the philosophy of feelings in poland - Kazimierz Dabrowski's Theory ...
the philosophy of feelings in poland - Kazimierz Dabrowski's Theory ...
the philosophy of feelings in poland - Kazimierz Dabrowski's Theory ...
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http://www.heksis.com/<strong>in</strong>dex_pliki/heksis_1_2010/teksty_3_20...more extensive read<strong>in</strong>g and analysis.This is <strong>the</strong> table <strong>of</strong> contents <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> manuscript titled “The Psychology <strong>of</strong> Feel<strong>in</strong>gs” by JulianOchorowicz (deciphered by Anita Benisławska, Warsaw 2010)”Introductory Part – I. Different Forms <strong>of</strong> Feel<strong>in</strong>g States – 1) Objective and subjectiveimpressions, 2) Emotions and <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>, 3) Moods and dispositions, 4) Feel<strong>in</strong>g sensation,sense <strong>of</strong>, impression, compassion and premonition; II. What dist<strong>in</strong>guishes general subjectivestates from detailed objective states? – 1) The lack <strong>of</strong> clarity <strong>of</strong> affective phenomena, 2) Thequantity oppositions <strong>of</strong> affective phenomena, 3) The Feel<strong>in</strong>g is subjective, 4) A feel<strong>in</strong>g has tohave a location, 5) Feel<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> contrast to <strong>in</strong>tellectual states weaken by be<strong>in</strong>g accustomed to<strong>the</strong>m, 6) Feel<strong>in</strong>gs are clearly characterised by <strong>the</strong>ir ma<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>tensity; III. What is <strong>the</strong> differencebetween <strong>in</strong>troverted states <strong>of</strong> pleasure and displeasure; IV. Theories expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> justifieddifference between pleas<strong>in</strong>g and displeas<strong>in</strong>g states – 1) Volitional <strong>the</strong>ories, 2) Intellectual<strong>the</strong>ories, 3) Theories <strong>of</strong> actions <strong>in</strong> general, 4) <strong>Theory</strong> <strong>of</strong> growth and loss <strong>of</strong> force, 5) <strong>Theory</strong><strong>of</strong> usefulness, 6) <strong>Theory</strong> <strong>of</strong> nerve and molecular equilibrium, 7) <strong>Theory</strong> <strong>of</strong> contrasts, 8)<strong>Theory</strong> <strong>of</strong> harmony or disharmony between <strong>the</strong> reserves <strong>of</strong> force and <strong>the</strong>ir consumption; V.Criticism <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hypo<strong>the</strong>sis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> connection <strong>of</strong> <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> and <strong>the</strong> metabolism; VI. Peripheralchanges dur<strong>in</strong>g feel<strong>in</strong>g states; VII. The evolution <strong>of</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>g expression; VIII. Cry<strong>in</strong>g andLaughter; IX. Chronic states – 1) a Lack, 2) Deduced changes; Part One. Subjectiveimpressions – 1) Subjective external sensations, 2) Auditory sensations, 4) Olfactorysensations, 5) gustatory sensations, 6) tactile sensations; A. Sensations com<strong>in</strong>g frommechanical external stimuli – 1) Prick<strong>in</strong>g, 2) Cutt<strong>in</strong>g, 3) Pierc<strong>in</strong>g, 4) Scratch<strong>in</strong>g, 5) P<strong>in</strong>ch<strong>in</strong>g,6) Hitt<strong>in</strong>g, 7) Gripp<strong>in</strong>g, 8) Sk<strong>in</strong> tear<strong>in</strong>g, 9) Peel<strong>in</strong>g oneself 1), 10) St<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g, 11) Itch<strong>in</strong>g, 12)Tickl<strong>in</strong>g, 13) Tighten<strong>in</strong>g; B. Sound sensations at first triggered by external stimuli i.e.physical and chemical – 1) Burn<strong>in</strong>g, 2) Scald<strong>in</strong>g, 3) Freez<strong>in</strong>g, 4) Injure by frostbite, 5)Stra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g; C. From electric stimuli – 1) Spark st<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g; D. From magnetic stimuli; E.Sensations <strong>of</strong> auditory stimuli <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>of</strong> external stimuli – 1) Neuralgia, 2) Sk<strong>in</strong> pa<strong>in</strong>,3) Itch<strong>in</strong>g, 4) Over-sensitivity; I. Pleasurable tactile sensations – 1) Touch<strong>in</strong>g oneself, 2)Be<strong>in</strong>g touched by someone else, 3) Active touch<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> someone else, 4) Touch<strong>in</strong>g nonliv<strong>in</strong>gobjects; II. Internal sensory sensations – 1) From <strong>the</strong> muscle organ, 2) From <strong>the</strong> respiratoryorgan, 3) From <strong>the</strong> vocal organ.The presented table <strong>of</strong> contents <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> manuscript <strong>in</strong>dicates a comprehensive approach to<strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> not only <strong>in</strong> Poland, but <strong>in</strong> Europe <strong>of</strong> Julian Ochorowicz’s times. A lack <strong>of</strong>a broader availability to this text condemns Poles and Europeans to a historical and culturalignorance. It triggers a feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> shame and guilt for <strong>the</strong> negligence <strong>of</strong> scientific <strong>in</strong>stitutions,academies <strong>of</strong> m<strong>in</strong>istries and universities <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> great Polish scholars – not onlyconcern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>. The publication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> table <strong>of</strong> contents <strong>of</strong> “The Psychology <strong>of</strong> Feel<strong>in</strong>gs”is an attempt to break <strong>the</strong> permanent state <strong>of</strong> ignorance <strong>in</strong> this sphere <strong>of</strong> our nation, even <strong>of</strong>those historians <strong>of</strong> science, who have written wisely on <strong>the</strong> subject <strong>of</strong> Ochorowicz and his<strong>the</strong>ories.Leon Petrażycki (1867-1931) attempted to connect <strong>the</strong> science <strong>of</strong> law and morality wi<strong>the</strong>motional psychology. Firstly, he presented emotions <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> psychology <strong>of</strong> cognition,concentrat<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> notion <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g and draw<strong>in</strong>g conclusions. Next, he presentedemotions <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> psychology <strong>of</strong> <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>, discuss<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> notion <strong>of</strong> affects, passions and moods.He also presented <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> emotion <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> psychology and <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>cts. (cf. L.Petrażycki, Russian Ed. 1908, Polish Ed. 1959).Petrażycki ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> and cognition constitute a basic category <strong>of</strong> psychic2 <strong>of</strong> 11 11-03-16 2:45 PM
http://www.heksis.com/<strong>in</strong>dex_pliki/heksis_1_2010/teksty_3_20...experience. His concern was about experienc<strong>in</strong>g pleasure, satisfaction, delight (“positive<strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>”) and experienc<strong>in</strong>g displeasure, discontent, suffer<strong>in</strong>g (“negative <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>”) (cf. L.Petrażycki, 1959, p. 232).He also analysed <strong>the</strong> notion <strong>of</strong> “emotional tone” and “cognitive-emotional complexes” thatconsist <strong>of</strong> cognitive and emotional elements (e.g. as sets <strong>of</strong> imag<strong>in</strong>ations and pleasures,imag<strong>in</strong>ations and displeasures etc.). In his view, those complexes are wrongly called “higher<strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>”.Petrażycki referred to notions already function<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> psychology – affects (Affekte), moods(Stimmungen) and passions (Leidenschaften), as well as to <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>tensiveness andextensiveness. He made a critical review and adjusted <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ories <strong>of</strong> Wilhelm Wundt, ArthurSchopenhauer, William James, Theodor Ribot etc. He carried out an <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g analysis <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> relation between emotions, <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>cts and act <strong>of</strong> man’s will.Jan Mazurkiewicz (1871-1947) <strong>in</strong> his “physiological <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>” attempted topresent <strong>the</strong> physiological sources <strong>of</strong> emotions. He referred, among o<strong>the</strong>rs, to <strong>the</strong> discoveries<strong>of</strong> Pierre Janet’s and Sigmund Freud’s <strong>the</strong>ories <strong>of</strong> <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>. He made a critical review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>psychophysiological assumptions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> James-Lang concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>. He assumed thathuman evolution depends on three ma<strong>in</strong> “regulations”, “programmes”, i.e. engrams. Today,we would say “drivers”, which control <strong>the</strong> cognitive, emotional and behavioural processes <strong>of</strong>an organism.Initially, <strong>the</strong> gnostic, emotional and movement engrams act without diversification. Theirma<strong>in</strong> aim is to realise <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual life programme <strong>of</strong> an organism. Only dur<strong>in</strong>gdevelopment is <strong>the</strong>re a division <strong>of</strong> functions, <strong>the</strong>ir specialization and ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g autonomy (cf. J.Mazurkiewicz, „Zarys fizjologicznej teorii uczuć”, vol.1.-1928, vol.2.-1930).“The biological role <strong>of</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>g tendency consists <strong>of</strong> a proper disposition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> body towardsan impression (irritation) by <strong>the</strong> appropriate activation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> performance apparatus, andthus appears <strong>the</strong> biological necessity <strong>of</strong> emotional irradiation not <strong>in</strong> one, but <strong>in</strong> bothdirections” (Mazurkiewicz, vol. 2, p. 35).The foundation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> evolution <strong>of</strong> man’s mental life are <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>cts, also called drives (vital,sexual, gregarious i.e. syntonic, cognitive). Inst<strong>in</strong>ctive emotionality – is a latent mnemicaffectiveorientation. It becomes active under <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>of</strong> external stimulus or stronger,energetic discharges <strong>of</strong> cortex centres, under <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>of</strong> periodical physiological needs.The syntonic drive forms man’s entire emotionality, it set <strong>the</strong> direction for <strong>the</strong> cognitive andmotor drive.Species experiences are established <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> subcortex nodes while <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual ones <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>cortex. The complex <strong>of</strong> species engrams <strong>in</strong>cludes – 1) <strong>the</strong> fundamental ability to recognizeshapes (global), 2) <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> directed at <strong>the</strong> object (klisis) or directed from <strong>the</strong> object(ekklisis), 3) general k<strong>in</strong>aes<strong>the</strong>sia (grasp<strong>in</strong>g or evasive movement). A feel<strong>in</strong>g always has anegative or positive nature <strong>in</strong> various species. The emotional component revives <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rcomponents and gives <strong>the</strong>m form and colour.There are orig<strong>in</strong>al and mnemic <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>, i.e. <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> derived from <strong>the</strong> direct impulse <strong>of</strong>sensations or from <strong>the</strong> remember<strong>in</strong>g such an impulse.3 <strong>of</strong> 11 11-03-16 2:45 PM
http://www.heksis.com/<strong>in</strong>dex_pliki/heksis_1_2010/teksty_3_20...The syntonic drive develops itself dur<strong>in</strong>g phylogenesis from <strong>the</strong> sexual and family drive(gregarious, ancestral), and not by <strong>the</strong> sublimation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> libido <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual life (cf. S.Freud). Syntony is an emotional phenomemon <strong>of</strong> co-sound<strong>in</strong>g (Eugen Bleuler), whichsupports <strong>the</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> social relations. Schizoid behaviour (psychopathy, psychosis) lacksit. Its excess <strong>in</strong> adult life means a development <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>hibition <strong>of</strong> social <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>.In his concept, J. Mazurkiewicz attributed a huge role to organic <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>: - “<strong>the</strong>psychophysiological significance <strong>of</strong> organic <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> is <strong>in</strong>comparably bigger than <strong>the</strong>psychological one, because <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>the</strong> only source <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> active force <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dynamics <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> whole emotional life” (J. Mazurkiewicz, vol. 2, p. 47). This group <strong>in</strong>cludes e.g. an <strong>in</strong>nateimpression <strong>of</strong> a filled bladder. The complex <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se emotional sensations and <strong>the</strong> system <strong>of</strong>reaction to such sensations rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> its primeval form till <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> man’s life.The organic feel<strong>in</strong>g which f<strong>in</strong>d its reference po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> cortex, stops its previoussensations (pol. odczucia zmysłowe), which creates a conflict between <strong>the</strong> organic <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>.Victorious is <strong>the</strong> one, which is more strongly bounded with <strong>the</strong> movement system, whichallows a discharge <strong>of</strong> present stress. The dysfunctions <strong>of</strong> organic <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> are responsible foremotional pathologies.Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Jan Mazurkiewicz – “each organic sensation, <strong>of</strong> a sufficient <strong>in</strong>tensity, has all<strong>the</strong> traits or dimensions <strong>of</strong> a feel<strong>in</strong>g” (J. Mazurkiewicz, vol. 2, p. 41). In <strong>the</strong> activity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>organic <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>, as well as <strong>in</strong> that <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs, an important role is played by <strong>the</strong> <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> <strong>of</strong>displeasure and pleasure.The oldest organic sensation is pa<strong>in</strong>. Not only does it deorganize <strong>the</strong> system <strong>of</strong> emotionaland cognitive reactions, but it also breaks us out from <strong>the</strong> normal perception <strong>of</strong> time. Severepa<strong>in</strong> may hamper logical processes and lead to unconsciousness. (cf. J. Mazurkiewicz, vol. 2,p. 43). In <strong>the</strong> thirties a several dozen <strong>of</strong> k<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>of</strong> pa<strong>in</strong> were identified (e.g. Baunis – 83,Hahnemann – 73).Inst<strong>in</strong>ctive <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> have a hereditary nature and are transferred as schemas <strong>of</strong> emotionalreactions remembered by generations. They exist as stable, latent mnemic-affectiveorientations, which are dynamized under <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>of</strong> specific situations and externalstimuli.Thanks to <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ctive <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>, a child wakes up from time to time <strong>in</strong> order to reproduce andreactivate his time-spatial, bodily and emotional contact with its mo<strong>the</strong>r. It does so by sat<strong>in</strong>gits physical, bodily and emotional hunger, <strong>in</strong> order to support <strong>the</strong> evolution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> higherstructures <strong>of</strong> its own nervous system. The state <strong>of</strong> sleep is an extension <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> foetal state.The state <strong>of</strong> vigil is aroused by <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ctive mechanisms.Jan Mazurkiewicz also dist<strong>in</strong>guishes prelogical <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> that are isolated, magical andpresent <strong>in</strong> a child until it is seven years old (and <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>digenous peoples). Dur<strong>in</strong>g adulthood<strong>the</strong>y can be caused by <strong>the</strong> damage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> coord<strong>in</strong>ative-hierarchical structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> frontallobe. Such damage destroys <strong>the</strong> control <strong>of</strong> prelogical emotions. Prelogical emotions arestimulated and appear <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> production <strong>of</strong> visual symbols <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> reality, similarly as <strong>in</strong> adream. There is a lack <strong>of</strong> critical, logical control <strong>of</strong> those symbols.Symptoms <strong>of</strong> prelogical emotions appear <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual and group psychoses (national4 <strong>of</strong> 11 11-03-16 2:45 PM
http://www.heksis.com/<strong>in</strong>dex_pliki/heksis_1_2010/teksty_3_20...megalomania, fanaticism, nationalism, ideological e.g. fascism, communism, delusionaltendencies, crimes etc.). Their positive mean<strong>in</strong>g is observed <strong>in</strong> scientific and artistic works,when <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> hierarchical activity <strong>of</strong> logical functions.Orig<strong>in</strong>al and irradiated <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> exist that have a free and conditioned nature.Organic sensations differ from sensory sensations (orig<strong>in</strong>al and memory based), which arecomb<strong>in</strong>ed with a gnostic component. “All sensory sensations (visual, auditory, tactile) are bynature <strong>in</strong>different, as opposed to orig<strong>in</strong>al sensations and can receive an emotional evaluation(colour) by <strong>the</strong> latter directly or <strong>in</strong>directly (J. Mazurkiewicz, vol. 2, p. 45).The emotionally active subcortex charges transmit energy to <strong>the</strong> cortex, which producedby emotional irritations, attribut<strong>in</strong>g a positive (pleasurable) or negative (upsett<strong>in</strong>g) tone.Conditional <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> are created at <strong>the</strong> cortex level, evoked by a phenomenon <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>irradiation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> organic feel<strong>in</strong>g’s stress, which is <strong>in</strong>cluded to <strong>the</strong> gnostic trait <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rcomplex.Thanks to emotional irradiation, it is possible to cross <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> organic and impulsiveemotionality. The first emotional conditional reflex <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> child is joy or sorrow at <strong>the</strong> sight <strong>of</strong>its mo<strong>the</strong>r. Conditional <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> relation with any k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> practical activity, artisticwork, science, upbr<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g and social behaviour, as well mental development.Higher <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> also exist, which are <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>hibitors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>cts, and if <strong>the</strong>re are no such<strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>, <strong>the</strong>re are no restra<strong>in</strong>ts as well, even if <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ct is correct. Their role consists <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>hibit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> activity <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>cts and correct<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir emotional expression. Thanks to this, itis possible to create a world <strong>of</strong> autonomic, non-impulsive emotions, which <strong>in</strong>dividualizeman’s cognition and activities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world.Wladyslaw Witwicki (1878-1948) by referr<strong>in</strong>g amongst o<strong>the</strong>rs to Wundt’s <strong>the</strong>ory,dist<strong>in</strong>guished: 1) simple <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> (pleasure and displeasure), 2) emotional processes, 3)higher <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>, 4) moods (a temporary disposition to a certa<strong>in</strong> type <strong>of</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>g) and 5) affects– as sudden <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> – s<strong>the</strong>nic and non-s<strong>the</strong>nic, <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ctive and habitual. He named all <strong>the</strong>re– 6) emotional life (cf. W. Witwicki, Psychologia, vol. 2, 1963, p. 17).Witwicki dist<strong>in</strong>guished – <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>cts, <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> and affects. He described ways <strong>of</strong> “subject<strong>in</strong>g<strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>” – by suggestion, imitation or by perform<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> symptoms. He also accepted <strong>the</strong>possibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> irradiation <strong>of</strong> <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>, <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>fluence on <strong>in</strong>different objects. He found that<strong>the</strong>y <strong>in</strong>fluence judgements and actions, as well as evoke th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.Roman Ingarden (1893-1970), while referr<strong>in</strong>g to Robert Vischer’s <strong>the</strong>ory, spokeapprov<strong>in</strong>gly about <strong>the</strong> directness <strong>of</strong> empathy, which embraces “coexistence” (miterleben)and “co-feel<strong>in</strong>g” (an, nach, zu – fuhlen). It consists <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>sert<strong>in</strong>g or plac<strong>in</strong>g someth<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong>object, which happens at <strong>the</strong> moment and spontaneously. Yet, he rejected his <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong>“mental <strong>in</strong>fect<strong>in</strong>g’, react<strong>in</strong>g with joy to joy, or with sadness to sadness by means <strong>of</strong> anemotional imitation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r person. This concept was easily accepted <strong>in</strong> psychiatry, butwas questioned by <strong>philosophy</strong>.Roman Ingarden thought that what appears here is a k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> “sens<strong>in</strong>g” (Erfuhlen) andreact<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> similar to <strong>the</strong> similar. Empathy is a direct experience, it shows and makesforeign mental states available, when what is empathized becomes “present” (not justthought or imag<strong>in</strong>ed). R. Ingarden stated that “empathiz<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>the</strong> direct exploratory5 <strong>of</strong> 11 11-03-16 2:45 PM
http://www.heksis.com/<strong>in</strong>dex_pliki/heksis_1_2010/teksty_3_20...experience, <strong>the</strong> one that gives us knowledge, this direct identification with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r person,walk<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> his shoes; <strong>in</strong>direct and consequent empathiz<strong>in</strong>g appears when it is still needed.”(Ingarden 1981, p.72)Cognition through empathy is needed, because notional knowledge does not create a directaccess to <strong>the</strong> object. This stance can be accepted not by phenomenologists, but also bypsychoanalysts and existentialists.A certa<strong>in</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> cognition is based on “observation filled with emotions” or “observation<strong>in</strong>fused spiritually with emotions” <strong>of</strong> objects (cf. R. Ingarden, 1981, p. 79). When <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d isable to <strong>in</strong>tegrate its own cognitive processes with objects that he perceives, <strong>the</strong>n onlyemotional experiences are comb<strong>in</strong>ed and various cognitive elements are arranged <strong>in</strong> acognitive hierarchy.Most phenomenologists gave a feel<strong>in</strong>g a soul (<strong>in</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual experiences) or a spirit(<strong>in</strong> case <strong>of</strong> collective experiences). Roman Ingarden thought that “sensory sensation”(Empf<strong>in</strong>den) can embrace all emotions (Pol. “wzruszenia”).<strong>Kazimierz</strong> Dąbrowski (1902-1980) was <strong>the</strong> only Polish author to connect <strong>the</strong> notions <strong>of</strong>syntony, sympathy and empathy <strong>in</strong> his own concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> personality’s evolution anddevelopment. It beg<strong>in</strong>s from <strong>the</strong> activization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> genetic, impulsive and emotionalstructure with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> environment and self-activity (I). Emotions are connected with primevalreflexes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nervous system, formed as <strong>the</strong> defence <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ct. It coexists with <strong>the</strong> fight<strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ct (temperament syntony). In his <strong>the</strong>ory, K. Dąbrowski referred to, among o<strong>the</strong>rs, <strong>the</strong><strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> P. Janet and W. James.Pierre Janet assumed that a feel<strong>in</strong>g is a k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>ner act<strong>in</strong>g, not a passive experience. Hestarted from analys<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> empt<strong>in</strong>ess, i.e. <strong>the</strong> analysis <strong>of</strong> reactions evoked by <strong>the</strong>lack <strong>of</strong> <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>, pronounc<strong>in</strong>g lack <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> so-called derivative activities. Those activities are –<strong>the</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> exhaustion and effort. One supports <strong>the</strong> primeval activity, ano<strong>the</strong>r onesuspends it. In sadness, <strong>the</strong>re is a reaction <strong>of</strong> failure, <strong>in</strong> joy a reaction <strong>of</strong> triumph. The basic<strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> are <strong>the</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> stress and effort, idleness and discouragement, exhaustion,melancholy and sadness, rapture and joy (cf. Janet 1926 & 1928).William James ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that “emotion dissociated from all bodily feel<strong>in</strong>g is<strong>in</strong>conceivable.” (James 1890). Accord<strong>in</strong>g to him <strong>the</strong>re is a countless number <strong>of</strong> types <strong>of</strong>emotions and <strong>the</strong>ir varieties, e.g. “what may be called <strong>the</strong> »coarser« emotions, grief, fear,rage, love, <strong>in</strong> which every one recognizes a strong organic reverberation, and afterwardsspeak <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> »emotions«, or <strong>of</strong> those whose organic reverberation is less obvious andstrong” – moral, <strong>in</strong>tellectual, aes<strong>the</strong>tic and bodily reactions connected with <strong>the</strong>m. Accord<strong>in</strong>gto James “one mental state is not immediately <strong>in</strong>duced by <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, that <strong>the</strong> bodilymanifestations must first be <strong>in</strong>terposed between (…).” (James 1890)Accord<strong>in</strong>g to K. Dąbrowski, primeval emotionality is <strong>in</strong>tegrated with <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>cts, it ischaracterised by biological defence reactions connected with susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g physical or mentallife. Next <strong>the</strong>re are dynamics <strong>of</strong> primeval affective sympathy and antipathy, which are anexpression <strong>of</strong> changeable reactions, sensations and moods connected with social relations.Ambivalence and ambitendence dom<strong>in</strong>ate here. They are emotional <strong>in</strong>sights, which aresubject to permanent divisions, dispers<strong>in</strong>g or concentration for <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> defend<strong>in</strong>g ego.6 <strong>of</strong> 11 11-03-16 2:45 PM
http://www.heksis.com/<strong>in</strong>dex_pliki/heksis_1_2010/teksty_3_20...Feel<strong>in</strong>gs at this level are <strong>of</strong>ten contradicted and present <strong>the</strong>mselves as moods, imposed by<strong>the</strong>ir own body sensations or environment pressure. Emotional cognition <strong>of</strong> this type has anidentification and projective character – directed at <strong>the</strong> outside where it is balanced throughemotional cognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>trojective character.Projective emotional <strong>in</strong>sight transforms itself <strong>in</strong>to <strong>in</strong>trojective <strong>in</strong>sight and <strong>the</strong>n <strong>in</strong>to a“connective” <strong>in</strong>sight, creat<strong>in</strong>g a type <strong>of</strong> emotional cognitive organ – an emotional subject, anemotional soul or emotional “self”, <strong>in</strong>dividual or group.Impulsive-emotional or social-emotional formations can atta<strong>in</strong> some sort <strong>of</strong> emotionalconscience, which identifies negative and positive emotions, analyses <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong>tellectually anddebilitates <strong>the</strong>ir negative <strong>in</strong>fluence.At this level, <strong>the</strong> Ego takes <strong>the</strong> energy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> negative and isolated emotions <strong>in</strong> order tocreate emotional formations <strong>of</strong> a higher level, which are, among o<strong>the</strong>rs, love for o<strong>the</strong>rs andoneself and friendship. Energy is taken from <strong>the</strong> cognitive and emotional acts, which are:wonder about oneself, dissatisfaction with oneself and <strong>the</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> shame and guilt.The critical moment is <strong>the</strong> chang<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> energy <strong>of</strong> those emotions <strong>in</strong>to a new structure<strong>of</strong> mental organisation, which is called by K. Dąbrowski “positive maladjustment”, which<strong>in</strong>cludes an <strong>in</strong>tellectual, emotional and behavioural component. Its opposition are <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>tellectual and emotional acts <strong>of</strong> self-choice, self-affirmation and self-upbr<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g, thus atype <strong>of</strong> global self-cognition.Perceiv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> world and oneself by means <strong>of</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>g can be – automatic, spontaneous and<strong>in</strong>tentional. In <strong>the</strong> first case, it is <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ctive and sensory perception, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> second one –impressionistic and emotional perception, and <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> third one – imag<strong>in</strong>ary and mental. All<strong>the</strong>se perceptions are subject to passive or active transcendence.Primeval emotional syntony, which has an impulsive character, is differentiated only under<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>of</strong> emotional antipathy and sympathy. The evolution <strong>of</strong> emotional <strong>in</strong>sights goesfrom atmospheric “syntony”, through affective “sympathy”, to emotional “empathy”. Apartfrom those three emotional factors act<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> evolutionary model, <strong>the</strong>re aremany factors that <strong>in</strong>tegrate <strong>the</strong>m or dis<strong>in</strong>tegrate <strong>the</strong>m.CONCLUSIONBefore <strong>the</strong> Second World War, <strong>the</strong>ories <strong>of</strong> William James, William McDougall, HenriBergson, Wilhelm Wundt, Theodor Ribot, Piotr Bovet and Pierre Janet were popular <strong>in</strong>Poland. They are based on <strong>the</strong> conviction that <strong>the</strong>re is a strong relation between emotionsand <strong>the</strong> body, and that bodily sensations play a role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> modification <strong>of</strong> man’s emotionalstructures. Here are two examples:Pierre Janet states that James’ description lacks <strong>the</strong> psychic element. Yet, he himselfwanted to describe <strong>the</strong>m only from <strong>the</strong> outside. Janet and James are sensitive as for <strong>the</strong>disorder that each emotion presents, so <strong>the</strong>y describe this emotion as a k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> less adaptedbehaviour or a maladaptive behaviour or even – behaviour <strong>of</strong> failure (cf. Sartre 2002).“Thus <strong>the</strong> physiological <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> James has led us, by its own <strong>in</strong>sufficiency, to Janet’s<strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> behaviour, and <strong>the</strong> latter to <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> functional emotion <strong>in</strong> form-psychology,and this refers us f<strong>in</strong>ally to consciousness” (Sartre 2002, p. 28). Sartre <strong>in</strong>cludes to importantdiscoveries <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> recogniz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> emotions, <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> emotion-<strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ct,7 <strong>of</strong> 11 11-03-16 2:45 PM
http://www.heksis.com/<strong>in</strong>dex_pliki/heksis_1_2010/teksty_3_20...<strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> emotion-purpose (psychoanalysis) and <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> emotion-consciousness(phenomenology).The contemporary reflection <strong>of</strong> Polish philosophers on <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> <strong>in</strong>cognition and emotion <strong>in</strong> action is quite limited. Older philosophers attempted not toseparate emotional acts from sensory, <strong>in</strong>tellectual and performative act analysis. Bodilyimpulses (pressure, impression, <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ct, drive, movement) and <strong>in</strong>tellectual impulses(thought, attention, observation, meditation) act and evoke emotions. These are not onlysensory, but also m<strong>in</strong>d reactions which form multidimensional and multileveled cognitivephenomena.At a Philosophical Convention <strong>in</strong> Piotraw<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> spr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> 2010, a philosopher from Lubl<strong>in</strong>,Stefan Symotiuk, presented a long list <strong>of</strong> questions concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> cognitive role <strong>of</strong> <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong>– 1) What are “experiences”? 2) What are “moods” – “emotions” – “passions”? 3) Is emotiona condensed, <strong>in</strong>tensive atmosphere (fear, terror), is <strong>the</strong> atmosphere objectless (fear) andemotions objective (fear <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dog)? 4) Do “mixed states” concern moods <strong>in</strong>dividually(gloom<strong>in</strong>ess, long<strong>in</strong>g); or moods + emotions (gloom + fear = fury)? 5) Do emotionalexperiences differ as far temporal direction is concerned (towards <strong>the</strong> past, present, future)?6) Do different <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> “recognize” by head<strong>in</strong>g towards objects – people – abstractions (lovefor nature – children – beauty)? 7) Do <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> “recognize” (can we recognize <strong>the</strong> world byregret)? 8) Is <strong>the</strong>re knowledge that impairs <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> and one that enhances it? 9) What is <strong>the</strong>relation between experiences and “needs” (for security, food, community, value, creation)?10) Are relations among emotions hierarchical or “central-peripheral”? 11) Are <strong>the</strong>recontradictory experiences (ei<strong>the</strong>r – or), or is it possible for <strong>the</strong>m to “mix” toge<strong>the</strong>r? Does“pure love”, “pure fear”, “pure hope” exist? 12) What is <strong>the</strong> difference between: <strong>the</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> passion, <strong>the</strong> passion for someth<strong>in</strong>g, and hope? 13) How do organised emotions (organisedregret – grief, aggressiveness – war enthusiasm) exist? 14) What is <strong>the</strong> relation betweenemotions and: melancholic, sangu<strong>in</strong>ic, choleric temperament? 15) What causes <strong>the</strong>expiration <strong>of</strong> <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> and what causes <strong>the</strong> non-expiration <strong>of</strong> <strong>feel<strong>in</strong>gs</strong> (eternal love)? 16)What is “emotional frigidity”? 17) Is it possible to “feel” o<strong>the</strong>r emotional states, or just “putoneself <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong>ir position”?It seems as though all that is great <strong>in</strong> man goes beyond <strong>the</strong> borders <strong>of</strong> pleasure anddispleasure, lik<strong>in</strong>g and dislik<strong>in</strong>g. 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