A Reassurance-Based Approach to Space Security - Center for ...
A Reassurance-Based Approach to Space Security - Center for ... A Reassurance-Based Approach to Space Security - Center for ...
through accords banning debris-generating tests, regulating peacetime laser use, or restrictinghow close one country’s spacecraft could come to another country’s military satellites. 14Other U.S. experts whose primary interest is nuclear weapons policy have also adopted theidea of a trilateral kinetic energy (KE) ASAT ban. 15A stand-alone ban or normative prohibition on KE ASAT activities might seem likethe most obvious area of overlap among traditional proposals for space arms control,emerging concerns about the space environment, and U.S. military preferences fortemporary and reversible ASAT options over permanent and debris-generating ones. But astand-alone KE ASAT proposal is too limited and lopsided to be a fair test of interest incooperative space security. Moreover, if—as in the EU Code of Conduct—the rule includedan exception for KE ASAT activities conducted in such a way as to reduce net space debrisor to satisfy imperative safety concerns, but did not include an independent process to weighcompeting claims about the positive safety or environmental benefits against the negativeeffects on space security, then the proposal would seem unfairly biased against the type ofKE ASAT test that China conducted in 2007 and in favor of the kind that the United Statesconducted in 2008.Without tighter legal constraints or other reassurances that satellites will not be usedin intolerably threatening ways, key countries are unlikely to give up the right to damage ordestroy them should national security imperatives override environmental considerations.This is especially true if one assumes that the United States has more non-debris-generatinganti-satellite options than do other countries because of the relative magnitude of its militaryspace programs and its preference for temporary, reversible, and environmentally friendlyASAT options. Nor would a stand-alone ban necessarily be a good stepping stone to broadercooperative space security. In the unlikely event that China and Russia agree to the spaceequivalent of the Limited Test Ban Treaty—e.g., an accord that addresses environmentalconcerns and constrains only the subset of activities most clearly in U.S. interests—it woulddecrease U.S. incentives to negotiate further restrictions on those military uses of spacewhere it retains a significant interest and advantage.Building on the Canadian SynthesisThe Canadian working paper, “On the Merits of Certain Draft Transparency andConfidence-Building Measures and Treaty Proposals for Space Security,” is a creativeattempt to synthesize ideas from these existing space security proposals into a compromisethat could appeal to all the major players. The paper calls on the international community toaddress issues left unresolved in the OST by adopting a balanced package of security andsafety guarantees as voluntary principles (soft law) that could evolve into formal treatycommitments (hard law) over time. It proposes that the CD negotiate a set of behavioralprinciples that would essentially rule out physical combat in space (e.g., the most destructive14 Bruce MacDonald, “China, Space Weapons, and US Security,” CFR No. 38 (September 2008),http://www.cfr.org/publication/16707/.15 “US Nuclear Weapons Policy,” CFR Independent Task Force Report No. 62, (April 2009), at:http://www.cfr.org/publication/19226/.13
or debris-generating activities) while allowing some forms of temporary, reversible, andlocalized interference (e.g., electro-optical sensor dazzling or radio-frequency jamming) whenit would be consistent with U.N. Charter rules for the use of force and other internationallaw. Meanwhile, the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Space (COPUOS) would doparallel work on best practices and coordinating mechanisms so that the number anddiversity of space activities could continue to increase without a corresponding rise ininadvertent dangers (e.g., space traffic accidents or safety hazards posed by satellites fallingto earth). Implicit in the Canadian paper is the need to develop refined rules to determinewhen activities that do not damage or destroy satellites constitute irresponsible behavior orimproper interference with the right to use space for peaceful purposes, and when theywould be legitimate for self-defense or other compelling reasons.As the Canadian paper notes, the OST was the best space security agreement thatcould have been negotiated in the 1960s, given the adversarial nature of the superpowerrelationship, the early stage of space technology, and the embryonic state of arms control. 16The OST established that all states were free to use space “on a basis of equality…inaccordance with international law…and in the interests of maintaining international peaceand security.” It foreclosed a few undesirable avenues for competition (orbiting weapons ofmass destruction and conducting military activities on celestial bodies) and tacitly legitimatedsatellite reconnaissance. It also urged states to consider other space users’ interests and toconsult about any activities that might cause harmful interference. The central idea behindthe OST—that the best way to protect vulnerable satellites was to connect rights toresponsibilities and restraints on terms that applied equally to all space-faring countries—remains as valid today as when the treaty was negotiated.Much has changed, though, since the early years of the space age when the principlesand policy declarations that formed a basis for the OST were developed. 17 The Canadianpaper focuses on the technological advances that could lead to more widespread ASATcapabilities, particularly the growing number of countries that have, or could soon develop,ballistic missiles, hit-to-kill missile defense interceptors, and small maneuverable satellites.Depending on their level of technological sophistication, numerous countries and even somenon-state actors have many ways they could—in theory at least—interfere with the normalfunctioning of satellites. 1816 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, includingthe Moon and other Celestial Bodies, 601 U.N.T.S. 206 (1967).17 The United States made a concerted effort to establish the peaceful nature of its space program and thelegitimacy of reconnaissance satellites, including a series of choices that led to the Soviet Union becoming thefirst country to launch a satellite. The two broadest security principles in the OST – that international lawapplies to outer space and that outer space is free for all states to use in conformity with international law –were first adopted by the UNGA in 1961, then elaborated by COPUOS into the declaration of legal principlesadopted by the UNGA in December 1963. One of the OST’s two specific prohibitions on military uses ofspace, its ban on weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies, began as parallel unilateraldeclarations of restraint made by the superpowers and endorsed by the UNGA in October 1963.18 Options for interfering with satellites are evaluated in much more detail in David Wright, Laura Grego, andLisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security, American Academy of Arts and Sciences Occasional Paper (2005),pp. 125-128, at http://www.amacad.org/publications/Physics_of_Space_Security.pdf.14
- Page 1 and 2: A Reassurance-based Approach toSpac
- Page 3 and 4: PREFACEThe International Security R
- Page 5 and 6: Executive SummarySpace security has
- Page 7 and 8: TABLE OF CONTENTSPagesIntroduction
- Page 9 and 10: security and embraced the objective
- Page 11 and 12: The final section sketches out the
- Page 13: Those countries who are primarily c
- Page 17 and 18: space diplomacy had two principle o
- Page 19 and 20: (NTM) or because noncompliance can
- Page 21 and 22: Is there a legal right to use space
- Page 23 and 24: In space, the situation is much mur
- Page 25 and 26: ace? Proponents of space deterrence
- Page 27 and 28: Traditional arms control and nonpro
- Page 29 and 30: Because the United States, Russia,
- Page 31 and 32: offensive strike weapons in space.
- Page 33 and 34: ANNEXElements of a companion agreem
- Page 35 and 36: 13. The Technical Secretariat shall
through accords banning debris-generating tests, regulating peacetime laser use, or restrictinghow close one country’s spacecraft could come <strong>to</strong> another country’s military satellites. 14Other U.S. experts whose primary interest is nuclear weapons policy have also adopted theidea of a trilateral kinetic energy (KE) ASAT ban. 15A stand-alone ban or normative prohibition on KE ASAT activities might seem likethe most obvious area of overlap among traditional proposals <strong>for</strong> space arms control,emerging concerns about the space environment, and U.S. military preferences <strong>for</strong>temporary and reversible ASAT options over permanent and debris-generating ones. But astand-alone KE ASAT proposal is <strong>to</strong>o limited and lopsided <strong>to</strong> be a fair test of interest incooperative space security. Moreover, if—as in the EU Code of Conduct—the rule includedan exception <strong>for</strong> KE ASAT activities conducted in such a way as <strong>to</strong> reduce net space debrisor <strong>to</strong> satisfy imperative safety concerns, but did not include an independent process <strong>to</strong> weighcompeting claims about the positive safety or environmental benefits against the negativeeffects on space security, then the proposal would seem unfairly biased against the type ofKE ASAT test that China conducted in 2007 and in favor of the kind that the United Statesconducted in 2008.Without tighter legal constraints or other reassurances that satellites will not be usedin in<strong>to</strong>lerably threatening ways, key countries are unlikely <strong>to</strong> give up the right <strong>to</strong> damage ordestroy them should national security imperatives override environmental considerations.This is especially true if one assumes that the United States has more non-debris-generatinganti-satellite options than do other countries because of the relative magnitude of its militaryspace programs and its preference <strong>for</strong> temporary, reversible, and environmentally friendlyASAT options. Nor would a stand-alone ban necessarily be a good stepping s<strong>to</strong>ne <strong>to</strong> broadercooperative space security. In the unlikely event that China and Russia agree <strong>to</strong> the spaceequivalent of the Limited Test Ban Treaty—e.g., an accord that addresses environmentalconcerns and constrains only the subset of activities most clearly in U.S. interests—it woulddecrease U.S. incentives <strong>to</strong> negotiate further restrictions on those military uses of spacewhere it retains a significant interest and advantage.Building on the Canadian SynthesisThe Canadian working paper, “On the Merits of Certain Draft Transparency andConfidence-Building Measures and Treaty Proposals <strong>for</strong> <strong>Space</strong> <strong>Security</strong>,” is a creativeattempt <strong>to</strong> synthesize ideas from these existing space security proposals in<strong>to</strong> a compromisethat could appeal <strong>to</strong> all the major players. The paper calls on the international community <strong>to</strong>address issues left unresolved in the OST by adopting a balanced package of security andsafety guarantees as voluntary principles (soft law) that could evolve in<strong>to</strong> <strong>for</strong>mal treatycommitments (hard law) over time. It proposes that the CD negotiate a set of behavioralprinciples that would essentially rule out physical combat in space (e.g., the most destructive14 Bruce MacDonald, “China, <strong>Space</strong> Weapons, and US <strong>Security</strong>,” CFR No. 38 (September 2008),http://www.cfr.org/publication/16707/.15 “US Nuclear Weapons Policy,” CFR Independent Task Force Report No. 62, (April 2009), at:http://www.cfr.org/publication/19226/.13
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