A Reassurance-Based Approach to Space Security - Center for ...

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space activity is peaceful, and thus protected. In grey zone cases, considerationshall be given to whether or not the states involved are members in goodstanding of this Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and other space securityagreements.7. Each State Party undertakes not to place weapons in outer space or to test, oruse any capability as a weapon against any peaceful satellite so as to damage ordestroy it.8. If a satellite is being used for purposes that are not peaceful, and thus are notprotected, the situation should be addressed first with diplomatic measures. Ifdiplomatic measures fail to resolve the problem, additional steps may be taken,consistent with international law, so long as they are proportionate, discriminate,and cause the least necessary damage to the physical and security environment ofspace.9. To increase responsible behavior, provide reassurance about the peaceful use ofdual-capable technologies, and to minimize inadvertent harmful interference, allStates Parties shall adhere to the behavioral rules listed in Protocol A and shouldrespect the voluntary guidelines listed in Protocol B. Additional transparency andconfidence-building measures may be negotiated as side agreements or adoptedon a voluntary basis by any subset of States Party to this agreement.10. The Executive Council shall review the rules listed in Protocols A and B on anannual basis, and shall make recommendations when needed to modify the rulesor their legal status in light of technological developments, new informationabout problematic or best practices, or other relevant changes in the physical andsecurity environment of space. Changes to Protocol A require the unanimoussupport of the Executive Council and approval by two-thirds of the Conferenceof States Parties. Updated versions of Protocol A supersede earlier versionsthrough an Executive Agreement. Changes to Protocol B require approval bytwo-thirds of the Executive Council before joining the record of voluntary bestpractices.11. If an uncontrollable space object poses an inadvertent threat to space security orterrestrial security, the Executive Council shall decide whether that threat issevere enough to override any damage that might be done to the physical andsecurity environment of space by the least destructive option for removing thethreat.12. The Space Security Organization shall include a Technical Secretariat that shallassist States Parties with the implementation of the Treaty, carry out theverification and other functions entrusted to it by the Treaty, help build StatesParties’ capacity to comply with their obligations, promote voluntary adherenceby non-members to the rules and guidelines contained in this Treaty, andperform additional functions as directed by the Executive Council for thepurposes of preserving space security and enhancing all countries’ ability to usespace safely for peaceful purposes.33
13. The Technical Secretariat shall operate a Space Surveillance System that providesall space users with the data and analysis deemed necessary by the ExecutiveCouncil for safe operations and mutual reassurance about the peaceful nature ofall space activities. This system could begin with pooled data from nationalsystems or could be based on sensors owned and operated by the Space SecurityOrganization. The quality and quantity of data and analysis provided couldincrease over time as states become more confident about sharing relevantinformation or as the density of space usage necessitates closer levels ofcoordination. While the Technical Secretariat could provide more informationand services to Executive Council members, which bear more of the costs of theSpace Security Organization, or alternatively to all members in good standingcompared with non-members, data or analysis from the Space SurveillanceSystem should never be withheld from any space user if there is a non-trivialpossibility of an accident that could put other users’ space assets at risk.14. To provide reassurance that all space activities are being conducted safely and forpeaceful purposes, and to verify compliance with the other obligations in thisTreaty, States Parties shall rely on the information reported to the Registry, onthe Space Surveillance System, and on any additional multilateral verificationmeasures that the Executive Council decides unanimously are necessary toprovide all members with confidence that the overall level of compliance withthe Treaty is consistent with their national security. For the purposes ofverifying compliance with this Treaty, States Party may also use informationobtained by national technical means in a manner consistent with internationallaw. Subsets of States Parties may also negotiate complementary verification sideagreements so long as they report the basic findings to the Executive Council ina way that provides additional reassurance and confidence in compliance to allmembers.15. If disputes or concerns about compliance arise, Member States shall workindividually, through the Technical Secretariat, and/or through the ExecutiveCouncil to reach agreement about the nature of the problem and to restore fullconfidence in compliance. States shall respond to requests for information andconsultations in a timely and constructive manner.16. When the problem stems from a lack of state capacity to comply with obligations,Member States or the Technical Secretariat should provide assistance in thedevelopment and implementation of a plan that meets Executive Councilapproval whereby the state in question would cease, curtail, or outsource theactivities in question until they can be carried out in a manner that is Treatycompliant.17. When the problem stems from a disagreement over existing obligations orambiguities about how agreed principles apply to a specific situation, theExecutive Council will endeavor to reach a consensus judgment about therelevant rules and the steps that should be taken to restore full confidence incompliance. If a consensus cannot be reached in a timely manner, the Executive34
Page 1 and 2: A Reassurance-based Approach toSpac
Page 3 and 4: PREFACEThe International Security R
Page 5 and 6: Executive SummarySpace security has
Page 7 and 8: TABLE OF CONTENTSPagesIntroduction
Page 9 and 10: security and embraced the objective
Page 11 and 12: The final section sketches out the
Page 13 and 14: Those countries who are primarily c
Page 15 and 16: or debris-generating activities) wh
Page 17 and 18: space diplomacy had two principle o
Page 19 and 20: (NTM) or because noncompliance can
Page 21 and 22: Is there a legal right to use space
Page 23 and 24: In space, the situation is much mur
Page 25 and 26: ace? Proponents of space deterrence
Page 27 and 28: Traditional arms control and nonpro
Page 29 and 30: Because the United States, Russia,
Page 31 and 32: offensive strike weapons in space.
Page 33: ANNEXElements of a companion agreem

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