Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on ...

with the causal power of exclusive nationalidentity, as is the elect<strong>or</strong>al strength of radicalright parties. These two variables account f<strong>or</strong> anestimated 57% of the country variance illustratedin Figure 2.We have argued that there is no necessaryconnection between national identity and supp<strong>or</strong>t<strong>or</strong> opposition to European integration. Thedots have to be filled in, and we find that theconnection is stronger when elites, particularlythose leading political parties, are polarized on theissue. 13ConclusionIt is fruitless to seek general validity in eithereconomic <strong>or</strong> identity the<strong>or</strong>ies of preferences. Weneed to inquire into their relative causal power. Inthis article, we do this f<strong>or</strong> a single object: publicopinion on European integration. Most scholarshave conceptualized European integration as aneconomic phenomenon, and the bulk of researchhas theref<strong>or</strong>e the<strong>or</strong>ized public opinion as afunction of the distributional consequences ofmarket liberalization. But the European Unionis also a supranational polity with extensiveauth<strong>or</strong>ity over those living in its territ<strong>or</strong>y. It istheref<strong>or</strong>e plausible to believe that Europeanintegration engages group, and above all, nationalidentities.Both the<strong>or</strong>ies bite. A multi-level model thatcombines both sources of preference can explainaround a third <strong>or</strong> m<strong>or</strong>e of the variance acrossindividual citizens in the EU, and the bulk ofvariation across countries. However, we findthat identity appears to be the m<strong>or</strong>e powerfulinfluence. To understand how the public viewsEuropean integration, one needs to considerhow individuals frame their national identity. Docitizens consider national identity as somethingthat can go hand in hand with Europeanintegration, <strong>or</strong> do they believe that European integration limits <strong>or</strong>threatens their national identity? There is nothing mechanistic <strong>or</strong>inevitable about one <strong>or</strong> the other position.<strong>Identity</strong> is simple and complex. Citizens can answer thequestion “What is your nationality” with much greater ease andvalidity than they can tell you f<strong>or</strong> which party <strong>or</strong> candidate theyvoted in the previous election. Like some in-group/out-groupidentities, national identities are f<strong>or</strong>med early in life. Children asyoung as six know full well whether they are British, German, <strong>or</strong>Swedish. Yet the political implications of national identity emergefrom debate and conflict. Whether a person is Belgian <strong>or</strong> Britishis (usually) a simple fact, but what does this national identityimply f<strong>or</strong> the political choices one makes?To understand the political implications of identity onetheref<strong>or</strong>e has to probe how identity is constructed and mobilized.Political elites and parties appear to be key. Exclusive nationalidentity is mobilized against European integration in countrieswhere the elite is polarized on European integration, wherepolitical parties are divided, and where radical right parties arestrong. Data over time would help scholars probe further.In terms of deductive sophistication, identity the<strong>or</strong>y cannotcompete with economic the<strong>or</strong>y—yet. But this is like comparing agasoline engine, honed over decades, with a hydrogen engine. Ifgroup identities are decisive f<strong>or</strong> preferences over a wide range ofpolitical objects, as recent research suggests, then we can safelypredict that the the<strong>or</strong>ies of group identity will become m<strong>or</strong>esophisticated and m<strong>or</strong>e powerful.4 PS July 2004