report

Belgian stress tests action plan ‐ 2012‐12‐14No. Plant / Type Topic Sub‐family Sub‐sub family Action / ActivityRelatedrecommendation onEuropean level("Topics 1 to 3")Relatedrecommendation onnational level("Additional topics")StatusTarget Date508 KCD / PWR Power supply Total Station Black‐out Additional emergency lightingIncrease the emergency lighting in the various zones and rooms andplaces where the operators must be present in various scenarios.38 In progress 31/12/2013509 KCD / PWREmergencymanagementInfrastructureOn‐site resistant storage for mobilemeansTemporary storage place on the site, capable of withstanding externalaggression, for non‐conventional equipment in order to guarantee anautonomy of 72 hours.32 26, 32 In progress 31/12/2013510 KCD12 / PWR512 KCD12 / PWR513 KCD / PWRSevere AccidentsmanagementSevere AccidentsmanagementSevere AccidentsmanagementRB protection Filtered containment vent Study of a filtered vent for the reactor building 3 8 In progress 31/12/2012H2 riskRB protectionH2 risk management in nuclear auxiliarybuildingResearch &Development for severeaccidentsEvaluation of the residual risk on H2 production and accumulationaround the spent fuel poolsR&D follow‐up status about ex‐reactor vessel cooling and basematmelt‐through41 9 In progress 31/12/201230, 47 50 In progress 31/12/2013515 KCD / PWREmergencymanagementRequirementsSpecifications of mobile meansDetermination of specific provisions for the additional equipmentincluding the non conventional means (operation in adverse weatherconditions, integration in the technical specifications, inspection andtesting, maintenance…)26, 29, 32 26, 31, 32, 55 In progress 30/06/2012516CNT / PWRKCD / PWREmergencymanagementRequirementsHarmonization of sites training programsConsider increasing as far as possible the consistency between CNTand KCD as regards emergency plan training and refresher training (interms of duration and frequency).29, 35 10, 49 In progress 31/12/2013518 KCD / PWRSevere AccidentsmanagementRB protectionResearch &Development for severeaccidentsR&D follow‐up status about steam explosion 30, 47 50 In progress 31/12/2013519 KCD12 / PWRSevere AccidentsmanagementReview SAMG proceduresCoherence severe accidents proceduresbetween Doel and TihangeAdapt BK‐procedures according to SAMG (SAEG‐1&2) and withoutreference to FRGs.36, 37, 38 43, 44 In progress 31/12/2013520 KCD34 / PWRSevere AccidentsmanagementReview SAMG proceduresCoherence severe accidents proceduresbetween Doel and TihangeAdapt BK‐procedures according to SAMG (SAEG‐1&2) and withoutreference to FRGs.36, 37, 38 43, 44 In progress 31/12/2013521 KCD12 / PWRSevere AccidentsmanagementReview SAMG proceduresCoherence severe accidents proceduresbetween Doel and TihangeAdapt BK‐procedures according to SAMG CNT (aspects: evacuation ofresidual heat versus isolation of leak on the recirculation line ‐ injectionin primary versus spraying containment).36, 37, 38 47,48 In progress 31/12/2013522 KCD34 / PWRSevere AccidentsmanagementReview SAMG proceduresCoherence severe accidents proceduresbetween Doel and TihangeAdapt BK‐procedures according to SAMG CNT (aspects: evacuation ofresidual heat versus isolation of leak on the recirculation line ‐ injectionin primary versus spraying containment).36, 37, 38 47,48 In progress 31/12/2013523 KCD12 / PWRSevere AccidentsmanagementRadiological releaseLeak path identificationComplete BK‐procedures with a decision‐supporting tool (table, flowchart) to pinpoint rapidly the (most likely) place of a containment leakbased on the reading of certain RM chains so as to determine the mostappropriate action to limit the spread of radioactivity. This approachmay involve deployment of mobile detectors at particular places.43 46 In progressOn hold tillresults ofdiscussion withSafety AuthorityImplementation of activities15/20