Seminar XXIV Final Sessions 1 - Lacan in Ireland
Seminar XXIV Final Sessions 1 - Lacan in Ireland Seminar XXIV Final Sessions 1 - Lacan in Ireland
of his time as a formidable cleric and this is quite true. He had religiousconvictions. People completely forget this adventure, this adventure of theaforesaid Pasteur, people forget it. People forget it and the fact of beingreduced to thinking that there is life, more or less pulsating life onmeteorites does not resolve the question. The fact that we do not find theslightest trace of life on the moon, or on Mars, does not help matters. Forwhy, in the name of what, if not in the name of a being that must all thesame be situated somewhere, of a being who might have done that explicitlylike a man, as if man who, for his part, manipulates and fiddles with things,as if man all of a sudden had seen that there was an ape, an ape-God – Imean that God is supposed to ape him – as if everything in short startedfrom that, which in fact loops the loop. Everyone knows that the ape-God,is more or less the idea that we can construct for ourselves of the idea and ofthe way in which man is born and that this is not something which iscompletely satisfying. For why does man have what I call parl’être,namely, this way of talking in such a fashion that nomina non suntconsequentia rerum, in other words that there is somewhere somethingwhich is not working in the structure as I conceive it, namely, the so calledBorromean knot.This is indeed the case, and it is worthwhile evoking by this nameBorromean a historic date, namely, the way in which there was elucubratedthe very idea in short of structure. It is altogether striking to see that thismeant at the time that, if one family withdrew from a group of 3, the 2others by that very fact found themselves free, free to no longer agree withone another. Of course, this sordid aspect of this history of the Borromeansis worthwhile recording.Not alone are names not the consequence of things, but we can explicitlyaffirm the contrary. I have a grandson, I have a grandson called Luc – it is afunny idea, but it was his parents who baptised him – he is called Luc andhe says quite appropriate things. He says, in short, that he strives to saywords that he does not understand, and he deduces that this is what makeshis head swell, because he has like me, - it is not surprising since he is my96
grandson – he has like me a big head. It is what is called, I am not properlyspeaking hydrocephalic, I have all the same a head, I have a head, and ahead is characterised by the average, I have a rather big head, and my littlegrandson also and he makes the mistake obviously of thinking that, this waythat he has of defining so well the unconscious – because that is what is atstake – this way that he has of defining so well the unconscious, thisapproach, namely, that the words entered into his head, he has deduced fromthat very fact that that is why he has a big head. It is a theory in short, thatis not very intelligent, but pertinent in the sense that it is justified. There issomething which all the same gives him the feeling that speaking isparasitic. So then he pushes that a little bit further to the extent of thinkingthat that is why he has a big head.It is very difficult not to slip, on this particular occasion into the imaginaryof the body, namely, the big head. The terrible thing is that it is logical andthat logic on this particular occasion, is no small thing, namely, that it is theparasite of man. I said earlier that the universe did not exist, but is that true?Is it true that the One which is at the principle of the notion of the universe,that the One is capable of dissolving into powder, that the One of theuniverse is not one or is only one among others. Does the fact that thereexists a One, imply just by itself the universal? This involves that oneshould say that, however excluded the universal may be, the foreclosure ofthis universal implies the maintenance of particularity. There exists a one isnever put forward in logic except in a way that is coherent with whatfollows: there exists a one that satisfies the function. The logic of thefunction is in short what depends on the logic of the one. But this means atthe same time, and this is what I try to draw somewhere on my graph, thisgraph that I risked a long time ago, on which like that so that no one wouldspeculate about it, I wrote this something which is the signifier, the signifierof the fact that the Other does not exist, which I wrote like that: (Ø). But theOther, the Other in question, must indeed be called by its name Other, it isthe sense, it is Other than the real.97
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grandson – he has like me a big head. It is what is called, I am not properlyspeak<strong>in</strong>g hydrocephalic, I have all the same a head, I have a head, and ahead is characterised by the average, I have a rather big head, and my littlegrandson also and he makes the mistake obviously of th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g that, this waythat he has of def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g so well the unconscious – because that is what is atstake – this way that he has of def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g so well the unconscious, thisapproach, namely, that the words entered <strong>in</strong>to his head, he has deduced fromthat very fact that that is why he has a big head. It is a theory <strong>in</strong> short, thatis not very <strong>in</strong>telligent, but pert<strong>in</strong>ent <strong>in</strong> the sense that it is justified. There issometh<strong>in</strong>g which all the same gives him the feel<strong>in</strong>g that speak<strong>in</strong>g isparasitic. So then he pushes that a little bit further to the extent of th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gthat that is why he has a big head.It is very difficult not to slip, on this particular occasion <strong>in</strong>to the imag<strong>in</strong>aryof the body, namely, the big head. The terrible th<strong>in</strong>g is that it is logical andthat logic on this particular occasion, is no small th<strong>in</strong>g, namely, that it is theparasite of man. I said earlier that the universe did not exist, but is that true?Is it true that the One which is at the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of the notion of the universe,that the One is capable of dissolv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to powder, that the One of theuniverse is not one or is only one among others. Does the fact that thereexists a One, imply just by itself the universal? This <strong>in</strong>volves that oneshould say that, however excluded the universal may be, the foreclosure ofthis universal implies the ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of particularity. There exists a one isnever put forward <strong>in</strong> logic except <strong>in</strong> a way that is coherent with whatfollows: there exists a one that satisfies the function. The logic of thefunction is <strong>in</strong> short what depends on the logic of the one. But this means atthe same time, and this is what I try to draw somewhere on my graph, thisgraph that I risked a long time ago, on which like that so that no one wouldspeculate about it, I wrote this someth<strong>in</strong>g which is the signifier, the signifierof the fact that the Other does not exist, which I wrote like that: (Ø). But theOther, the Other <strong>in</strong> question, must <strong>in</strong>deed be called by its name Other, it isthe sense, it is Other than the real.97
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