Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on ...

<strong>Does</strong> <strong>Identity</strong> <strong>or</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Rationality</strong><strong>Drive</strong> <strong>Public</strong> <strong>Opinion</strong> on EuropeanIntegration?byLiesbet Hooghe,University of N<strong>or</strong>th Carolina,Chapel HillGary Marks,University of N<strong>or</strong>th Carolina,Chapel HillHow do citizens respond to the reallocationof auth<strong>or</strong>ity across levels of government?This article investigates the relative imp<strong>or</strong>tanceof economic versus identity bases of citizensupp<strong>or</strong>t f<strong>or</strong> the most far-reaching example ofauth<strong>or</strong>ity migration—European integration.Most scholars have explained preferencesover European integration in terms of itseconomic consequences. We have precise expectationsconcerning how individual attributes(e.g., education, occupation, fact<strong>or</strong> mobility, andsect<strong>or</strong>al location) affect supp<strong>or</strong>t f<strong>or</strong> internationalregimes. The search f<strong>or</strong> plausible economicsources of preferences has widened to includeeconomic perceptions (as well as objectiveconditions), group (as well as individual) utility,and national economic institutions that mediateindividual interests.But there is a new—<strong>or</strong>, rather, old—kidon the block. Its hard c<strong>or</strong>e is the assumptionthat citizen preferences are driven by groupattachments, by the loyalties, values, and n<strong>or</strong>msthat define who a personis. This line of analysisis as old as the study ofEuropean integration(Deutsch 1957; Haas1958; Inglehart 1970), butwhile the pioneers werechiefly concerned with howregional integration affectsidentity, recent researchflips the causal arrow. 1One would expectEuropean integration to convey home fieldadvantage to both research programs. TheEuropean Union (EU) is a regional trade regimewith sizeable distributional effects. It is alsoa system of multi-level governance in whichnational auth<strong>or</strong>ity is pooled and limited. So weare conducting what Arend Lijphart describes asa crucial experiment, a case in which “all of thevariables which the researcher tries to relate toeach other are present” (1979, 444). 2There need be no suspense concerningour conclusion. Citizens do indeed takeinto account the economic consequences ofEuropean integration, but conceptions of groupmembership appear to be m<strong>or</strong>e powerful.We proceed in two steps. First, we set upan economic explanation of public opinionon European integration. We identify sixlines of the<strong>or</strong>izing. We cannot sacrificecomprehensiveness to parsimony because ouranalysis will be convincing only to the extentthat we bring the main economic contenders intothe ring—and there are many.Second, we the<strong>or</strong>ize identity as a sourceof public opinion on European integration.What would one expect if group identity drovepreferences? The answer is not obvious. Citizenswho attest strong national identity are m<strong>or</strong>e, notless, likely to identify with Europe. We arguethat the way a citizen conceives her nationalidentity is decisive. <strong>Does</strong> a citizen conceive hernational identity in exclusive <strong>or</strong> inclusive terms?Is that citizen positively <strong>or</strong> negatively <strong>or</strong>ientedto multiculturalism?The<strong>or</strong>izing Supp<strong>or</strong>t f<strong>or</strong> EuropeanIntegrationPolitical EconomyThe main thrust of European integration hasbeen to sweep away barriers to economicexchange, facilitate mobility of capital andlab<strong>or</strong>, and create a single European monetaryauth<strong>or</strong>ity. So it is not surprising thatexplanations of public opinion on Europeanintegration have focused on economic fact<strong>or</strong>s.The simplest expectation is that reducingtrade barriers fav<strong>or</strong>s citizens with relativelyhigh income, education, and occupationalskills (Gabel 1998; Inglehart 1970). There areseveral reasons f<strong>or</strong> this. International economicopenness rewards those with high levels ofhuman capital. It increases the internationalsubstitutability of lab<strong>or</strong> as firms are m<strong>or</strong>e ableto shift production across b<strong>or</strong>ders, and thisintensifies job insecurity, particularly f<strong>or</strong> lessskilled w<strong>or</strong>kers. Finally, international economicopenness puts pressure on welfare systemsand shifts the burden of taxation from mobilefact<strong>or</strong>s of production (e.g., financial capital) toimmobile fact<strong>or</strong>s (e.g., lab<strong>or</strong>).<strong>Economic</strong> internationalization also affectsrelative scarcity of assets. Acc<strong>or</strong>ding to theStolper-Samuelson the<strong>or</strong>em, trade benefitsindividuals who own fact<strong>or</strong>s with which thenational economy is relatively well endowedand hurts individuals who own fact<strong>or</strong>s that arerelatively scarce (Mayda and Rodrik 2002;O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001). Hence, in thewealthiest, most capital-rich member stateswe expect unskilled w<strong>or</strong>kers to be Euroskepticand managers and professionals to be Eurosupp<strong>or</strong>tive,while in the po<strong>or</strong>est, most lab<strong>or</strong>-richmember states we expect the reverse. 3Citizens may be sensitive to their collectiveeconomic circumstances, as well as to thosethat affect them individually (Anderson 1998).It seems reasonable to expect that residents incountries that are net recipients of EuropeanPSOnline www.apsanet.<strong>or</strong>g 1

Union spending will be inclined to supp<strong>or</strong>t European integration,while those in don<strong>or</strong> countries will tend to oppose (Brinegar etal. 2004). The same logic is often at w<strong>or</strong>k in regional <strong>or</strong> federalstates, where po<strong>or</strong>er regions champion centralization to increasethe scope f<strong>or</strong> redistribution while prosperous regions fav<strong>or</strong>decentralization.Subjective economic evaluations can be expected to influencepublic opinion on European integration alongside objectivefact<strong>or</strong>s (Rohrschneider 2002; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993).European integration is perceived by most citizens to shape theireconomic welfare in a general sense. Citizens who feel confidentabout the economic future—personally and f<strong>or</strong> their country—arelikely to regard European integration in a positive light, whilethose who are fearful will lean towards Euroskepticism.Finally, preferences may be influenced by institutions. TheEuropean Union encompasses countries with contrasting degreesof lab<strong>or</strong> and business co<strong>or</strong>dination, each of which is costly tochange (Hall and Soskice 2001). We assume that the further acountry is from the EU median (low lab<strong>or</strong> co<strong>or</strong>dination, relativelyhigh business co<strong>or</strong>dination), the greater the costs imposed on itscitizens by EU legislation.Political-economic institutions may interact with supp<strong>or</strong>t <strong>or</strong>opposition to redistribution (Brinegar et al. 2004; Marks 2004;Ray 2004). If European integration converges on a mixed-marketmodel, citizens in social democratic Scandinavian economiescan expect to see their welfare systems diluted, while citizensin liberal market economies, such as Britain, can expect m<strong>or</strong>eredistribution. Hence in social democratic systems, the left will beopposed to European integration and the right will be supp<strong>or</strong>tive.In liberal market systems, the left will supp<strong>or</strong>t integration and theright will be opposed.<strong>Economic</strong> the<strong>or</strong>ies of preference f<strong>or</strong>mation w<strong>or</strong>k best wheneconomic consequences are perceived with some accuracy, arelarge enough to matter, and when the choice a person makesactually affects the outcome. To the extent that these conditionsare not present, group identities are likely to be decisive (Chong2002; Elster 1990; Sears and Funk 1991; Young et al. 1991).What would one expect to find if public opinion were shaped bygroup identity?National <strong>Identity</strong>Humans and their ancest<strong>or</strong>s evolved an emotional capacityf<strong>or</strong> intense group loyalty long bef<strong>or</strong>e the development of rationalfaculties, and such loyalties can be extremely powerful in shapingviews toward political objects (Citrin et al. 1990; Massey 2002;Sears 1993). The strongest territ<strong>or</strong>ial identities are national, andwe suspect that such identities constrain preferences on Europeanintegration. 4To understand the effect of national identity one must cometo grips with a paradox. On the one hand, individuals oftenidentify with several territ<strong>or</strong>ial communities simultaneously(Citrin and Sides f<strong>or</strong>thcoming; Klandermans et al. 2003). It isnot at all unusual f<strong>or</strong> citizens to have multiple identities—tofeel, f<strong>or</strong> example, strongly Catalan, Spanish, and European—atone and the same time (Diez Medrano 2003; Marks 1999).Haesly (2001) finds positive, rather than negative, associationsbetween Welsh and European identities and between Scottishand European identities. Klandermans and his co-auth<strong>or</strong>s (2003)detect a cumulative pattern of identities, in which farmers whoidentify with Europe tend also to identify with their nation. Risse(2003) conceptualizes the relationship as akin to a marble cakein which multiple identities are meshed together. Van Kersbergen(2000) conceives of European allegiance as embedded in nationalallegiance. Citrin and Sides find that “even in an era in whichperceptions of the European Union as successful seemed todecline, the tendency to identify with both nation and EuropeTable 1Explaining Supp<strong>or</strong>t f<strong>or</strong> European Integration -A Multi-Level AnalysisConstantNational <strong>Identity</strong>National AttachmentExclusive National <strong>Identity</strong>MulticulturalismPolitical EconomyEducationProfessional/Manager*GrossNational IncomeManual W<strong>or</strong>ker*Gross NationalIncomeFiscal TransferType of CapitalismPersonal <strong>Economic</strong> ProspectsNational <strong>Economic</strong> ProspectsVariance ComponentsCountry-LevelParty-LevelIndividual-LevelMultilevel estimatesunderstandardizedcoefficientsstandarderr<strong>or</strong>s71.96*** (2.185)1.712***-12.740***4.163***0.932**0.072*-0.0333.973***5.370**2.292***3.074***27.316**4.599**453.831***-2 x Log Likelihood 68833Note: * = p

that individuals who identify themselves exclusively as Belgian<strong>or</strong> exclusively as Flemish oppose multi-level governance, whilethose who identify themselves as both Belgian and Flemishsupp<strong>or</strong>t it (Maddens et al. 1996). We expect to find somethingsimilar at the supranational level.Under what circumstances will citizens perceive theirnational identity as exclusive <strong>or</strong> inclusive? While nationalidentities are n<strong>or</strong>mally f<strong>or</strong>med bef<strong>or</strong>e adolescence (Druckman1994), we hypothesize that their consequences f<strong>or</strong> particularpolitical objects, such as European integration, are continuouslyconstructed through socialization and political conflict (Stråthand Triandafyllidou 2003; Diez Medrano 2003). But who doesthe framing? Literature on American public opinion suggeststhat public opinion may be cued by political elites (Zaller 1992,97–117). The sharper the divisions among national elites on theissue of European integration, the greater the scope f<strong>or</strong> nationalidentity to be mobilized, and the m<strong>or</strong>e we expect exclusivenational identity to bite. One sign of such division is the existenceof a radical right political party. Parties like the Vlaams Blokin Belgium and the French Front National make a fetish ofexclusive national identity with slogans such as “Boss in OurOwn Country” and “We give them our fact<strong>or</strong>ies; they give us theirimmigrants. One solution: The Nation.” Such sentiments reinf<strong>or</strong>ceEuroskepticism. 5 In countries where the elite is squarely behindthe European project, we expect national identity to lay d<strong>or</strong>mant<strong>or</strong> to be positively associated with supp<strong>or</strong>t f<strong>or</strong> integration. Incountries where the political elite is divided on the issue, nationalidentity is likely to rear its head.AnalysisTo measure supp<strong>or</strong>t f<strong>or</strong> European integration we combine threecomplementary elements of supp<strong>or</strong>t: the principle of membership,the desired speed of integration, and the desired direction offuture integration. The results rep<strong>or</strong>ted below are robust acrossthese component measures. This and other variables in ouranalysis are detailed in the appendix. 6 We use multilevel analysisto probe variation at the individual, party, and country level. 7Table 1 presents unstandardized coefficients and standard err<strong>or</strong>sf<strong>or</strong> variables of interest. 8Figure 1 illustrates the relative effect of the most powerfulvariables. The solid boxes encompass the inter-quartile rangeand the whiskers indicate the 5th to the 95th percentiles, holdingall other independent and control variables at their means. F<strong>or</strong>example, an individual at the 5th percentile on Multiculturalismhas a sc<strong>or</strong>e of 65.9 on Supp<strong>or</strong>t f<strong>or</strong> European Integration on a0–100 scale, and an individual at the 95th percentile sc<strong>or</strong>es 74.3.The variables towards the left of Figure 1 have the largest effectacross their inter-quartile range.Citizens do appear to take economic circumstances intoaccount. The EU redistributes money from rich to po<strong>or</strong> countries,and this gives rise to a predictable pattern of opposition andsupp<strong>or</strong>t. Fiscal Transfer is the most powerful economic influencethat we find. A citizen of Greece, the country with the highestper capita net receipts from the EU, will be 15% m<strong>or</strong>e supp<strong>or</strong>tiveof European integration than a citizen from Germany, thecountry with the highest net contribution, controlling f<strong>or</strong> allother variables in our analysis. The differing length of the 95%whiskers in Figure 1 f<strong>or</strong> this variable indicates that its associationwith supp<strong>or</strong>t f<strong>or</strong> European integration is not linear. FiscalTransfer sharply delineates four countries (Greece, P<strong>or</strong>tugal,Spain, and Ireland) that receive the bulk of cohesion funding andwhich tend to be pro-EU.We also confirm the effect of Type of Capitalism. Supp<strong>or</strong>tf<strong>or</strong> European integration is higher in countries whose economicinstitutions are less likely to be challenged by EU legislationbecause they are close to the EU median. 9Together, seven variables that tap individual and groupeconomic interest (listed in the appendix) account f<strong>or</strong> 15% of totalvariance in public opinion, which is in line with previous studies.The surprise is that these economic influences are overshadowedby identity.Three variables that tap identity—Exclusive National <strong>Identity</strong>,Multiculturalism, and National Attachment—together explain20.8 % of the variance in Supp<strong>or</strong>t f<strong>or</strong> European Integration.These variables also account f<strong>or</strong> m<strong>or</strong>e than two-thirds of thevariance across countries.The paradox that we identified earlier is apparent: nationalidentity both contributes to and diminishes supp<strong>or</strong>t f<strong>or</strong> Europeanintegration. Attachment to one’s country is positively c<strong>or</strong>relatedwith Supp<strong>or</strong>t f<strong>or</strong> European Integration in bivariate analysis. 10But national identity is Janus-faced: under some circumstances itcollides with European integration.The extent to which national identity is exclusive <strong>or</strong> inclusiveis decisive. A Eurobarometer question compels respondents toplace either European <strong>or</strong> national identity above the other, andseparates those who say they think of themselves as “only British(<strong>or</strong> French, etc.)” from those who say they have some f<strong>or</strong>m ofmultiple identity. Estimates f<strong>or</strong> Exclusive National <strong>Identity</strong> arenegative, substantively large, and significant in the presenceof any and all controls we are able to exert. 11On average, an individual in our sample who claims anexclusive national identity sc<strong>or</strong>es 53.3 on our thermometerscale f<strong>or</strong> supp<strong>or</strong>t f<strong>or</strong> European integration, compared to72.8 f<strong>or</strong> a person who does not. The difference, 19.5%, isthe baseline in Figure 2. 12 In some countries, citizens whohave exclusive national identity are only slightly m<strong>or</strong>eEuroskeptical than those with multiple identities. In others,exclusive national identity is powerfully associated withEuroskepticism. In P<strong>or</strong>tugal, exclusive national identitydepresses a citizen’s supp<strong>or</strong>t by just 9.5%. In the UK, at theother extreme, the difference is 29.5%.How can one explain this variation? Our hunch, derivedfrom what we know about American public opinion, seemsto be on the right track. The m<strong>or</strong>e divided a country’s elite,and the m<strong>or</strong>e elements within it mobilize against Europeanintegration, the stronger the causal power of exclusivenational identity. Political parties are decisive in cueing thepublic, and the wider their disagreement, the m<strong>or</strong>e exclusiveidentity is mobilized against European integration.Divisions within political parties are positively c<strong>or</strong>relatedPSOnline www.apsanet.<strong>or</strong>g 3

with the causal power of exclusive nationalidentity, as is the elect<strong>or</strong>al strength of radicalright parties. These two variables account f<strong>or</strong> anestimated 57% of the country variance illustratedin Figure 2.We have argued that there is no necessaryconnection between national identity and supp<strong>or</strong>t<strong>or</strong> opposition to European integration. Thedots have to be filled in, and we find that theconnection is stronger when elites, particularlythose leading political parties, are polarized on theissue. 13ConclusionIt is fruitless to seek general validity in eithereconomic <strong>or</strong> identity the<strong>or</strong>ies of preferences. Weneed to inquire into their relative causal power. Inthis article, we do this f<strong>or</strong> a single object: publicopinion on European integration. Most scholarshave conceptualized European integration as aneconomic phenomenon, and the bulk of researchhas theref<strong>or</strong>e the<strong>or</strong>ized public opinion as afunction of the distributional consequences ofmarket liberalization. But the European Unionis also a supranational polity with extensiveauth<strong>or</strong>ity over those living in its territ<strong>or</strong>y. It istheref<strong>or</strong>e plausible to believe that Europeanintegration engages group, and above all, nationalidentities.Both the<strong>or</strong>ies bite. A multi-level model thatcombines both sources of preference can explainaround a third <strong>or</strong> m<strong>or</strong>e of the variance acrossindividual citizens in the EU, and the bulk ofvariation across countries. However, we findthat identity appears to be the m<strong>or</strong>e powerfulinfluence. To understand how the public viewsEuropean integration, one needs to considerhow individuals frame their national identity. Docitizens consider national identity as somethingthat can go hand in hand with Europeanintegration, <strong>or</strong> do they believe that European integration limits <strong>or</strong>threatens their national identity? There is nothing mechanistic <strong>or</strong>inevitable about one <strong>or</strong> the other position.<strong>Identity</strong> is simple and complex. Citizens can answer thequestion “What is your nationality” with much greater ease andvalidity than they can tell you f<strong>or</strong> which party <strong>or</strong> candidate theyvoted in the previous election. Like some in-group/out-groupidentities, national identities are f<strong>or</strong>med early in life. Children asyoung as six know full well whether they are British, German, <strong>or</strong>Swedish. Yet the political implications of national identity emergefrom debate and conflict. Whether a person is Belgian <strong>or</strong> Britishis (usually) a simple fact, but what does this national identityimply f<strong>or</strong> the political choices one makes?To understand the political implications of identity onetheref<strong>or</strong>e has to probe how identity is constructed and mobilized.Political elites and parties appear to be key. Exclusive nationalidentity is mobilized against European integration in countrieswhere the elite is polarized on European integration, wherepolitical parties are divided, and where radical right parties arestrong. Data over time would help scholars probe further.In terms of deductive sophistication, identity the<strong>or</strong>y cannotcompete with economic the<strong>or</strong>y—yet. But this is like comparing agasoline engine, honed over decades, with a hydrogen engine. Ifgroup identities are decisive f<strong>or</strong> preferences over a wide range ofpolitical objects, as recent research suggests, then we can safelypredict that the the<strong>or</strong>ies of group identity will become m<strong>or</strong>esophisticated and m<strong>or</strong>e powerful.4 PS July 2004

Appendix: Variable DescriptionsSupp<strong>or</strong>t f<strong>or</strong>EuropeanIntegrationEducationProfessional/Manager*Gross NationalIncomeManual W<strong>or</strong>ker*Gross NationalIncomePersonal<strong>Economic</strong>ProspectsNational<strong>Economic</strong>PerspectivesFiscalTransferType ofCapitalismNationalAttachmentExclusiveNational<strong>Identity</strong>MulticulturalismAn index of three items: (1) Principle of membership – “Generallyspeaking, do you think that [our country’s] membership of theEuropean Union is (a bad thing, neither good n<strong>or</strong> bad, a goodthing)?” (2) Desired speed – (1=integration should be broughtto a “standstill”; 7= integration should run “as fast as possible”),and (3) Desired direction – “In five years’ time, would you likethe European Union to play (a less imp<strong>or</strong>tant role, same role, am<strong>or</strong>e imp<strong>or</strong>tant role) in your daily life?” The c<strong>or</strong>relation is 0.409between (1) and (2), 0.448 between (1) and (3), and 0.473between (2) and (3). Standardized item = 0.706. The indexis recoded as a 0-100 thermometer scale, with higher sc<strong>or</strong>esindicating greater supp<strong>or</strong>t.Measured by the age of respondents when they stopped full-timeeducation (D.8) and recoded on a 4-point scale.Interaction term of (1) a dichotomous variable Professional Managerthat takes a value of 1 when respondent is professional (selfemployed<strong>or</strong> employed), general manager, <strong>or</strong> business propriet<strong>or</strong>(D.15), and (2) gross national income per capita f<strong>or</strong> respondent’scountry of residence (in US dollars at exchange rate prices f<strong>or</strong>2001, divided by 1000). Values range from zero to 30.6 f<strong>or</strong>Denmark. Source: W<strong>or</strong>ld Development Indicat<strong>or</strong>s Database(W<strong>or</strong>ldbank, April 2003.)Interaction term of (1) a dichotomous variable Manual W<strong>or</strong>kerthat takes a value of 1 when respondent is skilled <strong>or</strong> unskilledmanual w<strong>or</strong>ker, <strong>or</strong> non-desk employee (e.g., salesman, driver)(D.15), and (2) gross national income per capita f<strong>or</strong> respondent’scountry of residence (in US dollars at exchange rate prices f<strong>or</strong>2001). Values range from 0 to 30.6 f<strong>or</strong> Denmark. Source: W<strong>or</strong>ldDevelopment Indicat<strong>or</strong>s Database (W<strong>or</strong>ldbank, April 2003.)An index of three items measuring respondents’ expectations(w<strong>or</strong>se, same, better) concerning their future life, the financial situationin their household, and their job situation (Q.501, Q503,Q505). Standardized item = 0.763. Values range from 1 to 3.An index of two items measuring respondents’ expectations(w<strong>or</strong>se, same, better) concerning the economic situation and theemployment situation in their country (Q.502, Q504.) Valuesrange from 1 to 3.Net fiscal transfers per country as percentage of GDP as an annualaverage over the period of 1995-2000. Values range from-0.56 f<strong>or</strong> Germany to 3.88 f<strong>or</strong> Greece. Source: Commission ofthe European Union (2001.)Categ<strong>or</strong>ization based on type of national production system(liberal market vs. mixed vs. co<strong>or</strong>dinated) and extent of welfareredistribution (limited, medium, extensive—measured by Giniindex). Country sc<strong>or</strong>es reflect distance from the median (mixedsystem, medium redistribution) whereby the median categ<strong>or</strong>y is2, adjacent cells are 1, and two cells removed are 0. Source:Gourevitch and Hawes (2001.)Question Q. 803: “People may feel different degrees of attachmentto their town <strong>or</strong> village, to their region, to their country, <strong>or</strong>to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to … (3) [ourcountry]: very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, not atall attached, don’t know.” This is a 4-point scale.A dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 f<strong>or</strong> respondentswith exclusive national identity ([nationality] only). Recoded from:“In the near future, do you see yourself as (1) [nationality] only,(2) [nationality] and European, (3) European and [nationality], <strong>or</strong>(4) European only?” (Q.23.)“Thinking about the enlargement of the European Union toinclude new countries, do you tend to agree <strong>or</strong> tend to disagreewith the following statement …’With m<strong>or</strong>e member countries,Europe will be culturally richer’ (tend to disagree, don’t know,tend to agree).’” (Q.399.) This is a 3-point scale.Note: Q and D notations refer to questions in the Eurobarometer codebook (Hartung2002).ReferencesAnderson, Christopher J. 1998. “When in Doubt, Use Proxies:Attitudes Toward Domestic Politics and Supp<strong>or</strong>t f<strong>or</strong>European Integration.” Comparative Political Studies31: 569–601.Brinegar, Adam, Seth Jolly, and Herbert Kitschelt. 2004.“Varieties of Capitalism and Political Divides over EuropeanIntegration.” In European Integration and PoliticalConfl ict, eds. Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 62–89.Carey, Sean. 2002. “Undivided Loyalties: Is National <strong>Identity</strong>an Obstacle to European Integration?” EuropeanUnion Politics 3: 387–413.Carrubba, Cliff<strong>or</strong>d J. 2001. “The Elect<strong>or</strong>al Connectionin European Union Politics.” Journal of Politics 63:141–58.Citrin, Jack, and John Sides. F<strong>or</strong>thcoming. “Can There beEurope without Europeans? Problems of <strong>Identity</strong> in aMultinational Community.” In Identities in Europe andthe Institutions of the European Union, eds. RichardHerrmann, Marilynn Brewer, and Thomas Risse. Lanham,MD.: Rowman and Littlefield.Citrin, Jack, Beth Reingold, and Donald P. Green. 1990.“American <strong>Identity</strong> and the Politics of Ethnic Change.”Journal of Politics 52: 1124–54.Commission of the European Union. 2001. Allocation of2000 EU Operating Expenditure by Member State. EuropeanCommission, Budget Direct<strong>or</strong>ate, September 2001.Christin, Thomas, and Alexander Trechsel. 2002. “Joiningthe EU? Explaining <strong>Public</strong> <strong>Opinion</strong> in Switzerland.”European Union Politics 3: 415–43.Deutsch, Karl W. 1957. Nationalism and Social Communication.New Y<strong>or</strong>k: John Wiley.Diez Medrano, Juan. 2003. Framing Europe: Attitudes toEuropean Integration in Germany, Spain, and the UnitedKingdom. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Druckman, Daniel. 1994. “Nationalism, Patriotism, andGroup Loyalty: A Social Psychological Perspective.”Mershon International Studies Review 38: 43–68.Eichenberg, Richard, and Russell Dalton. 1993. “Europeansand the European Community: The Dynamics of <strong>Public</strong>Supp<strong>or</strong>t f<strong>or</strong> European Integration.” International Organization47: 507–34.Elster, Jon. 1990. “When <strong>Rationality</strong> Fails.” In The Limitsof <strong>Rationality</strong>, eds. Karen Schweers Cook and MargaretLevi. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19–51.Gabel, Matthew. 1998. Interests and Integration: MarketLiberalization, <strong>Public</strong> <strong>Opinion</strong>, and European Union.Ann Arb<strong>or</strong>: University of Michigan Press.Gourevitch, Peter, and Michael Hawes. 2001. “UnderstandingNational Production Systems: Comparative Capitalismin the Globalized Economy.” Paper presented at theAPSA Annual Meeting, San Francisco.Haas, Ernst. 1958. The Uniting of Europe. Stanf<strong>or</strong>d: Stanf<strong>or</strong>dUniversity Press.Haesly, Richard. 2001. “Euroskeptics, Europhiles andInstrumental Europeans : European Attachment in Scotlandand Wales.” European Union Politics 2: 81–102.Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice, eds. 2001. Varieties ofCapitalism: The Institutional Foundations of ComparativeAdvantage. Oxf<strong>or</strong>d: Oxf<strong>or</strong>d University Press.Hartung, Harald. 2002. Eurobarometer 54.1: BuildingEurope and the European Union: The European Parliament,<strong>Public</strong> Safety, and Defense Policy, November-December2000. Brussels: Commission of the EuropeanCommunity.Hermann, Richard, Marilynn Brewer, and Thomas Risse,eds. F<strong>or</strong>thcoming. Identities in Europe and the Institutionsof the European Union. Lanham, MD.: Rowmanand Littlefield.Hjerm, Mikael. 1998. “National Identities, National Prideand Xenophobia: A Comparison of Four Western Countries.”Acta Sociologica 41: 335–47.Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Carole Wilson. 2002.“<strong>Does</strong> Left/Right Structure Party Positions on EuropeanIntegration?” Comparative Political Studies 35: 965–89.PSOnline www.apsanet.<strong>or</strong>g 5

Inglehart, Ronald. 1970. “Cognitive Mobilization and European <strong>Identity</strong>.”Comparative Politics 3: 45–70.Klandermans, Bert, Jose Manuel Sabucedo, and Mauro Rodriguez. 2003.“Inclusiveness of Identification among Farmers in the Netherlands andGalicia.” Unpublished ms.Kriesi, Hanspeter, and Romain Lachat. 2004. “Globalization and theTransf<strong>or</strong>mation of the National Political Space: Switzerland and FranceCompared.” Paper prepared f<strong>or</strong> a W<strong>or</strong>kshop on the Analysis of PoliticalCleavages and Party Competition, Duke University.Lijphart, Arend. 1979. “Religious vs. Linguistic vs. Class Voting: The CrucialExperiment of Comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland.”American Political Science Review 73: 442–458.Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1981 [1960]. Political Man: The Social Bases ofPolitics, 2nd ed. Baltim<strong>or</strong>e: Johns Hopkins University Press.Marks, Gary. 1999. “Territ<strong>or</strong>ial Identities in the European Union.” In RegionalIntegration and Democracy: Expanding on the European Experience, ed.Jeffrey J. Anderson. Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield, 69–91.Marks, Gary. 2004. “Conclusion: European Integration and Political Conflict.”In European Integration and Political Confl ict, eds. Gary Marks andMarco Steenbergen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 235–259.Marks, Gary, and Ivan Llamazares. F<strong>or</strong>thcoming. “Multi-level Governancein Southern Europe: European Integration and Regional Mobilization.”In The Changing Functions of the State in the New Southern Europe, eds.P. Nikif<strong>or</strong>os Diamandouros, Richard Gunther, and Gianfranco Pasquino.Baltim<strong>or</strong>e: Johns Hopkins University Press.Massey, Douglas. 2002. “Presidential Address: A Brief Hist<strong>or</strong>y of HumanSociety: The Origin and Role of Emotion in Social Life.” American SociologicalReview 67: 1–29.Mayda, Anna Maria, and Dani Rodrik. 2002. “Why Are Some People (andCountries) M<strong>or</strong>e Protectionist than Others?” Unpublished ms.O’Rourke, Kevin H., and Richard Sinnott. 2001. “The Determinants of IndividualTrade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence.” Paperpresented at the Brookings Trade Policy F<strong>or</strong>um.Ray, Leonard. 2004. “Don’t Rock the Boat: Expectations, Fears, and Oppositionto EU Level Policy Making.” In European Integration and PoliticalConfl ict, eds. Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 51–61.Risse, Thomas. 2003. “Nationalism and Collective Identities. Europe versusthe Nation-State?” In Developments in West European Politics, eds. PaulHeywood, Eric Jones, and Martin Rhodes. London: Palgrave Macmillan.Rohrschneider, Robert. 2002. “The Democracy Deficit and Mass Supp<strong>or</strong>tf<strong>or</strong> an EU-wide Government.” American Journal of Political Science 46:463-75.Sears, David O. 1993. “Symbolic Politics: A Socio-Psychological The<strong>or</strong>y.” InExpl<strong>or</strong>ations in Political Psychology, edited by Shanto Iyengar and WilliamJ. McGuire. Durham: Duke University Press, 113–49.Sears, David O., and Carolyn Funk. 1991. “The Role of Self-Interest in Socialand Political Attitudes.” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 24:1–91.Shulman, Stephen. 2002. “Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/EastDichotomies in the Study of Nationalism.” Comparative Political Studies35: 554–85.Spence, Jacqueline. [s.d., 1997]. The European Union: A View from the Top.Waver, Belgium: EOS Gallup Europe.Steenbergen, Marco, and Bradf<strong>or</strong>d S. Jones. 2002. “Modeling Multilevel DataStructures.” American Journal of Political Science 46: 218–37.Stråth, Bo, and Anna Triandafyllidou, eds. 2003. Representations of Europeand the Nation in Current and Prospective Member States: The CollectiveState of the Art and Hist<strong>or</strong>ical Rep<strong>or</strong>ts. Brussels: European Commission,Direct<strong>or</strong>ate-General f<strong>or</strong> Research, EUR 20736.Taggart, Paul. 1998. “A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemp<strong>or</strong>aryWestern European Party Systems.” European Journal of PoliticalResearch 33: 363–88.Van Kersbergen, Kees. 2000. “Political Allegiance and European Integration.”European Journal of Political Research 37: 1–17.Young, Jason, Cynthia J. Thomsen, Eugene B<strong>or</strong>gida, John L. Sullivan, andJohn H. Aldrich. 1991. “When Self-Interest Makes a Difference: The Roleof Construct Accessibility in Political Reasoning.” Journal of ExperimentalSocial Psychology 27: 271–96.Zaller, John R. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass <strong>Opinion</strong>. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.6 PS July 2004