SUPREME COURT OF CANADA CITATION: Alberta v. Hutterian ...

Answer: It is not necessary to answer this question.The following are the reasons delivered byABELLA J. —[110] Freedom of religion is a core, constitutionally protected democratic value. To justifyits impairment, therefore, the government must demonstrate that the benefits of the infringementoutweigh the harm it imposes. This was enunciated by Dickson C.J. in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R.103, where he developed the test under s. 1 for justifying limits to constitutional rights:Even if an objective is of sufficient importance, . . . it is still possible that, because ofthe severity of the deleterious effects of a measure on individuals or groups, the measurewill not be justified by the purposes it is intended to serve. The more severe thedeleterious effects of a measure, the more important the objective must be if the measureis to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. [p. 140]And in Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (2008),Martha C. Nussbaum similarly observed that:Some such burdens to religion may have to be borne, if the peace and safety of the stateare really at stake, or if there is some other extremely strong state interest. But it seemsdeeply wrong for the state to put citizens in such a tragic position needlessly, or inmatters of less weight. And often matters lying behind laws of general applicability arenot so weighty. [p. 117][111] It may be, however, that the nature of the particular religious duty brings it into seriousconflict with countervailing and compelling social values and imperatives. As Dickson J. stated in