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was likely, it would not violate customary international law to deny an adversary the “highground” of space by launching a debris cloud into orbit or detonating a high-altitude nuclearexplosion. 31While all international law is underdeveloped compared with domestic law,international rules and governance mechanisms for space security confront particularcomplications that must be overcome in order for space rules to catch up with the rate oftechnological change and the spread of capability. One complication involves the historicalseparation of forums for discussing the military/arms control side of space security(primarily the CD) and the non-military/environmental side (e.g. the COPUOS). Thisseparation is problematic because the same technology, indeed the same satellites, can oftenbe used for both military and non-military applications. Another complication is themismatch between the main international agreements and negotiating bodies for space(where states have the rights, responsibilities, and decision-making powers), and the currentglobal space environment—in which commercial firms and non-state actors havecomparable overall levels of space activity to governments, and where the same commercialor civilian satellite can be associated with different governments or customers. For instance,the OST assumes that a State Party will authorize and supervise all non-governmental spaceactivities and that every object launched into space will be publicly registered to a State Partythat controls it and accepts responsibility for any damage it might cause—yet actual practicehas been far less orderly. 32These complicating features of space governance begin to demonstrate whytraditional arms control models cannot be easily applied to space security. Most arms controlaccords have typically been designed to prohibit or regulate a type of weapon or weaponsrelatedactivity that can be segregated from permissible civilian or commercial uses of thatsame technology. The separation is sharpest in the nuclear case. But even in the case ofchemical and biological agents and equipment with both legitimate and prohibited uses, thelogic of their corresponding conventions assumes that signatories can differentiate betweenprohibited weapons-related activities and permitted or prophylactic ones based primarily oncriteria such as the quantity of material and the characteristics of the owner (whether itscommercial, scientific, or military).31 Schmitt, “International Law,” p. 117. The International Committee of the Red Cross, considered anauthority on customary international humanitarian law, has asserted that customary international law wouldcategorically ban any war fighting action that inflected “widespread, long-term and severe damage to the naturalenvironment” including space, but the United States has countered that such actions could be justified asproportionate if sufficient military advantage could thereby be achieved. See Koplow, “ASAT-isfaction,” pp.88-90.32 In recognition of this problem, the General Assembly has recently passed two related resolutions. Res.59/115 (December 2004) encourages launching states to “consider enacting and implementing national laws”authorizing and supervising the space activities of non-governmental entities under their jurisdiction. It alsorecommends that they volunteer information about their current practices regarding on-orbit transfer ofownership for space objects, and that States consider harmonizing their transfer practices. Res. 62/101(December 2007) contains recommendations for improving the quantity, quality, and usefulness of informationreported under the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.21
In space, the situation is much murkier. In addition to classical conceptions of spaceweapons—as dedicated anti-satellite weapons, space-based weapons that can hit terrestrialtargets, or space-based missile defense interceptors—some space capabilities are dual-useand can be used in anti-satellite mode or for other purposes. An exoatmospheric missiledefense interceptor, for example, could destroy a satellite circling Earth in a predictable orbitmore easily than it could stop a ballistic missile suddenly launched at an unanticipated target.Low-powered, commercially available lasers used for satellite tracking and other legitimatepurposes could temporarily blind imaging satellites. 33 And small, maneuverable satellitescould conduct close proximity operations for benign reasons, such as taking diagnosticpictures of a malfunctioning satellite, or for malicious ones. There is no way to outlaw allcapabilities that could be used as space weapons without also foregoing many beneficialapplications.Uncertainty about a satellite’s function is as much of a problem for soft law as it isfor formal arms control. Commercial space-based communication and imaging services areused extensively by the United States and increasingly by other countries to enhance theirterrestrial military capabilities. In addition, governmental and non-governmental satellites canserve users from different countries, making it hard to determine when and what type ofaction against a satellite would be acceptable under international laws of armed conduct,including principles of necessity, proportionality, discrimination, and neutrality.Instead of posing insurmountable barriers to arms control, these conceptualcomplications present compelling reasons for regulating behavior and not just capability (i.e.,whether a technology fits criteria that define it as a “weapon” or that are used as a proxy forhostile intent). They suggest that trying to find the right balance between protecting peacefuluses of space and preventing aggressive, unacceptably threatening, or recklessly irresponsibleones, should be done through a discussion and negotiation process that includes all keystakeholders and is approached as an evolving and interactive project, rather than as anabstract intellectual exercise, a policy question to be answered separately by each space-faringstate, or a static course of action where the rules, once negotiated, are set in stone. Perhapsmost importantly, these complexities suggest that before trying to elaborate new rules forcooperative space security, parties need to decide on the fundamental purpose and guidingprinciple of their enhanced space security regime.33 Low-powered laser beams are sent into space hundreds of times a year for various reasons, including trackingand imaging satellites, measuring distances between objects in space, calibrating instruments, and assessingcontinental drift. In 1997, the United States used high- and low-powered lasers against one of its own satellitesto assess vulnerability to deliberate attacks and to the level of inadvertent lasing that might occur if a satellitecrossed into one of these low-powered beams. For technical reasons, the United States could not collectcomplete information on the effects of the high-powered MIRACL laser, but it did determine that the 30 watttracking laser, used longer than intended because of information collection problems, was sufficient to dazzlethe imaging satellite at 500 km altitude. For an assessment of what can and cannot be done with low-poweredlasers, see Wright, Grego, and Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security, pp. 125-128. Kenneth Bacon, “DoD NewsBriefing,” October 23, 1997, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1103describes the MIRACL laser test.22
Page 1 and 2: A Reassurance-based Approach toSpac
Page 3 and 4: PREFACEThe International Security R
Page 5 and 6: Executive SummarySpace security has
Page 7 and 8: TABLE OF CONTENTSPagesIntroduction
Page 9 and 10: security and embraced the objective
Page 11 and 12: The final section sketches out the
Page 13 and 14: Those countries who are primarily c
Page 15 and 16: or debris-generating activities) wh
Page 17 and 18: space diplomacy had two principle o
Page 19 and 20: (NTM) or because noncompliance can
Page 21: Is there a legal right to use space
Page 25 and 26: ace? Proponents of space deterrence
Page 27 and 28: Traditional arms control and nonpro
Page 29 and 30: Because the United States, Russia,
Page 31 and 32: offensive strike weapons in space.
Page 33 and 34: ANNEXElements of a companion agreem
Page 35 and 36: 13. The Technical Secretariat shall

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