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Belgian stress tests action plan ‐ 2012‐12‐14N° ENSREG Topic Source ENSREG Peer Review Recommendations and Suggestions Action description : Family ‐ subfamily ‐ sub‐subfamilyAction to beimplementedComment21 Design issuesVentilationThe enhancement of ventilation capacity during SBO to ensure equipmentoperability.Power supply ‐ Total Station Black‐out ‐ Verification of thefeedwater pump in case of loss of ventilation (room temperature)223, 224, 225, 496,49722 Design issuesENSREG compilation ofrecommendations, xCNSMain and Emergency Control RoomsThe enhancement of the main control room (MCR), the emergency control room(ECR) and emergency control centre (ECC) to ensure continued operability andadequate habitability conditions in the event of a station black‐out (SBO) and inthe event of the loss of DC (this also applies to Topic 3 recommendations).Habitability of control rooms/emergency centers under DEC conditions.Additional actions are part of theman made events part of theaction plan23Design issues24 Design issuesENSREG compilation ofrecommendations, xCNSENSREG compilation ofrecommendationsSpent Fuel PoolThe improvement of the robustness of the spent fuel pool (SFP).Separation and IndependenceThe enhancement of the functional separation and independence of safetysystems.Operation management ‐ Spent fuel pools ‐ SUR procedures incase of accident in spent fuel poolsPower supply ‐ Spent fuel pools ‐ Electrical backup for the coolingpumpsPower supply ‐ Spent fuel pools ‐ Procedures to manage spent fuelpoolsWater supply ‐ Total Station Black‐out ‐ Inadvertent let down ofthe poolsWater supply ‐ Total Station Black‐out ‐ Water supply of spent fuelpools in case of aircraft crash88, 91, 146, 147,148, 456, 556, 596,597Additional actions are part of theman made events part of theaction planSeparation and independence ofsafety systems is a general designcriterion that is used in all designactivities.25 Design issuesENSREG compilation ofrecommendationsFlow Path and Access AvailabilityThe verification of assured flow paths and access under SBO conditions. Ensurethat the state in which isolation valves fail and remain, when motive and controlpower is lost, is carefully considered to maximise safety. Enhance and extend theavailability of DC power and instrument air (e. g. by installing additional or largeraccumulators on the valves). Ensure access to critical equipment in allcircumstances, specifically when electrically operated turnstiles are interlocked.Operation management ‐ Total Station Black‐out ‐ Procedures incase of total station black‐out128, 129, 130, 131,132, 133, 134, 135,136, 137, 138, 139,490, 491, 592, 59326Design issuesENSREG compilation ofrecommendations, xCNSMobile DevicesThe provision of mobile pumps, power supplies and air compressors withprepared quick connections, procedures, and staff training with drills.Emergency management ‐ Requirements ‐ Specifications of mobilemeansExternal hazards ‐ Flooding ‐ Additional means against extremeflooding (pumps, diesel generators,…)Power supply ‐ Total Station Black‐out ‐ Implementation of a 380 Vemergency electrical grid60, 61, 62, 63, 97,98, 99, 400, 436,480, 481, 482, 515,54227 Design issuesENSREG compilation ofrecommendationsBunkered/Hardened SystemsThe provision for a bunkered or “hardened” system to provide an additional levelof protection with trained staff and procedures designed to cope with a widevariety of extreme events including those beyond the design basis (this alsoapplies to Topic 3 recommendations).Bunkered systems (containing2nd level emergency systems) area standard issue of all Belgianreactor unitsTopics 1 to 34/7