘be<strong>in</strong>g’?” 5 While certa<strong>in</strong>ly not a l<strong>in</strong>guistic philosopher, <strong>Heidegger</strong> never<strong>the</strong>lesscasts <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> an enigma about a s<strong>in</strong>gle word, <strong>and</strong> how3<strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Nachwort zu ‘Was ist Metaphysik?’”, <strong>in</strong> Wegmarken, GA 9 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann, 1976b), pp. 310–311.4For Emad’s use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word “<strong>in</strong>ton<strong>in</strong>g,” see Parvis Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributionsto Philosophy (Madison: University <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press, 2007), p. 64.5<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, GA 2 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), p. 1.
294 F. Schalowwe can be struck aga<strong>in</strong> by <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> explor<strong>in</strong>g its “mean<strong>in</strong>g.” From <strong>the</strong>outset, <strong>Heidegger</strong> emphasizes that this perennial question h<strong>in</strong>ges on our underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word “be<strong>in</strong>g.” Thus, he suggests that <strong>the</strong> strategy for develop<strong>in</strong>g this question,or hermeneutics, already harbors a nascent concern for language, albeit <strong>the</strong> parallel<strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>to its hermeneutic roots quietly withdraws <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> background <strong>of</strong> histh<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. But if, ultimately, philosophy h<strong>in</strong>ges on <strong>the</strong> “mean<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> a s<strong>in</strong>gle word,<strong>the</strong>n it is because <strong>the</strong> enigma <strong>of</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g” emerges at <strong>the</strong> crossroads where <strong>the</strong>mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most basic philosophical terms hangs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> balance <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> need toreexam<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong>ir ancestral roots becomes necessary. Yet, <strong>the</strong> provisional formulation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> this way simply entails, as Emad clearly shows, that <strong>the</strong>possibility <strong>of</strong> “<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual” translation <strong>of</strong> this word, <strong>of</strong> its “mean<strong>in</strong>g,” pregovernsany attempt to outl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> human capacity to underst<strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g(Se<strong>in</strong>sverständnis).If we characterize such a philosophical enterprise as “fundamental ontology,”to employ <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s term, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation not only lies at <strong>the</strong>forefront <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> attempt to re-ask <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g but also for outl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>hermeneutic strategy <strong>of</strong> this task, which from <strong>the</strong> outset forms <strong>the</strong> various stages <strong>of</strong>its radicalization. The fact that <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation redirects us to <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> most basic philosophical terms, however, tells us someth<strong>in</strong>g crucial about adist<strong>in</strong>ctive preorientation to language that directs <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>to be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> allowsthis <strong>in</strong>quiry to h<strong>in</strong>ge on formulat<strong>in</strong>g a lexicon for express<strong>in</strong>g its “mean<strong>in</strong>g.” For <strong>the</strong>central corundum hidden <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> perplexity about be<strong>in</strong>g is this: <strong>the</strong> “mean<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>word cannot be reduced to any specific ideational content, but, on <strong>the</strong> contrary, <strong>the</strong>reis a dist<strong>in</strong>ctive “tonality” endemic to its expression that simultaneously <strong>in</strong>timates both<strong>the</strong> roots <strong>of</strong> its ancestry <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> subsequent arrival <strong>of</strong> its mean<strong>in</strong>g from<strong>the</strong> future. Because <strong>the</strong>re is, at bottom, a temporal trajectory to our underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g, no l<strong>in</strong>ear path can be carved <strong>in</strong> order to discern that word’s elusive mean<strong>in</strong>g.Instead, <strong>the</strong> ellipsis <strong>of</strong> temporality, dem<strong>and</strong>s that our underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g” proceedthrough <strong>the</strong> unique detour <strong>of</strong> an “attunement,” <strong>the</strong>reby carv<strong>in</strong>g a circuitouspath that accents <strong>the</strong> “pitch,” “<strong>in</strong>flection” <strong>and</strong> “tonality” <strong>of</strong> any utterance as <strong>the</strong> keyto “mean<strong>in</strong>g.” In suggest<strong>in</strong>g that such an “utterance” is <strong>in</strong>tegral to <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>Heidegger</strong> not only establishes a crucial nexus between underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>attunement, which will shape <strong>the</strong> subsequent development <strong>of</strong> his hermeneutics. Healso shows how tonality <strong>and</strong> attunement po<strong>in</strong>t to language, not as harb<strong>in</strong>ger <strong>of</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>atecontent, but as a self-disclosive act whose “mean<strong>in</strong>gfulness” may reside asmuch <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “hold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> reserve” <strong>of</strong> what rema<strong>in</strong>s “unsaid,” as well as <strong>in</strong> what isexplicitly stated. As Emad emphasizes, when understood most fundamentally <strong>in</strong>this way, “language is attuned by <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g-attunement <strong>of</strong> reservedness, whichreserves <strong>and</strong> preserves be-<strong>in</strong>g’s turn<strong>in</strong>g relation.” 6The allusion to <strong>the</strong> “unsaid,” however, does not necessarily entail anyth<strong>in</strong>g mystical<strong>and</strong> occult, although a “mystery” or Geheimnis <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s sense is <strong>in</strong>volved.Ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> unsaid frequently stems from what is most obvious, which, by virtue <strong>of</strong>6Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 56.
Attunement <strong>and</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>295that fact, also withdraws <strong>in</strong>to concealment, for example, what is withdrawn orhidden with<strong>in</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s pre-underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. A foremost example <strong>of</strong> thispre-underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g perta<strong>in</strong>s to how our own language harbors clues for address<strong>in</strong>gour capacity to underst<strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> ultimately, for express<strong>in</strong>g its mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> philosophicalterms. Put simply, through its declension <strong>in</strong> tenses, <strong>the</strong> grammar <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>verb “to be” shows an underly<strong>in</strong>g aff<strong>in</strong>ity with time, such that temporality provides<strong>the</strong> clue to <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g. Conversely, what is <strong>in</strong>timated“pre-philosophically” as a l<strong>in</strong>k between be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time f<strong>in</strong>ds an historical precedent<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> key expressions by which <strong>the</strong> philosophical tradition, perhaps uncritically <strong>and</strong>naively, has sought to conceptualize <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> simple word “is,” forexample, as “presence,” as “permanence,” <strong>and</strong> even as “com<strong>in</strong>g to be” <strong>and</strong> “pass<strong>in</strong>gaway.” This “cross-over” between <strong>the</strong> grammar <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> verb “to be” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> development<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most basic philosophical idioms, however, is not accidental. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, dueto its obviousness, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terdependence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relation between “be<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>and</strong> “time,”rema<strong>in</strong>s withdrawn <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby “unsaid” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> expression <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most basic philosophicalidioms <strong>and</strong> concepts. As <strong>the</strong> result, <strong>the</strong> attempt to make <strong>the</strong> reciprocitybetween “be<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>and</strong> “time” question-worthy aga<strong>in</strong> – turn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> momentum awayfrom <strong>the</strong> forgottenness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> its recollection – presupposesan “<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual” translation. Specifically, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation proceeds byprioritiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> grammar <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> verb “to be,” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> connotations that ensue from<strong>the</strong> “declension” <strong>of</strong> its tenses, <strong>of</strong> future, past, <strong>and</strong> present, <strong>in</strong> order to (1) makeexplicit <strong>the</strong> priority <strong>of</strong> ecstatic temporality <strong>and</strong> (2) show that <strong>in</strong> its primordial form,time provides <strong>the</strong> prelim<strong>in</strong>ary “<strong>in</strong> view <strong>of</strong> which” (woraufh<strong>in</strong>) for <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong>an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. By translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> word “be<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gually throughits verbal form (i.e., “to be”), we make explicit <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic condition for itspre-underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g: namely, that only through its reciprocity with time can we underst<strong>and</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> conversely, that temporal idioms yield <strong>the</strong> vocabulary to express<strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g.Let us consider two works <strong>in</strong> which <strong>Heidegger</strong> undertakes <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word “be<strong>in</strong>g.” First, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1925 lecture-course text Plato’s Sophist,he claims that time determ<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> “grammar” <strong>of</strong> a dist<strong>in</strong>ctive l<strong>in</strong>guistic practice,<strong>the</strong> declension <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> verb “to be” as a “time-word” (Zeitwort). 7 Secondly, <strong>in</strong> his1929/1930 lecture-course text, <strong>Heidegger</strong> succ<strong>in</strong>ctly summarizes <strong>the</strong> correlationbetween <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> our speech <strong>and</strong> our underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g: “The twoessential elements characteriz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> verb are that it also refers to time, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> itsmean<strong>in</strong>g is always related to someth<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> discourse is about, namely to be<strong>in</strong>gs.This <strong>in</strong>dicates that all posit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g is necessarily related to time. In keep<strong>in</strong>g withthis, <strong>in</strong> German, we <strong>the</strong>refore call <strong>the</strong> verb a time-word (Zeitwort).” 8 In prioritiz<strong>in</strong>g7<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Platon: Sophistes GA 19 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992a), p. 592.Plato’s Sophist, trans. R. Rojcewicz <strong>and</strong> A. Schuwer (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press,1997), p. 410.8<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, GA 29/30 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann,1983b), p. 466. The Fundamental Concepts <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics, trans. William McNeill <strong>and</strong> NicholasWalker (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 321, translation slightly modified.
296 F. Schalow<strong>the</strong> verbal form, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word “be<strong>in</strong>g” shifts <strong>the</strong> fulcrum<strong>of</strong> concern to <strong>the</strong> “<strong>and</strong>” designat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> grammar <strong>of</strong> its connection with time. 9 Thefocus <strong>of</strong> philosophy is no longer on be<strong>in</strong>g or time considered separately, but, through<strong>the</strong> guidance <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation, <strong>the</strong> grammar <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “conjunction” assumesprom<strong>in</strong>ence accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> head<strong>in</strong>g “time <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g.”In this way, <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation radically transposes <strong>the</strong> fulcrum <strong>of</strong> philosophical<strong>in</strong>quiry, mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> prelim<strong>in</strong>ary explication <strong>of</strong> temporality <strong>the</strong> new keyfor underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g as well as for articulat<strong>in</strong>g its “mean<strong>in</strong>g.” The attempt at<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation, however, does not occur <strong>in</strong> a vacuum, but ra<strong>the</strong>r arises froma pre-orientation to <strong>the</strong> philosophical tradition <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> historical situation with<strong>in</strong>which <strong>Heidegger</strong> first re-asks <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. By <strong>the</strong> same token, through hisown <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation, <strong>Heidegger</strong> does not seek a uniform mean<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong>word “be<strong>in</strong>g,” or construe it as a univocal concept. Instead, he enacts a decision thatcontrasts <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> recollect<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> historical precedent <strong>of</strong> itsforgottenness, <strong>the</strong>reby undertak<strong>in</strong>g a “leap” <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> historical crucible <strong>of</strong> conflict <strong>in</strong>which <strong>the</strong> birth <strong>of</strong> philosophy resides. The <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>of</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g” is<strong>in</strong>deed about a “word,” but only because its dist<strong>in</strong>ctive “mean<strong>in</strong>g” simultaneouslycalls forth what is at issue <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Western tradition <strong>and</strong> itsunique “dest<strong>in</strong>y.”Intral<strong>in</strong>gual translation, <strong>the</strong>n, transmits an important hermeneutical message:namely that <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>in</strong>herently historical, because its mean<strong>in</strong>g rema<strong>in</strong>sconcealed <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby “unsaid,” with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mystery surround<strong>in</strong>g its relation to time.Due to <strong>the</strong> predom<strong>in</strong>ance <strong>of</strong> what rema<strong>in</strong>s unsaid, be<strong>in</strong>g is not a concept that can beunivocally def<strong>in</strong>ed, but ra<strong>the</strong>r requires a circuitous path for unfold<strong>in</strong>g its “mean<strong>in</strong>g,”which parallels <strong>the</strong> elliptical movement <strong>of</strong> human temporality <strong>and</strong> attempt to developa philosophical methodology <strong>in</strong> accord with its dynamic. By enact<strong>in</strong>g this movement,hermeneutics arises as this uniquely circuitous path for unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> reciprocal<strong>in</strong>terplay between be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time. The hermeneutical “circle” <strong>of</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gunfolds with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> wider orbit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> reciprocity between be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time, implicat<strong>in</strong>geach through <strong>the</strong> primordial locutions “<strong>the</strong>re is be<strong>in</strong>g” only <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as “<strong>the</strong>re is time.”As <strong>the</strong> key to project<strong>in</strong>g-open what can be understood through this circularity, <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation provides <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> departure for “leap<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> circle, 10 <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong>reby to enter <strong>the</strong> historical clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g’s enown<strong>in</strong>g throw (der ereignendeZuwurf ). 11 As <strong>Heidegger</strong> states <strong>in</strong> Contributions to Philosophy: “The leap gives rise9For <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s discussion <strong>of</strong> “Die Grammatik des Wortes ‘Se<strong>in</strong>,’” see E<strong>in</strong>führung <strong>in</strong> dieMetaphysik, GA 40 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983a), pp. 58–60.10For <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s reference to <strong>the</strong> “leap” <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic circle, see GA 2, p. 418.11For clarification <strong>of</strong> this phrase, see Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Wege <strong>in</strong>s Ereignis: Zu<strong>Heidegger</strong>s “Beiträge zur Philosophie” (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994), pp. 18,24, 30, 33, 36, 40, 56, 59, 62, 70, 77, <strong>and</strong> 92. Also see Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sContributions to Philosophy, pp. 75, 103, 115, 120, 123, 125–30, <strong>and</strong> 159.
Attunement <strong>and</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>297to preparedness for belong<strong>in</strong>gness to enown<strong>in</strong>g.” 12 Seen <strong>in</strong> light <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g’s enown<strong>in</strong>g throw, as well as preparedness through <strong>the</strong> leap, be<strong>in</strong>gcan no longer be viewed as merely one philosophical concept among o<strong>the</strong>rs to bedef<strong>in</strong>ed. Instead, <strong>the</strong> s<strong>in</strong>gularity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> locution “<strong>the</strong>re is be<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong>vites us to heed itsclaim by prepar<strong>in</strong>g a place (Ort) through <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation for its unconcealment<strong>in</strong> language. Intral<strong>in</strong>gual translation, <strong>the</strong>n, makes explicit what o<strong>the</strong>rwiserema<strong>in</strong>s implicit <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s employment <strong>of</strong> hermeneutics: namely, <strong>the</strong> transformationto which language will be subjected when it says <strong>the</strong> “unsaid,” <strong>and</strong> thus <strong>in</strong>augurates<strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> a dist<strong>in</strong>ctive lógoV correspond<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> temporaldynamics <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g’s disclosure.By emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation, Emad reveals <strong>the</strong> unity <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought. That is, Emad shows how a pre-orientation to language as <strong>the</strong>locus <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation is already <strong>in</strong>terwoven <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic guidel<strong>in</strong>es<strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy, <strong>and</strong>, conversely, how safeguard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> wordbecomes <strong>the</strong> foremost mission <strong>of</strong> hermeneutics. If one wants to commit to <strong>the</strong>dogma that <strong>the</strong> concern for language only emerges <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s so-called “laterphilosophy,” <strong>the</strong>n one might want to reconsider such a hasty claim by engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>what Emad describes as a dialogue with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g, ra<strong>the</strong>r thanresort<strong>in</strong>g to m<strong>in</strong>dless conjectures <strong>of</strong> monological reductionism:The ‘dialogue’ with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> (<strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g) is shaped by <strong>the</strong> thrust <strong>of</strong> hermeneuticphenomenology, that is, by <strong>the</strong> self-transform<strong>in</strong>g onefold <strong>of</strong> ‘what shows itself <strong>in</strong> itself, <strong>the</strong>manifest,’ <strong>and</strong> ‘<strong>in</strong>terpretation.’ 13The “dialogue with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g” is a significant <strong>in</strong>dication that<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s hermeneutics is always guided by a prelim<strong>in</strong>ary orientation to <strong>the</strong> word<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>’s dwell<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> lógoV. When, for example, <strong>in</strong>The Basic Problems <strong>of</strong> Phenomenology, <strong>Heidegger</strong> suggests that phenomenology isa “temporal science,” <strong>and</strong> that all propositions <strong>of</strong> ontology are ultimately “temporalpropositions,” he gives voice to this basic hermeneutic provision <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation. 14 Far from forsak<strong>in</strong>g a hermeneutics <strong>of</strong> facticity <strong>in</strong> favor <strong>of</strong> an “aberrant”form <strong>of</strong> Kantianism, as critics have claimed, 15 <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong>stead makes explicit <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>terface between temporality <strong>and</strong> language that hermeneutics presupposes <strong>in</strong> itsattempt to “transcribe” <strong>the</strong> “mean<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> conceptual terms. In this regard,<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation projects open <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>-between” (Zwischen) <strong>of</strong> this <strong>in</strong>terface,<strong>in</strong> order that we can address <strong>the</strong> transformation <strong>of</strong> language, which both pre-directshermeneutics <strong>and</strong> allows for its subsequent radicalization.12<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann, 1989). Contributions to Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g) (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: IndianaUniversity Press, 1999), p. 234; tr. 166.13Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 3.14<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 24 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann, 1975), pp. 460–461. The Basic Problems <strong>of</strong> Phenomenology, trans. Albert H<strong>of</strong>stadter(Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 323–324.15For this questionable claim, see T. Kisiel, The Genesis <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time (Berkeley:University <strong>of</strong> California Press, 1993), pp. 370–374.
298 F. SchalowIn this regard, hermeneutics ceases to be simply a method we employ, <strong>and</strong>contributes to this transformed language as a “signpost” to (heed<strong>in</strong>g) what rema<strong>in</strong>s“unsaid” throughout <strong>the</strong> philosophical tradition. Conversely, <strong>the</strong> unsaid orig<strong>in</strong>atesfrom <strong>the</strong> abground (Abgrund) <strong>of</strong> language, from which <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g-attunement(Grundstimmung) <strong>of</strong> reservedness <strong>and</strong> refusal exacts <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> new idioms<strong>of</strong> expression. Through <strong>the</strong> guidance <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>tobe<strong>in</strong>g thus becomes primarily a concern about how to express a s<strong>in</strong>gle word, <strong>and</strong>hence turns on <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> how we, as <strong>in</strong>quirers, can reside with<strong>in</strong> language,that is, undergo a transformation that allows for such “dwell<strong>in</strong>g” to occur. But suchdwell<strong>in</strong>g implies tak<strong>in</strong>g up a new relation to language by which, as speakers, webecome acclimated <strong>and</strong> responsive to it by virtue <strong>of</strong> a ground<strong>in</strong>g-attunement. Let us<strong>the</strong>n explore <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> this attunement <strong>in</strong> prepar<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> transition from“<strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual” to “<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual” translation.2 Situat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>As Parvis Emad demonstrates, <strong>the</strong> very occurrence <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation is atestimony to <strong>the</strong> relationship between language <strong>and</strong> hermeneutics, <strong>and</strong> a directive to<strong>the</strong> place reserved for <strong>the</strong> unsaid as <strong>the</strong> key to re-ask<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> its“mean<strong>in</strong>g.” This <strong>in</strong>sight becomes crucial not only for outl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> radicalization <strong>of</strong>hermeneutics, as we have seen, but for show<strong>in</strong>g, conversely, how it also provides <strong>the</strong>guidel<strong>in</strong>es for translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs from German <strong>in</strong>to English, that is,<strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> “<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation.” Just as <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation requiresan attunement that orients th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g towards <strong>the</strong> word <strong>and</strong> seeks guidance fromits disclosive power, so <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation entails a ground<strong>in</strong>g-attunement <strong>of</strong> itsown. That ground<strong>in</strong>g-attunement po<strong>in</strong>ts to <strong>the</strong> fragility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word as a limit<strong>in</strong>gcondition, which <strong>in</strong> advance imposes a unique challenge upon <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs. But, simultaneously, <strong>the</strong> acknowledgment <strong>of</strong> this condition,as a testimony to our “thrownness” <strong>in</strong>to language, also suggests that <strong>the</strong>re arehermeneutic guidel<strong>in</strong>es that direct <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “ground<strong>in</strong>g words” <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy. Given <strong>the</strong>se prelim<strong>in</strong>ary observations, we must first ask:what does <strong>Heidegger</strong> mean by an “attunement?”In ask<strong>in</strong>g this question, we must recognize that what <strong>Heidegger</strong> calls “dispositions”<strong>in</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time have a specifically hermeneutic-phenomenological import.Prior to any explicit underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>, dispositions provide us with a hermeneutic-phenomenologicalfoot<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby for allow<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> example <strong>of</strong> our own facticity to imply <strong>the</strong> constitutive elements, which governany attempt to underst<strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. By way <strong>of</strong> formal <strong>in</strong>dication, dispositions likeanxiety (Angst) <strong>and</strong> boredom (Langeweile) grant us experiential access to <strong>the</strong> phenomenon,16 to <strong>the</strong> s<strong>in</strong>gularity <strong>of</strong> its self-show<strong>in</strong>g that o<strong>the</strong>rwise rema<strong>in</strong>s withdrawn16For a discussion <strong>of</strong> boredom as a ground<strong>in</strong>g-attunement, see Parvis Emad, “Boredom as Limit<strong>and</strong> Disposition,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 1 (1985): 63–78.
Attunement <strong>and</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>299from language, <strong>in</strong> order to prepare for a transformation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiryitself. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> formal m<strong>and</strong>ate <strong>of</strong> phenomenology, <strong>the</strong> transformationconsists simply <strong>of</strong> this: ra<strong>the</strong>r than superimpos<strong>in</strong>g arbitrary constructions <strong>and</strong> conventionsupon <strong>the</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, we allow <strong>the</strong> phenomenon itself to determ<strong>in</strong>e<strong>the</strong> nuances <strong>of</strong> our manner <strong>of</strong> expression, such that <strong>the</strong> lógoV or way <strong>of</strong>speak<strong>in</strong>g always co<strong>in</strong>cides with <strong>the</strong> uniqueness <strong>of</strong> what shows itself by itself, or <strong>the</strong>phenomenon as such. Thus, phenomenological truth is <strong>the</strong> unique jo<strong>in</strong>ture or convergencebetween our experience <strong>and</strong> way <strong>of</strong> articulat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> phenomenon as an<strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sically self-disclosive occurrence. By virtue <strong>of</strong> disposition or Bef<strong>in</strong>dlichkeit,<strong>the</strong>n, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>quirer always questions from out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> concrete situation <strong>in</strong>to which he/she is already thrown, <strong>in</strong> such a way that <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiry assumes <strong>the</strong>very design <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>quirer’s f<strong>in</strong>itude. As a result, <strong>the</strong>re is a unique co<strong>in</strong>cidencebetween <strong>the</strong> concrete, “factical” situation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>quirer <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>compass <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiry itself or what <strong>Heidegger</strong> calls <strong>the</strong> “hermeneutic situation.”In simplest terms, <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic situation comprises <strong>the</strong> set <strong>of</strong> presuppositionsthat pre-direct <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>quiry, <strong>and</strong> hence implicates <strong>the</strong> pre-underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g thatDase<strong>in</strong> already displays <strong>in</strong> its factical existence. Whenever <strong>the</strong>re is an impetus tounderst<strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby <strong>in</strong>terpret its mean<strong>in</strong>g, a hermeneutic situation alreadyoccurs. The same dependence upon a hermeneutic situation would also apply totranslation when viewed “<strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gually” – as render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> a given text<strong>in</strong>to that <strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r – provided, <strong>of</strong> course, that such an attempt at translat<strong>in</strong>g also<strong>in</strong>volves underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation. While <strong>the</strong>re might be different ways <strong>of</strong>establish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se connections, Emad’s path is <strong>the</strong> most direct <strong>and</strong> most basic.Specifically, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation presupposes its <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual counterpart,which enacts <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g by elicit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “mean<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> its key words,<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> what his writ<strong>in</strong>gs “mean” is already implied <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> attempt totranslate <strong>the</strong>m from German <strong>in</strong>to English. Because <strong>of</strong> its “coalesc<strong>in</strong>g” with <strong>in</strong>terpretation<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation, <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation is alreadygrounded on <strong>the</strong> presuppositions <strong>of</strong> a hermeneutic situation. Yet, <strong>in</strong> order for thishermeneutic situation to become explicit, it must spr<strong>in</strong>g from a deeper orig<strong>in</strong> thatjo<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation, <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation through<strong>the</strong>ir coalescence with<strong>in</strong> language itself.The task <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation as transmitt<strong>in</strong>g mean<strong>in</strong>gs from German <strong>in</strong>toEnglish should be conceived on a par with hermeneutics, that is, as fulfill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> role<strong>of</strong> an “<strong>in</strong>termediary.” Serv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> this way as a “medium,” <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translationfollows <strong>the</strong> same hermeneutic conditions that govern <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s attempt to re-ask<strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. Foremost among <strong>the</strong>se conditions, <strong>of</strong> course, is <strong>the</strong> relation tolanguage, on which <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation, as <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual as well as <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual,depends. In this regard, hermeneutics, whose mission lies <strong>in</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g explicit <strong>and</strong>articulat<strong>in</strong>g a mean<strong>in</strong>g that might o<strong>the</strong>rwise rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate, is rooted <strong>in</strong> thisdisclosive power. Correlatively, <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation acknowledges its allegianceto hermeneutics by first <strong>and</strong> foremost submitt<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> disclosive power <strong>of</strong> language.However, how does this submission take place, if not arbitrarily, but <strong>in</strong> a manner thatadheres to <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic precondition whereby language provides a place forunconcealment, <strong>and</strong> allows <strong>the</strong> “mean<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby <strong>the</strong> “truth” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g to be
300 F. Schalowspoken? Specifically, to submit to language is to acknowledge its ownmost provision,namely that th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g receives <strong>the</strong> claim <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g by first yield<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> disclosivepower <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word. Only <strong>in</strong> this way do <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g words arise, which canspeak from <strong>the</strong> midpo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “essential sway <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g,” that is, from <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>betweenness(Inzwischenschaft) <strong>of</strong> god <strong>and</strong> Dase<strong>in</strong>, world <strong>and</strong> earth.... ” 17 The needfor a similar ground<strong>in</strong>g-attunement applies equally, however, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation; for <strong>in</strong> order to render <strong>the</strong> key words <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy, <strong>the</strong>translator must heed <strong>the</strong>ir nuances <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby fulfill his/her mission as an emissary<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.In yield<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> this way, <strong>the</strong> translation adheres to <strong>the</strong> basic locutions by which <strong>the</strong>word be<strong>in</strong>g comes to expression, that is, “<strong>the</strong>re is be<strong>in</strong>g.” In order for <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gualtranslation to occur, <strong>the</strong>n, <strong>the</strong> translator must be transposed <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> position <strong>of</strong> a“listener.” Only <strong>in</strong> this way can language re-emerge as <strong>the</strong> place <strong>of</strong> self-ga<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g,as <strong>the</strong> creative wellspr<strong>in</strong>g for engender<strong>in</strong>g new idioms to express <strong>in</strong> English <strong>the</strong> “keywords” <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy. Already predisposed toward language on <strong>the</strong>ground <strong>of</strong> his/her “thrownness” <strong>in</strong>to it, <strong>the</strong> translator proceeds from hermeneuticpreconditions that orient him/her <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong>fer a “foothold” on <strong>the</strong> specific text <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s to be translated. The outl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic situation <strong>of</strong> translation<strong>the</strong>reby becomes explicit, show<strong>in</strong>g that this situation is not an artificial structure tobe imposed externally, but <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fer<strong>in</strong>g or “gift<strong>in</strong>g” with<strong>in</strong> language itself <strong>of</strong> ahermeneutic foothold. Given this foothold, <strong>the</strong> translator can <strong>the</strong>n respond to <strong>the</strong>ownmost provision <strong>of</strong> language, <strong>and</strong> by yield<strong>in</strong>g to its disclosive power, fulfill <strong>the</strong>primary m<strong>and</strong>ate <strong>of</strong> translation, or its “hermeneutic responsibility,” that is, safeguard<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> word. The hermeneutic situation, <strong>the</strong>n, does not spr<strong>in</strong>g from avacuum, but emerges from a “clear<strong>in</strong>g whole” with<strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> translator assumeshis/her place with<strong>in</strong> language <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby acquires a “foothold” on <strong>the</strong> text to betranslated.The development <strong>of</strong> this hermeneutic foothold, <strong>the</strong> emergence <strong>of</strong> this stancewith<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “clear<strong>in</strong>g whole,” always occurs through a correspond<strong>in</strong>g attunement. In“What Is Metaphysics?”, <strong>Heidegger</strong> po<strong>in</strong>ts to <strong>the</strong> role that dispositions play <strong>in</strong> shap<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> situatedness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>quirer, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> evok<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> questions that resonate from<strong>the</strong> fundamental condition <strong>of</strong> Da-se<strong>in</strong> as thrown <strong>in</strong>to, <strong>and</strong> emerg<strong>in</strong>g from with<strong>in</strong>,“be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> whole,” giv<strong>in</strong>g rise to questions such as “why is <strong>the</strong>re someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>not ra<strong>the</strong>r noth<strong>in</strong>g?” As <strong>Heidegger</strong> suggests from <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> attunement is adisclosive response to <strong>the</strong> whole, <strong>the</strong> factical testimony <strong>of</strong> our belong<strong>in</strong>g to it, <strong>and</strong>hence is <strong>in</strong> no way “an <strong>in</strong>terior, subjective feel<strong>in</strong>g encapsulated with<strong>in</strong>” <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual’sstate <strong>of</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German words for “belong<strong>in</strong>g”(gehören) <strong>and</strong> “hear<strong>in</strong>g” (hören) po<strong>in</strong>ts to <strong>the</strong>ir related mean<strong>in</strong>gs, fur<strong>the</strong>r suggest<strong>in</strong>gthat <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g-attunement orig<strong>in</strong>ates from <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>re,” ra<strong>the</strong>rthan from <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>teriority <strong>of</strong> consciousness. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> hermeneutic situation <strong>of</strong>17For <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Essential Sway <strong>of</strong> Be-<strong>in</strong>g,” see GA 65, p. 484; tr. 341. For afur<strong>the</strong>r exposition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “midpo<strong>in</strong>t,” <strong>in</strong> its relationship to thought <strong>and</strong> language, see <strong>Heidegger</strong>,“Über das Pr<strong>in</strong>zip ‘Zu den Sachen selbt,’” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 11 (1995): 5–8.
Attunement <strong>and</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>301translation, <strong>and</strong> its reliance upon attunement, doubly underscores <strong>the</strong> fact that<strong>the</strong> latter orig<strong>in</strong>ates from <strong>the</strong> “clear<strong>in</strong>g whole” <strong>and</strong> elicits our prior orientation tolanguage. By show<strong>in</strong>g how Dase<strong>in</strong> belongs to this clear<strong>in</strong>g whole, <strong>the</strong> “ground<strong>in</strong>gattunement”reveals <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fer<strong>in</strong>g that language makes <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby its <strong>in</strong>vitation <strong>in</strong>seek<strong>in</strong>g a dist<strong>in</strong>ctive response (from us). The solicit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> such a response, as <strong>the</strong>reciprocity <strong>of</strong> our belong<strong>in</strong>g to be<strong>in</strong>g, occurs through <strong>the</strong> unique “tonality,” “resonance”<strong>of</strong> language, <strong>and</strong> “<strong>in</strong>flection” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word. Conversely, <strong>the</strong> attunement isdeterm<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> “<strong>in</strong>toned” (Gestimmtse<strong>in</strong> be-stimmt) through <strong>the</strong> “clear<strong>in</strong>g whole,”ra<strong>the</strong>r than by <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>of</strong> human subjectivity. 18 Because <strong>of</strong> its primordiality, asEmad emphasizes, <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g-attunement can direct th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g “away from <strong>the</strong>subjectivity <strong>of</strong> preference,” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby beyond <strong>the</strong> doma<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> assertions <strong>and</strong>op<strong>in</strong>ions. 19Once aga<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong> harmony, rhythm, <strong>and</strong> cadence <strong>of</strong> this attunement, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as itreverberates from <strong>the</strong> depths <strong>of</strong> language, are noth<strong>in</strong>g subjective. On <strong>the</strong> contrary,because <strong>of</strong> its “pre-discursive,” pre-cognitive character (<strong>in</strong> short pre-<strong>the</strong>oretical), <strong>the</strong>ground<strong>in</strong>g-attunement preorients any attempt to underst<strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>gwhole <strong>and</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> expanse <strong>of</strong> its unconcealment. As such, <strong>the</strong> attunementprecedes any subject–object dichotomy, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby marks <strong>the</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g-silence<strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> wellspr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> language simultaneously withdraws <strong>and</strong> recedes <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>vit<strong>in</strong>gus to reside with<strong>in</strong> its disclosive power. <strong>Heidegger</strong> calls this dist<strong>in</strong>ctive shelter<strong>in</strong>g-silence,to which attunement serves notice, <strong>the</strong> stillness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word, <strong>the</strong>preced<strong>in</strong>g silence from which language first speaks. As he states toward <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong>Contributions to Philosophy: “Language is grounded <strong>in</strong> silence. Silence is <strong>the</strong> mostsheltered measure-hold<strong>in</strong>g.” 20 By acclimat<strong>in</strong>g to this silence, <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>gattunementnot only dist<strong>in</strong>guishes <strong>the</strong> threshold where <strong>the</strong> word first speaks, butalso dist<strong>in</strong>guishes <strong>the</strong> ownmost provision that belongs to language: <strong>the</strong> priority <strong>of</strong>“listen<strong>in</strong>g” over speak<strong>in</strong>g. But because this priority also governs <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation<strong>in</strong> its stewardship <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word, <strong>the</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> key words <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sphilosophy beg<strong>in</strong>s by heed<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> withdrawal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g-silencethus reveal<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rise <strong>of</strong> new idioms <strong>of</strong> expression.Precisely because <strong>of</strong> its <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>iteness, <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g-attunement unravelslanguage as <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g that yields new possibilities for expression. Ins<strong>of</strong>ar as18For an example <strong>of</strong> this phrase, see <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Nietzsche: Die Wille zur Macht also Kunst, GA 43(Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985), p. 123. For an analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subtlety <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>attun<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> attunement, apart from subjectivity, see Frank Schalow, “The GesamtausgabeNietzsche: An Exercise <strong>in</strong> <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>and</strong> Thought,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 9 (1993): 150–151. Thisnuance is overlooked by Krell <strong>in</strong> a key passage from his translation <strong>of</strong> Nietzsche, Volume I. TheWill to Power as Art (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1979), p. 126. Krell bases histranslation on <strong>the</strong> Neske, ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> Gesamtausgabe edition. <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Nietzsche, ErsterB<strong>and</strong> (Pfull<strong>in</strong>gen: Gün<strong>the</strong>r Neske, 1961), p. 105.19Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 77. For Emad’s account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>limitations <strong>of</strong> assertions, see pp. 57–58.20GA 65, p. 510; tr. 359.
302 F. Schalowlanguage harbors this power <strong>of</strong> creativity, <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g-attunement directs <strong>the</strong>translator to <strong>the</strong> breakthrough <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se new possibilities, to <strong>the</strong>ir emergence from<strong>the</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g-silence. As Emad states:As <strong>the</strong> German language bends <strong>and</strong> twist to adjust itself to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s new th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong>by be<strong>in</strong>g, which gives rise to Contributions to Philosophy, so does English <strong>in</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>gthis work. English too digs <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> treasury <strong>of</strong> its forgotten words to adjust itself to<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s language. 21But <strong>in</strong> order for this breakthrough to occur, <strong>the</strong>re must be correspond<strong>in</strong>g preparation,which acclimates <strong>the</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g words to a tonalityuniquely <strong>the</strong>ir own. This tonality, however, does not necessarily resonate withour sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> familiar, <strong>in</strong> a similar way that <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> anxiety clasheswith <strong>the</strong> passive acceptance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “status quo.” On <strong>the</strong> contrary, only whenguided by a prior ground<strong>in</strong>g-attunement, which reverberates from <strong>the</strong> depths <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> deepest distress, can a translation restore <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g words<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.Thus, <strong>the</strong> greatest distress must be experienced <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>key words <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy, because <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se words speakswhen th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g heeds <strong>the</strong> claim <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby is enowned by de-cid<strong>in</strong>g toreciprocate for this gift. As <strong>Heidegger</strong> states:But necessities light up only <strong>in</strong> distress. And <strong>the</strong> prepar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> preparation for decision<strong>in</strong>deed rests <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> distress <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ally only accelerat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g lack <strong>of</strong> history <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>distress <strong>of</strong> harden<strong>in</strong>g its conditions, whereas this preparation wants someth<strong>in</strong>g else.Whoever does not know <strong>of</strong> this distress has no <strong>in</strong>kl<strong>in</strong>g at all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decisions that areahead <strong>of</strong> us. 22Because <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation depends upon <strong>the</strong> ownmost provision <strong>of</strong> language,<strong>the</strong> creative venture <strong>of</strong> render<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s words <strong>the</strong>reby h<strong>in</strong>ges on a decision toproject open <strong>the</strong>ir mean<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> roots <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir deepest novelty, <strong>in</strong>deed, “unfamiliarity.”By abid<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> becom<strong>in</strong>g at home <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> uncann<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>of</strong> thisunfamiliarity, a translation receives its guidance from <strong>the</strong> transformation <strong>of</strong> languageitself, which occurs through <strong>the</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g. Indeed, only by becom<strong>in</strong>g“acclimated” <strong>in</strong> this way, <strong>and</strong> undergo<strong>in</strong>g a reciprocal transformation by virtue <strong>of</strong>this “turn<strong>in</strong>g,” can <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation fulfill its hermeneutic responsibility. Dueto <strong>the</strong> tonality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word, <strong>and</strong> its correspond<strong>in</strong>g ground<strong>in</strong>g-attunement, <strong>the</strong> venture<strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g cannot rest content with re<strong>in</strong>vok<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> most “familiar” terms <strong>and</strong>usages. On <strong>the</strong> contrary, <strong>the</strong> creative breakthrough, <strong>of</strong> reenact<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> eruption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>word from <strong>the</strong> uncann<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g-silence, moves away, <strong>in</strong> this “turn<strong>in</strong>g,”from <strong>the</strong> familiar to <strong>the</strong> unfamiliar, <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong> some cases, even welcomes <strong>the</strong> birth<strong>of</strong> neologisms. For by reenact<strong>in</strong>g this breakthrough, <strong>the</strong> neologisms are <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gualcounterpart <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation. Emad has this reenactment <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d21Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 87.22GA 65, p. 97; tr. 67.
Attunement <strong>and</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>303when he states: “The happen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> turn<strong>in</strong>g, which is be-<strong>in</strong>g itself, is at <strong>the</strong> sametime a turn<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> language, that is, a turn<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> ‘familiar’ language to <strong>the</strong>‘unfamiliar’ language <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.” 23If it is not acquiescence, but distress that guides <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation, it isbecause <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial act <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation, as it shapes a specific text, is“returnership,” that is, <strong>the</strong> “orig<strong>in</strong>ation” <strong>of</strong> a text presupposes a return to whatis most question-worthy. In terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation, this means that <strong>the</strong>translator, <strong>in</strong> order to enact this returnership, must <strong>of</strong>ten forsake <strong>the</strong> precedent <strong>of</strong>conventional usage <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> preference for <strong>the</strong> familiar “r<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>the</strong>se words have <strong>in</strong>English. This conventional usage may have its own superficial manner <strong>of</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g,which seeks words that are most common place <strong>and</strong> have a familiar r<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong>English ear. As Emad emphasizes, <strong>the</strong> usage <strong>of</strong> familiar words comes from <strong>the</strong>unquestioned priority we ascribe to <strong>the</strong> “mo<strong>the</strong>r tongue,” <strong>the</strong> priority <strong>of</strong> which ultimatelyblocks <strong>the</strong> path to <strong>the</strong> “returnership.” In place <strong>of</strong> this returnership arises a“monological reductionism,” which sacrifices <strong>the</strong> power <strong>and</strong> creativity <strong>of</strong> languageto <strong>the</strong> constra<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>of</strong> custom, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g what merely pleases <strong>the</strong> ear (<strong>in</strong> English), to<strong>the</strong> power <strong>and</strong> creativity <strong>of</strong> language itself. 24 Yet under <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ance <strong>of</strong> monologicalreductionism, what at first seems “pleas<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> ear,” for example, “appropriation”versus “enown<strong>in</strong>g,” may ultimately be “deaf” to <strong>the</strong> new array <strong>of</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>gsthat <strong>the</strong> key terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy evoke, that is, as “be<strong>in</strong>g-historical”words. For <strong>the</strong> familiarity <strong>of</strong> conventional usage must give way to ano<strong>the</strong>r “logic”<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> decision to render <strong>the</strong> key terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, which is exemplified<strong>in</strong> Contributions to Philosophy as “Sigetik” or <strong>the</strong> return to <strong>the</strong> uncann<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>of</strong>reticence <strong>in</strong> silence: “Reticence <strong>in</strong> silence is <strong>the</strong> ‘logic’ <strong>of</strong> philosophy, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar asphilosophy asks <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g-question from with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g.” 25 The<strong>in</strong>abid<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> uncanny depths <strong>of</strong> this silence, with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> self-ga<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>lógoV as “<strong>the</strong> h<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g-resonat<strong>in</strong>g hiddenness (mystery) <strong>of</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g,” 26 yields language’sownmost creativity, from which <strong>the</strong> basic words acquire <strong>the</strong>ir power. As aresult, <strong>the</strong> uncann<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>of</strong> unfamiliarity may be a truer measure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tonality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>words, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong>ir break with conventional usage creates an atmosphere or climate<strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> basic words, which enact be<strong>in</strong>g historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, can speakfrom <strong>the</strong> deeper roots <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ancestry. The unfamiliar use <strong>in</strong> English establishes anew precedent, not arbitrarily, but as a result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation,<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> accord with its ground<strong>in</strong>g-attunement, which heeds <strong>the</strong> disrupt<strong>in</strong>gdistress <strong>of</strong> what is most question-worthy. At <strong>the</strong> subtlest, although most basic level<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> attunement <strong>and</strong> tonality <strong>of</strong> translation, we discover what Emad describesas <strong>the</strong> “coalesc<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation, <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation.23Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 131.24Ibid., p. 161.25GA 65, p. 78; tr. 54–55.26GA 65, p. 78; tr. 55.
304 F. SchalowThis coalescence occurs with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g-silence, <strong>the</strong> “ga<strong>the</strong>red r<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>stillness,” which leads <strong>the</strong> way to <strong>the</strong> “transformed language called ‘say<strong>in</strong>g.’” 27To illustrate this po<strong>in</strong>t, allow me to cite an example from Emad’s book, which isnot merely one among o<strong>the</strong>rs, but actually implicates <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g whole by recall<strong>in</strong>gwhat is question-worthy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> key words evok<strong>in</strong>g it: “dasSeiende im Ganzen.” The decision to translate this phrase as “be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> a whole,” ra<strong>the</strong>rthan as “be<strong>in</strong>gs as a whole” – <strong>the</strong> prevail<strong>in</strong>g practice <strong>of</strong> various translators – po<strong>in</strong>ts toan essential element <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> tonality <strong>and</strong> attunement <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation. 28 Asvarious colloquialisms <strong>and</strong> even <strong>the</strong> normalcy <strong>of</strong> grammatical errors <strong>in</strong> Englishattest, what by <strong>the</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard <strong>of</strong> conventional usage “sounds good” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mo<strong>the</strong>rtongue cannot be utilized <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation, which is guided by <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>gattunement.In <strong>the</strong> former <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation, “be<strong>in</strong>gs as awhole,” <strong>the</strong> tonality follows <strong>the</strong> passive acceptance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “clamor” <strong>of</strong> “public”<strong>in</strong>terests, or <strong>the</strong> expediency <strong>of</strong> Gerede. In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> correct translation, “be<strong>in</strong>gs<strong>in</strong> a whole,” <strong>the</strong> tonality receives its “pitch” from, <strong>and</strong> resonates out <strong>of</strong>, <strong>the</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>gsilence.If this silence shelters <strong>and</strong> holds <strong>in</strong> reserve what rema<strong>in</strong>s unsaid, <strong>the</strong>n, as<strong>Heidegger</strong> suggests, “[r]eservedness is <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g-attunement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relation tobe-<strong>in</strong>g” (“Verhaltenheit ist die Grundstimmung des Bezuges zum Seyn”). 29The reservedness as <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g-attunement shows what is dist<strong>in</strong>ctive <strong>of</strong> it <strong>in</strong>its tonality. For <strong>the</strong> dynamic <strong>of</strong> hold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> reserve disrupts <strong>the</strong> mono-tonous reign <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> familiar, <strong>in</strong> order that <strong>the</strong> r<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unfamiliar can resound. In this way, anacclimation to <strong>the</strong> birth <strong>of</strong> new mean<strong>in</strong>gs becomes possible, ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> passiveacceptance <strong>of</strong> what is already given <strong>in</strong> its familiar usages. What, qualifies as mean<strong>in</strong>gfulis no longer dom<strong>in</strong>ated by a horizon <strong>of</strong> presence, but <strong>in</strong>stead new mean<strong>in</strong>gsspr<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> what is unsaid, from <strong>the</strong> silent reverberations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>abground. In this regard, <strong>the</strong> tonality is not <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong> auditory sense directed atwhat is audible <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> present. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> “<strong>in</strong>tonement” is <strong>the</strong> reverberat<strong>in</strong>g-ga<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>gout <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> future, <strong>of</strong> what has been held <strong>in</strong> reserve <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ancestry <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> words <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> past, <strong>in</strong> order that <strong>the</strong>ir mean<strong>in</strong>gs may be heard anew <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> present. The tonality27Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 30–31, p. 38.28Emad, Ibid., p. 16. Emad states: “Why does <strong>the</strong> monological reductive approach choose thismistranslation [‘be<strong>in</strong>gs as a whole?’] ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> correct render<strong>in</strong>g, ‘be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> a whole’? It doesso because <strong>the</strong> mo<strong>the</strong>r tongue dem<strong>and</strong>s smooth readability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translated terms <strong>and</strong> resists open<strong>in</strong>gitself to <strong>the</strong> unfamiliar words <strong>and</strong> phrases <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g. Thus,it makes for a smoo<strong>the</strong>r read<strong>in</strong>g to take <strong>the</strong> crucial phrase das Seiende im Ganzen as mean<strong>in</strong>g‘be<strong>in</strong>gs as a whole’ <strong>in</strong>stead <strong>of</strong> com<strong>in</strong>g to terms with its term<strong>in</strong>ological mean<strong>in</strong>g, ‘be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> awhole.’ The monological reductive approach prefers to distort <strong>the</strong> term<strong>in</strong>ological mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> thisphrase because it is committed to <strong>the</strong> supremacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mo<strong>the</strong>r tongue.”29<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte “Probleme” der “Logik”, GA 45(Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1984), p. 2. Basic Questions <strong>of</strong> Philosophy: Selected“Problems” <strong>of</strong> “Logic”, trans. A. Schuwer <strong>and</strong> R. Rojcewicz (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana UniversityPress, 1994), p. 4. For a discussion <strong>of</strong> this quotation, see Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sContributions to Philosophy, p. 53.
Attunement <strong>and</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>305<strong>of</strong> this ground<strong>in</strong>g-attunement, far from someth<strong>in</strong>g merely sensual, reverberateswith a completely new auditory pitch that <strong>Heidegger</strong> characterizes as an “echo.”Emad summarizes <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>timate connection between echo, reservedness, <strong>and</strong>attunement:With <strong>the</strong> word Verhaltenheit, <strong>Heidegger</strong> stresses not only <strong>the</strong> element <strong>of</strong> reservedness butalso Verhalten, that is, comportment. The latter st<strong>and</strong>s both for <strong>the</strong> comportment, orVerhalten, <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g’s turn<strong>in</strong>g relation as well as for Dase<strong>in</strong>’s comportment to thisrelation. Reservedness is thus an attunement that holds back <strong>and</strong> keeps <strong>in</strong> reserve <strong>the</strong> echo<strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g’s refusal <strong>and</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g’s dis-enown<strong>in</strong>g as well as Dase<strong>in</strong>’s disclos<strong>in</strong>g comportment.This shows that dis-enown<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> echo that <strong>in</strong>tones forgottenness <strong>and</strong> ab<strong>and</strong>onment bybe-<strong>in</strong>g, has its own attunement. 30Because <strong>of</strong> its correlation with an attunement, <strong>and</strong> hence through its receptivityto what is unsaid, <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation has its own mode <strong>of</strong> relatedness to, <strong>and</strong>reciprocity with be<strong>in</strong>g, which properly qualifies this translation as a “comportment”<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense that Emad describes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> preced<strong>in</strong>g passage. Because <strong>of</strong> its characteras “attuned comportment,” <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation heeds <strong>the</strong> tonality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word,not as an auditory event, but <strong>in</strong>stead as a “project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g” that is thrown <strong>in</strong>to,abides with<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> belongs to <strong>the</strong> disclosive power <strong>of</strong> language.In suggest<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation is an “attuned comportment,” which<strong>the</strong>reby becomes “acclimated” to <strong>the</strong> word, we give richer expression to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sphrase <strong>of</strong> “dwell<strong>in</strong>g” with<strong>in</strong> language. By develop<strong>in</strong>g fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> central po<strong>in</strong>ts thatEmad makes concern<strong>in</strong>g attunement, we discover that translation displays <strong>the</strong> fullactivity <strong>of</strong> a craft, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as its manner <strong>of</strong> co-respond<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> word exacts from <strong>the</strong>translation a dist<strong>in</strong>ctive comportment <strong>of</strong> dwell<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> safeguard<strong>in</strong>g language.In this way, Emad reveals a dimension that is so fundamental to <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation,that perhaps no one else has explicitly recognized previously: namely, that it isguided by an attuned comportment that <strong>the</strong> translator enacts a dist<strong>in</strong>ctive form <strong>of</strong>care, that is, undertakes a mission whose fulfillment constitutes an act <strong>of</strong> “hermeneuticresponsibility.”When we construe “action” more fundamentally as an “attuned comportment,”we can <strong>the</strong>reby see how <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation is an activity <strong>in</strong> which an <strong>in</strong>dividualengages; this activity is rem<strong>in</strong>iscent, <strong>in</strong> an analogous way, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> characterizationthat <strong>Heidegger</strong> reserved for th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g when he undercut <strong>the</strong> division between <strong>the</strong>ory<strong>and</strong> praxis <strong>in</strong> his “Letter on ‘Humanism.’” 31 If translation can be construed as an“activity” <strong>in</strong> this orig<strong>in</strong>al sense, <strong>the</strong>n we can appreciate more fully how as anattuned comportment, it can provide a “gateway” to <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Let me<strong>the</strong>n conclude this essay by draw<strong>in</strong>g out implications between Emad’s <strong>in</strong>sight<strong>in</strong>to translation as an attuned comportment <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “unsaid.”30Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 64.31See <strong>Heidegger</strong>, “Brief über den ‘Humanismus,’” <strong>in</strong> Wegmarken, GA 9, pp. 313–314.
306 F. Schalow3 The Return to Shelter<strong>in</strong>g-Silence <strong>in</strong> Interl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong>The characterization <strong>of</strong> translation as an attuned comportment underscores <strong>the</strong>necessity <strong>of</strong> its emergence with<strong>in</strong> a hermeneutic situation. In simplest terms, anycomportment is already situated. In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> translation, this is doubly <strong>the</strong> case,because <strong>the</strong> language <strong>in</strong>to which <strong>the</strong> translator is thrown is not a prist<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ancy,but ra<strong>the</strong>r is housed <strong>in</strong> a shelter<strong>in</strong>g-silence, which roots <strong>the</strong> most basicphilosophical words <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir deepest ancestry. As <strong>the</strong> “word <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g,” language“safeguards <strong>in</strong> silence <strong>the</strong> clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> t/here (Da).” 32 Because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>timacybetween <strong>the</strong> ground<strong>in</strong>g-attunement <strong>of</strong> reservedness <strong>and</strong> language, no s<strong>in</strong>gle “<strong>the</strong>ory”<strong>of</strong> translation, whe<strong>the</strong>r conceived through semiotics, Ricoeurian hermeneutics,or deconstruction would be applicable to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> keywords <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy. For all such <strong>the</strong>ories brazenly overlook <strong>the</strong> rolethat <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation plays <strong>in</strong> prepar<strong>in</strong>g for be-<strong>in</strong>g’s arrival <strong>in</strong> language, aswell as <strong>the</strong> guidance that a prior attunement provides for translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’stexts. By <strong>the</strong> same token, such <strong>the</strong>ories presuppose but are not aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> crucialbreakthrough, which Parvis Emad forged through his pioneer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>terdependence between <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation. Consequently,such <strong>the</strong>ories divorce <strong>the</strong> latter translation from <strong>the</strong> former. In <strong>the</strong> process, such<strong>the</strong>ories seek to abstract specific pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>of</strong> translation, as if <strong>the</strong>y could be developed<strong>in</strong>dependently (1) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “transformed language called ‘say<strong>in</strong>g’” <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>yreside <strong>and</strong> (2) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> matter <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, which <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation alreadyenacts, <strong>and</strong> whose historical development <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g preorients<strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation. Because <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation is already<strong>in</strong>fused with th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, which, through its historical response to <strong>the</strong> claim <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g,calls forth <strong>the</strong> decisions <strong>of</strong> how to translate its own key words, such <strong>the</strong>ories necessarilyunderestimate <strong>the</strong> depth <strong>and</strong> uniqueness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> translator’s craft. Because<strong>the</strong>se key words echo <strong>the</strong> voice <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g depends upon yield<strong>in</strong>gto language as “attuned to this reserved, turn<strong>in</strong>g relation” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. 33Perhaps, <strong>the</strong> most noteworthy example is Paul Ricoeur’s <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> text, whichconstrues mean<strong>in</strong>g as a system <strong>of</strong> signs or “semiotics,” which is constructed on variouslevels <strong>and</strong> harbors multiple possibilities <strong>of</strong> “<strong>in</strong>terpretation.” While <strong>in</strong> someways, Ricoeur’s approach to translation seems closer to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s than o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>orists(e.g., Derrida), <strong>the</strong>se two th<strong>in</strong>kers are never<strong>the</strong>less separated by an unbridgeablechasm. For <strong>in</strong> contrast to Ricoeur, who beg<strong>in</strong>s from <strong>the</strong> premise <strong>of</strong> an alreadyconstructed text, <strong>Heidegger</strong> upholds as his po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> departure <strong>the</strong> attuned responseto <strong>the</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g-silence that houses language <strong>and</strong> orients <strong>the</strong> translation from itsproximity to <strong>the</strong> claim <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. As a result, <strong>Heidegger</strong> construes mean<strong>in</strong>g (S<strong>in</strong>n),32For a discussion <strong>of</strong> this “silence,” see <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Vom Wesen der Sprache. Die Metaphysik derSprache und die Wesung des Wortes. Zu Herders Abh<strong>and</strong>lung “Über den Ursprung der Sprache”,GA 85 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999), pp. 55, 72, 85.33Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 56.
Attunement <strong>and</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>307not just as aris<strong>in</strong>g from a connection <strong>of</strong> signs, as <strong>in</strong> Ricoeur’s case, but as anemissary <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> its possibility <strong>of</strong> disclosure through language. Because<strong>Heidegger</strong> (1) bases <strong>the</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> what is “mean<strong>in</strong>gful” on <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong>unconcealment (<strong>and</strong> not <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r way around, as Ricoeur does), 34 while (2) show<strong>in</strong>gthat translation uncovers <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> a text only through its attuned comportmenttoward, <strong>and</strong> proximity with, <strong>the</strong> claim <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, that is, as <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual as wellas <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation, he (3) establishes that <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation engages <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> strife <strong>of</strong> truth as άlήq∈ia, as <strong>the</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> conceal<strong>in</strong>g-unconceal<strong>in</strong>g. Indeed,it is <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> crucible <strong>of</strong> this strife that <strong>the</strong> translation forges <strong>the</strong> novelty <strong>of</strong> its idioms,<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby yields to <strong>the</strong> “orig<strong>in</strong>ary essential sway <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g.” 35 As<strong>Heidegger</strong> emphasizes, <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation proceeds from “<strong>the</strong> transport<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>our whole be<strong>in</strong>g unto <strong>the</strong> realm <strong>of</strong> a transformed truth,” with<strong>in</strong> which we acquire <strong>the</strong>capacity to “care for <strong>the</strong> word.” 36 As a result, we can appreciate (4) <strong>the</strong> radicality <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> premise <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s approach to translat<strong>in</strong>g which, by rest<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> abground<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unsaid, <strong>in</strong>itiates <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation from <strong>the</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g-silence, <strong>in</strong>contrast to <strong>the</strong> Ricoeur’s derivative premise, which is based on <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical model<strong>of</strong> a text. As a result, <strong>Heidegger</strong> can (5) open <strong>the</strong> way for grasp<strong>in</strong>g translation as a“hermeneutic responsibility,” because <strong>of</strong> its proximity to <strong>the</strong> claim <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> itsmission <strong>of</strong> safeguard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> word. If translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>volves <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong> responsibility,<strong>the</strong>n, as a form <strong>of</strong> “attuned comportment” it, like th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, is also a way <strong>of</strong> act<strong>in</strong>g,<strong>and</strong> ultimately, <strong>of</strong> “be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world.” We can <strong>the</strong>reby summarize <strong>the</strong> fivepreced<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>ts by emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g ano<strong>the</strong>r: (6) because <strong>Heidegger</strong> undercuts <strong>the</strong>dichotomy between <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>and</strong> practice, <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong> activity <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g isalready <strong>in</strong>terwoven with <strong>the</strong> decisions <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, no <strong>the</strong>oretical model can everexpla<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>novativeness <strong>and</strong> creativity, which pervades <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation. 37Even <strong>the</strong> “anti<strong>the</strong>oretical,” “postmodern” perspective <strong>of</strong> deconstruction, whichadvances <strong>the</strong> claim <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “untranslatability” <strong>of</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> terms due to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>iteness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir “signification,” is still <strong>the</strong> mask for ano<strong>the</strong>r “<strong>the</strong>ory” – albeit <strong>in</strong> an ironicalway. 38 For <strong>the</strong> deconstructionist perspective still imposes a preconceived notion, itsown “a priori” disclaimer, upon <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> correspond<strong>in</strong>g power<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word. As a result, even this viewpo<strong>in</strong>t overlooks that translation is an attuned34For Ricoeur’s account <strong>of</strong> translation as a form <strong>of</strong> “<strong>in</strong>terpretation,” as unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> signify<strong>in</strong>gcontext <strong>of</strong> a text, albeit without regard to truth as disclosedness, see Paul Ricoeur, On <strong>Translation</strong>,trans. Eileen Brennan (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 36. For an attempt to l<strong>in</strong>k <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>and</strong>Ricoeur’s approach to translation, see Kenneth Maly, <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Possibility: Language,Emergence–Say<strong>in</strong>g Be-<strong>in</strong>g (Toronto: The University <strong>of</strong> Toronto Press 2008), pp. 163–166.35GA 65, p. 406; tr. 285.36GA 54, p. 18; tr. 12.37For a discussion <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g as an activity, see Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributionsto Philosophy, p. 65.38See John Sallis, On <strong>Translation</strong> (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 2002), pp. 1, 100–102.For a critique <strong>of</strong> this deconstructionist view <strong>of</strong> “untranslatability,” see Frank Schalow, “Freedom,Truth <strong>and</strong> Responsibility: A Critical Look at <strong>the</strong> Recent <strong>Translation</strong>s <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gesamtausgabe,”<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 23 (2007): 98–99.
308 F. Schalowcomportment, a responsive engagement with <strong>the</strong> disclosive power <strong>of</strong> language,which <strong>the</strong>reby transposes <strong>the</strong> translator <strong>in</strong>to an expanse <strong>of</strong> possibility, <strong>and</strong> an historicalclear<strong>in</strong>g, which calls forth a decision as to how to render <strong>the</strong> key words <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy. Put ano<strong>the</strong>r way, <strong>the</strong> decisions <strong>the</strong>mselves orig<strong>in</strong>ate from a“call” – hence <strong>the</strong>ir relatedness to an attunement – that “echoes” <strong>the</strong> specific claimthat be<strong>in</strong>g makes upon thought. Because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> echo <strong>of</strong> this call, translation rises to<strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> a “craft,” which st<strong>and</strong>s <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> service <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. The synergies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>serelationships do not become clear, however, by consolidat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong>to a “<strong>the</strong>ory.”Instead, we can clarify <strong>the</strong>m only through <strong>the</strong> “way-mak<strong>in</strong>g” venture <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong>translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> texts, which reverberates with <strong>the</strong> “echoes” <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g-historicalth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> first gives <strong>the</strong>m voice, as is <strong>the</strong> case <strong>in</strong> Contributions to Philosophy <strong>and</strong>M<strong>in</strong>dfulness. Put simply, it is only as “enowned” by, <strong>and</strong> already prepared forventur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> risk <strong>of</strong> de-cid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> crucial philosophical idioms,that a “pioneer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sight” emerges, which guides this endeavor <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> through <strong>the</strong>translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se two major texts <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s.No <strong>the</strong>ory, no matter how <strong>in</strong>genious, can replace <strong>the</strong> pioneer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sight that Emadforged with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> historical crucible <strong>of</strong> ventur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ground-break<strong>in</strong>g translations,Contributions to Philosophy <strong>and</strong> M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, because only <strong>the</strong> venture <strong>of</strong> this riskexplicitly st<strong>and</strong>s forth with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> “claim <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g.” Only by st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g forth <strong>in</strong> this way,can Emad, through his pioneer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sight, address <strong>the</strong> dynamics <strong>of</strong> translation, <strong>and</strong>,<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process, acknowledge <strong>the</strong> debt to which <strong>the</strong> translator is “own<strong>in</strong>g,” namely hisdependence upon <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g. In light <strong>of</strong> Emad’spioneer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sight, we can fully appreciate how <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual translation, as “commissioned”by be-<strong>in</strong>g, clears <strong>the</strong> way for <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>in</strong> two respects: first, bymeet<strong>in</strong>g its hermeneutic responsibility through safeguard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> word <strong>and</strong>, second,by fur<strong>the</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> mission <strong>of</strong> “Hermes” to mark <strong>the</strong> cross<strong>in</strong>g where <strong>the</strong> key idioms,which are held <strong>in</strong> reserve <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past, acquire deeper mean<strong>in</strong>g through <strong>the</strong>ir arrivalfrom <strong>the</strong> future. By answer<strong>in</strong>g a call as to how to translate <strong>the</strong> key words <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation holds open <strong>the</strong> creativity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> future, whose vistascan never be encapsulated with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> scope <strong>of</strong> any specific <strong>the</strong>ory.Because <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation receives its guidance from <strong>the</strong> future, we cannotevaluate its fruits by whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y satisfy <strong>the</strong> sensibilities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> status quo. On <strong>the</strong>contrary, <strong>the</strong> opposite might be a more appropriate litmus test. For overshadow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>words <strong>the</strong>mselves are <strong>the</strong> decisions about <strong>the</strong> future transformation <strong>of</strong> philosophy, <strong>and</strong>hence <strong>the</strong> emergence <strong>of</strong> new possibilities for express<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> most elemental word <strong>of</strong>all, namely “be-<strong>in</strong>g.” Just as <strong>Heidegger</strong> suggests that a dissociative exposition(Ause<strong>in</strong><strong>and</strong>ersetzung) with previous th<strong>in</strong>kers exacts a measure <strong>of</strong> “violence” (Gewalt),so <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation is always governed by <strong>the</strong> explosive power <strong>of</strong> those nuancesthat accentuate, <strong>in</strong>deed, through a dist<strong>in</strong>ctive tonality, “amplify” <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ground<strong>in</strong>g words. As <strong>Heidegger</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>ally suggested through his Ause<strong>in</strong><strong>and</strong>ersetzungwith Kant, such violence is necessary <strong>in</strong> order to evoke <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> what is “unsaid,”<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby to deepen <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> what has been said:Certa<strong>in</strong>ly, <strong>in</strong> order to wr<strong>in</strong>g from what <strong>the</strong> words say, what it is <strong>the</strong>y want to say, every <strong>in</strong>terpretation(Interpretation) must necessarily use violence (Gewalt). Such violence, however cannotbe rov<strong>in</strong>g arbitrar<strong>in</strong>ess. The power <strong>of</strong> an idea which sh<strong>in</strong>es forth (vorausleuchten der Idee)
Attunement <strong>and</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>309must drive <strong>and</strong> guide <strong>the</strong> lay<strong>in</strong>g-out (Auslegung). Only <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> this idea can an<strong>in</strong>terpretation risk what is always audacious, namely, entrust<strong>in</strong>g itself to <strong>the</strong> concealed <strong>in</strong>nerpassion <strong>of</strong> a work <strong>in</strong> order to be able, through this, to place itself with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> unsaid <strong>and</strong> forceit <strong>in</strong>to speech. 39 ***Because <strong>the</strong> unsaid determ<strong>in</strong>es what is most question-worthy, any philosophical<strong>in</strong>sight is always predicated upon “returnership,” that is, upon <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong>restor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most basic words <strong>of</strong> philosophy. Philosophy is <strong>the</strong>reforea unique enterprise because its direction does not lie <strong>in</strong> a l<strong>in</strong>ear progress, but <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> circular path <strong>of</strong> returnership, which honors its orig<strong>in</strong>s by recover<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m from<strong>the</strong> future. In <strong>the</strong> “poverty (Armut) <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g,” 40 or <strong>the</strong> shelter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> its truth <strong>in</strong>silence, lies also its wealth, where its most powerful idioms speak from <strong>the</strong> depths<strong>of</strong> simplicity. By <strong>the</strong> same token, <strong>the</strong> hallmark <strong>of</strong> this legacy does not lie only <strong>in</strong>what <strong>Heidegger</strong> says on this topic, but <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> echo<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r attempt to th<strong>in</strong>kalong with him, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> manner <strong>in</strong> which Emad does through his pioneer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sight<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> translation. If our discussion <strong>of</strong> “Attunement <strong>and</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>” hasborn any fruit, <strong>the</strong>n we should be able to experience <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tertw<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Emad’swords cited at <strong>the</strong> outset <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> paper, namely “<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>calculable richness peculiar tobe-<strong>in</strong>g’s turn<strong>in</strong>g relation” with a remark <strong>Heidegger</strong> made several decades earlier <strong>in</strong>his “Appendix to <strong>the</strong> Kantbook,” to <strong>the</strong> effect that “What has been said is poorwhile, <strong>the</strong> unsaid is filled with riches (das ungesagte erfüllt mit Reichtum).” 41In this regard, Emad’s pioneer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terdependence <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tral<strong>in</strong>gual<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation forsakes <strong>the</strong> false riches promised by various <strong>the</strong>ories <strong>of</strong>translation, <strong>in</strong> favor <strong>of</strong> a more humbler reward <strong>of</strong> “giv<strong>in</strong>g thanks,” which becomesenriched by its own poverty by dwell<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> simplicity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word. Inrenounc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary riches <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gs, he allows <strong>the</strong> depth <strong>and</strong> uncann<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s question from “Die Armut” to resonate, <strong>the</strong> remote but never<strong>the</strong>lessunique possibility that poverty could yield riches. As Emad illustrates, <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong>translation provides one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most important measures <strong>of</strong> this poverty, <strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong>ar as<strong>the</strong> translator “experiences <strong>the</strong> ga<strong>the</strong>red r<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> stillness (<strong>the</strong> ownmost <strong>of</strong> language)”only by “abdicat[<strong>in</strong>g] <strong>the</strong> throne he occupies when he conceives <strong>of</strong> himselfas <strong>the</strong> master <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> lord <strong>of</strong> language.” 42 For it is by travel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> path <strong>of</strong> “returnership,”<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>reby conced<strong>in</strong>g its humblest orig<strong>in</strong>s, that th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g reaps <strong>the</strong> fruit <strong>of</strong> itsmost elemental words. 43 In <strong>the</strong> stillness <strong>of</strong> this humility echoes <strong>the</strong> “voice (Stimme)39<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, GA 3 (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann, 1992b), p. 202. Kant <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Problem <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft(Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 141.40For one <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s key references to <strong>the</strong> “poverty <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g,” see GA 9, p. 364. Also, see<strong>in</strong> this volume, “Poverty,” trans. Thomas Kalary <strong>and</strong> Frank Schalow.41GA 3, 249; tr. 175 [translation slightly modified]. Italics m<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> both Emad’s <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sstatements.42Emad, On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 39.43For <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> restor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se elemental words,see GA 2, p. 291.
310 F. Schalow<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g,” 44 which calls th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> translation alike <strong>in</strong>to a common mission <strong>of</strong>endur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>oundest poverty, <strong>in</strong> order that philosophy may someday become<strong>the</strong> beneficiary <strong>of</strong> an “<strong>in</strong>calculable richness.”ReferencesEmad, Parvis. 1985. Boredom as limit <strong>and</strong> disposition. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 1: 63–78.Emad, Parvis. 2007. On <strong>the</strong> way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s contributions to philosophy. Madison: TheUniversity <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1995. Über das Pr<strong>in</strong>zip ‘Zu den Sachen selbt’. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 11: 5–8.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1961. Nietzsche, Erster B<strong>and</strong>. Pfull<strong>in</strong>gen: Gün<strong>the</strong>r Neske. Nietzsche, Volume I.The will to power as art. 1979. New York: Harper & Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1975. Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 24. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann. Trans. Albert H<strong>of</strong>stadter. 1982. The basic problems <strong>of</strong> phenomenology.Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1976a. Brief über den ‘Humanismus’. In Wegmarken, GA 9. Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1976b. Nachwort zu ‘Was ist Metaphysik?’. In Wegmarken, GA 9. Frankfurtam Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1977. Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit, GA 2. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1983a. E<strong>in</strong>führung <strong>in</strong> die Metaphysik, GA 40. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1983b. Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, GA 29/30. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann. Trans. William McNeill <strong>and</strong> Nicholas Walker. 1995. The fundamentalconcepts <strong>of</strong> metaphysics. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1984. Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte “Probleme” der “Logik”,GA 45. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann. Trans. A. Schuwer <strong>and</strong> R. Rojcewicz. 1994.Basic questions <strong>of</strong> philosophy: Selected “Problems” <strong>of</strong> “Logic”. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: IndianaUniversity Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1985. Nietzsche: Die Wille zur Macht also Kunst, GA 43. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1989. Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann. Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly. 1999. Contributions to philosophy(from enown<strong>in</strong>g). Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1992a. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann. Trans. Richard Taft. 1997. Kant <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> metaphysics. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton:Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1992b. Platon: Sophistes, GA 19. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.1997. Trans. R. Rojcewicz <strong>and</strong> A. Schuwer. Plato’s Sophist. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana UniversityPress.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1994. Die Armut. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 10: 5–11. Trans. Thomas Kalary <strong>and</strong>Frank Schalow “Poverty” [<strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> this volume].<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1999. Vom Wesen der Sprache. Die Metaphysik der Sprache und die Wesungdes Wortes. Zu Herders Abh<strong>and</strong>lung “Über den Ursprung der Sprache”, GA 85. Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.Kisiel, Theodore. 1993. The genesis <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time. Berkeley: The University <strong>of</strong> California Press.44GA 9, p. 310.
Attunement <strong>and</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>311Kovacs, George. 2001. <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong> dialogue with Herder: Cross<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> metaphysicstoward be-<strong>in</strong>g-historical language. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 17: 45–63.Maly, Kenneth. 2008. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s possibility – Language, emergence, say<strong>in</strong>g be-<strong>in</strong>g. Toronto:University <strong>of</strong> Toronto Press.Ricoeur, Paul. 2006. On translation. Trans. Eileen Brennan. Introduction by Richard Kearney.London: Routledge.Sallis, John. 2002. On translation. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.Schalow, Frank. 1993. The Gesamtausgabe Nietzsche: An exercise <strong>in</strong> translation <strong>and</strong> thought.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 9: 150–151.Schalow, Frank. 2007. Freedom, truth <strong>and</strong> responsibility: A critical look at <strong>the</strong> recent translations<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gesamtausgabe. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 23: 98–99.von Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm. 1994. Wege <strong>in</strong>s Ereignis: Zu <strong>Heidegger</strong>s “Beiträge zurPhilosophie”. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.
Appendix: List <strong>of</strong> Publications <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad2011 <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 27, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).2010 “<strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>: A Closer Look,” StudiaPhaenomenologica, X, (2010): 101–120.“Nietzsche <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cross<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> O<strong>the</strong>r Onset <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> Light <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sHermeneutic Guidel<strong>in</strong>e,” Existentia, 20 (2010): 161–180.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 26, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).2009 “‘Putt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Seed’: ‘Say<strong>in</strong>g Aga<strong>in</strong>’ or ‘Approximat<strong>in</strong>g’ <strong>and</strong> O<strong>the</strong>r QuestionsConcern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Interl<strong>in</strong>gual <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Keywords” (with Ivo DeGennaro), Existentia, 19, (2009): 161–192.“A New Access to <strong>the</strong> Early Stage <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Thought <strong>and</strong> QuestionsConcern<strong>in</strong>g his Relationship to Christianity”: a review <strong>of</strong> : Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>,Letters to his Wife (1915-1970), <strong>Heidegger</strong> und die christliche Tradition:Annäherungen an e<strong>in</strong> schwieriges Thema, “Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>s Götter und derchristliche Gott:Theologische Bes<strong>in</strong>nungen über <strong>Heidegger</strong>s Bes<strong>in</strong>nung, Existentia19: (2009): 303–319.“Translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Beiträge zur Philosophie as a HermeneuticResponsibility,” <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>s Beiträge zur Philosophie: InternationalesKolloquium vom 20–22 Mai 2004 an der Universität Lausanne (Schweiz),ed.,Emmanuel Mejia <strong>and</strong> Ingeborg Schüßler, (Vittorio Klostermann: Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong> 2009): 441–461.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 25, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).2008 “Interpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Thought Through Questionable Assumptions” a review <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Possibility: Language, Emergence-Say<strong>in</strong>g Be-<strong>in</strong>g by Kenneth Maly,Existentia, 18, (2008): 293–300.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 24, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).2007 On <strong>the</strong> Way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy, (Madison, WI: TheUniversity <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press).<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 23, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).F. Schalow (ed.), <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad, Contributions To Phenomenology 65,DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0, © Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media B.V. 2011313
314 Appendix: List <strong>of</strong> Publications <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad2006 Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, co-trans. Thomas Kalary, (London: Cont<strong>in</strong>uum Press).<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 22, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).“De-cision: Hermeneutic Pre-conditions <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Interpretation <strong>of</strong>Heraclitus,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> und die Antike, eds. Hans-Christian Gün<strong>the</strong>r, AntonioRengakos, (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck), pp. 115–132.2005 <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 21, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).2004 “La pergunta por la tecnologia y la voluntad de poder” <strong>in</strong> Estética: miradascontemporáneas, eds. Á. Corral C., J. T. Lozano, C. E. Sanabria B., <strong>the</strong> Spanishtranslation <strong>of</strong> “The Question <strong>of</strong> Technology <strong>and</strong> Will to Power,” first appeared <strong>in</strong>Walter Biemel <strong>and</strong> F.-W. von Herrmann, ed., Kunst und Technik, Gedächtnisschriftzum 100. Geburtstag von Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, (Klostermann, Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>), pp.125–140.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 20, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).2003 <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 19, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).2002 “The Question <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g: Foremost Hermeneutic Pre-condition for Interpret<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Heidegger</strong>,” Enrahonar: Quderns de Filos<strong>of</strong>ia, 34: 11–28.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 18, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).2001 “On ‘Be-<strong>in</strong>g’: The Last Part <strong>of</strong> Contributions to Philosophy: (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g),” <strong>in</strong>Charles E. Scott, et. al ed., Companion to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions to Philosophy,(Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press), pp. 229–245.“Contributions to Philosophy <strong>and</strong> Enown<strong>in</strong>g-historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>,” a translation <strong>of</strong>“Beiträge zur Philosophie und ereignisgeschichtliches Denken,” by F.-W. vonHerrmann <strong>in</strong> Charles E. Scott, et. al ed., Companion to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Contributions toPhilosophy, (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press), pp. 105–126.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 17, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).2000 “On <strong>the</strong> Inception <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g-historical <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> its Unfold<strong>in</strong>g as M<strong>in</strong>dfulness,”<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 16: 55–71.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 16, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).1999 Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g), co- trans.Kenneth Maly, (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press).“Mastery <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Coercive Force <strong>of</strong> Mach<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Beiträge zurPhilosophie <strong>and</strong> Bes<strong>in</strong>nung,” <strong>in</strong> Paola-Ludovika Cori<strong>and</strong>o, ed., Vom Rätsel desBegriffs, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker und Humblot), pp .73-90.“The Place <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pre-Socratics <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Beiträge zur Philosophie,” <strong>in</strong> DavidJacobs, ed. The Pre- Socratics After <strong>Heidegger</strong>, (New York: SUNY Press),pp. 55–71.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 15, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).1998 “A Conversation with Friedrich- Wilhelm von Herrmann on Beiträge zurPhilosophie,” <strong>in</strong> Burt Hopk<strong>in</strong>s, ed. Phenomenology: Japanese <strong>and</strong> AmericanPerspectives, (The Hague: Kluwer), pp. 145–166.Japanese <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>of</strong> “Nietzsche <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>s Beiträge zur Philosophie” from,Hans Helmut G<strong>and</strong>er, ed., Verwechselt mich vor Allem nicht: <strong>Heidegger</strong> undNietzsche, (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann Verlag), pp. 179–196.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 14, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).1997 Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Phenomenological Interpretation <strong>of</strong> Kant’s Critique <strong>of</strong> PureReason, co-trans. Kenneth Maly, (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press).<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 13, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).
Appendix: List <strong>of</strong> Publications <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad3151996 “Beiträge zur Philosophie,” <strong>in</strong> Encyclopedia <strong>of</strong> Philosophy Supplement,(New York: Macmillan), pp. 55–56.“Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> - Le philosophe dans la cité,” a translation by G. Guest <strong>and</strong> P.David <strong>of</strong> “Introduction: Elements <strong>of</strong> an Intellectual Portrait <strong>in</strong> H. W. Petzet’sMemoirs,” <strong>in</strong> Cahiers philosophiques, 66, pp. 77–101.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 12, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).1995 “Deconstructive Re<strong>in</strong>scription <strong>of</strong> Fundamental Ontology: The <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>After <strong>Heidegger</strong>,” <strong>in</strong> Kenneth Maly, ed ., The Path <strong>of</strong> Archaic <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>: Unfold<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> Work <strong>of</strong> John Sallis, (New York: SUNY Press), pp. 201–219.“<strong>Heidegger</strong> I, <strong>Heidegger</strong> II <strong>and</strong> Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis),” <strong>in</strong> B.Babich, ed., From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, <strong>and</strong> Desire, (The Hague:Kluwer), pp. 129–146.“Marg<strong>in</strong>al Notes on Sallis’s Peculiar Interpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Vom Wesen derWahrheit,” a translation <strong>of</strong> an essay by Walter Biemel, <strong>in</strong> Kenneth Maly, ed ., ThePath <strong>of</strong> Archaic <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>: Unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Work <strong>of</strong> John Sallis, (New York: SUNYPress), pp. 221–239.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 11, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).1994 “Nietzsche <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>s Beiträge zur Philosophie,” <strong>in</strong> Hans-Helmuth G<strong>and</strong>er, ed.,Verwechselt mich vor Allem nicht: <strong>Heidegger</strong> und Nietzsche, (Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Klostermann Verlag), pp. 179–196.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 10, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).1993 He<strong>in</strong>rich Wieg<strong>and</strong> Petzet, Encounters <strong>and</strong> Dialogues with Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>1929–1976 , co-trans. Kenneth Maly, with an Introduction by Parvis Emad,(Chicago: The University <strong>of</strong> Chicago Press).“Zu Fragen der Interpretation und Entzifferung der Grundlagen der GesamtausgabeMart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>s,” <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 9, pp. 161–171.“Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time <strong>and</strong> The Basic Problems <strong>of</strong> Phenomenology,” a translation <strong>of</strong> “Von‘Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit’ zu ‘Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie’” by F.-W. von Herrmann,<strong>in</strong> J. Sallis, ed., Read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Commemorations, (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: IndianaUniversity Press), pp. 118–135.“Introduction: Elements <strong>of</strong> an Intellectual Portrait <strong>in</strong> H. W. Petzet’s Memoirs,” <strong>in</strong>He<strong>in</strong>rich Wieg<strong>and</strong> Petzet, Encounters <strong>and</strong> Dialogues with Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>1929–1976, (Chicago: The University Press <strong>of</strong> Chicago), pp. xi-xxxi.“<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> More Deeply <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>: Essential <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> Unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Language,” <strong>in</strong> John Sallis, ed. Read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>:Commemorations, (Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press), pp. 323–340.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 9, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).1992 “<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> More Deeply <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Question <strong>of</strong> <strong>Translation</strong>: Essential <strong>Translation</strong> <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> Unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Language,” <strong>in</strong> Christopher Macann, ed. Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>: CriticalAssessments, Vol. 3: Language (London, Routledge).“Way <strong>and</strong> Method: Hermeneutic Phenomenology <strong>in</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>the</strong> History <strong>of</strong>Be<strong>in</strong>g,”a translation <strong>of</strong> “Zu Weg und Methode” by F.-W. von Herrmann, <strong>in</strong> C.Macann, ed. Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Critical Assessments, Vol. 1: Philosophy (London:Routledge), pp. 271–292.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 8, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).1991 “The Echo <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Beiträge zur Philosophie - Der Anklang: Directives for itsInterpretation,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 7: 15–35.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 7, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).1990 <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 6, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).
316 Appendix: List <strong>of</strong> Publications <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad1989 “The Question <strong>of</strong> Technology <strong>and</strong> Will to Power,” <strong>in</strong> Walter Biemel <strong>and</strong> F.-W. vonHerrmann, eds., Kunst und Technik, Gedächtnisschrift zum 100. Geburtstag vonMart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, (Klostermann, Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>), pp. 125–140.“Poetic Say<strong>in</strong>g as Beckon<strong>in</strong>g: The Open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s Germanien,” Research <strong>in</strong>Phenomenology, xix. pp. 121–138.“The Flower <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Mouth: Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s H<strong>in</strong>t for <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Essence <strong>of</strong> Language,” a translation <strong>of</strong> “‘Die Blume des Mundes’: Zum Verhältnisvon <strong>Heidegger</strong> und Hölderl<strong>in</strong>” by F.-W. von Herrmann, <strong>in</strong> Research <strong>in</strong>Phenomenology, xix, pp. 27–42.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 5, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).1988 Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Hegel’s Phenomenology <strong>of</strong> Spirit, co-trans. K. Maly(Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press).“Reference, Sign <strong>and</strong> Language: Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, Section 17 ” <strong>in</strong> J. Sallis, J.Tam<strong>in</strong>aux, G. Moneta, eds., Collegium Phaenomenologicum: The First Ten Years,Phenomenologica Series, (The Hague: Mart<strong>in</strong>us Nijh<strong>of</strong>f), pp. 175–189.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 4, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).1987 “<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Orig<strong>in</strong>ary Read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Heraclitus-Fragment 16” <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> onHeraclitus: A New Read<strong>in</strong>g, (Edw<strong>in</strong> Mellen Press), pp. 103–120.“Heraclitus <strong>and</strong> Parmenides,” a translation from French <strong>of</strong> an essay by JeanBeaufret, first published <strong>in</strong> 1960 <strong>in</strong> Botteghe Oscure, Rome Nr. 25, <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> onHeraclitus: A New Read<strong>in</strong>g, (Edw<strong>in</strong> Mellen Press),pp. 69–86.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 3, (Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot).1986 “The Significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> New Edition <strong>of</strong> Subjekt und Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> FundamentalOntology <strong>of</strong> Language,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 2, pp. 141–151.“The Basic Question <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g as Such,” a translation from German <strong>of</strong> an essay byMart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 2, pp. 1–3.“Metaphysics <strong>and</strong> Topology <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>,” a translation <strong>of</strong> “Metaphysikund Se<strong>in</strong>stopik bei <strong>Heidegger</strong>” by Otto Pöggeler <strong>in</strong> A Companion to Mart<strong>in</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans, (Wash<strong>in</strong>gton: UniversityPress <strong>of</strong> America) pp. 227–251.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 2, (Oak Brook, IL: Eterna Press).1985 “Boredom as Limit <strong>and</strong> Disposition,” <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies, 1, pp. 63–78.“World, F<strong>in</strong>itude, <strong>and</strong> Solitude as Basic Concepts <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics,” <strong>in</strong> Research <strong>in</strong>Phenomenology, xv, pp. 247–259.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 1, (Oak Brook, IL: Eterna Press).1983 “The Place <strong>of</strong> Hegel <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time,” Research <strong>in</strong> Phenomenology,xiii, pp. 159–173.“The Significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Essay on Art for Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Turn <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’sThought,” Research <strong>in</strong> Phenomenology, xii, pp. 241–247.“Die neue Errungenschaft der <strong>Heidegger</strong>forschung und das Problem der Kunst,”Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger, 36, pp. 189–196.1982 “<strong>Heidegger</strong> on Pa<strong>in</strong>: Focus<strong>in</strong>g on a Recurr<strong>in</strong>g Theme <strong>of</strong> his Thought,” <strong>in</strong> Zeitschriftfür philosophische Forschung, 36, pp. 345–360.Review <strong>of</strong> Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, by George Ste<strong>in</strong>er, Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger,35/2: 151–152.
Appendix: List <strong>of</strong> Publications <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad3171981 <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Phenomenology” <strong>of</strong> Values: His Critique <strong>of</strong> Intentionality, GlenEllyn, Tory Press.“Technology as Presence: <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s View,” <strong>in</strong> Listen<strong>in</strong>g, 16, Nr. 2, pp. 133–144.“<strong>Heidegger</strong> on Transcendence <strong>and</strong> Intentionality: His Critique <strong>of</strong> Scheler,” <strong>in</strong>Thomas Sheehan, ed. <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>the</strong> Man <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Th<strong>in</strong>ker, (Precedent Press),pp. 145–158.Repr<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> “Metaphysics <strong>and</strong> Topology <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>,” by Otto Pöggeler, <strong>in</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>the</strong> Man <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Th<strong>in</strong>ker, ed. Thomas Sheehan, (Precedent Press),pp. 173–185.1980 “Die neue Errungenschaft der <strong>Heidegger</strong>forschung und das Problem desWahns<strong>in</strong>ns,” Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger, 33/4, pp. 401–415.“The Development <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Th<strong>in</strong>g,” a translation <strong>of</strong> “DieEntwicklung von <strong>Heidegger</strong>s Begriff des D<strong>in</strong>ges” by Walter Biemel, <strong>in</strong>Southwestern Journal <strong>of</strong> Philosophy, pp. 47–66.1979 “The Conception <strong>of</strong> Logic as <strong>the</strong> Metaphysics <strong>of</strong> Truth <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s LastMarburg- Lectures,” Research <strong>in</strong> Phenomenology, ix. pp. 233–246.Review <strong>of</strong> Early Greek <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>, by Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, PhilosophischerLiteraturanzeiger, 32/1, 60–61.“Philosophy <strong>and</strong> Art,” a translation <strong>of</strong> “Philosophie und Kunst” by Walter Biemel,Man <strong>and</strong> World, 12, Nr. 3, pp. 267–283.1978 “<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Value-Criticism <strong>and</strong> its Bear<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> Phenomenology <strong>of</strong> Values,” <strong>in</strong>J. Sallis, ed. Radical Phenomenology: <strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>,Humanities Press, pp. 190–208.“Das R<strong>in</strong>gen um die Sprache <strong>Heidegger</strong>s,” Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger, 32/2,pp. 184–190.1977 “<strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Value-Criticism <strong>and</strong> its Bear<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> Phenomenology <strong>of</strong> Values,”Research <strong>in</strong> Phenomenology, vii, pp. 190–208.Review <strong>of</strong> Truth <strong>and</strong> Method, by Hans-Georg Gadamer, PhilosophischerLiteraturanzeiger, 30/2: 94–97.1975 First appearance <strong>of</strong> “Metaphysics <strong>and</strong> Topology <strong>of</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>” by OttoPöggeler, <strong>in</strong> Man <strong>and</strong> World, 8, Nr.1, pp. 3–27.Review <strong>of</strong> Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong> Europe <strong>and</strong> America, eds. E. G. Ballard <strong>and</strong> C. E.Scott, <strong>in</strong> Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger, 28/5: 297–298.Review <strong>of</strong> On <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> Language, ed., J. Kockelmans <strong>in</strong> PhilosophischerLiteraturanzeiger, 28/6: 344–346.Review <strong>of</strong> The End <strong>of</strong> Philosophy, by Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, PhilosophischerLiteraturanzeiger, 28/5: 296.“<strong>Heidegger</strong> on Schell<strong>in</strong>g’s Concept <strong>of</strong> Freedom,” Man <strong>and</strong> World, 8, Nr.2, pp. 157–174.1974 Review <strong>of</strong> On <strong>the</strong> Way to Language, by Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, PhilosophischerLiteraturanzeiger, 27/3: 161–163.Review <strong>of</strong> On Time <strong>and</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g, by Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, PhilosophischerLiteraturanzeiger, 27/4: 223–225.Review <strong>of</strong> Reason Revisited: The Philosophy <strong>of</strong> Karl Jaspers by S. SamayPhilosophischer Literaturanzeiger, 27/3: 163–166.“Person, Death, <strong>and</strong> World,” <strong>in</strong> M. Fr<strong>in</strong>gs, ed., Max Scheler (1874–1974) Centennial<strong>Essays</strong>, (Mart<strong>in</strong>us Nijh<strong>of</strong>f), pp. 58–84.
318 Appendix: List <strong>of</strong> Publications <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad1973 “Foucault <strong>and</strong> Biemel on Representation: A Beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g Inquiry,” <strong>in</strong> Man <strong>and</strong> World,12, Nr.3, pp. 284–297.Review <strong>of</strong> Sherover’s <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Kant <strong>and</strong> Time, <strong>in</strong> The Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Journal <strong>of</strong>Philosophy, 11, pp. 367–374.“Über den gegenwärtigen St<strong>and</strong> der Interpretation des Denkens <strong>Heidegger</strong>s <strong>in</strong>englischer Sprache,” Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 27/2, pp. 248–301.“God <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philosophers <strong>in</strong> Modern Metaphysics,” a translation “Gott derPhilosophen <strong>in</strong> neuzeitlicher Metaphysik” by Walter Schulz, <strong>in</strong> Man <strong>and</strong> World, 6,Nr.4: 353–371.Review <strong>of</strong> Poetry, Language, Thought, by Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, PhilosophischerLiteraturanzeiger, 26/2: 117–120.Review <strong>of</strong> The Dictionary <strong>of</strong> Existentialism, by St. Elmo Nauman PhilosophischerLiteraturanzeiger, 26/2: 120–121.Review <strong>of</strong> A Commentary on <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s ‘Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time,’ by M. Gelven,Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger, 26/3: 169–171.Review <strong>of</strong> Existence, <strong>and</strong> Transcendence, by O. Schrag, PhilosophischerLiteraturanzeiger, 26/3: 167–168.Review <strong>of</strong> Kant’s Moral Philosophy by H. B. Ashton, PhilosophischerLiteraturanzeiger, 26/1: 56–57.1972 “Max Scheler’s Notion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Process <strong>of</strong> Phenomenology,” The Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Journal <strong>of</strong>Philosophy, 10: 7–16“Max Scheler’s Phenomenology <strong>of</strong> Shame,” Philosophy <strong>and</strong> PhenomenologicalResearch, 32: 361–370.Review <strong>of</strong> Nietzsche <strong>in</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong>, 1890–1914, by D. S. Thatcher, PhilosophischerLiteraturanzeiger, 25/5: 291–294.Review <strong>of</strong> Hegel’s Concept <strong>of</strong> Experience, by Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, PhilosophischerLiteraturanzeiger, 25/3: 181–183.Review <strong>of</strong> Contemporary German Philosophy <strong>and</strong> its Background, by F. J. vonR<strong>in</strong>telen, Thought, xlvii/184: 150–151.Review <strong>of</strong> Philosophy II by Karl Jaspers, <strong>in</strong> Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger,25/1: 34–36.Review <strong>of</strong> Philosophy <strong>of</strong> Existence by Karl Jaspers PhilosophischerLiteraturanzeiger, 25/3: 175–176.Review <strong>of</strong> Karl Jaspers, by C. Wallraff, Philosophischer Literaturanzeige, 25/3:176–178.Review <strong>of</strong> Early German Philosophy, by L. W. Beck , PhilosophischerLiteraturanzeiger, 25/2: 117–123.1971 Review <strong>of</strong> Philosophy, I by Karl Jaspers, Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger, 24/4:238–241.Review <strong>of</strong> Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> im Gespräch, ed. R. Wisser, Thought, xlvi: 146–148.Review <strong>of</strong> Karl Löwith’s View <strong>of</strong> History, by R. E. Riesterer, PhilosophischerLiteraturanzeiger, 24/3: 170–171.Review <strong>of</strong> Hermeneutics, by Richard Palmer, <strong>in</strong> Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger,24/5: 292–295.Review <strong>of</strong> Zur Sache des Denkens, by Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Philosophy <strong>and</strong>Phenomenological Research, xxxi/4: 617–618.
Appendix: List <strong>of</strong> Publications <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad3191970 Review <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Quest for Truth, M. Fr<strong>in</strong>gs ed., PhilosophischerLiteraturanzeiger, 23/2: 97–99.Review <strong>of</strong> Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Be<strong>in</strong>g Human, by Richard Schmitt, PhilosophischerLiteraturanzeiger, 23/4: 212–215.1969 “Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit im Bereich der englischen Sprache,” Wissenschaft und Weltbild,22/23, 1969, pp. 227–230.1968 “The Great Themes <strong>of</strong> Scheler,” Philosophy Today, 12: 4–12.Review <strong>of</strong> Sartres Sozialphilosophie, by Klaus Hartmann, Modern Schoolman:332–334.Review <strong>of</strong> Existential Philosophers, ed. G. A. Schrader, Modern Schoolman, pp.326–328.Review <strong>of</strong> Scheler’s Phenomenology <strong>of</strong> Community, by E. Ranly, ModernSchoolman, pp. 340–342.Review <strong>of</strong> Max Scheler, by M. Fr<strong>in</strong>gs, Wissenschaft und Weltbild, 21/1.
Selected BibliographyNote: This bibliography, while focus<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> topic <strong>of</strong> translation, encompasses a wider spectrum<strong>of</strong> literature explor<strong>in</strong>g Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s philosophy. This bibliography also provides a list <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs available <strong>in</strong> English, as well as <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> texts appear<strong>in</strong>g so far <strong>in</strong> hisGesamtausgabe (“Complete Edition”).Beaufret, Jean. 2002. Le Sens de la philosophie grecque. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 18: 23–43.Bernet, Rudolf. 1987/1988. Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Zeit bei Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 3–4: 89–104.Biemel, Walter. 1976. Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>: An illustrated study. Trans. J.L. Mehta. New York <strong>and</strong>London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.B<strong>in</strong>der, Wolfgang. 1969. Hölderl<strong>in</strong> und Sophokles. Hölderl<strong>in</strong> Jahrbuch 16: 19–37.Brokmeier, Wolfgang. 1994. Der Andere Anfang im Ersten oder das F<strong>in</strong>den des Eignenen imFremden der Frühe: <strong>Heidegger</strong> und Anaxim<strong>and</strong>er. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 10: 111–126.Cercel, Larisa (ed.). 2009. Übersetzung und Hermeneutik/Traduction et herméneutique. Bucharest:Zeta Books.Ciocan, Cristian, ed. 2005. Translat<strong>in</strong>g Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit. Studia Phaenomenologica V: 1–410.Constant<strong>in</strong>e, David, <strong>and</strong> 4. 1978. Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s P<strong>in</strong>dar: The language <strong>of</strong> translation. The ModernLanguage Review 73: 825–834.Cooper, David E. 2000. Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, contributions to philosophy (From Enown<strong>in</strong>g). Trans.Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly. Times Literary Supplement, August 25: 12–13.Cori<strong>and</strong>o, Paola-Ludovika. 1998a. Die ‘formale’ Anziege und das Ereignis: VorbereitendeÜberlegungen zum Eigencharakter se<strong>in</strong>sgeschichtlicher Begrifflichkeit mit e<strong>in</strong>em Ausblick aufden Unterschied von Denken und Dichten. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 14: 27–43.Cori<strong>and</strong>o, Paola-Ludovika. 1998b. Der Letzte Gott als Anfang. Zur abgründigen Zeit-Räumlichkeitdes Übergangs <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>s “Beiträge zur Philosophie”. München: F<strong>in</strong>k.Cori<strong>and</strong>o, Paola-Ludovika, ed. 1999. Vom Rätsel des Begriffs: Festschrift für Friedrich-Wilhelmvon Herrmann zum 65. Geburtstag. Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot.Crownfield, David. 2001. The last god. In Companion to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s contributions to philosophy,ed. Charles Scott et al. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.Dastur, François. 2000. Hölderl<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> orientalisation <strong>of</strong> Greece. Pli 10: 156–173.David, Pascal. 1995. A philosophical confrontation with <strong>the</strong> political. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 11:191–204.David, Pascal. 1997. New crusades aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>Heidegger</strong>: On rid<strong>in</strong>g roughshod over philosophicaltexts (Part one). <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 13: 69–92.321
322 Selected BibliographyDavid, Pascal. 1998. New crusades aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>Heidegger</strong>: On rid<strong>in</strong>g roughshod over philosophicaltexts (Part two). <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 14: 45–64.David, Pascal. 2001. From fundamental ontology to be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies17: 157–168.Davis, Julia. 2005. Need delimited: The creative o<strong>the</strong>rness <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s demigods. Cont<strong>in</strong>entalPhilosophical Review 38(3–4): 223–239.De Gennaro, Ivo. 2000. <strong>Heidegger</strong> on translation translat<strong>in</strong>g–<strong>Heidegger</strong>. PhänomenologischeForschungen 5: 3–22.De Gennaro, Ivo. 2001. Logos – <strong>Heidegger</strong> liest Heralkit. Berl<strong>in</strong>: Dunker & Humblot.De Gennaro, Ivo. 2009. Own<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> belong<strong>in</strong>gness to be<strong>in</strong>g or th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g as surrender: The englishDenkweg <strong>and</strong> Parvis Emad’s book on Beiträge. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 25: 115–141.De Gennaro, Ivo. Oct. 2010. Translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong>to English: A Conversation with ParvisEmad. eduia.org.De Gennaro, Ivo, <strong>and</strong> Schalow Frank. 2010. <strong>Translation</strong>, tradition, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r onset <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 26: 97–123.De Gennaro, Ivo, <strong>and</strong> Zaccaria G<strong>in</strong>o. 2007. Dase<strong>in</strong>: Da-se<strong>in</strong>: Tradurre la parola del pensiero.Milano: Christian Mariotti Edizioni.Doty, Stephen C. 1991. Read<strong>in</strong>g strategies: Hear<strong>in</strong>g echoes. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 7: 127–135.Emad, Parvis. 1985. Boredom as limit <strong>and</strong> disposition. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 1: 63–78.Emad, Parvis. 1986a. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s orig<strong>in</strong>ary read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Heraclitus. In <strong>Heidegger</strong> on Heraclitus – Anew read<strong>in</strong>g, ed. Maly Kenneth <strong>and</strong> Parvis Emad, 103–120. Lewiston: The Edw<strong>in</strong> MellenPress.Emad, Parvis. 1986b. The significance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new edition <strong>of</strong> Subjekt und Dase<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> fundamentalontology <strong>of</strong> language. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 2: 141–151.Emad, Parvis. 1989a. Poetic say<strong>in</strong>g as beckon<strong>in</strong>g: The open<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s Germanien. Research<strong>in</strong> Phenomenology 19: 121–137.Emad, Parvis. 1989b. The question <strong>of</strong> technology <strong>and</strong> will to power. In Kunst und Technik:Gedächtnissshrift zum 100. Geburtstag von Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, ed. Biemel Walter <strong>and</strong> F.-W.von Herrmann, 125–140. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.Emad, Parvis. 1993. <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> more deeply <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> translation: Essential translation<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> unfold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> language. In Read<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>: Commemorations, ed. J. Sallis,323–340. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.Emad, Parvis. 1999a. A conversation with Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann on Beiträge zurPhilosophie. In Phenomenology: Japanese <strong>and</strong> American perspectives, ed. Burt C. Hopk<strong>in</strong>s,145–166. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Emad, Parvis. 1999b. The place <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pre-socratics <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Beiträge zur Philosophie. InThe pre-socratics after <strong>Heidegger</strong>, ed. Jacobs David, 55–71. Albany: SUNY Press.Emad, Parvis. 2002. The question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g: Foremost hermeneutic pre-condition for <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Heidegger</strong>. Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filos<strong>of</strong>ia (<strong>Heidegger</strong> 75è aniversari de la publicaciód’Èsser i temps) 34: 11–29.Emad, Parvis. 2006. A conversation with Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann on M<strong>in</strong>dfulness. TheNew Yearbook for Phenomenology <strong>and</strong> Phenomenological Philosophy VI: 1–20.Emad, Parvis. 2007. On <strong>the</strong> way to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s contributions to philosophy. Madison: TheUniversity <strong>of</strong> Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Press.Emad, Parvis. 2009. Translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Beiträge zur Philosophie as a hermeneutic responsibility.In <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Beiträge zur Philosophie: Internationales Kolloquium vom 20–22 Mai2004 an der Universität Lausanne (Schweiz), ed. Schuessler Ingeborg <strong>and</strong> Mejia Emmanuell,441–461. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.Emad, Parvis. 2010a. <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> translation: A closer look. StudiaPhaenomenologica 10: 101–121.Emad, Parvis. 2010b. A new access to <strong>the</strong> early stage <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought <strong>and</strong> questions concern<strong>in</strong>ghis relationship to christianity. Existentia 20(3–4): 303–319.
Selected Bibliography323Emad, Parvis. 2010c. Nietzsche <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> cross<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r onset <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> light <strong>of</strong><strong>Heidegger</strong>’s hermeneutic guidel<strong>in</strong>e. Existentia 20(3–4): 162–180.Emad, Parvis, <strong>and</strong> Gennaro Ivo De. 2009. Putt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> seed: ‘Say<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>’ or ‘approximat<strong>in</strong>g’<strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r questions concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>gual translation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s keywords. Existentia19(3–4): 161–192.Fédier, François. 1993. Traduire les Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies9: 15–33.Fédier, François. 1995. Regarder voir. Paris: Les Belles Lettres/Archimbaud.Fell, Joseph P. 1994. See<strong>in</strong>g a th<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a hidden whole: The significance <strong>of</strong> Bes<strong>in</strong>nung <strong>in</strong> DieGrundberiffe der Metaphysik. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 10: 91–109.Ferge, Gábor. 2010. <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>in</strong> knossos: The tracks <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> flown gods. Existentia 20(3–4):181–240.Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1977. Philosophical Hermeneutics. Trans. <strong>and</strong> ed. David E. L<strong>in</strong>ge.Berkeley: University <strong>of</strong> California Press.G<strong>and</strong>er, Hans-Helmut. 1993. Grund- und Leitstimmungen <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>s ‘Beiträge zur Philosophie.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 10: 15–31.Gediant, Jürgen. 1998. Zur Geschichtlichkeit der Kunst. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 14: 85–92.Gross, Daniel M., <strong>and</strong> Ansgar Kemmann (eds.). 2005. <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> Rhetoric. Albany: SUNYPress.Groth, Miles. 1997. The voice that th<strong>in</strong>ks. <strong>Heidegger</strong>: <strong>Translation</strong>s <strong>and</strong> studies with a bibliography<strong>of</strong> English translations, 1949–1996. Greensburg: Eadmer Press.Groth, Miles. 2004. Translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>. Atlantic Highl<strong>and</strong>s: Humanities Press.Guest, Gérard. 1999. The turn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Ereignis: Situat<strong>in</strong>g ‘deconstruction’ <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> topology <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 15: 15–35.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1949. Existence <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, ed. Werner Brock. Chicago: Henry RegenryCompany.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1958. The question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. Trans. Jean T. Wilde <strong>and</strong> William Kluback.New Haven: Twayne Publishers.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1959a. An <strong>in</strong>troduction to metaphysics. Trans. Ralph Manheim. New Haven:Yale University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1959b. What is philosophy? Trans. Jean T. Wilde <strong>and</strong> William Kluback.New Haven: Twayne Publishers.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1962a. Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time. Trans. John Macquarrie <strong>and</strong> Edward Rob<strong>in</strong>son.New York: Harper & Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1962b. Der Feldweg. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1962c. Kant <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> metaphysics. Trans. James Churchill.Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1966. Discourse on th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Trans. John Anderson <strong>and</strong> E. Hans Freund.New York: Harper & Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1967. What is a th<strong>in</strong>g? Trans. W.B. Barton <strong>and</strong> Vera Deutsch. Chicago: HenryRegnery Company.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1968. What is called th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g? Trans. J. Glenn Gray <strong>and</strong> Fred Wieck.New York: Harper & Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1970. Hegel’s concept <strong>of</strong> experience. Trans. J. Glenn Gray <strong>and</strong> Fred D. Wieck.New York: Harper & Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1971a. On <strong>the</strong> way to language. Trans. Peter D. Herz <strong>and</strong> Joan Stambaugh.New York: Harper & Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1971b. Poetry, language, thought. Trans. Albert H<strong>of</strong>stadter. New York: Harper &Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1972. On time <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1973. The end <strong>of</strong> philosophy. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper <strong>and</strong>Row.
324 Selected Bibliography<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1975a. Early Greek th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Trans. Frank Capuzzi <strong>and</strong> David Farrell Krell.New York: Harper & Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1975b. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 24. Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie.Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1976a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 9. Wegmarken. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1976b. The piety <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, ed. <strong>and</strong> Trans. James G. Hart <strong>and</strong> John C. Maraldo.Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1977a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 2. Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1977b. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 25. Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kantsre<strong>in</strong>en Vernunft. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klsotermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1977c. The question concern<strong>in</strong>g technology <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r essays. Trans. WilliamLovitt. New York: Harper & Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1978a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 5. Holzwege. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1978b. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 26. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe im Ausgangvon Leibniz. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1979a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 20. Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs.Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1979b. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 55. Heraklit. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1979c. Nietzsche, vol. I. The will to power as art, ed. <strong>and</strong> Trans. David FarrellKrell. New York: Harper & Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1980. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 32. Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes. Frankfurtam Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1981a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 4. Erläuterungen zu Hölderl<strong>in</strong>s Dichtung.Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1981b. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 33. Aristoteles: Metaphysik Q 1–3: Vom Wesenund Wirklichkeit der Kraft. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1981c. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 51. Grundbegriffe. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1981d. The pathway. Trans. Thomas F. O’Meara. <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>the</strong> man <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>th<strong>in</strong>ker. Chicago: Precedent Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1982a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 31. Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit.E<strong>in</strong>leitung <strong>in</strong> die Philosophie. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1982b. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 54. Parmenides. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1982c. Nietzsche, vol. IV. Nihilism, ed. David Farrell Krell. Trans. Frank A.Capuzzi New York: Harper & Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1982d. The basic problems <strong>of</strong> phenomenology. Trans. Albert H<strong>of</strong>stadter.Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1983a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 13. Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens. Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1983b. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 29/30. Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt–Endlichkeit–E<strong>in</strong>samkeit. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1983c. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 40. E<strong>in</strong>fürhung <strong>in</strong> die Metaphysik. Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1984a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 41. Die Frage nach dem D<strong>in</strong>g. Zu Kants Lehre vonden transzendentalen Grundsätzen. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1984b. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 53. Hölderl<strong>in</strong>s Hynme “Der Ister”. Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1984c. The metaphysical foundations <strong>of</strong> logic. Trans. Michael Heim.Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.
Selected Bibliography325<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1985a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 12. Unterwegs zur Sprache. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1985b. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 43. Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst.Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1985c. History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> time. Trans. Theodore Kisiel. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton:Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1985d. Schell<strong>in</strong>g’s treatise on <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> human freedom. Trans. JoanStambaugh. A<strong>the</strong>ns: Ohio University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1986. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 48. Nietzsche: Der europäische Nihilismus.Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1987. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 56/57. Bestimmung zur Philosophie. Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1988a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 34. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Zu PlatonsHöhlengleichnis und Theätet. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1988b. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 42. Schell<strong>in</strong>g: Vom Wesen der menschlichenFreiheit (1809). Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1988c. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 63. Ontologie: Hermeneutik der Faktizität.Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1988d. Hegel’s phenomenology <strong>of</strong> spirit. Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1988e. Ontology – The hermeneutics <strong>of</strong> facticity. Trans. John van Buren.Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1989. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 65. Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis).Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1990. Der Spiegel <strong>in</strong>terview – ‘Only a god can save us’. Trans. Maria Alter <strong>and</strong>John D. Caputo. Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> national socialism, ed. Gün<strong>the</strong>r Neske <strong>and</strong> EmilKetter<strong>in</strong>g. New York: Paragon House.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1991a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 3. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik.Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1991b. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 49. Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus. Zurerneuten Auslegung von Schell<strong>in</strong>g: Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichenFreiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände (1809). Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1991c. Basic writ<strong>in</strong>gs, ed. David. F. Krell. New York: Harper & Row.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1991d. The pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>of</strong> reason. Trans. Reg<strong>in</strong>ald Lilly. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: IndianaUniversity Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1992a. Fundamental concepts <strong>of</strong> metaphysics. World, f<strong>in</strong>itude, solitude. Trans.William McNeill <strong>and</strong> Nicholas Walter. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1992b. Parmenides. Trans. André Schuwer <strong>and</strong> Richard Rojcewicz.Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1992c. The concept <strong>of</strong> time. Trans. William McNeill. Oxford: Blackwell.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1993a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 59. Phänomenologie der Anschauung und desAusdrucks. Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1993b. Basic concepts. Trans. Gary E. Aylesworth. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: IndianaUniversity Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1994a. Die Armut. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 10: 5–11.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1994b. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 17. E<strong>in</strong>führung <strong>in</strong> die phänomenologischeForschung. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1994c. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 61. Phänomenologische Interpretationen zuAristoteles. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1995a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 60. Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens.Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1995b. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 77. Feldweg-Gespräche. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1995c. Über das Pr<strong>in</strong>zip ‘Zu den Sachen selbt. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 11: 5–8.
326 Selected Bibliography<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1995d. Aristotle’s metaphysics Q 1–3: On <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>and</strong> actuality <strong>of</strong> force.Trans. Walter Brogan <strong>and</strong> Peter Warnek. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1995e. Phenomenological <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> Kant’s critique <strong>of</strong> pure reason.Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1996a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 27. E<strong>in</strong>leitung <strong>in</strong> die Philosophie. Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1996b. Hölderl<strong>in</strong>’s Hymn “The Ister”. Trans. William McNeill <strong>and</strong> Julia Davis.Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1997a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 10. Der Satz vom Grund. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1997b. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 28. Der deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Schell<strong>in</strong>g,Hegel) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1997c. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 66. Bes<strong>in</strong>nung. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1997d. Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: SUNY Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1997e. Kant <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> metaphysics, 5th ed. Trans. Richard TaftBloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1998a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 69. Die Geschichte des Seyns. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1998b. Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1999a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 67. Metaphysik und Nihilismus. Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1999b. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 85. Vom Wesen der Sprache. Die Metaphysik derSprache und die Wesung des Wortes. Zu Herders Abh<strong>and</strong>lung “Über den Ursprung derSprache”, GA 85. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 1999c. Contributions to philosophy (From enown<strong>in</strong>g). Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong>Kenneth Maly. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2000a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 7. Vorträge und Aufsätze. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2000b. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 75. Zu Hölderl<strong>in</strong> – Griechenl<strong>and</strong>reisen. Frankfurtam Ma<strong>in</strong>: Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2000c. Introduction to metaphysics. Trans. Gregory Fried <strong>and</strong> Richard Polt.New Haven: Yale University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2001a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 36/37. Se<strong>in</strong> und Wahrheit. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2001b. Phenomenological <strong>in</strong>terpretations <strong>of</strong> Aristotle: Initiation <strong>in</strong>to phenomenologicalresearch. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2002. Supplements: From <strong>the</strong> earliest essays to be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time <strong>and</strong> beyond, ed.John van Buren. Trans. John van Buren et al. Albany: SUNY Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2003. Off <strong>the</strong> beaten track. Trans. Julian Young <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Haynes Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2004a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 64. Der Begriff der Zeit. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2004b. On <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> language. The metaphysics <strong>of</strong> language <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>essenc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word. Concern<strong>in</strong>g Herder’s treatise “On <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> language.” Trans.W<strong>and</strong>a Torres Gregory <strong>and</strong> Yvonne Unna. Albany: SUNY Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2005a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 70. Über den Anfang. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2005b. Introduction to phenomenological research. Trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom.Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2005c. Sojourns. Trans. John Pantele<strong>in</strong>on Manoussakis. Albany: SUNYPress.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2006a. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 11. Identität und Differenz. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>:Vittorio Klostermann.
Selected Bibliography327<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2006b. M<strong>in</strong>dfulness. Trans. Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Thomas Kalary. London:Cont<strong>in</strong>uum.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2007. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 81. Gedachtes. Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: VittorioKlostermann.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2009. <strong>Heidegger</strong> reader, ed. Günter Figal. Trans. Jerome Veith. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton:Indiana University Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2010a. Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time. Trans. Joan Stambaugh (Revised by Dennis J. Schmidt).Albany: SUNY Press.<strong>Heidegger</strong>, Mart<strong>in</strong>. 2010b. Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> truth. Trans. Gregory Fried <strong>and</strong> Richard Polt. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton:Indiana University Press.Hopk<strong>in</strong>s, Burt C. (ed.). 1993. Phenomenology: Japanese <strong>and</strong> American perspectives. Dordrecht:Kluwer Academic Press.Hopk<strong>in</strong>s, Burt C. 1999. Intentionality <strong>in</strong> Husserl <strong>and</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>. The problem <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>almethod <strong>and</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> phenomenology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Hübner, Alfred W.E. 2001. Existenz und Sprache: Überlegungen zur hermeneutischenSprachauffassung von Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong> und Hans Lipps. Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot.Ionescu, Christiana. 2002. The concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last god <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Beiträge: H<strong>in</strong>ts toward anunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gift <strong>of</strong> Se<strong>in</strong>. Studia Phaenomenologica 2: 59–95.Iyer, Lars. Review <strong>of</strong> Contributions to philosophy (From enown<strong>in</strong>g), by Mart<strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>, trans.Parvis Emad <strong>and</strong> Kenneth Maly. Journal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> British Society for Phenomenology (Jan. 2002):95–96.Jenn<strong>in</strong>gs, Virg<strong>in</strong>ia Lyle. 2004. <strong>Heidegger</strong>, Rilke, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> attunement <strong>of</strong> natural <strong>and</strong> human history.Existentia 14(3–4): 269–282.Jenn<strong>in</strong>gs, Virg<strong>in</strong>ia Lyle. 2005. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s critique <strong>of</strong> Rilke: On <strong>the</strong> venture <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> leap. <strong>Heidegger</strong>Studies 21: 17–34.Kalary, Thomas. 1999. Das bef<strong>in</strong>dliche Verstehen und die Se<strong>in</strong>sfrage. Berl<strong>in</strong>: Duncker & Humblot.Kalary, Thomas. 2000. Towards sketch<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> ‘genesis’ <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 16:189–230.Kalary, Thomas. 2002. Hermeneutic pre-conditions for <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>: A look at recentliterature (Part one) general <strong>in</strong>troduction to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought <strong>and</strong> its place <strong>in</strong> western philosophy.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 18: 159–180.Kalary, Thomas. 2003. Hermeneutics pre-conditions for <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>: A look at recentliterature (Part two) focus<strong>in</strong>g on, <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g after Beiträge. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 19:129–157.Kalary, Thomas. 2005. Hermeneutic phenomenology <strong>and</strong> related questions: The emotional, <strong>the</strong>political, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> godly. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 21: 135–157.Kalary, Thomas. 2008. New access to be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> time: Focus<strong>in</strong>g on Friedrich-Wilhelm vonHerrmann’s commentary on Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 24: 183–195.Kalary, Thomas. 2010. In search <strong>of</strong> traces <strong>of</strong> m<strong>in</strong>dfulness <strong>in</strong> today’s <strong>Heidegger</strong>-research. <strong>Heidegger</strong>Studies 26: 45–63.Kalary, Thomas, <strong>and</strong> Frank Schalow, 2011. Attunement, discourse, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> onefold <strong>of</strong> hermeneuticphenomenology: Recent <strong>Heidegger</strong>-Literature <strong>and</strong> a new translation <strong>of</strong> his work <strong>in</strong> criticalperspective. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 27: 199–219.Kipl<strong>in</strong>g, Rudyard. 1927. Songs from books. New York: Doubleday.Kovacs, George. 1987/1988. The ontological difference <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Grundbegriffe. <strong>Heidegger</strong>Studies 3/4: 61–74.Kovacs, George. 1990. The question <strong>of</strong> god <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s phenomenology. Evanston: NorthwesternUniversity Press.Kovacs, George. 1992. “The leap” (Der Sprung) for be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s Beiträge zur Philosophie(Vom Ereignis). 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328 Selected BibliographyKovacs, George. 2006. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s contributions to philosophy <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> ‘a grassrootsarchival perspective’. Studia Phaenomenologica VI: 319–345.Kovacs, George. 2007. The unthought at <strong>the</strong> limit <strong>of</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s thought. Existentia 17(5–6):337–355.Kovacs, George. 2009. The ‘place’ <strong>of</strong> hermeneutics <strong>in</strong> assess<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s lifelong contributionsto <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 25: 267–290.Kovacs, George. 2010. Philosophy, faith, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ology <strong>in</strong> <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s correspondence withBultmann. <strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 26: 219–223.Maly, Kenneth. 2000. Translat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s works <strong>in</strong>to English: The history <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> possibility.<strong>Heidegger</strong> Studies 16: 115–138.Maly, Kenneth. 2001. Turn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> essential sway<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> leap. In Companion to <strong>Heidegger</strong>’scontributions to philosophy, ed. Charles E. Scott et al., 150–170. Bloom<strong>in</strong>gton: IndianaUniversity Press.Maly, Kenneth. 2008. <strong>Heidegger</strong>’s possibility: Language, emergence–say<strong>in</strong>g be-<strong>in</strong>g. Toronto: TheUniversity <strong>of</strong> Toronto Press.McNeill, William. 2006. The time <strong>of</strong> life: <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> Êthos. Albany: SUNY Press.Mehta, J.L. 1978. <strong>Heidegger</strong> <strong>and</strong> Vedanta: Reflections on a questionable <strong>the</strong>me. 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IndexAAb<strong>and</strong>onment <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>sverlassenheit),32, 146, 149, 150, 154–157, 246A be<strong>in</strong>g (e<strong>in</strong> Seiendes), 6, 33, 51, 67, 77, 78,84, 85, 88, 90, 92, 103, 113, 130, 142,148, 155, 156, 158, 159, 161, 167, 169,214, 215, 222, 237, 239, 241, 242, 244,250, 257, 275, 276, 282, 283, 287Abground (Abgrund), 18, 22, 26, 27, 42,90, 131, 181, 239, 272, 298, 304.See also F<strong>in</strong>itudeAes<strong>the</strong>tics, 145–148, 150, 154, 155, 157, 158,162, 168, 265Anxiety (Angst), 18, 97, 164, 275–277,298, 302Appearance, 13, 15, 34, 56, 82, 91, 93, 128,141, 158, 159, 169, 177, 230, 292Appropriation; event <strong>of</strong>, 16, 17, 23, 24, 181,208, 223Aqu<strong>in</strong>as, St. Thomas, 199Arendt, Hannah, 107, 151Aristotelian, 55, 57, 58, 60, 112, 118Aristotle, 30, 52, 55, 58, 64, 98, 112, 136–138,240, 287Art (Kunst), 33–35, 59, 60, 72, 98, 145–148,150–158, 162, 166–168, 259, 261, 263,265, 266, 301Artwork, 145, 147, 150, 151, 153–155Associative th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, 186, 188, 189A<strong>the</strong>ism, 111, 116, 117Attuned response, 44, 306Attunement, 27, 43, 44, 95, 98, 100,105–107, 142, 154, 158–161, 216, 254,291–310August<strong>in</strong>e, St., 4, 160Awe (Scheu), 132, 159BBeg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, 5, 8, 16, 23, 39–41, 49–51, 58, 67,103, 105, 112, 116, 126–128, 130, 132,146–150, 152–155, 157–160, 162, 168,176, 186, 191, 197, 217, 218, 230, 240,258, 286, 293, 300, 303Be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>), 23, 31, 50, 72–75, 77, 82–84,90–93, 96, 102, 103, 196, 219, 269Be-<strong>in</strong>g (Seyn), 41, 43, 50, 95, 96, 103, 147,175, 179, 197, 217, 240Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Time (Se<strong>in</strong> und Zeit), 13, 14, 42, 57,72, 80, 100, 114, 118, 149, 159, 160,181, 188, 191, 192, 196, 213, 216–220,227, 248, 269, 296Be<strong>in</strong>g-historical perspective, 22–29, 38, 42,120, 122, 124, 125, 178, 187, 193, 194Be<strong>in</strong>g-historical th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, 19, 22, 23, 25, 27,30, 32, 37–39, 41–43, 111, 116,121–127, 129, 130, 145–170, 184, 216,217, 300, 302, 303, 308Be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>, 28, 74, 77–81, 83, 88, 117, 214, 216,217, 220, 277, 284, 307Be<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-world, 28, 74, 76–80, 83, 87–89,97, 117, 214, 216, 217, 220, 277,284, 307Be-<strong>in</strong>g poor (Armseyn), 7, 8Be<strong>in</strong>g-with (Mitse<strong>in</strong>), 78, 86, 270, 275, 276,280–284Belong<strong>in</strong>g toge<strong>the</strong>r (Zusammengehören), 25,124, 131. See also Enown<strong>in</strong>gBenjam<strong>in</strong>, Walter, 151, 168, 176Biemel, Walter, 107B<strong>in</strong>der, Wolfgang, 264, 265Blochmann, Elisabeth, 97Böhlderdorff, Casimir (“Letter to”),255–266F. Schalow (ed.), <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad, Contributions To Phenomenology 65,DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0, © Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media B.V. 2011331
332 IndexBöhme, Jacob, 4, 5Boredom (Langeweile), 8, 273, 298Boundary situation (Grenzsituation), 275Buber, Mart<strong>in</strong>, 96Buddhism, 136, 140, 141Bultmann, Rudolf, 160CCall <strong>of</strong> conscience (Gewissensruf), 275, 276.See also Self-responsibility(Selbstverantwortlichkeit)Calv<strong>in</strong>, John, 163, 165, 166, 169Camus, Albert, 195Care (Sorge), 202, 280Categorial (modes <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g), 215Categorial <strong>in</strong>tuition (kategorialeAnschauung), 237Categories, 54, 61, 136, 141, 146, 147, 151,153, 155, 157Catholicism, 165Causa sui, 42, 132, 137, 138Christ, 142, 161, 166–168.See also Jesus <strong>of</strong> NazarethChristianity (Christentum), 41, 145, 147, 156,159–166. See also GODChristianness (Christlichkeit), 119, 126Cicero, 176Clear<strong>in</strong>g (Lichtung), 38, 93, 157, 215, 217,221, 234, 238, 242, 293Clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g, 31, 38, 39, 131, 155, 156,216, 220, 221, 223, 241, 296Cogito ergo sum, 137Complete Edition (Gesamtausgabe), 9, 13, 14,16, 18, 21, 27–30, 35, 42, 72, 183, 186,187, 269, 301, 307Comportment, 44, 73–75, 82, 84, 85, 143, 168,284, 287, 292, 293, 305–308Concealment (Verborgenheit), 26, 29–31, 40,41, 57, 66, 67, 81, 89, 156, 182, 183,233, 295. See also Enown<strong>in</strong>g;Reservedness; Shelter<strong>in</strong>gConscience (Gewissen), 166, 270, 275,276, 281Constant<strong>in</strong>e, David, 264, 266, 267Contributions to Philosophy (Beitr?ge zurPhilosophie), 14, 15, 17–20, 22, 23,25–27, 29–31, 34–38, 40, 42, 43, 50,51, 67, 81, 93, 96, 100, 108, 111, 121,125, 127, 145–147, 159, 175, 176,179–181, 183, 185–188, 191–210,213–223, 225, 226, 238, 240, 253, 254,271, 276–278, 287, 288, 291, 293, 294,296, 297, 301–309Craft, 12, 13, 43, 305, 306, 308Cross<strong>in</strong>g, 43, 101–104, 148, 153, 162, 194,197, 249, 257, 259–261, 263, 283, 286,287, 292, 308DDanger (Gefahr), 8, 32, 34, 39, 130,178, 262Dase<strong>in</strong>, 14, 66, 71, 96, 114, 146, 175, 193,213, 225, 269, 295Dastur, Françoise, 264, 266Da, t/here, 119, 124, 127, 128, 184, 306Death (Tod), 168, 250, 270, 275–280De-cision (Ent-scheidung), 240, 284, 288Déconstruction, 150, 186, 306, 307Descartes, René, 5, 50, 60, 67, 136,137, 165Dest<strong>in</strong>y, 8, 32, 34, 74, 97, 102, 108, 123, 147,234, 259, 261, 283, 296Dialogical, 76, 209Dialogue, 9, 40, 41, 98, 101, 132, 135–143,176, 194, 199, 257, 264, 288, 292, 297Dick<strong>in</strong>son, Emily, 250Dil<strong>the</strong>y, Wilhelm, 23, 284Directive (der H<strong>in</strong>weis), 23, 36, 39, 112, 143,149, 158, 178, 201, 218, 246, 298Disclosedness (Erschlossenheit), 42, 43, 89,123, 177, 188, 214–219, 223, 291, 307Discourse (Rede), 17, 104, 155, 163, 184, 206,216, 295Dis-enown<strong>in</strong>g (Ent-eignis), 121, 305. See alsoAb<strong>and</strong>onment <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>gDisenownment, 129Disposition (Bef<strong>in</strong>dlichkeit), 42, 106, 184, 216,279, 298–300Distress (Not), 5, 126, 302, 303. See alsoNeedfulDreyfus, Hubert, 72, 77, 81EEarth (Erde), 81, 89, 98, 156, 157, 166, 169,249, 272, 285, 300Eastern, 41, 135, 136, 140Echkart, Meister, 142, 199Echo (Anklang), 43, 149, 150, 159, 182, 237,246, 248, 305, 308Ecstatic temporality, 114, 118, 295Elemental words, 26, 44, 181, 182, 308, 309Enopen<strong>in</strong>g (Eröffnung), 204, 222Enown<strong>in</strong>g (Ereignis), 6, 14, 50, 81, 96, 111,143, 145, 175, 191, 213, 226, 254,277, 296
IndexEnown<strong>in</strong>g throw <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g, 43Entities <strong>in</strong> a whole (das Seiende im Ganzen),32–34, 40, 77, 93, 304Epoché, 116, 117, 120, 125, 130, 131, 228,229, 232, 235, 241, 242Equipment, 40, 72, 75–77, 79–83, 85, 87,88, 92Errancy, 29–39, 93Essential sway<strong>in</strong>g (Wesung)., 15, 42, 96, 107,108, 157, 183–186, 198, 207, 247Ethics (Ethik). See Orig<strong>in</strong>al ethicsEvent, 17, 23, 24, 100, 103, 125, 148–150,155, 158, 166–168, 179–181, 185,192, 202, 204, 208, 223, 234,271, 305Everydayness (Alltäglichkeit), 39, 42, 67, 73,75–83, 86, 90–92, 271–280, 282FFacticity (Faktizität)., 24, 37, 74, 84, 123, 132,270–273, 275, 276, 278–281, 283, 284,288, 297, 298Factic life experience (faktischeLebenserfahrung), 116Faith (Glaube), 33, 111, 119, 137, 166, 169,229, 258Fallenness, 160, 270, 274, 280F<strong>in</strong>itude (Endlichkeit), 93, 141, 236, 237,270–272, 274, 280, 281, 299F<strong>in</strong>k, Eugen, 238First beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g (erster Anfang), 51, 67, 116,126, 148, 149, 157–159Flight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gods, 41, 147, 148, 152, 155,158, 166, 169Forgottenness (Vergessenheit), 30–33, 50,130, 185, 227, 231, 235, 239, 286,296, 305Forgottenness <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Vergessenheitdes Se<strong>in</strong>s), 30–32, 51, 178, 241,291, 295Formal <strong>in</strong>dication (formale Anzeige), 57,61–65, 148, 149, 160, 161, 279, 282,283, 298Freedom (Freiheit), 7, 8, 16, 18, 27, 42, 43,74, 141, 143, 180, 259, 270, 280,281, 307From enown<strong>in</strong>g, 14, 17, 25, 26, 40, 50, 81,96, 111, 145, 146, 175, 176, 183,191, 193, 195, 213–223, 226, 254,277, 297Fundamental ontology, 37, 38, 113,116–120, 122, 124, 125, 131, 184,188, 218–220, 294333GGadamer, Hans-Georg, 99Gift, 22, 26, 27, 100, 147, 153, 166, 175, 240,250, 258, 259, 302Gift<strong>in</strong>g refusal, 17, 30, 32, 34, 38, 41,169, 175God (Gott), 4, 5, 33, 34, 41, 111–132,137, 141, 142, 146, 147, 154–164,166, 168–170, 277, 300.See also Christianity; Gods (Götter)Gods (Götter), 148, 152, 154, 158, 160, 161,167, 169. See also Last godGrass, Gün<strong>the</strong>r, 185Ground<strong>in</strong>g attunement (Grundstimmung), 294,298, 300–306Ground<strong>in</strong>g words (Grundworte), 30, 43,176–178, 222, 241, 298, 300, 302, 308.See also Elemental wordsGrundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Die,13, 219, 297Guilt (Schuld), 119, 270HHabermas, Jürgen, 185Hear<strong>in</strong>g (hören), 202, 246,264, 274–276, 283–285,292, 300, 303Heraclitus, 238, 240Herder, Johann Gottfried, 95Hermeneutic circle (hermeneutischer Zirkel),22, 23, 27, 209, 284, 296Hermeneutic foothold, 22, 29, 35, 181, 300Hermeneutic labor <strong>of</strong> translation,196, 203, 207Hermeneutic phenomenology, 19–21, 35, 40,93, 99, 118, 147, 169, 189, 297Hermeneutics, 12–14, 16, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26,28, 29, 36, 39–43, 66, 95–103,105–107, 112, 126–128, 145, 176–178,183, 186–189, 192, 195, 199, 200, 202,205, 207–209, 270, 275, 283, 291, 292,294–300, 302, 306–308Hermeneutic situation, 21, 28, 29, 147, 148,151, 153, 197, 293, 299, 300, 306Hermes, 29, 308Hetzer, Theodor, 146H<strong>in</strong>duism, 137History (Geschichte), 3, 4, 9, 16, 22, 24, 26,30–33, 43, 56, 57, 63, 65, 74, 77, 81,97, 101, 104, 108, 116, 126, 128, 132,146, 148–151, 153–155, 157, 162, 163,166, 167, 192, 199, 203, 204, 227, 237,241, 249, 263, 274, 284, 286, 302
334 IndexHistory <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>sgeschichte), 38, 101,116, 126, 148–150, 153, 154, 162, 163,187, 203, 208, 233, 245Hölderl<strong>in</strong>, Johann Christian Friedrich, 3–6, 8,9, 21, 128, 177, 199, 253Holy (das Heilige), 4, 5, 120, 128, 165, 166,169, 259, 261Homer, 259, 262, 264, 265Hopk<strong>in</strong>s, Gerald Manley, 231Horizonal disclosedness, 215,217, 218House <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (language as),102, 210Humanism, 35, 114, 164–166,243, 305Hume, David, 140Husserl, Edmund, 20, 40, 52–57, 228, 229IIdol, 148, 159, 163–165, 167–170Image, 30, 41, 60, 145–170Inabid<strong>in</strong>g (Inständigkeit)., 123, 153, 157, 161,198, 303In-between (Zwischen), 22, 25, 233, 242, 245,284, 297Inceptual th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g (anfängliches Denken).,40, 205Intentionality, 229, 230, 235Interl<strong>in</strong>gual translation, 19, 23, 29, 34, 42, 43,176–181, 184–186, 225–251, 253–255,257, 264, 267, 292, 293, 298–300,302–310Interpretation, 5, 11, 13, 14, 19, 22, 27–32, 38,43, 64, 76, 78, 79, 81–83, 96, 112, 113,115, 117, 120, 126, 135, 159, 164, 168,176–179, 187, 192, 193, 199, 200, 209,216, 225, 226, 238, 253–257, 259–263,270, 283, 284, 287, 288, 297, 299, 303,306–309Intral<strong>in</strong>gual translation, 19, 22, 23, 25,27–29, 31, 34, 176, 177, 179–181,184, 185, 254, 292–299, 303,306–309“it gives” (es gibt), 24JJaspers, Karl, 275Jesus <strong>of</strong> Nazareth, 161Jo<strong>in</strong>ture, 16, 30, 125, 129, 149, 150, 153,217, 299Judeo-Christian (God), 160Jünger, Ernst, 7, 32KKant <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Problem <strong>of</strong> Metaphysics (Kantund das Problem der Metaphysik)., 13,15, 309Kant, Immanuel, 15Kisiel, Theodore, 191, 195, 208, 282Klages, Ludwig, 5Kle<strong>in</strong>, Jacob, 56–60LLanguage, 7, 11, 56, 72, 95, 114, 139, 145,177, 192, 216, 225, 253, 270, 291Last god (letzte Gott), 30, 41, 112, 125–132,154, 155, 157, 240Lawfulness, 15, 23Leap (Sprung), 15, 27, 122, 154, 156, 157,159, 160, 280, 296, 297Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 52, 60, 61Leopardi, Giacomo, 225Letter to William J. Richardson, S.J., 107Lett<strong>in</strong>g be, 41, 74, 287Lev<strong>in</strong>as, Emmanuel, 96Lewis, Michael, 93Life (Leben), 5–8, 65, 74, 97–99, 111, 114,116, 127, 135, 141, 150, 153, 160–162,166, 168, 229, 230, 238, 257, 270, 273,274, 280, 282, 285–288Lifeworld (Lebenswelt), 96, 274Light<strong>in</strong>g concealment (lichtendeVerbergung), 29Lived experience (Erlebnis), 148, 151, 152,166, 169, 179, 196, 279Logic, 36, 49, 50, 52, 53, 55, 135, 138, 260,264, 274, 282, 303, 304Loyalty to <strong>the</strong> word (wortgetreu), 16Lu<strong>the</strong>r, Mart<strong>in</strong>, 165, 166MMach<strong>in</strong>ation (Machenschaft), 31, 32, 34, 41,151, 152, 169Maly, Kenneth, 14, 26–28, 50, 81, 96, 102,108, 111, 143, 146, 183, 191–193, 195,199, 201, 203, 204, 206, 207, 216, 222,225, 226, 274, 277, 287, 307Ma<strong>the</strong>matics, 49, 50, 52, 56–59, 61Mean<strong>in</strong>g (S<strong>in</strong>n), 20, 22, 177, 255, 293, 294,296–298, 306Mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (der S<strong>in</strong>n von Se<strong>in</strong>), 14, 18,19, 51, 66, 67, 80, 114, 118, 188, 213,219, 272, 294, 295, 297Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 96Metaphysics, 7, 13, 15, 27, 30, 33, 64, 77, 95,
Index101, 112, 137–138, 140–143, 194, 206,258, 262, 263, 269, 271, 273, 278, 284,286, 292, 295, 300, 309Methodology (<strong>of</strong> translation), 13, 16, 19, 20,29, 39, 42, 175, 296M<strong>in</strong>dfulness, 9, 26, 31, 34, 39–41, 51,100–103, 105, 107, 111, 128, 130,145–148, 151, 152, 154, 156, 159,161, 167, 175, 176, 186, 187, 194,249, 308M<strong>in</strong>dfulness (Bes<strong>in</strong>nung), 98Modernity, 5, 32, 120, 145–148, 150–155,161–164, 166–169, 286Moment (Augenblick), 43, 54, 86, 87, 149,155, 157Mortals (die Sterblichen), 98, 153,157, 249Müller, Max, 113Mystery (Geheimnis), 26, 30, 41, 42, 169, 170,294, 296Mysticism, 4NNational Socialism, 286Needful (nötig), 6Neologism, 16, 17, 26, 27, 42, 181, 195, 198,199, 207, 302Nāgārjuna, 136–143Nietzsche, Friedrich, 11Nihilism, 285OO’Connell, Michael, 162–165, 167Ontical, 66, 77, 82, 90, 233Ontological difference, 33, 50, 51, 106, 112,113, 115, 116, 120–122, 124, 125, 127,128, 242, 279, 283, 286Ontology, 37, 38, 52, 53, 60, 63, 65, 67, 71,73, 74, 113, 116–120, 122, 124, 125,131, 135, 137, 184, 188, 218–220, 272,286, 294, 297Onto-<strong>the</strong>o-logy, 41, 113Open, 90, 91, 93Openness, 6, 14, 25, 31, 36, 37, 90, 93, 106,155, 156, 159, 160, 169, 214, 215, 217,223, 238–245, 247, 249, 250, 272, 277,281, 284, 286, 287Orig<strong>in</strong> (Ursprung), 15, 19, 33, 34, 41, 43, 50,53, 55–61, 65, 67, 83, 84, 87, 92, 95,99, 103, 106, 111, 122, 123, 136, 146,150, 153–155, 163, 167, 183, 206, 231,245, 263, 294, 299335Orig<strong>in</strong>al ethics, 43Orig<strong>in</strong>al translation (ursprünglicheÜbersetzung), 43, 254–256O<strong>the</strong>r beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>and</strong>erer Anfang), 40, 41,126–128, 132, 146–150, 152–155, 157,159, 160, 162, 168, 191, 197, 303. Seealso First beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g (erster Anfang)O<strong>the</strong>r onset (Anfang), 17, 226, 238, 239, 245,246, 250, 251Overcom<strong>in</strong>g metaphysics, 116Overman (Übermensch), 141Ownedness (Eigentlichkeit), 80, 119, 160, 274,280, 281, 284. See also Selfresponsibility(Selbstverantwortlichkeit)Owned-over-to (Übereignen), 130Ownmost (Wesen), 17, 25, 26, 28, 177, 178,206, 254, 278PParmenides, 12, 33, 158–160, 164, 177, 182,254, 255, 259Path <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g (Denkweg), 18, 20, 147, 176,179, 227, 231, 233, 237, 239, 241,245–249, 251Paul, St., 160, 161, 168People, 8, 9, 258, 263Phenomenology, 20, 36, 40, 49–52, 54, 56, 57,61–68, 71, 82, 93, 95, 99, 107, 111,115, 118–120, 147, 148, 157, 160, 161,169, 186, 192, 195, 199, 228, 232,234–237, 239, 241, 243, 283, 286, 297Phenomenology <strong>of</strong> religion, 61, 120Phenomenon (Phänomen), 40, 49–68, 71–73,75–78, 80, 82, 86–93, 102, 103,118–120, 122, 126, 128–130, 142, 148,149, 214, 218, 219, 225, 227, 229, 230,233, 234, 236, 278, 283, 298, 299P<strong>in</strong>dar, 253, 257, 264, 266Plato, 58, 157, 164, 199, 230, 256, 269,293, 295Platonism, 157, 165Play, 98Play <strong>of</strong> time-space (Zeit-Spiel-Raum), 156Play-space (Spiel-Raum), 247, 249Poetry (Dichtung), 43, 98, 247, 264, 266Political, 5, 152, 286Possibility, 13, 14, 22, 26, 28, 31, 32, 34, 38,41, 65, 72, 75, 77, 78, 89, 102, 105,115, 118–122, 124, 125, 146, 152–154,160, 185, 188, 213, 215, 269, 272–276,280–282, 284, 287, 291, 292, 294,296–298, 307, 309Postmodern, 307
336 IndexPoverty (Armut), 3–9, 106, 309, 310Praxis, 72, 305Pre-Christian, 119Pre-ontological underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, 74, 82Preparatory th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, 143Presence (Anwesenheit), 86, 87, 114, 121, 145,152, 168, 169, 258, 259, 267, 277, 286,295, 304. See also Presenc<strong>in</strong>gPresenc<strong>in</strong>g, 146, 148, 157, 159Pre-Socratics, 98, 199, 256, 258Prime-leap (Ur-sprung), 103, 104Project<strong>in</strong>g-open<strong>in</strong>g, 22, 23, 40, 43, 121–124,127, 128, 146, 150, 152, 154, 159, 168,176, 178, 182, 217, 220–223, 305Project<strong>in</strong>g open <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Entwurf des Se<strong>in</strong>s),127–129, 148, 177, 216, 217, 220,221, 223Protestantism, 160QQuestion <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, 12, 16, 20, 21, 30, 32, 41,42, 107, 112, 114, 118, 121, 126, 177,187, 188, 213, 219, 220, 269, 273, 282,293, 294, 296, 298, 299, 306Question <strong>of</strong> God, 41, 112, 118, 120, 125, 131,147, 158RRaphael, 145–148, 155, 156, 159–161, 167Read<strong>in</strong>ess-to-h<strong>and</strong>, 71–76, 78–81, 83–87, 89,90, 92Recollection (Er<strong>in</strong>nerung), 30, 31, 286, 295Releasement (Gelassenheit), 8, 24, 26, 89, 275Religion, 162Representational th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, 99, 146, 148, 196,204, 205, 278Reservedness (Verhaltenheit), 26, 143, 293,294, 298, 304–306Resoluteness (Entschlossenheit), 159, 161Reticence <strong>in</strong> silence (Sigetik), 303Returnership (Rückkehrerschaft), 36, 40–42,178, 179, 303, 309Richardson, William J., S.J., 14, 35, 107, 192Ricoeur, Paul, 23, 176, 177, 292, 293,306, 307R<strong>in</strong>gness <strong>of</strong> stillness (Geläut der Stille), 27, 184SSay<strong>in</strong>g (Sage), 7, 8, 16, 23–25, 95–100, 102,104–107, 114, 124, 140, 141, 176, 178,179, 181, 193–198, 200–203, 205–207,209, 210, 227, 229, 234, 239–241, 243,244, 246–250, 274, 287, 304, 306, 307Schell<strong>in</strong>g, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph, 5, 226Schismatic decision, 228, 233–235, 239, 240.See also De-cisionScience (Wissenschaft), 105, 119, 241, 254Self (das Selbst), 222, 288Semiotics, 292, 306Sett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to opposition (Ause<strong>in</strong><strong>and</strong>ersetzung),42, 283, 285, 308Shelter<strong>in</strong>g (Bergung), 7, 15, 23, 34, 40, 41, 81,108, 129, 154, 168, 170, 183, 200, 209,309. See also ConcealmentSigns (Zeichen), 71–75, 77, 90–92, 101, 104,153, 158, 194, 197, 200, 292, 293,306, 307Silence, 202Sist<strong>in</strong>e Madonna (Raphael’s), 145, 147, 161Sky (Himmel), 98, 258Solicitude (Fürsoge), 270, 280Solitude (E<strong>in</strong>samkeit), 271, 279Sophocles, 256–258, 260, 263, 264Space (Raum), 27, 39, 41, 43, 130, 131, 146,150, 154, 156, 157, 177, 208, 247,262, 292Spatiality (Räumlichkeit), 43, 271, 274Spengler, Oswald, 30Spirit (Geist), 4–6, 29, 192, 199, 258Spiritual, 3–6, 8, 9, 163, 164, 272Stambaugh, Joan, 16, 17, 30, 31, 96, 218, 269Stillness (Stille), 23, 27, 102, 104, 105, 180,184, 185, 301, 304, 309Strife (Streit), 81, 157, 182, 285, 307TTechnicity (Technik), 30–39, 148, 150, 164Technology. See Technicity (Technik)Temporality, 29, 114, 117, 118, 146, 148, 151,160, 168, 274, 275, 279, 294–297Temporal propositions, 297Theological difference, 41, 112, 113, 116, 120,122, 125, 127, 128, 130Theology, 118, 120, 131, 137, 160, 165–168/There, 73, 74, 78, 92, 218, 219, 229,246–251, 281They, <strong>the</strong> (das Man), 270, 273, 282<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g (Ereignisdenken), 25, 31<strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> by be<strong>in</strong>g, 22, 39, 127,177, 178, 181–186, 188, 297, 302,304, 308Thrownness (Geworfenheit), 12, 26, 37,38, 123, 216, 220, 276, 279, 283,298, 300
IndexTime <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Zeit und Se<strong>in</strong>), 13, 14, 36, 38,41, 42, 57, 65, 71, 72, 80–82, 100,113–115, 117–121, 148–150, 159, 160,176, 180, 181, 184, 187–189, 191, 192,196, 197, 213–223, 244, 248, 269, 270,272–274, 284, 293, 296–298Time-space (Zeit-Raum), 156, 157, 239, 243Time-word (Zeitwort), 295Tradition (Eastern versus Western), 4, 12, 15,19, 22, 32, 41, 99, 106, 112, 113, 116,120, 122, 126, 127, 131, 132, 135–137,143, 150, 153, 156, 159, 161, 165, 176,199, 227, 233, 240, 270, 272, 280, 295,296, 298Tragedy, 43, 257Transcendence (Transzendenz), 73, 113–116,122, 237, 271, 280, 283Transcendental, 37, 49, 50, 52, 53, 55,113–117, 121, 122, 124, 125, 159, 178,184, 217, 220, 221, 223, 229, 232,235–238, 241, 242, 245, 250, 276Transcendental horizonal perspective, 39, 43,115, 121–123, 177Transcendental subjectivity, 232, 236, 237,239, 242Transformed say<strong>in</strong>g, 25Truth (Wahrheit), 49, 157, 182, 183Truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Wahrheit des Se<strong>in</strong>s), 35, 36, 43,113, 116, 117, 121–123, 125–132, 155,158, 164, 167, 219–221, 231, 272, 299Turn<strong>in</strong>g (die Kehre), 7, 8, 31, 35–41, 114, 115,117–121, 124, 139, 149, 178, 206, 284,302, 309Turn<strong>in</strong>g around (<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g), 36,38, 41, 114Turn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> enown<strong>in</strong>g (die Kehre im Ereignis),31, 38, 39, 41, 124, 284, 302Turn<strong>in</strong>g relation <strong>of</strong> be-<strong>in</strong>g (der kehrige Bezugdes Seyns), 37, 123, 306UUnconcealment (Unverborgenheit), 14, 26, 31,33, 34, 36, 115, 129, 148, 150, 156–158,181, 184, 196, 291, 299, 301, 307.See also Truth <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g337Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g (Verstehen), 5, 76, 184,216, 281Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (Se<strong>in</strong>sverständnis),19, 20, 31, 40, 74, 75, 81, 82,96, 119, 120, 159, 160, 164,213, 214, 217, 232, 278,294, 295Unownedness (Uneigentlichkeit), 79, 80,119, 160Unsaid (Ungesagtes), 294, 296, 297, 305,308, 309Unthought (Ungedachtes), 77, 235, 237, 238,242, 286Untruth, 5, 31, 148, 164Urground (urgrund), 142VVallega-Neu, Daniela, 25Violence, 15, 43, 256–258, 261, 263, 278, 284,285, 308Virg<strong>in</strong> Mary (cult <strong>of</strong>), 162Voice <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g (die Stimme des Se<strong>in</strong>s),247, 306WWay (Weg), 308. See also ReturnershipWay-mak<strong>in</strong>g (Be-wëgen), 308Western, 140Will, 4Will to power, 7, 141, 146,150, 301Wilmans, Friedrich, 264, 265Worker, The (Der Arbeiter), 7World (Welt), 67, 72, 166, 215Worldhood (Weltlichkeit), 88, 115World view, 162, 272YYield<strong>in</strong>g, 24, 292, 300ZZeitgeist, 11
Greek IndexaἰdώV, 159άlήqeia, 156, 158, 160, 181, 182, 183•rcή, 235daίmwn, 158–160eÉdoV, 60, 230έttistήmh, 58¦pocή, 228ἦqoV, 159qewrίa, 136kecwrismέnon, 240, 241lógoV, 74, 78, 98, 180, 184, 287Ðn Á Ðn,Òrism`VÓroV, 240, 241oÛs\a, 136pVntwn kecwrisXmnonsoj`n, 240, 241fbsiV, 230cwrismόV, 58ñV mZF. Schalow (ed.), <strong>Heidegger</strong>, <strong>Translation</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Task</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<strong>Essays</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Honor</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parvis Emad, Contributions To Phenomenology 65,DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0, © Spr<strong>in</strong>ger Science+Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Media B.V. 2011339