From the Editor's - Foreign Military Studies Office - U.S. Army

From the EditorsIn Search of the Greater IO PerspectiveWelcome to the first-ever Special Edition of IO Sphere.It’s our privilege to bring you, the greater informationoperations community, something extra for 2008. You mayask why a quarterly journal would chose to field an “out ofsequence” product? The simplest answer is that we’re offeringsomething different enough to warrant a little extra attention.On the facing page you’ll read how representatives from twelvecountries produced something extraordinary, and that the J7“futures division” felt you might find worth a closer look.As representatives of IO practices and philosophies, theJoint Information Operations Warfare Command, guided by ourUS Strategic Command headquarters, looks at a range of waysto assist DOD and Coalition influence planners. This meanswe’re listening to many voices and world views, across a widerange of cultural and historic perspectives. Understanding thecomplexities of modern influence operations requires both thebroadest range of knowledge, and the most granular detail wecan determine. Sourcing such formidable needs can be tough,yet sometimes all we need to do is ask. Joint and Servicepartners are fortunate to have long-standing relationshipswith a number of graduate, post-graduate and professionalinstitutions—especially those who host sizable internationalfaculty, advisors and students. Similarly, diplomats andmilitary members on the ground in current campaigns aredeveloping increasingly greater regional expertise. Combinedwith booming open source database efforts, the IO communitycan access knowledge, experience and lessons learned fromalmost anywhere. Notably, this means an even greater numberof voices.The international circulation of this journal continuesto grow, especially among NATO countries, as do articleand editorial contributions by authors outside the US. Thisis welcome on many levels: helping build a professionalcommunity; helping educate new and developing IO staffs;and sharing views from outside traditional North Americanboundaries. Sometimes critical flashes of insight come fromthose farthest from the normal expert’s chair, in the same wayhistory enthusiasts may find the most interesting observationsfrom non-traditional sources. A writer from south Asia mayprovide a fresh perspective on the battlefields of the US CivilWar, while a west African soldier may give a US IO plannercause for reflection. Some in the IO community would saythat given DOD’s reputation as people of action, a time forreflection is the hardest thing to determine.Relationships change, sometimes very rapidly, and mayenhance or harm IO planners’ abilities. Yet in the strategiccommunications business, with more frequent talk of dialog—even among traditional adversaries—opportunities aregrowing. Sometimes an invitation is the toughest step. TheForeign Military Studies Office and their international gueststook up one such offer, and we hope you’ll find the results bothvaluable and enjoyable.-- Col J.R. Roberts, USAFExecutive Editor-- Mr. John W. WhisenhuntEditor2 Special Edition 2008

In 2007 the Foreign Military StudiesOffice (FMSO), a subordinate unitof the US Army Training and DoctrineCommand (TRADOC), hosted anInternational Information OperationsSeminar at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.Twelve countries from six continentsparticipated: India, Russia, Ukraine,Bulgaria, Senegal, Taiwan, Israel,Argentina, Chile, Canada, Australia,and the US.The IO perspectives provided aresolely those of the authors and notthose of the nation he or she represents.All discussions were conducted at the“unclassified” level. Chatham Houserules were in effect, meaning thatwhat was said at the seminar cannot beattributed to any individual speaker ortheir affiliation/organization. This alsomeans the seminar discussions will notbe published, only the prepared textsfound in this journal.Each representative was askedto answer three questions: How haveinformation operations changed in theirrespective countries over the past tenyears? How can countries neutralizean extremist’s use of the Internet? Andwhat new ideas in regard to informationoperations or other cyber-related issuesare emerging from their countriesperspective? In addition to the twelvecountries noted, FMSO attempted toanswer the same questions based onChinese materials.Some representatives were able toeasily answer all three questions whileothers, due to other priorities in theirdefense departments or simply due to alack of cyber capabilities and thus cyberexperience, were limited to answeringonly one or more questions in detail.Each country focused on differentaspects of IO according to its particularIO context and perspective. There is noFMSO comment on these . Rather thereader must judge for him or herselfwhether the recommendations and pointsof interest offered by each speaker areworthy of further consideration.A few general conclusions canbe drawn from this short summary ofthe country representatives preparedpresentations. First, there are still manydifferent ways to define IO. While some“The Challenge of Information Operations”International IO Seminarof the countries’ definitions clearlywere modeled after the US definitiondeveloped years ago, there were severalcountries (Ukraine and Australia inparticular) that are moving in differentdirections. Bulgaria is working on aneffects-based frame of reference asmuch as on an IO frame of reference,it appeared, as it strives to work closelywith NATO. Second, several countrieshighlighted (such as India did) theeconomic aspect of IO. This is a point ofconcern to several countries. Accordingto one Chinese author, who was not a partof this seminar, “war with the objective ofexpanding territory has already basicallywithdrawn from the stage of history, andeven war with the objective of fightingfor natural resources is now giving wayto war with the objective of controllingthe flow of financial capital.” It appearsthat the integration of civilian andmilitary systems and the focus on criticalinfrastructure protection has causedserious concern in the future economicperspective of several countries. Third,two items appear to have the interestof all participants: first, that criticalinfrastructure protection is of paramountconcern (Chile, Argentina, Taiwan, etc.)and second, that nations have to do moreto control extremist’s use of the Web(as highlighted by Canada and Israel inparticular). Fourth, one nation, Russia,called for expanded definitions of the terminformation weapon and for expandeduse of the United Nations to control these“weapons.” Finally, Senegal highlightedthe wide gap in complex informationsystem development between nations.That country focuses mainly on thepsychological operations aspect of IOand not on computer network operationsas others are doing.FMSO thanks these authors for theiroutstanding support and for the thoughtand time put into these presentations.-- Mr. Timothy L. ThomasForeign Military Studies OfficeL to R: Mr. Tim Thomas, Dr. Todor Tagarev, COL Antoine Wardini, Dr.Georgii Pocheptsovy, MG Tschai Hui-chen, Dr. Vitaliy Tsygichko, BGMark O’Neil (CGSC Commandant), CDR Derek Moss, BG Sapan KumarChatterji, Dr. Javier Ulises Ortiz, Mr. Igor Carrasco Neira , Mr. Tomer Ben-Ari, MAJ James Nicholas. (US Army FMSO)3

The Information Revolution and InformationSecurity Problems in RussiaBy Dr. Vitaliy N.TsygichkoEditorial Abstract: Dr. Vitaliy Tsygichko states the global community must define “what is an information weapon” and mustdevelop an international convention to limit their use. This should be done under United Nations (UN) auspices in orderto prevent the proliferation of information weapons and effectively resist the threats of information warfare, informationterrorism, and information crime. Dr. Tsygichko lays out Russia’s position on this issue in the form of recommended elementsof an international convention.IntroductionThe late 20th and early 21st centurieswere marked by the next phaseof technological change, notably,the introduction of information andtelecommunications technologies (ITT)across nearly all vital activities—and thedevelopment of the World Wide Web.Information and telecommunicationsnetwork technologies and the fast spreadof local and global networks provide anew quality of information exchange,shape a new global information space,and impact all facets of public life:politics, economics, culture, internationalrelations, plus national and internationalsecurity.Changes in the world informationspace act as a global development factor,and determine the key directions ofsocial progress. Most important amongthese are:• Acceleration of scientific,technological, economic, social, andcultural developments thanks to greatervolume and speed of informationexchange irrespective of distance.• Opportunities for disseminationof new ideas and knowledge plusrapid proliferation of scientific andtechnological achievements.• Creation of a basis for the elaborationand spread of a new scientific andphilosophical paradigm for the 21stcentury based on understanding themany facets of the world and on therealization of humankind’s commonglobal problems.• Intensification of global integrationtrends, in particular in economic, political,information, technological, educational,cultural, and other areas.• Creation of premises for thedevelopment and introduction of newforms and methods of ensuring global,regional, and national security.• Progress in the areas of political,economic, production, military control,and international relations.Insignia of the Russian FederationArmed Forces. (Wikimedia)At the same time, the worldcommunity’s “computerization” breedsa whole set of negative geopoliticalimplications. First comes polarization ofthe world (resulting in the widening of thegap between rich and poor and betweentechnologically backward and advancedcountries) and the realization of a growingnumber of marginal countries alongthe roadside developing civilization.These countries are the main source ofinstability for current and future conflictsincluding those of a global character.Thus, the information revolution notonly accelerates civilization’s progress,but gives rise to new national, regional,and global security threats—primarilyterrorism.The Information Revolution inMilitary AffairsNew IT changes are most radicalin the military. Recent developmentsclearly point to the fact that militarypower still remains the key argumentbehind global and regional policies.Moreover, the significance of militaryforce keeps increasing. After the ColdWar the world entered a period ofregional wars and political instabilityas the number of large-scale militaryoperations of a global, regional, andnational character increased sharply.Attempts to curb nuclear proliferationfailed. Under these circumstances,the US—the recognized leader of theWestern world—and their allies set outto cope with these security challengesand defend their national and groupinterests by establishing and maintaininga “new world order” based largely onthreatening the direct use of militaryforce. This US implements this strategyprimarily by building up military power,through reorganization of the armedforces in line with the tasks and supplyissues associated with a new generationof arms. All of these make wide use ofnew information technologies. DesertStorm operations, actions in the formerYugoslavia, and the current war in Iraq,illustrate this strategy in practice.The wide introduction of newinformation technologies greatlyi n c r e a s e s c o m b a t c a p a b i l i t i e sof conventional arms and defenserelatedtechnologies. Informationtechnologies foster qualitative changesin reconnaissance and communication,4 Special Edition 2008

will be quite different, when theywill no doubt make sacrifices for thesake of retaining their sovereigntyand independence. But the currentgeopolitical situation is such thatthese nations/alliances dominatethe world in economic, political,and military respects, and they arefacing no direct military threat.Today’s terrorist threat is quite real,and the West may accept certainsacrifices while fighting it. As civilsociety gets entrenched, it becomesmore difficult to use military forcein situations not threatening thestate’s existence. So, as far asadvanced democratic nations areconcerned, it is the civilizationfactor—the level of admissiblecasualties in handling foreign policyproblems by military means—that isattaining ever-larger significance. Inrecent decades, experience gainedin military conflicts of a different scalein reveals the level of admissible lossesamounts today to only scores of humanlives. This becomes one of the majorfactors restraining these nations fromuse of military force.This factor manifested itself mostfully in the still smoldering Balkanscrisis. Military-political implicationsof the former Yugoslavia conflict madeit necessary to radically revise manystrategic assessments linked to the use offorce in local conflicts. Notably, NATOoperations in Yugoslavia deadlockedin mid-May 1999, with the allianceon the brink of a split over two keyissues: continuation of bombing; and thepossibility of a land operation. NATO airoperations failed to produce the desiredresults, and the Yugoslav army retainedmost of its combat capability. It wasprepared to put up heavy resistanceagainst NATO use of land forces incase of a ground invasion. Aerialbombing—carefully targeted as it maybe—inevitably resulted in civiliancasualties which sharply undermined theoperational support of European publicopinion. In fact, Greece was against themilitary operation, and the Italian andGerman governments faced problemswithin their respective parliaments.Even under threat of the alliance’sThe Russian Federation. (Univ. of Texas)disintegration, public humiliation, andin effect, revision of the outcome of theCold War, NATO was unprepared for aground operation. Such is the influence ofthe civilization factor. Though within theboundaries of the European “province,”NATO operations demonstrated theimpossibility of realizing military power,even in a small military conflict.The civilization factor is alsobehind the deadlock in Iraq, whichis experiencing a civil war with noprospects for an end in sight, despite thepresence of a big foreign contingent andattempts to regenerate the Iraqi Army.Deaths of Western alliance soldiers andIraqi civilians keep mounting, reaching alevel where public opinions in Coalitioncountries are more and more persistentlyurging to pull their units out of Iraq.This in spite of the fact it may lead toyet another victory of Islamic radicalsover the civilized world, and to a furtherescalation of their activities in otherregions, including Russia.In the rest of the world, outsidethe club of developed nations, thecivilization factor does not yet playa significant role. Regional militaryconflicts of a different scale and characterdo not generally take the value of humanlife into consideration. The 1980s Iran-Iraq war, practically all wars in Africa,the civil war in Afghanistan, the China-Vietnam conflict, the armed struggle ofKurds for independence from Turkey,—and other military conflicts associatedwith the huge loss of human life—areall examples.Disregard for human life isspecifically characteristic of Islamicextremism, where principles of selfsacrificein the struggle with “infidels”provide terrorists with huge advantagesin their war against Western civilization.The latter is incapable—by its verynature—of sacrificing its citizens, andanswer terror with terror. Effectivecounterterrorism is possible only throughjoint efforts on a global scale. The entireworld community must coordinate itsanti-terrorist activities, to include thosein the area of information terrorism.Information TerrorismAs an integral part of technologicalterrorism, the spread of information orcybernetic terrorism poses a seriousglobal threat. Though this type ofcriminal activity is not yet a widespread,practical terrorist activity, there is a ratherhigh near term danger. Terrorists makeuse of the civilized world’s openness forattaining their ends. In the past, it wasmore difficult to arrange and executeterrorist acts because of the associated6 Special Edition 2008

Some groups attempted to combinethe two approaches, such as thesuggestion to call means of informationinfrastructure destruction which use ITT“information weapons.” However, suchcombined approaches fail to alleviateuncertainties in identifying informationweapons.According to these approaches,only software designed exclusively fordisrupting information infrastructure(viruses, etc.) can be unconditionallycalled information weapons. All othermodern means of armed struggleincorporating ITT are multi-purpose,designed not only for destroyinginformation infrastructure but also forother combat missions. These meansdiffer from past generation weapons giventheir higher selectivity and accuracy.They are in a sense “humane” weapons,and are not classified as weapons of massdestruction.Countries possessing sophisticatedw e a p o n s , r e c o n n a i s s a n c e ,communication, navigation, and controlbased on the wide-scale application ofITT, have a decisive military advantage.Naturally, such countries will neverbecome parties to any agreementslimiting this advantage. The currentUS stance clearly illustrates this thesis;this nation bluntly refuses to negotiateon issues associated with informationweapons, and resists such discussionsin the UN Disarmament Commission.The US is only prepared to considerinformation terrorism and informationcrime-related issues.However, Russia would liketo know if it is possible to developcriteria for identification of informationweapons (apart from software) that areacceptable to all negotiating parties.Could information security problemcriteria only limit multi-purpose weaponsystems used against civilian informationinfrastructure projects, instead of banningthem? This raises the question ofwhether the very issue of banning orlimiting manufacture, proliferation, anduse of information weapons is feasibleat all.Such negotiations may largelyconcern only single-purpose weaponsdesigned for affecting the informationinfrastructure components (weaponsbased on program codes such as differenttypes of viruses and their means ofdelivery). However, the universality,secrecy, surprise application, possiblewide-scale trans-border utilization,efficiency, and high effectiveness notonly make such weapons an extremelydangerous means of destruction, butmay significantly hamper installationof a relevant international controlsystem. Further, the overwhelmingmajority of modern ITT—usablefor military, terrorist, and criminalends—are developed in civilian sectors,hence control of their development andproliferation is highly difficult.At the same time, the threat ofinformation weapons is real for us all,especially developed nations wherethe complex information infrastructuresupports all vital activities. We arewitnessing a situation where onlyconcerted international communityefforts can lower the threat. Today,identifying and agreeing on a list ofkey critical information systems (bothpublic and private), whose functions arecritically important for ensuring vitalactivities plus international security,is a necessity. Identification of thisclass of information systems will makeit possible to develop more effectiveprotection measures, including the rightto take retaliatory measures. This willalso permit elaboration of internationalemergency threat response mechanisms,as an IW attack will likely affect thenational security of various countries.Real steps toward pooling globalinformation security efforts wouldseem to be found through internationalelaboration and endorsement ofa convention (treaty) providing thefollowing:• Renunciation of informationwarfare and the development and useof information weapons designed forthe destruction of the informationinfrastructure, including arms based onprogrammed codes• Harmonization of nationallaws governing information securitycounteractions;• Elaboration of legal, organizational,economic, military, technological,and other international measures, plusmechanisms for resolving conflictsin the information security area, tocounter information warfare, informationterrorism, and information crime;• Development of mechanisms forparties-to-convention interaction incollectively countering informationsecurity threats. This would involve thepermanent exchange of situation reviews,information on potential adversaries, andemergencies associated with informationinfrastructures, all with a view todesigning adequate countermeasures;• Compiling a list of criticallyimportant national informationinfrastructure projects, whose destructionmay lead to large-scale man-madedisasters and casualties;• International laws for protectionof critical information infrastructureprojects, with attacks on them consideredas a crime against humanity;• Development of convention-relatedinternational control and informationsecurity monitoring systems;• Accountability of conventionviolators.In order to prevent a single countryor group of countries from unfair oradvantageous use of the conventionprovisions, it would be reasonable toadopt declarations to refrain from:• Actions leading to dominance andcontrol within information space;• Denying access to the mostsophisticated information technologies,(to counter technological dependence incomputerization that could lead to thedetriment of other states).S u c h d e c l a r a t i o n s w o u l dd i s p e l d o u b t s i n d e v e l o p i n gcountries as to the non-discriminatorynature of the convention.The first step toward elaborationand adoption of such an internationalinformation security convention could bethe establishment—within the frameworkof the UN—of an international team ofexperts to analyze the following:• Scientific elaboration of an agreedframe of reference, including fundamentalnotions such as “information warfare,”8 Special Edition 2008

“information terrorism,” “informationcrime,” “information weapons,” etc.;• Compilation of a list of threats toinformation security, their classification,and how an adversary might implementthem;• Development of informationweapon classification principles andidentification criteria;• Compilation of a list of criticalinformation infrastructure projects, anda description of possible effects of theirdisruption;• Compilation of a list of possibleinformation security countermeasures;• Key principles for the developmentand functioning of an international systemof ensuring information security;• Compilation of voluntaryobligations assumed by conventionsignatories, and possible measures to betaken against convention violators.The first of these international teamsof experts could develop a method forensuring international informationsecurity, which would determinesubsequent team efforts, and serve asa basis for the main provisions of aninformation security convention.The concept of ensuring internationalinformation security should cover:• A common perception of informationsecurity problems;• Uniform terminology and a frameof reference;• An evaluation of the currentinformation security situation;• An assessment of current andpotential threats to information security• The international community’sgoals and objectives with respect toensuring information security;• A description of problems associatedwith shaping an international informationsecurity legal control regime;• Measures for countering informationsecurity threats;• Potential information securityinteraction mechanisms;• Recommendations regardingd e v e l o p m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s a n dkey provisions for an internationalinformation security convention.ConclusionInternational elaboration of aninformation security convention couldbecome an important practical step indealing with the complex informationweapons issues. Creation of aninternational legal regime could go along way in governing the development,proliferation, and use of informationweapons; preventing information wars;and ensuring an effective counteractionto information terrorism and informationcrimes.Dr. V.N. Tsygichko, Colonel, Russian Army, Ret., is a full member of the RussianAcademy of Natural Sciences, and since 1985 the chief researcher at the Instituteof Systems Analysis of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ISA RAS). He is currently theRussian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expert on information security problems.Since 1967 he has served the Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, working onmathematical simulations of military operations. From 1988 - 1991 he headed an autonomousCenter for Research into National Security Problems. Dr. Tsygichko’s range of scientific interestsembraces methodological and systematic problems of modeling socio-economic processes;decision theory; applied systems analysis; the theory and methods of socio-economic forecasting;ensuring national security and strategic stability; information security problems; and geopoliticalproblems. He has authored over 200 papers and 6 books. Dr. Tsygichko is a founder of a newnational school of mathematical simulation and forecasting of complex social processes inmilitary and socio-economic areas. He has developed principles and methods of systems theoryapplication, introduced an information theory of statistically unreliable decisions, and developeda scenario approach to researching and forecasting socio-economic processes. Some of his papersinclude: “On Decision Making for Managers” (1992), “Information Challenges to National andInternational Security” (2001); and “Models as Part of the Strategic Military Decision MakingSystem in the USSR” (2005). He is a permanent author of journals such as Military Thought,Military Bulletin, Independent Military Review, and a number of foreign publications. He isa graduate of the Ryazan Artillery Military School, the Dzerzhinsky Military Academy, andholds a Doctor of Science (Engineering).9

An Overview of Information Operationsin the Indian ArmyBy Sapan Kumar Chatterji, Brigadier General, Indian ArmyEditorial Abstract: Brigadier General Chatterji believes India’s IO methods differ only slightly from those used by manyWestern nations. Such distinctions include methods such as economic information warfare, in which one nation couldstrangle another’s access to external data, thereby removing the benefits associated with exchange of information and therebycrippling the economy. He believes India has other independent initiatives that have expanded the overall meaning and useof IO, including the topic of sub conventional operations.Information operations (IO), as aconcept, are as old as man’s questfor warfare and his dependence oninformation. However, its role hasincreased tremendously due to theexceptional growth in technology overthe past few decades. Indian mythologycirca 5000 BC is replete with examplesof the innovative and effective use ofinformation warfare as a war winningeffort. The announcement of the death ofAshwathama amidst the beating of drums(jamming), and various other tacticsof Lord Krishna to gain informationsuperiority, are just a few of the numerousepic examples.Today, the importance of IOduring recent conflicts and the ongoingcounter-terrorism operations in Jammu& Kashmir [Indian provinces] haveundisputedly created a new dimensionof battle. IO has become the fifthdimension of warfare. This articlecovers the concept of informationwarfare in the Indian Army, as well ascertain counterinsurgency initiativesIndia has taken in the past few years.The discussion covers: the objective andprinciples of information warfare; theterminology of information warfare; theforms of IW; the necessity to deny use ofthe Internet to terrorists; and the role ofinformation warfare in sub-conventionaloperations.Objectives/Principles of IWIW is utilized to achieve all or anyof the following objectives:• Develop and maintain a comprehensiveinformation base of an adversary’scapabilities, and forecast their likelyactions.• Deny information about one’s ownand other friendly forces, and denyinformation about operations conductedagainst enemies and adversaries.• Influence perceptions, plans, actions,and the will of adversaries to opposeour own/friendly forces by the use ofoffensive IW.• Influence noncombatant and neutralorganizations to support friendlymissions, or at least not resist friendlyactivities.• Protect friendly decision makingprocesses, information, and informationsystems.• Degrade adversaries’ informationsystems.IW is the result of competition broughtabout by the convergence of a numberof evolving technologies, includingimaging, remote sensing, precisionguided munitions, stealth, directedenergy weapons, and above all digitalcommunications & computer networks.During conflict, these technologies arein direct confrontation.TerminologyTerms used here include:• Information Operation (IO) - Actionstaken to affect adversary information andinformation systems, while defendingone’s own information and informationsystems;• Information warfare (IW) - Actiontaken during all forms of conflict, toachieve information superiority overthe adversary by adversely affecting hisinformation and information systemswhile protecting one’s own informationand information systems;• Information Assurance - Informationoperations that protect and defendinformation and information systemsby ensuring their availability, integrity,authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.This includes providingprotection, detection, and reactioncapabilities;• Information Superiority - A stateachieved when a competitive advantageis derived from the ability to exploit asuperior information position.Forms of IWIW is not a distinct type of warfarebut exists in different forms. IW can beapplied at every level of war, across allphases of an operation, and encompassesthe entire range of military operations.The Indian Army defines seven formsof IW:• Command & Control Warfare(C2W)• Electronic Warfare (EW)• Cyber Warfare (Cyber W)• Network Centric Warfare ( NCW)• Intelligence Based Warfare (IBW)• Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR)• Economic Information Warfare(EIW)C2WC2W implements informationwarfare on the battlefield, and integratesit with physical destruction. Itsobjective is to decapitate the enemy’scommand structure from the body offorces. C2W aims to influence, denyinformation, degrade, or destroy enemyC2 capabilities, while protecting one’sown C2 systems against such actions.C2W is the war fighting application ofIW in military operations.The foundation of C2Wlies in efficient command, control,communications, and computer (C4)systems, coupled with seamlessinformation and intelligence support.C2W consists of the following:10 Special Edition 2008

• OPSEC - A process of identifyingcritical information and one’s ownactions that can be observed by enemyintelligence systems, determiningindicators an enemy could interpretto derive critical information on one’sown forces; and selecting and executingmeasures that eliminate the vulnerabilitiesof one’s actions to enemy exploitation;• Military Deception - Actionsexecuted to mislead enemy commandersas to one’s capabilities, intentions, andoperations;• Psychological Operations - Thepurpose of PSYOP is to induce enemyattitudes and behavior favorably to one’sobjectives;• EW - Military action involving theuse of the electromagnetic and directedenergy spectrums in order to control theelectromagnetic spectrum;• Physical Destruction - Theapplication of combat power todestroy or neutralize hostile C2targets.EWEW is a set of militaryactions taken to deny the use ofthe electromagnetic spectrum tohostile forces while retaining theability to use it. The endeavor isto deny, degrade, delay, or disruptinformation in order to create afalse picture so that incorrect actionresults. Major components of EW:• Electronic Support Measures(ESM)• Electronic Counter Measures(ECM)• Electronic Counter-CounterMeasures (ECCM)Cyber WarfareCyber warfare entails techniques todestroy, degrade, exploit, or compromisethe enemy’s computer based systems—including attacks on computer networks.In contrast to physical combat, theseattacks exploit known lapses in a systemssecurity structure. Cyber warfareincludes the following actions:• Techniques to destroy, degrade,exploit, or compromise the enemy’scomputer based systems;• Attacks on computer networks;• Hacking/breaking into computernetworks to include defacing websites;• Intercepting and monitoringclassified information on networks,corrupting and manipulating stored data,and injecting viruses likely to causeirreparable losses;• Cyber security, includingencryption.Network Centric Warfare (NCW)NCW focuses on the combat powerthat can be generated from the effectivelinking or networking of war fightingmachinery/organizations. The basicelements necessary to generate therequired shared battle space awareness toachieve the Commander’s intent are:Indian soldiers raise their national colors.(MOD India)• A virtual sensor or “surveillance”grid that would provide a “grid ofcapabilities” overlaying the battle spaceinstead of a series of independent singlesensors;• A communications grid that wouldleverage the strength of the worldwidetelecommunications infrastructure. Thiswould enable communications to beconsidered as virtual grids overlayingthe tactical, operational, and strategicareas;•An abstract grid of weapons or“tactical grid” available to commanders,sorted by suitability and availabilityagainst a hostile order of battle.Intelligence Based Warfare (IBW)IBW occurs when intelligence is feddirectly into operations, instead of beingused as input for overall command andcontrol. As sensors grow more accurateand reliable, proliferate in type andnumber, and as they become capableof feeding fire control systems in realtimeand near-real-time, the task ofdeveloping, maintaining, and exploitingsystems that sense the battlefield, assessits composition, and send results toshooters assumes greater importance fortomorrows militaries.IBW is about conducting warfarein a transparent battlefield environment.However, while increasing thetransparency for one’s own functioning,an important consideration shouldbe to decrease it for the enemy. Theneed is to create an asymmetryin the level of transparency orsituational awareness, in relationto the enemy.Psychological WarfareP s y c h o l o g i c a l Wa r f a r eencompasses the use of informationto influence the human mind. It isalso defined as actions carried outduring peace, crisis, or wartimesituations, so as to influence theattitudes and behavior of enemy,friendly, or neutral audiences,towards fulfillment of political andmilitary objectives.Psychological operations canbe used over the entire supportspectrum of military operations,wherein all agencies work in synergyto achieve the desired end state. Theaims of psychological operations froma military point of view are:• Create of doubt, dissidence, anddissatisfaction within the ranks andthereby lowering the morale and reducingthe efficiency of adversary forces;• Reinforce the feeling of friendlytarget audiences and influence opinionmakers;• Gain support and cooperation ofuncommitted or undecided audiences;• Help achieve conflict prevention,resolution, and achieve a desired endstate.11

Psychological operations aredivided into four distinct but overlappingcategories:• Strategic Psychological Operations- This is PSYOP at the national level,conducted predominately outside themilitary arena. It utilizes all nationalassets and is directed at all types ofaudiences. Objectives are long term. Theprimary aim is to reduce the war makingcapability of the adversary;• Operational PsychologicalOperations - This type is conductedduring both war and peace time inthe operational area to promote theoperational commanders aims andobjectives. These operations are launchedin consonance with military operations,throughout the military operationalarea. All assets in the operational areaare utilized;• Tactical Psychological Operations- These are conducted in the tacticalarena, in consonance with tacticalmissions and objectives;• Counter Psychological Operations- The aim of this type of PSYOP isto safeguard one’s own forces andfriendly population from an adversary’spsychological operations. One mustsimultaneously carry out counterpsychological operations, identifying anadversary’s broad pattern of operations, toinclude the technical means and mediumof dissemination. Countermeasures arethen instituted, including informing theaudience about the adversary’s maliciousagenda.The most popular non-militaryand military mediums used for thedissemination of psychologicaloperations are print, television, radio, andcyber. Print is one of the most effectiveand widely used media, which has beenused extensively in all psychologicalcampaigns to target educated targetaudiences. Newspaper, magazines,leaflets, posters, pamphlets, and booksare associated with this medium.Television, with its ever-increasingpopularity, is one of the most powerful,flexible, and immediate means ofinfluence. It has become a very importantpsychological tool, as effectivelydemonstrated during the Gulf Wars andthe 1999 Kargil operations. Televisionwas an extensive part of the psychologicalcampaign, and instrumental in achievingthe final military objective.Radio has been used as an importantpsychological operations tool sinceWorld War I, due to its reach andcapability to affect target audiences.It can penetrate inaccessible areas totarget insurgents, enemy soldiers, and atthe same time help in the psychologicalconditioning of one’s own forces.Finally, there is the cyber dimension.The Internet has become a very importantmedia tool. The numbers of Internetusers are increasing rapidly, and intime will be one of the most powerfulmeans of dissemination for one’s ownpsychological operations. At the sametime, this medium is also available toIndian Armed Forces Emblem(Wikipedia.org)adversaries and terrorists, hence there isa need to monitor and counter maliciouspropaganda.Economic Information WarfareThis form of warfare is onlyconducted at the national level, asa combination of IW and economicwarfare. It can also be understood as avariant of an economic blockade, whereinthe well being of societies will be affectedby information flows of economic data,instead of the flow of material suppliesas they are today. In this form of warfarenations would strangle another nation’saccess to external data, removing thebenefits associated with the exchangeof information, and thereby crippling theeconomy. Nations would also strugglewith one another to dominate strategiceconomic industries.Denying the Internet toTerroristsWith terrorists using cyberspaceto communicate and coordinate theiractivities, denying them this medium iscertainly an important issue. However,there are a large number of factors thatimpede nations from undertaking seriousand immediate steps, since these couldeasily violate individual privacy—andaffect the performance of knowledgebasedindustries.Monitoring of DataIt is impossible to monitor everybyte transaction on the Internet becausethe volumes are simply too huge. Unlessexplicitly warranted, democracies shouldnot resort to monitoring. However, mostnations need to consider or implementselective monitoring. This is achievablethrough liaising with Internet serviceproviders on explicit state orders. Suchmonitoring can be done at gatewaysand routers, or the “last mile” stubs(i.e. switches / routers) where specificintelligence is available.Who to monitor, where to filter, orwhich switch/router to monitor can onlybe determined through hard intelligence.Therefore, it is extremely important toestablish coordination between variousintelligence agencies for this specificpurpose. Methods include using certainkeywords for the purpose of filtering/identifying intelligence data.Cyberspace monitoring can reaprich dividends if a state obtains hardintelligence. Further, the threat arisingfrom cyberspace needs analysis andplanning. For this purpose, RiskMitigation Plan / Disaster RecoveryPlan (DRP) development are the bestrecommendations. At the national levelsuch a contingency plan helps ensure thatshould critical resources be damaged,emergency measures and services arein place. India needs to put the DRP inaction, and exercise it periodically.12 Special Edition 2008

Cyber Laws Dealing with Mail /Blog / Portal Service ProvidersCommunications between terroristswould usually take place throughstandard mail portals, chat rooms, etc.States need laws need to enact andduly amalgamate international laws, toprovide understanding and cooperation,so that should a nation request transactiondetails or trace back details for any user,ISPs will provide answers. Such actionsmust be transparent through internationalboundaries, based on the need to fightthis menace jointly at the internationallevel. In addition, since terrorists usethe Internet for recruitment throughmisinformation, some of the steps wecould take in this direction are:• Exchange information pertainingto websites, blogs, chat rooms, etc.between nations that might containoffensive material;• Block such websites in our nationalinterest;• Host websites (as a part ofPsychological Operations) containingactual, factual information that mightbe used to influence, and sway awaypotential targets, or from embracingterror activities;• Track down offensive websites andclose them if hosted in our countries.An international treaty of this kind,enacted and enforced, can help ensurewe deny terrorists space for hostingsuch sites.Cyber PolicingTo detect and annihilate the terrorists’Internet attack planning and coordinatingmedium, we need to develop CyberPolicing Organizations. Hard intelligencemust be gathered from cyberspace toprovide enough clues to allow for thetracking of criminals and terrorists. Thecapabilities to handle multiple protocols,encrypted algorithms, code breaking, andso on should be incorporated into ourmonitoring agencies.Building a Cyber ForensicCapabilityIndia needs to establish a NetworkCyber Forensic capability to enable traceIndia in its south Asian context. (Wikimedia)back of messages, attacks, and othermalicious activities. The internationalcommunity needs to develop IT lawsthat support state sponsored cyberforensics, not only for the purpose oftracking down terrorists, but for use aslegal exhibits in a court of law. PC-basedforensics designed for data recovery canhelp to wean out intelligence capturedfrom terrorists. Similarly, India needs tocompile a cryptology analysis capability,so we can crack encrypted traffic andbreak passwords. This requires longterm government-sponsored initiatives,say at academic institutes or at researchinstitutions. However, this too is aexpensive and longer range activity.Sub Conventional OperationsSub conventional warfare is ageneric term encompassing all armedconflicts above the level of peacefulcoexistence amongst states, and belowthe threshold of war. This includesmilitancy, insurgency, proxy war, andterrorism when employed as a means in aninsurrectionist movement, or undertakenindependently. Border skirmishesalso fall within this category. Subconventional warfare entails protractedstruggle. It could also be characterizedby asymmetry of force levels betweenregular forces and irregulars, wherein theforce applied and the violence generateddepends on the modus operandi ofthe weaker side—and the laws of theland which bind the actions of theArmed Forces. For this discussion we’llconsider counterterrorist operations,and public information and perceptionbuilding operations.Counter Terrorist OperationsInformation operations in the contextof the sub conventional spectrum addressthe following:• Countering adverse effects ofcounterterrorist (CT) operations;• Supporting the goals and operationsof one’s own forces;• Defeating malicious propaganda;• Eroding the terrorists’ supportbase;• Helping justify one’s ownoperations and projecting the “humanface” of the Armed forces13

information installations, and equipment,along with the overall planning forand integration of communicationsresources. We will strengthen integrationof the operational environment andplatforms for communications andinformation systems. We will construct ajoint operations communications systemfeaturing operational compatibility,with the goal of integrating the differentmilitary services and joint warfarenetworks.(4) Integrating command, control,c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , i n f o r m a t i o n ,intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance systems: As a means ofexploiting Taiwan’s new generation offighting power, the nation is concentratingits efforts on construction of an integratedcommand, control, communications,information, intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance system (C4ISR) tolink up the joint operations command andcontrol system with weapons platforms.This will enable prompt synchronizedexchange of intelligence and information,improve transparency on the battlefield,eliminate the fog of battle, and initiate thebuildup of an instantaneous commandand control system which can see, hear,and command. This will be a key goalin establishing information superiorityin Taiwan and exploiting the nation’sinformation operations capabilities.(5) Strengthening electronic warfareoperations capabilities: In response tofuture forms of war and the demandfor joint operations, Taiwan is puttingall of its efforts into reorganizationof defensive equipment for electronicwarfare. This includes EW combatcapabilities, and frequency spectrummanagement capabilities for bothattacking and defending. We mustensure communications discipline andinformation security protection as ameans of enhancing IO combat power.Guided by these policies, Taiwan willformulate a three-phase developmentalplan for information warfare:(1) First phase: Establish informationresearch organizations and formulateinformation warfare educationalprograms. Plan for the buildup ofinfrastructure for national defenseinformation. Draw up an outline forinformation warfare.(2) Second phase: Build up theinfrastructure for national defenseinformation and set up an informationstrategy research center. Integrateresources at the Chung-shan Instituteof Science and Technology to researchand develop IW technology. Establishan information warfare research unitat National Defense University and setup an information warfare team andcommand mechanism.(3) Third phase: Integrate nationalresources and finish planning for amobilization mechanism for informationwarfare. Concentrate informationcombat power in the military, and supportTaiwan-Penghu defensive operations.The Evolution of an InformationSecurity Strategy in TaiwanThe Executive Yuan [Republic ofChina executive branch of government]passed the “National Communicationand Information Infrastructure SecurityMechanism Plan” in January 2001, andestablished the National Informationand Communication Security TaskForce (organizational structure givenin Figure 1) as a means of aggressivelypromoting its national informationand communications security policies.The group integrates, coordinates, andeffectively utilizes the resources ofrelevant government agencies, in orderto accelerate construction of a nationalsecurity environment and enhancenational competitiveness. In addition,these act establish of an informationsecurity protection system, providefor inspection of information securitycontingency capabilities, and the establisha sound developmental environment forinformation security. The followingsummary of current information andcommunications security actions showshow Taiwan is meeting swift-growingtrends in science and technology, as wellas dealing with developments on bothsides of the Taiwan Strait:1. Promotion of Awareness ofInformation and CommunicationsSecurity, Personnel Training,and International Collaboration.Considering international developmentsand the current domestic environment,p r o m o t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n a n dcommunications security awareness (andtraining personnel) joins internationalcollaboration as a necessary futuretrend. Strengthening participationin international information securityactivities will help establish regionaland global joint defense mechanisms forinformation security. Working togetherto attack network crime and aggressivelypromoting global information securityare especially important.2. Aggressive Promotion ofInformation and CommunicationsSecurity Operations for Key NationalInfrastructure Institutions. Electronicinformation and technologies affordus the ability to closely link criticalinternal infrastructure and administrationin the Taiwanese government,including security, financial services,energy facilities, the water supply,telecommunications, postal services,transportation, shipping, medical care,and other important national economicand security activities. This exposesmore potential weak points, presentingopportunities to those with maliciousintent, or those not be averse to attackingTaiwan with armed force. As such, Taiwanmust build on the foundation of existingnational information and communicationssecurity efforts by strengthening criticalnational infrastructure and institutions.This will include the establishment ofinformation security notifications andcontingency mechanisms, informationsharing mechanisms, establishinginformation security technology andinspection service teams, providingtechnology and inspection services,managing the critical infrastructurebuildup of information security systems,promoting widespread security educationand training, and promoting informationsecurity management system verification.This will be effective in providing thebest security safeguards during the buildupof infrastructure3. Widespread Applicationof Wireless Networking and theFlourishing Development of ISPProviders. Wireless communicationshave developed rapidly ever since thediscovery of electromagnetic waves at theend of the nineteenth century. Wirelesscommunications are an inescapable part17

Figure 2. Structural organization of the National Information and Communications Security Contingency Center(National Information and Communication Secuirity Task Force, Taiwan)terrorism, we need to understand howterrorists make use of information toachieve their goals:7. Methods of InformationWarfare Used by Terrorists. Only byunderstanding the IW methods availableto terrorists, and knowing the e nemyas you know yourself, can we achievevictory. Terrorist tactics are mostlysimilar to those used by the averagecomputer criminal, but there are notabledifferences:(1) Most computer criminalswill attempt to erase their tracks aftercommitting crimes, so that they canescape scot-free. By contrast, if theterrorist’s objective is shock effect, hewill typically attempt to create as largea public impact as possible when heparalyzes a system;(2) Most computer criminals arein it for their own pecuniary benefit.Alternately, terrorist attackers typicallyconsider themselves to be righteous,and very few act for pecuniary benefitfor fear of getting involved in disputes.Nevertheless, terrorists often make useof networks to launder money;(3) Unless they are engaged inretribution, very few computer criminalsaim to destroy computers and othersupport equipment. Informationterrorists may attack and destroy physicalequipment.8. Methods of Information TerrorAttacks. Having reviewed the differingmodes of attack, one can imagine thatthe terrorists’ methods of attack wouldinclude the following:(1) Stealing confidential information:Terrorists make use of network attacks,social engineering, and human contactto steal important classified or sensitiveinformation;(2) Paralyzing systems: Terroristsmake use of malicious code such asviruses, Trojan horses, and worms. Theyalso paralyze systems, make informationdisappear, and engage in denial of serviceattacks;(3) Physical destruction: Terroristsengage in the sabotage, especiallygovernment information systems(military, economic, defense, diplomatic,etc.) as a means of paralyzing governmentoperations.9. The Contribution Taiwan CanMake in the Fight Against Terror.Once we understand terrorist informationwarfare tactics and methods, what kindof contribution can Taiwan make in thewar against terror using our existinginformation technology?(1) Taiwan’s legal efforts in the WarAgainst Terror have produced its Anti-Terror Activities Act;(2) Taiwan has formed anti-terrororganizational structure that combinesvarious national security systems andthe Executive Yuan;(3) Taiwan’s potential contributionsinclude:1. Taiwan has never had anyterrorist activity nor the conditions forits presence. However, terrorism as aform of organized crime crosses bordersto obtain funding. These criminalactivities include smuggling drugs,human trafficking, money laundering,and other inappropriate financialoperations. These are important securityissues for Taiwan. With ample evidenceof terrorist crimes, plus clues for trackingtheir activities, we could pursue thesecriminals. Taiwan could also establishcooperative mechanisms, and strengthenexisting ones, to help other countriesprevent terrorist activities.2. In the future, regional terroristgroups might wish to use Taiwan as agateway for their support or planningactivities, in order to strengthen theirdisruptive activities in other Asiancountries. Taiwan can effectivelyprevent terrorist elements from entering20 Special Edition 2008

and leaving the country by strengtheningits overall security control capabilities.Rigorous surveillance actions can showevidence of terrorist activities, andprovide early warning.10. Opportunities are TurningPoints. Taiwan ranked sixth among 64countries surveyed in the “IT IndustryCompetitiveness Index” released by theEconomist Intelligence Unit in 2007.However, Taiwan is first in the area ofIT labor productivity and third in thearea of environment for research. Thisillustrates Taiwan’s notable informationand network technology strengths.In his book The World is Flat,Thomas L. Friedman describes “the riseof Netscape and the dotcom boom thatled to a trillion dollar investment in fiberoptic cable; the emergence of commonsoftware platforms and open source codesoftware enabling global collaboration;and the rise of outsourcing, offshoring,supply chain planning, and insourcing(also known as insourcing where internalbusiness is taken on).” Friedman heldthat these flatteners converged in 2000and “created a flat world: a global,web-enabled platform for multipleforms of sharing knowledge and work,irrespective of time, distance, geography,and, increasingly, language.” This is whywe believe that even though the Internetworld is full of dangers, it containsopportunities and turning points.(1) OpportunitiesEven though every corner of theworld is different, due to geography,culture, religion, and economics, the riseof the Internet has shortened the gapsbetween people. Every second that theclock ticks, various types of informationspeed along fiber-optical cables andvia microwaves to every corner of theEarth. The concept of the global villagehas taken shape, so every country inthis new century has an opportunityfor collaboration. Taiwan holds animportant strategic position which ispivotal in the Asia-Pacific region. Wehave already constructed a ContingencyMechanism for National Informationand Communications Security, allowingour nation to share information, andcollaborate with any country in the areaof network security.(2) Turning PointsIn the future, the world will be highlyinformation-based. Rapid and instantinformation will be the key to survival.“The Earth is round, but the worldhas been flattened by the informationhighway.” Taiwan is situated withinthis torrent of information. Based on itsefforts and guided by the right policiesit will emerge as a major informationpower.1. We have excellent and indispensabletechnical human resources—we were thefirst to discover the method behind thezero-day attack.2. We are open and willing to shareour practical experience with friends.3. We never fail to do the rightthing.Taiwan can make use of theincredible reach of the Internet to makeits contributions in the eliminationof global extremism. The distancebetween countries has been shortened byinformation networks, and utilization ofthe Internet to eliminate terrorism willbe the turning point in the struggle forworld peace.ConclusionWorld trends are even harder tofathom now that we have entered the eraof information networks. Their gradualapplication throughout the world bringsa new kind of international influence. Atthe end of 1999, a United Nations appealrecommended the Internet be seen asan effective tool for global justice, andas the communal wealth of humanity.However, in the “New Economy” whereinformation technology and knowledgeinnovation are used to create value, is stillthe privilege of wealthy countries. Mostdeveloping nations are still “informationpoor, left behind by the “digital divide,”and may be cast further to the marginsof the global economy. The War onTerror is a struggle which never ceases,and nobody knows when the nextdisaster is going to happen. As such,we will rely upon government policy,buildup of network infrastructure, andimprovements to information securityto minimize damage—or even preventterrorist attacks from happening again.Future wars will tend to bemultifaceted. Rapid and instantinformation will be the key to overallvictory or defeat. Information warfareis a new pattern of conflict which hasdeveloped against the backdrop of thistrend. Recent terrorist incidents haveoccurred in major cities in severalcountries, turning terrorism into themajor focus of attention, and making itvery apparent that our anti-terror actionscannot be delayed.Major General Tschai “Jane” Hui-Chen currentlyserves as the Director, Information Assurance (IA) Division,Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Communications, Electronics,and Information (J6), Taiwan Ministry of National Defense. Sheis responsible for directing and overseeing the strategy, policy,and program development of MND’s information assurance andinformation warfare programs. Since 2000, she has served as theDeputy Director of the Information and Communications SecurityTechnology Center (ICST). While serving as the Director of theTraining Institute for the Joint Information Operations Command,she was also assigned to organize, equip, and operate the InformationWarfare Center (IWC), the first such IO task force in Taiwan. MGTschai holds a Ph.D in Computer and Information Science fromSyracuse University, New York.21

China’s Comprehensive IW-Strategy LinkBy Timothy L. ThomasEditorial Abstract: Mr. Thomas describes how China’s Internet reconnaissance capability is central of establishing the strategyof “winning victory before the first battle.” Associated actions include China’s focus on collecting technical parameters ofother systems from which Chinese specialists develop countermeasures. A review of current Chinese IO theory reinforcestheir preemptive cyber strategy policy.IntroductionInformation operations offer the PeoplesLiberation Army (PLA) a new vectorfor the Chinese military’s transformationfrom an industrial to a modern dayforce. Recent Chinese White Paperson national defense describe this vectoras the requirement to informationizethe armed forces. The 2006 WhitePaper, for example, states the RMA isdeveloping worldwide and, based oninformationization, military competitionis intensifying. This document addsthat informationization will be usedas the main criteria to measure thequalitative improvement of the PLA;that for China to build a strong defense,it must build informatized armed forcesand be capable of winning informatizedwars by the middle of the twenty-firstcentury; and that the PLA has builtvirtual laboratories, digital libraries,and digital campuses to support thetraining and teaching needed to field thisinformatized force.How IO Has Changed in Chinaover the Past Few YearsThe basic definition of informationoperations has evolved slowly overthe past ten years. Only two of scoresof definitions will be discussed here,albeit two proposed by very influentialpeople in the Chinese IO arena. In1999, IO specialist Yuan Banggenstated that information operations arespecific information warfare (IW)operations. He added that IW is thecore of informationized warfare,whereas information operations are themanifestation of information warfareon the battlefield; that IO meansinformation wars in the narrow sense,that is the military field; and that IOincludes integrated, high technologycountermeasures. According to Yuan,People’s Liberation Army flag.(Wikimedia)IO’s theoretical system is formedfrom two levels, basic and applied.Basic theories consist of conceptssuch as its organizational structure andtechnological equipment, command andcontrol for IO, and so on. He categorizesapplied theories into offensive IO anddefensive IO; strategic, operational,campaign, and tactical levels; and intopeacetime, wartime, and crisis-periodIO. IO’s two missions are preparationand implementation. Yuan notes thatprinciples are centralized command,multi-level power delegation, multidimensionalinspection and testing, timelydecision-making, and the integration ofmilitary and civilian actions with a focuson key links. Overall, Yuan states thatall activities of IO focus attention oncommand and control.A 2005 book, Study Guide forInformation Operations Theory, offersseveral definitions of IO, and these haveprogressed over time. Dai Qingmin,an IO specialist and former chief of aGeneral Staff Directorate, and his coworkersnote:At present there are three maindefinitions for information operations.The first is as follows: ‘Informationoperations refer to operations usedto gain and maintain control overinformation.’ This definition expandsthe domain of information operations,as there are quite a few ways to gainand maintain control over information.Second, ‘Information operations refer toa series of operational actions employedby two sides in a conflict in which theenemy’s information systems are usedor destroyed and one’s own informationsystems are protected as a means ofgaining the power to acquire, control,and use information.’ Third, ‘Informationoperations refer to a series of operationalactions undertaken to gain and maintaininformation superiority on the battlefieldor control over information. The twosides in a conflict use electronic warfareor computer network warfare to use ordestroy the information and informationnetworks of the enemy and protect one’sown information networks as a meansof acquiring, controlling, and usinginformation.Clearly, the targets of informationoperations are information itself,information systems, as well as peoples’cognition and beliefs. IO meansemployed include information (bothinformation media and informationcontent) and weapons and equipmentdedicated for attacks on informationsystems. Information operations involveboth attacking and defending.Dai and his co-workers added onemore definition of IO in this book. Thedescription lists the targets of IO and themeans employed, stating:Information operations are definedas a series of countermeasures employedby two sides in a conflict in whichinformation or weapons and equipmentcontrolled by information and dedicatedto the destruction of information systemsare used in order to influence and destroythe enemy’s information, informationsystems, and cognition and beliefs,along with preventing the influence anddestruction of one’s own information,22 Special Edition 2008

information systems, and cognitionand beliefs in the same manner by anenemy.C h i n a ’ s e m p h a s i s o ncountermeasures is a significant deviationfrom Western definitions. When the PRCcollects technical parameters of othersystems, they develop countermeasuresas a sort of asymmetric response. China’s2006 White Paper, when discussingarmy projects, noted informationcountermeasure units were one ofthree organizations requiring prioritydevelopment. The primary reasonbehind this force may be to construct IWcountermeasures.Neutralizing the Internet AgainstExtremismChina’s police are starting to usecartoon police characters on domesticInternet sites to warn usersagainst using illegal content.At the moment these friendlylooking male and female cartooncharacter alerts walk, bike, ordrive across the screen at halfhour intervals on 13 of China’smost popular portals. Accordingto the Beijing Public SecurityMinistry, these virtual policeare expected to populate allregistered websites in Chinain 2008.While these animationswarn users that someone iswatching, such warnings are a far cryfrom neutralizing an extremist’s use ofthe Internet. With 137 million usersat present, and an Internet populationexpected to surpass the US in two years,the challenge could be a stiff one. Thecommon tactic is to simply close downdomestic websites deemed extremist orsubversive or to intercept emails withwords like “Falun Gong” or the “DalaiLama.” Email services in China areobligated to hand over user data andcommunications to Chinese securityofficials if asked for such material,which is another way to help neutralizean extremist’s use of the Web.In order to stem the tide of Internetcrime, China reportedly increased thesize of its Internet police force in 2000to some 300,000 personnel. While thisfigure is difficult to comprehend, thesecrime fighters are part of the Ministry ofPublic Security and, thus, may have jobsother than fighting crime (espionage,etc.). The Internet police are mainlyresponsible for carrying out supervision,analyzing information content flowingthrough local communication systemsor the Internet, fighting computerviruses, cracking down on Internetcrimes, and stopping the spread of“harmful information.” It is the influenceof the latter, of—the extremists andnationalists—that China wants to limitinside its borders. However, verylittle has been written in China on theInternet war in Iraq, and the fight againstextremism worldwide.China wants to make this a jointeffort. Reserve, militia, PLA, andcivilian forces are conducting jointThe People’s Republic of China in its Asian context.(Wikimedia)operations against notional interveningIW forces. This integration is underwayin the form of a proposed a ‘cyber securityforce’ (CSF). Qu Yanwen, a securityspecialist, proposes a unit composed ofmembers of the PLA, the Ministries ofState Security and Public Security, andtechnical specialists. Local authoritiesstate Chinese political, economic, andmilitary security is in danger due to thenascent stage of development of China’snetworks. Weaknesses exist in financialsecurity; in defending against cyberattacks against information networks ofkey organizations and computer-basedfund raising operations and scams; ininformation control over data that canaffect the stability of public order; and inmilitary information security. Within thePLA, the Shijiazhuang Army CommandCollege, the Navy Command Academy,the Air Force Command Academy, andthe Second Artillery Corps CommandAcademy met in July 2007 to work outan overall joint teaching program forthe three armed forces. They are tryingto share information resources andexchange experiences via the Internet,among other issues.According to one report, arrestsand prosecutions for endangering statesecurity have risen sharply overall since11 September 2001. In the two-yearperiod ending 31 December 2002, morethan 1,600 people were prosecuted forendangering state security, most afterthe terror attacks on the US. Manyof those arrested and prosecuted hailfrom Xinjiang, which Chinese sourcescharacterize as an autonomous regionin the northwest of the country, that ishome to a large and restiveMuslim population. China’sgovernment has used thewar on terror to crack downon those seeking greaterautonomy, including thosewho do so by peacefulmeans.What we do know aboutthe domestic populationarrested for politicalcrimes is of interest. JohnKamm, President of theDui Hua Foundation (“duihua “means “dialogue” inMandarin Chinese, and is a non-profit,human rights organization), wrote thatabout one-quarter of those arrested arenon-Han Chinese, principally Tibetansand Uyghurs. Since China is more than90% Han, the number of non-Han arrestsis well out of proportion to the rest of thepopulation. Kamm writes that sentencesfor non-Han Chinese are typically longerthan those imposed on Han Chinese.With some candor, China’s governmentrecently released statistics on peoplearrested and prosecuted for endangeringstate security, the most serious politicaloffence in the criminal code. China’s topprosecutor, Han Zhubin, revealed thatmore than 3,400 people were arrestedfrom 1998 to 2002 for such crimes assubversion, incitement to subversion,espionage, and trafficking in state23

secrets. Kamm adds that “Internetdissidents” make up the fastest-growinggroup of political prisoners.China has been concerned aboutInternet political movement activitiessince at least 1996. In that year the EastTurkistan information Center (ETIC)was formed, operating out of Munich,Germany. This site now delivers newsto 114 countries in seven languages,and focuses on news, both positiveand negative, about the Uyghur cause.Calling Chinese Communists “fascistauthorities,” the website covers incidentsreportedly aimed at robbing the Uyghurculture of its ideological roots, via amassive reeducation campaign. In 2004ETIC also established a Uyghur InternetTV station.In response to these events, on 15December 2003 the BeijingXinhua news service reportedthat China’s Ministry of PublicSecurity identified the EastTurkistan Information Centeras a terrorist organization and itsdirector, Abudujelili Kalakash,as a terrorist. A week later,the East Turkistan InformationCenter offered to disband, if thecommunist state offered freedomof expression and Internet accessto Uyghur Muslim minorities.In 2005, a Beijing CommunistYouth newspaper, ZhongguoQingnian Bao, identified EastTurkistan terrorist forces as themain terrorist threat to China.The battle for control of the newshas not stopped. China reported on anincident in January 2007 and providedits version of a scuffle between thePLA and “ethnic militants.” ETIC’swebsite reported the conflict occurredin a different area than that reportedby Chinese TV, and that more PLAservicemen died than was reported byChinese authorities.What is Special About ChineseIO?The key to understanding theChinese approach to IO consists of twounique and noteworthy issues. The first isthe extent to which the Chinese integratestrategy with IO. The second relatedissue is the focus on countermeasuresand reconnaissance.Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi,editors of the popular Chinese book TheScience of Military Strategy, note that thePLA must be “guided by the principlesof military strategy in the new era tobring forth new ideas to push ahead theprinciples of strategic actions for localwar under high-tech conditions…”This strategy-IO or strategy-technologyintegration was also highlighted byother authors. Perhaps the most notablecomments were made by IW specialistsShen Weiguang and Dai Qingmin. Shen,the reputed father of information warfarein China, notes “The issue of informationand network security, which accompaniesthe development of informationization,and the rise and increasing prominencePeople’s Liberation Army colonel points the way.(Defense Link)of information warfare, the form ofwarfare that is invisible and non-violent,is an issue of technology, but above allelse it is an issue of strategy.”Major General Dai Qingmin, theformer head of the information warfaredirectorate of the Chinese General Staff,offered a similar statement about theimportance and probability of an IW/IO-strategic integration. He notes:Laying all one’s hopes on technologyis dangerous. The road to future lossesmay not be from a fall in technology,it may be primarily poor strategy. Inreality the informationization of theforms of warfare has opened up an evenbroader space for playing tricks andusing strategy and for using the indirectto gain the upper hand.According to Shen and Dai, evenconditions of technological superioritywill not allow for success in all cases, ifone overlooks strategy.IO provides the PLA with a newmeans for applying strategy, one thatenables a new information-based useof manipulation, deception, and soft(computer) destruction as much as hard(physical) destruction. Noted Chinesestrategist Li Bingyan offered threeobservations: first, that collecting toomuch information can be blinding andcan prohibit or stilt strategy; second, thatweak information technology nations cansuccessfully attack strong informationtechnology nations with the use ofstratagems; and third, that informationtechnology can serve strategy as aneffective deterrent and prevent war fromever breaking out (the Chinesethink the use of informationtechnology at the Dayton talksto end the war in the formerYugoslavia is a prime exampleof winning without fighting).These are direct examplesof how IO and strategy arebeing integrated into Chinesethinking.P e n g a n d Ya o o ff e rother strategy-IO paradigmsin The Science of MilitaryStrategy. They write aboutthe strategic maneuver aspectof strategy’s applied theory,and stating the struggle in theinformation field may lead to changesin strategic maneuver. In particular, a“strategic information operations forcemay become a new form of strategicmaneuver in future wars.” If such a typeof maneuver actually does develop, thenIO experts must also explore questionsin the applied theory arena. Will therebe cyberflanking, cyberpenetration, andother cyber activities? One would thinkso, based articles that have appeared inauthoritative Chinese military journals.The second special issue after thestrategy-IO link is China’s focus oncountermeasures and reconnaissance.By collecting technical parameters ofother systems, China can use them toconstruct countermeasures, as a sort ofasymmetric response.24 Special Edition 2008

The Chinese note that the USlaunched reconnaissance in the formof electronic warfare and intelligencewarfare more than six months before theFirst Gulf War began. Such US actionsare in line with Sun Tzu’s concept that“the clever combatant seeks battle afterthe victory has been won.” Chinesetheorists have certainly bought intothis concept of reconnaissance andintelligence warfare well before abattle begins. According to GeneralDai, China’s vision of future war firstinvolves information reconnaissance, tocollect technical parameters. This willensure victory before the first battle.Reconnaissance (consisting of electronicwarfare, radar, radio technology, andnetwork reconnaissance) fits perfectlywith Dai’s and Sun Tzu’s concepts andstratagem.Dai’s writings focus not only oncollecting technical parameters, specificproperties of information weaponsystems and electronic informationproducts, but also on information attacks.This implies that collecting parametersand performing reconnaissance are twoprerequisites for preemptive attacks.Computer network reconnaissance helpschoose which opportune moments, whichplaces, and which attack measures willresult in maximum success—if war everbreaks out. Peng and Yao seconded thisconcept, stating that IO is directly linkedto the gain or loss of the initiative in warand thus “priority should be given to theattack and combining the attack with thedefense.” Thus it appears informationtechnology has enhanced Chinesethinking with regard to preemption.Chinese military academics state thatthose who do not preempt lose theinitiative, in what may be a very shortlivedIO war.ConclusionCombatants in present day conflictsmay find it easier than at any othertime in history to obtain their wartimeobjectives through one campaign, orone battle in the IO age. The idea ofsudden attack has changed, especiallyif one side possesses high-technologyequipment and the other side onlylow-technology means, which allowsfor better reconnaissance and insertionof preemptive mechanisms (back doorsin computer programs, etc.). “Attack”doesn’t mean “surprise” in the oldsense, but rather that one side can’tcorrespondingly react if they’re awareof the enemy situation. You may knowwhere all of the forces are on the enemyside, yet your systems can’t responddue to preemptive computer measuresan enemy has taken in peacetime. Ifwar does break out, then preemptiveattacks focus on “striking the enemy’sinformation center of gravity andweakening the combat efficiency ofhis information systems and cyberizedweapons.” This allows one to weakenthe enemy’s information superiority andreduce his holistic combat efficiency.Perhaps the current emphasis ongaining the initiative, and on shortwars that are over quickly, are the mainreasons that Dai gives the impression thatpreemption is a necessity, noting:Actions such as intelligence warfare,psychological warfare, and campaigndeception in advance of combat seem tobe even more important to the unimpededimplementation of planning and ensuringwar. For this reason, information warfaremust be started in advance of othercombat actions before making war plansand while making war plans.In a sense, it is the special featuresof IO tactics and techniques that enablethe increased emphasis on cyber attacksmore than traditional ground, sea, or airwarfare. For example, a weaker forcecan inflict much damage on a superiorforce with a properly timed and preciselydefined asymmetric information attack.Such an offensive may be impossible bytraditional means. Multiple informationattack actions can be developed, theoffense considered as defense, andinformation barrier methods developed—by both strong and weak opponents.Attack tactics include informationdeterrence, information blockade,information power creation (electroniccamouflage, network deception, etc.),information contamination, informationharassment, nodal destruction, systemparalysis, and entity destruction.China’s specific understandingof the intersection of strategy andinformation technology, especially asit relates to conflict, is not based on awartime scenario in a practical sense;China lacks recent combat experience.However, from a theoretical perspectiveand use of IO techniques in peacetime,China has written extensively on theuse of information technology andpreemption. Based on the number ofattacks worldwide attributed to China,they have given much thought to theseissues, and apparently have some recentpractical experience.Timothy L. Thomas is a senior analyst at the ForeignMilitary Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.Mr. Thomas received a BS from West Point and an MA from theUniversity of Southern California. He was a US Army ForeignArea Officer who specialized in Soviet/Russian studies. Hismilitary assignments included serving as the Director of SovietStudies at the United States Army Russian Institute (USARI) inGarmisch, Germany; as an inspector of Soviet tactical operationsunder CSCE; and as a Brigade S-2 and company commander inthe 82nd Airborne Division. He is an adjunct professor at the USArmy’s Eurasian Institute; an adjunct lecturer at the USAF SpecialOperations School; and a member of two Russian organizations,the Academy of International Information, and the Academy ofNatural Sciences.25

Bulgaria: The Rise And Decline Of Bulgaria’sInterest In Information OperationsBy Dr. Todor TagarevEditorial Abstract: Dr. Todor Tagarev described Bulgaria’s need to build selective IO capabilities that assist in the conduct ofNATO’s effects-based operations. In particular he recommends Bulgaria should work to define generic units that are relativelyself-sustained and can bring useful capabilities to a multinational operation. Bulgaria is also exploring what specialties itcan contribute to the European Union with regard to critical infrastructure protection, where it hopes to remain competitiveand capable of providing useful contributions.Opinions expressed are solely thoseof the author and do not reflect officialpositions of the G.S. Rakovski Defenseand Staff College, the Ministry ofDefense of the Republic of Bulgaria, orany other governmental institution.IntroductionAt the beginning of the 1990s theBulgarian military found itself in a void.The country had no paradigm that wouldfacilitate the post-Cold war transition,and no one in the old or emergingleadership had experience in devisingnational security and defense policies.The armed forces enjoyed very highprestige in the eyes of the people, whowere—and still are—proud of Bulgaria’smilitary traditions.While a member of the WarsawPact, Bulgaria was part of a very highlycentralized system of force planning andconceptualization. The officer corpswas well trained and very efficient infollowing Warsaw Pact (i.e. Soviet)doctrine, operational concepts, andtactics, but had minor (if any) contributionto force planning and the developmentof innovative concepts of operations.Thus, Bulgaria lacked officers withexperience to generate doctrine, forcestructure, and concepts of operations tofit the requirements of the new securityenvironment. In addition, until theend of the 1990s there was no civilianexpertise on defense matters, neither inthe executive branch nor in parliament.Not surprisingly, from 1990 until 1998Bulgaria adhered to its “inherited” forcestructure, while its military organizationevolved primarily under the pressures ofrapidly declining defense budgets.In such a situation the instituteswithin the Ministry of Defense thatmay have otherwise been instrumentalin devising operational concepts,adequate to meet the changing threat,technological, and business environment,did not respond to the challenge. On thecontrary, research organizations wereBulgarian soldier raises his nationalcolors during a NATO exercise.(Defense Link)among the first to suffer from budget cutsresulting in a brain drain. Nevertheless,around the mid-1990s a few curiousBulgarian officers, on their own initiative,decided to study information warfare andinformation operations developmentsand were able to attract the attention ofthe senior military leadership. Based onthis, Bulgaria adopted a comprehensiveset of new doctrinal documents from1999 through 2002. The first part ofthis essay examines the respectivedevelopments and outlines the country’sunderstanding of information operationsand its component parts. The second partbriefly addresses Bulgaria’s approachto the neutralization of the extremist’suse of the Internet. The final part of theessay examines the need to incorporateinnovative operational thinking in theforce planning process, and explains thereasons behind the decline of Bulgaria’sinterest in information operations.The essay concludes with a reiterationof the necessity to build selectivecapabilities for conducting informationoperations as a component of the NATOEffects-Based Approach to Operations(EBAO) and related developmentswithin the European Security andDefense Policy—a necessity that maybe met through a more realistic policyand efficient capability management. Itis possible (and appropriate) to examineother component parts of informationoperations such as the security ofinformation and command and controlsystems (for the military) and criticalinformation infrastructure protectionmeasures for the civilian sector.Bulgaria’s View of IOThe impressive utilization ofadvanced communications, information,sensors, and navigation technologies bythe US military during the First Gulf War,1990-1991, allowed the US-led coalitionto achieve quick and decisive victoryover Iraq. This placed informationwarfare among the top research topicsfor defense establishments aroundthe world. But in Bulgaria, given the26 Special Edition 2008

overwhelming problems in dealingwith a Cold War force structure and sizeunder declining budgets, the officialdefense establishment was not able toreact properly.Fortunately, as early as 1992Bulgarian officers got the chance tostudy in Western military colleges, andrapid access to Internet sources providedinformation at previously unthinkableease and speed. The combination ofthese two factors, plus the process ofdemocratization of Bulgarian societyenhanced the opportunities for curiousindividuals to collect information,analyze, synthesize, and reach broadaudiences. Thus, in the mid-1990s, aventure of individual researchers withprofessional interests in military affairsand in particular the link betweenadvances in IT and warfare, culminatedin the publication of the book InformationAspects of Security.The authors of this book examineda series of issues: the relationshipbetween security and IT developments;conflicts related to the emergenceof an information society; the maintechnologies providing for a competitiveedge in information age conflicts; andmain issues in managing the informationenvironment. Of particular importancefor this essay is the examination ofinformation warfare—its principles,levels, domains, and components. Inthe book, Velizar Shalamanov and thisauthor define information warfare as: asystem of actions undertaken in orderto create information space, in whichone side has superior understanding anduse of strong and weak points in thepolitical, economic, military, social, andcultural domains of activity of a potentialenemy and its dependence on friendlysources of power, and at the same timedoes not allow effective enemy actions.The authors identified information asa distinct domain, powerful weapon,and lucrative target in the evolutionof conflict. They defined the term“information power” as the capacitycreated by advanced technologies,procedures, and organization. Further,they define the information campaignas the main tool, used in combinationwith traditional military means andapproaches, to achieve informationsuperiority, and distinguished two levelsof this campaign:• A strategic information campaignwhich ideally tried to achieve paralysisof the OODA-loop of the opponent;• Command and control warfarecampaign which supported strategicobjectives through effects against theability of the enemy to make timelyand effective decisions on the use of itsarmed forces.According to Shalamanov andTagarev, the operation for achievinginformation superiority has sixelements:1. Security of operations—not allowingthe enemy to receive adequate informationon us; includes communications security,computer security, emission control,etc.;2. Deception;3. Psychological operations;4. Electronic Warfare;5. Physical effects on enemy C4ISRsystems;6. Superior situational awarenessthrough the fusion of all-sourceintelligenceIn addition, the authors examinedthe offensive and defensive aspectsof information operations, the role ofthe media, and information aspects ofoperations other than war. Importantly,in a forward to that book GeneralMiho Mihov—at the time a three-starequivalent and Chief of Staff of the AirForce and later (1997-2002) Chief of theGeneral Staff of the Bulgarian ArmedForces—presented his views on the roleof information in modern conflict. Thefollowing is a brief summary of his mainpoints:• Warfare has moved out of traditionaldomains and into the informationdomain;• Information superiority is the meansthat may dissuade an opponent, postponeaggression, and even prevent a war;• Winning the information warpredefines the outcome of “classic”military activities;• A new balance must be foundbetween information power andfirepower;• The country has no alternative, butto prepare for information war.A series of articles by the InformationAspects of Security authors, in theBulgarian Ministry of Defense/BulgarianArmed Forces official theoreticalpublication Voenen Journal, raised IWsawareness among Bulgarian security anddefense experts. Further, it facilitatedthe debate on possible objectives in theutilization of advanced IT under newoperational concepts, and the balanceof priorities in the development of thearmed forces.In 1998, on the wave of risinginterest in the relationships amongsecurity, warfare, and technology, theauthors began publication of Information& Security: An International Journalwith the intention to cover “scientific,technical, and policy issues related tonational and international security in theInformation Age, C4ISR technologiesand systems, information operations,command and control warfare, andinformation assurance.” The journal’sstated objective is “to bridge the IT andthe security communities, presentingstate of the art, new findings, ideas, andneeds of one community versus the other,as well as to present the latest researchconducted ‘on the bridge’ between thetwo communities.”General Mihov—already Chiefof the General Staff of the BulgarianArmed Forces—contributed an articleto the Information & Security pilot issue,conceptualizing in the context of thereform of the Bulgarian Armed Forces,and examining information warfareon the strategic and operational levels.He further reasoned that informationoperations were turning into a mainsupporting operation, and in the future,would be a distinct operation of the armedforces, to be conducted jointly with othergovernmental and public organizations.Paraphrasing the definition proposed byShalamanov and Tagarev, General Mihovdefined the term information operationas: a system of actions for the creationof an information space, in which oneside has superiority in understanding andusing the strong and weak aspects in thepolitical, economic, military, ecological,social, and cultural areas of activity of27

a potential enemy and its dependenceon friendly sources of power, while atthe same time not allowing identicalactivities on its side.He saw the objective of theinformation operation as “changing theway of reasoning and decision makingof the enemy in the direction of ourinterests.” General Mihov defined theterm “information superiority” andlinked information operations with otheractivities of the armed forces.Coincidentally, all three Bulgarianauthors mentioned so far played keyroles in the development of the firstnational military doctrine: GeneralMihov as Chief of the General Staff;Dr. Shalamanov as Deputy Minister ofDefense for defense policy and planning;and this author as a civilian Directorfor Defense Planning in the Ministryof Defense. The Military Doctrine wasthe first official document treating theissue of information operations andother information aspects of security. Forexample, the doctrine lists “informationwar/warfare” among the modern risksto security (articles 9, 11), and statesthe military threat to the country maybe expressed, inter alia, via informationattacks of another state against ‘nationalstrategic systems’ (article 16). For the firsttime, it set achievement of informationsuperiority as a military task. Accordingto article 62, “the armed forces protectthe country through the application ofa military-strategic concept for defenseof the national territory, a struggle forinformation superiority, control of theair and sea space, and defense of athreatened theater of military activities.”Respectively, the doctrine defined asthe priorities in the [technological]modernization of the armed forces “theC4ISR, identification and navigation …systems, the means and technologiesto provide for interoperability with thearmed forces of NATO countries, andthe transition to an information society”(article 97).The Military Strategy—a followupdocument—reiterated many ofthe postulates of the militarydoctrine, including its Article 62.Additionally, it listed the “reliableprovision of information” among themain requirements towards the reformof the armed forces and defined the“strategic defensive operation” as a jointoperation of the country’s armed forcesthat includes, inter alia, informationoperations.Bulgaria produced a number ofadditional doctrinal documents between1999 and 2002. The 2001 JointOperations Doctrine shed further light onofficial views of information operations.For example, the title of Section 5 inthe chapter “Joint Operations in ArmedConflict” is “Information Operations”with the subtitle “Operations againstC4I systems.” It defined informationoperations as “a set of informationeffects, attacks, and battles, withcoordinated objectives, tasks, placeand time, conducted according to adistinct design and plan for solving thetasks of an information battle in thetheater of military activities or on anoperational direction.” It states that IOssupport strategic objectives through theirinfluence on the ability of an enemy tomake timely and effective decisions onthe use of its armed forces. The doctrinedefines two component parts of IO aswell as other realms:• Defensive—protecting theeffectiveness of our own C2 system;• Effecting – influencing, damaging,and destroying the enemy’s C2;• Other IO realms;• Security operations;• Disinformation (with a set ofmeasures on the strategic, operational,and tactical levels);• Psychological operations;• Electronic Warfare.Further, the doctrine designates theJ3 staff as responsible for planning andcoordinating the conduct of securityoperations, disinformation, psychologicaloperations, and operations againstthe enemy’s C2 systems, and the J6staff for organizing the protection ofinformation.The 2002 Air Force Doctrinedelineates between ‘subordinated’ and‘supporting’ operations, with specialoperations and operations against C2systems being part of the latter. Ascomponents of operations against C2systems it lists security operations,psychological operations, disinformation,and electronic warfare. It assigns theair force a number of tasks, includingcountering an enemy’s command andcontrol, aerial intelligence, and ‘specialactivities in the interest of informationsuperiority.’The 2002 Land Forces Doctrineincludes a requirement that the SpecialOperations Forces are trained toparticipate in psychological operationsand to support information operations.The Main Guidance to OperationsPlanning, issued in 2000, followedthe respective NATO documentsand included requirements for twoannexes to plans of operations (inaddition to the more traditional ones)—on Psychological Operations and onInformation Operations.The publications of three additionalBulgarian authors are appropriate toour discourse. The first, Prof. TzvetanSemerdjiev, published Information Warin 2000. In a comprehensive manner heexamined risks and threats to nationalsecurity at the doorsteps of the 21stcentury, emphasizing those resultingfrom the proliferation of informationtechnologies and communicationchannels. He introduced the conceptof “national information space” andreasoned that defense should beorganized in a number of echelons.Prof. Semerdjiev made detailed studiesof the concept of information power,and applied the classic principles ofwarfare to elaborate on the principles ofinformation warfare and the utilizationof advanced IT.The second author is Colonel MitkoStoykov, who in 2003 published a bookon the meaning of the informationrevolution for terrorism, and the way inwhich we organize our security system.Colonel Stoykov—then assigned tothe Situation Center of the Ministryof Defense—examined three recentconcepts: cyberwar, information war,and netwar in a comparative study ofprimarily US sources. His chapteron information operations was basedalmost exclusively on US doctrine:28 Special Edition 2008

Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine forInformation Operations; FM 100-6;and Joint Publication 6-0, Doctrine forCommunications System Support to JointOperations.This was probably the lastcomprehensive treatment of the issue ofinformation operations by a Bulgarianauthor, to date. The main reason is thatwhile downsizing of the Bulgarian ArmedForces continued, Bulgaria became aMembership Action Plan (MAP) countryafter the NATO Washington Summit andthen, at the 2002 NATO Prague summit,was invited to join NATO. On its pathto NATO membership, Bulgaria had tocope with a variety of requirements;interoperability and the protection ofclassified information had the strongestimpact on all information-related issues.In combination with other constraints,these requirements overwhelmed theforce planning and management capacityof Bulgaria’s defense establishment.Just one example is that all cited authorscontinued to work and publish intenselyon defense issues, but with no onefocused specifically on informationoperations.Most recently, Brigadier GeneralBoyko Simitchiev—Chief of theCommunications and InformationSystems Directorate (J6) of the GeneralStaff of the Bulgarian Armed Forcesand Chief Information Officer for thedefense establishment—contributeda paper to the journal CIO.bg thatagain raises interest in IO. In hisopening statement he emphasized thatthe challenges of future war—andinformation operations in particular—will have a very important impact onthe generation of requisite capabilitiesof the Bulgarian Armed Forces forparticipation in NATO and EuropeanUnion missions. Without referringexplicitly to the evolving concept ofeffects-based operations, he underlinedthe importance of achieving informationsuperiority, and psychological operations’place in gaining the support of thelocal population. While developingcapabilities to conduct informationoperations, we need to study the stabilityof our own systems performance againstinformation attacks. In his conclusions,he emphasizes that in the near futurethe Bulgarian military must be able toplan and to participate in the conduct ofinformation operations.A novel element in GeneralSimitchiev’s paper was recognition ofcyberspace as not only the place formilitary and governmental informationoperations, but also by terroristorganizations. Extremists aim to recruitmembers, disseminate propaganda,videos, brochures, and training materials,as well as to coordinate terrorist actsin an anonymous and interactive form.Echoing General Mihov, SimitchievGeneral Zlatan Stoykov, BulgarianChief of Defence with LieutenantGeneral Atanas Zaprianov, BulgarianMilitary Representative to the NATOMilitary Committee (NATO)stated that cyberspace createsopportunities for spying, asymmetricimpact, and propaganda that may leadto winning wars. Therefore, the nextpart examines approaches to counteringuse of cyberspace, and the Internetin particular, by terrorist and otherextremist organizations.Bulgaria’s Approach toCountering Extremists’ Use ofthe InternetWith the amendment of militarydoctrine in the aftermath of September11th, the Bulgarian Armed Forces weretasked by the legislature to contributeto anti- and counter-terrorism activities.However, an examination of Bulgaria’slegislative framework on terrorismshows, by and large, this is a breach oflaw. Law enforcement organizationshave the primary role in counteringterrorism. This also applies to terroristand extremist used of Internet, for avariety of purposes.The Ministry of Interior in Bulgaria’sexecutive branch is responsible forlaw enforcement. It includes threenational services: Police, Security(counterintelligence), and Fire Safetyand Protection of the Population.The first organization that playsa role in countering extremist use ofthe Internet is the one dealing withorganized crime. The National ServicePolice are tasked to counter criminalactivities of local and cross-bordercriminal groups or organizations, toprevent terrorist acts, and to neutralizeterrorist and diversion groups. Its ChiefDirectorate for Combating OrganizedCrime (CDCOC), with units in theRegional Police Directorates, “carriesout independently or jointly withother specialized bodies operation andsearch activities of an informationaland organizational nature to combatorganized crime” related, among otherthings, to:• Monetary, crediting, and financialsystems• Terrorist activities• Computer (or cyber) crime• Intellectual property rightsSecond, fighting terrorism andextremism is among the main tasks of theNational Security Service. This civiliancounterintelligence activity identifiesand neutralizes destructive processesthat threaten constitutional order, theunity of the nation, and its sovereigntyand territorial integrity. It also countersinternational terrorism and extremism.Recently the Bulgarian Governmenta n n o u n c e d p l a n s f o r a m a j o rreorganization of its security agenciesthrough the creation of a “NationalAgency for Security.” The new agencyunites three organizations: the NationalSecurity Service (currently under the29

Ministry of the Interior); the SecurityService (Military Counterintelligence)under the Ministry of Defense; and theFinancial Intelligence Service (currentlyunder the Ministry of Finance), and toplace them under direct control of theCouncil of Ministers. This measure willraise the effectiveness and the efficiencyof the fight against terrorism, organizedcrime, and crime at the ‘high floors ofpower,’ e.g. high-profile corruption.A third realm of IO-related activitiesis protection of critical infrastructure,and in particular critical informationinfrastructure. Organizationaldevelopments in that respect are rathercomplex, and will not be examined indetail here. We only note that Bulgaria,as a member of the European Union sinceJanuary 2007, adheres to EU CriticalInfrastructure Protection (CIP) policiesin particular as related to the fight againstterrorism.Accounting for the trans-bordernature of crimes, aimed at or facilitatedby the Internet, Bulgarian documentsconsistently express the readiness of thecountry for international cooperation,in particular in the framework of NATOand the European Union, but also in theexpanding network of partnerships ofthese alliances and on a bilateral basis.From a legislative point of view,a decree issued in the aftermath ofSeptember 11th prohibited any formof assistance—active or passive—toorganizations and persons involved interrorist acts, including efforts to recruitmembers of terrorist organizations.Curiously however, the first casesagainst cyber crime involved breachesof intellectual property rights, and theillegal dissemination of software throughthe Internet. In those efforts, CDCOCjoined forces with the Bulgarian Officeof Business Software Alliance (BSA)that protects copyrights of softwareproducers. BSA’s influence was sostrong that, according to a recent articlein the newspaper Capital, the CDCOCunit tasked to fight cybercrime is “to aconsiderable degree modeled after theBSA views.” The same article claimsthat the Ministry of the Interior ordersInternet providers to block access toBulgaria in its southeastern European context. (www.info.bg)certain websites, i.e., to filter access toinformation.The respective articles in Bulgaria’sPenal Code form the legislative basisfor such actions. Finally, the law onprotection of classified information andrelated additional regulations prescribeprinciples and a complex set of measuresfor the prevention of unauthorizedaccess to classified information created,processed, stored, and transported inautomated information systems andnetworks.Capability ManagementChallenges & PossibleDevelopmentsAny novel concept of operationsis of practical importance onlyif incorporated in defense planningand force development processes.Furthermore, implementation of anyinformation operations approach hangson proper definition and development ofrespective capabilities.Briefly summarized, in capabilitiesbasedplanning, required capabilitiesare defined against tasks to beperformed under specified conditions,and requirements to produce conceptdriveneffects. For this purposerequired effects are decomposed andmatched with component capabilities.Then capabilities, at levels definedduring the force planning process, aredeveloped through the introductionof adequate procedures (or doctrine),organization, personnel policy, training,and technologies.The implementation of this planningapproach is extremely challenging,especially in the period after the year2000, when the Bulgarian Armed Forceswere downsized, and at the same timehad to meet diverse interoperabilityrequirements while sustaining itsparticipation in Iraq, Afghanistan,Bosnia, and Kosovo operations. Bulgariawas even called upon to expand suchparticipation in both its number ofoperations, and the numbers of soldiersdeployed.This combination of factors causedthe relative decline of Bulgaria’sefforts to further develop conceptsof information operations and, moreimportantly, capabilities to participatein such operations. Nevertheless, duringthe past decade the Bulgarian defenseestablishment reached a certain levelof conceptual and doctrinal maturity,assigning main IO responsibilities tomilitary organizations, launching anambitious program for the introductionof advanced communications andinformation technologies and, mostimportantly, gaining operationalexperience.The main challenge at this stageis to promote information operations30 Special Edition 2008

equirements among all competingrequirements, and to elaborate realisticIO policies and an efficient capabilitydevelopment plan. These must alsoaccount for NATO and EU policies andburden sharing arrangements, as well asfor developments in the national securitysector. It is fairly safe to make severalpredictions in that respect:First, the development of unique IOconcepts as a result of original thinking,and in particular the implementationof such concepts, would hardly beencouraged. Instead, the Bulgarianmilitary will adhere to the NATO militarypolicy on information operations andinformation operations doctrine, aswell as the EU concept for military IO.Nevertheless, it is important to underlinethat Bulgaria has the potential andwillingness to contribute to NATO andEU IO-related research efforts, conceptdevelopment and experimentation,or innovative developments in otherbilateral or multinational forums.Second, when it comes to thecontribution to allied or coalitionoperations, one should not expectBulgaria will develop and provide abroad spectrum of IOcapabilities. Possiblythe country will selecta subset of capabilities,and will specialize intheir development andutilization. In this respect,define generic unitsthat are relatively selfsustainedand can bringuseful capabilities into amultinational operationis a topic of particularresearch interest.Third, the IO attackaspect will most probablybe subordinated to theevolving effects-basedapproach to operations( E B A O ) . B u l g a r i awill contribute to thedevelopment of thisconcept in the frameworkof NATO.Finally, while protection of one’sown command and control is part ofdefensive information operations, otherelements of the information infrastructuremay also be of considerable importancefor the security of the state and society.As mentioned above, Bulgaria adheres tothe EU policy on critical infrastructureprotection and the major efforts will beon its implementation. At this stage theEU policy covers the Internet, but doesnot explicitly include defense or lawenforcement infrastructure. It is still tobe seen whether and how the militarywill cooperate with other governmentalorganizations and private actors inprotecting critical national informationinfrastructure.ConclusionFrom 1995 till 2002, Bulgaria’sinterest in information operations was onthe rise, but it has not been so prominentin the last five years. The decline in IOeffort is relative—proponents find it verydifficult to receive adequate financingamong all competing requirements.The country still struggles to defineareas of specialization within NATOand the EU in which Bulgaria wants tobe competitive, and provide useful andefficient contributions. Nevertheless,it is possible to predict that Bulgariawill develop selective capabilities forconducting information operations asits contribution to the EBAO. Theparticipation of the Bulgarian militaryin critical information infrastructureprotection (CIIP) is less clear at this stage.The CIIP policy will reflect the policyof the European Union, with civilianorganizations and the private sector inthe lead. Whatever the decision, Bulgariastill needs a more realistic policy,and efficient capability managementaccounting, to meet developments inNATO, the European Union, and thenational security sector.Todor Tagarev is Chair of the Defense and Force ManagementDepartment of “G.S. Rakovski” Defense and Staff College, Sofia,Bulgaria. He was the first Director of the Defense Planning Directorate in theBulgarian Ministry of Defense since its establishment in early 1999. From Mayuntil October 2001, he served as Director for Armaments Policy. He is a 1982Graduate of the Bulgarian Air Force Academy; received a PhD degree in systemsand control from the N.E. Zhukovsky Air Force Engineering Academy, Moscowin 1989; and is a 1994 Distinguished Graduate of the US Air Command and StaffCollege at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Dr. Tagarev has authored or coauthoredsix books, including Information Aspects of Security, and more than40 papers published in refereed journals. Since the early 1990s he is conductingresearch on chaos theory and complex systems as related to military issues, witha focus on information technology developments and their impact. His currentresearch is concentrated on defense and force planning and on novel operationalconcepts. Dr. Tagarev is a member of the NATO Research and Technology Boardand is a national representative on the RTO System Analysis and Studies panel. Heis Managing Editor of Information & Security: An International Journal, , and a member of the Editorial Board of Connections: TheQuarterly Journal, . -mail: tagarev@bas.bg.31

Ukraine: Information Operations In Countriesof the Former Soviet UnionBy Dr. Georgii PocheptsovEditorial Abstract: Dr. Pocheptsov offers a very different definition of IO than the other contributors. He notes informationoperations are the achievement of non-information goals (social, economic, military, political) using information technologies.He offers some mass communication means for changing public opinion, and recommends altering channels of masscommunications and mass meaning if one desires to change a target group’s conscience. For fighting extremists, herecommends finding ways to disagree with reality in more “soft” ways; and work toward new ways of “interpreting events,”instead of only working toward targeting the “user-website” relationship.The Development of InformationOperations in UkraineUkraine, as well as other formerSoviet Republics, has limited experiencein using public communications toinfluence the mass consciousness. Theprocess for creating one’s own identityis slowed primarily due to a lack ofexperience as an independent massculture. At the same time, however,Russia was able to “turn on” its massculture, which created the necessaryprerequisites to produce, for example,TV shows and soap operas on a varietyof themes from romantic to patriotic.Such a primary flow of informationallows for the crystallization of therequired configurations of virtualobjects. Mass consciousness can onlybe altered using the channels of masscommunications and mass meaning (forexample, a bestselling novel or soapopera). The latter allows for creationof a parallel virtual world, where theconfiguration of the content is presented“as is,” in the case of religion forexample.Information operations can bedefined as the achievement of noninformationgoals (social, economic,military, political) using informationtechnologies. Among informationtechnologies we are currently seeing anincreasing role for non-mass producedmessages, such as rumors and directcontacts. This shift is driven by theinherent higher level of trust in directcontact communication as compared tomass communication.As such we can emphasize twoimportant characteristics of informationtechnologies:• They are directed towards thesuccessful transition from information toanother level (social, economic, military,political)• They mimic natural communicationflows. The opposite case would be theuse of political advertising, or any type ofadvertisement, where the artificial natureof such communication flow is clear.Information operations can also bedivided into defensive and offensive,Republic of the Ukraine Coat of Arms.(Wikimedia)although recent research underlines theconnectedness of these processes. Ifwe talk about offense versus defense inthe former Soviet block countries (withthe exception of Russia), they haveonly defensive information operationsexperience. For example, governmentinstitutions of the Ukraine gainedexperience in defensive IO in thefollowing situations:• A scandal involving tapes of theformer guard of the President, that had aneffect on both the local and internationallevels;• Western accusations of the trade ofthe Ukrainian “Kolchugi” radar systemto Iraq, which produced pressure on boththe information and political levels;• The natural gas conflict betweenUkraine and Russia,; a conflict over meatand milk products trade; as well as othersimilar trade-related conflicts;• Local conflicts of smaller intensityand duration (between Ukraine andRomania, Ukraine and Poland, Ukraineand Bulgaria);• The Orange Revolution of 2004;• The emergence of totalitarianreligious cults, such as “WhiteBrotherhood.”The press-secretary of the UkrainianPresident at the time of the ‘tape scandal’noted: “I was long affected by the tapescandal. It was the hardest time forPresident Kuchma, no other Presidentwas in a worse situation. I rememberwe had consultants who worked withPresident Clinton during his troubles.God, I thought, I wish I was faced withtheir problems instead of this!”The gas conflict between Ukraineand Russia, which emerged aroundthe particulars of the gas trade treaty,was interesting as both Russian andUkrainian media attempted to createparallel interpretations of the sameevents for the Ukrainian audience. Aconsensus among experts was thatUkraine lost that battle.We can also view the OrangeRevolution of 2004 as a war ofinterpretation—one also lost by thegovernment—despite the fact a largeproportion of the media outlets wereunder government control. At the time,the opposition created a more compellingnarrative, which engaged key audiences.The government was seen as slowingdown the country’s progress, and it32 Special Edition 2008

could not get rid of such an image. Itis well known in the history of religionthat faiths under pressure become morecreative. Similarly, the opposition duringthe Orange Revolution was more creativethan the government.During the war of re-interpretations,especially during “colorful” revolutions,the same events achieve differentmeanings. Such wars display thefollowing patterns:• The more successful the narrative,the more favorable the interpretationof new events in accordance with thisnarrative;• Good narrative submergesambivalent facts;• “Mobilizing narrative” is writtenfrom the citizens’ perspective, whichmakes it that much harder for thegovernment to create a similarnarrative.Ukraine also witnessed newdevelopmental means among totalitarianreligious cults, such as “WhiteBrotherhood,” which successfully tookover a church building and made a callfor the mass suicide of its members. Noother former Soviet country experiencedthis. Investigations into the cult leftunanswered questions:• An organization of such magnitudecould not have survived only throughdonations from its followers;• The leader of the sect did not usehypnoses to influence followers, yet alarge number of followers had some sortof psychological deficiency;• It was difficult to define the natureof these psychological deficiencies, aswell as the large number of followersand their geographical spread;• One of the leaders of the cult wasrumored to work for a special agency(KGB) [former Soviet intelligence].The Ukraine was also used asa test-tube for several large-scaleinformation operations that affected thewhole population of the country. Localspecialists in the Ukraine participated inpolitical technologies and spin-doctoring.During the last decade, the practice ofdiscrediting was always ahead of thepractice of refuting negative information,which allowed some organizations toUkrainian officer demonstrates IT monitoringto NATO colleagues. (Defense Link)“build up muscle” in this area. Thisoffensively-oriented information sphereis characterized by:• What is seen as information factby one side, is seen as disinformationby another;• Information conflicts are anextension of economical ones;• A more powerful economical orpolitical player is also a more powerfulinformation player, as he has thenecessary resources.A l l U k r a i n e c i t i z e n s h a v eexperienced a drastic environmentalchange—one that led to a life in adifferent civilization (from a Soviet toa post-Soviet one).. Both “Perestroika”and the Orange Revolution have similarcharacteristics, mainly a rapid change in‘who is the enemy.’ The enemy playedan important role in the Soviet model,as it defined everything. “Perestroika”followed this model:• First Stage: The Change: an outsideenemy is substituted by an inside one: agovernmental system;• Second Stage: Use Of An InternalResource: all types of propagandamechanisms are used in the internalattack;• Third Stage: Delegitimization: thepopulation refuses the power’s right torule.The Orange Revolution was alsocrafted by creating an enemy insidethe government, not post factum asin previous examples, but during theprocess of its formation.Overall the population of the formerSoviet block countries have moreexperience with information operationsthan any other country in the world.During the Soviet era people learned toread between the lines of mass producedmessages, thus intuitively stumblingupon the opposite meaning.In order to speak about IO theory,we have to separate the players withtheoretical and practical experience.They rarely intersect, which complicatesthe transition of the experience betweenthe two. The practitioners fill the lackof theoretical knowledge with creativeapproaches, teamwork to generate ideas,and actual execution.Ukrainian experience in the theory ofinformation technologies is significantlyslowed, since theorists do not participatein practice and practitioners do notwrite theory. Where common sensepredominates, both substitute this fortheir lack of theory or practice.The Ukrainian military position, atleast that published in the mass media,has two characteristics: first, the levelof novelty of ideas lies only in the verydetailed aspects of the offense; second,there is a transition to a psychologicalsphere, which is where the terminology“ i n f o r m a t i o n a l — p s y c h o l o g i c a linfluence” originates.Academic research (such as doctoraldissertations) is an active area of theinformation sphere, as are informationpolicy, and Ukraine’s internationalimage. O. V. Litvinenko proposed what33

can be called a ‘culture-oriented modelof IO,’ in which the narrative introducedis taken from some local mythologicalstructure. Additionally, Ya. Varyvodaanalyzed Russian financial groups’information activities in the Caucasusregion, focusing on those connected witheconomical and political interests. Thisauthor is creating what can be called a‘semiotic model of IO,’ in which massculture plays a crucial role.As to Ukraine’s international image,a powerful political player such as Russialooks at Ukraine as an object, and notas a player in information wars. TheUkraine is seen either at the intersectionof the interests of Russia and US, or theUS and Europe.There are several agencies in Ukrainespecializing in information warfarewithin the economic sphere. In 2006these agencies held correspondingtraining to attract attention to theirwork, under the title “Ukraine:The Art of Future InformationWarfare.”Conflicts in post-Soviet blockterritory frequently have underlyingeconomic tension, although theyare also frequently tied to politicaltensions. Apart from Russia,most countries have very limitedaccess to TV broadcasting outsidetheir own territory. Thus theyfrequently become the source ofRussian attacks, as in recent actionsagainst Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia,Estonia, and Latvia. Just looking atthis list, it is clear that the politicalcomponent is present in theseactions. However, it is possible thatan economic war (using informationwarfare as a tool) also took place, dueto two factors:• There are fewer political restrictionsover actions;• There is a need to cut offeconomical ties due to political ormilitary concerns.More generally, information conflictusually develops through the followingstages:• Stage one: A point of conflictsuddenly appears;• Stage two: Public attention is broughtand kept at the point of conflict;• Stage three: The conflict fades(public attention is turned away fromthe conflict).The conflict fading stage is usuallylong-lasting: in the case of Russian-Georgian relations, it lasted a full year.This was driven by the vivid events in thefirst two stages, not easily forgotten bythe public. Even when the governmentwants the conflict to be over, it continuesto linger.For controlled conflicts—and allthe conflicts on the post-Soviet territoryare like this—the fading stage signalsthe end of the conflict. After event Xhappens, which was the sole purposeof the conflict, the controllers no longerinvest resources, thus the conflict fadesout.Republic of Ukraine. (Univ. of Texas)Russia has vast experience inconducting information operationstargetting outside parties. Let’s recall,for example, the “Romancing the Stone”situation, when the British Special Forceswere caught in Moscow with a ‘stone’used to read information from agentsat a distance. As a result, Moscow’sgovernment passed a law restrictingnongovernmental organizations, sinceone of the members of the British groupwas also responsible for distributingnongovernmental grants inside Russia.In 2007 a similar information conflictwas observed around the poisoning ofAlexander Litvinenko in London.All major international players havedealt with some issue aimed at unitingthe public: for the US it was recoveringfrom the Great Depression; and for theUSSR it was the propaganda during thefoundation of the Soviet Union. Themajor players built the new picture ofthe world through traditional mediaenviroments: movies in earlier times,and TV now. Ukraine, with its problemof a political split along geographicallines, requires projects of the samemagnitude to unite the country.Information Warfare Strategieson the Internet: Fighting theExtremistsWe can define the followingcharacteristics of the Internet that do noteasily coexist with items associatedwith visual culture:• A more dispersed environment,where the objects are hardlyconnected to each other;• A multitude of events thatbecomes less important due to theirsheer number. As a result it is hardto respond to them with individualinterpretations, which requires moregeneral interpretation systems;• Increased dependence on thesource of the interpretations;• The knowledge of the detailscomes before the understanding ofthe whole structure;• An Internet environment isformed by interaction with itsconsumers.The Internet environment isfrequently analogous to a socialnetwork, since the consumer visits its“own” websites. The consumer truststhe information presented there morethan other sources. The website and theconsumer have a friendly relationship, ascompared to the simpler ‘consumption‘relationship of newspapers or TV.Modeling such a “friendly” environmentshould incorporate the fact that modelswork with objects which do not interactphysically with consumers. All objectslie in the information environment.Several historical examples showa similar disconnect between thephysical environment and the receiver’sunderstanding of the environment:34 Special Edition 2008

• The WWII propaganda campaignwith Japan, where in addition to ninemessages a soldier could verify throughdirect physical contact, there was onemessage with informational evidence.• A maxim was formulated duringthe election of former US PresidentRichard Nixon: since there was no directcontact with the candidate, one shouldnot change the candidate, but rather hisimage.Another way to change theenvironment is to change the voter ratherthan the candidate. Therefore, there areseveral ways to change the elements ofthe communication chain:• Keep the speaker and the listenerconstant, but change the message. Thisis the most standard way of creatingcommunication;• Change the speaker (or the content)keeping the listener constant;• Change the listener, but keep thespeaker constant;• Change the context. For example,to diminish the negative interpretationof disasters, the Russian Ministry ofEmergency Situations started a weeklyTV program about disasters in the restof the world.The modification of certain “offlimits” subjects can be painful forthe audience, and usually should beavoided. For example, a figure of theJapanese Emperor was one such object;he remained unchanged even afterJapan’s capitulation. Hence, certainpolitical as well as religiously sensitiveobjects remain constant for the audience,thus making it harder to modify them.However, there exists a distributionof genuineness within the social network:the more direct contact we have with oursources, the more we trust them. Yet aswe move upward in any hierarchy, thereare more possibilities to loose trust, asdirect contact is less likely.Speaking from [author] MarshallMcLuhan’s view, the Internet environmentis more similar to the acoustic than thevisual environment. Let’s examine thefollowing characteristics of such anenvironment:• An audio environment does nothave a definite distinction between theauthor and the listener, since everyonecan be both; Internet blogs providethis opportunity. A visual environmentcreates authorship and correspondinghierarchy;• An audio environment moves awayfrom individual to collective. Collectiveopinion, collective structures dominatehere;• Authority and authenticity are builtthrough institutions, and not throughpeople. Therefore there is a high levelof stability, similar to those in Muslimsociety which are maintained througha religiously-oriented educationalsystem.We can use precisely thesecharacteristics as counterstrategies:• If everyone is equal in the acousticenvironment, this makes it easier for yourpeople or ideas to advance;• The audio environment is morelikely to be affected by a swarmingattack, a la [author John] Arquilla, andnot a standard centralized attack;• The model of a “magnet” attractingattention, which can be realized throughmarginal changes that introduce doubtinto the main version of events, withoutopenly denying them;• Major changes in this environmentcan only occur through extraordinaryevents (for example, news of Arafat’sdeath from AIDS can change the attitudetowards his movement as a whole).Audio environments can act irrationallyby shifting attention to the most vividevent, rather than the most importantone.G e n e r a l t e n d e n c i e s i n t h edevelopment of any environment followthe same principle: human systems tryto expand, and thus subordinate anyunclaimed environment. Physical,informational, and virtual environmentsall are constantly under attack by otherphysical, informational, and virtualenvironments trying to force the formerto live under its rules.The following goals highlightany attempt to modify the points of aconflict:• A change of heroes, enemies, andvictims;• A change of the objects ofattention;• A change in the underlyingmotivation of actions;• A shift of attention to the historicalperiod and the symbols of that time.The goal is to create a new virtualreality that would fit the interests of thecommunicator. This new virtual realitymust not change completely: as a firststep it can only question the validityof the previous reality. For example,we can keep the heroic event, but finda different motivation for it, such asstruggle for power, cowardice, or othersimilar negative aspect. So the structure:“positive act—positive motivation”is transformed into a “positive act—negative motivation.” Let’s callthis example Negation Through TheChange Of Motivation.During the destruction of the imageof [Vladimir] Lenin, his story wentthrough a ‘broadening’ of his personalcharacteristics, and as a result it was nolonger a taboo or “off limits” subject.It was okay to move away from acanonical image. The stage of Leninwith a “human face” was followed bythe stage of Lenin with an “inhumaneface.” Thus even though this broadeningof image was done with noble goals inmind, it was followed at the next step bya more negative characterization. Let’scall this device a Negation Through TheBroadening Of The Canon.Another device is to change thenature of the communications: a shiftfrom storytelling from one point of viewto another. Let’s take for example possibleways of telling the story of “Little RedRiding Hood.” The traditional versionis told from the point of view of a littlegirl. But it is also possible to tell thisstory from the perspective of the mother,grandmother, or even the wolf. Let’scall this device Negation Through TheChange Of The Storyteller. We can usethis device frequently, as many eventscan be described from the point of viewof different witnesses, allowing newinformation to be introduced.The Internet environment has lessinertia; therefore it is frequently usedin situations when the environmentof traditional media is blocked, forexample, by authorities. A campaignin the Internet environment can employdifferent types of messages unusable inan official environment. It could be a35

campaign similar to dissemination ofrumors, which takes on a second-lifethrough repetition.The environment which serves as asource for extremist/terrorism-friendlyfeelings is very ritualized and closed.The main goal of an Internet counterpropagandawar, which has very welldefined rules about both allowable andbanned actions and messages, should beto increase the number of possible futurelife directions of an individual. Specificresults of such work are:• A deceleration of the processes ofmoving towards a goal predetermined bythe creators of the environment;• An introduction of the possible“crossroads” that can shift the attentionor action away towards more secondarytasks;• An introduction of new models ofindividual development.The destruction of the preprogrammednature of terrorist behaviorcan be done by increasing the numberof options for development, where onecan transition from one state to another.For example:• Breach of the interpretation of realevents;• Breach of the understanding ofvirtual objects;• Breach of the motivations and goalsof terrorism by showing that they can beachieved using other means.The destruction of the interpretivemodel of the object is done by introducinga new opposite characteristic: adding anegative feature to a positive object oradding a positive feature to a negativeobject. For example, when the USwas bombing Afghanistan (a negativeobject), the addition of dropping foodsupplies and not bombing on religiousholidays added a positive feature to theobject, which slowed down the creationof the solitary negative view.In another example, the OrangeRevolution in Ukraine destroyed thelegitimacy of power, by introducingnew connections: not just power, but“criminal power.” According to scholarGeorge Lakoff, trying to dispute aparticular framing of an issue does notdestroy it, but rather strengthens it. Weshould refocus away from disputingsomeone else’s framing of an issue, andtowards creating and maintaining a newone. A more global goal in this case isto conceptually change and modify thevirtual environment by:• Change of heroes;• Change of enemies;• Change of sacred texts which makea coordinated system of heroes, enemies,and victims.Such principal change is hard toachieve. Therefore we talk more abouta correction of the meaning of heroes,enemies, and sacred text. This triad isinterconnected: by changing enemies, wechange the heroes, and vice versa.New meanings serve as goals ininformation warfare. These should notrepeat existing and conflicting themes,which would ease their acceptance intothe mass consciousness. The generationof new meanings can be seen as aseparate research task. Using anotherhistorical example, when the ApostlePaul introduced communion with breadand wine, where the latter is seen asblood, introduced something that goesagainst Judaism, which does not allowthe use of blood. But, this practice wasclose to pagan religions, where the use ofblood was accepted. The main obstacleto development of new meanings is thatthey are hard to come by in a worldflooded with old meanings. If thetechnical aspect of human civilizationhas developed rapidly, the social aspectis, paradoxically, advancing slowly.The Internet-environment can fulfillthree tasks:• Compensating for the lack ofsomething in reality (for example, filmand comic book superheroes appeared asa reaction to the Great Depression);• Reinforcing reality (for example,extremism reinforces the existingconfrontation between the East and theWest);• Transforming reality (for example,the US war for Muslim hearts and mindsis designed to negate the negativitydirected towards the West).Perestroika, the Orange Revolution,and the war for the hearts and minds ofMuslims are fought in a highly controlled(by ideology or religion) environment. Inthis case it is only possible to create a newvirtual reality using more “soft” tools,without engaging in direct conflict.Yet another counter strategyis creation of an alternative virtualreality:• Stage One: Expansion - broadeningcanonical frames of the description,which allows addition of negativefeatures into the positive objects, andpositive to negative;• Stage Two: Negativity - additionof negative features into the positiveobjects, and positive to negative;• Stage Three: Change of enemiesinto friends - this is a final stage ofchanging the virtual reality model.Political leaders go through the samestages when they go from admiration tocondemnation. Mikhail Gorbachev,for example, went through this processas did most major figures from hisadministration. Ukraine’s OrangeRevolution went through a stage ofcontrolled chaos, which made it easierto change the model of the world ofthe mass consciousness. For thatpurpose Perestroika used empty storeshelves, mass protests, and the fightagainst alcoholism, which resultedonly in longer lines in the stores. TheOrange Revolution openly expressedinsubordination to the government, usedthe main square of Kiev as a stage forprotests, and used the previously-notedpresidential tape recording scandal toreplace the serving president.In many ways the West did not winthe Cold War on the level of ideologies,where there were no deviations, butrather on the level of reality—everydayexistence. Ballpoint pens, bluejeans,etc. turned out to be more powerful“weapons” than real ones. This happensbecause each element of everyday lifecarries inside it the element of virtualreality—new meanings that can disagreewith accepted reality in more “soft” ways.Russia faced the problem of confrontingforeign influence much earlier than thetime of [Emperor] Peter I. This was aproblem during the governance of hisfather, Tsar Alexej Mikhailovich. A. S.Orlov sees the emergence of this conflicteven earlier during the times of Ivan theTerrible.36 Special Edition 2008

The opinions of that earlier time arevery similar to what Muslim society nowexperiences. Both then and now, religionremains the main component of thissociety, subordinating everything else.From here, we can see a way to influenceMuslim society: through building secularorganizations, which have the potentialfor change. The same experience easilytranslates to the Internet environment:our goal is to build a new representationof reality in the new virtual world.It is possible to borrow experiencefrom other related disciplines. Forexample, social marketing suggestsdifferent types of interventions dependon the target audiences’ motivations,abilities, and possibilities to act. Wemust incorporate all of these factors intoan Internet-based information war.For example, some suggestnongovernmental organizationsbecome highly visible when theiractivities resonate with internationalnongovernmental organizations. Thecounteraction strategy in this case canbe fighting against the interpretationof a fight for power or property in thelight of the fight for human rights anddemocracy, when such interpretation isprovided by the local NGOs. In this way,such interpretation looses resonance.However, information reality turnsout to be more complex than one canassume from such analyses. In thecase of the Internet, we can observe thefollowing characteristics:• Multitude of websites: blockingthem is no longer effective;• Websites change rapidly: it is hardto apply the same methods of influenceon them;• Decentralization: it is harder toattack the hierarchy;• Reliance on local websites: thisis the source of information in Arabcountries.It is also necessary to be closelyconnected to Arab culture as the only wayto establish trust. Counterpropagandarequires even more complex constructsthan propaganda, yet at the same timethe consequences of such actions areharder to plan. Counterstrategy canbe realized through counter-narratives,which can stand against the narrativesof the terrorists.The most effective counter-narrativesare the internal sources of influence. Forexample, the UK’s Information ResearchDepartment (part of the Foreign Officeand MI6), has worked from inside theforeign field. As a result its articles andbooks did not refer to the true sourcesor true authorship. Therefore, the levelof trust to such information was ratherhigh.ConclusionThe Internet is so flexible it allowsus to use of a wider set of possibilitiesthan traditional media. But the consumerwants to receive the information flowhe is looking for. The conflict or fightshould not be targeted towards the “userwebsite”relationship, as such wouldnot be productive, but towards “eventwaysof interpreting” relationship. It isimportant that this, or any such type ofinterpretation, should be acceptable tothe consumer.The Internet can foster thegeneration of new needs, which can alsobe an effective technique of informationwarfare. If the old needs stem fromreligious or political roots, the news onesdo not have this connection and becomea way of creating new meanings. Newneeds can be met: by new people, withnew types of virtual objects.Georgii Pocheptsov is a Professor who most recently served as theHead of the Department of Information Policy in the National Academyof Public Administration under the President of Ukraine. He also servedas the Chair of the Marketing Department at the International SolomonUniversity. His prior appointments include serving as the Chair of theDepartment of International Communications and Public Relations at theInstitute of International Relations at Kiev National University; and as theHead of the Strategic Initiatives Department in the Office of the President ofUkraine. Dr. Pocheptsov has written 40 books which, among others, includeInformation Wars, Psychological Wars, Propaganda and Counterpropaganda,Information and Disinformation, Information-political Technologies, andStrategy and Strategic Analysis.37

Australia: Current Developments In Australian ArmyInformation OperationsBy James Nicholas, Major, Australian ArmyEditorial Abstract: Major Nicolas notes Australia’s armed forces are considering doing away with the term “informationoperations” and substituting the term “information actions” in its place. IO appears to be too much of a specialist’s stovepipe, as influence emanates from all military activities. This change may better reflect the relative weighting Australia placeson specific aspects of information-related issues, such as the terms “decision superiority” and “influence.”IntroductionOver a decade ago, the concept of “command and controlwarfare” was incorporated into US doctrine. It focusedon enabling US commanders to complete their decisionmakingcycles more quickly and more effectively than theiradversaries. Subsequently, the concept was refined andrenamed “information warfare,” and later replaced by theconcept of information operations which has been incorporatedin Australian and allied joint doctrine.The developing concept of information operations isbroader than its predecessors. While continuing to focuson the need to move through decision-making cycles morequickly and effectively than the adversary, IO also recognizesthe need to influence and win support to enable friendly forcemilitary actions. This support primarily emanates from the localpopulation in an area of operations, as well as from broaderregional and international audiences.Currently, the Australian Army is developing processes toenable conduct of information operations at the tactical level.While the Australian Defense Force (ADF) joint informationoperations doctrine allows the strategic whole of government tofocus on operational planning, such doctrine does not providecommanders an adequate approach to conduct tactical level IO.Accordingly, many believe a gap exists in tactical AustralianArmy information operations.Issues addressed here include: status of Australian jointand ABCA armies’ doctrine; coalition experience; informationoperations versus use of the term information actions (IA); coreelements of information actions; and information actions andintelligence preparation of the battlespace.Status of Australian Joint and ABCA Armies’DoctrineAustralia published its first joint doctrine on informationoperations in 2002. Until early 2006 there was no change inAustralian joint doctrine, and little change in the Australian/British/Canadian/American (ABCA countries’) joint andarmies’ doctrine. In early 2006 the US issued a new US jointinformation operations publication. Some IO professionalsenvisaged that this publication, together with recent operationalexperience, may force change in the doctrine of ABCAarmies.Prior to 2007, the ADF produced joint informationoperations doctrine suited to the conduct of strategic andoperational IO, but no lower order doctrine existed. The decisionto develop Australian Army land warfare doctrine (LWD)arose from the requirement to develop an Army informationoperations capability to address tactical requirements, foroperations at brigade and below.The 2002 doctrine provided an Australian perspective oninformation operations, based primarily on US doctrine of thetime. Since then there have been shifts in joint US informationoperations doctrine, and although not fundamental, the changesare significant. In late 2006, the Australian Army finally beganwriting its own information operations doctrine.Coalition ExperienceRecent operational experience has generated considerablecriticism of Coalition information operations. First, thesecriticisms include being unwieldy and difficult to apply;secondly, as being inadequate in relation to the practical aspectsof gaining influence and support. This is especially significant inwhat may largely be an unfriendly operating environment, withan instinctively distrustful civilian population. Additionally,aspects such as training, inadequate allocation of appropriateresources, untrained staff, and inadequate intelligence supportto IO, have all drawn close examination. A US commanderrecently wrote:I am absolutely convinced that we must approach IO in adifferent way and turn it from a passive war fighting disciplineto a very active one. We must learn to employ aggressive IO.We cannot leave this domain for the enemy; we must fight himon this battlefield and defeat him there just as we’ve provenwe can on conventional battlefields.Complicating our efforts in the information domainis the fact that we are facing an adaptive, relentless, andtechnologically savvy foe. Our adversary recognizes theglobal information network is his most effective tool forattacking what he perceives to be our center of gravity: publicopinion—both domestic and international. And the truth of thematter is that our enemy is better at integrating informationbasedoperations, primarily through mass media, than we are.In some respects we seem tied to our legacy doctrine, andless than completely resolved to cope with the benefits andchallenges of information globalization.Such feedback may have been the basis for the decisionat the recent ABCA Information Operations Project Teammeeting to recommend the abandonment of the concept of IO,at least in its current form. The team recommends the term‘information operations’ be discarded, but that the core activity38 Special Edition 2008

of influence be retained. British Forces are also conductinga detailed analysis of the influence component of informationoperations.The ABCA report recommendations were an effort toensure a less cumbersome application of various capabilities,and to meet situations where influence and support achieve amuch greater weighting than at present. Thus the AustralianArmy views retention of the term ‘information operations’ asnon-critical; however, retention of the underlying concept of‘influence’ is seen as paramount.Another critical need is to remove information operationsfrom a specialist stove-pipe, and recognize that influenceemanates from all military activities: either as a planned (listorder) effect, or as an unintended (second or third order)effect.Information Operations Versus Information ActionsApart from the ABCA Project Team’s recommendation notto retain the term information operations (yet to be formallyendorsed by ABCA), further examination of how NATO seesthe IO construct led the Australian Army to examine alternativeterms to describe tactical level information-related actions.One issue with the term information operations is thecurrent variety of definitions in use. The Australian jointdoctrine definition is significantly different from US jointdoctrine, and those of the other ABCA services.The varying definitions reflect the relative weightingplaced by different countries or organizations on the decisionsuperiority and influence aspects of information operations. Thecurrent US joint and Army definitions focus on achievement ofdecision superiority, with somewhat less emphasis on influence.The current Australian joint definition addresses both aspects.The current NATO definition reflects the need for informationoperations to focus on influencing target audiences. The currentUS, NATO and Australian Joint formal definitions are:(US Joint) The integrated employment of the corecapabilities of electronic warfare, computer networkoperations, psychological operations, military deception, andoperations security, in concert with specified supporting andrelated capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurpadversarial human and automated decision making whileprotecting our own.(NATO) Coordinated actions to create desired effects onthe will, understanding, and capability of adversaries, potentialadversaries, and other approved parties in support of overallobjectives by affecting their information, information-basedprocesses, and systems while exploiting and protecting one’sown.(Australian Joint) The coordination of information effectsto influence the decision making and actions of a targetaudience and to protect and enhance our decision making andactions in support of national interests’.A second issue with the term information operations is thatit is somewhat at odds with other Australian Army doctrinalguidance and recommended ABCA standards. At present,the term “operation” is used openly, with a wide range ofActions described as operations. Examples are “bridgingoperations,” and “transport operations.” The reference aimsto establish tighter usage and more precise meaning within adefined spectrum. For example, the Australian Government’scommitment to stability in the Solomon Islands, OperationAnode, conducts four types of activities: offensive, defensive,stability, and enabling. Enabling activities can be described astactical actions that link, support, or create the conditions foroffensive, defensive, and stability activities.Offensive activities in turn have a number of associatedactions, such as: attack, advance, and pursuit. Within anoffensive activity (including defensive, stability, and enablingactivities), information actions would be intrinsically organicto the conduct of that activity, and may be represented in oneor more (simultaneous or separate) information actions. Wecan use a number of tools to best effect implementation of theinformation action (Figure 1).The Australian Army is therefore considering replacingthe term information operations with information actions. Anemerging Australian Army definition under consideration is:Actions conducted to influence target audiences in orderto achieve understanding, acceptance, and support of ouractions and aims, and to diminish the quality and speed of theadversary’s decision making, while maintaining our own, toachieve decision superiority.Battlespace Operating SystemIn the Australian Army tactical lexicon, informationoperations is also referred to as a battlespace operating system(BOS). This is a framework within which a force synchronizesactions across the battlespace. The Army further envisionsmoving away from the title of ‘IO BOS.’ Accordingly, they areconsidering a number of titles, including ‘information dominanceand influence’ (IDI) BOS. This reflects an Australian Armyview that the previously-titled BOS needs to reflect informationdominance in terms of effective electromagnetic environmentmanagement—resulting in domination of adversary or neutralinformation and protection of one’s own. Additionally, coreinfluence activities are incorporated into the BOS, extendingnot only across the information environment, but also thecognitive environment of any target audience.Core Components of IAAt present, information actions are the integratedemployment of a number of core capabilities: deception,psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare(EW), operations security (OPSEC), and computer networkoperations (CNO). Additionally, IA has a number of supportingcapabilities, including physical attack, information security,and some related capabilities —public information and civilmilitarycooperation (CIMIC). These various capabilities canbe employed across three core information actions that alignto the broad ABCA working group’s recommendations. Thecore actions are:39

Title Activity Actions Info Actions Capabilities/ToolsOffensiveAttack, Advance,Pursue, etc.A Military Operation, egOPERATION ANODEInformation Actions1) Influence2) Counter Command,3) Command & InfoProtectionPSYOP, MILDEC,EW, CNO, CIMIC, PI,MPA, PPP, OPSEC,HUMINT, Targeting,(Example list)DefensiveStatic, Delaying, As above As aboveMobileStability etc. As above As aboveEnabling etc. As above As AboveFigure 1. Link between an Operation, Activity, Action, and Capability in Describing Information Actions.1. Influence: aimed at changing the perceptions and willof target audiences.2. Counter Command: focused on diminishing theadversary’s command and control systems and associateddecision making.3. Information and Command Protection: focused onprotecting our own information and command and control andinformation systems.Influence actions include employing the supportingcapabilities of Military Public Information, PSYOP, deception,CIMIC, plus presence, posture, and profile tasks. However,depending on the results of ongoing analysis, this list mayeventually include other tactical capabilities.Counter command actions include employment of a rangeof capabilities or tools. OPSEC, EW (specifically electronicattack), and CNO (computer network operations, includingattack) are predominantly focused on the physical dimensionof information terrain (information systems). Deception andPSYOP focus on the cognitive dimension (decision makers’brains). Yet we may also employ other capabilities enablingphysical destruction of enemy commanders, their staffs, andsystems. Coalition staffs would draw on the assistance andadvice of specialist staff areas such as EW, PSYOP, and kinetictargeting as appropriate. The Australian Army is still analyzingwhich staff function should have responsibility for CounterCommand Activity.Information and command protection actions includeemployment of a range of capabilities including informationsecurity, EW (via electronic protection), CNO (primarily,computer network defense), OPSEC, counter deception, andcounter PSYOP/counter propaganda. While information andcommand protection actions would most likely draw heavilyon the assistance and advice of specialist staffs, indicationsare that “operations” or the “3” may be the most appropriateresponsible staff area. Notably, the ABCA Armies’ draft reportrefers to this activity solely as information protection, thoughthe Australian Army is still examining inclusion of commandprotection. There is an obvious need to address protection ofour own commanders, staffs, and command and control systemsagainst the adversaries’ counter command activity.Furthermore, commanders are increasingly likely toencounter a range of actions intended to impair or diminish thequality of their decision making, and their ability to commandeffectively. With our increasing IT reliance, modern armiesand commanders will undoubtedly face hostile activity directedtowards destroying or impairing automated command andcontrol and information systems.Defense against such measures is the core information andcommand protection activity. Physically, commanders, theirheadquarters, and staffs could be subject to destruction by arange of weapon systems or attacks. Defense against suchhostile actions is the realm of OPSEC, as well as defensiveforce protection and other security measures. Commandersmay be the target of deception measures, or PSYOP intendedto impair the quality of their decisionmaking. Defense againstsuch measures is achieved through effective intelligence,surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR),enabling accurate situational awareness, understanding, andcounter deception measures.The potential for all service members to be subject toan evolving class of incapacitating or debilitating weaponsis also increasing. The following quote advocates the needto “firewall” the minds of commanders, staffs, and systemsoperators:We are on the threshold of an era in which these dataprocessors of the human body may be manipulated ordebilitated. An entirely new arsenal of weapons, based ondevices designed to introduce subliminal messages or to alterthe body’s psychological or data processing capabilities, mightbe used to incapacitate individuals.We are potentially the biggest victims of informationwarfare, because we have neglected to protect ourselves.Our obsession with a ‘system of systems’ is most likelya leading cause of why we neglect the human factor inour information warfare theories. It is time to change ourterminology and our conceptual paradigm. Our terminologyconfuses us, sending us in directions dealing primarily withhardware, software, and communications components. Weneed to spend more time researching how to protect the humansin our data management structures. We cannot sustain anythingwithin those structures if we’re debilitated by our adversaries.Right now someone may be designing the means to disruptthe human component of our carefully constructed notion ofa system of systems.There has been significant development in the evolutionof mind- altering weapons since the preceding quotes werewritten. While much more than a doctrinal issue, there isobvious value in placing greater emphasis on protection of40 Special Edition 2008

commanders, their staffs, and systems operators. Hence, theAustralian Army is considering inclusion of “command” intothe core activity of information and command protection.Information Actions and Intelligence Preparation ofthe BattlespaceAustralian Army planning doctrine includes a chapteron Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB). Thedescription places more emphasis on factors that have far widerscope than the traditional domains such as physical terrain,weather, conventional or adversary weapon capabilities, andtactics, techniques, and procedures. These factors include: theelectromagnetic spectrum, societal, political, cultural, religious,and economic aspects, with this list not being exhaustive.Past Australian Army doctrine gives limited consideration ofinformation terrain and human terrain; future doctrine willaddress these areas in more depth.The information terrain is an increasingly importantcomponent of the battlespace. It includes the individuals,organizations, and systems of both friendly and adversaryforces that collect, process, or disseminate information—aswell as the information itself. It also includes the civilianpopulation and governmental agencies that coordinateinternational efforts, non-governmental organizations, and thenews media. Accordingly, the information terrain and humanterrain are interconnected.Australian Army doctrine regarding information actionsneeds to address intelligence support, through the IPB, to all coreareas of information actions. Given recent operational feedbackand associated criticisms of current doctrine, we should placemore emphasis on intelligence support to influence, particularlyin respect to peace support and counterinsurgency operations.Much greater emphasis could be placed on defining, describing,and understanding the diverse groups and micro populationsthat may exist in an area of operations and areas of interest.For each segment of the population, as well as the overallpopulation, this would include aspects such as aspirations,motivations, goals, religions, leaders, leadership rivalries andassociated factions, alliances, loyalties, obligations, hatreds,daily rituals, historical dates and cultural norms.Likewise, the Australian Army is considering informationactions, its roles, and relationships across the five lines ofoperation considered within adaptive campaigning:1. Joint Land Combat - Involves actions to secure theenvironment, remove organized resistance, and set conditionsfor the other lines of operation;2. Population Protection - Provides protection and securityto threatened populations in order to set the conditions for there-establishment of law and order;3. Public Information - Informs and shapes the perceptions,attitudes, behavior, and understanding of target populationgroups;4. Population Support - Establishes/restores or temporarilyreplaces the necessary essential services in effectedcommunities;Commonwealth of Australia(Univ. of Texas)5. Indigenous Capacity Building - Nurtures establishment ofcivilian governance (local and central), security, police, legal,financial, and administrative systems.Based on contemporary operational experience, thereappears to be a growing recognition that Australia shouldadopt a broader, more comprehensive, yet more systematicapproach to information-related actions. The answer to currentdifficulties in applying information actions to operations isnot to abandon the concept, but to “think outside the box” andimprove on it.In order for this to occur, the Australian Army iscurrently developing doctrine to meet the needs of the tacticalcommander. This will further develop concepts discussed inthis article, to ensure that information actions broadly align tothe Australian joint IO approach, and help the Army implementits components of any or strategic shaping and influencing plan.Additionally, the Australian Army is cognizant of the ABCAProgram’s works, and of the need for doctrinal interoperabilitywith other nations.Development of Australian Army doctrine will enablerefinement of information actions land capabilities, byproviding guidance to commanders and their staffs on the mosteffective employment of IA-related capabilities across theIDI BOS. Underpinning this development is that informationactions are intrinsically one of the four types of activities:offensive, defensive, stability, and enabling. Accordingly, wemust plan information actions in conjunction with all aspectsof a military operation, to ensure success and relevance in thefuture complex operating environment —across all lines ofoperation.Defeat or Neutralize Extremists’ Use of theInternet?How Australia plans to defeat or neutralize extremist useof the Internet raises a number of issues. First and foremostare those actions undertaken by a ‘Whole of Government’41

approach: employing strategic, operational, andtactical capabilities that revolve around managementand domination of the electromagnetic spectrum. Yetwe must examine other issues relating to extremistInternet use: spectrum of interest; scenario generation;countering extremist Internet-based influence actions;risk mitigation; and national policy considerations.Spectrum of InterestFirst, it is important to look further afield than justthe extremist group. We must also acknowledge thatan extremist group attempts to influence an audience.This may range from a domestic population (with itsvarious sub-groups), where military or stabilization operationsare being conducted; to the domestic audience (includingpolitical) of the contributing coalition nations. More broadly,we must consider a world audience who may or may notbe sympathetic (depending on country, background, and/orculture) to the extremists’ cause. The latter audiences willhold ongoing interest in both what is occurring, and what isbeing released via Internet and other media. This may be dueto personal connections to the events as they unfold, a culturalor socio-economic link, or a base level interest centered simplyon curiosity.While adversary use of the Internet will continue andexpand, it is how coalition nations discredit adversary themesand messages across the majority of audiences described, thatmake adversarial Web influence actions redundant. Thus, theremainder of this article examines how adversaries seek to gaininfluence, versus dominate the electromagnetic spectrum froma technical perspective.Adversaries look to exploit the broad fringe populationswithin the spectrum of interest. In simple terms the adversaryseeks to: separate and splinter local populations againstoccupying forces or agencies, or for those groups that are neutralto the adversary and the coalition; or subvert them to providefull support by joining in adversary activities. Subversion couldbe achieved via the provision of finance, weapons, safe houses,or more simply just not providing information to an occupyingforce on known or intended adversary activities. Additionally,extremists will target contributing coalition nations’ troops andcommanders, in an attempt to affect morale and the overallsuccess of the military operation.Noting the extremists’ spectrum of relative interests,it is likely the same spectrum would apply to any coalitionconducting IO (Figure 2). In this author’s opinion, whatmakes coalition IO slow to counter extremist Internet use isnot an issue of technological superiority, nor lack of abilityto respond—but inflexible command structures that do notenable quick and effective counter-computer network ops.This is especially pertinent for audiences in the “friendlybut uncommitted,” “neutral,” or “inactive hostile” range ofinfluence.Scenario GenerationAn example of how extremists use information is reflectedin the following scenario:Figure 2. Spectrum of Interest.• Extremists react to the outcomes of a coalition tacticalaction by posting either staged, incomplete, or deliberatelyincorrect website transmissions, to gain maximum effect onone or more groups outlined in the spectrum of interest;• Coalition reaction (based on the ability to effectivelyupload accurate combat camera images or other imagery),devises a response at the tactical IO level in the area ofoperations;• A coalition response would require operational levelapproval, from those who vet—and if required—recommendchanges to any proposal. Additionally, forces may requestfurther guidance from experts at the military-strategic decisionmakinglevel, with the possibility of input from non-militarystrategic decision-makers and bureaucrats;• Concurrently (and noting the known delays imposedby command and control), extremists are planning to launchthe next information Web activity aimed at influencing thosepopulations within the spectrum of interest. One could interpretthat extremists’ second and third order Internet influenceactivities (possibly without a friendly counter-influence activitytargeting the first extremist Internet action) are inside theresponse cycle of a coalition or a single nation;• Accordingly, extremists can and will continue toforce coalition reactions to their Internet activity. In thisscenario, extremists identify and target the coalition’s criticalvulnerability of being unable to implement rapid response toWeb-based information actions.Countering Extremist Internet Based InfluenceActionsTo counter extremist dominance, in terms of uploadingtheir IO messages and disseminating a message quickly toachieve influence, coalition individuals/groups who conducttactical level IO need to be empowered. Leaders at brigadelevel and below must be able to make command decisionsabout the responses they devise, and to launch rapid counternetwork-based influence actions.This in conjunction with robust implementation of aMilitary Public Information plan that supports and highlightscoalition strengths, sending messages to the world’s mediaand domestic populations that compliment coalition Internetactions. Concurrently, PSYOP and CIMIC would look to buildon the influence that “neutral” or “hostile inactive” audiencesare exposed to via coalition Internet actions.42 Special Edition 2008

Risk MitigationAn associated risk of empowering the tactical IOcommander is that the tactical IO message may not exactlymirror the military-strategic IO message. We can mitigatethis risk by effective and direct communication between theIO command levels, enabling a detailed understanding of thestrategic shaping and influencing (S&I) plan established by a“Whole of Government “approach. Thorough understandingof the S&I plan, in addition to robust comprehension of theoperational and tactical IO themes and messages, will assist inrisk mitigation and ensure timely and appropriate responses.While the outcome of the proposed solution enables aquick response, some could still probably view it as reactive.However, it does have a second order effect of making thecoalition operational/tactical IO staff less encumbered bytime intensive staffing issues—and more empowered byproactive information Internet actions. Once implemented,such actions would force an extremist group to consider aninfluence response. Accordingly, the extremists’ ability of toget inside the coalition’s Web-based influence decision responsecycle starts to erode, forcing the extremists to respond to outinfluence activities.While an extremist group may choose not to respondwith counter Web-based influence activities, it is at this stage(acknowledging that technical attacks are a separate criticaltarget for extremists), that a coalition starts to achieve Webbaseddecision superiority. While this approach may notcompletely negate extremist use of the Internet, combined withtechnological domination of the electromagnetic spectrum,it will make extremists’ Web-based influence actions moredifficult.National Policy ConsiderationsAchieving influence “action-decision” superiority acrossthe spectrum of influence enables a coalitionto consider implementing more aggressivetargeting of extremists. Web-based informationdeception is but one example. To enableeffective information deception, nationalgovernments must consider Internet-basedrules of engagement that empower the tacticalcommander to launch information deceptionagainst Web-based extremists. While thisdelicate legal and ethical subject, in terms ofhow different nations empower their forces,we must acknowledge that extremists operateunder no such restraints. They are essentiallyfree to conduct Internet-based influence actionsas they desire.Extremists retain the ability to utilize theInternet for influence activity, knowing that acoalition is only able to conduct counter-actionsthat adhere to restrictive rules of engagement.Future examination of national policies andprocedures (at a military-strategic and politicalstrategiclevel), are needed in order for coalition Web-basedinfluence actions to encounter less operational hindrance.We could continue to hear comments such as “we are failingto win influence and are being defeated by technologicallycompetent extremists in the area of influencing perceptions,”unless there is a unified will to empower coalitions to conductinfluence operations free of encumbrances. Such freedom ofaction still needs to maintain the moral and ethical high ground,and be appropriately balanced. Yet it demands a tactical andoperational freedom of action which allows degradation ofextremist influence operations on the Internet. Accordingly,national governments need to empower the highest-levelmilitary-strategic decision-makers and strategic and operationalcommanders to authorize responsive, appropriate tactical-levelactions.From a non-technical perspective, preemptive or pro-activedislocation of extremist Internet presence is best achieved byimplementing an aggressive IO campaign which saturates theInternet with favorable messages. This should create a situationwhere extremists, in order to pursue their own IO Internetagenda, are forced to react to an overwhelming coalitionInternet influence campaign. Otherwise, extremists have anopen time frame within which they can initiate unhinderedsupport for their influence campaign.Combined with technological domination of theelectromagnetic spectrum, reflections presented here are justsome of what we need to further explore. In order to combatextremist use of the Internet, we must degrade their abilityto dominate influence activities. We must keep them fromreaching audiences within the spectrum of interest.Major James Nicholas, Australian Army, serves asStaff Officer Grade Two Intelligence, Surveillance andReconnaissance, and IO at the Land Warfare DevelopmentCenter. Other postings include Platoon Commander, GeneralEngineering is a Platoon, Logistic Support Force Army College ofTechnical and Further Education instructor, Faculty Adviser forLogistics Training, and Training Development Officer at theDefense Intelligence Training Center. His Intelligence Corpspostings include the Defense Intelligence Organization asGlobal Security Section Analyst and OIC 35 Security Section,1st Intelligence Bn. Major Nicholas deployed to the SolomonIslands in 2005. He holds a Masters in Education & TrainingDevelopment, a BA, and Diplomas in Teaching, VocationalEducation, and Training Development.43

Canada: Information OperationsBy Commander Derek Moss, Canadian NavyEditorial Abstract: Commander Moss notes that information is as important as forces, space, and time on the operationallevel. Canada’s IO definition has taken out references to “influence an adversary’s decision makers” implying that Canadacan now message target audiences that are not adversaries. He references Canadian Marshall McLuhan, who famouslywrote “the medium is the message.” Finally, CDR Moss notes that Canada has developed a increasingly accurate “measuresof effectiveness” (MOE) paradigm.IntroductionInformation Operations is oftentalked about in tones that suggest it isa panacea, created as an alternative tokinetic action. It is often performedby a group of staff officers who are,physically and by job description,removed from operators. Many talkabout it, but few understand it. Althoughnot entirely PSYOP or Public Affairs, itcoordinates and advises on both topics,and many more. This article definesCanadian IO concepts and direction,and offers recommendations for fightingextremists’ use of the Internet.Definition of InformationOperationsUntil recently, Canada definedinformation operations as “actions takenin support of national objectives thatinfluence an adversary’s decision-makersby affecting other’s information andinformation systems while exploitingand protecting one’s own informationand information systems and those ofour friends and allies.” An informationoperation is a “military advisory andcoordinating function that targets andaffects information and informationsystems, human or technical, of approvedparties in order to achieve desired effects,while protecting our own and those ofour allies.”Canada has now removed “influencean adversary’s decision-makers” fromthe definition of information operations.While perhaps only a difference insemantics, the implication of this changemay be that we can message targetaudiences that are not our adversaries.The people of Afghanistan spring tomind. An interesting question wouldbe, “does this target audience include theCanadian public?” From my personalperspective the answer would be yes,even though not formalized in Canadiandoctrine. If national opinion is a strategiccenter of gravity, information operationspractitioners had best form relations withthe Public Affairs section. Of coursethis brings to mind the question ofwhether we are embarking on a slipperyslope—though not if all your informationis correct, and the Public Affairs Office(PAO) is out front with the message.With respect to operational art, ouropinion is that information now rankson an equal level with forces, time,and space as the fourth operationalfactor. It is peculiar because the effectsit delivers happen in both the physicaland cognitive realms. That particularityhas two corollaries: First, only propertargeting and measurement of the effectswill allow for a reliable assessmentof information activities; Second, thewide range of effects allow for the useof information operations along the fullcontinuum of conflict for both domesticand international operations.Successful planning, conduct, andexecution of operations require that allmilitary and government agencies andorganizations involved must cooperateand their activities coordinated. Althoughthe term information operations isdefined as a military function, it mustbe coordinated with other governmentdepartments (OGD), or at least be deconflicted,in order to be successful.Further, information operations“Encompass political, economic, anddiplomatic efforts as well as defense andmilitary measures. Coordination amongall government departments, under theguidance and direction of the centralagencies, is crucial.” IO involves thethree “Ds” as follows:Elements of IOCanada’s current IO doctrine isbased on original input from 1998,Three D’s of IO. (Author)revised in 2004. Now Canada is workingclosely with NATO to update thelatter’s doctrine and also with the NorthAmerican Aerospace Defense Command(NORAD) and US Northern Command(NORTHCOM) IO Staffs. A comparisonof US and Canadian IO doctrine as it hasdeveloped from 1998 through February2006 (Figure 1), reveals the following:Canada believes that offensiveinformation operations include actionstaken to influence an adversary’s decisionmakers;and these operations may bedone by affecting kinetically or nonkineticallyan adversary’s use of or accessto information and information systems.Defensive information operations, fromCanada’s perspective, include actionstaken to protect one’s own informationand that of one’s friends and allies.Defensive IO ensures friendly decisionmakershave timely access to necessary,relevant, and accurate information; andensures that the friendly decision-makingprocess is protected from all adverseeffects, deliberate or accidental.Electronic Warfare (EW) isdefined as actions taken to exploitthe electromagnetic (EM) spectrumwhich encompasses the interceptionand identification of EM emissions. Itincludes the employment of EM energy,including directed energy, to reduce orprevent hostile use of the EM spectrumand actions to ensure its effective use byfriendly forces.44 Special Edition 2008

Computer network operations includedefensive, offensive, and exploitationactivities. Computer network attack(CNA) involves actions taken throughthe use of computer networks to disrupt,deny, degrade, or destroy informationresident in computers and computernetworks, or the computers and networksthemselves. Computer network defense(CND) involves actions taken throughthe use of computer networks to protect,monitor, analyze, detect, and respond tounauthorized activity within Departmentof Defense information systems andcomputer networks. Computer networkexploitation (CNE) enables operationsand intelligence collection capabilitiesconducted through the use of computernetworks to gather data from targetor adversary automated informationsystems or networks.Operations Security is theprocess which gives a militaryoperation appropriate security,using passive or active means,to deny the enemy knowledge ofthe dispositions, capabilities, andintentions of friendly forces.Deception is measuresdesigned to mislead the enemyby manipulation, distortion, orfalsification of information, toinduce them to react in a mannerprejudicial to his interests.Psychological Operationsare planned activities designed toinfluence attitudes and behaviors,affecting the achievement of political andmilitary objectives.Civil-Military Cooperation is amilitary function that supports thecommander’s mission by establishingand maintaining coordination andcooperation between the military forceand civilian actors in the commander’sArea of Operations.Public Affairs is a distinctivefunction within DND/CF that helpsestablish and maintain mutual linesof communications, understanding,acceptance, and cooperation between anorganization and its audiences.IO targets include decision-makers,perceptions, information systems, theC4ISR communication infrastructure,software, and data.Terrorism – the CanadianContextCanada is facing several terroristthreat elements: religious extremism,with various Sunni Islamic groupsbeing the most serious threat at present;state-sponsored terrorism; secessionistviolence, which encompasses Sikhextremism, and separatist movements inSri Lanka, Turkey, Ireland and the MiddleEast; and domestic extremism, includingsome anti-abortion, animal rights,anti-globalization, and environmentalgroups. Plus there exists a small butreceptive audience for militia messagesemanating from the United States, whitesupremacists, and elsewhere.With the possible exception ofthe United States, there are moreFigure 1. CA & US doctrines compared. (Author)international terrorist organizationsactive in Canada than anywhere in theworld. This situation can be attributed toCanada’s proximity to the United Stateswhich currently is the principal target ofterrorist groups operating internationally;and to the fact that Canada, a countrybuilt upon immigration, represents amicrocosm of the world. It is thereforenot surprising that the world’s extremistelements are represented here, along withpeace-loving citizens, as part of Diasporacommunities.Most terrorist activities in Canadaare in support of actions elsewhere. Inrecent years, terrorists from differentinternational terrorist organizations havecome to Canada posing as refugees.Other activities include:• Fund-raising and lobbying throughfront organizations;• Providing support for terroristoperations in Canada or abroad;• Procuring weapons and materiel,coercing and manipulating immigrantcommunities, facilitating transit toand from the United States and othercountries, and other illegal activities.All of these functions are facilitatedby the use of the Internet, and remainamong the core components of cyberterrorism.One of the sponsoring registrars forHizballah is Register.com located in NewYork (but with offices in many places).The municipality and province providedhundreds of thousands of dollars in perksto convince it to locate operations inYarmouth, (southeastern) Canada.And, it has a very specific policyfor dealing with cases wheresomeone reports a domain beingused for illegal purposes.“This policy includesreviewing the content to determinethe validity of the report and, ifapplicable, disabling the domainand notifying the customer ofthe reason for this action,” saysWendy Kennedy, the firm’smanager of public relations andcustomer marketing. “At times,Register.com has also reachedout to law enforcement to reportsuspicious activity.”But the servers in Yarmouth are byno means the only ones in Canada whereterrorist-related content may be residing.Until a few weeks ago, the website for AlQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, one of themost extensive and regularly updated ofits kind, was registered to a building neardowntown Toronto. The address belongsto Contactprivacy, the anonymousregistrationarm of Canadian domainnameprovider Tucows Inc. After itsWeb-hosting service in Germany wasalerted to the Maghreb site and pulled theplug earlier this year, Tucows followedsuit. But in an environment wheresimilar sites are popping up daily, it wasa small victory.45

Porn versus TerrorYears ago, authorities noticed thatchild pornography websites, thoughoften operated from outside NorthAmerica, made use of North Americananonymous-registration services. Inresponse, a large number of watchdoggroups began hunting down such sitesto force the registration firms to shutthem down. Wade Deisman, Directorof the National Security Working Groupnear the University of Ottawa, notedin August 2007 that “There’s nothingnear that level [of public monitoring]with terrorist websites” and “I haven’tseen anything that comes even closeto addressing this issue.” If you shutdown a terrorist site, you still can’tarrest it’s originator. If you keepit going, you can at least monitorthe site.Countering Terrorist Use ofthe InternetTerrorist use of the Internetcan be countered when a terroristattack is computer based;is orchestrated by a foreigngovernment, terrorist group, orpolitically motivated extremists; oris done for purposes of espionage,sabotage, foreign influence, orpolitically motivated violence.Ward Elcock, Canadian SecurityIntelligence Service (CSIS)Director to the National JointCommittee of Senior CriminalJustice Officials, noted on 22 November2001 that “Our role is to determine whatis out there so as to provide adequatewarning to government and, whereappropriate, to law enforcement agenciesabout threats to the security of Canada,in particular from terrorism. If we loseour ability to do so, then Canadians andour allies will have been ill served.” Thethreat of attacks on critical informationsystems and the infrastructures thatdepend on them will, in the foreseeablefuture, be almost impossible to eliminateentirely, owing to the fact that attacktools, networks, and network controlsystems are constantly evolving. As newtechnologies develop, so too will newattack tools along with the sophisticationof the perpetrators who use them.The Canadian Cyber IncidentResponse Center (CCIRC) is the nationalfocal point for addressing cyber securityissues. A component of the governmentoperations center, it is located under thenational emergency response system.CCIRC is the focal point for reportingreal or imminent threats and incidents.It includes a threats and vulnerabilityidentification and analysis, early warningdissemination, and incident strategicresponse and coordination elements.P r o t e c t i n g C a n a d a ’ stelecommunications networks is a jobtoo big and too important for any onecompany or government. Therefore:• A partnership approach to cyberDominion of Canada (Wikimedia)security provides the momentum, speed,and flexibility required to addressemergencies and the challenges presentedby emerging technologies;• I n d u s t r y C a n a d a , a s t h elead government department fortelecommunications, has establishedthe Canadian TelecommunicationsCyber Protection Working Group(CTCP) to promote industry-to-industry,government-to-industry, and industry-togovernmentcooperation in protectingCanadian networks;• Industry Canada and theC T C P Wo r k i n g G r o u p h a v eestablished the Canadian Networkfor Security Information Exchange(CNSIE) to promote collaborationamong larger communities of cybersecurity stakeholders such as thetelecommunications, financial, energy,and vendor communities and othergovernment departments;• Collaboration has been establishedwith domestic and international partnerssuch as the Canadian Cyber IncidentResponse Center (CCIRC), as wellas the US and UK Network SecurityInformation Exchanges.Short-term SolutionsTwo agencies, the Royal CanadianMounted Police (RCMP) and CSIS,are lead counterterrorism elements inCanada. They have access to a widerange of investigative tools and powers—including physical surveillance,interception of communications(telephone, computer, pager,etc.), and recruitment of humansources or agents who canreport on suspects’ activitiesand intentions. Legislation,ministerial directions, and policydefine what can be investigatedand which tools can be usedunder what circumstances. Manypowers require prior ministerialand judicial authorization. Inaddition, both agencies aresubject to independent review.Just because an investigativecapability is lawful and availabledoes not mean it will be useda u t o m a t i c a l l y. C a n a d i a nintelligence and law enforcementagencies do not have the human andtechnological resources to target allpotential targets all the time. For the mostpart, they focus on two categories—first,leaders and principal organizers andsecond, those who represent a seriousthreat in that they are known to haveengaged in terrorist activity in the pastor are believed to be planning futureterrorist action in Canada or abroad.Investigations involving targetsresiding, working, or hiding in Diasporacommunities may present seriouschallenges. Police and intelligenceagencies may not possess the requisitelinguistic skills, or may be unable topenetrate closely-knit groups usinghuman sources or agents. They may46 Special Edition 2008

face resistance to requests for communitycooperation, may fail in attempts torecruit new officers from within thecommunity, and may even be unableto find individuals prepared to workas translators. They may be forced totake extraordinary measures to protectthe identity of agents or employeeswho fear for their safety in closely-knitDiaspora communities. Such measuresmay include:• Joint investigations involvingCanadian and foreign police orintelligence agencies. Terrorist globalconnections and movements call forglobal cooperation to track them andprevent them from taking violent actions.CSIS has reported that it has cooperationarrangements with about 230 agenciesin about 130 countries, while manyforeign police and security agencies havepermanent liaison staff in Canada.• Designation of individuals orentities associated with terrorist activity.Canada did adopt a designation processfor terrorists, terrorist groups, or statesponsors of terrorism after 11 September.By October 2003, the Canadian listincluded 31 organizations—10 eachbased in the Middle East and Asia, fourbased in South America, three in Africa,and one in Europe.• Security screening of applicationsfor refugee or permanent resident statusor for Canadian citizenship. If terrorismlinks surface during backgroundchecks, the government may commencedeportation action. Additionally, theCanadian Government can expelsuspected terrorists under special securityprovisions of the Immigration Act, andhas done so more than a dozen times.• Screening of people and goodsat ports of entry. Transport Canada,Immigration and Citizenship Canada, theCanada Customs and Revenue Agency,and other organizations have enhancedtheir screening for terrorist connectionssince 11 September. A new agency, theCanadian Air Transport Security Agency,performs this role at Canadian airports.Long-term SolutionCanadian security and intelligenceagencies seek to build positive counterterrorismrelationships with someDiaspora leaders and groups in thefollowing ways:• Consultations and briefings onpolicy or legislative proposals (forexample, those affecting changes inimmigration/refugee criteria or charityregulations);• Membership on advisoryboards (the RCMP Commissioner’sMulticultural Advisory Committee, forexample);• Community liaison with policeofficers assigned to specific Diasporacommunities to raise awareness,increase confidence, and promote opencooperation with Canadian authorities;• Direct requests for help andcooperation, usually through communityleaders or associations (such as theCanadian Arab Federation) and inconnection with specific events (forexample, visits to Canada by controversialforeign leaders) or in relation to specificinvestigations.Change: Information Operationsin OperationsIt wouldn’t be a Canadian articlewithout a shameless reference to afamous native son. (William Shatner,Mike Myers, John Candy, or any otherHollywood hack will not be quoted.)Instead, the reference here is to MarshallMcLuhan (see book jacket), a nameendured by many Canadians duringpainful undergrad classes.One of McLuhan’s lesser knownbooks (pictured), is strangely prescient.Although not prescriptive, the book’sthesis, broadly speaking, is that historicalchanges in communications and craftmedia change human consciousness,and that modern electronics arebringing humanity full circle to anindustrial analogue of tribal mentality,what he termed “the global village.”By erasing borders and dissolvinginformation boundaries, electronictelecommunications are fated to rendertraditional social structures like the nationstate and the university irrelevant.McLuhan’s book was written in1967 yet it has a lasting premise. Shortlywe’ll discuss how we apply it today. Butfirst we need to explore an earlier work,Understanding Media: The Extensionsof Man, source of McLuhan’s mostfamous quote:In a culture like ours, longaccustomed to splitting and dividingall things as a means of control, it issometimes a bit of a shock to be remindedthat, in operational and practical fact,the medium is the message. This ismerely to say that the personal and socialconsequences of any medium—that is, ofany extension of ourselves—result fromthe new scale that is introduced into ouraffairs by each extension of ourselves,or by any new technology.Two examples highlight changesintroduced by technology. First, RanaFM is a Canadian Forces radio stationbroadcasting in Afghanistan but locatedin Kingston, Ontario (two hours outside ofToronto). The broadcast is recorded onsiteand digitally transmitted via satellite.Rana FM uses an effective listenerfeedback capability, the only one in thearea of operations. Callers to the station,whether by phone or text message, call alocal Afghanistan number and have theirmessage recorded to an in-theatre digitalrepository. This message is stored andquickly forwarded to Kingston and puton the air, with only a 0.6 second delay.Rana has demonstrated its potential to bea giant campaign-winning enabler withits interactive nature since OperationAthena on 6 January 2007. Rana can be47

heard in Kandahar City, the KandaharAirfield region, in Sperwan Ghar and,shortly, in Spin Boldak (but spare partsare scarce).Second, My Thum is a cell phoneaggregator that also develops applicationsfor automated responses (SMS, voice,or the Internet) to cell calls or Internetcontacts. My Thum services the radioindustry in the Toronto area. It worksby accessing all of the local cell phonecarriers, and setting up a system thataggregates these carriers with onenumber (an SMS “short code” which issimply an easily remembered six digitnumber that callers can recall and dialfrom any cell system). The short codeautomatically brings any cell carrier user/customer to an automated response thatis either voice or SMS in the case of cellphones (or the Internet if so desired).The caller is guaranteed a response.Commercially, My Thum is usedmainly for contests and have great utilityfor “polling the audience” safely andinexpensively. The automated responsecan and usually is set to automaticallyanswer and offer an ‘invitation’ to join thestation’s ‘club’ to receive early advisorieson programs, contests, etc. Because thelaw in Canada requiresusers to agree to receiveSMS from ‘businesses,’this automated systeminvites them to join,thus agreeing to receivewhatever messages aresent to them.Measures ofEffectiveness (MOE)MOE are developedas part of the planningprocess to determine theeffects of IO activities.MOE must link our IOcoordinated activities(cause) to the responsegenerated by adversarialcapabilities and decisionmakers.The initial objectivesset the course, but MOEact as the rudder in orderto maintain that course.MOE feedback allows IO plannersthe ability to revise, create, and deleteIO objectives and themes as required,in order to support the commander’smission. Regardless of its importance,the conduct of a MOE has been largelyoverlooked. Within Canada, we havedeveloped such a system and have used itsuccessfully in two missions (OperationsHalo and Athena). J3 InformationOperations leads the MOE effort bydeveloping a combination of quantitativeor objective questions and qualitativeor subjective questions that are felt toaccurately reflect the information neededto establish whether an objective is beingmet. These questions are then distributedto appropriate stakeholders such asCanada’s Assistant Deputy Minister forPolicy, PA, intelligence and those intheatre. Once the answers are receivedthey are compiled by the J3 InformationOperations staff and are then assigned avalue of “met, partially met, or not met”to each objective. The final product issent back to the contributing stakeholdersto seek agreement on the assessment.ConclusionsOverall, Canada has a very robusttelecommunications industry which,through close collaboration with thegovernment, is able to mitigate manycyber attacks against communicationnetworks. As an example, the recentattacks against Estonia, which causeda significant stir and amounted to notmuch more than a national five-dayinconvenience, would have causeda five minute disruption in Canada.This has nothing to do with advancedtechnology. In fact, Estonia is one ofthe most communications-advancedcountries in the world. Canadiansuccesses are the result of a vestedinterest in the telecommunicationsindustry in maintaining a robust systembased on redundant technologies andno single points-of-failure. Short-termtechnological solutions will be anongoing, iterative process until longertermsocial solutions are found. Longtermsolutions will not eliminate theproblem, but they will make it moremanageable.Commander Derek Moss underwent indoctrination training atthe Naval Officer Training Center in Esquimalt, British Columbia andwas subsequently posted to HMCS Terra Nova in Halifax, Nova Scotia. TerraNova was tasked with several exercises in Europe, goodwill visits in the GreatLakes, and multiple operations off the coast of Haiti. In 1998 he served as DeckOfficer on the HMCS Toronto where, as the east coast flagship, he took part inexercises off the coast of Canada, the United States, and the Caribbean. In 2001Cdr Moss joined HMCS St. John’s, deploying to the North Arabian Sea andArabian Gulf as Combat Officer and, eventually, Plans Officer for CommanderTask Group 54.1. He went ashore to the Canadian Forces Maritime WarfareCenter, where he held subsequent appointments as Electronic Warfare andAnti-Air Warfare Tactical Development Officer. Following a very rewardingExecutive Officer tour aboard HMCS Winnipeg, CDR Moss was appointedInformation Operations section head at Canadian Forces Expeditionary ForcesCommand Headquarters, in Ottawa. He holds an undergraduate degree inMedia Communications from the University of Ottawa, and a Masters inDefense Studies through the Royal Military College of Canada.48 Special Edition 2008

Israel: Information Operations Threats AndCountermeasuresBy Tomer Ben-AriEditorial Abstract: Mr. Ben-Ari calls for a more proactive response to cyber threats, in order to win on the new “cyberfront.” Proactive steps include controlling the number of terrorist websites and their content, creating a search and downloaddetection engine for suspected terrorist activity, surveilling Internet communications devices, identifying insider help, andconcluding international conventions and local legislation. Ben-Ari sees Israel’s vulnerabilities as spam/phishing attacksand terrorist use of webcams. He also explores extremists perceptions of a hundred year war.IntroductionThe use of information operations (IO) by terroristorganizations is here to stay. Conflicts with terror organizationssuch as Hizballah and Hamas show that with the use of IO,even attacking the civilian population can be achieved easily.As a result, Israel has changed its approachto IO within the last decade. The country’sleadership realizes IO is a real threat thatcan easily create massive physical andcognitive damage, to civilians and militarypersonnel alike. Several measures havebeen taken in order to protect criticalinfrastructure, to include countermeasures.Yet a defensive approach is not enough—weneed a proactive approach in order to win acyber war. The software solutions offeredhere focus on active counter-methods. Twovulnerabilities serve as immediate threats for Israel to confront:spam and phishing attacks; and the explosion of webcams asa concrete threat.IO Roadmap of Terror OrganizationsDr. Boaz Ganor, a well-known counterterrorism researcher,defines the potential of terror as the sum of the motivation andoperational capability of terror groups. The use of IO directlyincreases both capabilities and motivation in a significant way,plus at a relatively low cost and minimal risk. The increasinguse of IO warfare tools will surely increase the spread andmagnitude of terror worldwide, as well as its sophisticationand ability to avoid interception. The facts clearly indicatethat the use of IO will become more popular in the yearsto come, due to Western societies’ (followed by developingcountries) increasing dependence on computer systems for alloperations—in almost every aspect of life. Dr. Ganor claimsthat Al Qaeda’s global terrorist warfare is one of the mostdangerous threats ever mounted against mankind; furthermore,it is more lethal than the threat posed by the Cold War’s nuclearconfrontation between America and the Soviet Union. Dr.Ganor points out several characteristics of contemporaryterrorism:• The first characteristic is that Al Qaeda and its affiliates arenot bound by any geographical or national restraints. Today alQaeda and its affiliates are dispersed in many lands, especiallyin lawless regions, but also have cells in Western countries.The cyber world has no law, limits, or constraints. Computersystems and networks are interconnected and accessible fromanywhere, thus there is no need to physically be present insome geographic area to exploit them. Additionally, thereare many security flaws in current systems. It takes a longtime to fix them, leaving them vulnerable forsome time. Moreover, we don’t know everyvulnerability—there are lots of viruses andvulnerabilities found daily. As terroristsuse the Web to organize, recruit, and gatherintelligence (and exploit information) itwill be much more difficult to fight terrorgroups, find them, or trace their operations.They are able to hide just about anywhere,Israeli Defense Forces insignia.do all communications over the Web, exploit(Wikimedia)vulnerabilities, and cause real damage.• Second, Al Qaeda and its affiliates are interested inemploying weapons of mass destruction represents a transitionfrom conventional to non-conventional terrorism. Thereare cookbooks available on the Web offering “step by step”instructions on how to make bombs and other lethal weapons.By using Web communications it will be easier to interact withresearchers that are trying to develop chemical, biological, andnuclear weapons, and are willing to sell their knowledge forextra income. It is relatively easy to influence people anywhereto develop these weapons, and to use them to serve mutual goalsof both terror organizations and their collaborators.• Third, Al Qaeda and its affiliates believe they are waging a“100 years” war, in which they will ultimately prevail, no matterhow many years it will take to achieve their objectives. This isa non-rational perception of time. World leaders have a toughtime convincing their civilian populations to fight such longwars, yet civilians demand immediate security. This perceptionof time by terrorists, the strength of terror movements, isopposite and irrational for nation states. Most believe currentIO threats such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS)attacks, partial damage to government services, communicationbetween service cells, and information gathering are stillfar less damaging than a 9/11 attack. Nevertheless, terroristorganizations believe that as the Web and computerizedsolutions develop in the forthcoming years, our lives willbecome captive to a handful of computers. This will enablethem to find weak points in the civil and governmental systems,49

and cause massive damage in the long run. Due to the fact thatthey only need to succeed a few times out of many attempts,it’s only a question of time before they will be able to causesignificant damage on an ongoing basis.• Fourth, Al Qaeda’s pre-9/11 organizational structure haschanged from a structured, hierarchical organization witha decision making process based on command and controlprinciples, into its current flat and cellular organizationalstructure. After losing much of its infrastructure in Afghanistanas well as the ability to move freely, Al Qaeda began usingother Islamic terrorist organizations as proxies to carry outtheir operations. Spreading the message and recruiting overthe Web can prove to be a tremendous unexpected proxy. Byusing simple cyber recruitment tactics, organizations like AlQaeda’s can easily outsource their operational attacks—evento individuals.All of these factors indicatethat information operations are hereto stay. Countries must encourageresearch and the development of toolsto resolve these and future IO threats,to avoid being surprised at the end ofthe day.IO in IsraelCyber threats have been indecision-maker and intelligenceforces’ crosshairs since computersstarted playing a major role in ourdefense forces and day-to-day lives.At first governments didn’t see cyberthreats as another war zone, but as away of gathering critical intelligenceinformation on forces, strategies,and facilities. In the past 10-12years Israel has changed this thoughtprocess. Today Israel understandsthat cyber threats are actually anotherwar front. Cyber attacks will not bedirected only at defense forces, but willmainly attempt to interrupt and affect the civilian population.This occurred during the Second Lebanese War [2006], whenIsrael’s adversaries attempted to demoralize the civilianpopulation by aiming thousands of missiles at them. Throughtheir massive exposure to computerized services, civilians willserve as a main front in a future cyber war. Damage to bankingsystems, traffic control systems, or major news websites (toinclude taking them hostage) can cause chaos, damage, andfear. In the past 10 years more and more government officesbegan providing Web services, making these more essentialand more common in the public sector. Government and civilsector services are the main factors in our day-to-day lives.Continuing disruptions of critical infrastructure might raise thequestion “Can this government really defend and secure us?”Governments recognize that disruptions of websites, even if notcausing an immediate security crisis, can motivate more andmore people to try to hack and cause further problems.Republic of Israel (Univ. of Texas)Israel is facing increasing attacks on its computerinfrastructure, averaging approximately 20-40 thousandattempted attacks every day, mainly against governmentwebsites and services. There is a real fear these may expandto more serious attacks: such as data corruption; data gatheringand spying operations; traffic disruption; and the spread ofdisinformation thru media sites.During the Second Lebanese War, Hizballah opened awebsite hosted in Iran. Launched in English, Arabic, andFarsi (and after the war in Hebrew), the site offered reports onthe Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and the political situation inIsrael. This Web effort was a well planned attempt to influenceIsraeli public opinion. It also turned out that Israel sufferedfrom critical information leaks. Anyone could easily findmovies, pictures, and operational charts that included frequencynetwork channels, soldiers’ equipment, and tactical memos.Classified information from the “BinatJabel Fight” was also available. BinatJabel is a village in southern Lebanonwhich is considered as Hizballah’smain area. The Second LebaneseWar saw intense fighting there, thoughthe IDF eventually managed to takecontrol of the town—a major turningpoint in that war. On the other hand,Hizballah had modern equipmenton the battlefield including cameras.Photos and movies didn’t find theirway to the Web in an uncontrolledway. It is believed that rocket strikelocations were reported to Hizballahin real-time via the Web, which helpedthem improve their aim. Further,a huge number of websites weredefaced as protests against Israel, toinclude NASA, Microsoft, Universityof California at Berkeley, and USGovernment pages. The hackersused Structured Query Language(SQL) injection techniques to extractusers’ names and passwords, then used this access to changewebsite content. In order to motivate supporters, especially theyounger generation, Hizballah recently launched a computergame named “Special Forces 2.” The game imitates events thatactually happened, such as kidnapping soldiers, firing rocketson Israeli towns, and participating in guerrilla battles. Basedon recent experiences, Israel changed its attitude toward the IOthreat, and established units that will deal with this problem ona daily basis. These new organizations will provide preventiveinstructions, consulting options, and tools.Defensive OperationsIsrael’s definition of IO is similar to Ivan Goldenberg’sdefinition, who claims that information warfare is the offensiveand defensive use of information and information systems todeny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy an adversary’s information,50 Special Edition 2008

information-based processes, information systems, andcomputer-based networks while protecting one’s own. Suchactions are designed to achieve advantages over military,political, or business adversaries. This definition is sometimesminimized to the following: “Taking the offensive on thecomputer services of the enemy while defending one’s owncomputerized services: defending and securing the secrecy ofthe service while maintaining its availability.”Israel has established the National Data ProtectionAuthority (NPDA) to lead the way in information warfaremeasures. This authority is responsible for securing governmentoffices and services from possible offensive operations. NPDAleads the research and countermeasures effort against anyinformation warfare danger. The authority is under IsraeliShabak (Israel’s internal security service, the equivalent ofthe US Federal Bureau of Investigation) supervision. In orderto better deal with information warfare dangers, the primeminister’s office has adapted a data protection doctrine to beapplied to all government infrastructures defined as critical.Fundamentals of Israeli protection doctrine are:• Information Mapping: Each office and critical institutewould examine and categorize data as sensitive or nonsensitiveinformation, according to twomain parameters: classified informationand vital information. The latter meansinformation which needs to be keptavailable and reliable at all times.Each entity receives a risk analysisbased on information exposure and use.This includes possible threats, currentvulnerabilities, increasing risks, andcountermeasures taken;• The Human Factor: Offices mustminimize human errors, theft, fraud,or misuse of information. Therefore,each employee should be questionedand checked thoroughly. Connectionswith outsourcing companies should be reduced to a minimum.Employee training is provided on how to identify and track asocial engineering attack;• Logic Protection: Each office will define a managementpolicy for all the computer data systems. Each user will beable to access only the resources that were authorized to him.Password usage is a must. Biometric devices will be combinedon some of the systems. Logical monitoring will look forsuspicious acts within the system’s log;• Physical Protection: Employees must reduce the numberof printed documents, limit access to printing rights, andprevent the exposure of classified information to optical ormagnetic devices. Secure data transfer between differententities is required. Employees ensure only unclassified datais put on personal computers.• Disaster Recovery Planning (DRP): Preventing disruptionsand sabotage to an entity’s ongoing work processes, andprotecting critical processes from deliberate damage orunexpected failure are absolute necessities. This process willenable the quick restoration of the system to its former statusbefore a collapse starts. Organizations must maintain statusof their systems at all times.• Network and Internet Security: Access to internal datashould be limited based on management roles. There willbe no direct connection between office data and websites.Office websites will have a secure zone for their computers.Establishing firewalls on all networks, plus consistentlychecking for Trojan horses, viruses, and other malicioussoftware is required.Countering Cyber Terror Methods andRecommendationsIn order to win on the cyber front, we require proactivesteps. In order to prevail in cyberspace, protection of valuableresources is not enough—we need offensive action in order toreduce a terrorist organization’s impact.• The first action to take is to control the number of terroristwebsites and terrorist content on the Web. Here, one personcan look like a whole army. It is very easy to appear to be apowerful and large organization by opening many websites,then generating content and traffic. Moreover, unlike real life,on the Web people do not die: their message can stay forever.A combination of DDOS attacks againstterrorist websites, plus legislation thatprohibits terrorist propaganda on theWeb will significantly reduce the amountof terrorist content. We should alsoconsider deliberate actions make someselected sites serve as “honey traps.”• The second action is to create asearch and download detection engine.It is possible to know the IP address ofthe websites one visits, and the filesWestern Wall webcam, Jerusalem.downloaded. If searched information(Window on the Wall)looks suspicious, for example too manysearches for maps, plans, and data of theEmpire State Building, then security authorities should checkout the person(s) making those queries• Third is surveillance of Internet communication devices.Emails describing the planned 9/11 attacks were found onAl Qaeda computers. These communications are not limitedto email, but extend to other text and voice communicationdevices such as Skype or MSN Messenger. Detection softwaresearching for suspicious information transfers can detectextremist actions prior to implementation.• Fourth, one must identify insider help. An employee of acritical organization can help extremists get control of computersystems within an organization. Possible scenarios are openingspecific ports or connecting a wireless device to the network.With insider help, extremists can remotely log into the network,access software, and cause damage. A system to gather andanalyze all system transactions in an organization can recognizeabnormal behavior, which may imply a potential attack.• The fifth action, probably the basic factor for all of theabove counter-solutions, is legislation. Currently there are no51

strict rules on what is legal or illegal in the cyber arena, thusmany loopholes exist. In order to win the battle against cyberterror, we should be prepared to pay a price in personal freedom.What rights are we willing to give up when using the Webin order to ensure security? This question is critical and weshould answer. Further, existing rules vary from one country toanother. In order to succeed in this war, we must legislate strictrules—and international conventions must be signed.Immediate Cyber ThreatsMany of the terrorist threats that are being discussed todayrequire intensive and sophisticated development. Yet twotypes of threats can be developed quickly, using off-the-shelftechnologies and a relatively small group of people. Theseimmediate concerns are spam/phishing attacks, and webcamexploitation.• Spam and Phishing can become attractive to terroristgroups, not merely as a tool to spread their messages, but also toraise funds and recruit members. More importantly, spam can beused by terrorists to influence non-members of a terrorist groupto carry out attacks that coincide with the terrorists’ goals andplans. Such connections allow coordinate among a dispersed,heterogeneously motivated network of activists. Now wecommonly assume that some Islamic terrorist organizations willonly recruit staunch believers to carry out attacks (especiallysuicide attacks), but in the future they may use “outsourcing”techniques—and will find the right justification for doing so.The trigger may be lack of resources, or the clear logistical andoperational benefits of “outsourced” activities. Worse, it mayresult in higher quality attacks.The main features that make spam and phishing attractiveto terrorists are:1. Anonymity and difficultyof tracing;2. Low cost to reach a largeaudience, hence the ability toengage in a large number ofinitiatives;3. Leverage in reachingnew and otherwise inaccessibleaudiences;4. Ability to recruit operativesfrom within the society underattack;5. Ability to spread fear, evenwithout any action being taken.A f t e r d e t e c t i n g a n dcommunicating with possiblecarriers, their communicationscan be moved to more securesystems.•Webcams for Surveillanceand Information Gathering:These days there are manycameras on the Web. These arevery simple and cheap to install;some are wireless and otherssatellite-based, and all are reasonably priced. Some webcamsare private, showing entertainment places, malls, and privatehomes, while others are government-based, showing touristplaces, traffic junctions, and streets. Webcam host sites canalso serve as a webcam search engine. Combined with softwareproducts such as Google Maps and Microsoft Live Maps thatuse cameras combined with static photos, we can view everystreet corner. In the future, as network pipes become wider andnetwork traffic faster, we will have live scenes on those samestreet corners.By exploiting these webcams, terror organizationscan acquire intelligence on specific targets without steppingfoot on them. Moreover, video information can be analyzedby computer vision algorithms. Based on technology availabletoday, it’s not difficult to access a specific webcam and analyzeits data stream. For instance, how many people cross a specificstreet each day and at what times, or how many police carspass? Such software would create reliable, long-term, wellanalyzedinformation about happenings in many differentplaces. Extremists could separately and easily monitor multiplelocations, without putting their spies at risk.ConclusionIsrael believes that IO will become an essential weapon inthe future in any war or actions against terrorists. Since it willbecome easier to hit Western society using IO methods, Israelmust be prepared to take offensive methods and measures.Resources should be invested in finding vulnerabilities andfixing them. Catching terror groups before their actual missionand detecting IO attacks prior to the point where massivedamage is done is the goal of offensive actions. Legislation andworldwide cooperation should be enhanced as well in order togenerate effective solutions.Tomer Ben-Ari has mainly focused on IO and cyber issuessince 2003. His research is focused on helping decision-makersdeal with possible threats and providing countermeasures as well. He hasdesigned and developed a large range of software products mainly in thedata management area for the following companies\institutions: IDF, Intel,GDH and currently Top Image systems (TISA). He is adept at pointingout possible threats from terrorist groups in cyberspace. He combined hisresearch with Israel’s International Disciplinary Center’s InternationalInstitute for Counterterrorism. Together with Dr. Boaz Ganor and Dr. RonRymon, Mr. Ben-Ari published papers at conferences, including “TheSecurity and Privacy in Information Society” held in Germany in 2005and “The Advanced Program of the Information Management Association”in 2007 in Canada. A recognized international speaker, he has providedcouncil to different governments. From 2001 he has served as a softwareengineer and system architect for many software systems for the Israeliarmy and the private sector. He holds a BA and an MS in computerscience from the Inter Disciplinary Center, Hertzliya, Israel.52 Special Edition 2008

Information Operations In SenegalBy Antoine Wardini, Colonel, Senegalese ArmyEditorial Abstract: Colonel Wardini notes information technology is slowly making inroads in Senegal. As a result, IOefforts focus on support to public affairs, civil-military operations, and defense support to public diplomacy. Psychologicaloperations and winning hearts and minds are implied in such an approach. Of special interest to the US is that China hasannounced its intention to finance the final steps of setting up Senegal’s government Intranet.IntroductionInformation is a strategic resource,vital to national security. Militaryoperations depend on informationand information systems for manysimultaneous and integrated activities.Since the 1960s, there have beenextraordinary improvements in thetechnical means of transmission,protection, collection, storage, andanalysis of data, which have allowedsignificant improvements in theexploitation of the information domain.Information Operations is anevolving discipline within the military.It has emerged from earlier conceptsoriginating in the 1990s and takesinto account lessons learned fromthe Gulf War(s), phenomena such asthe so-called “CNN Effect,” and theenormous advances in informationtechnology. Today Germany leads aNATO multinational effort on developinginformation operations as an integratingfunction/joint mission area within themilitary, called the “MultinationalInformation Operations Experiment”(MNIOE).This concept of informationoperations is somewhat new to mostmilitary experts. However, it is acceptedworldwide that the instantaneouscapability of transmitting informationtoday is a serious issue for all, and thata “hot talking image” is worth 10,000words.Information operations are defined as“the integrated employment of electronicwarfare, computer network operations,psychological operations, militarydeception, and operations security, inconcert with specified supporting andrelated capabilities, to influence, disrupt,corrupt, or usurp adversarial humanand automated decision making whileprotecting our own.” In other words,information operations can be definedas actions taken to affect adversaryinformation and information systemswhile defending one’s own.The purpose of this doctrine is toprovide joint force commanders (JFC)and their staffs guidance to help prepare,Senegalese Forces symbol.(Ministry of Armed Forces Senegal)plan, execute, and address informationoperations in support of joint operations.The principal goal is to achieve andmaintain information superiority overthe enemy.In order to tackle our topicprogressively, one must understandthe military capabilities of InfluenceOperations. They focus on affectingthe perceptions and behavior of leaders,groups, or entire populations. Influenceoperations employ capabilities thatprotect operations, communicatethe commander’s intent, and projectaccurate information to achieve desiredeffects. Ultimately, these should resultin differing behaviors or changes in theadversary’s decision cycle, which alignswith the commander’s objectives.Military capabilities of InfluenceOperations consist of:• Psychological operations (PSYOP)• Military deception (MILDEC)• Operations security (OPSEC)• Counterintelligence (CI) operations• Counterpropaganda operations• Public affairs (PA) operationsContextWith an approximately 90% Muslimpopulation, Senegal is—and still remains—a secular country, as mentioned inthe constitution and enjoyed by itsinhabitants. Senegal has never undergonea military putsch (coup d’état), andbesides the well-controlled rebellion inthe south, has never been threatened byany kind of external instability. This signof stability is unique in our sub-regionwhere the countries bordering Senegalhave experienced, at least one time, aputsch. Senegal belongs to the Saharanregion, a remote desert-like area, targetedby Islamic extremists as a potentialsanctuary for future activities.Social AspectWe can define Senegal’s knownthreats as poverty, drought, disease,political issues, growing Islamicmovements, drugs, and refugees. Allare internal problems the governmenthas to deal with as first priorities. Inother words, today’s enemy is no longerthe conventional army right next door;well organized and structured, fighting53

organizing facilities). Media aresometimes invited to the front linesto cover military operations, through“embedding” ground rules established bythe designated PA staff. In liaison withthe ground commander’s staff, DIRPAprovides ways to get friendly messagesto the target audience.In the civil military operations(CMO) field, the armed forces help toimprove the welfare of the populationby taking part in the country’s social andeconomic development. Accordingly,commanders conduct CMO to addressthe root causes of instability, to assist inreconstruction after a conflict or disaster,and to conduct other military operationsindependently—but in support of—national security objectives. CMO, bytheir nature, affect public perceptions intheir immediate vicinity. Distribution ofinformation about CMO efforts throughPA and PSYOP can affect the perceptionsof a broader audience, and favorablyinfluence key groups or individuals. Thatis why we exercise our heartfelt conceptof ‘Army-Nation,’ meant to assess theparticipation of the Senegalese armedforces in the country’s development,with 100% involvement in the followingfunctions:• The national integration function,exercised through military enrollment/conscription, a major factor in nationalcohesion assisted by the establishment ofa civic (national) service more accessiblefor our youth;• The economic function, reflectingcountless Engineer Corps actions (theconstruction of bridges, ferries, wells,etc.), along with the involvement ofthe Air Force (MedEvac, transport ofVIPs) and the Navy (marine resourcesprotection);• The social function which is the soleresponsibility of the Health Directorateand is the backbone of public health.The Senegalese armed forces, asa whole, take part in youth activities(sports and other activities), and play avery important role in the contingencyrescue plan, known as Plan ORSEC(Rescue Operations Plan). The militaryhealth benefit institution, known as“Mutuelle des Forces Armées,” is mainlyconcerned with setting up preventionand solidarity mechanisms that benefitmilitary members and their families.Our Military Building Cooperative(known as COMICO) is fully orientedtowards helping its members becomehome owners in nice and safeneighborhoods. To better portray theleadership’s concern for the soldier’swelfare, two other major social structuresstarted business in 2006:• The Injured Military ReinsertionAgency aims to find ways to assistretirees and departing military personnelwith their transition into civilian life;• The Invalids Foundation supports thehandicapped and their families.As far as defense support to publicPrinciple cities of Senegal.(CIA World Factbook)diplomacy is concerned, our militarycontributes to peacekeeping and helps toenforce stability on the African continentand around the world. Thee actionsare in line with our signed alliances,treaties, and international agreements,and our concept of Peace Defense. Thiscommitment is not in vain; Senegal has along series of humanitarian interventionsthat traces the history of our armedforces.These efficient humanitarianinterventions come under the aegisof the United Nations, the EconomicCommunity of West African States(ECOWAS), the former Organization ofAfrican Unity (now the African Union),and so on. These organizations havehonored our armed forces with worldwiderecognition for their dedication towardspeace and justice. As a matter of fact, ourforces deployed regularly in support of,or parallel to our diplomacy, playing animportant role in peacekeeping aroundthe world. In carrying out these noblemissions they have given their best, toinclude the ultimate sacrifice, and alwaysin solidarity with the conflict-strickencountries.Our achievements during our 47years of peacekeeping-engagements arehighly appreciated by the internationalcommunity. The sheer number ofactivities speaks for itself. For thissuccessful cooperative work, Senegal’sArmed Forces were awarded the 2007African Integration Trophy.Senegal’s Views for CounteringExtremist Use of the InternetOur country has no precise orobjective definition of what constitutesextremism on the Internet. For mostpeople, the term refers to the propagationof extreme views, usually of a political,social, or religious nature through theWorld Wide Web.The cheap Internet medium provideseasy access to a lot of informationand entertainment, every moment ofevery day. Some terrorist groups useit as a part of their decentralized andinternationalized command and controlstructure. In this highly sophisticateddomain, Senegal has a lot to learn anda long way to go. Our armed forces donot have the technology to hunt, track, orcounter extremist views on the Internet.Thus, Senegal currently uses no activemeasures against this threat. The ‘ifyou see it report it’ recommendation isour only available warning system sofar. However, our hierarchy is planningto train some officers in advancedsoftware, to counter intrusion and theftby subversives or wrongdoers.In addition, Senegal’s Americanallies are setting up the “ECOWASRegional INFORMATION ExchangeSystem” (ERIES) throughout the Africancontinent to provide information trackingand sharing among friendly nations. The2006 exercise Africa Endeavor took placein Pretoria, Republic of South Africa, asa major US-sponsored event focusing onthe ability of coalition communicationsystems to work together.55

Other regular computer-assistedexercises in Senegal are part of the“Trans Saharan Counter TerrorismPartnership” (TSCTP), which aimsto build partnerships and strengthenthe abilities of African governmentsand militaries. The hope is that suchactivities will make these nations lessvulnerable to terrorist recruiting efforts,and help catch those already using theWeb as a safe haven.Last but not least, the creation ofthe US Africa Command (AFRICOM)will “strengthen security cooperationbetween Africa and the USA,” thuscreating new opportunities to bolster thecapabilities of the African leadership.Senegal’s armed forces look forwardto such opportunities in this new era ofinformation operations.At the political level, somebelieve that Senegalese PublicTelecommunication Regulatory Agency(ARTP) countermeasures currentlyunderway are likely to be reinforced inthe near future—with dedicated partners.For example, the People’s Republicof China has recently announced itsengagement to fund the final stepsof setting up Senegal’s governmentIntranet.Some Recommendations forCountering Net ExtremismThe challenge of Internet extremismurges the establishment of a globalnetwork of like-minded individuals,organizations, and opinion-leaders, topromote moderate and progressive ideasthroughout the world. Some of Senegal’sideas on how to meet this challengeinclude:• Reinforcement of laws against thedistribution of extremist material;• Updating of Web legislation;• Actions against relevant Internetservice providers, who once identified,should close down extremist sites or facepotential prosecution;• Parental and teacher use of filteringsoftware to block access to sites withparticular ratings;• Promotion of sites containingcounter-extremist material, andthose promoting tolerance andmulticulturalism;• Building alternative viewpointWeb sites and networks;• Building networks to isolateand marginalize extremists and theirsupporters, galvanize the revulsion ofthe murder of innocents, and empowerlegitimate alternatives to extremism.Internet users tend to reinforcetheir existing perspectives; thereforewe must thoughtfully construct counterextremismwebsites, to track the verysame people who would be lured byradical ideologies.An IO Topic of ImportanceSenegal’s IO experts believe PSYOPis a very important asset for a commander’ssuccessful mission accomplishment.There is no doubt that PSYOP hasa central role in the achievement ofinformation operations objectives insupport of the JFC in Senegal. However,in order to maintain credibility withtheir respective audience —which is thepurpose of the information operationscell—we recommend facilitating closecooperation and coordination betweenPSYOP and PA staffs.Questions Senegal must furtherexplore: Is PSYOP useful or necessaryin the African environment? If yes, whatis the best way to make it efficient inSenegal (or Africa), considering the lackof sophisticated and technologicallyorientedcomponents? What is the bestway to counter PSYOP in Africa? DoesPSYOP apply to low intensity conflictslike civil wars or rebellions in Africa?We look forward to searching for theseanswers.Colonel Antonine Wardini is an active duty officer in theSenegalese Army and presently is the military zone commander ofDakar, the capital city. He had served as the Director of Information andPublic Relations for the Senegalese armed forces and acting spokesman forthe military until 15 June 2007. Colonel Wardini served as infantry battalioncommander, Chief G3 OPS, Chef de Cabinet of the General Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Senegalese armed forces, and press officerin his home country. He was deployed as a UN staff officer in the wartornDemocratic Republic of the Congo from April 2003 to May 2004. InNovember 2005, Colonel Wardini attended the “Media Course” in KAIPTCand later was invited in April 2006 to take part in the UN Chiefs PublicInformation Meeting, co-sponsored by DPKO/DPI in New York. ColonelWardini has valuable expertise in field crisis management. He took part intwo humanitarian US-sponsored exercises (Flintlock in Mali and ACRI inThiès, Senegal). He is fluent in French and English and has experience indealing with the media, both national and international.56 Special Edition 2008

Argentina: The Challenge OfInformation OperationsBy Dr. Javier Ulises OrtizDr. Ortiz discusses several policies and strategies for protecting Argentinean and coalition critical infrastructure. He describesthe functions of the Armed Forces Scientific and Technical Research Infrastructure Institute, a joint military organizationthat possesses an information security laboratory. He further explores the Argentine Defense Forces’ creation of “computerscience troops” in its Communications and Computing Systems Command.IntroductionTen years have passed since USmilitary systems were cyberneticallyelectronicallyattacked by means of acomputer network from an unknowncountry—an event known as “SolarDawn.” The 9/11 attacks and otherevents, like the massive blackouts inbig urban settings, demonstrate thatunlimited security in a complex worldis impossible.Cyberspace is the new “Athena´sCamp” in today’s conflicts, especially“asymmetrical” ones. In developedcountries the concepts of informationwarfare (IW) and information operations(IO) have appeared as new militarydoctrines.According to sociologist ManuelCastells, 9/11 was the beginning ofthe first world war of the 21st century,the “net war” initiated by weak forcesattempting to “impose their objectivesby using the only efficient weapon in itstechnological and military inferioritysituation.” In May 2007, the Estoniancomputing system was attacked by halfa million computers, via the Internet.Estonia was paralyzed for weeks andneeded NATO’s help to recover. NATOspokesman James Appathurai noted“the XXI century is not one of tanksand artillery.” He further summarizeda June 2007 NATO chiefs meetingsaying “everybody agreed that it isindispensable to improve the protectioncapability of the computing systems ofcritical importance.”As an answer to these attacks, anew concept in defense and securitymatters appeared: the Protection ofCritical Information Infrastructure(PCII). It is necessary to identify andsecure the CII to avoid new “MutualAssured Destruction” vulnerabilitiesin this new age. Cooperative agendasfor regional and defense security issuesmust incorporate CII-related definitions,so that member countries develop theirown concepts. Telecommunications(optical fiber, digitalization, computing)represent the technological infrastructureof globalization, making strategicdecision-making in real time possibleon a global scale.Argentine national flag.(Wikimedia)Nations can take on elements of newforms like the “Digital State” or “Net-State,” and a nation’s sovereign territorythen undergoes change in leaders’ minds.Whether by attack or by accident (suchas a blackout in a megalopolis), the risksassociated with not having preventativesystems, early warning, and fast answersbased on emergency plans, can bedevastating.The main objective of these newtypes of conflict is the destruction ordisability of information capabilitiesand critical infrastructures. Thisunderstanding of war as “not onlymilitary” has been developed in differentparts of the world. Different documentsin the USA, Europe, and other countriesstart to define the issue and to generatedoctrine for action. Information spaceand “physical” critical infrastructuresare strategically linked. Thus, networkwarfare is more about organizationaldoctrine than technology.The following US definitions areused in this article:• Critical Infrastructure: systemsand assets, whether physical or virtual,so vital to the United States that theincapacity or destruction of such systemsand assets would have debilitating impacton security, national economic security,national public health or safety, or anycombination of those matters.• Information Operations (IO): JointDoctrine’s first IO definition in 1998was changed in 2003 (the definitionof Information Warfare was removedcompletely, leaving only the definition ofInformation Operations). The February2006 doctrine says IO shall: “… integratethe employment of electronic warfare(EW), computer network operations(CNO), psychological operations(PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC),and operation security (OPSEC) inconcert with specified supporting andrelated capabilities to influence, disrupt,corrupt, and usurp adversarial humanand automated decision-making whileprotecting our own.” IO doctrine isin constant evolution, as shown by theFebruary 2007 US Army update which“uses the joint definition of IO as wellas all capabilities that compose IO;however, Army doctrine categorizesIO capabilities in themes of five IOtasks: information engagement, C2warfare, MILDEC, OPSEC, informationprotection.”57

Latin America had its first importantcomputer security-related challenge in1999, when facing the Y2K problem.Recently, new definitions related tomilitary information technologies startedto appear in many Latin Americancountries. Many nations are updatingdefinitions and doctrines. This articleincludes: strategic perspectives foranalyzing IO issues; the developmentof hemispheric strategies for thePCII and cyber security; Argentineanrecommendations for counteringextremist views on the Internet; theArgentine military doctrine related to IO;the Argentine military and other LatinAmerican countries understanding of IO;and conclusions.A Strategic View for Analyzingthe IssueIn a changing world, conflictsbecome highly complex. Our conceptof conflict, defined along a line fromdeclared wars to undeclared wars,becomes more diffuse between theselimits. Presently, we see continuouschanges in regional military strategies,doctrines, capabilities, organizations,land operations, and procedures. Hence,it is more efficient to analyze Argentina’sdoctrine by including elements ofNATO’s IO doctrine. Yet, even NATOstill does not define cyber attacksas military attacks. These wars ofprobable “zero casualties” can beanalyzed from different perspectives,all of which include the impact ofinformation technologies—and thepotential devastating consequences.It is important to analyze differentdoctrinal models based on “real,” andnot “potential” capabilities.Hence, it is necessary to analyzelaws, policies, and national and regionalstrategies. Only then can one understandthat information age conflicts are global,that military forces and doctrine arepart of a nation’s public sector, and thattogether with the private sector theyconstitute the critical and informationinfrastructure facing the cyberspacethreat. We must consider all theseelements, but even more explicitly incountries where the technological gapis wider, and the infrastructure is morevulnerable.Hemispheric Strategies forProtection of Critical InformationInfrastructures & CyberSecurityDuring the last five years,Organization of American States (OAS)member countries signed agreementsforming the basis for PCII and cybersecurity, as follows:1. Civil and civil-military cooperationin the fields of Defense and Security isnecessary, according to the five Ministersof Defense of the Americas Conference(Santiago de Chile, November 2002).They noted “The Hemisphere faces anincreasingly diverse and complex setof threats and challenges for its states,societies, and people,” and that “eachAmerican state is free to choose itsown defense instruments including themission, personnel, and the compositionof Defense and Security Forces neededto guarantee sovereignty, in accordancewith UN and OAS Charters.” There isalso a “particular strategic context ofeach sub-region in the Hemisphere.”2. The Defense “White Book:”(Officially the Adoption of the Guidelineson Developing National Defense Policyand Doctrine Book.) This is a key policydocument providing the government’svision for defense of the OAS (2002).3. The OAS’s “Declaration onSecurity in the Americas” (October 28,2003: This agreement notes the newconcept of security in the Hemisphere ismultidimensional in scope, and includestraditional and new threats, concerns,plus other challenges to member states,incorporating the priorities of eachstate. Traditional threats, new threats,national concerns, and other diversechallenges affect member states indifferent ways. New threats includeattacks on cyber security, and “newterrorist threats—whatever their originor motivation—such as threats to cybersecurity, biological terrorism, and criticalinfrastructure.4. An Inter-American strategyto combat threats to cyber security:Together with Argentina, Canada,and Chile, the US OAS delegationpresented this document May 19, 2003.This important strategy is key to thedevelopment and consideration of acommon vision of critical infrastructuresfor all the Americas. The documentnotes “A multidimensional andmultidisciplinary approach to createa culture of cyber security” mustbe developed in order to protect theinfrastructure of telecommunications. Itgives responsibilities to:• The Inter-American Committeeagainst Terrorism (CICTE): Theformation of an Inter-American Alert,Watch, and Warning Network is neededto rapidly disseminate cyber securityinformation and respond to crises.Creation of a Hemispheric network tosupport Computer Security IncidentResponse Teams (CSIRTs) is alsorequired.• T h e I n t e r - A m e r i c a nTelecommunications Commission(CITEL) was formed to identify andadopt secure Internet architecturetechnical standards, in 2004.5. Protect Critical InformationInfrastructures (PCII): Internationalcooperation is the key to protection ofessential information infrastructure,coordination of early alert systems,analysis of vulnerability, threats, andincidents—with regard to informationand to coordinate investigations ofattacks against said infrastructuresaccording to national legislation. Thisinformation can be found in the BlueBook: Telecommunications Policies forthe Americas (2005).6. Hemispheric Definition of CriticalInfrastructure (CI): This “refers, amongothers, to those facilities, systems, andnetworks, and physical or virtual ITservices and equipment, the disablingor destruction of which would have asevere impact on populations, publichealth, security, economic activity, theenvironment, democratic governance,or the ability of the government of amember state to operate effectively.”This important document is key toconsideration of a CI common vision inthe Americas. OAS, (March 1, 2007).58 Special Edition 2008

Argentina’s Recommendationsfor Countering Extremist Viewson the InternetArgentina created a national systemto face these challenges:1. The Information TechnologiesNational Office (ONTI) is part of theMinistries Office Chief. ONTI isresponsible for creating technologicaldevelopment and innovation policies,in order to transform and modernizethe state. On August 3, 2005, ONTIapproved the “National Public SectorInformation Security Policy” for thedevelopment of Information SecurityPolicies in each public area (regulationISO/CEI 17799).2. Argentina’s Computer EmergencyResponse Team (ArCERT). ArCERTstarted operations in May 1999 underONTI. Main roles are:• Centralize security incidentreports that take place in the FederalAdministration, and facilitate informationexchanges in response.• Provide a specialized advisoryservice for network security.• Enhance the coordination amongfederal organizations to anticipate,detect, handle, and recover informationfrom security incidents.• Act as a repository of informationfor security incidents, tools, and defensetechnologies.ONTI and ArCERT define thefollowing concepts:• Information: every communicationor representation of data or knowledge,in any form (text, numeric, graphic,cartographic, orthographic, oraudiovisual) and by any media (magnetic,paper, PC, audiovisual, or other).• Information systems: independentsets of information resources organizedto summarize information’s processing,maintenance, transmission, anddistribution by different processes(manual or automatic).• Security Incident: a negativeevent in a PC system, or PC net, thatcompromises the confidentiality,integrity, and availability of information.It can be caused through vulnerabilitiesor attempts/threats of breaking into aninformation security infrastructure.• Threats to Information Security:actions against the confidentiality,integrity, and availability of information.These threats can be caused by humanerror, attacks, or catastrophic accidents.3. The Homeland Security Systemhas the following additional offices withresponsibilities for the security of theinformation infrastructure.• The Federal Police Division forTechnological Crimes cooperates withJustice’s investigations on criminalissues.• In the National Defense System, theArmed Forces Scientific and TechnicalResearch Infrastructure Institute(CITEFA) is the only joint militaryorganization dedicated to scientificand technological activities allowedto conduct research and developmentto meet Argentina’s National Defenserequirements.• The Information Security Research& Development (SI6) Office is CITEFA’sLab. It was officially created in January2004 to develop information securityR&D activities for both general anddefense areas. SI6 belongs to theInformation Security Division of the ITDepartment. Actually, SI6 is working onintruder detection, intruder classification,intruder identification, honeypots, patternanalysis, biometric authentication,virtual private networks, firewalls, digitalsignatures, penetration tests, and otherissues. SI6’s mission is the generation ofinformation security knowledge throughresearch & development activities.The SI6 Lab considers the sum ofcommunity efforts in applied research,using innovative technologies as oneof the most efficient ways to buildtechnological knowledge. SI6’s workingprojects include: “Paranoid: IntruderIdentification System using HoneypotTechniques;” “BioVpn: An Open-sourceBiometric Authentication Process forVPN;” and “Cisilia: A Windows NT/2000/XP Password Cracking DistributedApplication for Linux Platforms UsingOpen Mosix Clusters.”Argentina’s Military DoctrineRelated to IOBefore analyzing the definition ofIO it is necessary to look at backgroundArgentine provinces.(Wikimedia)information on Argentina’s Structure forNational Defense:1. The National Defense System.Law N° 23.554 de 1988 definesNational Defense as the integrationand coordination of all forces of theNation for the solution of conflicts thatrequire the use of the Armed Forces, ina dissuasive or effective way to counterexternal aggression. Its scope is topermanently guarantee the sovereigntyand independence of Argentina, toprotect its territorial integrity and selfdetermination, and to protect the life andfreedom of its inhabitants.The Armed Forces primaryresponsibility is to defend the countryagainst military aggression from otherstates and protect the nation’s sovereigntyand territorial integrity. HomelandSecurity Law N° 24.059 establishesthat police and security forces must beused in case of criminal actions, whilethe Armed Forces can, only in specialcases upon request from HomelandSecurity Officials, confront threats of anon-military nature.In 1998, the Defense Ministrypublished the White Book for NationalDefense in which it analyzed “the59

Revolution of Military Affairs” (RMA).The RMA changed the quantitativecriteria for “soft power.” This concept hasthree axes: space military information,soft power’s use in processing elements(in systems C3I2), and soft power’s usein precision weaponry. The White Bookalso underscores a new danger: the threatto Argentina’s own computer systems.A 2001 update to this book includes astrategic view of the RMA (with IT) andhow this changed the “art of war.” Thisrequired changes in military doctrines, inweapon systems, and in the logistical andorganizational structures. This documentfurther established the need to integrateC4I2 and electronic warfare systems atthe national, military, and operationalstrategiclevels; and included the satellitesystems applicable to Defense.Decree N° 727/06 strengthened therole of the Joint Military Staff (EMCO)as the main military strategic decisionmakerunder the civil government.The mission of Chief VI -C3I2 - EMCO (Command, Control,Communications, Intelligence, andInteroperability) is to develop andcontrol the policies, plans, programs,and projects of the C3I2 joint andcombined staffs, and to provide a JointMilitary Doctrine for Communicationsand Electronic Warfare. Each of theArgentine armed forces has similarareas. The Argentine Army has theCommunications and ComputingSystems Command, staffed by speciallytrained personnel, to include “ComputerScience Troops” and officers withadvanced Computer Science degrees.2. Military doctrine related to IO.In Argentina, military doctrine is thesystematic organization of principles,definitions, regulations, and proceduresthat constitute military knowledge—andoffer satisfactory answers to militaryproblems. Doctrine is the basic andactive element in force design, includingJoint Military Doctrine, Naval MilitaryDoctrine, Air Force Military Doctrine,and Army Military Doctrine. Theseregulate the services’ actions to fulfilltheir missions as military components,and fundamental institutions of thenation. In 2007, Argentina adopted aDefensive Strategic Operational Attitudeby means of a deterrence policy derivedfrom the Argentine Army Chief of theGeneral Staff’s “Argentine Army 2025”vision. This plan takes into accountthe peace and cooperation zone createdby the Southern Common Market(MERCOSUR), including the RegionalTrade Agreement (RTA).The Regulation for the Conduct ofthe Land Military Component establishesthat secure communications are theessence of C2 so that the commandercan influence operations effectively.Many IO elements are incorporatedin Argentina’s military doctrine. Asmany Argentine military authors note,the diverse elements that constituteIO are defined by Argentina’s armymilitary doctrine. The Dictionary of theArgentine Army defines operations linkedwith IO as follows:Military Operations: militaryactivities for situations when facing areal enemy. This includes employmentand direction of dependent elements, toexecute mission needs;E l e c t r o n i c O p e r a t i o n s :complementary operations conductedthrough the use of communications andspecial communications electronic media,in order to support other operationsthroughout the electromagnetic spectrumfor their benefit while restricting oravoiding its use by the enemy;Special Operations: operationsdifferent from others, either becausethey have particular procedures,organizations, or media, or becausethere is a need for specially trainedforces. Special operations can beexecuted through conventional or nonconventionalmeans;Non-Conventional Operations:those executed on enemy territory oron friendly territory occupied by theenemy, and within the scope of attainingdesignated objectives;Complementary Operations (militarydeception): multiple, synchronizedactions to hide from the enemy the trueintentions of one’s own forces.P e a c e k e e p i n g O p e r a t i o n s :operations to support diplomatic effortsof international organizations to maintain,restore, and/or enforce peace in a conflictzone.Psychological Operations: thoseoperations that use psychological actionsin a planned way to influence the behaviorand attitudes of selected individuals orgroups, with the aim of facilitating thedevelopment of one’s own operations.At the operational-strategic level theseoperations contribute to:• Diminishing the morale and fightingstrength of the enemy;• Increasing one’s own and one’s alliesfighting strength;• Obtaining the help of neutralparties.Civil Military operations: supportspecial disaster situations.C2TI. IO doctrine includesC 2 T I ( C o m m a n d , C o n t r o l ,Telecommunications- Computer Science,and Intelligence) as the set of human andtechnological resources and proceduresthat allow the commander and his staffto control, communicate, and knowthe enemy situation in real time. Thisabbreviation includes the other conceptsof C3I and C4I.Electronic War: a set ofmilitary activities developed in theelectromagnetic spectrum, with thepurpose of providing:• Electronic Support Measures: thosethat determine the presence of enemyactivity. These are offensive measures(search, intercept, localization, analysis,identification, and evaluation amongothers);• Electronic Support Countermeasures:those that neutralize and/or reducethe use of electromagnetic energydispersed by the enemy. These aredefensive measures (such as deceptionand interference);• Electronic Support Counter-countermeasures: those that guarantee theelectromagnetic energy dispersed byone’s own means. These are offensivemeasures (counter-deception andcounter-interference);Army doctrine considers electronicwar as an essential part of every war. Itscharacteristics are that it:• Is permanent, secret, complex, andutilizes highly trained personnel;60 Special Edition 2008

• Is adaptable to planning, centralization,and the conduct and coordination withother electromagnetic activities;• Is flexible and adaptable to militarymaneuvers but possesses securitymeasures;• Is used in tactical surprise andprovides speedy assessments.C o m p u t e r , E l e c t r o n i c ,Cryptographic, and CommunicationsSecurity: The Functional Regulationsof Computer Systems used in the Army(RFD-75-01) contain the general rulesfor data administration and managementfor the forces’ computer security anddefine the following:• Computer Science: is the jointtechnique for the automaticuse of information.Computing is importantfor military operations;• Telecommunications& Computer Science: isthe association betweentelecommunications anddata processors’ technicaleffects that help processinformation;• Computer ScienceTroops: military personnelwho maintain an efficientsecurity system that avoidsboth the loss of informationand non authorized accessto the data;• Kinds of ComputerSecurity: ElectronicSecurity, CommunicationsSecurity, CryptographicSecurity, Transmission Security,Computer Systems Security, and PhysicalSecurity.Education related to IO. In differenteducational institutes of the Educationand Doctrine Command of the ArgentineArmy and its higher educationalinstitutions, personnel develop thefollowing courses including some aspectof IO:• Technical Higher School ofthe Army (EST): offers Degrees inComputer Systems Engineering, apostgraduate course in “ComputerSystems, Cryptography, and Security,”and a “Master in TechnologicalManagement.” The EST participatesin the organization of the Nationaland International Congresses of theTelecomputing and CryptographicSystems Security shows (CONSECRI) where civilian and military expertsfrom Argentina and the Region exchangeknowledge on cryptography, cyberattacks, IO, security, and others issues;• The Higher School of War (ESG)has a Tactical Trainer (ADITC)with simulation software that trainscommanders and staff and in a GeneralStaff Course the curricula includes someaspects of IO. For this reason manyofficers consider monographs or thesisrelated to IO in their studies;Malvinas War Memorial in Buenos Aires(Wikipedia)• School of Communications developstechnical courses for military specialistsand provides specific doctrine to employthe communications corps;• School of Computer Science, createdin 1992, has courses in ComputerSecurity Science;• Other Navy and Air Force institutes,and other public and private universitiessuch as Buenos Aires TechnologicalInstitute (ITBA), also have courses onthis issue;• The Argentine and Chilean Armiesjointly developed a Training System forPeace Missions (SIMUPAS), a virtualpeacekeeping operation.• AFCEA Argentina is the SouthAmerican chapter of the Armed ForcesCommunications and ElectronicsAssociation (AFCEA International)that unites specialists in C4ISR. AFCEAdevelops military and civilian courses inIW, IO, cyber attacks, and PCII.Argentine Military Understandingof IOThe Malvinas War (1982) [editor’snote: also called the Falklands War]served as the baptism by fire of theCommunications Units of the ArgentineArmy, in conventional operations. Thiswar marks the first reference to the“Computing Revolution” as applied totelecommunications, andespecially to electronicwarfare. In 1999, theArgentine Army firstevaluated the impact ofinformation technologies,by examining the use ofthe Internet and satelliteconnections between otherelements. As a result,Argentina created a unifiedArmy Communication andComputing System Unit,with a digital net for theSystems Integration of theArmy (REDISE).Argentina’s evolvingmilitary understanding ofIO over the past five yearsis as follows:• Argentina has an IWdoctrine - The ArgentineArmed Forces have specific doctrine oncybernetic war issues to include somerestricted issues. The Argentine conceptof EW (electronic warfare) is valid forIW (Commander of Argentine Navy G.Repetto, 2001);• Strategic IW - In strategic IW, itis necessary to apply “the enemy as asystem” theory of Colonel John Warden,attacking the C4ISR of an enemy whilemaintaining capabilities in C2 & TI.The threats to the national informationinfrastructure are real, non-traditional,and highly diversified. It is necessaryto develop operational concepts andstructures to have superiority on the new61

attlefield (Colonel, Ret., of ArgentineArmy, AA, H. Cargnelutti, 2002);• Cybernetic Strategy - Capturingcyberspace’s power requires a CyberneticStrategy to organize the CyberneticForce and develop new weapons.New national and international lawsare necessary. Cyberspace, where“cybernetic operations” are conducted, isnot limited as is the traditional battlefield.Hence, its duration and operationalrange is wider (Col A.A. and Veteran ofMalvinas War, E. Stel, 2002).• Basic Objectives of MilitaryComputer Security - The security ofthe military computer system mustaccomplish four basic objectives:confidentiality, confidence, integrity,and disposability of information. IWis offensive, and it is necessary to trainmilitary personnel how to enter enemynets. This organization would be theArmy’s “hackers” in conflict situations.(Captain F. Calvete, Military Engineer inComputing Systems of A.A., 2003).• Future Wars - These will involveIW. Modern armies must protect theirown information and nets, and attack thesame capabilities of the enemy on thenew cyberspace battlefield. (Col. A.A.Cerezo, 2003).• Need for new Strategic MilitaryThought in the Information Age -Argentina’s National Defense Systemdoctrine must include IW and IOconcepts. IW/IO Commission, theCenter of Strategic Studies, and theSchool of War are all doing work in theseareas (CEE-ESG, 2003).• Definitions - Argentina does notstrictly adopt the standard IO Definition,but the Argentine Armed ForcesInformation System is used in the IWcontext. Argentine cyber militarydoctrine is oriented toward a securityperspective, with IW as an asymmetricalthreat. If the Argentine Armed Forcesinclude IW concepts in their doctrine, itcan only help toward the identificationof operational and I+D capabilities forasymmetric war. It will be necessary toincorporate both defensive and offensiveIO within the definition of futurecomplementary operations (for example,military deception). Even though thereis not a doctrinal definition of IW incomputing systems, there is increasinginterest in the application of theseconcepts (Majors A. A.Machinandiarenaand Tabeada y Gaidano, 2003).• IO is Part of Asymmetrical War - IOincludes attempts to deceive or underminethe capabilities of enemy forces.Offensive IO includes infrastructureattacks, PSYOP, and misinformation.It is only necessary to have a PC, amodem, and a program to get into anenemy’s C4 or weapon system. (MajorA.A. Machinandiarena, Battalion 601 ofElectronic Operations, 2004).• Strategic Operational Dislocationin New Wars - Dislocation is achievedthrough a direct or indirect approachagainst an enemy force, to cause animbalance in their forces, disconnectelements of their command, affect theirmoral and maneuver capability, or toweaken their defenses. Dislocation canbe achieved via technological and digitalcapabilities, which can be improved stillfurther with the use of IO (Col RobertoPritz, Director of the Higher School ofWar of A.A., 2005).Latin American Countries’Understanding of IOIn the Latin American region thereare other studies related to IT in militaryaffairs. Homeland Security Departmentsinclude many IT security aspects in theirrespective areas of responsibility. In themilitary camp, there are fewer precisedefinitions of IO/IW. However, as is thecase with Argentina, IO is part of militarystudy groups, and many IO-relatedopinions have a national basis:• Strategic Information Warfare (SIW)- This refers to the use of computersystems against the critical infrastructure(CI) of a country. It is the new wayto conduct “war and anti-war” (AlvinToffler). Brazil has created severalresponsible offices designed to defendthe countries critical infrastructure.(Commander Riquet Filho, Brazil Navy,2003).• Cyber War is Not Yet UniformlyDefined - Cyber war can be understoodas measures taken against C2 systems,operational security, electronic war,piracy, hackers, and informationblockades. Since 2003 the BrazilianNavy has established rules of digitalinformation management for theirlocal nets (Commander Nascimento deAnnunciacao, Brazilian Navy, 2003).• Cyber War - This concept correspondsto the offensive and defensive use ofinformation systems and informationto deny, explore, corrupt, or destroyadversary values and information systemsas well as computer networks. Cyberwar attempts to obtain advantages in boththe military and civilian realms. Twentycountries are preparing cyber guerillas as“elite troops” (4th Computing SystemsSecurity Committee Meeting, BrazilMinistry of Defense, 2003).• Cyber Terrorism Post 9/11 in theWestern Hemisphere - The inability toaccurately track cyber attacks may givethe impression that there are a lowernumber of incidents in Latin America—which is wrong. History indicates politicaland military conflicts are increasinglyaccompanied by cyber attacks. A largepercentage of military traffic movesover civilian telecommunications andcomputer systems. Trends seem topoint to the possibility of terroristsusing information technology as aweapon against critical infrastructuretargets. Regional exercises are one ofthe best ways to assess such criticalinfrastructure vulnerabilities. Thereis a significant difference in the usageof computers and the Internet betweenLatin America, the Caribbean, and NorthAmerica. International collaborationand cooperation is important to ensuresecurity of international networks, whichwould in turn make local systems moresecure. (Lt. Col Wanda I. Cortes, US AirForce Reserve, Inter American DefenseCollege, 2004).In July, 2007, the ColombianTelecommunications Committeepublished a study for the implementationof a National Strategy for CyberSecurity. This report considers securityof communication nets a secondarypreoccupation for most countries inthe region. Some Latin Americannations have begun adopting informationsecurity labeling procedure (rule ISO/CEI 17799), but there is a juridicalweakness.62 Special Edition 2008

• Identification of CriticalInfrastructure - Mr. Arístides Royo,Ambassador of Panama to theOrganization of American States(OAS) and Chair of the Inter-AmericanCommittee against Terrorism (CICTE),announced in March 2007 that CICTEwill soon begin to review its work plan.It is likely the organization will identifyareas related to critical infrastructure,both in physical terms (ports, etc.) and interms of the so-called “virtual variety.”ConclusionsDuring the course of history,war was fought on open battlefields.During the twentieth century, with thedevelopment of the submarine and airpower, war extended its horizon fromone to three dimensional battle spaces. Afourth geo-strategic battle space was alsocreated near the end of the millennium:cyberspace. At the beginning of thetwenty first century, the dimensions ofwar are as foggy as they are clear, asAdmiral William Owens explained in hisLifting the Fog of War. For the militarycommander, the contemporary battlefieldis full of difficulties—the Net hasproduced a new fog of war. Cyber warforces changes in many of our objectives,strategies, doctrines, and procedures.In these new conflicts, C2TIs bringdifferent capabilities to commanders.But the C2TIs bring new vulnerabilitiestoo because all the public-private criticalinformation infrastructures are integrated,and one effective attack could generatemultidimensional “cascade effects.”Within the Organization of AmericanStates (OAS), the countries of LatinAmerica and North America agreed toa common vision of cyberspace threats,and to the first lines of protectionand reaction—both physically andvirtually—against them. In LatinAmerica this situation requires theelaboration of relevant national, bilateral,and multilateral policies and strategies.It is first necessary for all membercountries to secure critical informationinfrastructures. Each organization,especially military forces, needs to beprepared and trained to remain mobileand to generate influence (in terms ofpower) on a global scale. Argentineand other Latin American armies havegeneral doctrinal concepts to confrontthe new challenges in cyberspace.They can help support one anothers’responsibilities along with other publicareas, to include not only their countries,but also regional protection of criticalinformation structures.Regional military forces shouldpermanently update their doctrines inorder to generate methods, techniques,and training. Each country shoulddevelop new doctrines according to itsown capabilities and national realities,to support both bilateral and multilateralmechanisms of cooperation. Those whohave updated doctrines can confrontnew situations with confidence. Inhis “Strategy for Action,” the Frenchstrategist General Beauffre reminds us“it is necessary to act as a thoughtful manand to think as an action man” —becausethe future is now.Javier Ulises Ortiz has a PhD in Political Science. He graduatedwith a degree in International Relations (University of Salvador, BuenosAires, USAL). He also has a Master’s Degree in Drug Conflicts (CatholicUniversity of Salta). His postgraduate work has been in the area of strategyat the School of War of the Argentine Army (ESG); and at the Defenseplanning and Transformation Course of Defense Studies (US National DefenseUniversity). He is a Professor of Strategic Analysis (Information and NewConflicts in the ESG and has a Master’s Degree in Defense and HemisphericSecurity (USAL, Inter-American Defense College). He is a member of theCenter for Strategic Studies (ESG); has lectured at the School for AdvancedMilitary Studies (SAMS) in the US; and at the Armed Forces Communicationsand Electronics Association (AFCEA). He has also lectured in South Americaand in several defense, military, and security institutes of Argentina, France,Colombia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Honduras.63

Chile: A Vision Of Information OperationsBy Igor Carrasco NeiraMr. Igor Carrasco Neira noted that in his role as a responsible party for critical information protection in Chile, he is mostinterested in a global reform of the agreement on computer crime. Further, he feels that information will transform socialdevelopment into a resource, weapon, and target.Though the image of IO has shownbrightly since 1991, especially in lightof the First Gulf War, it was not until1 January 1994—the date when theZapatista Army of National Liberation(EZLN) uprising was started in Chiapas,Mexico—that we saw the practicaleffects of an information operation.The EZLN first utilized the Internet asan instrument of war to disseminate itsideas, to raise money, to denounce theMexican government, and by meansof cyberspace recruiting, to attack thenetworks of the Aztec government bysending massive emailings and computerviruses.As a contextual fact, until that datethe total number of servers connected tothe Internet worldwide was 2,217,000.As a result, any given state’s use ofinformation technology was low. Yetthe Zapatista’s IO results could not bequalified in the same way; they gainedseveral advantages from the use ofinformation technology.What Are the Innovations/Advantages of the InformationAge?• First, technological advances haveactually permitted information-basedprocesses to reach never before seenlevels of efficiency;• Second, there is an increasinglygreater dependency on technologysystems for handling and transferringinformation;• Third, this dependency enabledidentification of new vulnerabilities andweaknesses that favor the developmentof new technologies and procedures forexploiting them, and as a consequence,their countermeasures;• Fourth, political leaders’ interestin rapidly assimilating their respectivestates into the larger Information Societyhas grown.The importance of this assimilationis evident: those who ignore theinformation age will be left behind,both socially and economically. Forexample, the multimedia industry,which includes information technology,telecommunications, and mass media,is clearly affected by information agedevelopments. The requirement foreconomic and societal transformationsmakes entry conditions into aninformation society a decisive themefor the future.Chilean Forces insignia.(Wikipedia)Today, the cold combination ofcircuits and metal—the final product ofan industrial process—does not make thedifference. It is processed informationthat generates a substantial advantagein social competitiveness. Informationnow has a leading role in transformingsocial development into a “resource,weapon, and target.” Information hasbeen converted into strategic wealth aswell as a condition for competitiveness.Information technologies introduceenormous changes, surpassing pureeconomics and offering new social,political, and cultural promises throughinformation and communicationnetworks.The products derived fromintellectual activity represent a decisivepart of collective wealth. To a largeextent, international competitiveness inthe new century is a battle of intelligence,that is, of mental models to interpretreality.The pinnacle of world informationnetworks, such as the Internet, constitutesa considerable challenge for societies.There are evident benefits for the statethat uses electronic media, includinginformation media, but also by implicationassumption of certain risks—understoodto mean the possibility of success orfailure—that should be minimized toguarantee information integrity andacceptable service performance. Since1998, there are well-known reportsindicating the presence and executionof programs designed to control andelectronically eavesdrop on the differentcommunications of our planet. InFebruary 1999, Director of the US CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA) George Tenet,warned that “Various countries have orare developing the capability to attackadversary information systems.” Helater added, “to develop the capabilityto attack computers can be inexpensiveand ultimately attainable: this requiresminimal infrastructure.”National ForcesNational information technologysecurity policy came into being inthe mid-1990s because of the need toconfront the “Y2K” effect. This forcedus to prepare for a national catastrophe,or rather, to construct a national map ofcritical state information infrastructure.Even when primary attention focusedon “information errors,” the strategiccharacter of information forced thestate into an in-depth analysis of theroad ahead.If there is a sector of societyexperiencing great changes in recent64 Special Edition 2008

years, it would undoubtedly be in statesecurity and the armed forces. Thesechanges contributed to the promulgationof Law 19.974 in 2004, whose objectiveis to establish and regulate the StateIntelligence System (SIE), which isdefined in Article Four (below), andwhich is chaired by Chile’s Directorof the National Intelligence Agency(ANI):Article Four: The State IntelligenceSystem, henceforth the System, is thecollective intelligence organization, …functionally coordinated, that directsand executes specific intelligence andcounter-intelligence activities, to advisethe President of the Republic and thosevarious high-levels of leadership ofthe State, with the objective to protectnational sovereignty and to preserveconstitutional order and, in addition,formulate intelligence opinions usefulfor achieving national objectives. Theintegral organizations of the System,without prejudicing their agencies andtheir obligations with respect to superiorcommanders, should interconnect amongthemselves through the exchange ofinformation and mutual cooperation thatthis law and the legal code establish.The National Intelligence Agencywas created in Title Three, Article Sevenof the same law:Article Seven: The NationalIntelligence Agency will be created, acentralized public service, of technicaland specialized character, which willbe subordinate to the President of theRepublic through the Interior Ministry,whose objective will be to produceintelligence to advise the President of theRepublic and those various high-levelsof leadership of the State, in accordancewith current law.Among the ANI functions underLetter “C” of Article Eight: To proposeprotective norms and procedures forinformation systems critical to theState. In this context, national forces areconcentrated in two areas: identifyingand hardening information networksand infrastructure critical to the State:and creating the capability to influencea potential adversary.Identification and Hardening ofNetworksThe tasks conducted in this fieldrange from studies of information flowsto reorganizing national networks. Tothis end, the government sets forthcreation of a State Connectivity andCommunications Network, throughSupreme Decree 5996 of the InteriorMinistry.Presently, the Chilean governmentis contemplating cybernetic securitydevelopment within the nationaltechnological development plan knownas the Digital Agenda. The objective ofthis plan is to increase competitiveness,equal opportunities, individual liberties,quality of life, and the efficiency andtransparency of the Chilean public sectorthrough development and employmentof information and communicationtechnologies (TIC). At the same time,these actions help enrich the culturalidentity of the nation and its nativepeoples.The government plan of action forthe period 2004-2006 established 34initiatives, grouped in six areas:1. Expanded access;2. Education and training;3. Online status;4. Digital development of businesses;5. Deployment of the TIC industry;6. Legal framework.Two of the thirty four initiativesare discussed here: numbers twelveand seventeen. Known as Project5D, or The Connective Network of theState, Initiative Twelve encouragesthe telecommunications industries todevelop a broadband highway voiceand-data-over-IPnetwork for thepublic sector. It will connect all publicbranches—including municipalities,schools, hospitals, and clinics—permitting their convergence into asingle network of telephone, mobile, andInternet services. Initiative Seventeenestablishes a number of Interior Ministryresponsibilities: to search and maintain anational response system for cyberneticincidents; administer programs; reducethreats and vulnerabilities; developsecurity training programs; secure thecyberspace in which the governmentworks; and administer national andinternational cooperation in cyberneticsecurity matters.Other decrees to improve cybersecurity include new technical normsto provide for the confidentiality ofelectronic documents. These measuresestablish steps for the public ministriesand services to meet security standardISO 17779, and specify securityresponsibilities for information circulatingon state institutional networks.Creating the Capability toInfluence Potential AdversariesNaturally, the most serious efforts tocreate capabilities to influence adversariesutilize information technology resourcesfor training armed forces personnel. Thisis particularly critical given that modernconflicts are very different from only afew decades ago. In fact, the advanceof technology is in direct relation tothe decrease of men on the battlefield.Historical examples confirm that duringthe US Civil War, the “density of men”was approximately 8,200 soldiers persquare kilometer. According to NATOdoctrine, during the years 1985-1990there were approximately 400 men persquare kilometer. After observing thecurrent war in Iraq, we estimate a densityof 15-17 soldiers per square kilometer.This decrease is due to betterarmament which is increasingly morelethal, more precise, and lighter weight,but also due to better prepared soldiers.We find that soldiers have greater accessto information technology, beginningearly in their schooling. This enables thecapability to direct things, people, andequipment with greater efficiency. It alsoallows for the introduction of computersystem training directly into the militaryenvironment.Presently, there is an organizationwithin the Chilean War Academydedicated to this type of training: theComputerized Tactical OperationTraining Center (CEOTAC). Thecenter’s fundamental objective is toprepare officers, but includes developingthe software necessary for this task: theSETAC (Tactical Training System).This advanced military simulator65

Chile in its South American context.(CIA)replicates modern combat conditions inthe computer, thus reducing associatedtraining costs. This same centercreated the Institution and OrganizationManagement Training System (SEGIO)software that prepares civil organizationsfor emergency situations.The technology has been veryuseful in educating soldiers, as well asin instructing them in weapons-handlingand marksmanship techniques. TheBernardo O’Higgins Military School hasa virtual firing range, with two screensthat can project fixed or moving targets,offering the cadets a sensation of reality.The range includes all principal ChileanArmy weapons: the Famae 5.56mmrifle, the Beretta 9mm pistol, and theMinimi 5.56mm submachine gun—allof which can be loaded, and produce ashot recoil effect. All of the precedingtraining saves resources, and results inexcellent marksmen. Such technologiesenable realistic training, produce ahigher quality Chilean soldier, andproduce a deterrent effect on potentialadversaries.Combating Crime and Terrorism:Legal Status in ChileIn 1993, Chile ratified Law Number19.223, which typified legal preceptsrelating to information technology.Following the French model, this lawmarked a milestone in Chilean legislation,since it introduced penalties for a numberof IT-associated behaviors. The intentionwas to protect the quality, purity, andsuitability of associated information.The law was important for penalizingunlawful access to computer systems,altering and damaging computer data,and divulging such data. Nevertheless,continuous TIC innovations requireconsideration of a global reform oncomputer crimes agreements. Two billsseeking to reform our criminal code onthis matter. Both initiatives addressa similar type of criminal technicalprocessing: the predominance of theprotected legal right as a systematizedfactor. The first is a parliamentarymotion that tackles reform of Law 19.223on information technology crimes:• Unlawfully accessing informationcontained in a computer system;• Destroying a computer system oraltering its function;• Unlawfully obtainingtelecommunication services.The second corresponds to anexecutive message categorizing newmethods that are not criminalized in ourlegislation, such as computer crimes:• Falsification of electronicdocuments and credit cards;• Computer fraud;• U n l a w f u l l y o b t a i n i n gtelecommunication services.Both of these initiatives are currentlybeing processed in the Chilean NationalCongress. In short, the aforementionedactions seek to solve legal problemsthat have arisen through introductionof new types of criminal offences, ormodification of existing offences basedon traditional legal rights.Chilean International ActionsIn order to address the numerousinternational challenges related to thismatter, the Special Policy Director(DIPESP) of the Foreign Affairs Ministryestablished an Inter-Institutional WorkingGroup on Cybernetic Crime in 2004. Thegroup is made up of representativesfrom the Interior Ministry, the NationalIntelligence Agency, the JusticeMinistry, the Attorney General, andthe Investigative Police. Among theirobjectives are strengthening cooperativelinks with other countries, as well aspromoting and deepening an informationexchange to confront emerging threatsin this area.Thus far, Chile has conductedinternational actions primarily at theregional level: The Inter-AmericanCommission against Terrorism (CICTE);the Meeting of American JusticeMinistries (REMJA) under the OAS; theGeneral Assembly of the OAS; plus thefields of APEC and the United Nations.In the framework of the REMJA,Chile actively participated in the ThirdMeeting of the Group of GovernmentExperts on Matters Relating toCybernetic Crimes, in 2003. A seriesof recommendations arose from thismeeting that are still relevant, and webelieve the international communityshould provide appropriate follow-upon these issues.Agreement of the EuropeanCouncil on Cybercrime: TheChilean PositionIn order to define our country’sposition regarding eventually joiningthe Agreement of the European Councilon Cybercrime, Chile requested reportsfrom all institutions competent in thismatter. In general terms, membersfavored an eventual Chilean entry intothis part of the agreement.B e s i d e s s c r u t i n i z i n g t h emethodologies and results of the 2004Fifth Meeting of the American JusticeMinistries or Attorney Generals, Chileanrepresentatives noted recommendationsfor State members to “evaluate thebenefit of applying the principles of theAgreement of the European Council66 Special Edition 2008

on Cybernetic Crimes (2001) andconsider the possibility of joining thisagreement.”Intelligence and GlobalizationThemes addressing intelligence aremore complicated, given the scenariosthat arise from globalization. Althoughthis process presents advantages andopportunities for society, it also givesrise to new conflicts. Emerging areasof struggle range from the research, theknowledge, the industry, and the resultingcommerce, to new forms of crime thatlend support to criminal organizations,insurgents, or global terrorists.Information Technology Attackas a ThreatKnowing about and protecting againstcomputer attacks on Chile’s infrastructureis indispensable for functioninginformation and communicationsystems. Further, such knowledge iscritical for public administration ofthe country’s vital businesses—energy,electricity, telecommunications, fuelsupply, transportation services, healthservices, and security among others.The majority of these services administertheir productive processes remotelythrough computer networks, and in realtime, thus these have become mandatorytasks.This subject demands a relevantexample. In this context, it is certainlynecessary to protect informationnetworks, but also to clearly determine theorigin and motivation of the perpetrators,given that the state’s response will becompletely different if the attacker is acriminal hacker, or a hostile action byanother nation-state.Other data also provides evidenceof the magnitude of technologicaldependency and the requirement for itsprotection. In 1983, there were a total of562 computers connected to the Internetacross the entire world. In 1993, thenumber rose to 1,200,000 computers.By June 2005, counting only broadbandconnections, in Chile alone there were594,000 computers connected to theInternet. Today the number exceeds onemillion broadband connections. Thus intwo years, there has been more than a60% increase in Chile alone.ConclusionsAll future scenarios must considerthe state’s dependence on informationsystems and complex computingtechnologies, where many controlprocesses are made in real time andfrom a distance. As a result, these willbe extremely sensitive—if they are notalready—and will be likely targets ofhostile action from Internet and networkexperts.Looking to the future, we see the highprobability of increasing dependence onthese applied technologies:• Cheap solar energy;• Rural Wireless communications;• Genetically modified food;• R a p i d b i o t e s t i n g t h r o u g hnanotechnology;• Filters and catalysts for purifying anddecontaminating water;• Managed application of medicines;• Hybrid vehicles;• Wireless computers;• Quantum cryptography.Finally, to end with the words ofauthors John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt,“The information revolution alters thenature of conflict and introduces newmodalities in the art of war, terrorism,and crime.” Chile is in the process ofpreparing to meet these threats, andmore.Igor Carrasco Neira is Chief of the Division of the InformationSociety (DESI) of the National Agency of Intelligence, whosemission is to protect the critical information of the State. Since 1990 hehas worked in Chile’s defense and homeland security system. He is aformer analyst of organized crime and new threats, and has represented theChilean government at meetings of experts on information security in theInter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) of the Organizationof American States in Buenos Aires, Ottawa, and Washington. He teachescourses in Chile and foreign countries on information security, informationsociety, and new threat issues. Mr. Carrasco is an anthropologist with adegree from the Austral University of Chile. He is a Professor in the Instituteof Political Science of the National University of Chile; a Diplomatein National Strategic Intelligence, National School of Intelligence ofArgentina; and a Diplomate in the Methodologies of Intelligence in theInstitute of Political Science, Chile University.67

Air Force Symposium 2008: CyberspaceJuly 15-17Maxwell AFB, AlabamaSymposium Co-hosted By:Air University Cyberspace Information and Operations Study Center, Maxwell AFB, AL8th Air Force and HQ Air Force Cyber Command (Provisional), Barksdale AFB, LAU.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, NETHREE MAIN TOPIC TRACKSDoctrine and Concepts of Operations• Defining Cyberspace• Establish the Domain• Control the Domain• Use the DomainCyberspace Policy and Law• US and Int’l Law of Cyberspace Operations(From Peacetime through Post-conflict)• Cyberspace Rules of Engagement, the Lawof Armed Conflict, and Interoperability withMultinational Partners• DOD Cyberspace support to the DefenseIndustrial Base• Strategic Communications, InfluenceOperations and Public Affairs in CyberspaceGUEST SPEAKERS INCLUDE• Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, Commander, U.S. StrategicCommand, Offutt AFB, NE• Lt. Gen. Robert J. Elder, Commander, 8th Air Force,Barksdale AFB, La., and Joint Functional Componentcommander for Global Strike and Integration, U.S. StrategicCommand, Offutt AFB, NE• Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Deputy JudgeAdvocate General, Headquarters U.S. Air Force,Washington, D.C.• Maj. Gen. William T. Lord, Commander, Air ForceCyberspace Command (Provisional), Barksdale AFB, LA• Dr. Rebecca Grant, Founder and President of IRISIndependent Research.USAF CYBER: Supporting National Security• CYBER is Inevitable: Military, Media, Markets• CYBER: Military and Civilian Perspectives• CYBER: DOD, DHS and Interagency• CYBER: Educating and Developing the ForceWho Should Attend: Military and civilian defensepersonnel, industry and business leaders, academics, andothers interested in the Air Force’s cyberspace mission.FOR MORE INFORMATIONWeb: http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/cyberspace/index.htmlE-mail: AFSymposium.2008Cyberspace@maxwell.af.milCommercial Phone: 1-334-953-1153 or 5998DSN Phone: 493-1153 or 599868 Special Edition 2008