6139008-History-of-Money

majors were in danger of losing control of the World market. Exxon estimated that Libya would overtake Iran and SaudiArabia to become the leading producer in the region by 1971. If that happened, the majors would actually have todecrease production in their fields. Exxon realized that the governments of the Gulf States simply would refuse tocooperate with the majors if production were cut from their fields. The majors faced a new era of significantoverproduction (as they regarded it), and a dramatic fall in oil prices and profit margins.By 1970 Exxon's forecast looked as if it would come true. Libya was by then the fourth largest producer in the noncommunistWorld, surpassed only by Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Venezuela. What's more, King Idris had been overthrown byColonel Qaddafi, and the oil fields were controlled by a new revolutionary government that was not likely to beincorporated easily within the cosy structure of the large oil companies. To add to the problems of the majors, new fieldswere coming on line in Nigeria, with large but unknown potential. The resulting dénouement is interesting. The Qaddafigovernment demanded an increase in royalties to 40¢ a barrel, targeting Occidental in particular as the largestindependent company, totally dependent on its Libyan fields. Occidental, and then all the others, had to pay the increasedroyalty. Qaddafi had now accomplished more for Libya than OPEC had managed to do for its members since its foundingin 1960. Stung or stimulated by the Libyan success, OPEC met in Venezuela in December 1970 and demanded similarincreases. The majors met and agreed that they would support one another against any OPEC nation (for example, theywould supply crude oil from other sources to any company whose production were cut back by an OPEC government), andthey asked the US Government to turn a blind eye to the breaches of the anti-trust laws that this agreement had made.(The Justice Department agreed to do so.) The American Under Secretary of State even went to the Gulf, apparently onbehalf of the majors, to talk separately to OPEC governments and to try to dissuade them from joint action. This was aclumsy diplomatic blunder, and the US Government's pressure was shrugged off: the Shah of Iran angrily stated that themajors' agreement to collaborate against OPEC was a "dirty trick."The various producer nations used their leverage to get 20¢ a barrel more for the Gulf States, and the Libyans followedwith even more. It's clear that by now the producer nations knew their strength (especially the Libyans), and were playingoff the ability of the Libyan independents to curb the majors by pumping large quantities of oil. In this way the politicaland economic skill of the Libyans, combined with the great good fortune of striking very large and productive fields, wasable for a while to take control of events away from the majors. The Qaddafi government now rapidly began to nationalizethe oil companies in Libya, taking some over outright, and forcing the others to yield 51% to the government. But inexpelling the Western oil men, Qaddafi severely cut down Libyan production, and crippled the independent refiners andmarketers abroad who had been taking market share away from the majors. The Libyans were able to maintain theirrevenues by charging higher prices for the reduced oil flow, but the majors were delighted by the outcome. They regainedtheir market share of global output, and were able to exploit the sudden weakness of the new independents. Moreimportant, the Libyans themselves had removed the threat of Libyan production increase that had been hanging over themajors for ten years. The majors were now back in charge of most of the World's production, refining, marketing, andsales, in a global situation where the threat of overproduction had been removed.None of this was new: it was a return to the old oil World that had been in place for forty years. What was new wasOPEC's realization that it held a great deal of power. Could OPEC now work through the majors to take over effectivecontrol of global oil supplies? In 1973, the Trilateral Commission (TLC) is founded under the direction of David Rockefeller,with Jimmy Carter and Walter Mondale among the founding members to promote World government by encouragingeconomic interdependence among the superpowers. Zbigniew Brzezinski drafts the Commission's charter and becomesfirst director (1973-1976). Unlike the CFR which has 2,500 members, the Trilateral Commission has only 325 members, ofwhich 98 are from N. America, 146 from Europe, and 81 from Japan. Most, if not all, of the important Frenchmen who areTLC members belong to the Grand Orient Lodge of Masonry. In October 1973 the "Yom Kippur" war that ended with thehumiliating defeat of the Arab nations. The same month the OPEC countries met in Vienna to discuss raising oil prices,and with the new realization of their power, simply announced an immediate increase in the price of the standard "MiddleEast" barrel from $3 to $5.11. They doubled the price again in Tehran to $11.65, effective January 1, 1974. Given that thesame barrel had cost $1.80 in late 1970, this represented a six-fold increase since the weakness of the majors had beenexposed by the Libyans in 1970. Most major producing nations agreed to strengthen their position by cutting productionat least 10%. Arab leaders suddenly cooperated and imposed an effective oil embargo. A few of the Arab sheiks becamevice-presidents of American and European superbanks, such as Rockefeller’s Chase Manhattan.The "oil crisis" was comparatively short-lived in terms of supply. The oil companies had had hints from King Faisal of theimpending war and had built up stocks. There was no oil shortage in 1973. What was different was the price of oil, passedon to consumers by the majors as they paid more to the producers for their crude. As long as the majors could control thecrude oil supply, and as long as the consumer could pay the increased price, the majors could arrange to have at least thesame absolute profit margins as before. If they could arrange to keep anything close to their original percentage profitmargins, they would make a lot of money. In typical figures for a refinery on the US East Coast, the refining profit perbarrel was 95¢ (25% above cost) in 1969, but $4.23 (50%) in 1974. The result was that major oil companies madeprofits of about 19% in 1974, compared with a historical average of about 11% in the previous decade. In 1973, theSaudi Government acquired a 25% stake in Aramco. In 1974, this was increased to 60%. In 1975 Saudi Arabia begannationalizing foreign oil assets with full compensation. In 1975 King Faisal was shot by his nephew who had beenbrainwashed by a CIA operative. After the oil crisis in 1973 Caltex lost most of its Saudi holdings to nationalisation and in1980 Aramco was taken over 100% by the Saudi government with retroactive financial effect from 1976. Meanwhile, in1984 Socal renamed itself Chevron and bought Gulf for $13.3bn, a move which doubled its reserves. In 1988, thecompany was renamed Saudi Aramco. Nevertheless, the oil profits still flow back into the Rockefeller and Rotschilddynasties’ banks.The Hidden History Of Money & New World Order Usury Secrets Revealed at last! Page 622