Memorandum Opinion - the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Memorandum Opinion - the Circuit Court for Baltimore City Memorandum Opinion - the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
On August 24, 2009 Plaintiffs sent the Court a copy of an unpublished opinion,Magedson v. Whitney Information, Inc., No. CV-08-1715-PHX-DGC (January 16, 2009) witha letter stating that the district court found that Arizona had personal jurisdiction over RAAfor a claim of abuse of process for filing suit in Florida against Xcentric Ventures, LLC., anArizona company, on facts similar to this case. Rothstein and RAA sent a letter in replystating that the court should disregard Magedson in its analysis for several reasons, includingthe fact that the opinion was issued in January 2009 and thus, if it was to be considered,should have been attached to plaintiffs’ opposition. 27Sending the opinion, by letter, afterargument has been completed is an end run around the order which does not permitsurreplies. They are correct but the Court will not disregard the opinion because Magedsonillustrates why jurisdiction does not exist in this case.Initially, it is noteworthy that in Magedson the parties agreed that no generaljurisdiction exists, so the case provides no support for plaintiffs’ claim of generaljurisdiction. Slip Op. at 3. Second, and most important, the plaintiff in Magedson is anArizona company, thus the harm was in Arizona. Thus, although Magedson’s stated that itinterpreted Ninth Circuit precedent to hold that Calder effects are satisfied simply by the factthat the plaintiff is a resident of the forum, there was more than residence in the forum.There was harm in the forum because the company, the business was in the forum.Furthermore, this Court is not convinced that the Ninth Circuit would uphold a finding ofpersonal jurisdiction in this case despite its language that Calder effects are satisfied when27Rothstein and RAA point out that the factual detail in the opinion is too sketchy todetermine if the case is in fact similar to this case. While the factual detail is thin, as discussedabove, there are enough facts to show why it is not similar to this case.32
the acts are “targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the forumstate.” Bancroft & Masters v. Augusta Nat'L, 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) cited atSlip Op. at 4. In Bancroft & Masters the Court concluded that the defaming letter “wasexpressly aimed at California because it individually targeted [the plaintiff] a Californiacorporation doing business almost exclusively in California.” Id. at 1088 (emphasis added).Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. Cal. 2006), alsocited by the Magedson Court, slip op. at 4, makes clear that the Ninth Circuit recognizes thatunder Calder the harm must be suffered in the forum state.In this circuit, we construe Calder to impose three requirements:“the defendant allegedly [must] have (1) committed anintentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3)causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered inthe forum state.”(emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Court clarified that while the “brunt” of the harmneed not be suffered in the forum state, there still must be “a jurisdictionally sufficientamount of harm suffered in the forum state.” Id. As this Court has reiterated throughout thisopinion, there is no factual allegation of harm suffered in Maryland.Due ProcessFor all the reasons discussed above, the exercise of jurisdiction over Rothstein andRRA would be constitutionally unreasonable. The test of reasonableness requires a court toconsider:the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, theplaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief .. ., the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the mostefficient resolution of controversies[,] and the shared interest ofthe several States in furthering fundamental substantive socialpolicies.MaryCLE, 166 Md. App. at 510, quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 44433
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On August 24, 2009 Plaintiffs sent <strong>the</strong> <strong>Court</strong> a copy of an unpublished opinion,Magedson v. Whitney In<strong>for</strong>mation, Inc., No. CV-08-1715-PHX-DGC (January 16, 2009) witha letter stating that <strong>the</strong> district court found that Arizona had personal jurisdiction over RAA<strong>for</strong> a claim of abuse of process <strong>for</strong> filing suit in Florida against Xcentric Ventures, LLC., anArizona company, on facts similar to this case. Rothstein and RAA sent a letter in replystating that <strong>the</strong> court should disregard Magedson in its analysis <strong>for</strong> several reasons, including<strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> opinion was issued in January 2009 and thus, if it was to be considered,should have been attached to plaintiffs’ opposition. 27Sending <strong>the</strong> opinion, by letter, afterargument has been completed is an end run around <strong>the</strong> order which does not permitsurreplies. They are correct but <strong>the</strong> <strong>Court</strong> will not disregard <strong>the</strong> opinion because Magedsonillustrates why jurisdiction does not exist in this case.Initially, it is noteworthy that in Magedson <strong>the</strong> parties agreed that no generaljurisdiction exists, so <strong>the</strong> case provides no support <strong>for</strong> plaintiffs’ claim of generaljurisdiction. Slip Op. at 3. Second, and most important, <strong>the</strong> plaintiff in Magedson is anArizona company, thus <strong>the</strong> harm was in Arizona. Thus, although Magedson’s stated that itinterpreted Ninth <strong>Circuit</strong> precedent to hold that Calder effects are satisfied simply by <strong>the</strong> factthat <strong>the</strong> plaintiff is a resident of <strong>the</strong> <strong>for</strong>um, <strong>the</strong>re was more than residence in <strong>the</strong> <strong>for</strong>um.There was harm in <strong>the</strong> <strong>for</strong>um because <strong>the</strong> company, <strong>the</strong> business was in <strong>the</strong> <strong>for</strong>um.Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, this <strong>Court</strong> is not convinced that <strong>the</strong> Ninth <strong>Circuit</strong> would uphold a finding ofpersonal jurisdiction in this case despite its language that Calder effects are satisfied when27Rothstein and RAA point out that <strong>the</strong> factual detail in <strong>the</strong> opinion is too sketchy todetermine if <strong>the</strong> case is in fact similar to this case. While <strong>the</strong> factual detail is thin, as discussedabove, <strong>the</strong>re are enough facts to show why it is not similar to this case.32