A Reassurance-Based Approach to Space Security - Center for ...
A Reassurance-Based Approach to Space Security - Center for ... A Reassurance-Based Approach to Space Security - Center for ...
A Reassurance-based Process for Enhancing Space SecurityGiven the urgent need for action to ensure space security and sustainability, thedecades-long inability of the CD to address this topic, and the differences between the kindsof traditional arms control measures that the CD was designed to negotiate and areassurance-based approach to space security, it is worth asking how the rule-making processmight be handled more effectively. Some have proposed changes to the CD’s operatingpractices, while others have suggested abandoning efforts to negotiate and ratify treaties andrelying instead on Codes of Conduct and other informal policy coordination. The Canadianworking paper proposed one way to blend these two positions: using the CD to negotiatenew complementary rules that would be politically binding at first, and become legallybinding later. But the only reason why it might be easier to get agreement in the CD on newnorms than on legal obligations is that states would have greater latitude in interpreting thosenorms as they see fit and ignoring them when inconvenient. An alternative approach wouldbe to step outside the CD, at least for the time being, and create a new negotiating processthat is optimized for the special features of space and would facilitate steps towardsreassurance-based cooperative security.The CD’s inclusive make-up, its consensual decision-making rules, and its provenability to negotiate legally binding treaties, give many countries a stake in upholding theposition that the CD is the best forum for tackling core issues of space security. But giventhe huge number of pressing security challenges on the global agenda, it may make sense tolet the CD focus on the issue at the top of its negotiating agenda (a fissile material treaty) andto agree by consensus on entrusting space security to a special forum that shares the bestfeatures of the CD—inclusivity, decision-making procedures that respect all stakeholders’interests, and the ability to negotiate legally binding rules and compliance managementmechanisms when the time is right, not just declarations of principles or Codes of Conduct.Taking space security off the CD agenda could even strengthen the standing of the CD ifthat development makes it easier for the CD to concentrate on other pressing securityproblems that are more amenable to progress under the CD’s established process.Arguably, the CD is both too large and too narrowly focused on traditional militaryand arms control issues, to make it the optimal forum for rapid progress on cooperativespace security. A dedicated forum, either in Geneva or Vienna to share resources andexpertise with the CD or COPUOS, or in a new venue to symbolize a fresh, more balancedoutlook on global security, would attract a smaller group of states particularly concernedwith space security. It would also encourage the formation of delegations that moreaccurately represent the mix of military, civilian, and commercial interests in space, ratherthan the status quo in which military/arms control issues are discussed in the CD andcivilian/commercial issues in COPUOS.An important feature of space governance is that everybody has a stake in spacesecurity, but each stakeholder has particular levels of investment, expertise, and impact. Anynew forum would need to be inclusive and representative enough to be widely viewed aslegitimate, without becoming unwieldy. The best arrangement would include a governancemechanism that puts a larger burden of responsibility and decision-making power in thehands of those countries that care the most and whose constructive involvement is the mostimportant for space security, without creating an inherently discriminatory structure.27
Because the United States, Russia, and China have the most advanced military spaceprograms, have each conducted ASAT tests, and are the most focused on the strategic sideof space security, they need to be constructively engaged from the outset. But if the initialphase of negotiations involved only these three countries, the deliberations would arguablybe too heavily focused on the military side of space security and too likely to devolve intotraditional arms control arguments. Using technical criteria to decide which other states toinclude in initial deliberations, such as a state’s ability to launch objects into space, would notnecessarily be a good option either. Doing so would allow some countries whoseparticipation was not essential to play a spoiler role, while excluding other countries, such asCanada, which has an active space program and a long-standing interest in cooperative spacesecurity. The best option might be to invite all countries who have demonstrated asignificant interest in space security to participate in the discussions and eventualnegotiations, but to set participation costs sufficiently high so that only those countries thathave a major stake in the outcome would likely choose to be active participants.The Antarctic Treaty offers one model of a flexible, non-discriminatory way toauthorize decision-making powers depending on a state’s demonstrated level of interest andcommitment. 41 At the invitation of the United States, the main treaty was negotiated in lessthan three months by the twelve countries participating in the International GeophysicalYear of 1957-58. This group included all seven countries that had claimed sovereignty overareas of Antarctica and most of the other countries that had engaged in scientific explorationthere. The treaty created two categories of members, which have come to be known asConsultative and Non-Consultative. All original signatories are Consultative members, as isany country that acceded to the treaty and demonstrated their interest in Antarctica by“conducting substantial research activity there.”Representatives of the Consultative members meet at semi-regular intervals toexchange information, discuss treaty-related matters, and develop recommendationsregarding additional measures to further the principles and objectives of the treaty. Non-Consultative members can attend these meetings as observers. The treaty may be modifiedor amended by the unanimous agreement of Consultative members, and proposed changesenter into force upon ratification by all Consultative members. Non-Consultative membershave two years after the changes enter into force to ratify them. If they do not, they aredeemed to have withdrawn from the treaty, presumably for lack of interest. The onlywithdrawal provision covering Consultative members includes an option to call for a 30-yeartreaty review conference, at which changes to the treaty could be approved by a majorityvote, including a majority of Consultative members. If these changes are not ratified by allConsultative members after two years, then any treaty member can give notice of its intentto withdraw in a further two years’ time.The Antarctic Treaty example also illustrates the benefits of developing a cooperativesecurity system through an iterative process, with key players making firm enoughcommitments up front that others know they are serious but leaving enough flexibility forthe depth and breadth of cooperation to increase over time. After starting out with 12members, the Antarctic Treaty now has 28 Consultative and 18 Non-Consultative members.41 The text of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty is at: http://www.ats.aq/documents/ats/treaty_original.pdf andadditional information about the Antarctic Treaty System is at: http://www.ats.aq/e/ats_treaty.htm.28
- Page 1 and 2: A Reassurance-based Approach toSpac
- Page 3 and 4: PREFACEThe International Security R
- Page 5 and 6: Executive SummarySpace security has
- Page 7 and 8: TABLE OF CONTENTSPagesIntroduction
- Page 9 and 10: security and embraced the objective
- Page 11 and 12: The final section sketches out the
- Page 13 and 14: Those countries who are primarily c
- Page 15 and 16: or debris-generating activities) wh
- Page 17 and 18: space diplomacy had two principle o
- Page 19 and 20: (NTM) or because noncompliance can
- Page 21 and 22: Is there a legal right to use space
- Page 23 and 24: In space, the situation is much mur
- Page 25 and 26: ace? Proponents of space deterrence
- Page 27: Traditional arms control and nonpro
- Page 31 and 32: offensive strike weapons in space.
- Page 33 and 34: ANNEXElements of a companion agreem
- Page 35 and 36: 13. The Technical Secretariat shall
A <strong>Reassurance</strong>-based Process <strong>for</strong> Enhancing <strong>Space</strong> <strong>Security</strong>Given the urgent need <strong>for</strong> action <strong>to</strong> ensure space security and sustainability, thedecades-long inability of the CD <strong>to</strong> address this <strong>to</strong>pic, and the differences between the kindsof traditional arms control measures that the CD was designed <strong>to</strong> negotiate and areassurance-based approach <strong>to</strong> space security, it is worth asking how the rule-making processmight be handled more effectively. Some have proposed changes <strong>to</strong> the CD’s operatingpractices, while others have suggested abandoning ef<strong>for</strong>ts <strong>to</strong> negotiate and ratify treaties andrelying instead on Codes of Conduct and other in<strong>for</strong>mal policy coordination. The Canadianworking paper proposed one way <strong>to</strong> blend these two positions: using the CD <strong>to</strong> negotiatenew complementary rules that would be politically binding at first, and become legallybinding later. But the only reason why it might be easier <strong>to</strong> get agreement in the CD on newnorms than on legal obligations is that states would have greater latitude in interpreting thosenorms as they see fit and ignoring them when inconvenient. An alternative approach wouldbe <strong>to</strong> step outside the CD, at least <strong>for</strong> the time being, and create a new negotiating processthat is optimized <strong>for</strong> the special features of space and would facilitate steps <strong>to</strong>wardsreassurance-based cooperative security.The CD’s inclusive make-up, its consensual decision-making rules, and its provenability <strong>to</strong> negotiate legally binding treaties, give many countries a stake in upholding theposition that the CD is the best <strong>for</strong>um <strong>for</strong> tackling core issues of space security. But giventhe huge number of pressing security challenges on the global agenda, it may make sense <strong>to</strong>let the CD focus on the issue at the <strong>to</strong>p of its negotiating agenda (a fissile material treaty) and<strong>to</strong> agree by consensus on entrusting space security <strong>to</strong> a special <strong>for</strong>um that shares the bestfeatures of the CD—inclusivity, decision-making procedures that respect all stakeholders’interests, and the ability <strong>to</strong> negotiate legally binding rules and compliance managementmechanisms when the time is right, not just declarations of principles or Codes of Conduct.Taking space security off the CD agenda could even strengthen the standing of the CD ifthat development makes it easier <strong>for</strong> the CD <strong>to</strong> concentrate on other pressing securityproblems that are more amenable <strong>to</strong> progress under the CD’s established process.Arguably, the CD is both <strong>to</strong>o large and <strong>to</strong>o narrowly focused on traditional militaryand arms control issues, <strong>to</strong> make it the optimal <strong>for</strong>um <strong>for</strong> rapid progress on cooperativespace security. A dedicated <strong>for</strong>um, either in Geneva or Vienna <strong>to</strong> share resources andexpertise with the CD or COPUOS, or in a new venue <strong>to</strong> symbolize a fresh, more balancedoutlook on global security, would attract a smaller group of states particularly concernedwith space security. It would also encourage the <strong>for</strong>mation of delegations that moreaccurately represent the mix of military, civilian, and commercial interests in space, ratherthan the status quo in which military/arms control issues are discussed in the CD andcivilian/commercial issues in COPUOS.An important feature of space governance is that everybody has a stake in spacesecurity, but each stakeholder has particular levels of investment, expertise, and impact. Anynew <strong>for</strong>um would need <strong>to</strong> be inclusive and representative enough <strong>to</strong> be widely viewed aslegitimate, without becoming unwieldy. The best arrangement would include a governancemechanism that puts a larger burden of responsibility and decision-making power in thehands of those countries that care the most and whose constructive involvement is the mostimportant <strong>for</strong> space security, without creating an inherently discrimina<strong>to</strong>ry structure.27
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