report

Belgian stress tests action plan ‐ 2012‐12‐14No Topic Source Recommendations, Requirements from other national reviews Action : Family ‐ subfamily ‐ sub‐subfamily35 Design issuesNational regulatoryinspectionStation black‐outIn relation to the “total SBO” scenario, the operability of the AFW turbinedrivenpump due to the loss of ventilation in the turbine‐driven pump roomshould be examined.Power supply ‐ Total Station Black‐out ‐ Verificationof the feedwater pump in case of loss of ventilation(room temperature)Actions to beimplemented223, 224, 225, 496, 497Comment§ 7.2.4 of national stresstests report36 Design issuesNational regulatoryinspectionStation black‐outIn case of (total) station black‐out, the licensee should assess whether allcontainment penetrations can be closed in due time and whether the relevantcontainment isolation systems remain functional, in particular during outagesituations. The feasibility of closing the personnel and material hatches shouldbe assessed. These topics should be addressed in the “total station black‐out”procedure.Power supply ‐ Total Station Black‐out ‐ Reactorbuilding confinement498, 551§ 7.2.4 of national stresstests report37 Design issuesNational regulatoryinspectionLoss of ultimate heat sinkThe licensee shall justify that the water capacity (quantity and flow of coolingWater supply ‐ Loss of Main Heat Sink ‐ Backup heatwater for the consumers) of the second level of protection is sufficient when allsinkthe units of the site are affected by the loss of primary UHS. If needed astrategy to optimize the water consumption should be developed.454, 455, 552§ 7.2.4 of national stresstests report38Emergencypreparedness andresponseNational regulatoryinspectionEmergency lightingFor Tihange, the licensee should reinforce the emergency lighting in thedifferent rooms and places where the operators should intervene during thedifferent scenarios.Power supply ‐ Total Station Black‐out ‐ Additionalemergency lighting553, 508§ 7.2.4 of national stresstests report39Emergencypreparedness andresponseNational regulatoryinspectionLoss of ultimate heat sinkIn relation to the “loss of primary UHS” scenario, the licensee shall carry outalignment and operating tests of the emergency deep water intakes from theMeuse river bed in 2012 (for Tihange 2 and 3).Water supply ‐ Loss of Main Heat Sink ‐ Backup heatsink554§ 7.2.4 of national stresstests report40Emergencypreparedness andresponseNational regulatoryinspectionLoss of ultimate heat sinkIn relation to the “loss of primary UHS” scenario, the licensee should justify theWater supply ‐ Loss of Main Heat Sink ‐ Backup heatavailability (accessibility, operability and alignment) of the emergency watersinkintakes of Tihange 2 and 3 in accordance with the requirements of US NRC RG1.27.226, 227§ 7.2.4 of national stresstests reportAdditional topics6/9