(1979). Social Networks and Psychology. Connections, 2 - INSNA

- 77 -classes" which are "in between" "positively and negatively privileged property classes" (1986 : 303-304) .Thus far, these categories of "class situation" appear to be purely nominalist . This interpretationis supported by Weber's (1968 : 928-29) assertion that in order to avoid ambiguity, "class interest"("interest" being the operator defining "class") is understood to be "the factual direction of interestsfollowing with a certain probability from the class situation for a certain average of those people subjectedto the class situation ." These interests are shared individual properties which may result ineither "mas behavior" or "amorphous social action ." It seems clear that the creation, choice, andcombination of categories would be the sole basis for the construction of ideal-typical interests amongvarious sectors of the population .However, stratification, for Weber, takes - on an implicitly independent reality in his discussion ofthe formation of intermediate organizations, or associations, for the purpose of organized social actionon the basis of class interest . His discussion of this is remarkably similar to Marx's theory of classstructure and consciousness, in which an analysis of the objective structure provides a vantage point fromwhich to study the adequacy of meaning (approximation to a correct understanding) for the actor :[H]owever different life chances may be, this fact in itself, according to all experience,by no means gives birth to "class action" . . . For that, the real conditions and the resultsof the class situation must be distinctly recognizable . For only then the contrast of lifechances can be felt not as an absolutely given fact to be accepted, but as a resultant fromeither (1) the given distribution of property or (2) the structure of the concrete economicorder (Weber, 1968 : 929) .The reasons for Weber's shift here seems to lie in his own recognition of the limitations of simpleaggregation in determining structure at the societal level . If individuals in a particular society areindeed differentiable through a potentially infinite series of combinations of cross-cutting variables,it is difficult to posit stable sets of categories without being extremely arbitrary . He never actuallyconfronts this problem in his substantive studies, however, because he never attempts to use thisaggregative methodology to analyze an entire society . He does use it, however, to contrast two basicallydifferent types of stratification which may characterize ideal-typical societies : "class society" or "statussociety" (1968 : 306, 937) . In order to do this, he employs the concept of status and "status group" whichmay be interpreted both as an additional variable and as an intermediate level of structure .Weber defines "status" as "an effective claim to social esteem in terms of positive or negative privileges; it is typically founded on (a) style of life, hence (b) formal education . . . or . . . (c) hereditaryor occupational prestige" (1968 : 305-306) . Thus, status as much as class is an individual attribute . Webergoes on to say, however, that "in practice, status expresses itself through (a) connubium, (b) commensality,possibly (c) monopolistic appropriation of privileged modes of acquisition or the abhorrence of certainkinds of acquisition, (d) status conventions (traditions) of other kinds" (1968 : 306) . These are relational,or group, rather than individual characteristics .Weber is contrasting types of societies here in terms of the appropriateness, however, determined, ofclassifying individuals as individuals, or as actors organized into intermediate structures . The definitionof class situation as "ultimately market situation" (1968 : 928) contrasts with the definition of statusgroups as at least to some extent self-defining (1968 : 306) . This contrast is sometimes evolutionary, themarket ("commercial classes") being based on instrumentally rational social action, and status groupsbeing based on traditional social action (1968 : 306) . At other times, there is a more explicit notion ofprocess : Since status groups involve consumption at a level to maintain a specifically defined style oflife, given a "relatively stable" (1968 : 938) distribution of goods, property classes may "create" statusgroups (1968 : 307) .In his analysis of class and status, Weber confronts the difficulty of analyzing process in distributionalterms . Weber attempts to resolve the difficulty of analyzing societies as combined distribution ofindividual characteristics through constructing intermediate levels of structure --- class associationsand status groups . In order to do this, he abandons his explicit methodology in describing the processesof group formation . Specifically, since he recognizes that similar social action does not imply organization,he posits, albeit implicitly, the existence of large-scale social organization which does not derivefrom social action, but which provides an "objective" framework within which subjective meanings develop .Conclusions :Notes onaStructural ApproachWeber's great historical studies rest on the assumption that collective entities, or structures, existin their own right . His social action methodology, however, has led to the logically consistent conclusionthat "to see them (collective entities) as possessing a supra-individual reality of their own is to reifythem", and consequently that "a society is essentially a set of broadly warranted predictions made by itsmembers about one another's behavior . In this sense, it exists only in people's minds," even if it resultsfrom observable interaction (Wrong, 1970 : 22, 25) . While this interpretation is extreme, the major thrustof Weber's methodology asserts that social structures which exist in their own right can be derived fromthe cumulation of social actions . Therefore, the study of social structure cannot be limited to the causes