Explaining the Ultimate Escalation in Rwanda: How and ... - GSDRC
Explaining the Ultimate Escalation in Rwanda: How and ... - GSDRC
Explaining the Ultimate Escalation in Rwanda: How and ... - GSDRC
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In most cases of mass kill<strong>in</strong>g s<strong>in</strong>ce World War II – unlike <strong>the</strong> Holocaust – <strong>the</strong>victim group has triggered its own demise by violently challeng<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> authority of <strong>the</strong>state (Fe<strong>in</strong>, 1990; Harff & Gurr, 1988; Kuperman, 2002). The Holocaust paradigm is sodom<strong>in</strong>ant, however, that <strong>the</strong> field of genocide studies has focused almost exclusively onexpla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> actions of <strong>the</strong> perpetrators of genocide, leav<strong>in</strong>g aside <strong>the</strong> actions, strategy,<strong>and</strong> potential responsibility of victim groups <strong>and</strong> third parties. To start rectify<strong>in</strong>g thisbias, it is useful to reexam<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> early 1990s role of <strong>the</strong> Tutsi-led <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n PatrioticFront (RPF) rebels, who with <strong>the</strong> support of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational community threatened<strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>’s Hutu regime to such an extent that it retaliated with genocide. Thisexploration is not <strong>in</strong>tended to excuse or justify <strong>the</strong> genocide <strong>in</strong> any way, but merely tounderst<strong>and</strong> more fully its causes. Until scholars <strong>and</strong> policymakers appreciate howgenocide may stem from <strong>the</strong> strategic <strong>in</strong>teraction of ethnic groups <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternationalcommunity, <strong>the</strong>re will be less chance of prevent<strong>in</strong>g such tragedies.Overview<strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>’s 1994 genocide was a retaliation by <strong>the</strong> state’s Hutu regime to a violentchallenge from <strong>the</strong> Tutsi rebels, who <strong>in</strong>vaded from Ug<strong>and</strong>a <strong>in</strong> 1990 <strong>and</strong> fought for overthree years to seize effective control of <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>. From <strong>the</strong> start, <strong>the</strong> rebels expected <strong>the</strong>ir<strong>in</strong>vasion to trigger a violent backlash aga<strong>in</strong>st Tutsi civilians <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>. Subsequently, as<strong>the</strong> war dragged on, <strong>the</strong> rebels received <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g threats <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dications that, if <strong>the</strong>y didnot relent, <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>’s Tutsi civilians would be targets of a massive retaliatory kill<strong>in</strong>gcampaign. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> RPF persisted <strong>in</strong> its military offensive <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>s forpolitical power, refus<strong>in</strong>g to make compromises with <strong>the</strong> Hutu government that mighthave averted massive retaliation. When <strong>the</strong> rebels f<strong>in</strong>ally were poised to seize control of<strong>the</strong> country, <strong>the</strong> Hutu regime retaliated by kill<strong>in</strong>g more than three-quarters of <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>’sdomestic Tutsi population <strong>in</strong> barely three months. Ironically, <strong>the</strong> Tutsi rebels <strong>the</strong>ndefeated <strong>the</strong> Hutu government but ga<strong>in</strong>ed control of a country whose Tutsi populationhad been devastated.The exist<strong>in</strong>g literature on <strong>the</strong> Tutsi rebels is deficient <strong>in</strong> several respects(Kamukama, 1993; Otunnu, 1999a, 1999b; Prunier, 1993, 1998; Reed, 1996; Watson,1991). It tends merely to list possible explanations for <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion, ra<strong>the</strong>r than test<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong>ir validity. It reports as fact what actually is mis<strong>in</strong>formation or dis<strong>in</strong>formation put outby <strong>the</strong> rebels or <strong>the</strong>ir enemies dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> conflict <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir respective attempts to garner<strong>in</strong>ternational support. It neglects to explore <strong>the</strong> role, if any, of <strong>the</strong> rebels’ expectationsabout <strong>the</strong> costs of <strong>the</strong>ir violent challenge, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir expectations of forthcom<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>tervention. Perhaps most important, it focuses almost exclusively on <strong>the</strong>rebels’ <strong>in</strong>itial <strong>in</strong>vasion, fail<strong>in</strong>g to explore <strong>the</strong>ir later actions on <strong>the</strong> battlefield <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> peacenegotiations that ultimately provoked <strong>the</strong> genocidal retaliation (an exception is Jones,2001). These subsequent actions <strong>in</strong>clude: launch<strong>in</strong>g military offensives <strong>in</strong> 1991 <strong>and</strong>1992; refus<strong>in</strong>g to compromise dur<strong>in</strong>g peace negotiations <strong>in</strong> 1992 <strong>and</strong> 1993; break<strong>in</strong>g acease-fire <strong>and</strong> launch<strong>in</strong>g an offensive <strong>in</strong> early 1993, which antagonized even <strong>the</strong>ir allieswith<strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>; refus<strong>in</strong>g to renegotiate <strong>the</strong> terms of an exist<strong>in</strong>g peace agreement <strong>in</strong> late1993 despite <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g signs that such refusal would lead to massive retaliation aga<strong>in</strong>stTutsi civilians; refus<strong>in</strong>g to accept cease-fire offers dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> first two weeks of <strong>the</strong>1
genocide; <strong>and</strong> pursu<strong>in</strong>g a war plan dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> genocide that gave greater priority tomilitary victory than to protect<strong>in</strong>g Tutsi civilians.This study relies on <strong>in</strong>terviews with former senior Tutsi rebels who now are morewill<strong>in</strong>g to speak frankly than <strong>the</strong>y were dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> war or its immediate aftermath. TheseRPF officials, many of whom assumed senior government posts after <strong>the</strong> war as notedbelow, <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g: its found<strong>in</strong>g coord<strong>in</strong>ator <strong>and</strong> later constitutionalcommission chairman (Tito Rutaremara); its vice-chairman at <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion<strong>and</strong> later electoral commission president (Protais Musoni); its director of external affairs<strong>and</strong> top peace negotiator dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> war <strong>and</strong> later foreign m<strong>in</strong>ister (Patrick Mazimaka); itsdeputy peace negotiator <strong>and</strong> later chief of cab<strong>in</strong>et (Theogene Rudas<strong>in</strong>gwa); its topdelegate to peace talks <strong>in</strong> 1991 <strong>and</strong> director of war operations dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> genocide <strong>and</strong>later chief of army operations (Karenzi Karake); its top delegate to <strong>the</strong> first peace talks <strong>in</strong>1990 <strong>and</strong> later deputy police commissioner (Dennis Karera); its head of f<strong>in</strong>ance from itsfound<strong>in</strong>g through <strong>the</strong> genocide <strong>and</strong> later prefect of <strong>the</strong> capital area (Aloysie Inyumba); itsrepresentative <strong>in</strong> Wash<strong>in</strong>gton dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> war <strong>and</strong> later foreign m<strong>in</strong>ister (CharlesMurig<strong>and</strong>e); <strong>the</strong> personal physician <strong>and</strong> right-h<strong>and</strong>-man of its leader Paul Kagame <strong>and</strong>later national security advisor (Emmanuel Ndahiro); a member of its executive committee<strong>and</strong> later m<strong>in</strong>ister of <strong>in</strong>formation (Wilson Rutaysire, AKA “Shaban”); <strong>and</strong> a top rebel <strong>and</strong>later senior official <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>istry of defense (who wishes to rema<strong>in</strong> anonymous). Foradditional perspective, I <strong>in</strong>terviewed a senior moderate Hutu officer <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n armydur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> genocide (who wishes to rema<strong>in</strong> anonymous).The Tutsi rebels made <strong>the</strong>ir major decisions <strong>in</strong> a highly <strong>in</strong>stitutionalized manner,which <strong>in</strong>cluded extensive debate <strong>and</strong>, when <strong>the</strong>re was not consensus, subsequent vot<strong>in</strong>gby <strong>the</strong> RPF membership. Perhaps for this reason, <strong>the</strong> retrospective accounts of <strong>the</strong>officials <strong>in</strong>terviewed for this study are highly consistent with each o<strong>the</strong>r, yield<strong>in</strong>g robustevidence on <strong>the</strong> causes of those decisions. All quotes <strong>and</strong> historical accounts <strong>in</strong> this studycome from my <strong>in</strong>terviews, except where o<strong>the</strong>rwise noted.There are four potential explanations for <strong>the</strong> RPF pursu<strong>in</strong>g a violent challenge thatprovoked such tragic consequences. One possibility is that <strong>the</strong> Tutsi rebels did soirrationally, without th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g of expected consequences. A second is that <strong>the</strong>y didcontemplate consequences, but <strong>the</strong>ir expectations did not <strong>in</strong>clude retaliation aga<strong>in</strong>stcivilians. A third is that <strong>the</strong> RPF expected violence aga<strong>in</strong>st Tutsi civilians regardless ofwhe<strong>the</strong>r it challenged <strong>the</strong> Hutu regime, <strong>and</strong> so perceived little extra risk from do<strong>in</strong>g so.The f<strong>in</strong>al possibility is that <strong>the</strong> rebels expected <strong>the</strong>ir challenge to provoke genocidalretaliation but viewed this as an acceptable cost of achiev<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir goal of atta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g power<strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>. The evidence detailed <strong>in</strong> this study supports only <strong>the</strong> last explanation.Historical BackgroundIn colonial <strong>and</strong> pre-colonial times, <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n politics were dom<strong>in</strong>ated by <strong>the</strong> Tutsi,17 percent of <strong>the</strong> population just prior to <strong>in</strong>dependence. Virtually all <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong>population was Hutu, <strong>and</strong> less than one percent were aborig<strong>in</strong>al Twa. Dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>transition to <strong>in</strong>dependence start<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 1959, however, <strong>the</strong> Tutsi were ab<strong>and</strong>oned by <strong>the</strong>ir2
Belgian colonial sponsors, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hutu seized control, mobiliz<strong>in</strong>g around <strong>the</strong> idea ofthrow<strong>in</strong>g off hundreds of years of Tutsi oppression. The new Hutu rulers targeted formerTutsi officials <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir supporters for retaliation, compell<strong>in</strong>g several thous<strong>and</strong> Tutsi toflee <strong>the</strong> country.The first Tutsi refugees left <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1959 for neighbor<strong>in</strong>g Burundi, Tanzania,Ug<strong>and</strong>a, <strong>and</strong> Zaire. Start<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 1961, some of <strong>the</strong>se Tutsi refugees call<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>mselves<strong>in</strong>yenzi (or “cockroaches,” to signify <strong>the</strong>ir persistence) attempted to return to power <strong>in</strong><strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> – <strong>and</strong> to re<strong>in</strong>stall <strong>the</strong> Tutsi mwami, or k<strong>in</strong>g – by launch<strong>in</strong>g attacks from bases <strong>in</strong>Ug<strong>and</strong>a <strong>and</strong> Burundi. <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>'s hard-l<strong>in</strong>e Hutu nationalist government retaliated byescalat<strong>in</strong>g oppression of, <strong>and</strong> attacks aga<strong>in</strong>st, Tutsi with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country. The mostsuccessful of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>yenzi attacks occurred <strong>in</strong> l963 – when Tutsi from Burundi came with<strong>in</strong>ten miles of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n capital, Kigali – but this also triggered <strong>the</strong> most <strong>in</strong>tenseoutburst of reprisal kill<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st Tutsi <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>. <strong>Ultimate</strong>ly, <strong>the</strong> government's tactics,though horrific, proved effective <strong>in</strong> reduc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>cidence of <strong>in</strong>yenzi attacks, whichended <strong>in</strong> 1967. Overall, from 1959 to 1967, some 20,000 Tutsi were killed <strong>and</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r200,000 Tutsi – half <strong>the</strong>ir population <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> at <strong>the</strong> time – were driven from <strong>the</strong>country as refugees. As a result, <strong>the</strong> Tutsi percentage of <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>'s population droppedfrom 17 to 9 percent.After <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>yenzi <strong>in</strong>vasions, <strong>the</strong> rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Tutsi population of <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> was sparedany major outburst of violence for over two decades. There was one m<strong>in</strong>or occurrence <strong>in</strong>1973, an attempt by <strong>the</strong> fail<strong>in</strong>g regime of <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>’s first President to w<strong>in</strong> popular Hutusupport by scapegoat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Tutsi. But this quickly was truncated by <strong>the</strong> overthrow of<strong>the</strong> regime <strong>in</strong> July 1973 by a Hutu army officer from northwestern <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>, JuvenalHabyarimana.After Habyarimana seized power, Hutu from his northwestern region came todom<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>, engender<strong>in</strong>g resentment from both Tutsi <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Hutu. The Tutsialso were subjected to quotas for education <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r government benefits, <strong>in</strong> proportionto <strong>the</strong>ir percentage of <strong>the</strong> population, as part of an affirmative action program on behalfof <strong>the</strong> historically deprived Hutu. Moreover, Habyarimana blocked <strong>the</strong> return of Tutsirefugees, whom he apparently viewed as a potential threat to his power. <strong>How</strong>ever, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>absence of any fur<strong>the</strong>r attempted <strong>in</strong>vasions by Tutsi refugees, <strong>the</strong> Tutsi <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> werespared any organized violence for 17 years.The Tutsi refugees, lack<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> means or organization to force <strong>the</strong>ir way home,<strong>in</strong>stead did <strong>the</strong>ir best to make lives <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir new l<strong>and</strong>s. At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong>y reta<strong>in</strong>ed<strong>the</strong>ir <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n language <strong>and</strong> culture <strong>and</strong> dreamed of eventually return<strong>in</strong>g home. In somestates such as Tanzania <strong>and</strong> Burundi, <strong>the</strong> refugees were relatively welcome, while <strong>in</strong>o<strong>the</strong>rs such as Zaire <strong>and</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a, <strong>the</strong>y were objects of <strong>in</strong>termittent discrim<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>and</strong>abuse.Of <strong>the</strong> four neighbor<strong>in</strong>g African states, Ug<strong>and</strong>a was <strong>the</strong> site of <strong>the</strong> best <strong>and</strong> worsttimes for <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n Tutsi refugees, because <strong>the</strong>y became entangled <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>tra-Ug<strong>and</strong>anpower struggles. Initially, Ug<strong>and</strong>a was quite welcom<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> refugees <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>3
expectation that <strong>the</strong>ir stay would be short. Local political leaders such as Milton Obotesupported legal protections for <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> refugees even prior to Ug<strong>and</strong>a’s 1961<strong>in</strong>dependence. <strong>How</strong>ever, Ug<strong>and</strong>an resentment soon built aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n Tutsi forat least three reasons: <strong>the</strong> refugee camps were be<strong>in</strong>g used as rear bases <strong>and</strong> recruitmentareas for <strong>in</strong>yenzi attacks <strong>in</strong>to <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>; <strong>the</strong> refugees received special benefits from <strong>the</strong>United Nations, creat<strong>in</strong>g jealousy <strong>and</strong> resentment among some Ug<strong>and</strong>ans; <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tutsiallied <strong>the</strong>mselves with a culturally-related Ug<strong>and</strong>an ethnic group, <strong>the</strong> Hima, who wereresented locally as elitists. Eventually, dur<strong>in</strong>g an economic slump <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> late 1960s,President Obote turned aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> refugees <strong>and</strong> announced a policy bann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m fromemployment. <strong>How</strong>ever, <strong>the</strong> policy never was implemented fully because of a successfulcoup by Idi Am<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1971. Obote retreated to <strong>the</strong> bush <strong>and</strong> launched a protracted rebelcampaign aga<strong>in</strong>st Am<strong>in</strong>, eventually team<strong>in</strong>g with ano<strong>the</strong>r rebel leader, Yoweri Museveni(Kamukama, 1993, p. 33; Otunnu, 1999a, pp. 6-15; Watson, 1991, pp. 9-10).Am<strong>in</strong>’s tenure turned out to be a mixed bless<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> refugees. Initially, hereduced oppression of <strong>the</strong> Tutsi <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a. In 1972, however, he suddenly beganpersecut<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m as part of his blanket retaliation aga<strong>in</strong>st all <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>ns for Kigali’sback<strong>in</strong>g of Obote’s rebel force – even though <strong>the</strong> Tutsi refugees shared Am<strong>in</strong>’s hatred of<strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n regime. After Habyarimana’s 1973 coup, Am<strong>in</strong> aga<strong>in</strong> reversed course <strong>and</strong>cozied up to <strong>the</strong> Tutsi refugees, recruit<strong>in</strong>g some to jo<strong>in</strong> his <strong>in</strong>famously brutal army <strong>and</strong>security forces. <strong>How</strong>ever, when Am<strong>in</strong>’s leadership faltered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> late-1970s, he reversedhimself yet aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> turned on <strong>the</strong> Tutsi, blam<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r refugees as scapegoatsfor Ug<strong>and</strong>a’s ills. Despite this f<strong>in</strong>al split, many Ug<strong>and</strong>ans cont<strong>in</strong>ued to associate <strong>the</strong>Tutsi with Am<strong>in</strong>’s brutal security forces, so that when he was overthrown <strong>in</strong> 1979,Ug<strong>and</strong>ans attacked <strong>the</strong> Tutsi refugees <strong>in</strong> revenge (Prunier, 1998, p. 122; Watson, 1991,pp. 9-10).Am<strong>in</strong> was overthrown by a comb<strong>in</strong>ation of Tanzanian troops <strong>and</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>an rebels,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Museveni <strong>and</strong> Obote. An <strong>in</strong>terim Ug<strong>and</strong>an government was established <strong>in</strong>1979, <strong>and</strong> Museveni served as defense m<strong>in</strong>ister, but <strong>in</strong> late 1980 he lost <strong>in</strong> disputedpresidential elections to Obote. Two months later, <strong>in</strong> February 1981, Museveni returnedto <strong>the</strong> bush <strong>and</strong> formed <strong>the</strong> guerrilla Popular Resistance Army, aim<strong>in</strong>g to conquerKampala by force aga<strong>in</strong>. Obote, back <strong>in</strong> power, resumed persecution of <strong>the</strong> Tutsi,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g large-scale attacks <strong>in</strong> October 1982 that entailed kill<strong>in</strong>g, rapes, maim<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>and</strong>destruction of homes, <strong>and</strong> led to <strong>the</strong> displacement of tens of thous<strong>and</strong>s of Tutsi refugees.A subsequent wave of attacks <strong>in</strong> December 1983 displaced ano<strong>the</strong>r 20,000 of <strong>the</strong><strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>ns <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a. In <strong>the</strong> face of such oppression, an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g number of Tutsibegan to jo<strong>in</strong> Museveni’s rebel movement, now called <strong>the</strong> National Resistance Army(NRA), <strong>the</strong>reby giv<strong>in</strong>g Obote fur<strong>the</strong>r reason to persecute <strong>the</strong> rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g bulk of refugees.In 1986, however, Museveni’s rebels overthrew Obote, usher<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a renaissancefor <strong>the</strong> Tutsi refugees. They were rewarded for <strong>the</strong>ir rebel role with key posts <strong>in</strong>government, bus<strong>in</strong>ess, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> army – highly unusual power <strong>and</strong> prestige for refugees.The Tutsi revival was tempered only by <strong>the</strong> resentment of o<strong>the</strong>rs who asked why <strong>the</strong>refugees were acquir<strong>in</strong>g more power <strong>and</strong> wealth than “real” Ug<strong>and</strong>ans (Kamukama,4
1993, pp. 40-42; Otunnu, 1999a, pp. 17-21; Prunier, 1998, pp. 126-27; Watson, 1991, p.10).Orig<strong>in</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> RPFThe temporary spurt of anti-Tutsi violence that followed Am<strong>in</strong>’s fall also gaverise to a slow resurgence of political organiz<strong>in</strong>g among <strong>the</strong> Tutsi refugees <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a. In1979, <strong>the</strong>y formed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> Refugee Welfare Foundation, to assist refugees who hadbeen attacked. Later that year, <strong>the</strong> renamed <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> Alliance for National Unity(RANU) exp<strong>and</strong>ed its agenda to <strong>in</strong>clude eventual return to <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>, but rema<strong>in</strong>edcl<strong>and</strong>est<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> face of Ug<strong>and</strong>an hostility. The new organization rejected two ma<strong>in</strong>tenets of <strong>the</strong> earlier rebel movement – violence <strong>and</strong> restoration of <strong>the</strong> Tutsi monarchy –<strong>and</strong> had an aff<strong>in</strong>ity for Marxist ideology. In 1982, most members of RANU fled toKenya, where <strong>the</strong>y rema<strong>in</strong>ed for four years. By 1983, <strong>the</strong> cl<strong>and</strong>est<strong>in</strong>e RANU still hadonly about 100 members (see also, Reed, 1996, p. 484; Misser, 1995, p. 154).RANU also had ties to Museveni through a Tutsi refugee named Fred Rwigyema,who had been one of <strong>the</strong> first to jo<strong>in</strong> Museveni’s anti-Am<strong>in</strong> rebel group (go<strong>in</strong>g toMozambique for tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 1976), <strong>and</strong> who also jo<strong>in</strong>ed RANU <strong>in</strong> 1979. When Musevenireturned to guerrilla warfare <strong>in</strong> 1981, two of <strong>the</strong> 26 rebels who <strong>in</strong>itially jo<strong>in</strong>ed him were<strong>the</strong> Tutsi refugees Rwigyema <strong>and</strong> Paul Kagame (Kamukama, 1993, pp. 39-40; Watson,1991, pp. 10-11; Watson, 1992, p. 54). Some Tutsi refugees jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong>m spontaneouslyfrom Ug<strong>and</strong>a’s refugee camps, while o<strong>the</strong>rs, start<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 1983, were sent from Kenya toUg<strong>and</strong>a by <strong>the</strong> nom<strong>in</strong>ally pacifist RANU to obta<strong>in</strong> military expertise for a potentialforcible return to <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>. By 1985, when Museveni began actively recruit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>Ug<strong>and</strong>a’s refugee camps, many more Tutsi refugees were active <strong>in</strong> his rebel force than <strong>in</strong>RANU (see also, Otunnu, 1999a, p. 16).By <strong>the</strong> time of RANU’s 1985 annual congress <strong>in</strong> Kenya, some members hadgrown openly frustrated with <strong>the</strong> empty promises of European states to facilitate <strong>the</strong>irpeaceful return to <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>. They wanted to mobilize at <strong>the</strong> grassroots <strong>and</strong> create amilitary option. Habyarimana’s 1986 formal ban on <strong>the</strong> return of refugees to <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>fur<strong>the</strong>r galvanized this militant faction (see also, Reyntjens, 1994, p. 26).The capture of Kampala by <strong>the</strong> NRA <strong>in</strong> 1986 paved <strong>the</strong> way for development ofsuch a military option by <strong>the</strong> Tutsi refugees. At <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>the</strong> NRA's victory,approximately 3,000 of Museveni’s 14,000 rebels were <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n Tutsi (Prunier, 1993, p.125). The defeat of Obote allowed RANU to move back to Ug<strong>and</strong>a to associate moreregularly with Tutsi <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> NRA that now was Ug<strong>and</strong>a’s national army. <strong>How</strong>ever,Rwigyema warned RANU not to organize openly with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> army, because it could call<strong>in</strong>to question <strong>the</strong> loyalty of <strong>the</strong> Tutsi troops to Museveni <strong>and</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a.In June 1987, RANU ab<strong>and</strong>oned its quasi-Marxist ideology <strong>and</strong> embracedsecretly a last-resort “zed option” – <strong>the</strong> use of military force, if necessary, to return to<strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> (see also, Misser, 1995, p. 154; Prunier, 1993, pp. 126, 128; Reed, 1996, p. 485).To mark <strong>the</strong> change, <strong>in</strong> December 1987, <strong>the</strong> organization renamed itself <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n5
Patriotic Front. Its new big-tent philosophy <strong>and</strong> military option attracted more <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>nrefugees – <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Kagame, who had refused to jo<strong>in</strong> its precursor – <strong>the</strong>reby effect<strong>in</strong>g amerger between <strong>the</strong> Tutsi political activists of RANU <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tutsi warriors of <strong>the</strong> NRA(see also, Misser, 1995, pp. 43-44, 51, 156).In addition, <strong>the</strong> RPF dramatically exp<strong>and</strong>ed its global political network. Tutsi <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> diaspora soon provided most of <strong>the</strong> rebels’ fund<strong>in</strong>g, which totaled approximately $1million annually dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> first years of <strong>the</strong> war (see also, Shoumatoff, 1992, p. 50;Watson, 1992, p. 52). But <strong>the</strong> organization’s leadership rema<strong>in</strong>ed dom<strong>in</strong>ated by refugeesfrom Ug<strong>and</strong>a who had roots <strong>in</strong> RANU, <strong>the</strong> NRA, or both.InvasionBy 1988, it had became an open secret <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a <strong>and</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> that Tutsimembers of <strong>the</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>an army were consider<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>vasion of <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>, partly becauseeager, younger Tutsi soldiers sometimes said so dur<strong>in</strong>g unguarded moments. 1 <strong>How</strong>ever,<strong>the</strong> RPF leadership had yet to make <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al decision for <strong>in</strong>vasion, <strong>and</strong> its senior militaryofficials with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>an army were extremely circumspect, hid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir membership<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rebel organization <strong>and</strong> avoid<strong>in</strong>g any open plann<strong>in</strong>g or discussion of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion(Misser, 1995, p. 47). Amongst o<strong>the</strong>r concerns, <strong>the</strong>y were afraid of be<strong>in</strong>g dismissed from<strong>the</strong> army prematurely, which would deny <strong>the</strong>m access to weapons for <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion.Many historical accounts claim that Ug<strong>and</strong>an President Museveni supported <strong>the</strong>Tutsi <strong>in</strong>vasion of <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>, based on <strong>the</strong> fact that he did not prevent it <strong>and</strong> that he laterpermitted <strong>the</strong> rebels to use Ug<strong>and</strong>a as a rear base <strong>and</strong> conduit for military supplies dur<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> civil war (Otunnu, 1999b, pp. 44-45; Watson, 1991, p. 17). In reality, Museveni didwant <strong>the</strong> Tutsi refugees to return to <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>, because <strong>the</strong>y were becom<strong>in</strong>g a domesticpolitical liability. <strong>How</strong>ever, he wanted <strong>the</strong>m to do so peacefully because he worried thatUg<strong>and</strong>a would lose foreign aid if it appeared to sponsor a foreign <strong>in</strong>vasion. At <strong>the</strong> sametime, it was too risky for him to try to prevent an <strong>in</strong>vasion by arrest<strong>in</strong>g Tutsi soldiers,because <strong>the</strong>y could have reacted with a coup or civil war <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a.Instead, Museveni tried to use <strong>the</strong> threat of an impend<strong>in</strong>g Tutsi <strong>in</strong>vasion to coerce<strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n President Habyarimana to accept <strong>the</strong> peaceful return of Tutsi refugees.Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, Museveni approached Habyarimana as early as 1988, urg<strong>in</strong>g him to legalize<strong>the</strong> return of refugees <strong>in</strong> order to avert <strong>the</strong> impend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vasion. In February 1988, a jo<strong>in</strong>tUg<strong>and</strong>a-<strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> m<strong>in</strong>isterial commission was established to address <strong>the</strong> refugee issue, butit <strong>in</strong>itially made little progress, apparently due to Habyarimana’s resistance (see also,Kamukama, 1993, p. 43).Museveni’s efforts also were opposed by <strong>the</strong> RPF, which did not want <strong>the</strong> refugeeissue to be resolved <strong>in</strong> isolation. Although RANU’s orig<strong>in</strong>al goal had been refugeereturn, <strong>the</strong> RPF had a broader political agenda, which <strong>in</strong>cluded removal of Habyarimana<strong>and</strong> implementation of political reform <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> to provide <strong>the</strong> return<strong>in</strong>g Tutsi asignificant share of political power. 2 Museveni urged his two senior Tutsi militaryofficers, Rwigyema <strong>and</strong> Kagame, to meet with Habyarimana <strong>in</strong> secret, but <strong>the</strong>y refused to6
do so (Watson, 1991, p. 14). The RPF leadership believed <strong>the</strong>re was little po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong>meet<strong>in</strong>g Habyarimana at all prior to an <strong>in</strong>vasion, because <strong>the</strong>y were conv<strong>in</strong>ced he neverwould grant significant political concessions until threatened by military overthrow.Habyarimana took several steps to avert <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion. First he ordered his<strong>in</strong>telligence service to <strong>in</strong>filtrate both <strong>the</strong> NRA <strong>and</strong> RPF <strong>in</strong> order to sabotage, or at leastacquire <strong>in</strong>telligence to defend aga<strong>in</strong>st, a Tutsi <strong>in</strong>vasion. Second, he agreed jo<strong>in</strong>tly withUg<strong>and</strong>a to seek UN assistance on two <strong>in</strong>itiatives to facilitate repatriation of Tutsi refugees– a survey of <strong>the</strong>ir wishes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>an camps, scheduled for October 1990, <strong>and</strong> a visitto <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> by refugee leaders to draw up lists of proposed returnees, scheduled forNovember 1990. Third, he legalized opposition political activities <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>. With<strong>the</strong>se steps, Habyarimana attempted both to underm<strong>in</strong>e Tutsi refugee support for an<strong>in</strong>vasion <strong>and</strong> to assuage <strong>in</strong>ternational pressure for domestic political liberalization.By <strong>in</strong>vad<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> October 1990, <strong>the</strong> rebels preempted Habyarimana’s refugee<strong>in</strong>itiatives before <strong>the</strong>ir s<strong>in</strong>cerity could be tested. Publicly, <strong>the</strong> RPF disparaged his<strong>in</strong>itiatives as <strong>in</strong>adequate because <strong>the</strong>y offered return only to refugees <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a, withoutaddress<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> needs of Tutsi refugees <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r states whom <strong>the</strong> RPF also represented.<strong>How</strong>ever, even if Habyarimana had agreed to take back all Tutsi refugees, RPF officialssay privately <strong>in</strong> retrospect that <strong>the</strong>y still would have launched <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion – unlessHabyarimana also had offered to give <strong>the</strong>m a significant share of political power. Whilea few old-l<strong>in</strong>e RANU pacifists were will<strong>in</strong>g to forego <strong>in</strong>vasion <strong>in</strong> return for repatriation,<strong>the</strong>y were but a small m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> a revamped refugee organization that had much greaterambitions (see also, Kamukama, 1993 p. 43; Prunier, 1993, p. 130; Reed, 1996, p. 486;Watson, 1991, p. 13). Indeed, <strong>the</strong> RPF reportedly assass<strong>in</strong>ated some Tutsi moderateswho enterta<strong>in</strong>ed such compromises (Kakwenzire & Kamukama, 1999, p. 89). 3The RPF plann<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion was deliberate – tak<strong>in</strong>g nearly three years from<strong>the</strong> found<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> group – <strong>and</strong> was <strong>in</strong>hibited by <strong>the</strong> need to organize <strong>in</strong> secrecy with<strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>an army. Rwigyema knew that <strong>the</strong> RPF <strong>and</strong> NRA had been <strong>in</strong>filtrated byHabyarimana. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, only a small, “special plann<strong>in</strong>g group” of Tutsi officerswith<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> NRA was permitted to know <strong>in</strong> advance <strong>the</strong> tim<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> plan of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion.O<strong>the</strong>r Tutsi officers <strong>and</strong> enlisted soldiers knew someth<strong>in</strong>g was be<strong>in</strong>g planned, butreceived only one day’s notice of <strong>the</strong> actual <strong>in</strong>vasion (see also, Misser, 1995, p. 66;Prunier, 1993, pp. 129-30). 4Rwigyema believed he needed about 1,000 troops to succeed, but was concernedthat Museveni would stop him. His plan, after cross<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to nor<strong>the</strong>ast <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>, was tomove south by foot about 20 miles to attack a lightly guarded <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n army barracks atGabiro that would provide weapons <strong>and</strong> ammunition for his troops. He planned <strong>the</strong>n tomove about 20 miles west <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> hills of Byumba prov<strong>in</strong>ce, which he believed wouldprovide a secure base for a protracted guerrilla struggle, analogous to those he had carriedout successfully with Museveni <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a. Rwigyema believed that if his forces couldreach Byumba, “not even God can move us from <strong>the</strong>re” (see also, Misser, 1995, p. 21).7
Nearly all previous accounts of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion have claimed that <strong>the</strong> RPFanticipated a rapid collapse of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n army that would enable a quick capture ofKigali. <strong>How</strong>ever, <strong>the</strong>se accounts appear to be erroneous, <strong>and</strong> may be based on <strong>in</strong>correct<strong>in</strong>ferences from <strong>the</strong> course of <strong>the</strong> actual <strong>in</strong>vasion or <strong>in</strong>terviews with junior officials wholacked access to pre-<strong>in</strong>vasion plann<strong>in</strong>g. Rwigyema <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r senior rebel officialsanticipated a protracted struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st a more numerous <strong>and</strong> better equipped <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>narmy. The RPF expected to have about 1,000 rebels on foot with small weapons fac<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> 5,000-strong <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n army that was outfitted with armored vehicles <strong>and</strong> helicopters.In addition, <strong>the</strong> rebels expected that foreign powers, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Belgium, France, <strong>and</strong>Zaire, probably would <strong>in</strong>tervene to support <strong>the</strong> army, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y discussed this prospectexplicitly prior to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion. Anticipat<strong>in</strong>g that France could not be dissuaded from<strong>in</strong>terven<strong>in</strong>g, Rwigyema directed his external affairs chief – at <strong>the</strong> start of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion – toplead with Zaire <strong>and</strong> Belgium not to <strong>in</strong>tervene. 5The rebels’ preparations provide fur<strong>the</strong>r evidence that <strong>the</strong>y anticipated aprotracted struggle, <strong>and</strong> help expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> three-year delay between <strong>the</strong> found<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong>RPF <strong>and</strong> its <strong>in</strong>vasion. The RPF prepared food stores <strong>and</strong> follow-on <strong>in</strong>vasion routes <strong>in</strong>Zaire, Tanzania, <strong>and</strong> Burundi. This <strong>in</strong>cluded plant<strong>in</strong>g crops <strong>in</strong> neighbor<strong>in</strong>g states <strong>and</strong>prepar<strong>in</strong>g dried beef for an extended campaign. 6The formal RPF decision to <strong>in</strong>vade was made around July 1990, approximately<strong>the</strong> same time <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n President Habyarimana proposed his <strong>in</strong>itiatives for <strong>the</strong> peacefulrepatriation of Ug<strong>and</strong>a’s Tutsi refugees (see also, Watson, 1991, p. 13; Misser, 1995, p.55). At <strong>the</strong> end of September, <strong>the</strong> RPF gave <strong>the</strong> order for Tutsi soldiers <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>anarmy to desert <strong>the</strong>ir posts <strong>and</strong> head south. Rwigyema, now retired from <strong>the</strong> army, met <strong>the</strong>troops <strong>and</strong> told onlookers he was tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m to celebrations for Ug<strong>and</strong>a’s <strong>in</strong>dependenceday on October 9. To lend credibility to <strong>the</strong> cover story, <strong>the</strong> soldiers left beh<strong>in</strong>d most of<strong>the</strong>ir heavy military equipment – fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>dication that Museveni did not support <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>itial <strong>in</strong>vasion. On October 1, 1990, Rwigyema led <strong>the</strong> troops across <strong>the</strong> border <strong>in</strong>to<strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>. He had worried about not gett<strong>in</strong>g even <strong>the</strong> requisite 1,000 troops, but was metby about 4,000 Tutsi soldiers (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g 120 officers), <strong>and</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r 3,000 Tutsi civilianswho jo<strong>in</strong>ed spontaneously upon hear<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> long-awaited return to <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> f<strong>in</strong>allywas be<strong>in</strong>g launched (see also, Prunier, 1993, p. 131-32; Reed, 1996, p. 487-88; Watson,1991, pp. 2, 14; Watson, 1992, p. 54). As detailed below, this unexpected outpour<strong>in</strong>gproved a decidely mixed bless<strong>in</strong>g.Even as <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion began, Museveni apparently hoped it could be truncated <strong>and</strong>used as leverage to achieve <strong>the</strong> peaceful return of refugees to <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>. At <strong>the</strong> time, bothhe <strong>and</strong> Habyarimana were <strong>in</strong> New York at a UN conference (Otunnu, 1999b, p. 42).Museveni got word first, by phone. Though he had feared such an eventuality, he wasirate that his longtime friends <strong>and</strong> military deputies, Rwigyema <strong>and</strong> Kagame, hid it fromhim. In retrospect, Museveni says he was “taken by surprise by <strong>the</strong> speed <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> size of<strong>the</strong> desertions,” which implies he was not surprised that <strong>the</strong> Tutsi ultimately would optfor a military return to <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>, as he had been warn<strong>in</strong>g Habyarimana for two years.After learn<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion, Museveni alerted Habyarimana <strong>and</strong> offered to stop <strong>the</strong>Tutsi if <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n president would negotiate with <strong>the</strong>m on <strong>the</strong>ir dem<strong>and</strong>s, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g8
Habyarimana responded to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion by launch<strong>in</strong>g both a military counterattack<strong>and</strong> a crackdown on civilians – Tutsi <strong>and</strong> opposition Hutu – who were accused ofsupport<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rebels. With<strong>in</strong> three days, he had deta<strong>in</strong>ed 10-15,000 domestic opponents,eventually imprison<strong>in</strong>g an estimated 8-13,000 (Des Forges, et al., 1999, p. 49; Prunier,1993, p. 135). Zaire quickly deployed armored units to <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> that helped blunt <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>itial rebel offensive (but <strong>the</strong>n were asked to leave with<strong>in</strong> two weeks for engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>loot<strong>in</strong>g). Belgian troops arrived to evacuate foreign nationals, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n withdrew with<strong>in</strong>two months. France deployed troops that bolstered <strong>the</strong> resolve of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n army,helped organize its counter-attack, <strong>and</strong> assisted <strong>in</strong> operations such as target<strong>in</strong>g artillery.The French cont<strong>in</strong>ued this military support for <strong>the</strong> next three years, deploy<strong>in</strong>gre<strong>in</strong>forcements whenever necessary (see also, Prunier, 1993, p. 134; Reed, 1996, p. 489;Reyntjens, 1994, pp. 93, 99-103).The RPF made an <strong>in</strong>itial advance southward, but after Zairean armored units cutoff <strong>the</strong>ir rear, <strong>the</strong> rebels diverged from Rwigyema’s orig<strong>in</strong>al target of head<strong>in</strong>g northwestfor cover <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> hills of Byumba. Instead, <strong>the</strong> rebels proceeded south <strong>and</strong> west throughopen savanna, where <strong>the</strong>y were vulnerable to <strong>the</strong> better equipped, more mobile <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>narmy supported by <strong>the</strong> Zaireans <strong>and</strong> French. In a decisive battle on October 23, <strong>the</strong><strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n army killed 300 rebels, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g two of <strong>the</strong>ir top three rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g comm<strong>and</strong>ers(see also, Prunier, 1993, p. 133). 8That left only Paul Kagame, who was <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States at <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>vasion. Museveni had sent Kagame, <strong>the</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>an army’s chief of <strong>in</strong>telligence, fortra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g at <strong>the</strong> U.S. army’s Fort Leavenworth, possibly <strong>in</strong> an unsuccessful attempt toforestall an RPF <strong>in</strong>vasion of <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>. Kagame returned to <strong>the</strong> region on October 14,1990, replaced <strong>the</strong> late Rwigyema as military comm<strong>and</strong>er of <strong>the</strong> RPF, <strong>and</strong> belatedlybegan to establish a rebel comm<strong>and</strong> structure (Prunier, 1993, p. 131; Misser, 1995, p. 60).<strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>’s populace had vary<strong>in</strong>g reactions to <strong>the</strong> RPF <strong>in</strong>vasion. Elite Hutupolitical opponents of Habyarimana welcomed <strong>the</strong> military pressure on him to sharepower, even form<strong>in</strong>g an uneasy alliance with <strong>the</strong> rebels. By contrast, most <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>ns –Hutu <strong>and</strong> Tutsi – resented <strong>the</strong> RPF for perpetrat<strong>in</strong>g violence <strong>and</strong> provok<strong>in</strong>g governmentretaliation aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong>m. For example, <strong>in</strong> November 1990, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n army respondedto <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion <strong>in</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>ast <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> by kill<strong>in</strong>g an estimated 500-1000 civilians of <strong>the</strong>Bahima ethnicity, closely related to <strong>the</strong> Tutsi. Then, <strong>in</strong> December 1990, as Kagame led<strong>the</strong> bulk of <strong>the</strong> rebels back to Ug<strong>and</strong>a, his forces massacred approximately 50 <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>ncivilians <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn Byumba town of Kivuye. Reach<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> border, <strong>the</strong> rebels tookrefuge <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Virunga mounta<strong>in</strong>s, where <strong>the</strong>y faced harsh w<strong>in</strong>ter conditions that killedsome rebels <strong>and</strong> compelled o<strong>the</strong>rs to desert back to Ug<strong>and</strong>a. Still, <strong>the</strong> respite gaveKagame <strong>and</strong> his rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g rebels time to regroup, slip <strong>in</strong>to Ug<strong>and</strong>a for supplies, <strong>and</strong>prepare <strong>the</strong>ir next offensive. To demonstrate that <strong>the</strong>y were not defeated, <strong>the</strong> rebelsstaged a dar<strong>in</strong>g raid on January 23, 1991, <strong>in</strong>to Habyarimana’s stronghold of northwestern<strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n, attack<strong>in</strong>g a prison <strong>and</strong> free<strong>in</strong>g its <strong>in</strong>mates. <strong>How</strong>ever, <strong>the</strong> attack also provokedretaliatory massacres aga<strong>in</strong>st several hundred Tutsi civilians <strong>in</strong> Ruhengeri <strong>and</strong>neighbor<strong>in</strong>g Gisenyi (see also, Des Forges, et al., 1999, p. 50; Reed, 1996, pp. 488-90;Reyntjens, pp. 93-95; Watson, 1991, pp. 14-16; Watson, 1992, p. 55).10
From early 1991 through <strong>the</strong> spr<strong>in</strong>g of 1992, Habyarimana made additionalconcessions on democratization <strong>and</strong> refugees to satisfy <strong>in</strong>ternational dem<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong>undercut support for <strong>the</strong> rebels. For example, on February 19, 1991, he signed <strong>the</strong> Dar-Es- Salaam declaration on <strong>the</strong> right of refugee return. In March, his governmentnegotiated a cease-fire with <strong>the</strong> rebels. In July, Habyarimana offered <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n passportsto Tutsi refugees abroad, <strong>and</strong> he legalized opposition political parties. In August, hecommenced broader negotiations with <strong>the</strong> rebels <strong>in</strong> Arusha, Tanzania, <strong>and</strong> asked for U.S.mediation. Later <strong>in</strong> 1991, Habyarimana made a small gesture toward pluralization byadd<strong>in</strong>g an opposition member to his government. More significantly, <strong>in</strong> April 1992, he<strong>in</strong>stalled a multi-party government compris<strong>in</strong>g 10 m<strong>in</strong>isters of his own party <strong>and</strong> 9 from<strong>the</strong> opposition, though he still reta<strong>in</strong>ed effective control (Kamukama, 1993, pp. 61-62;Reed, 1996, p. 492; Reyntjens, 1994, pp. 104, 110, 202).The rebels were not appeased by <strong>the</strong>se concessions. In 1991, while participat<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> peace negotiations, <strong>the</strong>y also streaml<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong>ir military logistics <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong>ed newrecruits (Misser, 1995, p. 62). Soon after, <strong>in</strong> March 1992, <strong>the</strong>y launched a mobileengagement <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>’s nor<strong>the</strong>ast, perform<strong>in</strong>g markedly better than <strong>the</strong>y had <strong>in</strong> 1990.In contrast to <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>itial <strong>in</strong>vasion, <strong>the</strong> rebels now benefited from good logistics <strong>and</strong>communications, well-designed plans, <strong>and</strong> a year of tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> units – prov<strong>in</strong>g able toconfront <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n army. The follow<strong>in</strong>g month, <strong>the</strong>y launched ano<strong>the</strong>r offensive <strong>in</strong>toRuhengeri. Then, <strong>in</strong> June 1992, <strong>the</strong>y attacked <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Byumba. Francedeployed an additional 150 troops to bolster <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n army, but <strong>the</strong> rebels managedto occupy <strong>the</strong> north of <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce – <strong>the</strong> first substantial territory <strong>the</strong>y had been able tocontrol <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g nearly two years of war. The RPF f<strong>in</strong>ally had <strong>the</strong> foothold <strong>in</strong><strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> that Rwigyema orig<strong>in</strong>ally had <strong>in</strong>tended. The new rebel zone also facilitatedmilitary tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> recruitment of Tutsi from with<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> outside <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>.<strong>How</strong>ever, by aga<strong>in</strong> resort<strong>in</strong>g to military force, <strong>the</strong> RPF also raised questions <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>m<strong>in</strong>ds of its few Hutu allies <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> about its true <strong>in</strong>tentions. Until <strong>the</strong>n, <strong>the</strong> Hutuopposition had appreciated <strong>the</strong> RPF’s existence because it helped <strong>the</strong>m extract powershar<strong>in</strong>gconcessions from Habyarimana. In <strong>the</strong> wake of <strong>the</strong> new offensive, however, <strong>the</strong>opposition Hutu worried that <strong>the</strong> rebels <strong>in</strong>tended to conquer <strong>the</strong> country for <strong>the</strong>mselves. 9On July 1, 1992, <strong>the</strong> lead<strong>in</strong>g opposition Hutu party, <strong>the</strong> MDR, criticized <strong>the</strong> rebeloffensive, say<strong>in</strong>g it “shows a duplicity with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> RPF that calls <strong>in</strong>to question its goodfaith <strong>and</strong> s<strong>in</strong>cerity” (see also, Kamukama, 1993, pp. 66-68; Reyntjens, 1994, p. 204).In response to <strong>the</strong> rebel offensives, <strong>and</strong> at <strong>the</strong> urg<strong>in</strong>g of U.S. <strong>and</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>anrepresentatives, Habyarimana agreed to <strong>in</strong>tensify <strong>the</strong> seriousness of <strong>the</strong> negotiations atArusha on July 10, 1992. After three days, he reached a cease-fire with <strong>the</strong> rebels,creat<strong>in</strong>g a demilitarized zone between <strong>the</strong> oppos<strong>in</strong>g forces to be monitored by 50 foreignmilitary observers. Habyarimana also conceded <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple to <strong>the</strong> rebels’ dem<strong>and</strong>s onrule of law, democratization, power-shar<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> creation of a unified military, althoughwithout specify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> crucial details (Kamukama, 1993, pp. 67-68; Reed, 1996, p. 492).Unsatisfied, <strong>the</strong> rebels aimed to <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>the</strong>ir military threat aga<strong>in</strong>st Habyarimana tocoerce fur<strong>the</strong>r concessions from him. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to two senior rebels, <strong>the</strong> RPF used <strong>the</strong>11
next six months to politically <strong>in</strong>doctr<strong>in</strong>ate new recruits, conduct military tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong>enhance ties to <strong>the</strong> Hutu opposition.Then, at <strong>the</strong> start of 1993, <strong>the</strong> RPF launched one of <strong>the</strong> most controversial <strong>and</strong>consequential aspects of its tragic challenge. On February 8, 1993, <strong>the</strong> rebels broke aseven-month cease-fire <strong>and</strong> rapidly captured a large swath of nor<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gportions of <strong>the</strong> hardl<strong>in</strong>e Hutu stronghold of Ruhengeri. With<strong>in</strong> two weeks, <strong>the</strong> rebelsdoubled <strong>the</strong> territory under <strong>the</strong>ir control <strong>and</strong> approached with<strong>in</strong> 20 miles of <strong>the</strong> capital,Kigali, appear<strong>in</strong>g poised to capture it. In <strong>the</strong> course of <strong>the</strong> operation, <strong>the</strong> rebels alsokilled many Hutu civilians. The government characterized <strong>the</strong>se as massacres, while <strong>the</strong>rebels claimed that <strong>the</strong> victims ma<strong>in</strong>ly were collateral damage, killed when <strong>the</strong> rebelsretaliated aga<strong>in</strong>st Hutu troops <strong>and</strong> militias who were attack<strong>in</strong>g from with<strong>in</strong> civilian areas(Misser, 1995, pp. 68-69). The RPF offensive also provoked retaliatory kill<strong>in</strong>g of Tutsi<strong>in</strong> Ruhengeri on March 5, 1993, <strong>and</strong> displaced an estimated one million <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>ns, orapproximately one-eighth of <strong>the</strong> country’s entire population. The government claimedthat <strong>the</strong> civilians had fled <strong>in</strong> terror of <strong>the</strong> approach<strong>in</strong>g Tutsi rebels. The RPF claimed – <strong>in</strong>an effort to fend off <strong>in</strong>ternational criticism – that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n army itself had ethnicallycleansed <strong>the</strong> civilians as it retreated, to prevent <strong>the</strong>m com<strong>in</strong>g under control of <strong>the</strong> rebels.Regardless of <strong>the</strong> precise details, <strong>the</strong> Tutsi rebel offensive <strong>in</strong>tensified Hutuconcerns – <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g among <strong>the</strong> RPF’s erstwhile allies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> domestic opposition – that<strong>the</strong> rebels were <strong>in</strong>tent on conquer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> country <strong>and</strong> restor<strong>in</strong>g Tutsi hegemony. Francedeployed 150 troops to re<strong>in</strong>force <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n army on February 9, 1993 <strong>and</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r 250troops on February 20. Confronted by this French military <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>and</strong> politicalcondemnation from <strong>the</strong> Hutu opposition <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational community, <strong>the</strong> RPF haltedits offensive <strong>and</strong>, on March 19, 1993, pulled back from two-thirds of <strong>the</strong> territory it hadcaptured, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> strategic road l<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g Kigali <strong>and</strong> Ruhengeri (Jones, 1999, p. 141lKamukama, 1993, pp. 53, 55, 70-71; Prunier, 1993, pp. 137-38).The RPF justifies its offensive on grounds that Habyarimana was refus<strong>in</strong>g tomake concessions at Arusha while cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g to orchestrate periodic massacres of Tutsicivilians (Misser, 1995, p. 143; Reyntjens, 1994, p. 205). Indeed, only weeks earlier,Habyarimana’s representative at <strong>the</strong> peace talks, Col. Theoneste Bagosora, had left <strong>in</strong>anger, announc<strong>in</strong>g he was go<strong>in</strong>g home “to prepare <strong>the</strong> apocalypse” (African Rights, 1995,p. 86; Gillet, 1998; Nevill, 1997). 10 Soon after, from January 22-31, 1993, Hutu forceskilled some 300 Tutsi <strong>in</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>, which brought <strong>the</strong> toll of such massacress<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> start of war to around 2,000 (Jones, 1999, p. 141). The RPF says it perceivedthat Habyarimana was attack<strong>in</strong>g domestic Tutsi civilians <strong>in</strong> an effort to coerceconcessions from <strong>the</strong> rebel group at <strong>the</strong> negotiat<strong>in</strong>g table, <strong>and</strong> that it had to demonstrateto him that this was not an acceptable tactic. <strong>How</strong>ever, <strong>the</strong> rebels apparently <strong>in</strong>tendedmore than just to send signals <strong>and</strong> had <strong>in</strong>voked <strong>the</strong>ir long-st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g “zed option.” If <strong>the</strong>iroffensive had not provoked French military <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational politicalcondemnation, <strong>the</strong>y were ready to conquer <strong>the</strong> country. As one senior rebel puts it, “Wecould have won, but <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational community wouldn’t let us. France would aid <strong>the</strong>army <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational community would criticize us.”12
The February 1993 RPF offensive was a short-run success but a long-run disaster.The rebels succeeded <strong>in</strong> show<strong>in</strong>g Habyarimana that <strong>the</strong>y could overrun his army if herefused to concede to <strong>the</strong>ir dem<strong>and</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> so were able to coerce fur<strong>the</strong>r concessions fromhim <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g months at Arusha. <strong>How</strong>ever, <strong>the</strong> offensive also enabledHabyarimana to unite <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n Hutu political class aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> rebels <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>irdomestic Tutsi “accomplices.” The Hutu opposition felt betrayed, as it made clear dur<strong>in</strong>ga February 1993 meet<strong>in</strong>g with RPF representatives <strong>in</strong> Burundi. Faust<strong>in</strong> Twagiramungu,<strong>the</strong> moderate Hutu leader of <strong>the</strong> MDR opposition party, criticized <strong>the</strong> RPF for displac<strong>in</strong>ga million Hutu <strong>and</strong> accused it of be<strong>in</strong>g no better than Habyarimana’s party – <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong>total control ra<strong>the</strong>r than shar<strong>in</strong>g of power. The rebels defended <strong>the</strong>ir actions by say<strong>in</strong>gthat <strong>the</strong>y had to do someth<strong>in</strong>g to stop <strong>the</strong> regime’s repeated massacres of civilian Tutsi.The RPF resented <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> opposition Hutu politicians were more critical of <strong>the</strong>rebel military offensive than of <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al massacres of Tutsi that triggered it. AsPatrick Mazimaka puts it, “They felt that 1,000 Tutsi could die, but why must <strong>the</strong> war restart?”The RPF <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hutu opposition nom<strong>in</strong>ally ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong>ir alliance ofconvenience for several more months, to reta<strong>in</strong> a common front <strong>in</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g dem<strong>and</strong>s atArusha, but mutual trust had been destroyed.Follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> RPF’s dramatic display of strength, <strong>and</strong> spurred by renewedpressure from <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational community, Habyarimana soon conceded to virtually allof <strong>the</strong> rebels’ rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g dem<strong>and</strong>s at Arusha. He agreed to <strong>the</strong> return of refugees <strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>ternally displaced persons, <strong>the</strong> transformation of his office of president <strong>in</strong>to a largelysymbolic office, a transitional government prior to democratic elections, <strong>and</strong> a small UNpeacekeep<strong>in</strong>g force to facilitate security dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> transition. But peace talks boggeddown over two power-shar<strong>in</strong>g issues: which parties would be represented <strong>in</strong> a transitionalgovernment before new elections, <strong>and</strong> how would <strong>the</strong> rebel <strong>and</strong> government troops be<strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to a comb<strong>in</strong>ed army? Habyarimana <strong>and</strong> his Hutu cronies from northwestern<strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> feared that, if <strong>the</strong> Tutsi rebels <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir allies with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n oppositionwere allowed to dom<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>the</strong> transition government <strong>and</strong> army, <strong>the</strong> outcome would beessentially a negotiated coup. Under this scenario, <strong>the</strong> Hutu elite feared <strong>the</strong>y would atbest lose <strong>the</strong> privileges of rule, <strong>and</strong> at worst suffer deadly retribution for <strong>the</strong>ir violenceaga<strong>in</strong>st Tutsi dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> war <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir years of corruption <strong>and</strong> favoritism.International pressure mounted on Habyarimana to share power. Sanctions wereapplied or threatened by <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational community, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g French officials whowarned <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n president that <strong>the</strong>y would soon withdraw <strong>the</strong>ir troops, which hecorrectly viewed as his only protection aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> rebels. In August 1993, see<strong>in</strong>g littleo<strong>the</strong>r choice, he f<strong>in</strong>ally caved <strong>in</strong> on <strong>the</strong> two power-shar<strong>in</strong>g provisions <strong>and</strong> signed <strong>the</strong>comprehensive Arusha accords. The RPF <strong>and</strong> its allied domestic opposition parties wereto be given <strong>the</strong> majority of seats <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terim cab<strong>in</strong>et <strong>and</strong> legislature preced<strong>in</strong>g elections.Moreover, <strong>the</strong> rebels were to be granted <strong>the</strong>ir requested 50 percent of <strong>the</strong> officer positions(<strong>and</strong> 40 percent of <strong>the</strong> enlisted ranks) <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ed army, ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> 15 percentthat Habyarimana orig<strong>in</strong>ally proposed. In light of <strong>the</strong> superiority of <strong>the</strong> rebels on a manfor-manbasis by this time, <strong>the</strong> military <strong>in</strong>tegration protocol was tantamount to anegotiated surrender of <strong>the</strong> Hutu army to <strong>the</strong> Tutsi rebels.13
The profound distress with<strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>’s army <strong>and</strong> government engendered by thisconcession was widely known. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to one account, “An American participantobserved at <strong>the</strong> time that <strong>the</strong> division of <strong>the</strong> army as it stood would never be accepted byhard-l<strong>in</strong>e factions <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> army” (Jones, 1999, pp. 142-43). The U.S. assistant Secretary ofState for Africa dur<strong>in</strong>g most of <strong>the</strong> war says <strong>the</strong> “RPF dem<strong>and</strong>s concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> future of<strong>the</strong> military were guaranteed to push <strong>the</strong> regime <strong>in</strong>to a state of total paranoia” (Cohen,1998, pp. 14-15). Yet, Habyarimana conceded to <strong>the</strong>se dem<strong>and</strong>s because <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>ternational community made clear that o<strong>the</strong>rwise it would remove its support, whichwould leave him at <strong>the</strong> mercy of <strong>the</strong> rebels. As <strong>the</strong> RPF’s Rutaremara observes, “He hadto [concede] because of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational observers who provided aid.”The rebels argue that <strong>the</strong>y too made multiple concessions. For example, <strong>the</strong>yaccepted <strong>the</strong> Hutu regime’s dem<strong>and</strong> for a dual-comm<strong>and</strong> structure <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ed army.They agreed that refugees would not necessarily return to <strong>the</strong>ir home regions with<strong>in</strong><strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> due to concerns about overpopulation. They accepted a complex transitionalpower-shar<strong>in</strong>g arrangement ra<strong>the</strong>r than absolute control. They conceded to a UNpeacekeep<strong>in</strong>g force, even though <strong>the</strong>y preferred an all-African force to reduce French<strong>in</strong>fluence. And <strong>the</strong>y agreed to accept a 60-40 split <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> enlisted ranks of <strong>the</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>edarmy, ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> 50-50 split <strong>the</strong>y sought <strong>and</strong> which <strong>the</strong>y received for <strong>the</strong> officercorps. <strong>How</strong>ever, <strong>the</strong>se were marg<strong>in</strong>al concessions <strong>and</strong> did not imp<strong>in</strong>ge on <strong>the</strong> RPF’sunceas<strong>in</strong>g dem<strong>and</strong> that Habyarimana h<strong>and</strong> over to <strong>the</strong>m effective political <strong>and</strong> militarycontrol of <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>. Indeed, even <strong>the</strong> rebels admit that Habyarimana made <strong>the</strong> lion’sshare of <strong>the</strong> concessions. They attribute this to three factors: <strong>the</strong> rebels’ unrelent<strong>in</strong>gmilitary pressure; <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational community’s threat to cut off aid to Habyarimana; <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal Hutu opposition, which Habyarimana had to appease to reta<strong>in</strong> ethnic support,<strong>and</strong> which was unarmed <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore favored a negotiated outcome ra<strong>the</strong>r than militaryvictory by ei<strong>the</strong>r side.Habyarimana's cronies felt betrayed <strong>and</strong> terrified. They immediately set out tounderm<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> implementation of <strong>the</strong> accords, work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> conjunction with <strong>the</strong> president.Although Habyarimana’s motivation <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tent at <strong>the</strong> time still rema<strong>in</strong> somewhatclouded, he clearly was walk<strong>in</strong>g a political tightrope. He apparently perceived that itwould be political suicide – if not literal suicide – ei<strong>the</strong>r to refuse to sign <strong>the</strong> accords oractually to implement <strong>the</strong>m. If he refused to sign, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational community <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gFrance had threatened to suspend economic <strong>and</strong> military assistance, which would leavehis regime at <strong>the</strong> mercy of <strong>the</strong> rebels. But if he actually started implement<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> accords,he risked be<strong>in</strong>g killed ei<strong>the</strong>r by <strong>the</strong> entrenched Hutu elite, which sought to blockimplementation <strong>in</strong> order to preserve its power <strong>and</strong> physical security, or by <strong>the</strong> Tutsi rebelelite, which would take over key positions <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> army <strong>and</strong> government, whence <strong>the</strong>ycould seek revenge for past offenses. Thus, he pursued a third, middle path: sign<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>accords but do<strong>in</strong>g everyth<strong>in</strong>g possible to avoid implement<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m as orig<strong>in</strong>ally <strong>in</strong>tended.In <strong>the</strong> fall of 1993, Habyarimana obstructed implementation of <strong>the</strong> Arushaaccords by coopt<strong>in</strong>g virtually all of <strong>the</strong> Hutu opposition parties <strong>in</strong>to his “Hutu Power”alliance aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> Tutsi. He did so by spawn<strong>in</strong>g Hutu Power w<strong>in</strong>gs with<strong>in</strong> each partythat quickly became more popular than <strong>the</strong>ir moderate rivals (except <strong>in</strong> one case). This14
effort was facilitated greatly by <strong>the</strong> co<strong>in</strong>cidental assass<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong> October 1993 ofneighbor<strong>in</strong>g Burundi’s first elected Hutu president by Tutsi soldiers <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> subsequentmassacre of thous<strong>and</strong>s of Hutu civilians. Based on <strong>the</strong>se kill<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> RPF’s militaryoffensive earlier that year, Habyarimana could make a credible case that <strong>the</strong> Tutsirepresented an existential threat to <strong>the</strong> survival of <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>’s Hutu. Once <strong>the</strong> oppositionparties were dom<strong>in</strong>ated by <strong>the</strong>ir Hutu Power w<strong>in</strong>gs, he <strong>in</strong>sisted to <strong>the</strong> rebels that <strong>the</strong>sehardl<strong>in</strong>ers – ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority moderate w<strong>in</strong>gs allied with <strong>the</strong> RPF – should appo<strong>in</strong>t<strong>the</strong> parties’ representatives to <strong>the</strong> transitional government, which would enable him toreta<strong>in</strong> effective control of <strong>the</strong> government. He also dem<strong>and</strong>ed that <strong>the</strong> transitionalgovernment be broadened to <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>the</strong> extremist Hutu CDR party. Meanwhile, <strong>the</strong><strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n media began to report, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> rebels became aware of, strong signs thatextremist Hutu were prepar<strong>in</strong>g to greatly escalate <strong>the</strong>ir campaign of retaliation aga<strong>in</strong>stcivilian Tutsi. UN peacekeepers arrived <strong>in</strong> late 1993 to replace French forces, as calledfor <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> peace accords, but this switch only exacerbated <strong>the</strong> paranoia of <strong>the</strong> govern<strong>in</strong>gHutu elite, which felt it was los<strong>in</strong>g its last l<strong>in</strong>e of defense.At <strong>the</strong> same time, extreme elements with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>g Hutu clique prepared <strong>the</strong>irown “f<strong>in</strong>al solution" to reta<strong>in</strong> power <strong>and</strong> block what <strong>the</strong>y perceived as a Tutsi attempt tore-conquer <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> after thirty-five years of Hutu emancipation. These Hutu extremistsapparently believed that by prepar<strong>in</strong>g to kill all of <strong>the</strong> Tutsi civilians <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> <strong>the</strong>ycould prevent <strong>the</strong> country from be<strong>in</strong>g conquered by <strong>the</strong> rebels. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, <strong>the</strong>yimported thous<strong>and</strong>s of guns <strong>and</strong> grenades <strong>and</strong> hundreds of thous<strong>and</strong>s of machetes, <strong>and</strong>transformed political party youth w<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>to fully fledged armed militias. To fomentHutu fear <strong>and</strong> anti-Tutsi hatred <strong>the</strong>y also created a new private radio station as analternative to <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g, somewhat more moderate government channel. Theyapparently also established a cl<strong>and</strong>est<strong>in</strong>e network of extremists with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> army to takecharge when <strong>the</strong> time came. When <strong>the</strong> Tutsi rebels became aware of <strong>the</strong>se activities <strong>in</strong>early 1994, <strong>the</strong>y responded by tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> earnest for <strong>the</strong> resumption of war, which onlyfed Hutu anxieties. This crescendo of fear was exacerbated still fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> February 1994by a wave of mutual political assass<strong>in</strong>ations.By early 1994, <strong>the</strong> rebels had two choices. They could f<strong>in</strong>ally make concessions<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir dem<strong>and</strong>s for power – for example, by lett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> now dom<strong>in</strong>ant Hutu Powerw<strong>in</strong>gs pick <strong>the</strong> opposition parties’ representatives <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> transitional government – <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>hope of avert<strong>in</strong>g massive retaliatory violence aga<strong>in</strong>st Tutsi civilians. Or <strong>the</strong> rebels couldma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir hard l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> prepare a f<strong>in</strong>al military offensive to conquer <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>. Theychose <strong>the</strong> latter.In preparation for war, <strong>the</strong> rebels also attempted to arm <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir politicalallies with<strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> to defend <strong>the</strong>mselves aga<strong>in</strong>st expected retaliation. This was abelated <strong>and</strong> major expansion of <strong>the</strong> RPF’s longst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> largely unsuccessful, effortsto bolster its domestic allies. After Habyarimana created his Interahamwe militia <strong>in</strong>1992, <strong>the</strong> rebels encouraged opposition parties to form <strong>the</strong>ir own militias, which somedid. The RPF also offered to arm <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong> its nor<strong>the</strong>rn occupied zone, but mostrefused because <strong>the</strong>y ei<strong>the</strong>r did not trust <strong>the</strong> rebels or feared reprisal from Habyarimana.The RPF redoubled <strong>the</strong>se efforts <strong>in</strong> early 1994. For example, Rutaremara says he met15
four times with <strong>the</strong> Christian Democratic party “to persuade <strong>the</strong>m that <strong>the</strong>re would begreat violence <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong>y needed counter-tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g.” 11 Ironically, most of <strong>the</strong>opposition militias eventually were coopted <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> Hutu Power movement, so thatdur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> genocide <strong>the</strong>y participated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> kill<strong>in</strong>g of Tutsi.In February 1994, <strong>the</strong> RPF also started arm<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g separate Tutsi “selfdefenseforces” with<strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> to defend aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> expected retaliatory massacres.When <strong>the</strong> genocide started, <strong>the</strong> program was a few months away from fruition, so thatmost Tutsi <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> still were defenseless. In <strong>the</strong> first two months of 1994, some RPFofficials also proposed publicly exhort<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “expected targets” of retaliation <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>– that is, all Tutsi – to flee <strong>the</strong> country. <strong>How</strong>ever, <strong>the</strong> rebels worried this could cost <strong>the</strong>m<strong>in</strong>ternational support by suggest<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>y <strong>in</strong>tended to violate <strong>the</strong> cease-fire. Moreover, itwould stigmatize <strong>the</strong> Tutsi <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> as fifth-columnists, re<strong>in</strong>forc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> worstaccusations of <strong>the</strong> Hutu extremists. Instead, <strong>the</strong> RPF decided to communicate discreetlyto certa<strong>in</strong> groups of domestic Tutsi that <strong>the</strong>y should flee <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to rebelofficials, most such Tutsi refused to leave on <strong>the</strong> grounds that <strong>the</strong>y expected <strong>the</strong> UNpeacekeepers to protect <strong>the</strong>m if violence broke out.Dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> first months of 1994, <strong>the</strong> RPF also prepared a f<strong>in</strong>al military offensiveto conquer <strong>the</strong> country. First, it withdrew its top political officials from Kigali, where<strong>the</strong>y had been deployed <strong>in</strong> December 1993 along with a rebel battalion to prepare for<strong>in</strong>stallation of <strong>the</strong> transitional government under <strong>the</strong> Arusha accords (See also, Misser,1995, pp. 77-78). Next, it <strong>in</strong>filtrated additional rebels to <strong>the</strong> capital, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>battalion’s strength from 600 to about 800. Third, it ordered rebels <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn zone,who had been tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g lightly <strong>in</strong> preparation for <strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n army, toswitch to a “war-foot<strong>in</strong>g,” to be prepared to “react quickly,” <strong>and</strong> to tra<strong>in</strong> for “urbanwarfare” – <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>y soon would be fight<strong>in</strong>g to capture <strong>the</strong> capital. Fourth, <strong>the</strong> RPFdeveloped a war plan, under which <strong>the</strong> re<strong>in</strong>forced battalion <strong>in</strong> Kigali would p<strong>in</strong> downmost <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n army troops, leav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> country to be captured by a separaterebel offensive. The plan was risky because <strong>the</strong> rebel battalion headquarters <strong>in</strong> Kigaliwas r<strong>in</strong>ged by five <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n army battalions <strong>and</strong> several additional army companiesaround <strong>the</strong> city, but <strong>the</strong> RPF was cautiously optimistic about its prospects. As a seniorrebel recalls, “We thought we could defend ourselves as <strong>the</strong> FAR [<strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n army] cameto us [<strong>in</strong> Kigali]. It would leave <strong>the</strong>m vulnerable to our ma<strong>in</strong> thrust from <strong>the</strong> north, butstill we were scared. It was guts.”Then, on April 6, 1994, as President Habyarimana was fly<strong>in</strong>g back to <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>from a conference <strong>in</strong> Tanzania, he was killed when his private plane was shot down bysurface-to-air missiles dur<strong>in</strong>g approach to Kigali. Hutu extremists quickly blamed <strong>the</strong>Tutsi rebels for <strong>the</strong> attack <strong>and</strong> seized effective control of <strong>the</strong> government. With<strong>in</strong> hours,<strong>the</strong>y began assass<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g opposition politicians <strong>and</strong> commenced <strong>the</strong> genocide of Tutsi. In<strong>the</strong> first two weeks alone, <strong>the</strong>y killed approximately 200,000 Tutsi. Despite this, <strong>the</strong> RPFclung to its strategy: refus<strong>in</strong>g to compromise its dem<strong>and</strong>s for political power, whileaccept<strong>in</strong>g retaliation aga<strong>in</strong>st Tutsi civilians as <strong>the</strong> price of achiev<strong>in</strong>g that goal, even as <strong>the</strong>price climbed much higher than expected.16
This RPF calculus was reflected both <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rebels’ battle plan <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>itialrefusal to test government cease-fire offers. Primarily, <strong>the</strong> battle plan was designed toconquer <strong>the</strong> country, ra<strong>the</strong>r than to protect Tutsi civilians from retaliatory violence. Had<strong>the</strong> rebels placed higher priority on protect<strong>in</strong>g Tutsi civilians, <strong>the</strong>y would have racedquickly to <strong>the</strong> country’s southwest where most domestic Tutsi, some 86 percent, lived <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> six prefectures of Kigali, Butare, Gitarama, Gikongoro, Cyangugu, <strong>and</strong> Kibuye(Kuperman, 2001, p. 121). <strong>How</strong>ever, <strong>the</strong> rebels feared casualties if <strong>the</strong>y tried to penetrate<strong>the</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e between <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n army’s two strongholds <strong>in</strong> Kigali <strong>and</strong> Ruhengeri. Instead,<strong>the</strong> rebels <strong>in</strong>itially moved east, where “<strong>the</strong> campaign was easier because <strong>the</strong> terra<strong>in</strong> wasflatter” <strong>and</strong> few army troops stood <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> way, <strong>in</strong>tend<strong>in</strong>g to envelop <strong>the</strong> capital clockwise.The rebels swept through <strong>the</strong> eastern half of <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> <strong>in</strong> about two months, on foot,bypass<strong>in</strong>g army units ensconced on strategic high ground. This unorthodox strategysucceeded because <strong>the</strong> dispersed army units <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> east eventually ran out of logistics <strong>and</strong>apparently lacked <strong>the</strong> nerve to confront <strong>the</strong> rebels directly. <strong>How</strong>ever, <strong>the</strong> rebels’circuitous route did have a major cost: by <strong>the</strong> time <strong>the</strong>y reached <strong>the</strong> southwest <strong>in</strong> June1994, most of <strong>the</strong> Tutsi <strong>the</strong>re already had been killed.Figure 2RPF Offensive: April-July 199417
Interest<strong>in</strong>gly, <strong>the</strong> RPF <strong>in</strong>itially had ordered one unit of rebels to proceedimmediately to <strong>the</strong> southwest but <strong>the</strong>n worried <strong>the</strong>y could be outflanked by <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>narmy <strong>and</strong> so recalled <strong>the</strong>m. This <strong>in</strong>cident illustrates how <strong>the</strong> RPF gave higher priority tomilitary effectiveness than protect<strong>in</strong>g Tutsi civilians. The RPF defends its decision topursue an eastern route on grounds that <strong>the</strong> best way to save Tutsi civilians was to defeat<strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n army that “provided <strong>the</strong> psychological <strong>and</strong> physical environment for <strong>the</strong>killers.” <strong>How</strong>ever, <strong>the</strong> rebels almost certa<strong>in</strong>ly could have saved many more Tutsi, albeitat higher military cost, if <strong>the</strong>y had pursued a southwestern offensive.Dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> first two <strong>and</strong> a half weeks of genocide, <strong>the</strong> rebels also repeatedlyrejected cease-fire offers from <strong>the</strong> government. Then, <strong>in</strong> late April 1994, <strong>the</strong>y realized<strong>the</strong> genocide was be<strong>in</strong>g carried out so quickly that most Tutsi would be killed before <strong>the</strong>rebels could conquer <strong>the</strong> country. At this po<strong>in</strong>t, <strong>the</strong> rebels apparently decided that <strong>the</strong>expected cost <strong>in</strong> retaliatory violence had risen so high – total annihilation of <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>’sTutsi population – that it was no longer acceptable as <strong>the</strong> price of achiev<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir goal.Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, on April 23, <strong>the</strong> RPF belatedly offered to accept <strong>the</strong> cease-fire that <strong>the</strong> armymoderates had proposed 10 days earlier (Richburg, 1994). Patrick Mazimaka says <strong>the</strong>rebel offer was made <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> hope that, “if we accepted a cease-fire, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n armymight stop <strong>the</strong> kill<strong>in</strong>gs because <strong>the</strong>y knew <strong>the</strong>y were go<strong>in</strong>g to lose o<strong>the</strong>rwise. . . . Thearmy could help us <strong>in</strong> areas where we couldn’t get to quickly enough.” Although such aconcession might have had a chance of work<strong>in</strong>g earlier when <strong>the</strong> moderate Hutu officerMarcel Gats<strong>in</strong>zi still was army chief of staff, once he was purged on April 17 <strong>the</strong> rul<strong>in</strong>gextremists appeared <strong>in</strong>tent on f<strong>in</strong>ish<strong>in</strong>g what <strong>the</strong>y had started. The genocide cont<strong>in</strong>ueduntil <strong>the</strong> RPF captured most of <strong>the</strong> country (<strong>and</strong> French-led peacekeepers secured <strong>the</strong>rest) <strong>in</strong> July, by which time an estimated 500,000 Tutsi – nearly 80 percent of <strong>the</strong>ir prewardomestic population – had been killed.<strong>Expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>the</strong> RPF’s Tragic ChallengeOf <strong>the</strong> four putative explanations for <strong>the</strong> RPF’s tragic challenge presented at <strong>the</strong>beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of this study, <strong>the</strong> evidence supports <strong>the</strong> last – that <strong>the</strong> Tutsi rebels expected<strong>the</strong>ir challenge to provoke genocidal retaliation but viewed this as an acceptable cost ofachiev<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir goal of atta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g power <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>. Even prior to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion, <strong>the</strong> rebelleadership expected Habyarimana’s “knee-jerk reaction” would be retaliation aga<strong>in</strong>stTutsi civilians <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>, concedes Patrick Mazimaka. Likewise, Charles Murig<strong>and</strong>eadmits, “reprisals were expected.” After <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial <strong>in</strong>vasion, it also became clear that<strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>’s Hutu government would respond to any fur<strong>the</strong>r rebel offensives or<strong>in</strong>transigence by launch<strong>in</strong>g massacres aga<strong>in</strong>st Tutsi civilians. Wilson Rutaysireacknowledges, “Every time <strong>the</strong>re was a deadlock <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> [peace] talks, <strong>the</strong>re would bemassacres.” Alison Des Forges (1999, pp. 87-88) of Human Rights Watch observes thatall five major outbursts of anti-Tutsi violence from 1990-93 were launched “<strong>in</strong> reaction tochallenges that threatened Habyarimana’s control,” as summarized <strong>in</strong> Figure 3. 1218
Figure 3RPF Challenges to Hutu Regime Provoke Retaliatory MassacresChallenge to Regime Months til Retaliatory MassacreDate Type Retaliation Date Location (geographic region)Oct-90 Invasion 0 Oct-90 Mutara (NE) <strong>and</strong> Kibilira (NW)Jan-91 Attack on Ruhengeri 0 Jan/Feb-91 Ruhengeri (NW)Jan-92 Dem<strong>and</strong>s for power-shar<strong>in</strong>g 2 Mar-92 Kibilira (NW) <strong>and</strong> Bugesera (S)Aug-92 First Arusha Protocol 0 Aug-92 Kibuye (W)Jan-93 Later Arusha Protocol 0 Jan-93 Gisenyi (NW), Kibilira (NW) <strong>and</strong> Kibuye (W)Sources: Des Forges, 1999, pp. 87-88; Reyntjens, 1994, pp. 184-88.<strong>How</strong>ever, <strong>the</strong> RPF persistently underestimated <strong>the</strong> eventual toll of retaliation. At<strong>the</strong> time of <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>vasion, <strong>the</strong> rebels expected “maybe five- to ten- thous<strong>and</strong>” reprisalkill<strong>in</strong>gs, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Rutaysire. By late 1993, <strong>the</strong> Tutsi rebels grew to expect tens ofthous<strong>and</strong>s of retaliatory deaths if <strong>the</strong>y persisted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir challenge, but <strong>the</strong> eventual “scaletook us unawares,” he says. Rudas<strong>in</strong>gwa concurs that, “we knew <strong>the</strong> mass kill<strong>in</strong>gs wouldoccur,” but were surprised by “<strong>the</strong> speed <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> viciousness.” Tito Rutaremara says <strong>the</strong>rebels explicitly rejected such forecasts: “The French were warn<strong>in</strong>g us of this eventuality.But we took it as blackmail. We didn’t expect <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al extent.” Never<strong>the</strong>less, given that<strong>the</strong> RPF from <strong>the</strong> start did expect its challenge to provoke thous<strong>and</strong>s of retaliatorycivilian kill<strong>in</strong>gs, this challenge cannot be expla<strong>in</strong>ed by failure to anticipate such areaction.Nor can <strong>the</strong> challenge be expla<strong>in</strong>ed by a rebel expectation that Tutsi were boundto suffer even if <strong>the</strong>y eschewed violence <strong>the</strong>mselves. With<strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>, prior to <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>vasion, Tutsi were not even suffer<strong>in</strong>g discrim<strong>in</strong>ation relative to most Hutu, let aloneviolence. In secondary schools, <strong>the</strong>y “rema<strong>in</strong>ed over-represented” (Uv<strong>in</strong>, 1997, p. 101).Likewise, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> mid-ranks of <strong>the</strong> public sector, “Tutsi rema<strong>in</strong>ed represented beyond <strong>the</strong> 9percent <strong>the</strong>y were <strong>the</strong>oretically allocated. Moreover, <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r sectors of society –commerce <strong>and</strong> enterprise, NGOs, <strong>and</strong> development projects – <strong>the</strong>y were present beyondthat proportion” (Uv<strong>in</strong>, 1998, p. 35; see also, Erny, 1994, p. 83).In Ug<strong>and</strong>a, likewise, <strong>the</strong> Tutsi had faced no significant discrim<strong>in</strong>ation or violencefor several years prior to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> late 1980s represented a high-watermark for Tutsi <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a, given <strong>the</strong>ir mlitary role, ties to Museveni, <strong>and</strong> economicadvancement. The majority of Tutsi <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a had left <strong>the</strong> refugee camps <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrated<strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> larger society. The rema<strong>in</strong>der, mostly elderly, lived <strong>in</strong> refugee settlements thatwere “solid <strong>and</strong> permanent – more village than refugee camp” (Watson, 1991, pp. 6-8).Admittedly, o<strong>the</strong>r ethnic groups <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ant Bag<strong>and</strong>a, resented <strong>the</strong>Tutsi <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> late 1980s, but this was precisely because <strong>the</strong> Tutsi enjoyed economicsuccess <strong>and</strong> support from <strong>the</strong> president.In o<strong>the</strong>r neighbor<strong>in</strong>g states, most <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n Tutsi refugees also were safe <strong>and</strong>secure. The largest group of refugees, about a quarter-million, lived <strong>in</strong> Burundi, where<strong>the</strong>y had been treated well for decades by that state’s Tutsi-dom<strong>in</strong>ated government.Burundi <strong>and</strong> Tanzania even had offered citizenship to <strong>the</strong> refugees. Zaire was probably19
<strong>the</strong> least secure environment for Tutsi refugees <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> late 1980s, but <strong>the</strong>y still enjoyed agood relationship with <strong>the</strong> president, Mobutu Sese Seko, who hired elite <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n Tutsias political adm<strong>in</strong>istrators. As <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a, <strong>the</strong> Tutsi <strong>in</strong> Zaire were resented by some of<strong>the</strong> local populace but were not subject to significant discrim<strong>in</strong>ation or threat of violence(Reed, 1996, p. 483; Watson, 1992, p. 53). Even after <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial <strong>in</strong>vasion, <strong>the</strong> rebels had<strong>the</strong> option of return<strong>in</strong>g to relative safety <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a. Indeed, some rebels did return when<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion <strong>in</strong>itially fared poorly, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r estimated 200,000 Tutsirefugees 13 <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a rema<strong>in</strong>ed secure throughout <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n civil war.For most of <strong>the</strong> war, <strong>the</strong> rebels also expected that <strong>the</strong>y could mitigate violentretaliation aga<strong>in</strong>st Tutsi with<strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> by <strong>the</strong>mselves eschew<strong>in</strong>g military escalation<strong>and</strong>/or scal<strong>in</strong>g back dem<strong>and</strong>s for political power. For example, as late as March 1993,<strong>the</strong> rebels voluntarily withdrew from a large swath of territory captured <strong>the</strong> previousmonth because <strong>in</strong> return, “We had confidence that Habyarimana would listen to <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>ternational community <strong>and</strong> maybe even step aside. We thought that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> worst case,<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational community would establish safe areas.” The rebels also might haveaverted genocide by relent<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong>ir dem<strong>and</strong> for de facto control of <strong>the</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ed army,perhaps <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al straw for <strong>the</strong> Hutu extremists.Even after <strong>the</strong> rebels <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational community compelled Habyarimana tosign <strong>the</strong> Arusha accords <strong>in</strong> August 1993, <strong>the</strong> RPF still potentially could have avertedmassive retaliation by mak<strong>in</strong>g concessions dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir implementation. For example,had <strong>the</strong> rebels acquiesced to a transitional government that <strong>in</strong>cluded m<strong>in</strong>isters from <strong>the</strong>dom<strong>in</strong>ant Hutu Power w<strong>in</strong>gs of <strong>the</strong> opposition parties – <strong>the</strong>reby permitt<strong>in</strong>g Habyarimanato reta<strong>in</strong> political control – <strong>the</strong> clique around <strong>the</strong> president might have been sufficientlymollified to forego genocide. Of course, it is also possible that by this po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>the</strong> Hutuextremists were committed to genocide because <strong>the</strong>y perceived <strong>the</strong> Tutsi rebels asirrevocably <strong>in</strong>tent on total victory.Until at least <strong>the</strong> previous year, however, <strong>the</strong> RPF did expect it could avertgenocidal retaliation by mak<strong>in</strong>g concessions, yet refused to do so because it viewed suchretaliation as an acceptable cost of atta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g power <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>. “You always have tobalance <strong>the</strong> pros <strong>and</strong> cons,” says Tito Rutaremara, who acknowledges that, “We knew ifwe fought, people would suffer” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>re would be “civilian atrocities.” A rebelspokesman justifies this decision matter-of-factly: “One can’t make an omelet withoutbreak<strong>in</strong>g some eggs” (Overdulve, 1997, p. 74).The RPF’s tolerance for retaliatory kill<strong>in</strong>g also may be expla<strong>in</strong>ed by a schismwith<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n Tutsi that stemmed from <strong>the</strong> prolonged refugee experience. By1990, many refugees who had spent up to three decades <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a felt little k<strong>in</strong>ship forthose <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> who faced retaliation. Indeed, some Tutsi <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> diaspora suspected thatthose who had been permitted to rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> must have collaborated with <strong>the</strong>extremist Hutu regime (Erny, 1994, pp. 137-38, 147; Prunier, 1993, p. 136; Reed, 1996,p. 482). From <strong>the</strong> opposite perspective, many Tutsi <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> bitterly opposed <strong>the</strong>rebels on grounds <strong>the</strong> diaspora Tutsi were will<strong>in</strong>g to fight to <strong>the</strong> last domestic Tutsi(Overdulve, 1997, p. 74). Realistically, <strong>the</strong> RPF did value its Tutsi brethren <strong>in</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>,20
if noth<strong>in</strong>g else as likely ethnic political supporters follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> war. <strong>How</strong>ever, <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>tra-Tutsi schism may help expla<strong>in</strong> why <strong>the</strong> RPF had such a high tolerance forretaliatory kill<strong>in</strong>g.ConclusionA revised history of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n Patriotic Front reveals how <strong>and</strong> why <strong>the</strong>se Tutsirefugee rebels, by pursu<strong>in</strong>g an armed challenge aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>’s Hutu regime, provokeda retaliatory genocide aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> state’s Tutsi populace. These f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs help expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>genocide, but do not justify or excuse it. Nor can <strong>the</strong>y resolve debates about <strong>the</strong>legitimacy of <strong>the</strong> RPF’s goals or its resort to military force. <strong>How</strong>ever, <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs dosuggest that <strong>the</strong> genocide was foreseeable – <strong>and</strong> avoidable if <strong>the</strong> RPF had been will<strong>in</strong>g tocompromise ei<strong>the</strong>r its aspirations or means of pursu<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m. The evidence alsodemonstrates that <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational community, by support<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rebels’ <strong>in</strong>transigence,<strong>in</strong>advertently helped trigger <strong>the</strong> genocidal backlash. Scholars <strong>and</strong> policymakers would beadvised to heed <strong>the</strong>se lessons as <strong>the</strong>y attempt to avert genocide <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r cases.21
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Notes1 Indeed, as early as 1987, when <strong>the</strong> U.S. National Security Council’s new senior director for Africa,Herman Cohen (1998, p. 5), traveled to Africa, “President Habyarimana told me of his suspicions that Tutsiyouth <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>an army were plott<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>vade <strong>the</strong>ir ancestral homel<strong>and</strong>.”2 This was a ma<strong>in</strong>stream RPF position, not merely that of <strong>the</strong> radicals as reported by Prunier (1993, p.130).3 Watson (1991, p. 13) also reports that when Kagame was head of <strong>in</strong>telligence for <strong>the</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>an army,“He is alleged to have used its resources to <strong>in</strong>timidate dissenters with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> RPF . . . as well as refugeeswho did not favor an armed return or who had relations with <strong>the</strong> Rw<strong>and</strong>ese state. Some were imprisoned.”4 This secret, patient approach led a group of 26 younger, more aggressive Tutsi soldiers to attempt tojump-start <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion prematurely by cross<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>’s Akagera national park <strong>in</strong> January 1989,hop<strong>in</strong>g it would compel o<strong>the</strong>rs to jo<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>m. Instead, Rwigyema crossed <strong>the</strong> border <strong>and</strong> retrieved <strong>the</strong> men.The actual <strong>in</strong>vasion was not launched for ano<strong>the</strong>r 21 months.5 Details on <strong>the</strong> <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>n army’s equipment <strong>in</strong> 1994 can be found <strong>in</strong> Kuperman (2001, p. 41).6 In April 1990, six months prior to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion, Protais Musoni was directed to arrange production ofcrops for <strong>the</strong> troops. He obta<strong>in</strong>ed l<strong>and</strong> to grow maize <strong>in</strong> Tanzania, organized transport across LakeVictoria, <strong>and</strong> arranged two water cross<strong>in</strong>gs of <strong>the</strong> Akagera River <strong>in</strong>to <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong> that would enableresupply<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rebels after <strong>the</strong>y <strong>in</strong>vaded. The RPF also arranged a network to provide meat for its fighters,<strong>and</strong> shortly before <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion slaughtered 1,200 cattle to prepare dried meat for <strong>the</strong> war (see also, Otunnu,1999b, p. 41).7 Kagame says that his agree<strong>in</strong>g to go for tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States prior to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion was adiversion to make Ug<strong>and</strong>an authorities believe that <strong>the</strong> suspected <strong>in</strong>vasion was not imm<strong>in</strong>ent. He says he<strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Tutsi officers already had been <strong>in</strong>terrogated several times about a suspected plot but had beenfound <strong>in</strong>nocent. He also says Museveni “was surprised by <strong>the</strong> tim<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> attack. . . . He was very bitter.He was extremely unhappy. There is no doubt about this” (Misser, 1995, pp. 54, 65-66).8 A widespread account, that <strong>the</strong> top three rebel leaders had died from rebel <strong>in</strong>fight<strong>in</strong>g ra<strong>the</strong>r thanhostile fire, apparently was a false rumor spread by <strong>the</strong> Habyarimana regime to undercut <strong>the</strong> morale <strong>and</strong>recruit<strong>in</strong>g efforts of <strong>the</strong> Tutsi rebels (Misser, 1995, pp. 55-59, 61, 63).9 Cohen (1998, p. 9) <strong>in</strong>dicates that <strong>the</strong> opposition parties already had been skeptical of <strong>the</strong> RPF as earlyas May 1992, when he visited <strong>Rw<strong>and</strong>a</strong>. “The different opposition parties were refresh<strong>in</strong>gly multi-ethnic,with Tutsi <strong>in</strong>tellectuals hold<strong>in</strong>g important positions. Never<strong>the</strong>less, everyone placed <strong>the</strong> RPF <strong>in</strong> a separatecategory. . . . [M]any of <strong>the</strong> Hutu opposition also regarded <strong>the</strong> RPF as a throwback to <strong>the</strong> old days of Tutsifeudalism. For <strong>the</strong>m, <strong>the</strong> RPF was less a force for democratization <strong>and</strong> more a threat of a return totraditional m<strong>in</strong>ority rule.”10 There are several versions of this account, with some claim<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> statement was made <strong>in</strong> Arusha <strong>and</strong>o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>in</strong> Kigali. The date varies from December 1992 to February 1993. It is possible that Bagosorarepeated several versions of <strong>the</strong> threat at different times <strong>and</strong> places.11 Protais Musoni says <strong>the</strong> RPF also helped tra<strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r militias, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Social Democrats’Akambozi militia.12 The last two rounds of massacres targeted not only Tutsi, but <strong>the</strong>ir allies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> moderate Hutuopposition. The <strong>in</strong>termittent massacres ended after a March 1993 UN report publicized <strong>the</strong>m, butapparently only because <strong>the</strong> extremists <strong>the</strong>n turned to plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir f<strong>in</strong>al solution.13 Reyntjens (1993, p. 139) says 82,000, but Watson (1991, p. 6) clarifies that such lower figures countonly <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority of refugees who lived <strong>in</strong> camps, exclud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> majority who “self-settled” elsewhere <strong>in</strong>Ug<strong>and</strong>a.24