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JOURNAL OF EUROPEANINTEGRATION HISTORYREVUE D’HISTOIRE DEL’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNEZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DEREUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATIONedited by theGroupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaineauprès de la Commission européenne1999, Volume 5, Number 1NOMOS VerlagsgesellschaftBaden-Baden

EditorsPublished twice a year by theGroupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoirecontemporaine auprès de la Commission européennein cooperation with theJean Monnet Chairs in History of European Integrationwith the support of theEuropean Commission, DG X University InformationEditorial BoardBOSSUAT, GérardUniversité de Cergy-Pontoise,Jean Monnet ChairDEIGHTON, AnneSt. Antony’s College, OxfordDUMOULIN, MichelUniversité catholique de LouvainJean Monnet ChairGUIRAO, FernandoUniversitat Pompeu Fabra, BarcelonaJean Monnet ChairLAURSEN, JohnnyUniversity of AalborgLOTH, WilfriedUniversität-Gesamthochschule EssenJean Monnet ChairM1LWARD, Alan S.European University Institute, FlorencePOIDEVIN, RaymondUniversité de Strasbourg IIISCHWABE, KlausRheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule AachenJean Monnet ChairTRAUSCH, GilbertCentre Robert Schuman, Université de LiègeVARSORI, AntonioUniversità degli Studi di FirenzeJean Monnet ChairJOURNAL OF EUROPEANINTEGRATION HISTORYREVUE D’HISTOIRE DEL’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNEZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DEREUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATIONEditorial SecretariatGilbert Trausch, directorCharles Barthel, assistant directorAddress:Centre d’études et de recherches européennesRobert Schuman4 Rue Jules WilhelmL-2728 LuxembourgTel.: (3 52) 4 78 22 90/4 78 22 91Fax.: (3 52) 42 27 97

JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORYREVUE D’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNEZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATIONedited by theGroupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaineauprès de la Commission européenne1999, Volume 5, Number 1

The Liaison Committee of Historians came into being in 1982 as a result of an important internationalsymposium, that the Commission had organized in Luxembourg in order to launch historical researchon European integration. It consists of historians of the European Union member countries, who havespecialized in contemporary history.The Liaison Committee:- gathers and conveys information about works on European history after the Second World War;- advises the European Union in the matter of scientific projects to be carried through. Thus, theLiaison Committee was commissioned to make publicly available the archives of the Communityinstitutions;- enables researchers to make better use of the archival sources;- promotes scientific meetings in order to get an update of the acquired knowledge and to stimulatenew research: six research conferences have been organized and their proceedings published, aseventh conference will take place in Essen (Germany).The Journal of European History - Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne - Zeitschrift fürGeschichte der europäischen Integration is totally in line with the preoccupations of the Liaison Committee.Being the first journal of history to deal exclusively with the history of European Integration,the Journal intends to offer the increasing number of young historians devoting their research to contemporaryEurope, a permanent forum.At the same time, the Liaison Committee publishes the Newsletter of the European Community LiaisonCommittee of Historians and of the Jean Monnet Chairs in History of European Integration. TheNewsletter publishes in particular an important current bibliography of theses and dissertations, booksand articles dealing with European integration and presents the syllabuses of research institutes andcentres in the field of European history.The Liaison Committee is supported by the European Commission and works completely independentlyand according to the historians’ critical method.*Le Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire auprès de la Commission des Communautéseuropéennes s’est constitué en 1982 à la suite d’un grand colloque que la Commission avait organiséà Luxembourg pour lancer la recherche historique sur la construction européenne. Il regroupedes professeurs d’université des pays membres de l’Union européenne, spécialistes d’histoire contemporaine.Le Groupe de liaison a pour mission:- de diffuser l’information sur les travaux portant sur l’histoire de l’Europe après la Seconde Guerremondiale;- de conseiller l’Union européenne sur les actions scientifiques à entreprendre avec son appui; ainsile Groupe de liaison a assuré une mission concernant la mise à la disposition du public des archivesdes institutions communautaires;- d’aider à une meilleure utilisation par les chercheurs des moyens de recherche mis à leur disposition(archives, sources orales...);- d’encourager des rencontres scientifiques afin de faire le point sur les connaissances acquises etde susciter de nouvelles recherches: six grands colloques ont été organisés et leurs actes publiés,un septième colloque aura lieu à Essen (RFA).L’édition du Journal of European Integration History - Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne -Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration se situe dans le droit fil des préoccupations duGroupe de liaison. Première revue d’histoire à se consacrer exclusivement à l’histoire de la constructioneuropéenne, le Journal se propose de fournir un forum permanent au nombre croissant de jeuneshistoriens vouant leurs recherches à l’Europe contemporaine.Parallèlement le Groupe de liaison édite la Lettre d’information du Groupe de liaison des professeursd’histoire auprès de la Commission européenne et du réseau des Chaires Jean Monnet enhistoire de l’Intégration. La Lettre d’information publie notamment une importante bibliographie courantedes thèses et mémoires, livres et articles consacrés à la construction européenne et présente lesprogrammes des instituts et centres de recherche en matière d’histoire européenne.Le Groupe de liaison bénéficie du soutien de la Commission européenne. Ses colloques et publicationsse font en toute indépendance et conformément à la méthode critique qui est celle des historiens.

JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORYREVUE D’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNEZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION1999, Volume 5, Number 1Anne DEIGHTON, coordinatorAnne DEIGHTONIntroduction 5Lorena RUANOElites, public opinion and pressure groups: the British positionin agriculture during negotiations for accession to the EC, 1961-1975 7Anne DULPHY & Christine MANIGANDL’opinion publique française face à l’élection européenne de juin 1979 23Julie SMITHThe 1975 Referendum 41G. WYN REESBritish Strategic Thinking and Europe, 1964-1970 57Andreas WILKENSWestpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic and Monetary Union.Germany’s European Policy in the Brandt Era (1969-1974) 73Book reviews - Comptes rendus - Buchbesprechungen 103Notices - Informations - Mitteilungen . 113Abstracts - Résumés - Zusammenfassungen 115Contributors - Auteurs - Autoren 121Books received - Livres reçus - Eingegangene Bücher 123

Editorial noticeArticles for inclusion in this journal may be submitted at any time. The editorial board will thenarrange for the article to be refereed. Articles should not be longer than 6000 words, footnotesincluded. They may be in English, French or German.Articles submitted to the Journal should be original contributions and not be submitted to anyother publication at the same time as to the Journal of European Integration History. Authorsshould retain a copy of their article. The publisher and editors cannot accept responsibility forloss of or damage to author’s typescripts or disks.The accuracy of, and views expressed in articles and reviews are the sole responsibility of theauthors.Authors should ensure that typescripts conform with the journal style. Prospective contributorsshould obtain further guidelines from the Editorial Secretariat.Articles, reviews, communications relating to articles and books for review should be sent to theEditorial Secretariat.CitationThe Journal of European Integration History may be cited as follows:JEIH, (Year)/(Number), (Page).ISSN 0947-9511© 1999 NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden and the Groupe de liaison des professeursd’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne. Printed in Germany.All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, ortransmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,without prior permission of the publishers.

5IntroductionAnne DeightonIn the first number of the Journal of European Integration History, Alan Milwardwrote a penetrating article that challenged scholars working on European integrationhistory to reverse the existing theoretical flow that he argues runs from socialscience to history. He also sought to expand our horizons about the different facetsof European integration history, pointing out that domestic political history, diplomatichistory, economic history and business history have a role in the building ofwhat he calls “allegiance” towards Europe. Allegiance to Europe has run in parallelto allegiance to the nation-state, and Milward asks how this allegiance played itselfout historically in postwar Western Europe.In this volume of the Journal of European Integration History, the phenomenonof attachment to Europe is examined from a number of different perspectives,reflecting Milward’s argument that allegiance was expressed in a number of ways.Public opinion is a most fickle and elusive phenomenon, which ebbs and flows, andwhich may be susceptible to political manipulation, as well as representing realpreferences. The articles by Julie Smith, and Anne Dulphy and Christine Maniganddeal with public opinion and voting behaviour at two crucial moments in the 1970s.The first moment was during the British referendum, which was held in 1975 to determinewhether the terms of British membership of the European Communitiesthat had been renegotiated by Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson were acceptable.Smith reconstructs the arguments and tactics deployed during the referendumcampaign. This article has both intrinsic and general relevance, as another referendumhas been promised in Britain on the issue of British participation in the Europeanand Monetary Union project. The article by Dulphy and Manigand, largelybased upon Eurobarometer material, examines the consistently high levels of supportfor European integration in France at the time of the European elections. Thiswas an important moment, as it was not until 1979 that the first sets of direct electionsfor the European Parliament were held, and therefore this was the first timethat electoral opinion about European integration was directly tested.Lorena Ruano does not examine the direct effects of public voting, but rather posesthe question regarding the extent to which public preferences guide decisionmakers.Her analysis of British decisions regarding the agricultural sector between 1961and 1975 reveals that decision-makers found considerable “policy space” in which tooperate in this area. That is to say, public allegiance in this sector at least was nottightly bound or predetermined - the power of political decision-making could leadand shape both interest groups and wider public opinion. For Wyn Rees, the shiftfrom the global to the European theatre by the British military in the 1960s likewiseshows a lack of strongly defined preferences. His case study reveals similarities tothat of Ruano, in that it shows the “top-down” nature of British decisionmaking overEuropean issues, that well reflects the conventional notions about the elite nature ofthe European debate during the first three decades of the European Communities. For

6 Anne Deightonneither author was there evidence of a great deal of positive public enthusiasm inBritain about European integration. The contrast here with the work of Wilkens isstriking. Wilkens has used the recently released Willi Brandt papers to re-examine,inter alia, the important debate in the early 1970s about European economic andmonetary union. His work shows that West Germany was a country in which“allegiance” was highly consensual and widespread, and in which national andEuropean interests appear, for historical reasons, to have converged closely.These articles were first presented as papers at a conference in St. Antony’sCollege, University of Oxford, in September 1998. They formed part of a two daystudy on public opinion and national decision makers, itself part of a wider internationalresearch project on ‘Identité européenne au XXième siècle’. The conferencepapers will be published in France later this year.

7Elites, public opinion and pressure groups:the British position in agriculture during negotiations foraccession to the EC, 1961-1975Lorena RuanoThe study of the British position during the accession negotiations with the EC canthrow light on general questions which have traditionally occupied the minds ofpolitical scientists, in this case, the relationship between ‘public opinion’ and‘elites’. How was the British position towards the European Community (EC) formulated?Which actors were involved? Whose ‘opinion’ mattered? Whose interestsdid the policy line reflect?In order to answer these questions and highlight their relevance, the first sectionof this article outlines a simple theoretical framework, based on the criticism ofliberalism made by Michels, Duverger and Weber. 1 The empirical analysis, in thesecond section, is restricted to the agricultural sector, which was the most difficultand controversial to negotiate. 2I. Theoretical considerations: elites, public opinion and democracy1. Assumptions and questions of the ‘elite’ approachThe use of the terms ‘public opinion’ and ‘elites’ entails a number of theoreticalassumptions on the relationship between society and the state, on how democracyworks, and on how public policy is formulated. The concept ‘elites’ belongs withinthe debate about the autonomy of the state, in which the main cleavage for analysisis that between the general ‘public’, and the policy ‘expert’ or ‘decision-maker’,who, dedicated full time to public issues, acquires the skills to handle the highdegree of complexity and information required to run the affairs of the modernnation-state. Information and expert knowledge differentiate the decision-makerfrom the general public and give him (or her) the power and, to some extent, thelegitimacy to take specific decisions in the name of the ‘general/national interest’.Since the public is unable to take informed decisions in every single public policyarea, the question arises of how much autonomy the decision-maker has vis-à-vis the1. R. MICHELS, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of The Oligarchical Tendencies of ModemDemocracy, translated by Eden and Cedar Paul, New York-Dover, 1959 (reprint of the 1915 edition);M. DUVERGER, Les partis politiques, Paris, A. Colin, 1951; S. ANDRESKI, Max Weber on capitalism,bureaucracy and religion: a selection of texts, London, Allen and Unwin, 1983.2. A longer version of this paper was presented to the second research group on ‘National decision-makersand public opinion’, in a conference held at St Antony’s College, in September 1998,under the Chair of Dr. Anne Deighton and Professor Elisabeth du Réau (Paris HI), as part of theinternational research programme Les identités européennes au XXème siècle: Diversités, convergenceset solidarités.

8 Lorena Ruanorest of society when formulating public policy. This problem pertains within the olddebates about democratic accountability and the effectiveness of interest representationmechanisms, and there are differing interpretations on the issue. Liberal/pluralistanalyses view policy goals as emerging from societal preferences which are representedand articulated by political parties, and policy-makers as constrained by mechanismsof accountability, such as elections and systems of checks and balances. Theelite approach, in contrast, is sceptical about the effectiveness of representation mechanisms,and among the most pessimistic versions are Michels’ ‘iron law of oligarchies’,Duverger’s ‘inner circle’ within political parties, and the Weberian ‘bureaucraticwinter’. In political parties, as in the higher ranks of bureaucracies, wherepolicies are designed and decided upon, small powerful core groups emerge, whichseem to develop identities and interests of their own, which are distinct from those ofthe public in whose name they act. Through the governmental process, individuals inleading positions undergo a constant process of socialisation which eventually makesthem more akin to other elites, rather than to those in the name of whom they are takingdecisions. Moreover, given the need for rationality, coherence and continuity requiredin government policy, elites seem to enjoy a high degree of insulation and autonomyfrom public scrutiny. Given that societal preferences are fragmented into amyriad of short-sighted ‘particular interests’, the public is seen as incapable of definingby itself what is in the ‘general interest’, so elites are in charge of articulating it.The ‘state’s interest’ thus reflects the world views of the particular groups of individualswho run it -the elites. Therefore the use of the concept ‘elites’ carries an underlyingquestioning about whether and to what extent democracy works, according to thedegree of accountability/autonomy that the policy maker has from ‘public opinion’.The liberal response to this criticism is that, although imperfectly, in democratic systems,the public has some input into the goals and content of public policies. The ‘publicinterest’ is not always susceptible of being determined through rational informedcalculation: values and beliefs in society determine normative questions. In a democracy,the decision-maker ultimately depends on the elected representative, who allocatesresources and sets normative policy guidelines, and who is accountable to the electorate.Voters mark the outer limits of the range of policy options within which the decision-makercan move. This point should be taken on board for the case of Western Europeandemocracies, where, despite all the shortcomings of representation mechanismsanalysed below, decision-makers can not seriously be seen as not accountable at all.2. Whose opinion?Assuming there is some accountability and representativeness, the problem stillremains of establishing precisely whose opinion is ‘public opinion’? Whose interestsand preferences exactly should the policy-maker bear in mind when taking a decision?Should it be the preferences expressed in opinion polls, or by the media, or the majorityof voters? Furthermore, there are a variety of methodological difficulties in measuringpublic opinion through polls, which cannot deal satisfactorily with the complexities offragmented societal preferences. In particular it is important to mention that people mayhave different opinions on different aspects of an issue, which poll questions do not

Elites, public opinion and pressure groups 9reflect. 3 Another problem is that the public does not always have and/or express itsopinion on the details of every single policy issue.Even assuming that we can know with an acceptable degree of accuracy ‘what thepublic thinks’, another crucial question remains: what happens when majority opinionclashes with the interest of a minority, which is particularly affected by a specificdecision? Should Tocqueville’s ‘tyranny of the majority’ prevail? The opposite situation,a powerful and organized minority overriding the will of the majority, also posesa serious challenge to democratic principles.In pluralist polities, the variety of opinions and the range of interests are boundto be large and complex, and in most cases, incorporating more than one view canmake policy incongruous. Policy-makers are constantly facing these dilemmas andhave to accommodate or choose among conflicting interests, arising from differentsegments of society.3. The problem of representationHow does the decision-maker know what the ‘public’ wants? Opinion polls are acommon instrument, but they are not binding on the decision-maker. Two major representationmechanisms are considered here, both of which offer an articulated viewof society’s preferences as well as some degree of accountability. On one hand, theelectoral system works through political parties, which are in charge of aggregatingand articulating in their manifestos the ‘preferences’ of diverse sections of society, soas to achieve the support of a majority. On the other hand, the executive consults, andeven sometimes negotiates, with the interest groups involved in a policy.a. Votes and partiesElections are the most common mechanism for transmitting preferences and ensuringaccountability. However, political scientists have pointed out that, when voters electrepresentatives from a political party, they are opting for a package of policy-options,embodied in party manifestos. This ample and general mandate opens space for thediscretion and autonomy of policy-makers, specially in issue-areas which are notvery publicised, politicised or likely to make a difference in voting patterns. 4Second, the process of mobilisation, aggregation, and articulation of interests, entailsassigning priorities, if the coherence of a party’s policy line is to be preserved. Yet, giventhat parties are supposed to win as many votes as possible, they cannot always afford tomaintain such coherence and end up advocating conflicting points of view simultaneously,especially during election time. Once in Parliament, however, effective policy-makingdemands clearer and consistent goals, with the effect of alienating the views of one ormore groups of representatives inside the party, and with them, the opinion of the segment(s)of society which voted for them. The ‘dissident’ MP is thus faced with two equal-3. N. NUGENT, ‘British Public Opinion and the European Community’, in S. GEORGE, Britain andEuropean Community: The Politics of Semi-Detachment, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 173.4. DUVERGER, Les partis politiques.

10 Lorena Ruanoly costly courses of action: defying the party line in defence of his constituency, but at thecost of splitting the party which brought him to power; or aligning with the whip, but atthe cost of alienating his constituency. Whichever way, a section of the voters is not represented,and a cleavage appears within the party, either horizontally (with other MPs ofcontrary opinion) or vertically (with the voters).There is a third cleavage inside political parties, which surfaces more clearlywhen they are in power, and which also works as a filter for conflicting interests: thatbetween the leadership, which holds the executive posts, and the parliamentary party,which is more immediately related to its constituencies. The elite in control of theexecutive has to be more ‘pragmatic’ and ready to compromise than back-benchers,because as the government, it has to act in the ‘national interest’ and not just in thename of a part of society, which a party represents. These three filters act as selectionmechanisms which have the virtue of translating disaggregated and fragmented ‘publicopinions’ into a coherent policy programme. But they have the disadvantage ofmisrepresenting a part of the electorate.b. Interest groupsInterest groups are another mechanism of transmission of preferences from societyto government which, in a way, complements majority/electoral representation.Interest groups and policy-making literature emphasise that given that the electoralarena provides only the broad picture of an ambiguous and large mandate, when itcomes to fill in the details, policy-makers and bureaucracies rely on the support andinformation provided by organised particular interests. Since the latter have a stakein policy, they are likely to share some expertise and to help in implementation.Interest groups can make life easier for the government by simplifying and articulatingsocietal preferences and opinions on specific issues.However, representation through interest groups has some drawbacks, the first ofwhich is inequality of access. What about those interests which are not organised, orthose which are deliberately demobilised? In the case of agriculture, for example, it isclear that in most European countries, and at Community level, the organised farmershave made their interests prevail over those of the unorganised consumers, who havehad to pay higher prices for subsidised food. Although it might be in the general interestto have a wealthy and productive peasantry, the fact is that the immediate interestsof the minority have prevailed.In sum, translating public preferences into concrete public policy is not astraight-forward process. The input comes both from majority and particular interestsvia two main channels: the electoral system and interest group activity. This processimplies the intervention of biases and selection mechanisms among the plurality of‘public opinions’ emerging from a diverse polity, which lead to the over-representationof some views and the suppression of others. In this way, it is in the decision-maker’sown interest to maintain the balance between private and public interestson the one hand, and to reconcile the continuity, rationality and coherence of apolicy with the ever-changing combination of inputs coming from a volatile publicopinion, shifting coalitions of pressure groups, and political parties.

Elites, public opinion and pressure groups 11II. The British accession to the EC: where did the national negotiating positionon agriculture originate?Leaving President de Gaulle’s “vetoes” (1963, 1967) aside, agricultural issues werethe most problematic in the negotiations between Britain and the EC and theyabsorbed a vast amount of time and energy on both sides, compared to other issues. 5It was in this area that Britain raised most of its objections to adopting the acquiscommunautaire in full, which membership of the EC required, as the Commissionrepeatedly stated in its opinions. 6 It is therefore important to understand what werethe implications for Britain in adopting the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), todetermine whose interests it affected and how they were reflected in the British negotiatingposition. What was the relation between the British governments’ position,which sought exemptions and delays in the adoption of the CAP, and public opinion?1. Implications of adopting the CAP and the British positionThe main difficulty faced by Britain in adopting the CAP was the abandonment of thelow-cost food policy, which was based on two instruments: first, the ‘deficiency payments’system to subsidise producers and, second, low tariffs for imports, whichensured access to the cheapest supplies available in the world market. Leaving thesetwo instruments to adopt the CAP system of market intervention, in turn, created athird major problem, that of the British contribution to the Community’s budget.a. Abandoning the deficiency payments systemThe abandonment of the first instrument, the deficiency payments system, created awide social problem for Britain, because it switched the costs of subsidising agriculturefrom the taxpayers to the consumer. Under the previous system, British farmers’sales prices were made up to a guaranteed level, fixed during the Annual Reviewprocess between the National Farmers’ Union (NFU) and the government andfinanced by the Treasury. The Six, by contrast, kept up their farmers’ incomesthrough market intervention to maintain high prices, which were fixed annually bythe Council of Ministers, with the assistance of the Commission and after consultationswith COPA (Comité des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles des Pays dela Communauté Économique Européenne). The change required in Britain was froma progressive to a regressive system; that is, from one in which the taxpayer contributedto the agricultural subsidy according to his income level, to one financed by arti-5. See Simon Z. YOUNG, Terms of Entry: Britain’s Negotiations with the European Community,1970-72, London, Heinemann, 1973, p. x; and F. DE LA SERRE, La Grande Bretagne et la CommunautéEuropéenne, Paris, PUF, 1987, in particular, Chapter 2, section II, A. ‘L’agriculture aucoeur de la négociation’, pp. 37-40.6. Commission of the European Communities (CEC), ‘Opinion on the Applications for Membership receivedfrom the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway’, Bulletin of the European CommunitiesSupplement, 29 September 1967, § 6 and 9 (subsequently quoted as: CEC, ‘1967 Opinion’);and M. E. MARTTNO (member of the Commission), ‘Updating the Commission’s Opinion on theenlargement of the Community’, Bulletin of the European Communities, 11/1969, p. 7.

12 LorenaRuanoficially high prices which everyone had to pay. This affected most the poor, as theyspend the highest proportion of their income on food. 7The difference between the two systems resided in the distribution of the burden,and in particular, in its visibility. As Wilson correctly observed, ‘the political geniusof the method of subsidising agriculture in Britain prior to membership of the EC wasthat it was inconspicuous’. 8 Accession to the EC would change this picture, and thepublic was aware of that. Opinion polls showed that, in October 1962, 58% of thoseinterviewed mentioned food price increases as the most likely consequence of joiningthe EC. The increase in food prices became a continuous feature of the debate aboutjoining Europe and one of the public’s main concerns. In April 1967, the percentageraised to 76%. 9 It turned to worse after the Sterling reserves crisis unleashed inflationin the late 1960s. By 1971, one survey noted that the ‘public’ expected rises in foodprices, especially for meat and butter (about 85%), milk and bread (65%) and freshfruit and vegetables (45%). 10 It is therefore not surprising that the British negotiatorsinsisted on obtaining from the Six long transitional periods to catch up with Communityprice levels, as well as maintaining, to a certain degree, the previous system (withexemptions if necessary), with the aim of diffusing the costs over time, so as to makethem less ‘visible’ to the public. It must be remembered that these were difficult yearsin British politics, with rising social unrest, economic decline, and high governmentturnover. Rising food prices were undesirable for anyone in government.At first sight, it seems that British decision-makers were bound in the negotiationsby the preferences of domestic public opinion. Yet, it is not clear whether theBritish public saw transitional periods as a solution to the feared increase in prices;they were rather inclined towards not joining the EC at all. This was not the courseof action that decision-makers were following, convinced that, in the long term,joining the EC would be beneficial. However, the 1971 survey also pointed out thatmany of those who believed in the long term benefits of joining the Community didnot think it was worth the sacrifices. 11 The opposition to changes in agriculturalpolicy was channelled against Europe, rather than the British farming community,and in 1969, only 28% ‘thought it a good thing to remove ‘eventually all [national]subsidies and other protection to industries, like agriculture’. 12 ‘Public opinion’ onthe particular issue of food prices got tangled with the wider issues involved injoining Europe. Thus the public’s mandate (as expressed in opinion polls) on thisspecific policy decision became blurred by other considerations.7. YOUNG, Terms of Entry, p. 75.8. G. K. WILSON, Special Interests and Policymaking: Agricultural Policies and Politics in Britainand the United States of America, 1956-70, London, John Wiley & Sons, 1977, p. 24.9. J. SPENCE, ‘Movements in the Public Mood: 1961-75’, in R. JOWELL and G. HOINVILLE, eds.,Britain Into Europe: Public Opinion and the EEC 1961-75, London, Croom Helm, 1976, p. 21.10. B. HEDGES, ‘The Final Four Years: From Opposition to Endorsement’, in JOWELL and HOINVILLE,Britain Into Europe, p. 54.11. HEDGES, ‘The Final Four Years’, p. 39.12. SPENCE, ‘Movements in the Public Mood’, p. 27.

Elites, public opinion and pressure groups 13b. Applying Community PreferenceThe abandonment of the second instrument implied that Britain would cease toimport, at world prices, about half of its food requirements, because it would nowhave to apply Community Preference. Not only did this mean that Britain would haveto buy its food from the EC at higher prices, but also that its special links with Commonwealthcountries were to be put down. The Commonwealth issue was very prominentin the negotiations of 1961-3, but by 1970-1, it had broken down into a numberof fairly marginal technical problems, except for two major questions: imports fromNew Zealand of mutton, lamb, butter and cheese, and sugar from the Caribbean,Mauritius and Fiji. All these countries depended heavily on their exports to Britainand their economies were likely to be severely damaged by the adoption of the CAP.These two issues were specifically mentioned in Britain’s 1970 opening statement,forcing the Six to give a response beyond their previous position of including theCommonwealth in the Yaoundé Convention. Britain wanted to maintain access to itsmarket unchanged, even after the expiry of the transitional period in 1978. The Communitywas very reluctant to do so, and, although Britain secured some exceptions fora few of its Commonwealth suppliers, most of its interests in these countries (likeaccess to cheap food) had to be sacrificed in the name of Community Preference.Where did the pressure for such a support of the Commonwealth come from?What did public opinion think about it? It should be noted, that polls did not askspecific questions about the details of New Zealand mutton or sugar imports, butgeneral ones about maintaining preferential relations with the Commonwealth.There were certainly many family links and cultural affinities, which made it anemotional issue among the British public. In 1965, 62% of the British disapprovedjoining the EC if that meant ‘weakening our trade link with the Commonwealth’. InFebruary 1969, 34% thought that the Commonwealth ‘was the most important partnerfor Britain and only 21% mentioned Europe. 13 By 1974, 67% of the populationfelt with some regret that ‘Britain should have developed links with the Commonwealthrather than joined the Common Market’. 14British decision-makers did thus have popular support for ‘defending the Commonwealth’in the negotiations with the Six, and it seems again that that policy wasthe result of the societal preference of a majority. Yet, whether the results of thesepolls can be interpreted as a popular mandate to maintain the special regimes of mutton,lamb, sugar, etc. after the expiry of the transitional period is doubtful. More preciseand direct pressure came from lobbying by the Commonwealth prime ministersfrom many developing countries and by the Labour Party. For example, at the LancasterHouse meeting on 2 and 3 June 1971, when consultations were held withrepresentatives of the Sugar Commonwealth Agreement (SCA) countries, Britaincommitted itself to safeguarding their interests in the enlarged Community. 15 Britishrefiners, who held 86% of the market, also had an input into these specific measures.13. Social Surveys, (The Gallup Poll), British Attitudes towards the Common Market, 1957-1971,London, 1971, questions 45 and 66.14. HEDGES, ‘The Final Four Years’, p. 59.

16 LorenaRuanoand big business to commit Britain to joining the Common Market before the publichas had a chance to appraise the pros and cons to know precisely what is happening’.24 82% of the Gallup sample thought that, leaving aside their personalopinion, Britain ‘will join’ anyway. 25One of the most important features of public opinion on this matter was its hesitancy,division, confusion, and lack of basic knowledge. Rather than a mandate to decision-makers,public views were themselves being shaped and interests were mobilisedby the elites through the media, political parties and interest groups. Moreover, the reliabilityof opinion polls may be called into question, because, when the British peoplewere asked for their opinion in circumstances which really mattered, that is the 1975referendum, 67% of them voted in favour of Britain staying in the Community. Nevertheless,on this unique occasion, when public opinion actually had a direct impact onpolicy, its expression had to be reduced to a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the package negotiated, andhad no incidence on the details of specific policy implications.However it seems excessive to conclude on a completely negative note about therepresentation of the British public opinion in this area of public policy. As it has beennoted, public concern about food prices and the Commonwealth coincided with thenegotiators’ positions, and the euroscepticism of the public somehow coincided withthe attitudes of elites, which were deeply divided. It is therefore necessary to examinethe two representation mechanisms mentioned before, to understand in more detailthe input that the ‘British people’ had on this particular government policy.2. Mechanisms of interest intermediationa. The electoral/majority mechanism and political partiesIn the early 1970s euroscepticism mainly came from the Labour left and a smallsection of the Conservative right. One of the reasons why parties had such an influenceon shaping public opinion was that, for most voters, the issue did not havemuch saliency. After 1971, the polls indicated that support and opposition to entrywere fairly balanced (39% against 41%), but that there was a substantial proportionof ‘don’t knows’. It is not surprising that many tended to follow the lead and theviews of their chosen political leaders and parties, and it was observed that Labourvoters were more anti-European than the Conservatives. 26The influence of the political parties is related to the way in which issues comeonto the public agenda and are processed by the political system in Britain. The adversarialnature of the Westminster system, in which the opposition parties tend toreject the policies of the government, contributed to this. 27 However, the debateamong elites revolved around the details of the ‘terms’ of accession, rather than on24. J. MORTON-WILLIAMS, Attitudes towards the European Common Market: report on an exploratorystudy, London, SCPR, P192, January 1971, p. (i).25. Gallup Poll, British Attitudes, questions 77 and 84 .26. SPENCE, ‘Movements in the Public Mood’, p. 29.27. ASHFORD, ‘The Political Parties’, pp. 119-120.

Elites, public opinion and pressure groups 17whether to join or not, since the leadership of both parties was committed to joining.This elite consensus, however, did not feed down to the public, which was confusedby the complexity of the debate and the confrontational way in which it waspresented in Parliament. The media followed a pattern of presentation which reflectedthis style, and, for example, the campaign leading up to the referendum wascast by the media as an ‘extra general election’. 28Among the several factors which shifted public opinion in favour of joining theEC by the time of the referendum, Spence thinks that the major influence ‘wasprobably Wilson’s espousal of the idea’. 29 Many others have also commented onthe influence of the Government’s final recommendation to approve membershipon the outcome of the consultation, rather than the positions of political parties, becausethese were divided. In this respect, British political parties got into great difficultieswhen trying to articulate and represent adequately the views of their supporterson the European issue. The ‘state of civil war’ that Europe provoked withinthe Labour party was the clearest symptom of this inability. On 28 October 1971,when the vote was held in the Commons to ratify the Accession Treaty, the sixty-nineLabour MPs who supported entry and the twenty who abstained defied theparty whip to enable the bill to pass. 30 Labour opposition to accession was justifiedat the time with criticism of the ‘terms’ obtained by the Conservatives.This split among Labour MPs becomes even more interesting in the light of thecleavage which separated lay members from the ‘inner circle’ within the party, speciallywhile in power. The higher up in the hierarchy they were, the more pro-EuropeanLabour members seemed to be. Never was this more visible than in 1975,when a narrow majority of the Labour parliamentary party voted against membership(by one hundred and thirty-seven in favour, one hundred and forty-five against,and thirty-three abstentions), against the recommendation of its own Cabinet. TheNational Executive Committee of the party recommended opposition to membershipas a result of the overwhelming vote against it. 31Labour was not alone in displaying the existence of this ‘iron law’. It is truethat, at the time, the division about Europe among the Conservatives was not whatit has become today. But, after the election in 1970 of Heath as Prime Minister andhis espousal of British membership of the EC, ‘there was concern about the size ofConservative parliamentary support [...] and a feeling of a lack of knowledge andconsultation within the party’. 32 Policy with regard to Europe was in both parties anissue decided primarily by the leader, particularly if he was Prime Minister.The consistency with which successive British governments from both partiesopened and maintained accession negotiations with the Six, suggests a high degreeof consensus among the party elites which did not reflect with fidelity the opinions28. D. NANDY, ‘The Media and the Messages’ in Jowell and Hoinville, Britain Into Europe, p. 90.29. SPENCE, ‘Movements in the Public Mood’, p. 23.30. ASHFORD, ‘The Political Parties’, p. 127.31. ASHFORD, ‘The Political Parties’, p. 128.32. ASHFORD, ‘The Political Parties’, p. 122.

18 Lorena Ruanoand the divisions amongst their members and the public in general. This resulted ina lack of clear party cues on the issue of Europe, which ‘confused the voters and ledto a low level of saliency and consistency amongst the public, voters and partymembers, whilst it is of high saliency to party elites and activists’ . 33 It also meantthat ‘the views of anti-European electors had been given no outlet in the form of avote for any of the major parties’. 34 This became the justification for holding a referendum.So far, the discussion about political parties has focused on British entry in generaland the specific policy issues involved in the adoption of the CAP have beensubmerged in it. This is because, in an election, the voter gives his representative anample mandate, who fills in the detail with specific policy decisions. In Britain, therole of the Community issue in general, and of the CAP in particular, had beenslight in general elections. Then, the three cleavages within the parties intervenedin the formation of the party’s position, inevitably alienating the opinion of some oftheir voters and members. So, given the short-comings of the electoral system torepresent the ‘public’, it is now the turn to ask whether interest groups could fill thegap. How do they articulate and represent their members’ views? How powerful arethey in determining policy?b. Interest groups and the executive.Before examining the relationship between the NFU and the Ministry of Agriculture,it is important to mention the main interests of the farming community withrespect to the adoption of the CAP. Farmers did not see their level of supportreduced as a result of the abandonment of the deficiency payments system. If anything,the CAP, designed to reward productivity, was to benefit the highly mechanisedand efficient British agricultural sector. It is possible to say that British farmerssupported accession and did not seem to oppose any resistance or cause troublefor the negotiators. In fact, what Young called the ‘truly ‘agricultural’ effects of theCAP’, those affecting British farmers directly, were swept aside at an early stage ofnegotiations. 35 The other difficult issues, namely, the financing of the CAP, sugarand New Zealand, did not involve British farming interests, and, as has also beensuggested, the pressure seems to have come from elsewhere: government departmentslike the Treasury and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and lobbyingfrom Commonwealth countries.It is important to stress that, although farmers supported the idea of joining theCAP, the final acceptance by the British government of the agricultural ‘acquis’should not be interpreted as the outcome of pressure from the NFU, but from theCommunity. 36 The British government’s position towards agriculture has always33. ASHFORD, ‘The Political Parties’, p. 148.34. R. JOWELL and G. HOINVEJLE, ‘An Unconscionable Time Deciding’, in JOWELL and HOINVILLE,Britain Into Europe, p. 12.35. YOUNG, Terms of Entry, p. 77.36. See CEC, ‘1967 Opinion’, § 77.

Elites, public opinion and pressure groups 19advocated CAP reform and cuts in spending, in clear opposition to the farmers’ interest.In this sense, not everything was in favour of the farming community and inparticular its representative body, the NFU. Farmers stood to lose a very importantpolitical asset by joining the EC: the close relationship with the government whichallowed them direct influence in the agricultural policy-making process, via theAnnual Review procedure for setting prices. They would have to go to Brusselsnow and join the other members’ farmers in COPA, in order to have their viewsrepresented in European policy. There were certain commodities and policies, notincluded in the agricultural acquis which would stay in the hands of the BritishGovernment (like support for ‘hillside’ farming in Scotland), and in which the NFUwould have a say. But most of the decisions would now be taken away from thecosy symbiosis which the NFU and the Government had developed over the years.The point about representation through interest groups is that it is largely governmentsponsored or at least encouraged, because the government itself needs toconsult the interests affected by and involved in its decisions. 37 In the rural sector,this is accentuated by the fact that government is the ‘paymaster of the industry’, soco-operation with farmer organisations is not only valuable for the formulation ofpolicy, but also for its implementation. As a consequence, farming interests haveprivileged access to the political system, through their permanent contact with theMinistry of Agriculture, and are taken into account in the decision-making process.Yet, representation through interest groups also has its drawbacks. First, andmost commonly mentioned, is the inequality of access for different groups, letalone for those ‘latent’ interests which are not organised (like consumers). Suchclose contact between the NFU and the Ministry of Agriculture was shaped to agreat extent by the government, which decides which groups are recognised as legitimateinterlocuteurs, and which ones are not. The Ministry of Agriculture ‘followeda deliberate policy of giving the NFU a privileged, quasi-monopoly role inrepresenting farmers [...] instead of choosing between conflicting advice fromsquabbling interest groups’. 38 In this way the Ministry obtained a coordinated pictureof the industry’s needs by the NFU. This allowed the Government to have aregular and integrated view of the industry and its needs, which contrasted with thedisconnected, and often contradictory, concessions made to different commodityproducers in other countries of the EC. 39A second problem with this kind of representation mechanism is that of the divisionbetween elites and lay members inside the interest group. Many studies of37. See S. BERGER, ed., Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism and theTransformation of Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981; in particular, see thechapter by P. C. SCHMITTER, ‘Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in ContemporaryWestern Europe and North America’, pp. 285-327.38. WILSON, Special Interests and Policymaking, p. 32.39. WILSON, Special Interests and Policymaking, p. 44. For similar reasons, DGIV of the Commissionhas encouraged all agricultural interests to be grouped in a single organization: COPA. See J. MEY-NAUD and S. SIDJANSKI, Les groupes de pression dans la Communauté Européenne 1958-1968,Brussels, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Éditions de l’Institut de Sociologie, 1971, p. 166.

20 Loretta Ruanointerest group politics have pointed out that they are not very reliable indicators oftheir members’ wishes. The NFU was no exception to this pattern. Its elite must‘behave in a way which encourages civil servants to believe it is moderate, sensible,and worth listening to’, and as a consequence, it ‘appears to fit Michels’ law’. 40 Theapathy and technical incompetence of ordinary members contrast sharply with thestyle of the Union’s leadership, which is technocratic, and of its publications,which resemble those of the Civil Service. Wilson concluded his study of the NFUby saying that it has been ‘coopted’, and it performs another very useful functionfor the government: ‘it channels rural discontent away from electoral politics or directaction and into a form Whitehall can handle [...] it is the character of the NFUwhich enables farming policy in Britain to be formulated after informed rationaldiscussion and not militant, demagogic argument’. 41 Therefore it can be said thataccession to the EC, by threatening the Annual Review, affected mainly the governmentand its symbiotic relation with the NFU. Britain thus proposed, in the earlystages of the negotiations, to introduce into the Community an annual review likeits own, but this was not taken very seriously by the governments of the Six. 42Thirdly, even if certain interests like those of farmers have privileged access tothe decision-making machinery, by becoming the constituency of a particular ministry,their views might not always end up reflected in policy decisions. As a matterof fact, compared to other member states of the EC, there is a very effective interministerialcoordination system in Britain. 43 This ensures that farmers’ demands,represented by the Ministry of Agriculture, are balanced against other interests, likethose of taxpayers through the Treasury, in the formulation of the ‘national interest’to be presented and defended in Europe. This coordinating task occurs withinWhitehall and the Cabinet. 44 The Treasury, the Board of Trade, and the FCO aremaking a check on any policy that costs the taxpayer more money or threatens theinterests of foreign suppliers. And theirs are the views which seem to have prevailedin the formulation of the British position towards the CAP. Ever since itjoined the EC, Britain has tried to reform the CAP, to cut its spending and to reduceprices, actually against its own farmers’ financial interests.Representation through interest groups thus tends to be more precise and to have amore direct impact on the details of policy formulation. The political advantages thatfarmers enjoyed have certainly constrained the actions of the British government inthis area. However, this does not necessarily mean that a special or particular interestcould dominate public choices, because the coordination process inside governmentensures a ‘limited pluralism’ which provides checks and balances. As well, the char-40. WILSON, Special Interests and Policymaking, pp. 36 and 166.41. WILSON, Special Interests and Policymaking, p. 40.42. The Commission, however, included this British concern in its ‘1967 Opinion’, § 63. See alsoYOUNG, Terms of Entry, p. 78.43. V. WRIGHT, “The National Co-Ordination of European Policy-Making: Negotiating the Quagmire’,in J. RICHARDSON, ed., European Union: Power and Policy-Making, 1996, London,Routledge, p. 161.44. WILSON, Special Interests and Policymaking, p. 170.

Elites, public opinion and pressure groups 21acter of the British Civil Service emphasises a belief that there exists some ‘general’or ‘public’ interest which it should serve’. 45 In the end, it was this policy-makingmachinery which decided that it was worth paying the costs of joining the CAP, inexchange for the industrial, trade, and political benefits of joining the EC.ConclusionThe changes implied by the adoption of the CAP mainly affected the government,and that is the reason for the British negotiators being ‘tough’ in this area. The abandonmentof the deficiency payments system turned what used to be invisible subsidies,into higher food prices for consumers, a problem for the popularity of governmentswhich were already struggling with inflation. The increase in prices did takeplace in the end, and as has been argued, the concern of British negotiators in Brusselswas to diffuse the costs over time, so as to make them less visible. The elites,when negotiating accession, were actually managing the costs of change, in order toavoid feeding the opposition of their public opinion, which was against the idea ofjoining Europe. The problem of the Commonwealth issue seems to have been solvedin a way which the public regretted, but which accommodated the interests of NewZealand producers, the Commonwealth sugar exporting countries, and the Britishrefining industry. The budget, which was the most contentious issue in the negotiationswith Europe (and remained so for years), in turn, did not seem to have muchsaliency for public opinion, although it dominated the debate amongst the elites. Byjoining the EC the government also was losing control of a large part of the decision-makingprocess in agriculture, as it ceased to be the ‘gatekeeper’ here.With regard to the two mechanisms of representation analysed, it is clear thatthe electorate and public opinion did matter in the policy-making process, albeitonly on occasions like general elections and the referendum. Food prices, in particular,were an issue which could create discontent and cost an election, and in thissense, British negotiators were constrained by public preferences, and therefore,sought to smooth the transition as much as possible. However the process of mobilisation,aggregation and articulation of interests through the electoral system hadthe effect of distorting the views of the public. 46The fact that the electoral mandate is very broad means that the public preferenceson particular issues get tangled up with other parts of party manifestos and agendas, anddo not end up having much influence on the details of policy decisions. So the issue ofthe CAP first became submerged in the broader one of whether to join the EC or not,and then again into the internal splits of the parties. Therefore, when it came to thedetails of the ‘terms’ negotiated, which dominated the controversies among elites, thepublic did not have much input, and interest groups, and the NFU in particular, seem to45. WILSON, Special Interests and Policymaking, p. 45.46. NUGENT, ‘British Public Opinion’, p. 197.

23L’ opinion publique francaiseface à l’élection européenne de juin 1979Anne Dulphy & Christine Manigand«La construction de l’Europe ne peut se faire contre les nations. Il faut au contrairela construire avec elles, en faisant progressivement comprendre aux peuples del’Europe qu’il leur est maintenant nécessaire de s’unir s’ils veulent survivre dans lemonde de demain». 1Ainsi, moins d’un an avant la première élection du Parlement européen au suffrageuniversel direct, le Premier ministre Raymond Barre en soulignait-il l’enjeu en recevantdes mains d’Edmond Giscard d’Estaing le prix Richard de Coudenhove-Kalergidécerné par l’Union paneuropéenne: combler le déficit démocratique d’un processusd’unification jusqu’alors exclusivement technocratique, économique et diplomatique.Observatoire privilégié de l’état de l’opinion publique française, cette échéance incitedonc à mener une étude quantifiée en l’enrichissant de sources variées qui reflètent ladialectique élite-opinion. 2 Les sondages insérés dans les publications semestriellesdes Eurobaromètres constituent l’instrument essentiel: il s’agit d’une série engagéedès l’automne 1973 quand - conscientes de l’élitisme de la dynamique européenne etsoucieuses de nouer une relation étroite avec les populations, cantonnée à une assembléecomposée de représentants désignés par les Parlements des Etats membres - lesinstitutions communes ont lancé une étude permanente, approfondie et comparativedu sentiment public dans les neuf pays. Ces données sont corrélées aux enquêtesréalisées par les grands instituts, contenues dans les archives du Centre d’étude de lavie politique française (CEVIPOF-FNSP) ou publiées par la presse. Sur ces élémentsstatistiques se greffent des documents institutionnels, partisans, associatifs - ceux dela Jeunesse européenne fédéraliste notamment - afin de mesurer les efforts tentéspour informer et mobiliser les masses.Il convient donc de relever la constance et la hardiesse du sentiment européenavant de le confronter au principe de la consultation populaire. Dans un deuxièmetemps, étudier la campagne puis le scrutin lui-même amène à s’interroger sur laréalité de ce nouvel espace démocratique.1. Le Monde, les 3-4 juillet 1978, cité par R. CHIROUX, «Les partis politiques et l’élection du Parlementeuropéen», Revue politique et parlementaire, n° 876, septembre-octobre 1978, p. 44.2. Nous avons amorcé cette étude pour la période 1945-1960 dans «L’opinion publique française etla construction européenne approche quantifiée». Europe des élites? Europe des peuples?, sous ladirection d’E. du REAU, Paris, Presses de la Sorbonne nouvelle, 1998, p. 303-315.A. DEIGHTON nous a offert la possibilité de la poursuivre à l’occasion du colloque organisé àOxford les 25 et 26 septembre 1998 sur The european communities 1965-1979: national decision-makersand public opinion.

24 Anne Dulphy & Christine ManigandI. L’étonnante stabilité des attitudes face à la Communauté européenne1. La hardiesse du sentiment européenDepuis trente ans, une très large majorité de Français se prononce en faveur del’unification européenne; les années soixante-dix le confirment, à en juger par lesavis énoncés sur deux questions régulièrement posées à partir de 1973. La premièrea trait au fait de savoir si l’appartenance à la Communauté européenne est unebonne ou une mauvaise chose, interrogation qui suscite des réponses où la variationn’est que de faible amplitude. 3 Invariablement le pourcentage favorable rassembleplus de six Français sur dix, les maxima ayant été atteints en septembre 1973 et auprintemps 1977 lorsque soixante-quatre pour cent estiment que c’est une «bonnechose»; moins d’une personne sur dix (6%) pense que c’est une «mauvaisechose». 4 On peut toutefois constater entre 1973 et 1979 une légère érosion des opinionsfavorables. Les jugements positifs ont donc légèrement diminué par rapportau score maximal atteint au début de la crise économique mondiale pour aboutir à59% en automne 1978.Tabelle 1: Jugement sur l’appartenance à la Communauté 5%aut1973aut1974aut1975aut1976aut1977pts1978aut1978pts1979bonnechose6163675257545956Alors que cette première question permet d’apprécier les opinions à l’égardd’une réalisation concrète, la deuxième est de tonalité différente. Elle porte sur lapoursuite du processus d’unification qui rallie une majorité écrasante. Au printemps1977, quarante-cinq pour cent des Français se prononcent en faveur del’accélération du phénomène de la construction européenne; il faut y rajoutertrente-sept pour cent qui privilégient la simple continuation du processus d’unification.6 Cette attitude, dont le contenu est probablement assez vague pour nombre derépondants, demeure stable: en octobre et novembre 1978, 80% se déclarent «trèspour» ou «plutôt pour»; ils sont encore 75% à l’automne 1979. 73. A l’exception toutefois d’une diminution de dix points entre l’automne 1975 et le printemps 1976(de soixante-sept à cinquante-sept pour cent).4. Eurobaromètre, n° 7, juillet 1977, p. 21. Pour vingt-quatre pour cent des Français la réponse n’est«ni bonne ni mauvaise», tandis que six pour cent ne se prononcent pas.L’ensemble des pays situe «une bonne chose» à cinquante-sept pour cent, «une mauvaise chose»à quatorze, «ni bonne ni mauvaise» à vingt-et-un, et sans réponse à huit.5. Eurobaromètre, n° 11, mai 1979, p. 43.6. Eurobaromètre, n° 7, printemps 1977. Sept pour cent seulement souhaitent freiner la constructioneuropéenne, onze pour cent ne répondent pas.7. Eurobaromètre, n° 12, automne 1979, p. 27.

L’opinion publique francaise face à l’élection européenne de juin 1979 25Tabelle 2: Pour ou contre l’unification de l’Europe occidentale? 8%très pourplutôt pourplutôt contretrès contresans réponseaut197828525213pts 197925478218Ces réponses expriment un ensemble d’opinions, d’aspirations et de croyancesplus ou moins floues, mais profondes et durables, que l’on pourrait qualifier de«climat», d’«atmosphère» ou d’«ambiance». 9 Si ce soutien se révèle insuffisantpour mobiliser les masses ou les électeurs, il joue pourtant un rôle excessivementimportant quand il vient à faire défaut.Or il apparaît que l’écart s’amenuise de plus en plus entre les Français qui souhaitentl’accélération (40% à l’automne 1978) et ceux qui préfèrent «continuercomme maintenant» (37 %). Le décrochage au printemps 1979 est significatif: lesFrançais ne sont plus que 27% à désirer que la dynamique de la construction européennesoit accélérée, contre 47% à opter pour le maintien du statu quo. Dans presquetous les pays membres, cet écart a tendance à augmenter, sans doute sousl’effet de l’approche des élections européennes. Pour les uns il s’agit d’un progrès àpoursuivre; pour les autres il convient de ne pas mettre trop d’espoirs dans cetteavancée institutionnelle qui n’est qu’un événement de portée limitée.Ce reflux ne dément pas un soutien affectif global au mouvement d’unificationde l’Europe. Celui-ci est approuvé par plus de trois quarts des personnes interrogées,10 contre soixante pour cent en moyenne dans les années cinquante. Il estpatent que cet assentiment de principe est beaucoup plus répandu dans l’opinionque l’attitude favorable à l’égard de la Communauté européenne: l’écart est devingt points au mois de janvier 1979, lorsque 79% adhèrent à l’entreprise d’intégrationen général, alors que la CEE en particulier rallie seulement 59%. Si les Françaisapprouvent à une très large majorité la construction européenne, il s’agit doncplutôt d’une adhésion formelle que d’un engagement sans réserves: 35% seraientprêts à faire des sacrifices personnels pour atteindre cet objectif européen, contre60% qui s’y refusent. 118. Eurobaromètre, n° 11, mai 1979, p. 41.9. Pour reprendre le terme employé par P. RENOUVIN et J.-B. DUROSELLE, Introduction à l’histoiredes relations internationales, Paris, Armand Colin, 1991, p. 367-37310. Eurobaromètre, n° 10, janvier 1979, p. 72.11. Sondage Figaro-SOFRES publié dans Le Figaro du 4 avril 1979.

26 Anne Dulphy & Christine Manigand2. Le postulat électoralLes attitudes à l’égard de l’élection corroborent le caractère prégnant du sentimentd’adhésion, mais également son caractère formel.Tabelle 3: Pour ou contre l’élection au suffrage universel direct? 12%aut1973aut1975aut1976aut1977pts1978aut1978pts1979pour51696970676771contre18131314121113?31181816212216Depuis l’automne 1973 et le lancement des Eurobaromètres, une moyennesupérieure à six personnes sur dix se déclare favorable au principe de la consultationdémocratique, quelles que soient la carence de son information ou ses réservessur le rôle de l’instance législative. La force d’attraction exercée sur le jugementcollectif par les termes d’«union européenne» et de «suffrage universel» est révéléepar une progression spectaculaire de vingt-trois points jusqu’en avril 1977 (74%).La mise à jour du projet par le sommet de Paris en décembre 1974 et surtout sa concrétisationpar le Conseil de l’Europe en septembre 1976 ont provoqué la cristallisationde l’assentiment potentiel et le transfert des abstentionnistes, l’instaurationdu débat se greffant sur l’effet d’entraînement des décisions. Celui-ci s’érodeensuite pour céder la place à la perplexité devant un événement dont l’image estbrouillée et ne soulève pas de passions: le pourcentage des indifférents gagne plusde cinq points, celui des partisans retombe à soixante-sept pour cent en 1978. 13Certes, un sursaut se produit à la veille de l’échéance électorale (71%), mais il n’enreste pas moins que la France se situe au cinquième rang seulement des pays fondateursde la CEE, ne devançant que la Belgique. 14La mesure d’intensité révèle par ailleurs que seule une frange des sympathisantssouscrit pleinement au projet européen. Il s’agit de la petite moitié qui se déclare toutà fait favorable à l’élection 15 en laquelle elle perçoit un «événement gros de conséquencesqui fera nécessairement avancer l’unification politique de l’Europe». 1612. Eurobaromètre, n° 11, mai 1979, p. 20.13. Eurobaromètre, n° 9, juillet 1978, p. 32-34. La moyenne européenne est de sept avis favorablessur dix (n° 10, janvier 1979, p. 31).14. Eurobaromètre, n° 11, mai 1979, p. 17-22. La Belgique recueille soixante-deux pour cent d’avis favorables,le Danemark cinquante-huit, la Grande-Bretagne soixante-et-un et l’Irlande soixante-douze.15. Eurobaromètre, n° 11, mai 1979, p. 17-22 et 28.16. Cinquante-huit pour cent estiment que tel est le cas au printemps 1977, contre vingt-trois pour cent -soit une progression de douze points depuis novembre 1976, la plus forte avec l’Irlande - (Eurobaromètre,n° 7, juillet 1977, p. 51-52). Puis cette conviction fléchit immédiatement sous la barre descinquante pour cent.

L’opinion publique francaise face à l’élection européenne de juin 1979 27Tabelle 4: Importance de l’événement 17%aut 1976pts 1977aut 1977pts 1978aut 1978important4658494650peu d’importance2823273026?2619242424A condition de le corréler à d’autres facteurs explicatifs, le meilleur indicateur detendance réside dans l’intention déclarée d’aller voter. L’évaluation globale fourniepour le printemps 1977 - soixante-neuf pour cent - situe la France en sixième position.18 L’enquête distingue ensuite la «volonté certaine» du «dessein probable» et metainsi en lumière une détermination croissante, tant en chiffres absolus que par rapportaux autres populations concernées: 51% et 26% au printemps 1977; 19 59 et 17% àl’automne; 20 60 et 19% au printemps 1978; 21 65 et 18% à l’automne; 22 68 et 16% auprintemps 1979. 23 Plusieurs éléments conduisent à pondérer ces données, comme parexemple l’intérêt tout relatif accordé aux futurs résultats (il est «vif» pour un tiersseulement des électeurs potentiels!) 24 ou la préférence que le parlementaire européendevrait accorder à la défense des intérêts nationaux sur ceux de la Communauté, soit48% contre 40 à partir de l’automne 1978. Cette question, délibérément provocantedans sa formulation, est d’autant plus discriminante que le rapport était exactementinversé en 1977.17. Eurobaromètre, n° 10, janvier 1979, p. 36. Les questions sont les suivantes: «c’est un événementgros de conséquences qui fera nécessairement avancer l’unification politique de l’Europe», «c’estun événement de peu d’importance car les gouvernements nationaux ne seront pas tenus par lesvotes du Parlement européen».18. Eurobaromètre, n° 7, juillet 1977, p. 49-50. La moyenne européenne est de soixante-sept pour cent19. Eurobaromètre, n° 7, juillet 1977, p. 73-74. L’Italie vient en tête avec soixante-quatre pour cent,suivie des Pays-Bas - soixante pour cent -; la Belgique - trente-sept pour cent - et l’Allemagne -vingt-huit pour cent - ferment la marche. La moyenne est à quarante-sept pour cent.20. Eurobaromètre, n° 8, janvier 1978, p. 73-74. Seuls l’Italie et les Pays-Bas dépassent la France.21. Eurobaromètre, n° 9, juillet 1978, p. 46. Ce chiffre prend en compte les quinze ans et plus; ramenéaux électeurs potentiels, il passe à soixante-deux pour cent.22. Eurobaromètre, n° 11, mai 1979, p. 50.23. Eurobaromètre, n° 11, mai 1979, p. 34.24. Trente-trois pour cent parlent des élections avec leur entourage, dont neuf pour cent souvent, maisquarante-sept pour cent jamais (CEVIPOF, sondage SOFRES du 18 avril 1979).

28 Anne Dulphy & Christine ManigandTabelle 5: Intérêt pour les résultats 25%très intéressésassezseulement un peupas du toutsans réponseaut 1978293419144pts 1979353315143Tabelle 6: L’attitude attendue d’un parlementaire européen: intérêt nationalimmédiat ou intérêt de la Communauté 26%pts 1977aut1977pts 1978aut1978pts 1979aut 1979intérêtcommunautaire484845414039intérêtnational414041484846sansréponse111214111215En fait, chaque étape décisive est synonyme d’une hésitation qui révèle le décalageexistant entre l’adhésion à l’idée d’Europe et le consentement effectif auxcommunautés: prévue avec optimisme, elle est envisagée avec circonspection à laveille de l’échéance électorale.Ces aléas reflètent la diversité des conceptions qui coexistent au-delà du postulateuropéen. Deux sondages préélectoraux s’accordent à chiffrer à 22% ceux pourqui l’attachement à une France indépendante induit le refus de l’unification et lemaintien de toutes les prérogatives nationales. 27 Ils sont également 22% à prônerune simple coopération et 21% à se rallier aux structures communautaires enplace. 28 Ces trois segments de l’opinion se rejoignent pour revendiquer que la durée25. Eurobaromètre, n° 11, mai 1979, p. 32.26. Eurobaromètre, n° 12, décembre 1979, p. 22. Les questions sont les suivantes: «défendre l’intérêtde la Communauté considérée comme un ensemble, même si ce n’est pas toujours l’intérêt de sonpays dans l’immédiat», «toujours défendre l’intérêt de son pays, que ce soit ou non l’intérêt de laCommunauté considérée comme un ensemble»27. L’Express, le 24 février 1979, et Le Figaro, le 29 mai.28. Le Figaro, le 4 mai 1979.

L’opinion publique francaise face à l’élection européenne de juin 1979 29du service militaire (54%), la date des vacances et le prélèvement des impôts (66%)continuent à incomber au gouvernement hexagonal. S’ils abandonnent plus volontiersaux instances européennes la politique étrangère (55%) et la recherche scientifique(66%), c’est que leurs retombées sont moins immédiates. 29 Enfin, moins dedeux Français sur dix se disent fédéralistes, mais plus de trois confieraient les décisionsmilitaires à une Europe pour laquelle ils sont prêts à faire des sacrifices. 30L’analyse structurelle ne dément donc pas les conclusions tirées pour les annéescinquante: une majorité substantielle reste acquise au principe de l’intégration, partagéeen un courant «activiste» et un courant «suiviste»; le pôle hostile est faible, leniveau d’indécision élevé. Autrement dit, nous avons ici à faire aux «passions molles»stigmatisées par François Furet.De même la pertinence du modèle élaboré par Annick Percheron 31 est-elle ànouveau flagrante: l’europhilie est d’autant plus marquée que l’on se trouve en présencede catégories à statut professionnel et financier élevé, diplômées et intéresséespar la politique. Une évolution doit néanmoins être observée entre la décenniecinquante - caractérisée par des attitudes contrastées - et les années suivantes aucours desquelles les avis tendent à converger vers un consensus de plus en pluslarge.Bornons-nous à insister sur les deux idées reçues infirmées par les enquêtes.D’une part, elles persistent à placer les gaullistes dans le peloton de tête des partisansde l’union: les proches du RPR sont soixante-huit pour cent à qualifier de«positive» l’appartenance de la France à l’Europe; ils sont précédés de peu par ceuxde l’UDF (71%) et devancent largement les socialistes (49%). 32 Trente-deux pourcent d’entre eux - contre quinze pour cent à l’UDF - sont même partisans d’un Etatsupranational. 33 Rappelons que ce courant offrait cette physionomie surprenantedès la IVème République, résolu sans doute à soutenir toute possibilité théoriquede puissance et d’indépendance, fut-elle véhiculée par une institution internationale;plus attendue à partir de 1958, cette option demeure indéniablement déterminée.D’autre part, les sondages indiquent que le sentiment d’appartenance des jeunes- repérable depuis les années soixante - n’est pas source de mobilisation. Auprintemps 1978, la fourchette des 21 à 24 ans se distingue par la plus faible intentioncertaine d’aller voter (51%), alors que la détermination des plus de quarante29. Le Figaro, le 29 mai 1979.Au contraire, la présence d’un oriflamme européen à côté du drapeau national pendant les cérémoniesofficielles est refusé par quarante-cinq pour cent et accepté par trente-huit pour cent; six pourcent seulement souhaitent la disparition du second (CEVIPOF, sondage Louis Harris pour L’Express,janvier 1979).30. L’Express, le 24 février 1979. Les chiffres sont respectivement de trente-cinq et trente-et-un pourcent.31. A. PERCHERON, «Les Français et l’Europe, acquiescement de façade ou adhésion véritable?».RFSP, vol. 41 n° 3, juin 1991, p. 382-406.32. Le Nouvel observateur, le 23 juillet 1979. Les avis négatifs sont respectivement de cinq, trois ethuit pour cent; vingt-trois pour cent des communistes partagent cette opinion, contre trente-troispour cent favorables.33. Le Figaro, le 4 mai 1979.

30 Anne Dulphy & Christine Manigandans dépasse la moyenne nationale, située à 62%; elle atteint même 69% pour lesclasses d’âge de 40 à 54 ans. 34 La confiance en la jeune génération est pourtant unsentiment partagé parmi les européistes, comme en témoigne une déclaration faiteen 1962 par René Mayer, alors président de la section française du Mouvementeuropéen: «l’Europe a en ce moment le vent en poupe car la mode est à la jeunesseet la jeunesse est européenne». 35La corrélation établie entre la disposition à aller voter et l’attachement à uneformation politique confirme la sociologie élitiste du sentiment européen: la clairevolonté de s’exprimer est manifestée à l’automne 1978 par 77% de ceux qui revendiquentun engagement partisan ferme, mais par 50% seulement de ceux qui nesont proches d’aucun parti.Tabelle 7: Propension à aller voter selon l’attachement à un parti politique 36%très attachés àun partiassez attachésà un partiseulementsympathisantsprochesd’aucun partiiront votercertainement77686850iront voterprobablement10161622total87848472Un critère spécifique aux Eurobaromètres en prend acte: le degré de leadership.Les leaders d’opinion sont des personnes qui, dans l’exercice de leurs fonctionssociales, exercent généralement sur les opinions des autres plus d’influence que cesderniers n’en exercent sur eux. Ils s’identifient par leur goût pour les discussionspolitiques et par leur propension à rallier leur entourage à un avis auquel ils tiennentfortement. Ils représentent une moyenne de dix à quinze pour cent de la populationet ont une attitude qui tranche nettement sur celle de leurs concitoyens. 37 Ilssont ainsi 52% à penser au printemps 1978 que, grâce au prochain scrutin, ils sesentiront davantage citoyens de l’Europe, alors que la moyenne est de 46%. 38 Demême, six mois plus tard, apportent-ils en majorité une réponse supranationale à laquestion sur la mission du futur parlementaire, tandis que la population, dans son34. Eurobaromètre, n° 9, juillet 1978, p. 46.35. Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères (AMAE), série Europe 1961-1965, dossier 1981. DeMunich à la direction d’Europe, le 25 juin 1962. Le Mouvement européen a été fondé en 1948 pourréunir toutes les associations européistes.36. Eurobaromètre, n° 10, janvier 1979, p. 60.37. Les Eurobaromètres vus par eux-mêmes. Dix ans d’Eurobaromètres. Bruxelles, Documentationeuropéenne, p. 27.38. Eurobaromètre, n° 8, juillet 1978, p. 40.

L’ opinion publique francaise face à l’élection européenne de juin 1979 31ensemble, privilégie pour la première fois la défense de l’intérêt national. 39 Naturellement,ils considèrent l’élection avec nettement plus de faveur.La campagne préélectorale tire de ce modèle du consensus permissif une importancecruciale puisque, exception faite des leaders, la large faveur dont jouissent laconstruction européenne et le principe d’une consultation démocratique ne s’accompagnentdans l’opinion ni d’une réelle implication ni d’une claire perception desenjeux.II. La connotation des attitudes face aux élections européennes1. Une campagne détournéeL’élection des 81 représentants français à l’Assemblée des communautés européennesle 10 juin 1979, soulève une interrogation alors originale: quelle dimension,internationale ou nationale, est-elle privilégiée? Première échéance commune auxneuf Etats membres et à leurs 180 millions d’habitants, appelés à désigner 410mandataires, elle confère pour la première fois à l’unification une caution démocratique.Mais il s’agit aussi de la première consultation française sur un enjeu officielde politique extérieure depuis le référendum d’avril 1972, du premier retour à laproportionnelle depuis l’instauration du scrutin majoritaire en 1958 ... Sans prétendreépuiser le sujet, quelques éléments de réponse à cette question peuvent êtreapportés: d’abord la campagne, ses acteurs et ses enjeux; ensuite le scrutin, sesrésultats et la connotation des attitudes.La démocratisation des institutions européennes est une revendication communeaux groupements européistes, déterminés de longue date à associer lescitoyens à la construction d’une Europe unie. En effet, comme le précisait le fondateurde l’Union paneuropéenne, Richard de Coudenhove-Kalergi, dans les messagesqu’il adressait au directeur du Monde, «le dernier mot n’appartient ni aux gouvernementsni aux Parlements. Ce sont les peuples qui doivent... donner la réponse... Si l’Europe des gouvernements refusait aux peuples ce droit à l’autodétermination,elle ne deviendrait qu’une Sainte Alliance moderne». 40 De même, en 1963,Maurice Faure déplorait-il au nom du Mouvement libéral pour l’Europe unie que«le seuil qui sépare le ‘concert des nations’ de la conception nouvelle d’une communautédes peuples» n’ait pas encore été franchi. 41Les organisations mentionnées correspondent à la strate agissante de l’opinion,autrement dit aux minorités informées qui exercent leur action par la médiation deréseaux ou la constitution de mouvements. Or les sources consultées sont peu prolixessur les vecteurs par lesquels elles tentent d’influer sur le sentiment collectif et39. Eurobaromètre, n° 10, janvier 1979, p. 45.40. Fondation nationale des sciences politiques (FNSP), archives Beuve-Méry, dossier 108. Note deR. de Coudenhove-Kalergi sur le congrès pour l’auto-détermination de l’Europe, 1960.41. AMAE, série Europe 1961-1965, dossier 1981. De Bonn au MAE, le 21 février 1963.

32 Anne Dulphy & Christine Manigandconfirment que, enclines à privilégier les élites, elles n’ont pas cherché ou ne sontpas parvenues à mobiliser les masses.Seule la Jeunesse européenne fédéraliste, créée en 1953 et reconstituée en 1972, 42semble active à la veille d’une échéance qu’elle proclame «date historique». 43 Elle estl’organisation des jeunes de l’Union européenne des fédéralistes et se veut commecette dernière une force de proposition et d’influence. Concevant la «fédération européennecomme (un) moyen de renouvellement démocratique», 44 elle engage dès le11 mars 1969 la lutte pour l’élection au suffrage universel direct en provoquant par samanifestation à la chambre une suspension de séance. 45 Elle reprend en effet à soncompte le principe constitutif énoncé dès 1950 par le Mouvement des fédéralisteseuropéens: 46 la convocation d’une assemblée constituante européenne est le seulmoyen d’associer le peuple à un pacte d’union fédérale. 47 Le scrutin revêt donc «uneimportance cruciale pour changer la Communauté» en la fondant sur la représentationdémocratique. 48 Dans son bulletin, Fédéraliste militant, le président de la sectionfrançaise, Jean-Marie Dubos, énonce les conditions de son crédit et de sa représentativité:l’interdiction du cumul avec un mandat national, le rejet des «recalés» dansleurs pays respectifs, la faiblesse de l’abstention. 49 Le 26 mars 1978, il demande auprésident de la République d’engager une «action de sensibilisation des citoyens auxproblèmes de l’unification politique de l’Europe afin de permettre aux électeurs demanifester une réelle volonté politique». 50En décembre 1975, l’association a opposé un contre-sommet populaire, fort decinq mille manifestants, à la réunion des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement àRome. 51 Elle persiste en préparant des conférences et des meetings; en réunissantquatre cents participants - dont Charles Hernu - à la fête européenne de Villeurbanne;en suscitant des «actions de rues» à Paris, à Lyon et dans plusieurs villes du42. C’est les 25 et 26 mars 1972 que se tient à Luxembourg le congrès constitutif de la JEF par l’unificationdes jeunes du Mouvement des fédéralistes européens et des Jeunesses européennes fédéralistes.A la date étudiée, elle compte 10 000 membres. La section française, constituée en septembre1975, est une des plus faibles numériquement avec 300 adhérents: étudiants, jeunesenseignants, syndicalistes, ils ont une moyenne d’âge de 23 ans (FNSP, archives de l’UEF, dossier6. Fédéraliste militant. Bulletin de la Jeunesse européenne fédéraliste, n° de mai-juin 1978. Rapportpolitique et d’activité du 3ème congrès de la JEF France à Arras, 10-11 novembre 1979).43. FNSP, archives de l’UEF, dossier 6. Fédéraliste militant... , n° de mai-juin 1978, p. 5.44. FNSP, archives de l’UEF, dossier 6. Rapport politique et d’activité du 3ème congrès de la JEFFrance à Arras, 10-11 novembre 1979, p. 2.45. FNSP, archives de l’UEF, dossier 6. Fédéraliste militant... , n° de mai-juin 1978, p. 9.46. Le Mouvement des fédéralistes européens (MFE), créé en décembre 1946, est la section françaisede l’Union européenne des fédéralistes (UEF); les organisations nationale et supranationale s’individualisenten 1959.47. FNSP, archives de l’UEF, dossier 6. Rapport politique et d’activité du 3ème congrès de la JEFFrance à Arras, 10-11 novembre 1979, p. 2-3.48. FNSP, archives de l’UEF, dossier 6. Rapport politique et d’activité du 3ème congrès de la JEFFrance à Arras, 10-11 novembre 1979, p. 4.49. FNSP, archives de l’UEF, dossier 6. Fédéraliste militant... , n° de mai-juin 1978, éditorial.50. FNSP, archives de l’UEF, dossier 6. Fédéraliste militant..., n° de mai-juin 1978, p. 3.51. FNSP, archives de l’UEF, dossier 6. Fédéraliste militant..., n° de mai-juin 1978, p. 9. Toutes lesforces démocratiques - partis, syndicats ... - étaient conviées à ce contre-sommet.

L’opinion publique francaise face à l’élection européenne de juin 1979 33département du Rhône, à Turin; en organisant des «actions frontières» et des jumelagesde sections régionales belges, françaises et italiennes; enfin, en décernant leprix de l’élection européenne à Vitrolles à l’occasion du passage du tour de France... 52 . Le 17 juillet, elle marque la séance inaugurale du Parlement, «premièregrande victoire de l’internationalisme», par une manifestation de plusieurs milliersde ses militants et du Mouvement des fédéralistes européens. 53Le petit nombre de Français présents reflète la discrétion des groupements fédéralistespendant la campagne, malgré quelques réunions publiques. La JEF se contentepar exemple d’appeler les jeunes européens à «voter pour les listes qui prennentdes engagements précis sur la monnaie et le gouvernement européens». 54Deux de ses membres se présentent sous l’étiquette «Emploi-Egalité-Europe»défendue par Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, mais sans pour autant mentionnerleur appartenance à la JEF! 55La Commission vise pour sa part à fournir une information non partisane, à sensibiliseret à inciter au vote: elle adapte à chaque pays son message ainsi que sarépartition entre les différents media (affichage, presse, radio, télévision ...) 56 Or,elle n’atteint pas sa cible en France: une personne sur deux n’a pas remarqué cettecampagne officielle qui a été plus fréquemment perçue par les leaders, alors qu’elleespérait toucher le grand public. 57 En d’autres termes, elle a sans doute renforcé lesattitudes préexistantes. 58 De plus, 25% seulement jugent la campagne convaincante,32% estiment le contraire et 43% ne se prononcent pas; cette évaluation estla plus désastreuse, d’autant qu’il s’agit du seul cas où les leaders ont en majorité(58%) une impression défavorable. 5952. FNSP, archives de l’UEF, dossier 6. Rapport politique et d’activité du 3ème congrès de la JEFFrance à Arras, 10-11 novembre 1979, p. 5-6 et 9. D’après ce document, les régions concernéespar ces actions sont: la Wallonie; la Provence, la région Rhône-Alpes; la Ligurie, la Lombardie, lePiémont.53. FNSP, archives de l’UEF, dossier 6. Fédéraliste militant..., n° d’avril-mai 1979.54. FNSP, archives de l’UEF, dossier 6. Rapport politique et d’activité du 3ème congrès de la JEFFrance à Arras, 10-11 novembre 1979, p. 6.55. FNSP, archives de l’UEF, dossier 6. Réunion du bureau, le 28 mai 1979.Cette liste se définit comme «ultra-européenne» et s’engage en faveur de la supranationalité;démarrant tardivement une campagne à la tonalité très fédéraliste, elle ne réussit pas sa percée(La Croix, les 7 et 12 juin 1979).56. Les Echos, le 7 mars 1979. En France, elle est lancée en janvier par l’affichage de cinq mille panneauxpublicitaires pendant quinze jours, puis se poursuit à la télévision - avec retard en raisond’une grève - et enfin dans la presse, en déclinant douze thèmes, jusqu’à la fin du mois de mars.57. Eurobaromètre, n° 11, mai 1979, p. 7-9. L’écart est de quarante points entre les degrés de leadershipextrêmes - vingt-huit à soixante-huit pour cent -.En Irlande, en Italie et aux Pays-Bas, la perception est supérieure à soixante-dix pour cent.58. Eurobaromètre, n° 11, mai 1979, p. 15.

34 Anne Dulphy & Christine ManigandTabelle 8: Perception et évaluation de la campagne 60Campagne remarquéeCampagne non remarquéeSans réponse%Bonne impression4750325dontleaders - 28leaders - 40leaders + 58leaders ++ 68dontleaders --leaders -leaders +leaders ++24223313Mauvaise impressionSans réponse3243Plusieurs hypothèses peuvent être formulées devant cette carence de la propagandeofficielle: son manque de visibilité faute d’un budget suffisant; 61 l’inadéquationde son mysticisme européiste, puisque la primeur accordée aux impératifs nationauxreflète la faible maturité de la conscience européenne qui leur est subordonnée;59. Eurobaromètre, n° 11, mai 1979, p. 10-11.Selon un sondage publié le 23 juillet 1979 dans Le Nouvel observateur, trente-et-un pour cent estimentque la campagne n’a rien apporté sur les avantages et les inconvénients de l’Europe etvingt-quatre pour cent la jugent ennuyeuse.60. Eurobaromètre, n° 11, mai 1979, p. 8-9 et 10-11.61. Les Echos, le 7 mars 1979. Quelque dix millions de francs sont dévolus à cette campagne, soit le budgetd’accompagnement d’un produit de consommation en vitesse de croisière, et deux à trois foismoins que celui de son lancement. Cette somme correspond à vingt pour cent de l’allocation totale:les trois autres principaux pays sont dotés de manière équivalente, les autres se partageant le solde.

U opinion publique francaise face à l’élection européenne de juin 1979 35la nécessaire neutralité de son message qui se résume en une abstraction (en France,la notion de l’espoir est symbolisée par l’homme-oiseau de Jean-Michel Folon). 62Il ressort que le débat a été accaparé par les quatre principales formations politiques63 d’une manière jugée décevante par les observateurs 64 : poids du gouvernement,conformisme des informations, personnalisation excessive, dérapage vers despréoccupations nationales, etc. Loin de marquer la naissance d’un espace démocratiqueeuropéen, le scrutin constitue une sorte de «coup pour rien» 65 avant les présidentiellesde 1981, permettant au PCF de se démarquer du PS, à celui-ci de fluctuerentre la critique de la majorité et la définition vague d’une Europe socialiste, auRPR d’ébaucher une ligne d’opposition nationaliste: l’enjeu spécifique est dilué enun sondage préélectoral. 66 Des enquêtes thématiques confirment cette analyse. Certesl’opinion française se prononce majoritairement en faveur de méthodes (50%pour des émissions radio européennes, 67 52% pour une campagne transnationaledes partis 68 ) et d’objectifs européens, comme l’action face aux difficultés économiques,la lutte contre la pollution et pour la protection de la nature. Mais les Françaissont les seuls à privilégier, après ces priorités communes, le renforcement del’union face aux super grands; autrement dit, ils envisagent l’Europe comme substitutà la puissance hexagonale. 69 Ils retiennent parmi les arguments échangés le plusimportant pour leur pays: l’espoir que l’Europe soit un remède à la crise. 70Au total, pour reprendre la formule du Monde sur cette première campagnecommunautaire, l’Europe est «à peine moins absente ... que l’Arlésienne del’œuvre de Bizet». 7162. Les Echos, le 7 mars 1979. Il s’agit de la légalité démocratique en Allemagne, de l’intérêt du citoyenen Grande-Bretagne.63. R. MORGAN, «L’élection d’une assemblée européenne très diversifiée », Revue politique et parlementaire,«Dossier des élections européennes», n° 81 (881), juillet-août 1979, p. 45.64. Dans La Croix, M. Merle déplore les débats médiocres et irréels tandis que N. Copin flétrit unecampagne qui, «partie sur les chapeaux de roue, ... s’est mise à tourner sur elle-même et ronronner»(les 26 mai et 24 juin 1979); dans L’Express, R. Schneider parle de «campagne bidon» et J.-F.Revel de «détournement de campagne ... hermétique et risible» (le 2 juin); dans Le Monde, L. Leprince-Ringuetstigmatise les «slogans simplistes et mensongers, (le) byzantinisme des mots, (la)jouissance de l’abstraction et de la formule» et C. Bourdet conclut sur «la campagne truquée» (les1er et 20 juin). En contrepoint, A. Lancelot fait valoir le modèle de campagne démocratique permettantà l’électeur de se déterminer en connaissance de cause (Projet, n° 138, septembre-octobre1979, p. 1010).65. R. MORGAN, op. cit., p. 49.66. A. LANCELOT, «’Europe numéro zéro’. Les premières élections européennes des 7 et 10 juin1979», Projet, n° 138, septembre-octobre 1979, p. 1004.67. Eurobaromètre, n° 8, janvier 1978, p. 83-84.68. Eurobaromètre, n° 7, juillet 1977, p. 70-72.69. Eurobaromètre, n° 7, juillet 1977, p. 66-69. L’intérêt pour l’union face aux grandes puissances -quarante-quatre pour cent - n’excède pas trente-cinq pour cent dans le reste de l’Europe, si ce n’esten Allemagne avec trente-huit pour cent.70. Eurobaromètre, n° 12, décembre 1979, p. 41-43. Avec l’Italie et le Luxembourg, la France est lepays où les espérances économiques sont les plus importantes.71. Le Monde, les 3-4 juin 1979.

36 Anne Dulphy & Christine Manigand2. Un scrutin franco-françaisSi la grande majorité des Français se prononce avec une grande ferveur pour l’électionau suffrage universel du Parlement européen et reconnaît toujours l’importancedu scrutin, il n’en demeure pas moins qu’elle ne possède qu’une information parcellaireou lacunaire sur l’événement et qu’elle porte un jugement restrictif sur sonfutur rôle. Les résultats de la consultation démocratique en «cette Europe annéezéro» corroborent cette faible implication.De l’été 1977 à l’automne 1978, le pourcentage de notoriété des électionsdemeure inchangé: 57% des Français déclarent avoir «lu ou entendu récemmentquelque chose au sujet du Parlement européen» (contre 40%), mais ils ne sont que37% à pouvoir citer réellement l’élection européenne. Seules quatre personnes surdix sont donc capables de la mentionner spontanément. 72Les variables relevées précédemment fonctionnent bien, puisque les critères lesplus discriminants se révèlent être le revenu, le niveau de l’instruction et le degré deleadership. 13 Curieusement, l’information du public diminue alors que le jour duscrutin approche et que de vifs débats surgissent. 74 Ceux-ci ont-ils eu un effetdémobilisateur qui, cette fois-ci, affecterait toutes les catégories sociales?Ce n’est qu’à deux mois de l’échéance que la situation change: les deux tiersdes sondés ont perçu un écho et quarante-cinq pour cent peuvent préciser qu’ils’agit bel et bien des élections. 75 Voilà qui constitue une progression importante,même si le résultat reste décevant.Tabelle 9: Notoriété de l’élection 76%ont lu ou entendu quelquechose au sujet du Parlementeuropéenpeuvent préciser qu’ils’agit des élections auParlement européenAut 19785727pts 19796538En dépit de ce net manque d’information, les trois quarts des Français environestiment qu’il s’agit d’un événement important pour leur pays. Cette opinion n’est72. Eurobaromètre, n° 7, juillet 1977, p. 39. Le score tombe à un sur quatre en Italie et au Danemark,un sur six en Irlande et moins d’un sur sept aux Pays-Bas ...73. Ibid. L’écart est particulièrement significatif selon le degré de leadership: treize pour cent parmiles non-leaders sont informés, cinquante-sept pour cent parmi les leaders.74. Eurobaromètre, n° 10, janvier 1979, p. 25. La baisse est de dix points parmi ceux qui sont en mesurede préciser de quoi il s’agit.75. La moyenne européenne est de soixante-cinq pour cent.76. Eurobaromètre, n° 11, mai 1979, p. 5.

L’opinion publique francaise face à l’élection européenne de juin 1979 37ni contradictoire, ni fondée sur une connaissance approfondie du phénomène, maisl’importance du scrutin est reconnue par une forte majorité à partir du moment oùcelui-ci paraît irréversible. 77 Comme on l’a vu, cela n’implique pas que «l’électionsera un événement lourd de conséquences qui fera nécessairement avancer l’unificationpolitique de l’Europe».Le vote ne suscite donc pas de véritable engouement, encore moins de passion.Dans le dernier sondage publié par Le Figaro-SOFRES, 54% se déclarent personnellementintéressés, 44% peu ou pas du tout. 78 L’attention a pourtant été croissante,79 même si elle semble retomber dans les jours qui précèdent la consultationdes électeurs. 80Cet intérêt découle moins de sa signification proprement européenne que de sesretombées sur la politique nationale et la vie quotidienne, attendues par 64% desindividus sondés, quels que soient leurs sentiments à l’égard de l’Europe. Tout aulong de la campagne, les préoccupations hexagonales l’ont emporté: les choix européensont très rarement damé le pion aux enjeux nationaux mais s’y sont dilués. Defait, 52% des électeurs ont l’intention de tenir compte avant tout de facteurs politiquesintérieurs pour voter, contre 26% seulement qui déclarent se déterminer enfonction des problèmes inhérents à la construction européenne. 81 S’il est vrai qu’ilsconstituent plus une confirmation qu’une révélation, ces chiffres représentent unnouveau sujet de désappointement pour les adeptes de l’Europe: les Français voterontfrançais. 82 Il s’agit bien d’une «campagne de politique intérieure à prétexteeuropéen» 83 et d’un scrutin à l’avenant.La plus grande déception réside cependant dans la faible participation descitoyens à un scrutin sans enjeu direct ni tradition, dont la portée est incertaine. Dansles neuf pays concernés, la participation est plus faible que lors des derniers scrutinsgénéraux. En France, c’est presque un record avec près de 39% d’abstentionnistes, 84surtout des jeunes (36% des dix-huit à vingt-quatre ans) et des ouvriers (30%) 85 . Plu-77. Soixante-quinze pour cent dans le sondage Figaro-SOFRES publié le 4 avril 1979, soixante-seizepour cent dans le même quotidien le 20 avril, quatre-vingts dans celui du 20 mai (soit trente pourcent qui jugent le scrutin très important, cinquante assez).78. Figaro-SOFRES, le 17 mai 1979. Dix-huit pour cent sont très intéressés, trente-six assez.79. Le sondage du 4 avril donnait quarante-huit pour cent d’intéressés, soit une progression de septpoints en deux mois.80. J. JAFFRE, «L’élection européenne du 10 juin 1979», Pouvoirs, n° 11, 1979, p. 179.81. Sondage Figaro-SOFRES paru le 4 mai 1979. Lors du sondage publié le 20 avril 1979, ils étaientcinquante-six pour cent à dire qu’ils obéiraient à des impératifs de politique intérieure et vingt-quatrepour cent à considérer qu’il serait prioritairement question de construction européenne. Le premierchiffre passe même à cinquante-neuf pour cent le 31 mai.82. Ce réflexe national se trouve confirmé par le refus de soixante pour cent de payer un peu plus d’impôtpour aider à l’unification de l’Europe.83. J.-F. REVEL, L’Express, le 2 juin 1979.84. Seulement surclassé par les différentes élections cantonales depuis la guerre (1951, 1955, 1961,1964, 1967 et 1973) et le référendum d’avril 1972 sur l’Europe (plus de trente-neuf pour cent, maisl’abstention avait été recommandée par le PS).85. Le Nouvel observateur, le 23 juillet 1979. Enclins au scepticisme, peu portés à se prononcer, lesouvriers ont néanmoins depuis 1962 une appréciation majoritairement positive.

38 Anne Dulphy & Christine Manigandsieurs raisons contribuent à l’expliquer: l’Europe ne représente pas un défi prioritaire,la France politique quadripolaire a développé quatre thèses opposées, l’opinion pressentune aggravation de la crise économique ...La formation gouvernementale UDF l’emporte finalement - Simone Veil ayantporté le label d’«européen le plus convaincu» dans tous les sondages préélectoraux86 - au détriment du RPR que sa lourde défaite situe dans les basses eaux dugaullisme. Le score du Parti communiste reste stable, mais le Parti socialiste setasse quelque peu alors qu’il aurait pu espérer bénéficier davantage de sa traditionpro-européenne.Tabelle 10: Résultats de l’élection 87%AbstentionnistesBulletins blancs ou nulsSuffrages exprimésMétropole38,783,25Total39,223,22ListesExtrême gauche trotskiste (A. Laguiller)PCF (G. Marchais)PS et MRG (F. Mitterrand)RPR (J. Chirac)UDF (S. Veil)Ecologie (S. Fernex)Emploi-Egalité-Europe(J.-J. Servan-Schreiber)Défense interprofessionnelle(M. Malaud)Eurodroite(J.-L. Tïxier-Vignancour)Régions-Europe (J.-E. Hallier)PSU (H. Bouchardeau)3,1220,5923,7316,0927,394,451,871,381,33--3,0720,5223,5316,3127,64,381,841,391,31--86. Pour vingt-huit pour cent des personnes interrogées le 17 mai 1979, après un débat à quatre surTF1, et le 18 mai par L’Aurore Public SA.87. Ministère de l’Intérieur, le 13 juin 1979. La colonne «total» regroupe les votes des Français de métropole,d’outre-mer et de l’étranger. Les deux dernières listes n’ont pas déposé de bulletins dansles bureaux de vote.

L’opinion publique francaise face à l’élection européenne de juin 1979 39Somme toute, une élection européenne dans ses enjeux et son mode de scrutinmais bien française par les comportements politiques exprimés. Les Français sonteuropéens parce que leur pays fait partie d’une réalité géographique, mais ils ne sontpas prêts pour autant à sacrifier leur identité et leurs intérêts propres. Ils sont doncpartisans d’une intégration en douceur qui ne dérange pas leurs habitudes de vie.Tocqueville s’affirme toujours d’actualité, lui qui déclarait dans ses souvenirs de1848 que «les démocraties ... ne résolvent guère les questions du dehors que parles raisons du dedans».Anne DulphyChristine Manigand

Susanne Baier-Allen (ed.)Looking into the Futureof Cyprus-EU RelationsIn what way will the EU accession process impact on the Cyprus conflict? Willthe prospect for EU membership be a catalyst towards finding a solution in one ofthe most long-standing and protected conflicts in Europe?The authors in this book, both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot researchers aswell as experts from Europe and the US, are addressing these questions takinginto consideration the implications Cyprus’s potential EU membership has on thesecurity concerns and economic prosperity of the Cypriot people. The EU’sdecision to include Cyprus in the next enlargement has given fresh impetus forinternational mediation, yet the analyses of the options and perspectives for asettlement serve to highlight the diverging interests and the deep-seated mistrustof the parties to the conflict, which have so far been in the way of successfullyreuniting the island.Published in the series Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung(ZEI), this book is a timely contribution to the current debate onCyprus and the effects of EU enlargement.1999, 262 p., hb., 89-DM, 650-öS, 81-sFr, ISBN 3-7890-5620-0(Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI), Vol. 5)NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft76520 Baden-Baden

41The 1975 Referendum 1Julie SmithOn 5 June 1975 the British public voted to remain in the European Community (EC), or’Common Market’ as it was typically called. 2 This event was of deep and lasting significancefor several reasons. First, in marked contrast to the other late-comers to the integrationprocess - Denmark, Ireland, and later the Mediterranean and EFTAn states - Britainhad not held a referendum prior to accession. Thus, the 1975 referendum offered Britishvoters their first opportunity to vote on the issue of Britain’s place in Europe. Secondly,the Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, had waived Cabinet responsibility on the issueof Britain’s membership of the EC for the duration of the referendum campaign, becauseof the deep divisions in his party. Although he thereby managed to avoid an outright split,the party remained divided over Europe. This proved to be one of the factors behind thedecision of leading pro-Europeans to break away in 1981 and establish the Social DemocraticParty (SDP). 3 Thirdly, the referendum was the first national referendum to be heldin Britain. For the first time politicians were willing to forego the principle of parliamentarysovereignty and permit an element of direct democracy. It set a precedent for referendumson Scottish and Welsh devolution in 1979 and in 1997 and for a national referendumon economic and monetary union early in the twenty-first century.The aim of this article is to analyse the 1975 referendum campaign, its impacton the British party system and its implications for Britain’s membership of the EC.Following a brief discussion of public participation in the process of European integration,the paper gives an overview of Britain’s relationship with the EC prior toentry, noting especially the Labour Party’s shifting and divided stance on the issue.That section will also consider the terms of Britain’s accession and the re-negotiationundertaken by Harold Wilson’s government.The main section will then discuss the referendum campaign. It assesses the activitiesof several key individuals, the work of the pro-Market Britain in Europe(BIE) campaign and the anti-Market, National Referendum Campaign (NRC), andthe arguments put forward by the pro- and anti-Marketeers, particulary the emphasison questions of food prices, jobs, sovereignty, and Britain’s relationship with theCommonwealth. The final section will then give an analysis of the referendum,briefly outlining its constitutional and political implications.1. The author would like to thank Anne Deighton, Geoffrey Edwards and William Wallace, for theirextremely helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article, John Roper, for agreeing to be interviewedabout the referendum, and the staff of Chatham House Library.2. EC is used here to refer to all three European Communities - the Coal and Steel Community ofEconomic Community and the Atomic Energy Community.3. It should be pointed out that although many of the founders of the SDP were pro-Europeans, thiswas not always the case and Europe was perhaps not as significant in individuals’ decisions to jointhe SDP as has often been assumed. Interview with John Roper, former Labour and then SDP MP,24 February 1999; I. CREWE and A. KING, SDP - The Birth, Life and Death of the Social DemocraticParty, Oxford, 1997, pp.106-107.

42 Julie SmithThe People and IntegrationEuropean integration began as an elitist process which paid little attention to the ‘peoples’who were to be integrated. The first Treaties took the form of internationalagreements signed by national governments, with no direct reference to the citizens.Nevertheless there was a deeply held belief among the founding fathers that citizensin the member states did indeed support the integration process. As Leon Lindbergand Stuart Scheingold have argued, however, public support in the form of a ‘permissiveconsensus’ was assumed rather than actually articulated or tested. 4By the time the Communities were created, public opinion was less clearly in favourof the idea of uniting Europe than it had been in the late 1940s. The federalists,having originally favoured the creation of a directly elected Assembly as a way ofdemonstrating the popular support for integration that they believed existed, began tofavour such a body on the grounds that it would elicit support for integration. Provisionfor direct elections was made in the 1957 Treaties of Rome establishing the EuropeanEconomic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community(Euratom), but despite the federalists’ demands, the European Assembly was littlemore than a democratic symbol, with few powers, and only a distant prospect of directelections. 3 Voters were, of course, electing the governments that agreed Europeantreaties and the parliaments that ratified them. However, since national elections tendednot to focus on European issues, the fact that the first elections to the EuropeanParliament, as the Assembly was called informally in the 1960s and formally followingthe 1986 Single European Act (SEA), were not held until 1979 meant that forover twenty years the ‘peoples’ were hardly involved in the integration process.There were two partial exceptions to this point: first, prior to 1979 the EuropeanParliament was composed of representatives of national parliaments and could thereforeclaim indirect democratic legitimacy; 6 and secondly, from 1972 various memberstates and applicant states had held referendums on issues concerning European integration.In most cases such referendums related to constitutional reform of the EuropeanCommunity (and later Union), as was the case with ratification of the SEA andthe Treaty on European Union, or they offered voters an opportunity to determinewhether their country should join the Community - in 1972, Denmark, Ireland andNorway voted on joining and France on whether to permit enlargement. 7 Thus, theECs accepted an element representative democracy typically associated with that oth-4. L. N. LINDBERG and S. A. SCHEINGOLD, Europe’s Would-be Polity, Englewood Cliffs, NJ,1970, p.41.5. J. SMITH, Europe’s Elected Parliament, Sheffield. 1999, Chapter 1.6. V, HERMAN and J. LODGE, The European Parliament and the European Community, London,1978, p. 77.7. For an analysis of the Reach decision to hold a referendum, see B. CRIDDLE, “Politics by plebiscitein France”, in The World Today, 28/6» June 1972, pp.240-248.Norway successfully negotiated terms of accession twice, in 1972 and again in 1995, only to secits application rejected by the voters on both occasions. Switzerland’s case was even more tricky:following a ‘No’ vote in a referendum on joining the European Economic Area, Switzerland’s applicationto the European Union was frozen.

The 1975 Referendum 43er artificial construct, the nation-state, while the newer member states and France favoureddirect democracy in the form of referendums.The United Kingdom chose a rather different path, based on its conventionalconstitutional practice. On 1 January 1973, the Conservative Prime Minister, EdwardHeath, led the country into the European Community after a parliamentaryvote; there was no opportunity at that stage for the British public to express itsopinion directly. However, in the second general election of 1974, the Labour Partypledged to hold a referendum on continuing Britain’s membership of the EC. Callsfor a referendum had occasionally been made for some time before the 1974 election,but had typically been rejected, partly because there was a perceived danger,especially on the right and among pro-Marketeers, that using this form of direct democracymight undermine the principles of parliamentary sovereignty. 8 Thus,while voters had not been consulted on whether Britain should join the Community,they were given the chance to say whether Britain should stay in the Community, asubtle but profound difference, given voters’ tendency towards conservatism.While the introduction of this novel device was ostensibly a way of demonstratingpopular support for Britain’s membership of the EC, the reality was rather different.The Labour Party was deeply divided over the question of Britain’s continuingmembership of the Common Market, a division which re-enforced much deepersplits within the party. Opposition to membership gradually became a symbol ofthe Labour left led by Tony Benn, Michael Foot and Barbara Castle, fighting thoseon right of the party often following Roy Jenkins, whose commitment to the Europeanideal had caused him to resign from the Labour front-bench in 1961. 9 Thus,the referendum was primarily a way of circumventing a complete split in the Labourmovement. However, the referendum did not end divisions within either of themain parties. Nor, if opinion poll evidence is to be believed, did the referendumleave the British public with a much greater understanding of the EC than they hadpreviously had.Britain and EuropeBritain’s post-war relationship with Europe was one of semi-detachment or, asWinston Churchill put it, ‘We are with Europe but not of it’. 10 As Lindberg andScheingold have shown, British support for ‘making efforts towards uniting WesternEurope, including Great Britain’ was sixty-four per cent in 1957, ahead of both8. Paradoxically, it was those who were most willing to cede national sovereignty to the EC who expressedthe greatest anxiety about possible loss of parliamentary sovereignty through the use of thereferendum device.9. B. BRIVATI, Hugh Gaitskell, London, 1996, p. 404.10. S. GEORGE, ed., Britain and the European Community: The Politics of Semi-Detachment, Oxford,1992; R. JENKINS, “Britain and Europe: ten years of Community membership”, in InternationalAffairs, 59/2, Spring 1983, pp.147-153.

44 Julie SmithFrance and Italy. However by 1962, the situation had altered significantly with Britishsupport for unifying Europe twenty to thirty per cent below that of France, Italyand Germany. 11 Despite the initial popular support for European unification,Britain was unwilling to play a part in the integration process, preferring to wishher European partners well while remaining firmly outside. 12 This official position,which was held by Labour and Conservative politicians, masked considerable differenceswithin the parties. As James Callaghan noted in his memoirs, Labour partydivisions on the question of Europe, when he was sent to the Council of Europe in1949 went back at least as far as the late 1940s. 13 The Conservatives had also beendivided over the issue since the formation in the 1940s of the European Movement,in which several Conservatives played leading roles. However, the differencesdiminished considerably during the 1960s and, with the notable exception of themaverick right-winger Enoch Powell, were not especially evident during the1970-1 negotiations for membership; not until the late 1980s and 1990s did internalConservative differences threaten to split that party.Almost as soon as the ink was dry on the Treaties of Rome, British politiciansstarted to consider joining the new European Communities, as Britain’s role in the internationalarena began to decline and then as the British economy fell behind that ofthe EC member states. Thus in 1961, the Conservative Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan,put in an application to join the EC. At that time the Labour Party remainedbroadly opposed to membership. 14 In particular, the Labour leader, Hugh Gaitskell,felt that the conditions for possible British entry would undermine the Commonwealth.15 This application, later vetoed by French President de Gaulle, was significantbecause it reflected an emerging British recognition that Britain could no longer actas a world leader and that the ‘special relationship’ with the United States was not assecure as they had assumed. 16 Such attitudes were very clearly expressed fourteenyears later during the referendum campaign, among the many supporters of membershipwho felt there was no alternative to membership. Similarly, the views of thosewho opposed membership in the early 1960s, notably on the issue of relations withthe Commonwealth, were reiterated during the 1975 referendum. 1711. LINDBERG and SCHEINGOLD, Europe’s Would-be Polity, p. 59 citing data from MERRITTand PUCHALA, Western Attitudes on Arms Control, Defense and European Unity, pp. 94-5.12. See, for example, J. YOUNG, Britain and European Unity, 1945-1992, London, 1993 and S.GEORGE, An Awkward Partner - Britain in the European Community, Oxford, 3 rd edition, 1998.13. J. CALLAGHAN, Time and Chance, London, 1988, p. 297.14. For a detailed analysis of the official Labour position and the internal party differences in 1961,see BRIVATI, Hugh Gaitskell, pp. 404-418. For a more detailed discussion of the application seeA. DEIGHTON and P. LUDLOW, “ ‘A Conditional Application’: British Management of the FirstAttempt to Seek Membership of the EEC, 1961-3”, in A. DEIGHTON, Building Postwar Europe- National Decision-Makers and European Institutions 1948-63, London, 1995, pp. 107-126.15. BRIVATI, Hugh Gaitskell, pp. 404-405.16. See J. W. YOUNG, “Britain and the EEC, 1956-73: an overview”, in B. BRIVATI and H. JONES,From Reconstruction to Integration: Britain and Europe since 1945, Leicester, 1993, pp.103-113.17. W. WALLACE, “Europe: the changing international context - Implications for British policy”, inThe World Today, May 1975, pp. 177-213 (177).

The 1975 Referendum 45As the British economic situation deteriorated further, the Labour Prime Minister,Harold Wilson, who had taken office in 1964, gradually shifted his position onEC membership and a second British application was lodged in 1967, only to bevetoed a second time by de Gaulle. 18 Not until de Gaulle’s resignation in 1969could British accession be considered seriously. Wilson had reopened Britain’s bidto join the EC, but it was the newly-elected Conservative Prime Minister, EdwardHeath, who oversaw the negotiations from 1970 and took Britain into the Communityon 1 January 1973. Whereas Macmillan’s commitment to membership wasgenuine but not deep and Wilson’s approach had been entirely pragmatic, Heath,who had been Macmillan’s negotiator during the first application, was a convincedpro-European. 19 Heath had been profoundly moved by bis war-time experiencesand made his maiden speech to the House of Commons in the debate on the SchumanPlan in June 1950. 20 This commitment was vital in terms of ensuring Britain’sultimate accession to the Community, since Heath was able to persuade de Gaulle’ssuccessor as President of France, Georges Pompidou, that Britain genuinely desiredto join the Community. 21 However, although Heath’s determination to secureBritish accession meant that the terms of accession agreed may have been the bestthat could be achieved at the time, they were obviously a compromise, the assumptionbeing that the crucial task was to get Britain into the Community, with the detailsto be refined later - a position shared by moderates in the Labour Party. 22Negotiation and AccessionThe successful accession negotiations involved a complicated trade-off, as PresidentPompidou was determined that British accession should not entail a weakeningof the integration process as the French saw it. Thus, at the Hague Summit inDecember 1969, Pompidou made enlargement conditional on ‘completion’ - essentiallycompleting the common market and the Common Agricultural Policy(CAP) - and ‘deepening’ in terms of a commitment to economic and monetary union(EMU) and foreign policy cooperation. 23 Britain, along with Denmark and Ireland,who applied to join at the same time as Britain, would only be allowed to joinif they accepted the new ‘acquis communautaire ’, including the commitments to18. For a detailed discussion of Britain’s relationship with Europe over the whole post-war period leadingup to 1975 and especially the divisions within the Labour Party, see YOUNG, Britain and theUnity of Europe, George, Britain and the European Community and ROM, An Awkward Partner.19. Heath’s memoirs give a vivid account of his commitment to European integration. E. HEATH, TheCourse of My Life, An Autobiography of Edward Heath, London, 1998. See also, H. YOUNG,This Blessed Plot-Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair, London, 1998, pp. 216-220.20. HEATH, The Course of My Life, pp.144-5.21. Ibid., pp.364-372.22. Tony Benn, at that time a moderate pro-Marketeer, noted in his Diaries on 30 April 1966, that‘Those of us who favoured the application were not too worried about the conditions’. Cited inPIMLOTT, Harold Wilson, p.440.

46 Julie Smithcomplete the common market, to finalise the provisions of the Common AgriculturalPolicy, the Common Fisheries Policy agreed even as the enlargement negotiationswere being prepared, and the Community budget, as well as the new commitmentsto economic and monetary union and cooperation in foreign affairs, knownas European Political Cooperation (EPC).Provisions for the CAP and especially the associated budgetary arrangementsput Britain, with her more heavily industrialised economy, at a serious disadvantagecompared with the founding member states. 24 Those negotiating British membershipimmediately realised that Britain’s budgetary contributions would causedifficulties. However, Heath chose to take membership on the terms offered, believingperhaps that the proposals for a Regional Fund provided a foundation for futureBritish benefits. 25During the period that the Heath Government was negotiating membership, attitudestowards the Common Market became increasingly polarised within the LabourParty. In 1967, there had been moderate Labour support for Wilson’s entry bid, butthe new intake of MPs in 1970 was less pro-European and several older MPs who hadpreviously supported Britain’s application, including James Callaghan, began tochange their minds once out of office. 26 Anthony Wedgwood Benn, at that time stillnominally a pro-European, called for a referendum on membership in 1971, believingthat ‘...the issue was of such major constitutional significance, because of the loss ofsovereignty involved, that it should be put before the British electorate’. 27 For Bennthe referendum idea was of vital importance, since it offered voters an opportunity toindicate their opinions. At the same time it served as a way of retaining some credibilityfor party, which had initiated the negotiations on terms rather similar to thoseachieved by Edward Heath, but now seemed to be abandoning the cause. 28 This idea23. See C. FRANCK, “New Ambitions: From the Hague to Paris Summits (1969-72)”, in R. PRYCE,The Dynamics of European Union, London, 1987, pp.130-148; J. SMITH and G. EDWARDS,“British-German Relations 1972-1989”, in K. LARRES and E. MEEHAN, eds., Uneasy Partners:British-German Relations and European Integration since 1945, Rom, forthcoming 2000.24. The structure of the Community budget, the nature of the CAP and the fact that Britain was farmore heavily industrialised than the other member states meant that Britain’s contributions wouldbe higher than average, while its receipts would be rather lower than average. For the French inparticular, this situation was something that the British should just have accepted as part of theprice of joining late; for the British it was an inequitable arrangement that needed to be tackled.The problems in negotiating a solution to the impasse were compounded by the fact that the memberstates could not agree on the nature of the problem.25. For a full discussion of Edward Heath’s negotiations on, inter alia, regional policy, see C. LORD,British Entry to the European Community Under the Heath Government of 1970-4, Aldershot,1993, Chapter 8.26. PIMLOTT, Harold Wilson, pp.580-1.27. T. BENN, Office Without Power - Diaries 1968-72, London, 1988, p.313. Benn’s opinions aboutthe importance of a referendum run through his Diaries.28. George Thomson, who would have negotiated for Labour in the event of a victory in the 1970 generalelection, has affirmed that ‘...during the election campaign, in consultation with the thenPrime Minister, he had been drawing up the basis for a renewed bid shortly after polling day - andthat this was essentially the same as the terms of entry later agreed by Heath’. PIMLOTT, HaroldWilson, p. 581.

The 1975 Referendum 47was rapidly dismissed by most of Benn’s colleagues. Only once the negotiations wereover and the terms of entry clear to everyone did the Labour Party move towards theidea of taking the issue to the people.Internal Labour Party divisions became apparent in the House of Commons voteon accession held in October 1971, when 67 Labour MPs voted with the Conservativesand 20 abstained. 29 The initial preference was not to hold a referendum, butrather to make use of conventional electoral practices. Thus in October 1971 theLabour Executive passed a resolution calling on Heath ‘to submit to the democraticjudgement of a general election’ . 30 The Labour Party pledged itself to re-negotiate theterms of membership - the terms had been the main source of contention within theparty, not least because the most devout anti-Marketeers could win support from thehesitant on the details of accession rather than on membership per se. Such dissensionwithin the party, rather than simply a desire to let the people decide, seems to havebeen the main reason for the manifesto pledge in the second general election of 1974to hold a referendum on Britain’s continuing membership of the EC.Although the idea of a referendum was still not the party’s preferred strategy,the shadow cabinet agreed on 29 March 1972 to support the idea of a referendumthat had been put down as an amendment to the European Communities Bill byNeil Marten and Enoch Powell amongst others. 31 Roy Jenkins, who had been absentfrom the meeting, resigned the deputy leadership of the party, arguing that areferendum would be detrimental to the Labour Party and set an unfortunate precedent.32 As late as the first February 1974 election, the manifesto commitment wasthat the people would be consulted on a positive outcome of the proposed re-negotiationeither ‘through a General Election or a Consultative Referendum’. 33 The incomingminority Labour government of February 1974 had, however, pledged tore-negotiate the terms of Britain’s membership of the EC and it was on the outcomeof this re-negotiation that the referendum was fought.Re-negotiationThe re-negotiation consisted of window-dressing rather than significant substantivechanges. 34 The idea of re-negotiation had suited Wilson’s purposes while the partywas in opposition, but once in office, Labour ministers rapidly discovered that itwould be difficult to secure any substantive change in the terms of membership,while the ongoing re-negotiation also made it extremely difficult to engage in29. PMLOTT, Harold Wilson, p. 590.30. BUTLER and KITZINGER, The 1975 Referendum, p. 10.31. Ibid., pp. 18-19.32. Ibid., p. 19.33. Ibid., p.27.34. With the benefit of hindsight, former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt indicated that the exercisehad been largely cosmetic. See YOUNG, This Blessed Plot, p. 283.

48 Julie Smithday-to-day decision-making. The Labour Party had agreed that it would not be afundamental re-negotiation in the sense that it would not touch on the Treaties ofParis (1951) and Rome (1957), only the terms of accession were to be challenged.Although the Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, set off to win the support of hisEuropean colleagues and initially made strong demands, gradually he and theLabour Party tempered their claims. 35 This shift was partly the result of a socialisationof previously hostile ministers into the Brussels process and partly a recognitionthat many of the issues were far less of a problem than they had feared. Thatwas certainly true for matters of regional, industrial and fiscal policy - after alengthy struggle, or what Wilson referred to as a ‘squalid wrangle’, at the ParisSummit in December 1974, agreement was reached, at least provisionally, on aRegional Fund. 36As demonstrated by Lorna Ruano elsewhere in this journal, two other substantiveissues had to be resolved: that of the import of New Zealand dairy goods, onwhich agreement was finally reached in March 1975, and that of Britain’s budgetarycontributions. 37 The latter issue had caused consternation in European circles,especially amongst the French, who felt that Britain should pay the price of latemembership and who were opposed for not entirely unselfish reasons to a mechanismthat might smack of juste retour. However, an outcome was reached by dint ofcreating a ‘corrective mechanism’ based on a general formula, not one that was suigeneris for Britain. 38 The fact that the details were so complex and tightly-drawnthat the mechanism was unlikely ever to be met was irrelevant; what mattered wasthat Wilson could claim success in his ‘re-negotiation’ and hence advocate supportfor continued British membership of the EC.The ReferendumBritain’s accession to the Community had come at a difficult time in terms ofglobal economic and political factors. Thus, while the first nine months of membershipsuggested benefits for Britain, agricultural shortages, rising fuel prices and theinternal conflicts and confusions that characterised the Europeans’ response to theMiddle East crisis all contributed to a weakening of support for the EC. Moreover,the effects of the information campaign that had been held in 1972 prior to accessionseemed to diminish swiftly. But when global food prices rose above those in35. PIMLOTT, Harold Wilson, p. 635. For details of the re-negotiation, see CALLAGHAN, Time andChance, pp. 299-325, and YOUNG, This Blessed Plot, pp. 280-83.36. B. CASTLE, The Castle Diaries, 1974-76, London, 1980, p.248. See also D. DINAN, Ever CloserUnion? An Introduction to the European Community, London, 1994, pp. 88-89.37. Geoffrey Denton gives a clear and detailed analysis of the issue of Britain’s budgetary contributions.G. DENTON, “Re-Structuring the EC Budget: Implications of the Fontainebleau Agreement”,in Journal of Common Market Studies, 23/2, December 1984, pp. 117-140.38. BUTLER and KITZINGER, The 1975 Referendum, pp. 42-3.

The 1975 Referendum 49the EC, the antis’ complaint that EC membership would bring rising food pricesseemed far less compelling. It was against this increasingly favourable backgroundthat the referendum took place.The ActorsSplits persisted within both the Labour and Conservative parties, although graduallyall senior Tories, including many who were to become so-called sceptics a decadelater, migrated to the ‘Yes’ camp. Divisions within the Labour Party were far moreserious and the danger that the party might split led Wilson to accept the necessity ofwaiving Cabinet responsibility on the issue. This was only the second time that Cabinetresponsibility had been waived, the precedent being an ‘agreement to differ’ onthe question of free trade in 1931. 39 However, although ministers were free to supportthe ‘No’ campaign, Wilson subsequently stressed that waiving cabinet responsibilitydid not mean that ministers were permitted not to fulfil tasks relating to the Community,or to give hostile speeches in Parliament. 40 Seven members of his Cabinet,including Benn, Castle, Foot and Shore, came out against EC membership, as did themajority of backbenchers. Wilson, himself, and his Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan,were both pragmatic Europeans at best - Callaghan was clearly more of anAtlanticist, Wilson an Atlanticist who was also deeply committed to the Commonwealth.The Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, was a committed European.Proponents and opponents of the Community could be divided into six broadcategories, which encapsulate attitudes both to joining the Common Market and toremaining in it. 41In favour of membership. The first group in favour were the Federalists, thosesuch as Edward Heath and Roy Jenkins whose vision of Europe was an idealisedfederal one - they were in a tiny elite minority. Secondly, there were Surrogate Imperialists,most of whom were Tory, and again fell into the elite category. They includedDuncan Sandys, MP, who had been active in the European Movement, andthe Commissioner and former Conservative MP, Christopher Soames. Thesepro-Marketeers felt that the US had spurned Britain and hence Britain should lookto Europe for support, although the assumption was that Britain, once inside theCommunity, would lead it. 42 Finally, there were the TINAs, who espoused the viewthat ‘there is no alternative’. This category of supporters was by far the largest in allthe parties. From their perspective, the negative factors of loss of empire, the col-39. PIMLOTT, Harold Wilson, p. 656.40. Ibid., pp. 656-7.41. I am grateful to Geoffrey Edwards for this schema.42. This assumption was also held by the Deputy Labour Leader in the 1960s, George Brown. Whilespeculation that Britain would play a leading role if she joined the Community had been rife in theearly years of the EC - and desired by many, at least as a counterweight to the Franco-German axis- by the 1970s such pretensions were scarcely welcome.

50 Julie Smithlapse of the Commonwealth, and the fact that the US was not treating Britain properlycombined with a certain cosmopolitanism to convince them of the need forBritain to be part of the EC. This position was probably the most easily accessibleto the ‘man on the street’ ; in any case the pragmatic approach was dominant in thereferendum campaign.The differences between various pro-Marketeers was highlighted further byDavid Owen (admittedly not an entirely unbiased commentator) - a Labourpro-Marketeer during the referendum - who went as far as to say in his memoirs:‘I never realised that Edward Heath was hiding his own federalist opinions at everystage of the negotiations as well as during the passage of the legislation. He was notthe only one. I only later discovered that Roy Jenkins was a closet federalist. Thedubious tactic of the federalists throughout was to deny they wanted a single ExecutiveEuropean President, a European Cabinet or an authoritative European Parliamentbut to quickly push in this direction over a series of small decisions. In thissense the anti-Europeans were right - there was a secret agenda. Yet many of thepro-Europeans were, like me, deeply suspicious of a federalist Europe’. 43With the ultimate goal of integration unclear, Owen was perhaps correct to notethe reluctance of many of the pro-Marketeers to discuss the political implicationsof European integration. Yet this was an inevitable dimension of campaigning in anational plebiscite: pro- and anti-Marketeers all had to attempt to win over the averagevoter, typically more interested in jobs and the pound in their pockets than inthe rather arcane issues surrounding European integration. 44Against the Common Market were Nationalists both left and right wing. Thoseon the left sought ‘socialism in one country’ in the form of a new alternative strategyoften linked to economists such as Lord (Nicky) Kaldor, Cambridge Schooleconomists such as Wyn Godley and Lord (Thomas) Balogh, and Stuart Holland,who favoured protectionist import control policies. Of the right-wing Nationalists,the most notable ‘Little Englander’ was Enoch Powell, who was deeply opposed tothe loss of sovereignty caused by European integration. Powell, on the far-Right,was one of the most charismatic opponents of the Community, but along with Bennon the Left (not to mention the Ulster Unionist anti-Marketeer Ian Paisley) he couldalienate as well as attract large numbers of voters. 45The second group of opponents were the liberal Internationalists. Typically onthe right of the Labour Party, these anti-Marketeers, including the Commonwealthromantic Judith Hart and the vehemently anti-Market Peter Shore and Douglas Jay,rejected the EC as a rich man’s club, with Hart in particular more anxious to lendsupport to the developing world. 46 The last group of anti-Marketeers were the43. D. OWEN, Time to Declare, London, 1991, pp.176-7. This might seem a re-writing of history byOwen, but one of his former colleagues, John Roper (1999) remembers Owen even in the 1970s asbeing more cautious than many of his fellow Labour MPs on issues concerning the future directionof the EC.44. Roper, 1999.45. YOUNG, This Blessed Plot, p. 291.

The 1975 Referendum 51Atlanticists - another cross-party group including the pro-Nato right-wing LabourMP, Bruce George, and probably at heart Callaghan himself.The campaigns were fought along broadly these lines, although the campaignteams coalesced within two competing umbrella organisations. Britain in Europe(BIE) united most of the ‘Yes’ campaigners, while the National Referendum Campaign(NRC) attempted rather less successfully to bring together opponents of theCommon Market. The BIE was better organised than the NRC and had considerablygreater resources. The BIE was a cross-party grouping that could rely on supportfrom the European Movement, but was distanced from it to some extent. Sir ConO’Neill, the former Foreign and Commonwealth Office mandarin who had negotiatedBritish accession, was chosen to be the BIE’s chief administrator, although RoyJenkins played a more active part and became the President of the BIE. 47 The BIEmade use of the Tories’ infrastructure although the Tories made less impact in thecampaign than the Labour Party. Former Prime Minister Edward Heath played an activerole. His successor as Conservative leader, Margaret Thatcher, who had allowedherself to become a patron of the European Movement and who advocated a ‘Yes’vote, played little part in the actual campaign, preferring to leave Heath to play a leadingpart, with William Whitelaw as the Conservative Vice President of the BIE. 48Heath was to be seen sharing platforms with Labour’s keenest advocate of the EEC,Roy Jenkins, and the Liberal leader, Jeremy Thorpe. The referendum had clearlybrought down many barriers between the mainstream political parties, whose membersrapidly discovered that they could work with traditional opponents. 49The Britain in Europe movement gave a forum for some pro-Market ministers,notably Roy Jenkins and Shirley Williams, the minister for Prices and ConsumerProtection, to make speeches. Wilson and Callaghan did not initially join in thegeneral fray, preferring to remain in the background until towards the end whenthey too made pro-EC speeches. The timing was less the result of a late conversionthan part of a grand strategy. Butler and Kitzinger argue that the electorate was dividedinto three roughly equal groups - pro, anti and hesitants. 50 The theory wasthat hesitants were more likely to be won over by another hesitant converting thanby the die-hard pros and hence, perhaps, Callaghan, who was himself seen as a‘hesitant’, had a better chance of winning them over.In contrast to the BIE, the NRC lacked manpower and resources. Both groupswere given a government grant of £125,000 for advertising - the BIE, which enjoyedconsiderable support among business elites, raised a further £1,825,000 comparedwith the NRC’s £8,610. 51 The NRC was also handicapped by the heterogeneityand factionalism of its supporters and activists. Where the BIE drew support46. Such politicians, especially Judith Hart, played a key part in pushing the Community towards a developmentpolicy and the Lomé Agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.47. YOUNG, This Blessed Plot, p.290; M. THATCHER, The Path to Power, New York, pp. 331.48. THATCHER, The Path to Power, pp. 330-31.49. Roper, 1999.50. BUTLER and KITZINGER, The 1975 Referendum, pp.94-5.51. Ibid., p. 86 and p. 110, and YOUNG, This Blessed Plot, 290.

52 Julie Smithfrom centrists in the three main parties, the NRC attracted the extremes, although itdid rule out extra-parliamentary parties, particularly the Communists, and excludedthe National Front. 52 In addition to various anti-European groupings within the umbrellabody there was a strong grouping of Labour opponents in the framework ofthe Labour Safeguards Committee. The NRC also contained the Conservativesagainst the Treaty of Rome, the tiny ‘Liberal “No” to the Common Market Campaign’,as well as the Ulster Unionists, the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru.The Scottish and Welsh Nationalists, who were later to recognise that Europeoffered considerable potential for furthering their interests, were hostile to theCommunity in the 1970s. They also perceived the referendum as a way of highlightingtheir ‘difference’ from England. 53 The nationalists were especially keen forthe referendum to be counted at the regional level so that differential support wouldbe apparent for all to see.The IssuesBoth pro- and anti-Marketeers could put forward impressive arguments about thenature of Community membership. In addition to speaker meetings and media coverage,each household received three publicly-funded campaign brochures. 54 Britain’sNew Deal in Europe outlined the government’s position, with particularemphasis given to the results of the re-negotiation in terms of food, money andjobs. It also analysed the implications of EC membership on the powers of parliamentand stressed the desire of commonwealth leaders for Britain to remain in theCommunity. The BIE brochure, Why you should vote YES, addressed very similarissues in a similar way. Both brochures quoted the Australian Prime Minister assaying, ‘I do not want to give any impression that the present Australian Governmentsees any advantage for Australia, for Europe or for the world in Britain leavingthe Community’. 55 The NRC’s brochure, Why you should vote NO, placed considerableweight on questions of national sovereignty and national identity,claiming that the Common Market ‘...sets out by stages to merge Britain withFrance, Germany, Italy and other countries into a single nation’. 56 Like the twopro-Market brochures, Why you should vote NO stressed the impact of Communitymembership on food, jobs and trade.Two problems beset the campaign. In the first place, as with the prospects forEMU in the 1990s, so the ‘experts’ in the early 1970s could not agree among them-52. For an indication of the relative coherence and strengths of the two campaigns see H. YOUNG,“Out-Gunning of the ‘Out’ Brigade”, in The Times, 4 May 1975.53. This position comes across strongly in newspaper coverage during the first half of 1975.54. For a brief overview of these documents, see W. MILLINSHIP, “Who’s telling the truth?”, inThe Observer, 4 May 1975.55. Britain’s New Deal in Europe, p. 10; Why you should vote YES, p.3.56. Why you should vote NO, p. 3.

The 1975 Referendum 53selves about the likely implications of accession. The problem was that very few ofthe claims put forward prior to, or in the immediate aftermath of, accession couldbe substantiated in the short term. Indeed, Kenneth Younger’s attempt to justifyChatham House’s apparent inactivity concerning European affairs, offered someuseful insights into why the British public had succeeded in remaining so blissfullyignorant of European affairs for so long - they had not chosen to listen becausewhat they wanted was unobtainable material:‘...hard and detailed facts about a fairly long-term future. People have wanted toknow not only what is now happening in Europe and what obligations Britain has toaccept at the moment of signing the Treaty, but also what would happen over thenext decade to the cost of living or to the mobility of manpower or the sovereignty ofParliament if Britain were to join’. 57Moreover, many of the central issues in the campaign, including Britain’s contributionto the Community budget and the CAP, reverted to questions first raised inthe entry negotiations. William Wallace argued that the debates seemed to be repeatperformances of discussions held at the time of the first and second applicationsand the re-negotiation, but in the context of profoundly altered global conditions. 58The EC’s attitude towards developing countries, as well as British access to her traditionalsuppliers of food and raw materials associated with impassioned debatesabout ‘kith and kin’ might have been compelling in the 1960s, but seemed to fit lesswell in altered global economic conditions with rising oil prices and structuralchange. Indeed, several of the issues debated in the referendum campaign had beenovertaken by events. The emphasis placed by Barbara Castle and Douglas Jay onthe cost of food within the EC, for example, came at a time when EC prices hadfallen below world prices. The right to import New Zealand dairy products had effectivelybeen overcome by the re-negotiation as, for the time being, had the questionof Britain’s budgetary contribution.Questions of ‘sovereignty versus integration’ - symbolic issues about Britishsovereignty and identity - were thus rendered relatively more significant. Some ofthe antis - Michael Foot on the left, Enoch Powell on the far right and the ConservativeNeil Marten - did campaign on issues of sovereignty rather than bread andbutter issues but, perhaps inevitably, the bread and butter issues were the ones thatinterested the voters. Having begun to see an improvement in their economic situation,there was a positive reason to vote ‘Yes’. Moreover, as Britain had been in theCommunity for two and a half years by the time the referendum was held withoutany discernible change in terms of governance, a gradual acceptance of the new statusquo was becoming apparent. Thus anti-Marketeers felt that the wording of thereferendum question, ‘Do you think that the United Kingdom should stay in theEuropean Community?’, with the implicit conservatism of ‘stay in’, was ‘loaded’,and so would have preferred something along the lines of ‘Should Britain be a57. YOUNGER, “The European Issue”, p.45.58. WALLACE, “Europe: the changing international context”, p. 177.

54 Julie Smithmember of the European Community (also known as the Common Market)’? 59 Inthe light of the referendum results, their anxiety was perhaps justified.The Outcome64.5 per cent of the electorate turned out to vote on 5 June 1975. 67.2 per cent ofthe participants voted ‘Yes’ to the question ‘Do you think that the United Kingdomshould stay in the European Community (the Common Market)?’ compared with32.8 per cent ‘No’ votes. In brute figures, 17, 378, 581 votes were cast in favour,8,470, 073 were cast against. The result was a victory for the pro-Marketeers andfor those who felt that the crucial thing was to ‘let the people decide’. Support differedsomewhat across the country, seemingly reflecting the political persuasion ofthe respective electoral regions. 60The results were disappointing for the Scottish and Welsh nationalists: at 64.8 percent, support for remaining in the EC was not noticeably lower in Wales than in England,where 68.7 per cent voted ‘Yes’. 61 Support was lower in Scotland than elsewhere,with just 58.4 per cent in favour of continued membership. The difference insupport was not marked, however, and hence did little to support the nationalists’claims. Only in the Shetlands and the Western Isles was there a majority againstmembership. In the case of the Western Isles, this could be related to the fact they alsohad an anti-Market SNP MP, Donald Stewart, who suggested that the ‘No’ vote wasbecause ‘European policies had had an adverse effect on fishing and crofting’. 62 TheShetlands, by contrast had been represented for twenty-five years by the pro-Europeanformer Liberal Party leader, Jo Grimond, who noted wryly after the results wereannounced, ‘I have always suspected that they [the Shetlanders] did not know what Istood for’. 63 These minor results apart, the outcome of the referendum was an unambiguous‘Yes’ for continued membership of the European Community.The results of the referendum were greeted enthusiastically by Roy Jenkins, whoclaimed, “This is not merely a day of satisfaction but a day of jubilation... It puts theuncertainty behind us’. 64 While others did not necessarily agree with Jenkins’s delight,most politicians and commentators did concur that the overwhelming ‘Yes’vote ended speculation about Britain’s membership of the Community. For HaroldWilson, the vote meant ‘.. .fourteen years of national argument are over’ . 6559. “Anti-Marketeers complain of ‘loaded’ question”, in The Times, 27 February 1975.60. BUTLER and KITZINGER, The 1975 Referendum, pp.263-278.61. The data are taken from The Daily Telegraph, 7 June 1975.62. The Times, 7 June 1975.63. Ibid.64. The New York Times, 7 June 1975.65. “E.E.C. Referendum”, Prime Minister’s Statement, Verbatim Service, 117/75, Friday 6 June 1975.

The 1975 Referendum 55ConclusionsThe referendum confirmed Britain’s membership of the European Community. Theturnout was relatively low, however, although whether this was due to lack ofenthusiasm for the EC, dislike of the referendum mechanism, or reflected passiveconsent is not clear. In many ways the British referendum can be seen as a way ofcircumventing internal party splits, in the same way that the ‘People’s MovementAgainst the Common Market’ had given Danish politicians a way of breaking partyranks during the 1972 Danish referendum. 66 The United Kingdom’s only nationalreferendum to date did little to bring the people into the integration process and the‘Yes’ campaign deliberately focused on bread and butter issues. The EuropeanMovement and some other committed Europeans had been determined to outlinethe real nature of integration, but the political leaders of the campaign were naturallyconcerned to secure a positive outcome. 67If, as the anti-Marketeers claimed, the 1970 election had not given voters an opportunityto indicate their preferences on accession to the European Community,since the three main party leaders were all in favour, the two elections of 1974 hadnot done so either. 68 The referendum left them ill-informed in many ways, theirchoice constrained and partially determined by the weight behind the ‘Yes’ campaign- many important aspects of integration were carefully overlooked by thepro-Marketeers. Perhaps the ends justified the means: the result was confirmationof Britain’s membership of the Community, although it did not lead to the morepositive role Wilson and others had predicted when the result was announced. TheLabour Party began to send representatives to the European Parliament and theTrades Union Congress sent representatives to the European Economic and SocialCommittee, reflecting acceptance of the ‘will of the people’, and ending their boycottof the Community institutions. However, the referendum did not finally endquestions about Britain’s membership. The referendum did create a constitutionalprecedent as its opponents feared. Referendums were held on the questions of Scottishand Welsh devolution in 1979 and again in 1997, and a referendum is now proposedby all three parties on the issue of Britain’s entry to the Euro.In party political terms, the referendum and in particular the decision to waiveCabinet responsibility prevented an immediate split in the Labour Party. However,Wilson and Callaghan failed to capitalise on their victory and party divisions persisted- the Callaghan government’s approach from 1976 to 1979 was pragmaticrather than ideologically pro-European, hence his failure to make Britain a key66. In the Danish case the cross-party grouping subsequently served as an electoral vehicle for the anti-Europeansin European Parliament elections, putting Danes in the almost unique position of being able tovote on ‘European’ rather than domestic lines as has typically happened in the other member states.67. Roper 1999.68. BUTLER and KITZINGER, The 1975 Referendum, p. 8. Hugo YOUNG clearly outlines the reasoningbehind Heath’s low-key electoral pledges in the 1970 general election, which took placeagainst a background of anti-Europeanism among the electorate - a Gallup poll held in April 1970found only 19 per cent in favour of joining the Community. This Blessed Plot, p. 223.

56 Julie Smithplayer in the integration process, when he refused to take sterling into the ExchangeRate Mechanism in 1978. Some members were strongly committed to Europe. Otherssuch as Barbara Castle, Tony Benn and Michael Foot remained opposed tomembership despite the results of the referendum, seeing membership of the CommonMarket along with nuclear disarmament and membership of the North AtlanticTreaty Organisation as vital symbols distinguishing the Labour left. Thus, if thereferendum ended speculation about Britain’s continuing place in Europe, it did notend its divisive potential. In terms of the Labour Party, this was only to come aboutafter the 1981 split which led to the creation of the pro-European Social DemocraticParty, and in the wake of the disastrous 1983 general election in which Labour hadcampaigned on a platform of taking Britain out of Europe. Many of the most activepro-Marketeers in the Parliamentary Labour Party including Jenkins, Shirley Williamsand Bill Rodgers were instrumental in forming the SDP - a belated indicationthat, if the idea of the referendum had been to prevent the party from splitting, ithad failed. Moreover, the experience of campaigning with pro-Marketeers fromother parties helped foster a willingness for Liberals to cooperate with the new SDPin the SDP-Liberal Alliance from 1981 to 1987. 69The European issue introduced a new dimension into British politics which cutacross other socio-economic cleavages. As the then Foreign Secretary, GeorgeBrown, pointed out to Barbara Castle in 1967, ‘Left versus Right had lost is oldmeaning’ - questions of European integration were superseding more traditionalsocio-economic questions that had previously divided the main political parties. 70The 1975 referendum permitted this new dimension to be articulated, it weakenedintra-party cohesion and helped foster inter-party cooperation, but ultimately it resolvedfew of the tensions surrounding Britain’s membership of the EC or the failure of elitesto deal with the question within traditional party frameworks.Julie Smith69. Roper, 1999; CREWE and KING, SDP, p.10.70. Cited in PIMLOTT, Harold Wilson, p. 432.

57British Strategic Thinking and Europe, 1964-1970G. Wyn ReesThis article will focus upon British military policy in the 1960s. It was in this decadethat the most significant decisions were taken, arguably in the whole post-war period,about narrowing Britain’s strategic focus away from a global orientation and towards aconcentration upon Europe. With the aid of hindsight, such a transition appears to havebeen inevitable as Britain came to terms with its status as a middle-ranking Europeanpower. However, as the new Labour government came into office in 1964 it was farfrom universally expected. Indeed from a cursory reading of the records in this period itbecomes difficult to see why such a change took place. The 1960s, after all, werelittered with a series of international crises involving Britain’s overseas interests thatwould seem to have justified the country’s preoccupation with these issues.Nevertheless, as this article will argue, there were long term military strategicand political factors that were undermining Britain’s global role and were pushingit to concentrate its energies upon Europe. Strategic issues included the growingdifficulty of defending Britain’s far-flung protectorates and the underlying assumptionsof policy-makers about both the nature of modern warfare and the value of thealliances of which Britain was a member. In addition, Britain’s military thinkingneeds to be assessed against the backcloth of changing political and economicrealities. Resource constraints were serving to weaken the UK’s ability to sustain aglobal role, whilst simultaneously political and trading priorities were drawing theUK closer to its European partners in the European Economic Community (EEC).This article seeks to focus on the substance of British policy outputs in this periodand draws on papers of the Cabinet and its relevant sub-committees, papers fromthe Chiefs of Staff, government White Papers and selected memoirs. There weremany sources of decision-making and the records reveal significant differences ofopinion amongst Cabinet members and amongst military leaders on some of the majorchanges of policy. However, one alteration in decision-making is perhaps worthyof particular mention as it changed the structure of policy-making in the Ministry ofDefence (MoD) for the future. This was the decision that was taken by the governmentin 1964 to elevate the status of the Defence Minister to that of a Secretary ofState. Concurrently, the three separate military Chiefs of Staff were brought togetherinto the single building of the Defence Ministry in Whitehall. 1 The power of thePermanent Under-Secretary in the MoD was extended to all the civilian staffs underthe three Service chiefs and a new position of Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) wascreated with privileged access to the incoming Defence Minister, Denis Healey. Thenew Defence Minister sat in the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, whichwas the relevant Cabinet sub-committee that discussed issues before they were submittedto the full Cabinet.1. P. ZIEGLER, Mountbatten, Collins, London, 1985, pp. 610-620.

58 G. Wyn ReesPreoccupation with Extra-European ResponsibilitiesAt first sight, the fact that by the latter 1960s Britain had declared its intention tofocus its military efforts on Europe appears bizarre. In the light of the events thathad taken place amongst Britain’s dependent territories overseas in this period,compared to what had occurred in Europe, it seems difficult to account for the UK’sswitch of emphasis. Europe demonstrated relative stability in this decade.East-West relations had moved cautiously towards détente, spearheaded by theWest German ‘Ostpolitik’ and meaningful arms control agreements, such as the1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, had beenconcluded. The likelihood of war between the two blocs had receded markedly,especially in relation to the Central Front, due to the presence of large conventionalforces and stockpiles of tactical and theatre nuclear weapons. Only the crisis inCzechoslovakia in 1968 had upset a steady trend towards improved relations andeven this crisis had little long term impact upon the two sides, once the West acceptedthat there was nothing they could do to reverse the Warsaw Pact intervention.Compared to the relative tranquillity of Europe, those overseas territories towhom Britain retained defence obligations and political linkages presented the impressionof a seething cauldron of instability and conflict. Internal unrest had takenplace in countries as diverse as Kenya, Uganda and Aden. In addition, there hadbeen external threats such as the ‘Confrontation’ between Indonesia and Malaysiathat had resulted in the actual outbreak of hostilities. Under the South East AsiaTreaty Organisation (SEATO), the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and theAnglo-Malaysian Treaty, the UK had been obligated to assist in the defence of allof these areas and to help to restore stability. With the frequency and severity ofsuch crises, it would appear to be self-evident that the UK would invest the greatestproportion of its military efforts in these areas in the future. It was widely recognisedin the UK policy-making community that no other country could replace theunique role that Britain fulfilled in relation to these territories. For example, in amemorandum to the Cabinet, the Foreign Secretary stated:‘We alone can play this stabilising role (in the Persian Gulf) because of the positionswe hold along the eastern and southern shore of Arabia; it would not be possible forthe United States or any other Western power to take them over from us’. 2Such a view extolling the unique contribution of the UK to international securityoutside Europe was held widely amongst senior and retired British military officers.In the words of Viscount Montgomery: ‘The Atlantic is safe; the Mediterranean issafe: the potential trouble spots lie elsewhere, in the Near East, the Middle East andthe Africa.’ 3 According to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the immediate threat to Britain’sinterests and security seemed to be emanating less from the Soviet Union andmore from the forces of nationalism in the UK’s former empire. It was an argument2. Public Records Office (PRO) Cabinet Papers 129/120 C (65) 49, The Middle East, 24 March 1965,Kew Gardens, London.3. Quoted in P. DARBY, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947 - 1968, For the Royal Institutefor International Affairs by Oxford University Press, London, 1973, p.214.

British Strategic Thinking and Europe, 1964-1970 59that received unexpected support from the United States which advocated a continuedrole for Britain in the Far East. This was a very different position from that which theUS had hitherto held as it had traditionally been critical of Britain’s imperial policies.It reflected the fact that the US was itself locked into an increasingly desperate strugglein Vietnam in the 1960s and was eager to see the UK share in the fight to resist thespread of communist influence in the developing world. The US pressured the Britishto maintain their troop levels in the Far East, even if this resulted in the withdrawal ofsome British forces from Europe. As a Cabinet paper noted,‘The US government agreed with us in regarding the contribution which we made topeace and stability outside Europe as more important than our European role ...’ 4When Labour came into power the UK deployed more troops in the Far Eastand the Middle East than it did in Europe. Its main bases were at Singapore and atAden and these bases facilitated the intervention of British forces into conflicts inall of the principal theatres. For their part, most senior military officers had witnessedextensive military service overseas and such experiences had played a vitalrole in shaping their views on the world. 5 They were sympathetic to the opinionthat Britain should seek to remain a global power with the ability to deploy forcesaround the world. This was a view that was held and defended by Prime MinisterHarold Wilson, in November 1964, when he told the House of Commons that ‘wecannot afford to relinquish our world role’. 6 Senior military leaders were all tooaware that the Cold War role for military forces in defending Western Europe was astatic and relatively dull one. Such a role was far removed from the interesting anddemanding postings in distant lands where it was possible to exercise those militaryskills for which a lifetime had been spent in training. As former Defence MinisterDenis Healey noted in his memoirs, ‘they [the Services] much preferred fighting inthe glamorous Orient to patrolling the North German plain or the East Atlantic’. 7Thus the Services were an interest group broadly sympathetic to preserving Britain’sextra-European responsibilities.Furthermore, two of the three Services had powerful vested interests in non-Europeanroles to justify their possession of cherished military capabilities. The Army, forexample, justified the size of its professional forces on the basis of operations thatmight have to be conducted outside Europe. They had come to fear the arguments ofan earlier Conservative Defence Minister, Duncan Sandys, who had contended thatnuclear weapons delivered by guided missiles were the technology of future wars.Similarly, the Royal Navy was eager to retain its prestigious fleet of four aircraft carriers,armed with fixed-wing aircraft. Aircraft carriers could only be justified as platformsfor projecting power and guaranteeing aerial support in operations east of theSuez canal - their utility in an East-West nuclear war was highly questionable.4. PRO, CAB 128/39 CC14 (64) Prime Minister’s Visit to Washington and Ottawa, 11 December1964.5. For example, the First Sea Lord, David Luce, had served as joint-service Commander in Chief inthe Far East.6. Quoted in C. MAYHEW, Britain’s Role Tomorrow, Hutchinson, London, 1967, p. 131.7. D. HEALEY, The Time of My Life, Penguin, London, 1990, p. 293.

60 G. Wyn ReesAs a result, as Field Marshal Lord Carver has argued, the Services were determinedto preserve all their military roles in a period where new technologies werethrowing traditional tasks into doubt. In order to preserve their positions, the Serviceswere advocates of retaining ‘balanced forces’: namely, the capability to executeall types of military operations independently of allies. Inevitably, preservingsuch a capability required very high levels of defence spending which brought themilitary into confrontation with their political masters. 8However, in spite of the weighty support for Britain’s global effort, there werepowerful factors that were steadily undermining the extra-European role. The firstof these was the upsurge in nationalism around the world that was leading to therapid increase in the number of independent states. This period could be characterisedas the twilight of the British empire in which former colonies demonstratedtheir impatience to divest themselves of their subjugated status and assert their ownnational interests. The move towards the creation of the Commonwealth had increasedin tempo in the latter years of the 1950s. It was evident to all observers thata process was underway in which it would become progressively harder for Britainto preserve its position overseas without recourse to repression. Whilst in opposition,the Labour Party had argued for Britain to withdraw from its military commitmentsEast of Suez, but in the early years of office a new desire to remain linked toits overseas territories was forthcoming from the government. The trend, however,towards a shrinkage in responsibilities could not be ignored for ever. Even as theUK was providing military support to some of its allies, it was discovering that theywere covertly funding opposition groups in neighbouring British protectorates.Healey describes ‘the scales falling from my eyes’ when he discovered that the Kuwaitigovernment - that had desperately needed British help against Iraq in 1961(and was to do so again in 1990) - was funding the Free Bahrain movement to ejectUK forces from that territory. 9The argument that military forces were required in order to protect British overseasinvestments and economic interests was also harder to sustain. European allies,who did not deploy military forces in the Far East and Middle East, were to be foundtrading with these same areas of the world, yet they were free from the onerous defenceburdens that were being borne by the UK. The chief threats to the stability ofUK dependent territories were mainly internal unrest and externally inspired subversion,and these were often exacerbated, rather than cured, by the presence of Britishforces on foreign soil. Even with close allies such as Australia, New Zealand and Singaporeurging the UK to stay in the Far East, the economic realities of the situationwere all too clear.Furthermore, UK policy-makers found it difficult to articulate vital national intereststhat Britain possessed in the Far East and Middle East that were worthy of protection.Admittedly, oil was a vital consideration in the case of the Middle East, particularlyin relation to Iran which was the only non-Arab source of oil in the region,8. M. CARVER, Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy Since 1945, Hutchinson, London, 1992, p. 65.9. D. HEALEY, op. cit. p. 280.

British Strategic Thinking and Europe, 1964-1970 61and there were companies in the region in which the UK had invested heavily. Yet itwas questionable whether a British military presence guaranteed the supply of oil orprevented the possible nationalisation of part-British companies. On the other side ofthe coin there was evidence to suggest that a military presence could actually be prejudicialto British interests. In the words of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs,George Thomson, ‘our presence might be disadvantageous to our interests by providingan irritant and a focus for nationalist pressures’. 10Another factor that weighed against Britain’s global military role was its logisticalimpracticability. Britain depended upon a string of overseas bases for the forwarddeployment of its forces and the right to fly over various countries in the eventof an emergency occurring. Both of these requirements were becoming increasinglyproblematic. The vulnerability of overseas bases had long been acknowledged:Sandys’ Defence White Paper of 1957 had warned against placing large garrisonsin a single location due to their inherent vulnerability. By the 1960s, the morepressing issue was the availability of bases as Britain had to withdraw from territoriesand find alternative locations. For example, Kenya and the island of Gan wereeach considered as possible base areas for UK reinforcements.As for the issue of air transportation, Britain faced the problem of possible ‘AirBarriers’ emerging, where countries might refuse to allow British aircraft the rightto overfly their territory during an emergency. Notable air barriers were emergingin the Middle East and North Africa which could have cut the lines of communicationbetween the UK and the Far East. The RAF hoped to bring into service longer-rangeaircraft that would give greater operational flexibility and studies wereeven undertaken to assess the costs of flying to the Far East via the United States.Such difficulties as these served to weaken the credibility of Britain’s strategy of relyingupon relatively small forces scattered overseas that could be reinforced quicklyduring crises.A final factor militating against the continuation of the East of Suez militaryrole was the question of what significance was attached to Britain’s alliance commitmentswithin SEATO and CENTO. Although the UK was a leading member ofthese alliance systems, papers of the Chiefs of Staff Committee from the late 1950shave revealed the low military priority that was attached by Britain to these obligations.11 In the event of a conflict between the West and the Soviet Union and itsallies, Britain had no intention of attempting to contribute to the defence of partnerssuch as Pakistan and Thailand in SEATO, or Iran in CENTO. For the military plannersin London, the UK would be too concerned with prosecuting the nuclear airoffensive against the USSR and protecting its own national territory to be distractedwith trying to send forces to distant theatres.10. PRO, CAB 130/213, Misc 17/8th Meeting, Mediterranean and Middle East, 14 November 1965.11. See for example, PRO, DEFE 5/88 COS (59) 17, Brief for the 6th Meeting of the Military Committeeof the Baghdad Pact, 22 January 1959 and PRO, DEFE 5/80 COS (57) 260 Oil Planning inSouth Asia, 2 December 1957.

62 G. Wyn ReesHence, from the military point of view, the SEATO and CENTO alliances wereviewed by Britain as instruments in the Cold War to enhance western unity againstcommunism. They were largely façades that bolstered the image of anti-Communistunity in peacetime but would be military irrelevant in a global war. The UK was willingto send conventional forces to protect its dependent territories in the event of localisedconflicts and insurgencies, as this was considered to be a part of resisting thespread of Soviet and Chinese-sponsored influence around the world. But if a majoreast-west conflagration broke out then the UK was under no illusions that its allies inSEATO and CENTO would have to fight alone without British assistance.Resource ConstraintsIf there were a variety of political as well as strategic rationales that steered Britishmilitary policy towards re-focusing on Europe, then there was a single factor thatprovided the decisive momentum; namely, resource constraints. This more thananything else explains the policy of retrenchment in the 1960s that was subsequentlycarried over into the following decade. As early as 1964, when Labourcame to power, there had been discussions about whether one of the defence roleswould have to be cut. 12 Britain was acknowledged to be attempting to play toomany major roles: a leading actor within NATO, a strategic nuclear power and apossessor of world-wide commitments. This was recognised to be a major challengeat a time when the UK economy was sluggish compared to many of its westernrivals. Yet the incoming government was not prepared to take the hard choicesthat this analysis appeared to demand.It was accepted that long term economic viability was just as important to Britain’sinternational influence as her possession of sophisticated military capabilities.A failure to find the correct balance between these two demands risked significantdamage to the British economy. Although policy-makers perceived that Britain obtaineda disproportionate degree of influence from its military standing, if this actuallyundermined its own economic strength, then the exercise was futile. Had therebeen a greater abundance of resources, although the UK may have been forced toabandon specific territories due to internal nationalistic aspirations, then there wasevery chance that a UK military presence in the Far East and the Persian Gulfwould have been preserved.The overstretch in Britain’s military posture was evident from the outset of theLabour government. Indeed in opposition, spokespeople for the Labour Party hadagreed with military commentators that resources for the Armed Services needed tobe brought into line with Britain’s commitments abroad. The largest proportion ofBritish forces remained deployed outside of Europe and the UK wanted its widercontribution to international security to be taken into account by its European allies12. PRO, CAB 128/39 CC (64) 1 lth, Defence and Overseas Policy, 26 November 1964.

British Strategic Thinking and Europe, 1964-1970 63in calculating the relative burden of defence costs. It was clear that Britain wasspending a much higher proportion of its national wealth on defence compared tomost of its major European allies. By 1965, for example, the UK defence budgetamounted to 6.9 per cent of Gross National Product (GNP) whereas the comparablefigure for Germany was 4.5 per cent of GDP. 13Forces were spread thinly across the various overseas theatres and a successionof conflicts and confrontations led the three Services to feel that they were engagedin an unending struggle to balance resources against commitments. There were periodsof time in the mid 1960s, for example, when there were no units of the StrategicReserve capable of deployment to cope with emergencies because all its unitswere already allocated for normal tasks, despite the fact that the Strategic Reservehad deliberately been created with the aim of providing a contingency force to beheld back from regular missions. Estimated costs of the deployments in the FarEast alone varied between £250 - £350 million per year. 14 This role exacted aheavy toll on equipment and particularly on personnel: Navy Minister ChristopherMayhew wrote in ‘The Times’ in 1965 that, ‘Officers and men are accepting as amatter of routine conditions of service which are suitable only for an emergency’. 15In the face of this perpetual over-commitment, the annual defence reviews wereusually the harbingers of major financial cuts. As for the economic priorities establishedby their political masters, the Chiefs of Staff had no choice but to cringe underthe cuts and to seek ways to mitigate the worst effects upon their respective Services.In November 1964, the new government established an overall defence spending ceilingof £2000 million for the years 1969-70. This figure amounted to a cut of £400million in projected spending. It was difficult to believe that a global defence policycould be sustained on this level of spending, particularly in the light of the spirallingcosts of new generations of defence equipment. In spite of the wholesale cancellationof weapons programmes, such as the TSR-2 strike aircraft, the HS-681 transport andthe P-1154 fighter programmes, there were insufficient funds to support all defenceroles. Additional cuts aggravated these problems: in 1966 and again in November ofthe following year, devaluations in the value of sterling prompted the Treasury tomake reductions in the defence budget. Even Defence Minister Denis Healey andPrime Minister Harold Wilson, who had been firm advocates of a UK role East ofSuez, were forced to accept that it had to be terminated.The relinquishing of military roles gathered momentum towards the end of the1960s. In the February 1966 Defence White Paper 16 it was announced that the UKwould withdraw from Aden by 1968. This was to be made more palatable by thebuilding up of an alternative British base in the Persian Gulf area at the same time.Following the end of the Confrontation crisis with Indonesia, British forces east ofthe Suez Canal came to be reduced in size on a much larger scale. By early 196713. PRO, CAB 130/213 Misc 17/8th Meeting, Europe, 13 November 1965.14. C. MAYHEW, op. cit. p. 19.15. ‘The Times’ dated 15 August 1965, quoted in C. MAYHEW, ibid, p. 139.16. Command2901, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966, The Defence Review, HMSO, London, 1966.

64 G. Wyn Reesthe Cabinet was discussing the possibility of wholesale withdrawal (even thoughthis was not mentioned in the Defence White Paper of February 1967). In Januaryof the following year, the decision to withdraw all forces, over a period of years,was released to the public, after it had been discussed with Britain’s allies. Henceforth,Britain would eschew the possession of bases in the Far East and Middle Eastand the ability to intervene effectively in these regions.This decision of 1968 must thus be seen, not in isolation, but as the culminationof a process that began in the early 1960s and was driven by financial constraints.As early as the 1962 Chiefs of Staff secret review, it had been recommended thatthe UK should only undertake a maximum of one major operation per year beyondthe NATO area. 17 By the mid 1960s it was becoming clear that there was insufficientpolitical support to increase substantially the resources available to the ArmedServices. Yet only such an increase would make it possible to carry on conductinglarge-scale operations at long distances from the UK. In 1966, for example, theWhite Paper stated that Britain was unlikely to fight a future war without the helpof allies and that countries would have to provide facilities for UK forces if theywanted defence assistance. In view of the lack of military capabilities and the shortageof finance, the withdrawal from East of Suez had become only a matter of time.The Focus on EuropeHence, it might appear from the discussion outlined above that focusing defenceupon Europe occurred by default, as a result of the termination of the Middle Eastand Far East roles. However this would not be completely accurate, because at thetime of the decision to end the East of Suez role, they had already agreed on notreducing substantially Britain’s contribution to the defence of Western Europe. Inthe eyes of the UK’s political leaders and military planners, the defence of Europewas a commitment that remained sacrosanct. This was for two main reasons.Firstly, British strategic thinking posited Western Europe and the North AtlanticTreaty Alliance as vital to security. Only an all-out global war could threaten the verysurvival of the UK: other levels of conflict, such as limited war, could damage nationalinterests but did not threaten the existence of the state itself. In British eyes, Europewas the theatre of overriding importance in the case of global war. It was assessedthat the likelihood of such a conflict was low providing that a number of conditionswere assured: namely, NATO preserved its coherence, the US continued to be involvedin the defence of the continent and substantial nuclear forces were retained todeter Soviet aggression. During his tenure as Minister of Defence, Denis Healey didnot think it likely that the Soviet Union would deliberately initiate a catastrophic warin Europe. 18 Whereas all the other theatres were of secondary importance in global17. M. CARVER, op. cit. p. 63.18. D. HEALEY, op. cit. p. 309.

British Strategic Thinking and Europe, 1964-1970 65war - Britain had no serious intention to attempt to protect SEATO or CENTO allies19 - in the case of Europe the UK was totally committed to use all means for itsdefence.Not only was Europe geographically of vital importance to the UK’s security, italso represented many of its most valuable allies and trading partners. The proportionof British trade with Europe had been increasing through the 1950s and 1960s.In comparison, the relative value of British trade with the territories of its formerempire had been decreasing. The EEC itself had contributed to the impressivelyhigh rates of economic growth amongst its members. For example, Sanders notesan average annual GDP growth rate of 4.2 per cent for the EEC countries in the1960s compared to an average of 2.3 per cent for Britain. 20 To be excluded fromEurope could only result in the reduction of Britain’s influence. By 1965, PrimeMinister Harold Wilson was making clear his government’s determination to drawcloser to the Community and to do all in its power to make future membershipmore likely; following a policy of membership of the EEC that Harold Macmillanhad initiated in 1961. 21In order to demonstrate its commitment to Europe, the UK had been willing todeploy sizeable ground forces on the European continent. Under the 1954 ParisAgreements a force of four divisions had been pledged to Europe’s defence, alongwith a Tactical Air Force, for a minimum fifty year period. This was a contributionwithout precedence in British history. There were notable differences with some ofBritain’s NATO allies about how a conflict against the Warsaw Pact might befought and how long it would last. Some countries did not envisage the nuclearphase of a global war as being decisive and anticipated that a prolonged conventionalphase could occur. Consequently, they argued that western military forcesneeded to be capable of sustaining conventional combat operations for between 60and 90 days, with the ammunition levels and logistics capacity to match. The Britishconsidered that the nuclear phase would be decisive and were dubious about thewhole concept of a conventional battle. They were only prepared to provide weaponstockpiles for a maximum of 30 days. They were not prepared to countenancethe concept of a limited war in Europe; they were unwilling to undertake the militarypreparations that would be required to fight a war against the Soviet Unionwithout nuclear weapons. They were ready to accept that conventional forces couldplay a role in dealing with a minor border clash, thereby preventing it from escalatingto an all-out war. Alternatively, they accepted that such forces might delay amassive enemy attack long enough to prepare for a thermonuclear response. A Cabinetpaper from 1964 stated the requirement for:19. It had been disingenuous of Defence Minister Harold Watkinson to suggest, in 1962, that all thealliances were of equal value and that the failure of any one of them would be equivalent to thefailure of them all. See P. DARBY, op. cit. p. 224.20. D. SANDERS, Losing an Empire, Finding a Role. British Foreign Policy Since 1945, Macmillan,Basingstoke, 1990, p. 145.21. PRO, CAB 129/121 C (65) 73 Links Between EFTA and the EEC, 11 May 1965.

66 G. Wyn Rees‘...sufficient forces (to be) retained in Europe to hold for a limited amount of timeany attack based on a local misunderstanding or to demonstrate that a deliberate andplanned attack would inevitably escalate into a nuclear conflict’ . 22Furthermore, the British believed that nuclear weapons had a central role to playin deterring global war. Britain’s nuclear force of V-bombers was an integral part ofNATO forces and since 1962 the Conservative government had secured a successorsystem, the American Polaris ballistic missile. This was achieved on the basis of anunderstanding that it would be available for targetting by the Supreme Allied Commander(SACEUR). The British were convinced that they had to make a contributionto the West’s nuclear forces in order to guarantee both a last line of defence anda voice in American decision-making. 23 Even though the UK firmly supportedwestern nuclear strategy formed around American extended nuclear deterrence,there was no desire to see nuclear sharing amongst the NATO allies as this threatenedto dilute the unique influence that the UK enjoyed in Washington. Hence,when the Labour government inherited the debate about a Multilateral Force(MLF) 24 in Europe, they were no more eager than their predecessors to see the ideaturned into reality. Indeed, the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) 25 proposal was designedto reassert the centrality of British-American nuclear cooperation.Second, the British were very well aware of the possible disastrous politicalramifications in case of reducing significantly their NATO commitment. They foresawthat this might weaken the US commitment to the defence of the continent.This was anathema to the British who regarded the maintenance of US forces inEurope as the bedrock of Western defence. For not only might the US then reducethe size of their forces in Europe but British influence over American decision-makingwould be diminished. Moreover, this was judged to be a highly inappropriatetime to cut Britain’s conventional contribution when the US was seekinga switch in NATO military policy away from the blunt nuclear strategy of ‘MassiveRetaliation’ to the more sophisticated strategy of ‘Flexible Response’. Strategists inthe US Pentagon, under Defence Secretary Robert McNamara, were determined toend the automatic nature of the US nuclear guarantee to Europe, in the light of theemerging vulnerability of the US homeland to a Soviet nuclear response. Americanthinking was predicated on the assumption that its European allies would increasethe size of their conventional forces so as to make a non-nuclear defence of the continentmore feasible. It would therefore have been an issue of extreme political sen-22. PRO, CAB 130/213, Misc 17/184 Defence Review, 21 November 1964.23. For a detailed discussion of the US-UK nuclear relationship see the excellent studies by I. CLARK,Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain’s Deterrent and America 1957-1962, ClarendonPress, Oxford, 1994 and J. BAYLIS, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy 1945-1964, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995.24. The Multilateral Force concept was an idea to provide a mix-manned surface fleet of ships fromamongst the NATO allies that would be armed with Polaris missiles. For details see P. WINAND,Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996, chapter 8.25. The British inspired Atlantic Nuclear Force was to comprise the British V-bombers and Polarissubmarines, plus an equivalent US contribution and a possible mix-manned element from NATOnations.

British Strategic Thinking and Europe, 1964-1970 67sitivity if the UK had responded to these American overtures by a dramatic reductionin the level of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). The UK was caughtbetween two positions: on the one hand, strategic logic and economic necessity dictatedreducing the size of its conventional forces in Europe, whilst on the otherhand, political considerations were encouraging the preservation of the status quo.The US was not the only ally that was a source of concern to the British. Policymakers in the UK were worried that the instability in the European politico-militarysituation could lead West Germany to reassess its position. It was well known thatthe Bonn government was eager to wield more influence over matters pertinent toits security, but it was feared that this might result in West Germany drawing closerto France, at the expense of its relationship with the United States. This would notserve UK interests as they perceived themselves as playing a vital role as interlocutorsbetween European capitals and Washington and they regarded West Germanyas central to the vitality of the Alliance. The British did not want to be seen to be increasingGerman insecurity by effecting unilateral cuts in the size of their armedforces in West Germany. It was therefore the desired objective of British policy toreduce its forces in West Germany only within the framework of an arms controlagreement.At the same time, cuts in UK conventional forces risked stimulating nationalistictendencies in West Germany that might result in pressure for Franco-Germannuclear collaboration. The Foreign Secretary told the Cabinet that, ‘We must try toprevent a Franco-German nuclear alliance which would result in the establishmentof a European nuclear force’. 26 This was a spectre that haunted British alliancethinking. It carried with it the dangers of creating an exclusive bilateral relationshipbetween the two leading continental powers, whilst at the same time alienating theUS and minimising British influence on the continent.France was the third element in this difficult equation for the British. France hadlong protested against US domination of NATO and had pursued a policy of disengagingits forces from the Alliance. This culminated in 1966 with its damagingwithdrawal from NATO’s Integrated Military Structure (IMS). The British werewary of any action on their part that could increase President Charles de Gaulle’sinfluence over security in Europe and were opposed to NATO making concessionsto France. The view that had been advanced by the Foreign Secretary in September1965 was that the example set by the EEC in giving way to French ‘intransigence’over the so called ‘empty chair’ policy could not be followed in the NATO context.27 Britain was all too aware that France was blocking its entry into the Community.France also had the intention to give the EEC an active part to play in foreignpolicy and defence matters, as shown by the Fouchet Plan 28 in the early 1960s, andthis was inevitably a cause of concern for Britain as it presented a possible rival to26. PRO, CAB 130/213, Misc 17/3 Atlantic Nuclear Force, 21 November 196427. PRO, CAB 128/39 CC49 (65) Foreign Policy, 24 September 1965.28. The two Fouchet Plans of 1960 to 1961 were an attempt to create an intergovernmental body involvingthe EEC ‘Six’ that would develop a common foreign policy and defence policy.

68 G. Wyn ReesNATO. The growing success of the Community in economic terms raised the possibilityof its influence spreading to other issues, thereby rendering a transatlantic defencepolicy increasingly problematic.Two of the initiatives in which the British were closely involved in European securityat this time reflected their concern about the nexus between the US, Franceand West Germany. The establishment of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), inDecember 1966, owed much to the energies of Defence Minister Healey and wasaimed at compensating West Germany for its lack of independent control over nuclearforces. The British expressed fears of a special US-German understandingemerging, which might have had the effect of diminishing their own close relationshipwith America. 29 The NPG provided a constructive alternative to the ideas ofthe MLF and the ANF, on which the British had always been lukewarm. West Germanysecured additional consultative arrangements over nuclear weapons and howthey might be used in a European conflict. To Britain’s relief no new nuclear forceswere created.The second initiative was the setting up of the ‘Eurogroup’, a meeting of Europeandefence ministers that convened prior to North Atlantic Council meetings.This was designed to serve two functions. One was to show the United States thatthe Europeans were willing to bear their fair share of the defence burden, especiallyin the area of common weapons procurement. Although France was to pull out ofthe project to build a swing-wing aircraft with Britain, other projects such as theTornado Multi-Role Combat Aircraft became a reality. The European Defence ImprovementProgramme in the 1970s was a further spin-off. The other function ofthe Eurogroup was to create a stronger sense of a European identity on defencematters amongst the participating nations. The Eurogroup effectively institutionalisedan ad hoc forum that had existed for some considerable time.It had long been plain to British military planners that there was a tension betweentheir East of Suez commitment and the deployment of UK forces in Europe.This was evident in more ways than just the competition for defence resources. Thecommitment to the Far East and Middle East, exacerbated by frequent crises, haddrawn personnel and equipment away from NATO. On numerous occasions duringthe period of the Labour government, forces had to be removed directly fromBAOR, or indirectly from NATO-assigned forces in the UK, to be flown overseas.For example, the Confrontation with Indonesia led to a force of over 16 000 troopsbeing deployed in Malaysia, 30 which was only possible at the cost of denudingfront-line units from Europe.But their East of Suez commitment did not only exert pressure on conventionalforce deployments; there were also implications for Britain’s nuclear forces. Forexample, aircraft carrier groups possessing a nuclear strike capability were dedicatedto SEATO, whilst some nuclear equipped Canberra squadrons were committedto CENTO. The speediest contribution that the UK could make to a distant crisis29. PRO, CAB 128/39, CC (64) Defence and Overseas Policy, 26 November 1964.30. PRO, CAB 130/213 Misc 17/8th Meeting, Defence Policy, 13 November 1965.

British Strategic Thinking and Europe, 1964-1970 69often was the provision of V-bomber aircraft equipped for the dropping of conventionalbombs. This was at the expense of the nuclear missions that these forces fulfilledin Europe and led in March 1965 to complaints from SACEUR that therewere insufficient nuclear forces to carry out the Quick Reaction Alert role. Healeyhas also indicated in his memoirs that Prime Minister Harold Wilson harboured anextra-European ambition for the Polaris force. Wilson was of the opinion that whenthe Polaris force reached operational service it might serve as a nuclear umbrellaover countries such as India in its confrontation with China. These commitmentswere a potential distraction from the principal role of British nuclear forces in relationto a possible global war with the Soviet Union.Lastly, in the procurement of various weapons systems, there was a tension betweenEuropean and extra-European missions. The type of equipment that might beused in the Far East or Middle East theatres was often unsuitable for the Europeancontinent. Admittedly, this became progressively less problematic as the sophisticationof regional powers increased - countries potentially hostile to British interestswere to be found purchasing the most modern weapons systems from the Superpowers.31 Nevertheless, the contrasting needs of the European and East of Sueztheatres presented a thorn in the side of defence planners. For example, the purchaseof a long range transport aircraft for the RAF was a requirement that centredaround the need to be able to fly reinforcements to distant theatres. The HS 681project, with its Short Take-Off and Landing capability, reflected these prioritiesdue to the need to be able to operate from poor airstrips in remote locations. Yet thiswas not a requirement for a transport aircraft whilst in use in the European theatre.In relation to major force projection capabilities, such as aircraft carriers, therewere fundamental choices to be made. Aircraft carriers were considered to be essentialfor the fulfilment of the East of Suez role as they provided a strike capabilityagainst the shore and also possessed enormous deterrent potential in time of crisis.The Royal Navy had been able to sustain two out of its fleet of three aircraft carriersEast of Suez in the early 1960s, but by the middle of the decade a new generationof carrier was required. Besides the question of costs, this type of force projectioncapability was extremely demanding in its need for other vessels to guaranteeits protection. As far as global war against the USSR in Europe was concerned, theaircraft carrier had only a minor role to play. Hence when the decision was announcedin 1966 not to proceed with the next generation of aircraft carriers, CVA01, this was tantamount to renouncing an independent military role for British forcesEast of Suez. The decision to purchase the 50 F-111 long range bombing aircraft,as an alternative to the aircraft carriers, owed more to short term financialconsiderations than to strategic logic. The purchase of F-111s was itself cancelledin 1968.31. Indonesia, for example, was known to be the recipient of sophisticated Soviet fighter aircraft and mediumrange bombers. See PRO, CAB 130/213, Misc 17/8th Meeting, Far East, 14 November 1965.

70 G. Wyn ReesNever an ‘Irreducible Commitment’It would be an exaggeration, however, to state that Britain’s military commitmentto Europe was too important to be reviewed. Although the commitment itself wasnever at risk of being axed, the actual size of the forces that Britain pledged wassubject to periodic review. Indeed, the size of forces that had originally been promisedin the Paris Agreements of 1954 had never been realised. The UK had made acompromise by stationing half of its Rhine Army and Second Tactical Air Force onnational soil, earmarked to reinforce its allies in the event of war. In 1957, as part ofthe Sandys Defence Review, there were cuts in the forces that were stationed inWest Germany from 77 000 to 64 000. 32When the Labour government came to power they identified BAOR as sufferingfrom major deficiencies in manpower and obsolescent weapons systems. They didnot have the resources, however, to provide any short term answers to these weaknesses.Their period in office was characterised by periodic reductions in the size ofthe land and air forces that were deployed on the continent, despite the pressure ofdoctrinal changes militating in favour of increased troop numbers. What made theUK position easier to justify was the fact that the US was also seeking to reduce theoverall size of its forces based in Europe - driven by the needs of the conflict in Vietnam.By 1966, regardless of the applications to join the EEC and the increasing defencefocus upon Europe, the size of Britain’s contribution had fallen to 51 000troops. 33 There was pressure for this to be reduced still further and one study withinthe Ministry of Defence suggested that two whole divisions could be removed fromBAOR, and the Second Tactical Air Force returned to the UK. This thinking wasjustified on the grounds that war with the Soviet Union was considered unlikely.British policymakers even thought that, had Britain been able to join the EEC, makinga case for further defence reductions would have been improved. 34 But the experienceof the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia induced a note of cautioninto military planning. It was considered possible at the time that the crushingof the ‘Prague Spring’ could presage a more aggressive and expansionist strategyby the USSR. After the 1968 decision to withdraw forces east of the Suez Canal,the British undertook a token gesture to the European theatre by the redeploymentof amphibious and parachute troops from the Far East and Mediterranean underSACEUR’s control.Throughout the 1960s, Britain was engaged in a series of consultations with thegovernment in Bonn over their provision of financial help to offset the costs of deployingpermanent garrisons on West German soil. This was a heavy drain on theBritish balance of payments, amounting to about £85 million per year, 35 as it in-32. Command 124, ‘Defence: Outline of Future Policy’, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London,April 1957.33. C. MAYHEW, op. cit., p. 105.34. PRO, CAB 148/40 OPD (O) (64) 1st, 30 October 1964.35. PRO, CAB 128/39 CC 35 (65) Anglo-German Offset Agreement, 1 July 1965.

British Strategic Thinking and Europe, 1964-1970 71volved foreign exchange expenditures. Yet West Germany was reluctant to continuethe defence offsets that it had initiated in the 1950s even when Britain was experiencingdevaluation problems. In the early 1960s, the West German government wascontributing around £30-40 million per year for all the costs associated with theBritish presence, whereas the British wanted this increased to about £60 million.The British proposed that West Germany pay for those of its nationals who wereemployed by UK forces - at a cost of some £35 million 36 - and further discussionstook place but without a significant breakthrough. As a result, Britain withdrew onebrigade and a squadron in 1967 in reflection of the economic difficulties that it wasexperiencing.ConclusionBy the end of the 1960s, British defence policy had undergone a major reorientation.The three Armed Services, having argued that the military commitments theywere being asked to sustain were overstretching the available resources, foundthemselves after 1968 in a much changed environment. Their responsibilitiesbecame increasingly focused on the European theatre as the drawdown in the FarEast and the Middle East took its course. This policy was endorsed by leading figuresin the Wilson Cabinet such as Richard Crossman, Roy Jenkins and BarbaraCastle. It was reluctantly accepted by both Harold Wilson and Denis Healey.Yet, as this article has sought to demonstrate, the European commitment becamethe dominant defence role not because of any perception of a growing threatto the continent, but because there was no longer the political will to resource theEast of Suez role. The European commitment, because of its long-standing priority,emerged by default as the only role, because the other missions were axed. In a periodof retrenchment, despite the fact that conflicts and crises were more likely inthe Far East and the Middle East than in Europe, the pressure on the defence budgetmade it imperative for Britain to divest itself of its overseas roles.As for Britain’s focus on Europe, its policy was guided by the desire to preservethe status quo amidst a period of considerable upheaval. With the withdrawal ofFrance from the NATO IMS, with a major change in NATO strategy and a debateover the role of nuclear forces and with the United States engaged in a major war inSouth East Asia, the British were concerned about the health of the Alliance. Policy-makersattached a premium to preserving the Atlantic focus of defence effortswhilst at the same time addressing European desires to express more influence overdefence decision-making. Uppermost in British minds was always the desire to preservetheir own influence over allies, such as the US and Germany in a period whenreduced funding impinged upon all strategic thinking36. PRO, CAB 130/213, Misc 17/5, 15 June 1965.G. Wyn Rees

Klaus Dicke, Karl Schmitt (Hrsg.)Transformation und Integration in EuropaDie in diesem Band versammelten Aufsätze gehen auf eine Tagung zurück, die vonden politikwissenschaftlichen Instituten der Jagiellonen-Universität Krakau und derFriedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena unter dem Dach des Hellmuth-Loening-Zentrumsveranstaltet wurde. Ziel des Symposiums war es, Grundfragen der politischen EntwicklungMittel- und Osteuropas in einer europäischen und polnisch-deutschenPerspektive zu diskutieren. Dabei standen die theoretischen Grundfragen demokratischerTransformation ebenso im Mittelpunkt wie die außenpolitischen Fragender Integration der mittelosteuropäischen Staaten in NATO und EU. Daneben wurdedie Rolle der wichtigsten Akteure, der politischen Parteien, im Transformationsprozeßanalysiert und gefragt, welchen praktischen Beitrag zur Transformation diepolitische Bildung leisten könne.1998, 173 S., kart., 39,80 DM/291,- ÖS/37,-SFr, ISBN 3-87061-785-3Ausgezeichnet mit dem Europa-Preis der Berliner Kaufleute und IndustriellenEugénia da Conceiçâo-HeldtDezentralisierungstendenzenin westeuropäischen LändernTerritorialreformen Belgiens, Spaniens und Italiens im VergleichIn der Analyse wird am Beispiel Belgiens, Spaniens und Italiens zu zeigen sein,warum ursprünglich unitarische Staaten sich für eine dezentral istische bzw. föderalistischeStruktur entschieden. Welche institutionellen Arrangements wurden zurGewährleistung der Steuerungs- und Leistungsfähigkeit des Zentralstaats implementiert?Welche Konsequenzen ergaben sich daraus? Konnte die Dezentralisierungdie funktionalen Defizite abbauen oder sind sie immer noch vorhanden?Durch die Territorialreformen haben die drei Länder, so die Ausgangsthese, sowohldie Modernisierung der Staatsstrukturen als auch die Aufrechterhaltung des Staatesermöglicht. Mit Hilfe einer Dezentralisierung der Politikgestaltung lassen sich Effektivitäts-,Effizienz- und Legitimitätsprobleme verringern.1998, 120 S., kart., 38- DM/277,- ÖS/35,50 SFr, ISBN 3-87061-830-2BERLIN VERLAG Arno Spitz GmbHPacelliallee 5 • 14195 Berlin • Tel. 030/84 17 70-0 • Fax 030/84 17 70-21E-Mail: berlin-verlag.spitz@t-online.de • Internet: http://www.berlin-verlag.de

Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic andMonetary Union.Germany’s European Policy in the Brandt Era (1969-1974)73Andreas WilkensI. The New Stance of German Foreign Policy - Continuity and ChangeAmong the turning-points in the political development of the Federal Republic ofGermany, the year 1969 is without any doubt of particular importance. When WillyBrandt took over the Office of the Federal Chancellor, it was not only for the firsttime that the highest executive office was assigned to a social democrat - which initself was remarkable - but something more important went together with thischange. Twenty years after the formation of the Federal Republic, the foundingperiod of the Bonn Republic seemed to have come to a definite end; the assumptionof power of the “small coalition” between the social and the liberal democrats hadproved the viability of the democratic system. This turning-point in the history of theGerman Federal Republic had already distinctively been noticed by contemporaries. 1The new Federal government introduced itself in a self-assured way which wasbound to stand out ostensibly from the incrustations and deadlocks of German politicsin the sixties. This new self-assurance was deployed as well on the national as on the internationalscale. The government’s aim to achieve a social and political renewal foundits counterpart in the standards Chancellor Brandt wanted to apply regarding the internationalposition of the Federal Republic: “We will be a loyal ally but not a comfortablegovernment. I will not be the Chancellor of a conquered Germany, but of a liberatedGermany”. 2 On the one hand, this statement revealed the still persisting problems stemmingfrom the post-war period and their importance for German politics; on the otherhand, it displayed a new approach in the way of safeguarding what the new governmentperceived as the German national interests in foreign and European affairs.With their fundamental concept for a European policy the Brandt Government hadperceptibly shifted to the ground. As the majority of the SPD had voted for the Treatiesof Rome in 1957, and furthermore, two years later, the party had elaborated the GodesbergProgram, thus definitely setting out for an integration of the Federal Republic inthe West, there had been a major consensus between the relevant German political forc-* This study is the enlarged version of a contribution presented at the conference “The EuropeanCommunities, 1965-1979: National Decision-Makers and Public Opinion”, St Antony’s College,University of Oxford, September 25-27, 1998, directed by prof. Anne Deighton in cooperation withprof. Elisabeth Du Réau. I am very grateful to Marlies Hagen for having translated the text as well asto the Robert-Bosch-Foundation, Stuttgart, that made possible the researchfor this article.1. W. BRANDT, Begegnungen und Einsichten. Die Jahre 1960-1975, Hamburg 1976, pp. 293-317;A. BARING, Machtwechsel. Die Ära Brandt-Scheel, Stuttgart 1982.2. Brandt to a group of American journalists in mid-October 1969, according to D. BINDER, TheOther German. Willy Brandt’s Life and Times, Washington 1975, p. 256.

74 Andreas Wilkenses about the basic importance of the European Community. Brandt himself, whose viewbore the imprint of his exile in Scandinavia as well as of his experience in Berlin, wasone of those SPD politicians who had seen quite early - in the fifties - the necessity ofthe Bonn Republic being integrated into the Western structures, with all the consequencesthat this would entail. The European Community on one side, and the AtlanticAlliance on the other, set the framework within which the Federal Republic was able tofind political respectability, economic prosperity and military security. Being ratherurged to give a last argument for his European policy during his chancellorship, Brandtalso declared for a motive that no German politician - if he wanted to survive politically- could defend in public: “For the Germans, Europe might be something like a substitutefor their own nation “, Brandt said in secret to the French president George Pompidouin June 1973, thus hoping to convince the latter of the definitive Western Europeanorientation of the Federal Republic. The constitution committed him the task to pursuethe re-establishment of German unity, and this was what he wanted, of course, he said.But the commitment to Europe would allow, he continued, “to channel the nostalgia,the hopes and the wishes of the forthcoming generation”. 3The relationship with France had in this perspective an exceptional and particularnature for Brandt. It was important for him, though, to find a stable balance where thepartners had equal rights and where none of them would try to misuse the other forhis own aims. This reproach had been made in the beginning of the sixties with regardto the relationship between Adenauer and de Gaulle which had been felt as too partial.De Gaulle’s retirement created the hope that a new balance in the bilateral relationscould be established after a period of serious crisis because of diverging positionsin security and European affairs. The “exemplary co-operation”, in Brandt’sterms, 4 had to be compatible with the respective relations with other member states ofthe Community. 5Relations with the USA represented a second objective in Brandt’s internationalframework. Brandt had been fascinated by Kennedy’s concept of a “Strategy ofPeace” as well as by his idea of an equal transatlantic “partnership”. In this view,European unification and close relations to the USA didn’t exclude each other; onthe contrary: Brandt had always given the USA credit for their - certainly never altogetherdisinterested - support in the process of European unification. It seems asif Brandt had discovered the idea of economic rivalry between the USA and Europemerely in the course of his chancellorship. 6 But even then, he was still convinced3. Conversation Brandt-Pompidou, 21.6.1973 (first conversation, 4.30-7.30 p.m.), Archives nationales,Paris (AN), 5 AG 2 (Fonds Georges Pompidou), vol. 106. In retrospect, Brandt later publicallydeclined a similar assessment by Jean Monnet: W. BRANDT, Erinnerungen, Frankfurt 1989,p. 489.4. Interview with the ZDF, the second German television channel, 4.12.1969, in W. BRANDT,Reden und Interviews, Hamburg 1971, vol. 1, p. 64.5. For a general survey cf. H. SIMONIAN, The Privileged Partnership. Franco-German Relationsin the European Community, 1969-1984, Oxford 1985, pp. 78-246.6. W. BRANDT, “Germany’s “Westpolitik””, in Foreign Affairs 50 (1972), pp. 416-426.

Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic and Monetary Union 75that an “organic dialogue” would be the best way to settle the divergences of interestwhich didn’t fail to occur. 7Concerning the German question and the relations with the Eastern neighbours, theBrandt Government aimed at more than just a limited course correction. But its approachdid not represent a completely new beginning either. The redefinition ofWest-Germany’s relations with the second German state, the GDR, as well as the developmentof the relations with the East-European countries had been regarded as a necessaryact of political realism by an increasing part of the German political public sincethe second half of the sixties. In his function as Foreign Minister, during the “Great coalition”(1966-69), Brandt had already promoted a related course correction.No one else would plead the German cause, if not the German government itself.This was a lesson Brandt had learned during his period of office as Mayor ofBerlin and particularly from the course and outcome of the Berlin crisis, at the beginningof the sixties. It was true that the Western Powers had declared that theywould defend the liberty of West-Berlin, but eventually, they had not been able tochange the status quo of the divided capital of the former Reich, neither of Germanyas a whole, and maybe they had no real interest in a further change either. FromBrandt’s point of view, the development of a more independent strategy dealingwith the problems linked to the divided Germany had to be of major interest forGerman politics. This was a new objective in comparison with the idea, which hadprevailed until the sixties, namely that, at the proper time, the Western allies wouldtake the initiative to bring Germany a step closer to its reunification.Brandt, however, had always made it quite plain that Germans could act in relationto the German question and the Ostpolitik could only be taken in accordanceand in close connection with the directly interested Western Powers and the otherpartners in the Atlantic Alliance. The order of precedence was often distilled into asimple formula: Ostpolitik begins in the West, a statement which incidentally calledfor a policy towards the West which should be at least as active as the Ostpolitik. 8Nonetheless, Egon Bahr, Brandt’s close advisor in matters of Ostpolitik, made thesubtle distinction that the Federal Government would no longer “consult” but just“inform” its partners about the bilateral treaty negotiations. 9 Certainly, this was arather symbolic statement meant to claim an independent competence on this questionof specific national interest, but it created quite a few irritations on the side ofthe Western Powers which had been used to a reactive German policy during thelast two decades.In spite of all efforts to realise a “normalisation” of West-Germany’s internationalrole, Brandt had always been aware of the limitations of German politics.One of the first decisions made by the new government concerning foreign policy7. Brandt to Pompidou, 16.10.1972, AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 103.8. W. BRANDT, “Feste Verankerung der deutschen Ostpolitik in der westlichen Zusammenarbeit”,speech at the 5 th meeting between the German and French Chambers of Handicrafts on 3.9.1970in Hamburg, in Bulletin der Bundesregierung, 5.9.1970, n° 118, pp. 1225-1228.9. E. BAHR, Zu meiner Zeit, Munich 1996, p. 272.

76 Andreas Wilkensand subjected to controversial discussion on the national scale, was the signing ofthe Non-proliferation Treaty. Conversely, in the context of European politics, theawareness that, in the foreseeable future, the role of leader or spokesperson for Europewould not fall to the Federal Republic was even more important. Initiativeswhich visibly impacted on the public would indeed be imputed so far as possible toFrance. Examples for this approach were the convocations for the summits of TheHague and Paris as well as the negotiations between Pompidou and President RichardNixon in the Azores, in December 1971, where Pompidou had assumed the roleof spokesman for Europe’s monetary interests vis-à-vis the USA.Even if the Federal Republic could not be a nation like any other due to its historicand geographical situation and the existing national division, German foreignpolicy in the Brandt era aimed fundamentally at an alignment with the otherWest-European nations by redefining its relations with its Western partners but alsoby revising its attitudes towards the East. According to Brandt’s formula, Easternand Western policy were the two sides of the one “Policy for Peace in Europe”. 10In order to get a clear notion of the way Brandt’s Government saw itself interms of foreign and particularly European affairs, it seems indicated to explore therange of its Eastern policy, bearing in mind that interference with German Westernpolicy could occur. In a second part, some characteristics of the European policy ofintegration shall be worked out putting a certain stress on the project of the Economicand Monetary Union.II. Ostpolitik - settling the German Question and contributing to the EuropeanDétenteThe term “Ostpolitik” in itself is quite ambiguous and Brandt himself used it with acertain reservation. Originally, the so-called Ostpolitik did not aim at an improvementof relations with the Soviet Union (and with other East-European countries)but at a solution for the “German Question”, i.e. the situation resulting from thedivision of Germany. Therefore, despite its name, Ostpolitik was above all Germanpolicy (”Deutschlandpolitik”), conceived to treat the national problem of the Germansin a realistic way, free from illusions.“We have to start from the existing realities” in matters of German national politics,this was the basic claim the Brandt Government made on itself but also on itsEastern neighbours. In practice this meant in the first place to recognise in principlethe German Democratic Republic as a second German state with equal rights and torecognise the existing borderlines, especially the Oder-Neisse-Line, as well as toaccept their inviolability. On the other hand, the Eastern neighbours would have toaccept the continuing special character of the relations between the two Germanstates, to recognise the ties between West-Berlin and the Federal Republic and atthe same time, to take note of the fact that, in a historical perspective, the Federal10. W. BRANDT, Friedenspolitik in Europa, Frankfurt 1968.

Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic and Monetary Union 77Republic would not give up hope to restore Germany’s national unity in quest of securingits unalienable right of self-determination. The policy of non-aggression,even if it referred concretely to the existing borderlines, would not, in Brandt’sterms, “close the book of German history”. 11Indirectly, the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw, signed in August and December1970, and the Basic Treaty between the two German States validated in December1972, helped the Federal Republic to a sort of “self-recognition” in the sense that itwas no longer considering itself as a provisional state with open borderlines and anunsolved national question. Over the mid-term, the fruits of this policy were to be alessening of tension in Central Europe, namely an improvement in human, economicand cultural exchange between the two German states as well as with theEast-European neighbour-countries, and, last but not least, the safekeeping of theisolated enclave of West-Berlin. 12From the point of view of the Brandt Government, the Federal Republic made anappropriate contribution within the framework of the strategy of détente between theEast and the West. Without the former initiatives, taken by the American governmentssince Kennedy, as well as those by the French governments since de Gaulle,West-Germany’s separate Ostpolitik would have been inconceivable. Brandt andBahr often referred to the fact that it was de Gaulle who, in spite of the difference insystems, had set a precedent by paving the way for a political opening towards theEastern European countries. This reference was certainly made in calculated self-defencein order to weaken ready criticisms put forward by the Western allies.Even after 1969, the German Ostpolitik could only be successful with the support,or at least the consent, of the three Western Powers (the USA, Great Britainand France). 13 In fact, neither Nixon, nor Heath or Pompidou failed in giving theirexplicit assent as well in public as in internal bilateral or multilateral meetings.Their own policy of negotiation with the Soviet Union - less evident, though, in therather special British case - ensured in itself that the German Ostpolitik could notbe criticised outspokenly. 14The Federal Government fully respected the fundamental condition stipulatedby all three Powers but explicitly by France: the particular rights and responsibilitiesof the Four Powers towards Germany as a whole as well as towards Berlin had11. Brandt, Speech before the Bundestag on February 25, 1970, in BRANDT, Reden und Interviews, vol.1, pp. 78-90.12. For the political framewok cf. P. BENDER, Die ,Neue Ostpolitik‘ und ihre Folgen. Vom Mauerbaubis zur Vereinigung, Munich 3 1995; for two recent studies see A. VOGTMEIER, Egon Bahr unddie deutsche Frage. Zur Entwicklung der sozialdemokratischen Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik vomKriegsende bis zur Vereinigung, Bonn 1996; H. POTTHOFF, Bonn und Ost-Berlin 1969-1982. Dialogauf höchster Ebene und vertrauliche Kanäle. Darstellung und Dokumente, Bonn 1997. Foran analysis of the treaties cf. B. ZÜNDORF (A. EITEL), Die Ostverträge. Die Verträge vonMoskau, Warschau, Prag, das Berlin-Abkommen und die Verträge mit der DDR, Munich 1979.13. A. WILKENS, Der unstete Nachbar. Frankreich, die deutsche Ostpolitik und die BerlinerVier-Mächte-Verhandlungen 1969-1974, Munich 1990.14. For the Washington perspective see H. KISSINGER, The White House Years, London 1979, pp.405-412, 529-534.

78 Andreas Wilkensnot to be jeopardised by the treaties signed in the area of the Ostpolitik. The BrandtGovernment had never questioned either the presence of the three Western Powersin Berlin or the continuing Four-Power-Status of the divided city. Nevertheless, theFrench President, who had agreed with the beginning of the Berlin negotiations almostagainst his own reluctance, 15 continued to be convinced that regarding theBerlin Question, the procedure could not be cautious enough. Pompidou uttered his- objectively unfounded - suspicion even in public that Bonn had been tempted tocome to a solution with East-Berlin directly. 16 The full affirmation of theFour-Power-Rights was made, of course, according to the official discourse in Paris,in order to safeguard the liberty and viability of the Berlin enclave; 17 at the sametime, however, it was a precious pawn for a possible codetermination in all futurematters of the German Question. By comparison, the British attitude was, on thewhole, characterised by a greater distance, but certainly also by a greater trust inthe American commitment. However, after the Berlin agreement had been settled,Prime Minister Heath assured Brandt, without any reservation, of Britain’s “continuingand unstinting support”. 18Beyond his official declarations, Pompidou observed the developments in theGerman Eastern policy at the very least with mixed feelings. His reaction was certainlycomplex and intricate. The French President accepted the general approachand the series of treaties, which, in the end, consolidated the status quo in Europe,as decisions made by the German government. Clearly and frankly Pompidou reaffirmedhis “moral and political support” 19 for Brandt as well as his “attentive sympathy”.20 Pompidou’s concern and uncertainties referred undoubtedly to thelong-term perspective. Rather than subsiding, the doubts about a reliable integrationof the Federal Republic in the Western alliance grew even stronger towards theend of Pompidou’s presidency and this after long experience with Brandt’s policy. 21In fact, the views of Germany and France were largely divergent regarding theMBFR negotiations. Brandt saw in the beginning of a negotiation process about theEuropean security situation, that aimed, in the long run, at a balanced reduction ofconventional forces, a merely logical step on the way to diminish tension in Europe.Pompidou, on the other hand, feared the development of a dynamism with, atits end, a special status of central Europe where maybe even the neutralisation of15. Note du Président de la République, 26.3.1970, Négociation sur Berlin, AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 1009.16. Press conference, 23.9.1971, in G. POMPIDOU, Entretiens et discours 1968-1974, vol. 2, Paris1975, pp. 162-163.17. Pompidou to Brandt, 13.3.1970, ibid.18. Heath to Brandt, 9.9.1971, Willy-Brandt-Archiv im Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Bonn(WBA), Bestand Bundeskanzler, vol. 52.19. Conversation between Pompidou and Brandt in Bonn, 3.7.1970 (first conversation), AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 104.20. Pompidou to Brandt, 11.8.1970, AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 103. For a similar clear statement made in publicsee the Elysée communiqué on August 8, 1970, in La politique étrangère de la France, Textes etdocuments, 2/1970, p. 55.21. Cf. also G.-H. SOUTOU, “L’attitude de Georges Pompidou face à l’Allemagne”, in Georges Pompidouet l’Europe. Colloque 25 et 26 novembre 1993, ed. by the Association Georges Pompidou, Bruxelles1995, pp. 267-313; E. ROUSSEL, Georges Pompidou 1911-1974, Paris 1994, pp. 387-394.

Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic and Monetary Union 79both German states could not be excluded. Dissent in this matter was discussedopenly in governmental circles without reaching a rapprochement of standpoints inthis major question. 22Misunderstandings and second thoughts regarding the German Ostpolitik weresignificant for the fundamental communication problems between the French and theGerman political decision-making elite. Behaviour patterns developed from bad experiencesin the past kept showing up in the diplomacy of the day. Pompidou, andwith him large parts of the French public opinion, were convinced that the intrinsicand long-term motive of the German policy was to restore national unity. After all,Brandt had tried several times to make Pompidou change his mind by pointing outthat he, as Chancellor, was making considerable sacrifices by recognising the Germandivision as a matter of fact. If he accepted the principle of the inviolability of the borders,so Brandt explained to Pompidou in December 1971, he did so, because he wasconvinced that, the economic dimension left apart, Western Europe could only getcloser on political terms “when there was no unsolved borderline question anymore”. 23The strife for a normalisation of the relations with the second German state didnot present a handicap for the German policy towards Western Europe. On the contrary,Brandt and his government saw there one of the prerequisites for a further evolutiontowards a European union.III. European Policy - taking into account the existing realitiesThe European policies of the three heads of government, Brandt, Pompidou andHeath have been respectively described as “pragmatic”. This may be true to thatextent that none of the three leaders had a long-reaching, flawless master plan forthe development of Europe or of the European Community. A European constructionfollowing a unified concept, Europe as a unified whole, was not at stake.Brandt’s leading idea concerning the Ostpolitik, i.e. “to take into account the existingrealities” can also be seen as a principle for his conception of the West-Europeanpolicy. “We can only go as far as our partners are ready to go”, Brandtdeclared in 1970, in a parliamentary debate about the Economic and MonetaryUnion. 24 The underlying notion of this statement was that he considered far-reachingEuropean solutions in many areas as conceivable, but that it could not be of anyinterest for West-Germany to expose itself to the danger of isolation by developingbold activities in this direction.22. Obvious contrast i.e. in the meeting between Brandt and Pompidou in Bonn, 3.7.1972 (second conversation),AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 106.23. Conversation between Pompidou and Brandt in Paris, 3.12.1971, AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 105.24. Declaration concerning European policy, 6.11.1970, in BRANDT, Reden und Interviews, vol. 1, p. 237.

80 Andreas Wilkensa. The Hague Conference - A new approach based on pragmatismThe conference of the heads of state of the Community of the Six, on December1-2, 1969, in The Hague, was the first political test in foreign affairs for the newGerman government. In his function as Foreign Minister, Brandt had already considerablycontributed to the establishment of this conference which was bound tomark an important turning-point in European politics. It was certainly an advantagefor the Federal Government that the conference took place before the beginning ofdirect negotiations with the Soviet Union. This made it possible for the Chancellorto point out the priority which was given to political understanding with the West.In a communication on November 27, 1969, Brandt notified Pompidou of hisprior aims for the forthcoming conference. 25 The interesting aspect of this letterwas the concise catalogue which Brandt presented, including one concession, onecondition and one proposition. In other words:- a guarantee of the definite financial agreement concerning the agricultural policy,which was by far the major concern on the French side;- the commencement of negotiations with Great Britain about the conditions fortheir membership, an issue which Brandt declared as of “common interest”, butwhich in fact was a condition;- and last but not least, a relatively surprising idea, the creation of a “Europeanreserve fund”. The latter was meant to be an important factor of solidarity andstability in the framework of the European Community which had experiencedunfavourable movements in economic and monetary matters since the Novembercrisis of 1968.Brandt was very concerned about putting his cards on the table before the beginningof the conference. In this, he followed the idea that a French-Germanagreement was decisive for the development of the Community. President Pompidoubasically held the same position. His concise program for The Hague differedfrom Brandt’s only in its accentuation. 26 After settling the agrarian finance it alsocontained plans about the commencement of negociations on an enlargement of theCommunity - without fixing a precise date, though - and, last but not least, the creationof a European monetary fund as a result of a desired economic and monetaryco-operation. There didn’t seem to be many possible variations for the envisagednew “relance européenne”.The program Brandt finally presented in The Hague, however, was much moreextensive than his former communication to Pompidou. 27 It may even have surprisedthe other participants in its massiveness. In addition to the necessity of anenlargement of the Community, Brandt accentuated - in French - the “finalité politique”of the European policy. In order to come up to the extended areas of responsibility,Brandt considered a reinforcement of the institutions of the Community as25. Brandt to Pompidou, 27.11.1969, AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 103.26. Typed note without signature, but without any doubt by Pompidou, 28.11.1969, AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 1009.Another exemplar can be found in: Egon Bahr Papers, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (Bonn), vol. 441/1.27. Declaration made on 1.12.1969, in BRANDT, Reden und Interviews, vol. 1, pp. 47-55.

Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic and Monetary Union 81inevitable. In this, he referred as well to the way the Council worked as to the responsibilityof the Commission or the competence of the European Parliament. Thesuggestion he had made before, i.e. the European reserve fund, was now put intothe context of a general development in the direction of an Economic and MonetaryUnion, and should be set on its way through the effective co-ordination of theshort-term economic policy. Later, a “common economic policy” should lead to theaim that Brandt described in general terms as “an outward-looking, stability-mindedCommunity”.The immediate genesis of this “European reserve fund”, launched by the Chancellor,and to which the Federal Republic as well as the other countries of the Communityshould transfer a part of their monetary reserves, is of special interest. Itwas Jean Monnet who had expounded the advantages and the useful working methodof such an institution in a detailed memorandum to Brandt, on October 31,1969. 28 On November 7, the Chancellor and Monnet had intensive talks in Bonn.Two days later, Brandt himself drew in a hand-written note the outlines of the monetaryfund and of its function within the political framework of the Community. 29After all, the Chancellor also expected from this initiative a general benefit for Germanforeign policy if the Federal Republic was able to create the impression that itwas ready to contribute actively to the policy of the Community from a “position ofrelative strength”.The contact with Monnet thus was without any doubt decisive for the concretephrasing of the proposition. Because it was presented as a political objective at thehighest political level, the interested German Ministries could assert their objectionsand conditions only later. The point is that Brandt had shown considerableperceptiveness towards the project singled out by Monnet. Later experience madeclear, that the hopes for a rapid breakthrough in this matter were largely premature.For the moment, the German public undoubtedly judged the conference of TheHague in a positive way, as a new starting point of European politics. Although stillsceptical about a fundamental change in French foreign policy under PresidentPompidou, the forthcoming negotiations about the enlargement of the Community,fixed in the conference communiqué, were evaluated as a solid sign of change in inner-Europeanrelations. 3028. French in: Archives Jean Monnet, Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, Lausanne, AMK C 1/6/162; German version in: WBA, Bestand Bundeskanzler, vol. 14. Monnet’s accompanying letterfrom October 31, 1969, is reproduced in A. WILKENS (ed.), Interessen verbinden. Jean Monnetund die europäische Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bonn 1999, pp. 411-414. ForMonnet’s influence and his further role cf. G. BOSSUAT, “Drei Wege nach dem Gipfel von DenHaag. Monnet, Brandt, Pompidou und das Europa der 70er Jahre”, ibid., pp. 353-386; IDEM, “JeanMonnet et l’identité monétaire européenne”, in G. BOSSUAT, A. WILKENS (eds.), Jean Monnet,l’Europe et les chemins de la Paix, Paris 1999, pp. 369-398, p. 379; see also the short notes in J.MONNET, Mémoires, Paris 1976, pp. 582-583.29. Hand-written note, 9.11.1969, 5 pages, WBA, Bestand Bundeskanzler, vol. 91.30. Communiqué in Bulletin der Bundesregierung, 4.12.1969, n°148, pp. 1262-1263.

82 Andreas Wilkensb. The enlargement issueFrom the German perspective, the enlargement of the EEC, at the beginning of the seventies,was an overdue and somewhat self-evident process. There was no social groupof importance which would have considered this decision as problematic, either inpolitical or in economic terms. For the main governing party, the SPD, Great Britain’smembership had been a matter of concern since the discussions about the Schumanplan, at the beginning of the fifties. The critique of de Gaulle’s veto, in 1963, evenreached the Unes of Adenauer’s then governing Christian-democratic party. Great Britainand Scandinavia being markets of considerable importance, German industry evidentlyhad always been in favour of an opening and enlargement of the Community.The British membership had been an important subject at all British-German consultationsin the course of the sixties, with the German government regularly asserting itssupport. 31 Neither side, however, could shut their eyes to the fact that no fundamentalchange would take place as long as de Gaulle was in office.The widespread approval of British membership is unsurprisingly reflected byvarious public opinion polls: in December 1967, almost two thirds of the interviewees- i.e. sixty-four percent - declared to be in favour of Great Britain’s entryinto the Community, and not more than eight percent were against it. 32 The questionremains open, whether the political class as well as public opinion, so favourabletowards a British and Scandinavian membership, were well aware of the institutionaland political consequences of this evolution. In roughly the same period - inFebruary 1972 - not less than seventy-three percent of the Germans expressedthemselves in favour of the evolution of the Community to what was labelled the“United States of Europe”! 33 But, at any rate, since the path to a more integratedcharacter of the European Community had been obstructed by de Gaulle, even dedicatedsupporters of the integration could not see any further reason to keep onexcluding Great Britain in the future.When the political change in France and Germany had taken place, Prime MinisterHarold Wilson did not let the grass grow under his feet. Only three days afterBrandt had been elected Chancellor, at the end of October 1969, he received a letterin which Wilson requested fairly urgent support for the British concern. Great Britain,he specified, should become a member “as soon as possible on terms that arefair for all”. More precisely, his request aimed at fixing a date for the commencementof negotiations “in the early part of the year”. 34 Brandt answered by sendinghim the corresponding passage of his Government’s forthcoming programme (Oc-31. Cf. for example the records of the German-British governmental conferences on October 23-25,1967, in Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1967, ed. by the Institutfür Zeitgeschichte on behalf of the Auswärtiges Amt, Munich 1997, n° 362-365 as well as therecord by Permanent Under-Secretary Lahr on 25.10.1967, ibid., n° 366.32. Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1968-1973, E. NOËLLE, E. P. NEUMANN (eds.), Institut fürDemoskopie Aliensbach, Aliensbach, Bonn 1974, p. 561.33. Ibid.34. Wilson to Brandt, date missing, accompanying note from the chargé d’affaires Richards,25.10.1969, WBA, Bestand Bundeskanzler, vol. 52.

Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic and Monetary Union 83tober 28, 1969), where he declared himself very much in favour of the principle ofan enlargement of the Community. 35 Helmut Schmidt, Minister of Defence in thenew government, tried to dispel the British concern that their membership was likelyto be made impossible because of the agreement on agrarian financing which, atthe instigation of France, was still to be made by the Community. Schmidt assuredForeign Minister Stewart when they met at Monnet’s “Action Committee for theUnited States of Europe” (mid-December 1969) in Bonn, that the German and theBritish interests in agrarian affairs would be “very much in parallel”. 36Considering President Pompidou’s earlier statements, it was perceptible, at thisstage already, that there would be no further dissent about the principle of enlargement.As a matter of fact, Brandt himself explained, in retrospect, that at the end of1969 nothing had to be “wrested” from Pompidou regarding a British membership anymore. 37 This did not mean, however, that all the problems had been solved at that time.The negotiations for British membership, officially started on June 30 1970, indeeddragged on too long for Brandt. Before Prime Minister Heath’s visit to Bonn,in April 1971, Brandt thought it necessary to urge Pompidou quite openly to acceptthe last few technical and financial compromises. “I consider any further hesitationfrom our side”, Brandt insisted in his letter, “as irresponsible concerning the interestsof the European cause”. In addition, he did not fail to hint discretely at the factthat the items, formerly adopted in The Hague, were “political aims which couldnot be separated”. 38 As a matter of fact, Pompidou’s reaction threw a different lighton these views. 39 He referred to Great Britain’s own interest in the membership andto the necessity that the new member states fully respected the system of preferencesas well as the financial regulations of the Community. “Il faudra des compromis,mais pas aux dépens de l’avenir européen”, was Pompidou’s general directiveat that time. 40 It was quite obvious that the French ambition to increase itsagricultural export rate was higher than that of the Germans, in other words, thatthe question of butter from New Zealand, and sugar from the Caribbean Islandswas bound to irritate the French President much more than the German Chancellor.Brandt kept painting the British views in the brightest colours to Pompidou. AfterHeath’s visit to Bonn, on April 4-6, 1971, Brandt reported that, once more, hewas under the impression that the British government was genuinely committedwhen it announced its readiness to accept in their entity the regulations expressedin the Treaties of Rome and their implications for the evolution of the CommonMarket. According to Brandt, British membership would not lead to a “threateningof the Community’s achievements, but to their strengthening”. 41 In return, Pompi-35. Brandt to the German Embassy in London with a message for Wilson, 27.10.1969, IA2-81.00 VS, ibid.36. Schmidt to Brandt, 19.12.1969, WBA, Bestand Bundeskanzler, vol. 18.37. BRANDT, Erinnerungen, p. 453.38. Brandt to Pompidou, 18.3.1971, WBA, Bestand Bundeskanzler, vol. 51.39. Pompidou to Brandt, 27.3.1971, ibid.40. Annotation du Président sur la lettre de M. Brandt, du 18 mars 1971, AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 1009. Cf.for the French perspective in general J.-M. BOEGNER, Le Marché commun de Six à Neuf, Paris1974, pp. 173-203.

84 Andreas Wilkensdou insisted on total compliance with Community rules and the implementation ofreasonable regulation for the transition period. 42 Brandt played the mediator’s partquite voluntarily because, until then, it had never come to a deepened discussionbetween Heath and Pompidou. 43 To both of them he pointed out, on several occasions,that a direct exchange of views could only be beneficial to European affairs.The Franco-British summit, finally scheduled in Paris on May 20-21 1971, was infact conceived to be the turning point in the negotiations with Great Britain. 44 Thekey-note of the detailed letters from Pompidou and Heath to Brandt, giving notice oftheir talks, testify to the change in climate that the meetings had brought about. All atonce, Pompidou was convinced that the British government was determined to be amember of a “real European” community “not to destroy, but to strengthen it”. 45From now on, Europe would know how to use its own original and strong voice inglobal affairs. Pompidou was already confident that the technical negotiations, takingplace in Brussels at that moment, would come to a positive end in June.It was left to Heath to inform the German chancellor about the agreement whichwas certainly the real foundation for the sudden French-British entente: “Also withregard to the institutional arrangements, we found ourselves very much of onemind: that the identity of national states should be maintained in the framework ofthe developing Community, and that, in practice, Community decisions should bereached by unanimous agreement when the vital interests of member states were atstake”. 46 By doing this, Paris and London assured each other that only an intergovernmentallyorganised Europe could be on the program and that a stop should beput to any possible supranational developments - this also with regard to the Economicand Monetary Union. This effectively confirmed the “Luxembourg agreement”which had been made just five years earlier and this commitment was certainlyfollowing the line of continuity. From Brandt’s point of view, however, thetwo had gone quite far with this unilateral fixing of preliminaries for future Europeanevolution, all the more since it had been arranged at a meeting that he had finallycontributed to engineer. The then confirmed clear rejection of a Europe with a federaltendency was part of the price which in turn had to be paid for Great Britain’sfinal membership of the Community. 47Neither the German public nor the German parliamentarians showed any greatinterest in the terms of membership agreements which, in the British case, could be41. Brandt to Pompidou, 6.4.1971, WBA, Bestand Bundeskanzler, vol. 51.42. Pompidou to Brandt, 21.4.1971, AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 1009.43. In fact the French President and the British Prime Minister had briefly met in occasion of thefunerals of Charles de Gaulle on November 12, 1970, AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 108.44. Records of conversation in: AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 108; also: Armstrong to Jobert, 25.5.1971, with(British) “Record of Conversation ...”, 9 pages, ibid.45. Pompidou to Brandt, 28.5.1971, WBA, Bestand Bundeskanzler, vol. 51.46. Heath to Brandt, 27.5.1971, ibid., vol. 52. The published communiqué of May 21, 1971, had alreadyinsisted on this conception regarding European politics (AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 108).47. Brandt’s short written answers do not contain any evaluation concerning the subject: Brandt toPompidou, 28.5.1971, WBA, Bestand Bundeskanzler, vol. 51; Brandt to Heath, 4.6.1971, draft,ibid., vol. 52.

Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic and Monetary Union 85reached within one month after the Pompidou-Heath summit. The opening of theCommunity was still seen as a matter of principal concern and therefore, the processof ratification in the German parliament presented no problem. The final vote inthe Bundestag on June 21, 1972 turned out to be unanimous.After the successful meeting between Pompidou and Heath in May 1971, it mightbriefly have seemed as if the Paris-London connection would eventually determinethe rhythm of the Community, but in reality, nothing really changed the fact that thecore of the Community’s policy was German and French. Current historical evidencegives no credence to the original theory which indicated that Pompidou was desirousof Great Britain’s membership in order to counterbalance the weight of the FederalRepublic. Rather than to this abstract calculation, Pompidou had certainly always attachedmore importance to the safeguard of the concrete economic interest of Franceas well as to its possibilities for development in the Community.The fact that the pound sterling left the currency snake only a few weeks after ithad been created in March 1972, as well as the subsequent long-lasting but futileefforts to induce the British government to return to the snake - even at the cost ofa pound devaluation - were taken in Paris as unmistakable signs that Great Britaininsisted on keeping its separate role quite consciously. 48 That is why Brandt’s mediationdid not end with London’s entry into the Community. On the one hand, hewould emphasize in several talks with Pompidou that Britain made efforts to contributeto the budgetary stabilisation and to the fight against inflation, yet again, hewas ready, during the monetary crisis in March 1973 - as will be described later -,to grant important financial support to the British government in order to help themjoin the European monetary block.c. The institutional framework of the CommunityAt the conference of The Hague Brandt had been quite vague on the question of thefuture role and character of the European Community’s institutions. In this respect,the Chancellor apparently avoided any premature commitment. This low profilewas consciously adopted and largely motivated by his awareness of the Frenchposition on this subject. The sixties had shown in a very obvious way that in thefield of shaping institutions the danger of blockades was the highest. Although hehad never cultivated a supranational vocabulary, Brandt’s guideline clearly seemedto avoid any provocation, conflict or stiffening which might appear counterproductiveby using neither rhetoric formulas nor by making precise demands. He repeatedlyused the wording, Europe would not be created “on the drawing-board of theconstitutionalists”, expressing thus his own conviction while sketching thetwenty-year-old history of European unification. 49In principle, Brandt was convinced that a strengthening of the institutional structuresof the Community was necessary. Significant advances however, especially if they48. Conversation Brandt-Pompidou, 4.7.1972, Bonn, 10.30 a.m., AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 106.49. Conversation Brandt-Pompidou, 3.7.1972 (first conversation), Bonn, AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 106; alsoBRANDT, Begegnungen und Einsichten, p. 345.

86 Andreas Wilkensneeded a changing of the Rome Treaties were, under the circumstances, only conceivableover the mid- or long-term. Several gradual improvements seemed to be in sight, butthey needed to be achieved in parallel with an increase in the competence of the Community’svarious institutions as well as with the establishment of a greater working efficiency.However, in the first phase, priorities were laid elsewhere, mostly because theenlargement of the Community didn’t need additional complications or endangermentby institutional obligations. Also, because the economic and monetary union projectwould automatically have major consequences on the institutional status quo.The European Council - the intergovernmental realityIt was Jean Monnet who had advocated again and again the advantages of the“functional method”, openly adopted by the Chancellor. 50 Brandt was still in regularcontact with Monnet either personally or through Katharina Focke, his permanentunder-secretary for European affairs in the Chancellery. With regard to arenewal in procedures, which was bound to lead to an institutional implementation,Brandt developed early - just like Monnet - an interest for the periodic organisationof summits between Community members. 51 Firstly, the successful outcome ofthe conference at The Hague seemed to have set a positive precedent, and secondly,this way of consultation and decision-making seemed to meet Pompidou’s - andnot only his - idea of a preference for intergovernmental process. The desired outcomeof meetings within the small circle of heads of state or government wouldcreate a certain pressure for making decisions without interfering with procedureswithin the existing institutions of the Community and also provide greater impulseto the discussion of technical projects. Last but not least, the meetings seemed to bea means of accentuating the political dimension of the Community.The fact that intentions which had been declared at the Paris Summit, in October1972, were put into practice only reluctantly or not at all, was a motivation forMonnet to intensify the working out of institutional reforms. 52 Monnet thought oftaking the governments at their word when they proclaimed that they wanted totransform relations between Community members until the end of that decade insuch a way that the term “European Union” would be justified. This goal, however,would certainly not be reached, as long as the decisions of the Community weremade “mostly by administrations”, whereas the governments, although having thepolitical responsibility, would back out of the search for common regulations. 53 Atthe end of August 1973, Monnet made a short declaration which sketched brieflythe tasks of - as he called it - a “provisional European government”. In fact, it was50. Speech before the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 13.11.1973, in Bulletin der Bundesregierung,15.11.1973, n° 147.51. Brandt to Pompidou, 26.11.1970, AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 103.52. M.-T. BITSCH, “Jean Monnet et la création du Conseil européen”, in BOSSUAT, WILKENS(eds.), Jean Monnet, l’Europe et les chemins de la Paix, pp. 399-410.53. Monnet to Brandt, 3.9.1973, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn(AdsD), Katharina Focke Papers, vol. 106.

88 Andreas WilkensThe EPC, however, i.e. the regular consultation of foreign policy questions, includingtopics such as the preparation of the Conference on Security and Cooperationin Europe (CSCE), the crisis in the Near-East or the Mediterranean policy, wasmuch more promising. The discussions taken up during a conference in Munich onNovember 19, 1970, however, were set beyond the actual competencies of theCommunity and were thus left completely to the intergovernmental domain. In orderto help the consultations gain greater steadiness and substance Brandt made thesuggestion his own to create a permanent secretariat. 61 However, the question ofwhere to establish it would become an insurmountable obstacle. Whereas Brandtpleaded for a seat in Brussels, with the intention, of course, of making the affiliationto the Community’s tasks at least geographically visible, Pompidou didn’twant to withdraw from his request to settle the secretariat in Paris. As Pompidouhad to face opposition of the other members, lead by the Benelux countries andGreat Britain, who feared a return to the schemes of the Fouchet plan, he refused, inSeptember 1972, any further discussion about the project. 62Before the Paris summit meeting, in October 1972, Brandt conveyed his ideasabout the impending priorities to Pompidou, just as he had done before the summitin The Hague. 63 In opposition to 1969, however, these weren’t proposals to someselected central aspects, but suggestions on a broad scale, which bore the risk to berealised only in a few cases. Brandt granted a certain priority to the battle againstinflationary developments in the member countries as well as to the creation of the“Monetary Cooperation Found”, i.e. European cooperation in the fields of economyand finance. Other suggestions concerning the social dimension of European unification,regional politics and ecological matters were meant to mark an extension ofthe Community’s activities beyond its economic utilitarian purpose, in the narrowsense. 64 In the institutional field, concrete progress seemed possible to Brandt, atleast in matters of safeguarding “the permanent work of the Council”, strengtheningthe “rights of control and participation” of Parliament and vesting the Committeefor Economic and Social Questions with the right of autonomy. Many of thesesuggestions certainly found their mark in the final declaration of the Paris summit.65 Their impending realisation into a common policy within the Community,however, was obstructed by the slowly grinding mills of the various national bureaucracies.In retrospect, Brandt drew a rather disillusioned conclusion concerningthe impact of the Paris summit. 6661. BRANDT, Begegnungen und Einsichten, p. 344.62. Conversation Brandt-Pompidou, 9.9.1972, Feldafing, AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 106.63. Brandt to Pompidou, 16.10.1972, AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 103.64. Wording of the suggestions for a European social policy in Bulletin der Bundesregierung,20.10.1972, n° 147, p. 1757; Brandt’s declaration at the beginning of the conference on October19,1972, ibid., pp. 1753-1756.65. Text in Bulletin der Bundesregierung, 24.10.1972, n° 148, pp. 1763-1767.66. BRANDT, Begegnungen und Einsichten, pp. 354-360; BRANDT, Erinnerungen, pp. 456-457.

Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic and Monetary Union 89A “revitalisation” in the year 1973?In the second half of 1973, foreign policy advisers in the Chancellery formulatedplans to give a new dynamism to the Government’s European policy, and perhapsalso to set a new course over the medium and long term. A series of confidentialnotes about the German Government’s position aimed at a “reinforcement”together with an “intensification” of Western policy, where this was meant to bepart of a comprehensive action in the whole range of integration policy. The triggerfor this reflection on the situation in Europe seemed to have been, above all, thealarming evolution of American politics.In his speech of April 23, 1973, the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger,made the distinction between regional interests of European countries andthe global responsibility of the USA. 67 This unilateral statement together with theAmerican-Soviet agreement (June 1973) on the prevention of atomic war, 68 wereseen as alarm signals which could threaten if not renounce the balance of transatlanticpartnership. It was generally felt that both superpowers had a tendency for“autocracy in world politics” together with an interest in a “regression of all Europeanstates to the rank of insignificant nations”. According to the study made by theChancellery in July 1973, the Americans would consider the NATO-alliance asmuch less important after the treaties and agreements with the other superpowerand would see it only as a “subsidiary instrument” in matters of security policy,military strategy and on an operational level. 69The emerging shift of balance in a new international constellation had essentialimplications for the advisers at the Chancellery, and this in all central aspects of relationsbetween the Federal Republic and its European neighbours: in the areas offoreign and security policy as well as in economic, monetary, regional and energyaffairs. The aim was to look for approaches and mechanisms which seemed to allowa progression of the Community’s practice without being thwarted by the divergingideas and interests of the partner countries. According to this, the internalpropositions were constructed very pragmatically: Aiming at the strengthening ofthe EPC, consultations among the member countries should be compulsory in thefuture, before making decisions in foreign affairs. Relations with the USA especiallyshould be set more openly on a multilateral basis. Also relations with the SovietUnion and with the East-European states - explicitly including the GDR - shouldbe integrated in the EPC. Thus, the advisers thought, they might prevent French -and maybe also British - misinterpretations of German politics, and prepare a commonposition of the Nine in matters of world politics. When considering the stagnatingEconomic and Monetary Union they envisaged, as a German concession, a“gradual transmission of foreign exchange reserves to the Community”, they also67. H. KISSINGER, Years of Upheaval, London 1982, pp. 151-155.68. Ibid., pp. 274-286.69. Note Ministerial Director Lahnstein and Assistent Director Fischer (Bundeskanzleramt), Betr.:Verstärkung der Westpolitik, hier: Erste Überlegungen zur Entwicklung 1973/74, 17.7.1973, confidential,13 pages, AdsD, Focke Papers, vol. 194.

90 Andreas Wilkensconsidered promoting Brandt’s social union project, sketched at the Paris summit inOctober 1972, “as of equal rank and importance as the EMU”. 70In another special study about the security and defence policy the authors couldclaim to be even more original in their line of reasoning. Their starting point was toassume that the American government, as a consequence of their agreements on rearmamentcontrols with the Soviet Union, would aim at a withdrawal of their nuclear“Forward Based Systems” from Europe and by doing that, indirectly heighten therisk of a conventional war. In addition, France intended to equip its forces in Germanywith its own tactical nuclear weapons. But even if they were stationed in the eastof France, so Brandt said quite alarmed to Pompidou in a conversation on June 21,1973, 71 these Plutonium missiles, having an estimated range of 20 to 120 km, wouldcertainly go down on German territory. The stationing in Germany itself seemed allthe more unacceptable without appropriate consultations about the operational planning.In 1970/71 Bonn had already tried to obtain an exchange of information on astrictly bilateral basis, obviously in vain. 72 Brandt, just as the study that expressed hisline of reasoning, concluded from all this that an integration of defence policy mattersinto the foreign policy co-operation of the Nine was necessary and should aim at harmonisingthe concepts for a common security policy. In the long run, the creation of a“limited Western European defence organisation” was envisaged, not to competewith NATO, as was said explicitly, but to “complete” it. 73The fact that important sources of information are still missing at present doesmean that a complete picture of the process of opinion-forming in the German governmentcannot be made. In principle, the suggested program for a revitalisation ofthe Community’s politics seemed to have been accepted though, the more so as thefollowing consultations about a common foreign policy actually bear the imprint ofthese reflections. Although Brandt’s attempt in June, to achieve a better co-ordinationin security affairs had been brushed off straight away by Pompidou with referenceto the advantage of the French strategy of independence, the Federal Governmentkept on sounding the ground in this direction.In an exchange of views on “the future development of the state of security in Europe”,introduced by Brandt, 74 Foreign Minister Scheel put his cards on the table in aconversation (November 9, 1973) with his French counterpart Michel Jobert: “Je considèrequ’une communauté européenne ayant une volonté de politique centrale etsouhaitant également se défendre, devra nécessairement avoir une défense nucléaire”.75 For a German foreign minister this statement was spectacular in every respect,but it was also erroneous regarding the French tenacity in matters of their secu-70. Note Lahnstein and Fischer, Betr.: Verstärkung der Westpolitik, hier: Inhalt eines deutschen Vorschlagsbündels,16.8.1973, confidential, 22 pages, AdsD, Focke Papers, vol. 194.71. Conversation Brandt-Pompidou, 21.6.1973, Bonn, 4.30-7.30 p.m., AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 106.72. G.-H. SOUTOU, L’alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands,1954-1996, Paris 1996, pp. 330-333.73. Note Fischer, Betr.: Verstärkung der Westpolitik, hier: Möglichkeiten im verteidigungspolitischenBereich, 26.7.1973, confidential, 11 pages, AdsD, Focke Papers, vol. 194.74. Brandt to Pompidou, 29.9.1973 (from Washington), AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 103.

Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic and Monetary Union 93tance. 82 Schiller’s Ministry had already considered the simultaneity of the economicand political progress, and the - possibly very expensive - European monetarysolidarity as an almost untenable compromise induced only by political choice 83 .Scepticism about a monetary co-operation that might be reached in the short term wenteven beyond the traditional guardians of the holy Grail of a solid Deutschmark. In aconversation with his counterpart Maurice Schumann, Foreign Minister Scheel had dissociatedhimself openly - and this was quite extraordinary - from the “parallelism” thatBrandt had wanted and pushed through, when he explicitly said that he would prioritisethe “harmonisation of the policy for business and industry”. 84It is well-known that the elements in the Werner Report which outlined the perspectiveof a monetary integration met with sharp criticism from Pompidou. TheFrench president thought it was basically undesirable for the foreseeable future, togive away essential national competencies in monetary affairs, as planned for the secondstage. 85 Pompidou was, on the whole, more restrictive than several other membersof the French government, in particular Foreign Minister Maurice Schumannwho had approved the interim report of the Werner group. In return, the situation onthe German side was reversed: the Chancellor had to convince his own ministers toput aside their concern about the monetary policy with regard to its importance forthe European policy. In the Bundestag debate of November 1970, Brandt demonstratedhis enthusiasm for a graduated plan for the Economic and Monetary Union byqualifying it as nothing less than the “New Magna Carta” of the European Community.86 Political will had thus been unequivocally proclaimed to make the monetarymatter progressively a part of the Community policy. The much more restrictive if notopposing positions of the Chancellor’s financial and monetary advisors had been confinedat this stage, due to a “clause de prudence”, that the sceptical Economy MinisterKarl Schiller had managed to insert into the plan of graduation. This clause wasmeant to make the effective parallel between convergence in economic policy andmonetary solidarity compulsory. 87 In these inflexible conditions, the German BundesbankPresident Karl Klasen declared publicly that essential monetary prerogativesshould be conceded to newly created or extended authorities of the Community, andhe took even into consideration the creation of a kind of a “Federal Reserve Bank ofEurope”. 88 As Schiller had assured the German Central Bank Council, the autono-82. So the wording of the German memorandum which was presented at the meeting on 12.2.1970, text inArchiv der Gegenwart, 6.3.1970, pp. 15329-15330; see also the earlier assessment: K. SCHILLER,“Die internationale Währungslage nach der Bonner Konferenz der Zehnergruppe”, in Europa-Archiv1969, n° 1, pp. 1-4.83. H. TIETMEYER, “Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion - eine politische Herausforderung”,in Europa-Archiv, n° 12, 1971, pp. 409-420. At that time, Tietmeyer was Head of Departmentin the Ministry of Economics and participant in the meetings of the Werner group.84. Conversation Schumann-Scheel, 25.5.1970 in Paris, AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 104.85. Cf. for an overview R. FRANK, “Pompidou, le Franc et l’Europe 1969-1974”, in Georges Pompidouet l’Europe, pp. 339-369.86. Declaration concerning the European policy,6.11.1970, in BRANDT, Reden und Interviews, vol. l,p.238.87. Declaration by Schiller on 10.2.1971, in Bulletin der Bundesregierung, 12.2.1971, n° 22, pp.233-235.

94 Andreas Wilkensmous Bundesbank would be the model for any future European central bank. 89 Afterthe Werner Plan had thus been filled with the necessary saving clauses, which loosenedup the obligations for an integration policy, the project passed at the meeting ofthe Council of Ministers on March 22, 1971.From the floating of the Deutschmark to the Smithsonian AgreementThe weakness of the dollar, which manifested itself in a speculative flight to theDeutschmark, and the resulting international monetary crisis would thwart theCommunity monetary project considerably. Capital inflows registrated by the Bundesbankin the first days of May 1971 amounted to 2 billion dollar and seemed tocreate what was qualified in Bonn a “hopeless” situation. 90 In order to avoid a furtherdollar inflow the Federal Government decided on May 9, 1971 the floating ofthe Deutschmark, interrupting at the same time the perspectives outlined in theWerner Plan. The majority of the Community countries - with France in the lead -had refused Schiller’s original suggestion for a common floating after harsh discussions.Only the Dutch guilder followed the German example. 91 On the same day,Brandt assured Pompidou in a personal hand-written note that Germany wouldbasically still adhere to the project of an Economic and Monetary Union, but thathe also had to establish “more stability” in his own country. 92Concerning the problem of the Eurodollars, which emerged not only, but particularlyon the German capital market as a result of the American passiveness regardinga solid dollar exchange rate, the Federal Republic and France were actually intwo different situations. The communication was impeded additionally by extremelydiverging traditions and philosophies in the monetary sector, which aimed, firstof all, to combat inflation on the German side, whilst France’s priority consisted ofa growth and expansion policy. Besides, Bonn and Paris also diverged substantiallyin their evaluation of the American policy. As a last point, if one takes into consid-88. K. KLASEN, “Die Verwirklichung der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion in der EWG aus der Sichtder Deutschen Bundesbank”, in Europa-Archiv, vol. 13, 1970, pp. 449-458. The then vice-presidentof the Bundesbank evidently didn’t consider the EMU-project as very important and hardlywrites one line about it in his memoirs: O. EMMINGER, D-Mark, Dollar, Währungskrisen. Erinnerungeneines ehemaligen Bundesbankpräsidenten, Stuttgart 1986.89. P. BERNHOLZ, “Die Bundesbank und die Währungsintegration in Europa”, in Fünfzig JahreDeutsche Mark. Notenbank und Währung in Deutschland seit 1948, ed. by the Deutsche Bundesbank,Munich 1998, pp. 773-833 (p. 792).90. J. SCHÖLLHORN, “Außenwirtschaftliche Absicherung der Stabilitätspolitik in der BundesrepublikDeutschland”, in H. KÖRNER, P. MEYER-DOHM, E. TUCHTFELD, C. UHLIG (eds.), Wirtschaftspolitik,Wissenschaft und politische Aufgabe. Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Karl Schiller, Bern,Stuttgart 1976, pp. 407-428 (p. 415); Deutsche Bundesbank, Geschäftsbericht 1971, pp. 32-33.91. Declaration by Schiller at the extraordinary meeting of the EC-Council of Ministers on 8.5.1971,in Bulletin der Bundesregierung, 11.5.1971, n° 70, pp. 712-713. For contrasting opinions withinthe Bundesbank see O. EMMINGER, “Deutsche Geld- und Währungspolitik im Spannungsfeldzwischen innerem und äußerem Gleichgewicht (1948-1975)”, in Währung und Wirtschaft in Deutschland1876-1975, ed. by the Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt 1976, pp. 485-554 (p. 524).92. Brandt to Pompidou, 9.5.1971, WBA, Bestand Bundeskanzler, vol. 51.

Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic and Monetary Union 95eration that on the German side, there was a social democratic Finance Minister,Karl Schiller, who was especially devoted to the idea of the healing powers of themarket and therefore - at least in the area of monetary politics - fundamentally opposedto state interventions and administrative controls, it may be worth mentioningthat, although the adopted schedule for the economic and monetary union hadto be suspended, the basic necessity of a common European answer to the Americanchallenge was self-evident.But the divergences would prove to be extremely tenacious: Schiller claimed asort of right for monetary self-defence to which the other objectives had to submit.93 His public pleading for an understanding of the American economic situationwas seen in France as a renunciation of a concerted Community policy. In return,Pompidou refused to let the French franc participate in a common European floatingbecause he feared amongst other things that the hitherto domination of the dollarwould only be replaced by the Deutschmark which was under pressure of revaluation.The claiming of fixed exchange rates was a French interest becausefloating rates threatened the system of homogeneous prices in European agriculture.Paris recommended the establishment of strict exchange controls as a provenmeans to stem the dollar tide. It would not be up to the Europeans to accept an openor hidden revaluation of their currencies in order to cover the American balance-of-paymentsdeficit, but it should rather be the USA that should be induced -for the first time in history - to accept a devaluation of the dollar. Bonn answeredwith doubts about the realisation and the political admissibility of restrictions withininternational capital movements.On August 15, 1971, Nixon unilaterally decreed the abolishment of the dollar’sconvertibility to gold, combined with the establishment of an import tax of ten percent.The historic American decision to abandon one of the central principles of theBretton Woods system made the search for a new global order of relations betweencurrencies all the more inevitable. 94 This incident together with the undisguised violationof the basic rules of GATT had a positive impact on European cooperation,though. On the German side, important members of the Federal government suchas Defence Minister Helmut Schmidt and Minister of Transport Leber pleaded, atthis stage, for a more conciliatory attitude towards France, because a double monetaryconflict, with Washington and Paris, could hardly be kept up in the long run. 95For the first time, the Community of the Six and Great Britain were able toadopt a common policy in monetary affairs which they set against the American93. Cf. the interview with Schiller in L’Express, 6.-12.9.1971, n° 1052, pp. 26-27. After that, Brandtgave an appeasing interpretation of the statements of his finance minister: Brandt to Monnet,27.9.1971, AdsD, Focke Papers, vol. 103.94. R. SOLOMON, The International Monetary System, 1945-1981, New York 2 1982, pp. 188-215;H. JAMES, International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods, Washington, New York,Oxford 1996, pp. 205-227.95. W. LINK, “Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik in der Ära Brandt 1969-1974”, in K.-D. BRACHER,W. JÄGER, W. LINK, Republik in Wandel, 1969-1974: Die Ära Brandt, Stuttgart, Mannheim1986, p. 268.

96 Andreas Wilkenspretensions at the meeting of the Group of Ten in Rome on November 30, December1, 1971. Without a medium dollar devaluation there would be no new fixing ofexchange rates. As a matter of fact, the USA finally accepted the principle of devaluationfor a fixed dollar relation to gold, while they were trying to compensate forthe loss of prestige through a series of important trade advantages. 96After these preliminaries, Brandt and Pompidou managed to define a furthercommon strategy in their talks in Paris on December 3-4, 1971, which had beenarranged independently from the periodic bilateral consultations. 97 The complexpakkage set out a devaluation for the dollar, an unchanged exchange rate for thefranc and a revaluation of the Deutschmark. Pompidou and Brandt discussed atlong over the appropriate revaluation rate. As he had done on other occasions, theFrench president intended to maintain a maximal difference in the exchange ratesof both currencies in order to favour export trade. 98 At the same time, the packagewas designed to set the parity margin of the European currencies narrower than theone which should be valid in the area of the International Monetary Fund, whichwas bound to be enlarged as requested by the Americans. When Nixon and Pompidoumet ten days later in the Azores, the Franco-German agreement was acceptedin principle as a European compromise proposal. 99 Slightly modified and more detailed,it was transformed, on December 18, 1971, in an impressive mise en scène,into the Washington “Smithsonian Agreement”: The Deutschmark was revalued by4.61 percent against its rate before floating, the devaluation of the Dollar againstgold amounted to 7.9 percent, the French franc and the pound sterling remained unchanged.The German and French efforts to reconcile the different positions hadnot been made in vain.The Currency SnakeThe return to a system of fixed exchange rates created the basis for a new attempt toconnect the European currencies with one other. On March 21, 1972, the Councilof Ministers accepted a plan to reduce the parity margin of the European currenciesto a maximal 2.25 percent - i.e. fifty percent of the margin fixed by the IMF - andto oblige the issuing banks to support measures that would guarantee exchange parities.The mechanism of the “European Currency Snake” however, joined in thebeginning of May by the British pound and the Danish Crown, would reach thelimits of its functioning only a few weeks after its establishment. In the spring of1972, the pound sterling had been considerably weakened. As the “snake” had no96. EMMINGER, Erinnerungen, pp. 195-210; R. HELLMANN, Gold, the Dollar, and the EuropeanCurrency Systems. The Seven Year Monetary War, London 1979, pp. 1-9.97. Records of conversations in AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 105.98. Pompidou’s former counsellor for monetary questions Jean-René Bernard was very clear aboutthat: “Georges Pompidou et l’effondrement du système de Bretton Woods”, in La France et lesinstitutions de Bretton Woods 1944-1994. Colloque tenu à Bercy les 30 juin et 1 er juillet 1994,Paris, Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, 1998, pp. 121-125.99. Pompidou to Brandt, 15.12.1971, AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 103; Brandt to Pompidou, 16.12.1971, ibid.

Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic and Monetary Union 97effective remedy for such a situation, a new speculative tide flooded the Germancapital market. The pound left the snake on June 23, and started floating. Again thequestion was how Germany could answer the undesired speculative capital tide. Ashe had done in May 1971, Schiller recommended a joint floating of the Europeancurrencies. Apart from this, the Federal government should adopt repulsive measureswhich “concurred with the market”, in particular, the stiffening of the alreadyexisting cash deposit regulations. 100 For the first time the Cabinet refused the Minister’sproject which, by the way, could be presumed to be unacceptable for Francesince it intended a joint floating of currencies. At the memorable Cabinet meetingon June 28-29, 1972, the alternative motion, made by Bundesbank ResidentKlasen, suggested a return to the light and flexible form of exchange controls - itpassed unanimously. 101 This solution had the advantage of being more acceptableon the European level and avoided the undesired further revaluation of the Deutschmark,at least over the short term. When the isolated Economics and FinanceMinister handed in his resignation after this incident, Brandt accepted it withouthesitation. One of Schiller’s most biting opponents in the Cabinet had beenDefence Minister Helmut Schmidt.The controversy about the monetary policy and its European aspects had certainlynot been the only motivation for Schiller’s resignation, and perhaps not even the mostimportant, although he himself put it in the centre of his exhaustive letter of resignation.102 From Brandt’s point of view, the resignation of the wilful and orthodox Economicsand Finance Minister had the at least not undesired although subordinate effectthat in the future it would probably be easier to come to an understanding withFrance about European monetary matters. Only a few days before the meeting of theCabinet, Brandt had made it plain that it mattered a great deal to him to come to anunderstanding with France about the new monetary crisis. He instructed his PermanentUnder-Secretary Katharina Focke, who was in charge of European questions, toconcentrate completely on the currency problem: “If we can get only halfway withthe French, we will have achieved a lot”, Brandt expressed himself. 103 In return, anew floating of the Deutschmark would only let the latent conflict with France flareup again. On the same level, Brandt justified his course before the board of the SPDparliamentary group, first of all, in order to defend the monetary resolutions passed inWashington, and also to “make an effort to obtain the best conditions for a Europeancooperation in case of new possible difficulties”. 104100. Cf. H.-O. Pöhl (German Ministry of Finance) to the Chancellor, 19.6.1972, with a note by Kurth,14.6.1972: Kann sich die Bundesrepublik in Zukunft vor unerwünschten Geld- und Kapitalzuflüssenschützen ?, AdsD, Focke Papers, vol. 198.101. Adding to other measures, the sale of debentures to nonresidents became subject to permission andthe assignment of receivables to nonresidents had to be registered, cf. EMMINGER, Erinnerungen,pp. 217-224; Deutsche Bundesbank, Geschäftsbericht 1972, p. 21.102. Schiller to Brandt, 2.7.1972, 9 pages, WBA, Bundeskanzler, vol. 67; answering letter Brandt toSchiller, 6.7.1972, ibid.103. Brandt to Focke, hand-written note, 23.6.1972, 2 pages, AdsD, Focke Papers, vol. 198.104. Erklärung Brandts für die Fraktionsvorstands-Sitzung, 9.9.1972, WBA, Bestand Bundeskanzler,vol. 67.

98 Andreas WilkensAt any rate, the floating of the pound sterling reveals open the fragility of theSmithsonian monetary realignment. The American authorities had not been readyto intervene at the stock exchanges in favour of the fixed dollar rate. This continuing“benign neglect” outraged Paris even more than Bonn, but at the same time, itwas a permanent call for both governments not to lose sight of the envisaged aim ofa common European Monetary Union. Brandt sounded Pompidou out to learnwhether he would agree on a common or at least a coordinated intervention in orderto convince the American President that he could not only expect the others to finda solution for the problem of the balance-of-payment deficit. 105 In addition, theChancellor insisted on making the currency problem a major issue at the next Europeansummit that he himself had suggested. In return, he was ready to discuss othercontroversial topics only marginally or even not at all.The new “Superminister” for Economics and Finance, Helmut Schmidt, just afterhis appointment to office, tried to come to an understanding with his Frenchcounterpart Giscard d’Estaing. Satisfied, Brandt and Pompidou noticed these positivesigns, that were given at the Ministers’ first meeting on July 27, 1972. With theintention to obtain at least one concrete result in the field of the monetary problemat the not very promising EC-summit in Paris, in October 1972, Brandt pleaded fora dissociation of the common monetary fund from the overall program for an Economicand Monetary Union and to create it earlier than planned. 106 On a more formallevel, this project would be successful, but in reality, the “European MonetaryCooperation Fund” that had been founded by the Council of Ministers, in April1973 would lead only a fictitious existence in the shadow of the “Committee ofCentral Bank Governors” which met in Basle, being not much more than a poorcopy of the integration instrument as which it had originally been conceived duringthe preparations for the conference at The Hague. 107 Nevertheless, it was possible,a few years later (since March 1979), to have recourse to the once created monetaryfund and to strengthen its part within the scope of the newly established “EuropeanCurrency System”. Only then - almost ten years after the first official suggestionmade by Brandt - it received twenty percent of the gold and dollar reserves of theparticipating countries in order to cover stabilising measures. 108Schmidt had first set out against free floating, but within a short time, the continuouslysliding dollar would make the restored system of fixed exchange ratesdefinitely obsolete. In spite of a second dollar devaluation in February 1973, theEuropean central banks were forced again, at the beginning of March, to purchasethe American dollar in massive quantity. On March 16, 1973, the EC-Council ofMinisters declared openly that the European countries, as far as they had not yetparticipated in or joined the currency snake, would switch to joint floating, i.e. they105. Conversation Brandt-Pompidou, 3.7.1972 in Bonn, AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 106.106. Suggestion made by Brandt in a conversation with Pompidou, 9.9.1972 in Feldafing, AN, 5 AG 2,vol. 106.107. WERNER, Itinéraires, pp. 140-149; D. C. KRUSE, Monetary Integration in Western Europe:EMU, EMS and Beyond, London, Boston, Butterworths, 1980, pp.137-138.108. SOLOMON, The International Monetary System, p. 296.

Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic and Monetary Union 99would stop defending a fixed parity in relation to the dollar, but maintain fixed exchangerates between one another. In this respect, the Federal government madeconsiderable efforts to induce the British government to join the European monetaryblock, all the more as British participation had originally been a conditionmade by France. The fact that Italy would not join was generally accepted, though.In personal consultations on March 1-2, 1973, 109 and also by letter, Brandt assuredHeath of the all important monetary support by the Community - especially an exchangeguarantee for the pound reserves - as well as a significant German financialaid which had to be agreed on. 110 Brandt thought that, at this point, he could reachan important breakthrough for the Community’s policy. 111 At the decisive meetingof the EC-Council of Ministers on March 11, 1973, however, the British Chancellorof the Exchequer Anthony Barber maintained his request for “unconditional mutualfinancial support without limits of amount, without guarantees, without specific obligationsto repay”. 112 Since the other candidates for the floating thought that such aformula put a bit too much strain on their solidarity, they renounced to a Britishparticipation and London preferred to let the pound float independently from the restraintsof the currency snake.It seems as if the decision for a common floating of the snake currencies wasmade on friendly terms and basically in cooperation between the Finance MinistersGiscard d’Estaing, Schmidt and George Shultz, with Schmidt having to concede aslight revaluation of the Deutschmark by three percent in relation to the franc. 113The American decision, made at the same time, to abolish the dollar’s fixed relationto gold represented the definite end of the monetary system of Bretton Woods. HadSchiller’s strategy, that now was applied along with French consent, revealed itselfas being right too early?The guarded optimism, to which the Finance Ministers yielded at that moment,that it would be possible to control future monetary crises by early and intensiveconsultations, would prove to be premature. This also led to quite different evaluationsat their first exclusive meeting in Washington on March 25, 1973: Giscardd’Estaing insisted on the French wish to return, in the medium term, to a system offixed, but adaptable exchange rates; Schmidt did not see any durable solution for themonetary problem if the American balance-of-payment did not improve considerably.114 But before this could happen, the trade and energy crisis which had been triggeredby the oil price shock a few months later, and which had various effects on theEuropean national economies, would put the solidarity that had been achieved with109. Brandt to Pompidou, 2.3.1973, AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 103.110. Message Brandt to Heath, (11.3.1973), WBA, Bestand Bundeskanzler, vol. 52. In this respect,Kruse’s study needs correcting, cf. KRUSE, Monetary Integration in Western Europe, p. 130.111. Brandt to Pompidou, 8.31973, AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 103; cf. BRANDT, Begegnungen und Einsichten,pp. 329-330.112. The quotation in the English original version in EMMINGER, Erinnerungen, p. 247. The Bundesbank- and this was not surprising - had thought the offer made by the Federal government beingquite excessive: ibid., pp. 236-237; Deutsche Bundesbank, Geschäftsbericht 1972, p. 36.113. SOLOMON, The International Monetary System, pp. 228-234.

100 Andreas Wilkensso much difficulty to a new and serious test. In January 1974, the French franc leftthe currency snake, with regret of course, and only for a limited period, as Pompidoudeclared. 115 What was left, was the torso of the snake to which, apart from the Deutschmark,only the Benelux currencies and the Danish crown still belonged. Itseemed as if the common European monetary policy of 1974 was not very far awayfrom where the new attempt had been made back in 1969.ConclusionIn the Brandt Era, Germany’s policy towards the West, as far as public attentionwas concerned, always stood in the shadow of its policy regarding the Eastern block.This perception, however, should not lead to the misapprehension, that the commitmentto West-European Community affairs had diminished during this period. Thegovernment in Bonn did not deviate from the traditional line of a major political, economic,and social interest in German integration into the European Community.An overall analysis of the complete framework of the German foreign affairswould show that the policy concerning West-European integration would not havebeen different, if, for any reason, there had not been an option for an active Easternpolicy. There are no indications that the government exercised restraint in mattersof European cooperation policy in order to favour the development of the Easternor the national German policy. If there has been interference in the East/West policy,it has rather had a positive effect on the activities in European affairs becausethe Brandt Government needed palpable results in its West-European policy in orderto safeguard their endeavours concerning the East which were heavily disputedin West-Germany itself.As someone who preferred gradation, Brandt tried to push forward the stabilisation,the enlargement and the reinforcement of the European Community on abroad scale. Pragmatic progress was more important than far-reaching projects fora policy of integration that would have no chance to be realised, as he knew verywell. The limited and controlled transfer of new rights to the European institutionswas certainly not excluded, as Brandt did not set any principal limits. The limitswere rather set by the fact that the Federal Government took very largely into considerationwhat was possible with regard to the different concepts conceived by theother European governments and in the first place by France.On March 6, 1974, the Chancellery elaborated a general survey about the state of Europeanpolitics which portrayed the situation without complacency or illusion. 116 The key-114. Note by Permanent Under-Secretary Pöhl, 27.3.1973, Betr.: Reform des Internationalen Währungssystems,hier: Gespräch zwischen Secretary George Shultz, Minister Giscard d’Estaing,Chancellor of the Exchequer Anthony Barber, Minister Helmut Schmidt, 25.3.1973 in the WhiteHouse Washington, 4 pages, WBA, Bestand Bundeskanzler, vol. 18. From this “Library-Group”should emerge the consultations of the “Group of Seven” (G 7) in the mid-eighties; cf. H. SCHMIDT,Menschen und Mächte, Berlin 1987, p. 193.115. Pompidou to Brandt, 19.1.1974, AN, 5 AG 2, vol. 103.

Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic and Monetary Union 101word to describe the situation was “disillusion” because “sense and purpose of the Europeanintegration” would be questioned once again in the different European countries.The authors of the study could not help stating that, as a result of the war in the Near-East,the oil embargo and the energy crisis, there were signs for a re-nationalisation of politicsin Europe, and they blamed France in particular for making egoistic solo attempts. Therefore,the only realistic objective for the nearer future seemed to be “to hold the presentstate of integration and safeguard it against inner and outer destructive influence”. At thesummit of the Nine under German chairmanship, planned for May 1974, Brandt wouldset new priorities with a program that suggested prompt measures: the entry into the second,“real” stage of the Economic and Monetary Union, a better stand-by mechanism forthe remaining five members of the currency snake, the creation of a common agency forenergy, an agreement on the regional fund for the Community, the strengthening of politicalcooperation and, last but not least, further reflection on how questions concerning a cooperationin matters of a European common defence could be integrated into the frameworkof the European Community. As previously stated, this program was not meant tosearch for new horizons in the world of the Community’s politics, but it was to prevent anew setback through aiming at solutions likely to be found for problems which sometimeshad been on the agenda for quite a long time. At any rate, from the Bonn point of viewthere was no alternative to the Community.On the whole, the review of European politics between 1969-1974 would certainlybe more positive than the snapshot of the morose spring 1974. The outcomeremains ambiguous though, being marked by both progress and setbacks. The enlargementof the Community represented an old wish within German politics whichhad been fulfilled, but Great Britain revealed itself as a partner with only reducedenthusiasm. Wilson, who had been re-elected Prime Minister, made the request -motivated either by national politics or not - for new deals about the conditions of aBritish membership, which caused grave concern regarding the future developmentof the Community. Notwithstanding the enlargement of the Community theFrench-German relationship continued to be of vital importance for the Germanforeign policy and the Community’s affairs in general. Eastern policy, the monetarycrises, and the relations with the USA created without any doubt tensions in the relationsbetween Bonn and Paris. The political, economic and monetary interests ofboth countries and the ways in which they became manifest were not immediatelyidentical. It had become obvious, though, that an agreement between Germany andFrance would be a necessary prerequisite for any further project of the Community.In the monetary sector - just as in the energy policy - the temptation for nationalsolo attempts was still immense.The wide-spread optimism during 1970, that the Community would rapidly getcloser in monetary terms, was certainly an illusion. The “monetary cultures” of themember countries were separated by wide gaps and in times of international mone-116. Note for the Chancellor, Betr.: Europäische Integration, hier: Erste Überlegungen für die Präsidentschaftskonferenzim Mai 1974 in Bonn, 6.3.1974, 9 pages, AdsD, Focke Papers, vol. 205. Thestudy was written by Ministerial Director Lahnstein and Assistent Director Fischer.

102 Andreas Wilkenstary turbulence, were an obstacle on the way to a directed action. There were no instrumentsyet for a co-ordinated and effective reaction, when the European currencieswere affected by the turmoil of the Dollar-crisis. But it is unmistakable that theimpact of the dollar devaluation increased the awareness of the limits of a nationaleconomic and monetary policy in Europe. Still far away from being in harmony, themember countries developed a tendency towards a rapprochement in monetary affairs,even if this process was accompanied by periods of regression and retardation.In this respect, the beginning of the seventies appear as an important stage oflearning and adaptation, and the experiences gained were to be essential for the furtherevolution of European politics, especially in the field of monetary matters. Allthis meant a lot of change in comparison to the stagnation and hesitations of themid-sixties. Compared to many hopes, which had risen at the beginning of the decade,the result certainly was not a spectacular one, but it did show how far “Europe”was able to go at that time!Andreas Wilkens

103Book reviews - Comptes rendus - BuchbesprechungenKlaus LARRES. - Politik der Illusionen. Churchill, Eisenhower und die deutsche Frage1945 -1955. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995, 335 p. - ISBN 3-525-36320-6. -92,00 DMLe personnage principal du livre de Klaus Larres, Politik der Illusionen, n’est autre queWinston Churchill, dont on se souvient d’ordinaire comme un des défenseurs de la guerrefroide. Image en partie trompeuse cependant, puisque «the Old man» s’attachera, dès l’instantde son retour au pouvoir en octobre 1951, à dépasser le statu quo entre l’Est et l’Ouest,en touchant notamment à l’épineuse question de la réunification allemande. Pour arriver àses fins, Churchill a un instrument de prédilection: la conférence au sommet. Il n’aura decesse, dès la mort de Staline en mars 1953, que de rendre possible une telle conférence auplus haut niveau tout en essayant de préserver les intérêts de la Grande Bretagne et ses prétentionsau statut de grande puissance. Ses efforts se heurteront à l’opposition du PrésidentEisenhower, ou encore à celle du Chancelier Adenauer, qui ne sont pas prêts à sacrifier lesfondements de la politique de renforcement de l’Ouest face à la menace soviétique en faveurde pourparlers qui pourraient déboucher sur la neutralisation de l’Allemagne et, à terme,faire tomber celle-ci sous la coupe de Moscou. Churchill aura aussi fort à faire pour contrerl’opposition de ses propres troupes. Le ministre des affaires étrangères, Eden, déploiera destrésors de patience, d’ingéniosité, voire de duplicité à contrer les efforts de son PremierMinistre, il en ira de même pour le Foreign Office.A première vue, les détracteurs du vieil homme finiront par avoir raison de lui, puisqueses tentatives répétées d’organiser une conférence au sommet échoueront. La révolte populairede juin 1953 et finalement le rejet par Moscou en 1954, d’une dernière initiative churchilliennede diplomatie au sommet, seront aussi pour beaucoup dans cet échec. Une conférence«à l’échelon le plus élevé» finira bien par avoir lieu, mais après le départ de Churchill.En juillet 1955, Eisenhower, Eden, Edgar Faure et Boulganine, accompagné de Kroutchtchev,se réuniront en effet à Genève. Si le désaccord sur la sécurité européenne et la réunificationde l’Allemagne sera total, cette première réunion au sommet des chefs d’état et degouvernement depuis la conférence de Potsdam de 1945, permettra cependant d’amorcer undialogue favorable à la détente entre l’Est et l’Ouest ou à tout le moins à une coexistencepacifique. Ne peut-on pas dès lors, s’interroge Klaus Larres, attribuer à Churchill un certainsuccès? La conférence de Genève aurait-elle pu voir le jour sans ses efforts et surtout sansles espoirs que ses tentatives ne manquèrent pas d’éveiller dans l’opinion publique?N’est-ce pas grâce à Churchill que la diplomatie des sommets retrouva ses lettres denoblesse, «ce qui permit à long terme à l’Est et à l’Ouest d’entrer plus étroitement en contactet de faire reculer le danger de guerre immédiat»? (Klaus Larres p.304) Par ailleurs, en cettepériode de l’après-guerre froide, et au regard des difficultés économiques qu’a traverséesl’Allemagne lors de sa réunification dans les années quatre-vingt dix, les tentatives de Churchillacquièrent une pertinence renouvelée.Churchill était-il donc en avance sur son temps? Ou regardait-il vers le passé? Se faisait-ildes illusions sur les chances de ses initiatives? Quelles étaient ses motivations profondes?A ces interrogations, Klaus Larres répond avec subtilité et finesse, en faisant intervenirtoute une série d’acteurs. Se réclamant de la «international history», l’auteur aborde sonsujet par une perspective «multibiographique» qui fait apparaître les protagonistes non pascomme des «abstractions identifiables» mais bien plutôt comme des «individus identifiables.»Les personnages de son récit étayé par de nombreuses citations, parfois truculentes,prennent du relief, apparaissent avec leurs défauts, leurs espoirs chimériques, leurs peurs,

104 Book reviews - Comptes rendus - Buchbesprechungenéminemment humains. Faisant néanmoins quelques concessions à d’autres façons d’aborderl’histoire, Klaus Larres fait référence au contexte social, économique, et militaire, même sic’est de manière succincte, tout en laissant une large place à l’opinion publique, dont il examinel’incidence sur les décisions des hommes politiques. On pourrait même se demander sil’opinion publique n’est pas, bien que Klaus Larres ne nous le dise pas, le deuxième personnagele plus important de son étude, derrière Churchill.D’autre part, si l’auteur est passé maître dans l’analyse des méandres de la politiqueétrangère britannique, dont il dépeint les dissensions et les rivalités internes, son portrait desdivergences de vues au sein de l’administration Eisenhower sonne juste, en particulierquand il esquisse les rôles respectifs d’Eisenhower et de Dulles dans l’élaboration de la politiqueétrangère des Etats-Unis. Sur fond de pressions électorales, le personnage d’Adenauerapparaît quant à lui dans ses tentatives de rapprochement vis à vis des Etats-Unis pourmieux contrer les efforts de Churchill, qu’il stigmatise pour sa méconnaissance du problèmeallemand, ou encore son manque de compréhension des enjeux de l’unité européenne.A ce sujet, la question brûlante de la Communauté Européenne de Défense (CED) transparaîtà travers tout le récit, surtout dans sa relation avec les initiatives churchilliennes quisemblent apporter de l’eau au moulin de certaines personnalités politiques, y compris françaises,dans leur quête d’alternatives au réarmement allemand. Sur ce dernier point, on peutcependant regretter que Klaus Larres, qui se base en priorité sur les archives britanniques etaméricaines, ainsi que sur des entretiens avec des collaborateurs de Churchill, n’ait pas misen exergue de façon plus approfondie les positions françaises, y compris vis à vis de la CED.L’accès aux archives soviétiques apporterait d’autre part très certainement un éclairage nouveausur la «summitry» et les intentions de Moscou face à la question allemande et permettraitde répondre de façon plus péremptoire encore à la question que nous pose Klaus Larres:la politique de Churchill était-elle une politique des illusions?Ceci dit, une des contributions principales de l’ouvrage de Klaus Larres à la littératureexistante est d’insister sur la continuité de la pensée de Churchill. N’hésitant pas à remonterà 1914 pour illustrer son propos, l’auteur nous démontre point par point que l’obsessionchurchillienne pour des conversations personnelles au plus haut niveau, ainsi que ses positionssur la réunification allemande, n’étaient pas tant des élucubrations de vieil homme, unefaçon de s’accrocher au pouvoir le plus longtemps possible ou encore de régler des comptesavec son rival, Eden, qu’un moyen de conserver à la Grande-Bretagne un rôle de tout premierplan sur la scène internationale, tout en lui permettant de se refaire une santé économique.Tel est le refrain du livre de Klaus Larres, qui se présente comme une analyse érudite,convainquante, parfois répétitive, et néanmoins vivante d’une problématique passionnante.Pascaline WinandUniversité Libre de Bruxelles

Book reviews - Comptes rendus - Buchbesprechungen 105Christopher LORD. -Absent at the Creation: Britain and the Formation of the EuropeanCommunity, 1950-1952. Aldershot, Dartmonth, 1996, 175 p. - ISBN 1-85521-520-9.-41,50 £.Christopher Lord, professeur titulaire d’une chaire Jean Monnet à l’Université de Leeds,analyse les raisons de l’abstention britannique au moment de la formation de la CECA, entre1950 et 1952. Mais au-delà des réactions face au Plan Schuman, l’auteur s’interroge sur lapolitique anglaise vis-à-vis de l’intégration européenne. Le Royaume-Uni manifeste en effetd’évidentes difficultés à concilier ses priorités de politique intérieure et les nouvelles exigencesinternationales. De ce fait, le refus d’adhérer à la CECA est considéré comme untournant, car c’est la première fois que la Grande-Bretagne s’exclut d’une grande organisationinternationale en Europe. Les raisons des réticences anglaises sont constantes, à commencerpar l’aversion pour la supranationalité, selon les principes posés par la Déclarationde Robert Schuman. Cette décision est dans le prolongement des positions défendues depuislongtemps par les principaux dirigeants travaillistes. L’explication tient aussi aux conceptionsanglaises concernant les délégations de souveraineté. Ainsi, selon la tradition anglaise,la légitimité ne peut émaner que du Parlement de Westminster. D’un point de vue économique,la Grande-Bretagne, premier producteur européen de charbon et d’acier, craint une perturbationde ses marchés, si les autres concurrents de la CECA peuvent y écouler plus facilementleurs produits. De plus, la sidérurgie anglaise offre l’avantage de ne pas êtredépendante de l’extérieur pour la plupart de ses approvisionnements. Les travaillistes aupouvoir jusqu’en 1951 redoutent encore une remise en cause des actions dirigistes menéesdans la sidérurgie et les charbonnages du pays et des aides octroyées à ces industries. Cesconsidérations sont essentielles à l’approche des élections générales.Tout au long de l’ouvrage, on découvre l’incapacité des Anglais à dégager une voiemédiane entre une participation à la CECA, un refus définitif et un hypothétique statutd’association. Londres a alors du mal à évoluer à l’intérieur des trois «cercles» désignés parChurchill: le Commonwealth, les Etats-Unis et l’Europe. La priorité est incontestablementdonnée au premier, qui, malgré ses faiblesses, est toujours considéré comme un partenaireprivilégié, selon le vieux principe de la préférence impériale. L’attitude anglaise a confortéle Plan Schuman dans son but principal qui est d’assurer les bases de la réconciliationfranco-allemande. Les Anglais ont eu le sentiment d’être exclus du rapprochement nouéentre Paris et Bonn. Pourtant, le Foreign Office entendait rester un interlocuteur essentiel surle délicat dossier des contrôles alliés en Allemagne. Londres devait consentir à laisserl’Allemagne participer à la défense de l’Europe occidentale, mais après que son industrielourde ait été placée sous l’autorité de la CECA. C’est ce point qui a conditionné le soutienaméricain au Plan Schuman. Les Anglais ont d’ailleurs été gênés par cette caution américaine,mais c’est bien l’attitude du Royaume-Uni qui a poussé Washington à se tourner versla France pour promouvoir le processus d’intégration européenne. Même s’il fut impensabled’écarter l’Angleterre d’un rôle de premier plan sur la scène internationale, le Plan Schuman,en prenant acte de l’exception britannique, a incontestablement ébranlé la crédibilitéde la diplomatie anglaise.Après avoir refusé dès juin 1950 de participer aux négociations en vue de la création d’unecommunauté du charbon et de l’acier, le gouvernement anglais poursuit néanmoins les discussions,même si sa position reste floue. Si beaucoup envisagent une association avec le futurmarché commun, les hésitations du gouvernement travailliste, entre juillet 1950 et octobre1951, sont telles qu’elles ont empêché une définition de la forme qu’aurait pu prendre une telleassociation. Le retour au pouvoir des conservateurs a laissé espérer un nouveau départ dans lesnégociations. En janvier et en juillet 1952, ce cabinet prend une initiative avec le Plan Eden,mais sans vraiment renoncer aux préalables exprimés antérieurement. Ainsi, les Anglais suggèrent-ilsune articulation de la CECA avec l’Assemblée du Conseil de l’Europe. Maisl’accueil est très réservé sur la proposition d’un pays dont on a du mal à définir quelle pourrait

106 Book reviews - Comptes rendus - Buchbesprechungenêtre sa place à l’intérieur du dispositif. Surtout, ces propositions sont venues trop tard, à unmoment où les Six inaugurent leur nouvelle solidarité à l’intérieur de la Communauté.En conclusion, Christopher Lord ouvre la problématique en rappelant que ces doutesexprimés par les Britanniques interviennent au moment où la Grande-Bretagne s’interrogesur les raisons de son déclin. Or, en refusant d’adhérer au Pool Charbon-Acier, elle s’est privéedes moyens de moderniser son appareil productif en coupant les producteurs anglais dela compétition internationale. Le constat est sévère pour ce pays et son incompréhension del’environnement international, même si l’auteur admet un effort d’adaptation des Anglaisqui ont cru pouvoir imaginer un statut d’association avec la CECA. Le principal reprocheformulé est de ne pas avoir compris les avantages d’une approche supranationale del’Europe. Enfin, la question est posée de savoir si la période 1950-1952 marque la ruptureirrémédiable entre le Royaume-Uni et l’Europe? L’abstention de 1950 n’a pas empêché denouvelles interrogations en 1957 pour adhérer ou non à la CEE. Mais la décision prise alorsdécoule de celle prise par rapport à la CECA.Pascal BrenneurUniversité de Nancy IIFrances M.B. LYNCH. - France and the International Economy. Front Vichy to theTreaty of Rome. London, Routledge, 1997, 227 p. - ISBN 0-415-14219-9. - 45,00£.Les Uvres sur les relations économiques internationales de la France sont relativement rares, d’oùl’intérêt de celui-ci écrit par une bonne spécialiste de la France contemporaine et de l’économie.Le découpage chronologique est fort attrayant. Le tout est accompagné de nombreuxtableaux statistiques. La période de Vichy est toutefois bien peu développée. L’auteur évoqueclassiquement des questions telles que le rôle du plan Marshall dans le financement du plan demodernisation, l’apport de la France à la reconstruction économique de l’Europe, la libéralisationdes échanges, la modernisation de l’agriculture française qui fait l’objet d’un chapitrecopieux, la marche vers le Marché commun et le retrait de l’empire qui clôture ce Uvre.On ne s’étonnera pas de lire que le plan Marshall a permis à la France de sortir de la crisede 1947 en facilitant le ravitaillement en blé, charbon et en permettant les paiements extérieurs.Mais au-delà de l’aide d’urgence, le plan Marshall a favorisé le financement de lamodernisation et des investissements économiques plus que la consommation. L’auteur rappelleque l’ECA (Economic Cooperation Administration) a calculé que 22% de l’aide a étéaffectée à l’achat de machines pour la fabrication de l’acier. Monnet a réussi à regrouperl’acier français dispersé entre 177 firmes. La naissance d’USINOR avant le plan Marshall etde la SOLLAC pendant le plan, en sont les illustrations. Toutefois on ne peut oublier que leplan Marshall fut aussi le signal du relèvement sidérurgique allemand. La création de laCECA dans ce contexte général de regroupement des industries lourdes en France a étéacceptée peut-être aussi parce qu’elle rappelait aux industriels français l’Entente Internationalede l’Acier d’Emile Mayrisch de 1926. Le plan Marshall a mis à la disposition de l’économiefrançaise des machines-outils sans qu’il suscite pour autant un développement del’industrie française de la machine-outil. Le plan Monnet avait fixé comme objectif 200.000machines à fabriquer en France et 50.000 à importer. Mais beaucoup moins furent fabriquéesdu fait des importations Marshall.Le financement du plan de modernisation a été rendu difficile du fait que les Français onttoujours préféré l’or, dit l’auteur, plutôt que les bons d’Etat. On peut discuter la généralitédu propos. Mais la mobilisation des avoirs à des fins d’investissement a été difficile. L’inflationétait forte et les taux d’intérêts bas. Comment prêter? La dévaluation de 80% en décembre1945 a contribué à rendre méfiants les Français, même si elle était nécessaire. Dans cecontexte, l’existence de la contre-valeur de l’aide américaine a été un élément essentiel pour

Book reviews - Comptes rendus - Buchbesprechungen 107l’investissement. Le mérite des gouvernements de la IV e République fut donc de l’affecterrésolument à cet objet, tout en répondant favorablement aux demandes américaines deréforme fiscale en France. Sur ce dernier point le succès n’a pas répondu aux attentes. Maisde 1948 à 1952 la contre-valeur a représenté 13% de tous les investissements dans l’économiefrançaise. Cette ressource n’a pas empêché toutefois le prélèvement fiscal direct de passerde 15% à 28,6% des revenus de 1938 à 1951.On pourrait se demander pourquoi la France a accepté de jouer le jeu de l’ouverture libéraledans le cadre de l’OECE, alors qu’elle cherchait à bâtir une économie puissante autourd’un projet économique global incluant le développement de toutes les activités économiques.La réponse de Frances M. B. Lynch est que seule l’UEP assurait le cadre dans lequel leflux de dollars Marshall, puis libres, pouvait faciliter l’expansion de l’économie française.C’était reconnaître les limites du projet de développement économique autocentré du planMonnet, constater l’incapacité du marché britannique à fournir des crédits. Cette nécessitéentraînait alors la France vers une certaine mondialisation, comme on dirait aujourd’hui.Ajoutons cette remarque. Il nous semble que les Français avaient pour objectif de restaurerleur puissance économique et politique dans un cadre national et impérial. Mais ils avaientcompris dès 1943 que ce cadre serait trop étroit. Ils ont donc cherché à contrôler la nécessaireouverture vers le grand large, à gagner du temps, en usant de leur influence dans laconstruction économique de l’Europe, la grande comme la petite; la gestion de l’agriculturefrançaise se posait aussi en ces termes. La protection dont les paysans français avaientbesoin nécessitait un accord européen que la PAC offrirait plus tard si on voulait développerla production. Le marché national n’était plus assez large pour justifier une protection nationale.Cette protection était toujours désirée, mais pour un marché européen. D’une certainefaçon la fin de l’empire et de l’aide américaine conduisaient à signer le traité de Marchécommun. Cette thèse nous semble très intéressante d’autant plus que Frances Lynch revientlonguement sur le projet d’union économique franco-britannique de Guy Mollet, rejeté parEden, comme alternative au Marché commun en septembre 1956. Le bilan a été remarquablementpositif pour la France qui a su surmonter deux contraintes: celle d’une politique britanniquequi tournait le dos au continent et celle de la perte de l’empire français dont l’utilitééconomique déclinait en face des potentialités ouvertes par l’aide américaine et la créationd’un grand marché commun.La thèse centrale de ce livre est que l’économie française avait besoin de protection pourse développer mais que cette protection ne pouvait plus être celle du marché national.L’Europe du Marché commun, à défaut d’une entente avec l’empire britannique, a été cenouvel espace. Cette vision est fort intéressante et nous la partageons largement sous lesréserves suivantes. L’auteur semble dire que la force des choses a contraint les Français àaccepter l’Europe du Marché commun. Or le plan Monnet est aussi un acte de puissancepolitique qui ne vient pas des milieux économiques mais du pouvoir politique, relayé parune opinion publique tragiquement désemparée par la défaite de 1940. Le succès de la croissancefrançaise, un succès relatif en termes quantitatifs, doit beaucoup à la volonté nationale.Il me semble qu’il faut aussi prendre en compte ce type de facteurs dans une explicationsur les choix de politique économique extérieure de la France. Mais cette volonté bienréelle a eu le soutien évident, que les Français ne reconnaissent probablement pas assez, duplan Marshall, de l’OECE et de l’UEP, des six pays de la CECA et de la CEE. Bref! Unenouvelle solidarité européenne et l’intérêt bien compris des Etats-Unis d’Amérique ontbénéficié pleinement à l’effort de renouveau français.Gérard BossuatUniversité de Cergy-Pontoise

108 Book reviews - Comptes rendus - BuchbesprechungenJasmine AIMAQ. - For Europe or Empire? French Colonial Ambitions and the EuropeanArmy Plan. Lund, Studies in International History 33, Lund University Press, 1996,311 p. -ISBN 91-9766-371-0. - 118,00 SK.On ne peut que se réjouir que le dossier encore trop délaissé de la Communauté européennede Défense (CED) ait bénéficié de l’intérêt d’un nouveau chercheur. Plus encore lorsquecelui-ci annonce son intention de se consacrer à l’un des aspects les plus stimulants de cettequestion: les liens qui existèrent entre ce projet et les ambitions impériales de la France.Comment une grande puissance coloniale, luttant pied-à-pied pour préserver son influencedans le Sud-Est asiatique, put-elle dans le même temps se lancer avec autant de persévérancedans un projet qui signifiait inévitablement la fin de l’état-nation?Mais les bonnes intentions ne suffisent pas. Autant le dire tout de suite, en dépit de saclarté, l’ouvrage de Yasmine Aimaq ne pourra que décevoir tous ceux qui s’intéressent à laquestion. Sa thèse tient en quelques mots: l’obstination dont firent preuve les Français nes’explique que très partiellement par leur souci de trouver un échappatoire au réarmementallemand. En inventant ce curieux projet, Paris cherchait surtout à reprendre l’initiative enmisant sur l’intérêt de Washington pour l’unification européenne. L’incroyable mauvaisevolonté des Français à ratifier le traité, signé fin mai 1952, ne s’explique pas autrement. Ilsont cherché à durer le plus longtemps possible dans cette position confortable, où ils disposaientd’un extraordinaire moyen de pression sur leurs protecteurs d’outre-Atlantique. End’autres termes, du début à la fin, Paris à milité en faveur de la CED bien plus pour assurerson rang vis-à-vis de Washington, et obtenir des crédits pour la guerre d’Indochine, que pourdes raisons spécifiquement européennes.L’hypothèse est stimulante et mérite qu’on s’y attarde. Vieille antienne de la propagandecommuniste, le thème de la guerre d’Indochine «notre meilleure industrie exportatrice», selonla formule cruelle d’Edgar Faure, a été développé par bien des acteurs. Pour ne rien dire duchantage à la ratification pratiqué par certains dirigeants français après 1952, une fois signé letraité de CED. On sait en particulier combien le gouvernement Laniel joua de cette possibilitéauprès de Washington pour obtenir un soutien américain accru en Indochine. La question estde savoir si, comme le prétend l’auteur, on peut appliquer à la situation de l’automne 1950, desanalyses d’ordinaire développées pour la fin de la période. Or s’il n’est pas niable que les forcesengagées en Extrême-Orient bénéficiaient déjà de l’aide américaine, s’il est évident que ledésastre de Cao Bang la rendit plus nécessaire encore, on ne saurait prétendre que l’impératifindochinois joua un rôle décisif dans la genèse du plan Pleven.«Pour sauver la CECA, j’ai inventé la CED», devait plus tard avouer Jean Monnet. Même sison calcul est loin d’être partagé par l’ensemble des décideurs français, qu’il s’agisse des chefsmilitaires, effondrés devant l’irréalisme du projet, ou de nombreux ministres et parlementaires,qui ne voient dans le plan Pleven qu’une splendide manœuvre dilatoire, il est certain que l’Inspirateura réussi à rallier à ses thèses la majorité du gouvernement. En cet automne 1950, lapriorité est d’abord de sauver le nouveau cours de la politique européenne de la France, initiéede manière spectaculaire par le plan Schuman, quelques mois plus tôt. Cinq ans seulementaprès la fin de la guerre, le réarmement de la RFA, même avec les garanties de l’OTAN, estencore inacceptable, que ce soit pour des raisons psychologiques, sur lesquelles YasmineAimaq glisse avec désinvolture, ou stratégiques. Comment en effet accepter de gaieté de cœurque pareil concurrent vienne disputer à la France le leadership continental...?Certes ce livre «n’est pas une histoire du plan d’armée européenne», comme prend soin de lesouligner l’auteur. Mais peut-on espérer réfléchir sur les liens qui existèrent entre ce projet et lesambitions coloniales de la France sans avoir une connaissance précise de ces dossiers? La listeest malheureusement longue des erreurs qui parsèment l’ouvrage et faussent l’analyse ... Beaucoupauraient pourtant été évitables au prix d’un dépouillement systématique de la bibliographieexistante. Mais si les mémoires de Moch sont abondamment utilisées, combien d’autres man-

Book reviews - Comptes rendus - Buchbesprechungen 109quent à l’appel! Les témoignages pourtant décisifs de Monnet, Alphand, Massigli ou Bidault sontignorés, le Journal du Septennat n’est utilisé que dans sa version raccourcie ... Pour ne rien diredes recherches les plus récentes et déjà disponibles à l’époque où cette étude fut préparée.Bref, les lacunes de la bibliographie sont telles que l’auteur s’enferre dans une visioncaricaturale des événements. Prétendant rompre avec le conformisme de ceux qui l’ont précédée,elle ne fait qu’en inventer un nouveau, faute de s’être donnée les moyens de sonambition intellectuelle. Les carences relevées à propos des origines du plan Pleven se retrouventdans la présentation de bien d’autres épisodes. La relance du printemps 1951, qui aboutità une véritable renaissance du projet, grâce notamment à la conversion des Américains,Eisenhower en tête, est ainsi pratiquement passée par pertes et profits. Une carence plutôtgênante dans le cadre d’une réflexion centrée sur l’étude des relations franco-américaines ...Et comment traiter sérieusement de leurs répercussions sur la guerre d’Indochine lorsquel’on ignore aussi superbement la thèse fondamentale de Laurent Césari sur La France, lesÉtats-Unis et l’Indochine, 1945-1957 (Université de Paris IV-Sorbonne, 1991, 1 272 p.)?L’utilisation intensive de l’un de ses articles ne peut suffire, et l’on est obligé de constaterqu’il y a là plus qu’un défaut occasionnel. D’une manière générale en effet, l’ouvrage manqued’approfondissement. On en voudra pour preuve la présentation des rouages gouvernementauxà laquelle l’auteur se livre au début de son ouvrage. Que dire du tableau synoptiquequi présente les principaux responsables en la matière? Croit-on vraiment que la gestion dela politique extérieure se limite au président du Conseil, à son vice-président et au ministredes Affaires étrangères? Quid de son homologue de la Défense, de ses trois secrétairesd’État (Guerre, Marine, Air) et du ministre des Etats associés?!! Le simple rappel de leursattributions, particulièrement sur des sujets comme la défense européenne ou celle del’Indochine, aurait suffi à dissiper le malentendu. Mais peut-on attendre autant de précisionde la part de quelqu’un qui se plaît à souligner qu’il y eut «seulement deux ministres desAffaires étrangères pendant toute la Quatrième République» (sic)...?Cette vision caricaturale traduit parfaitement le reproche fondamental que l’on peut faireà ce travail. Loin de se réduire à l’affrontement désincarné de deux capitales ou de deuxpays, les relations franco-américaines mettent en jeu une pluralité d’acteurs. L’analyse duState Department n’est pas nécessairement celle du Pentagone, elle-même produit d’uncompromis entre les terriens, les marins et les aviateurs. Une situation que l’on retrouve enFrance, exacerbée. Mais faute d’une analyse sérieuse des réseaux de pouvoir des deux côtésde l’Atlantique, l’auteur en est réduit à faire évoluer des abstractions.Il en va de même pour ce qui est des «French colonial ambitions». Derrière cette expressionvague se cache la dénonciation intransigeante de la guerre d’Inochine, sale guerre onn’en discutera pas, mais qui servit surtout de vecteur à l’insatiable quête du rang. Au contrairede l’Afrique, l’expansion en Extrême-Orient n’a jamais été pleinement acceptée parles élites françaises. Sans remonter jusqu’à la chute du cabinet Ferry, tombé après l’évacuationde Lang Son, rappelons que dès avant 1939, l’un des grands stratèges de l’époque,l’amiral Castex, préconise l’abandon de l’Indochine au profit de l’axe eurafricain. L’hypothèseest plus que jamais d’actualité en cette première moitié des années cinquante. Nombreuxsont les apôtres discrets du «lâchons l’Asie, gardons l’Afrique». Mais la majorité desdirigeants français, reste prisonnière de la dialectique de la grandeur à l’œuvre dans le conflitindochinois. De Dunkerque à Hanoi, la France se tient aux avant-postes de la défense dumonde libre. Abdiquer en Extrême-Orient serait renoncer à l’un des éléments qui fondent cestatut de troisième Grand occidental, déjà si difficile à faire admettre. Loin d’être un dernieravatar du colonialisme de la grande époque, la guerre d’Indochine ne se comprend que parréférence au trauma de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Car contrairement à ce que prétendl’auteur, voilà longtemps que l’Indochine a cessé d’être «la perle de l’Empire»: c’est auMaghreb que se trouve le cœur du projet impérial français, transcendé par ce rêve eurafricainauquel la Guerre froide donne une nouvelle légitimité stratégique.

110 Book reviews - Comptes rendus - BuchbesprechungenParti d’une hypothèse intellectuellement séduisante, appuyée sur une réflexion conceptuelleintéressante, cette recherche promettait beaucoup. Mais il eut fallu nettement plus detravail... Les développements consacrés aux années 1952-1954 en offrent une dernière illustration.La démonstration opérée au sujet des liens existant entre la gestion du dossier indochinoiset celle du dossier de la CED apparaît prometteuse. Mais les références aux archivessont encore trop rares pour emporter l’adhésion sans réserve du lecteur ... Et puis, pas unmot sur les divisions provoquées par la Grande Querelle au sein de la haute armée, et si peusur ses répercussions politiques. Même si l’on a singulièrement exagéré l’importance desfractures qu’elle provoqua au sein des partis, il est certain qu’elles jouèrent un rôle moinsnégligeable que l’auteur ne veut le croire dans l’enlisement du processus de ratification.Le sujet était-il traitable en l’état actuel des recherches? Vraisemblablement non. Il eut fallupour cela que l’auteur puisse s’appuyer sur des travaux définitifs, que ce soit sur les questionscoloniales ou européennes. Or, notre connaissance de la CED est encore bien trop parcellaire.Même chose pour la guerre d’Indochine, où il faudra attendre l’achèvement des thèses entreprisespar Hugues Tertrais sur le coût de ce conflit (Paris I, directeur: René Girault), FrédéricTurpin sur l’attitude des gaullistes (Paris IV, directeur: Georges-Henri Soutou) ou Pierre Grossersur les aspects diplomatiques de la fin du conflit (Institut d’Études politiques de Paris,directeur: Pierre Milza) pour pouvoir aller plus loin. Au total, un ouvrage que l’on doit prendredavantage comme une invite à poursuivre la recherche que comme un achèvement.Philippe Vial,Service historique de la Marine;Université de Paris I Panthéon-SorbonneGuido MÜLLER (ed.). - Deutschland und der Westen: Internationale Beziehungen im20. Jahrhundert - Festschrift für Klaus Schwabe zum 65. Geburtstag. Stuttgart, FranzSteiner Verlag, 1998, 381 pp. - ISBN 3-515-07241-9. - 138,00 sFR.Ever since the creation of the German Reich in 1871, relations between Germany and theWest - i.e., above all, France, Britain, the Benelux countries and the United States - haveconstituted a major challenge to political leaders, political scientists and historians alike.Before limited cooperation and hostility gave way to a lasting attempt for reconciliationafter 1945, Germany’s geographic location, economic power and military force, combinedwith political determination and ideological radicalism, provided for a scenario of tensionand conflict. Yet even after 1945, the unresolved “German Question” continued to have aneffect on European integration that would hardly have taken its present course, had Germanynot questioned the traditional balance of power among European nation-states during WorldWar I and II. And in 1999, the European Monetary Union would most likely not have goneinto effect, had German reunification on October 3, 1990, not posed the threat of renewedGerman predominance - if only in the form of monetary superiority - in the new millenium.Historians and political scientists, looking for an interesting subject to analyze and writeabout, could hardly have asked for more. Klaus Schwabe, a professor emeritus of modernhistory at the Technical University of Aachen and a specialist of histoire contemporaine, hasdevoted much of his academic life to Germany’s complex relationship with the West. Thevolume edited by Guido Müller pays tribute to this eminent scholar who always tried tounderstand and explain the roots of the “Americanization” - or, indeed, “Westernization” -of German politics and culture in the 20th century. Its focus therefore is largely on Europeanintegration, although Professor Schwabe dealt with other subjects as well: the German elitesduring World War I, the development of historiography and, most notably, U.S. PresidentWoodrow Wilson and his policy of peace-making and missionary diplomacy.

Book reviews - Comptes rendus - Buchbesprechungen 111So it seems quite appropriate that the volume starts, after several essays on methodologicalaspects of research in contemporary history and European integration, with contributions on“America’s Mission” following World War I until the present. Wilson’s principles of promotingliberal democratic internationalism “have remained the bedrock of American foreign-policythinking” ever since Wilson stated that the idea of peace depended above all on promotingdemocratic institutions, says Lloyd E. Ambrosius, quoting from Henry Kissinger’s Diplomacy(New York, 1994). “Wilsonianism,” though savaged by critics for three generations, thus had amajor impact on the Americanization of Germany, even if Wilson himself became “a negativebenchmark for Germans concerned with history and the course of world events” after the disappointingVersailles Treaty, as Reinhard R. Doerries notes quite correctly. But Wilson’sapproach to establish a universal order - including the League of Nations - also paved the wayfor European multilateralism that eventually turned into the idea of European integration,despite Wilson’s failure to succeed at the Paris peace talks in 1919.In this respect it is only logical that Peter Krüger follows up with an interesting piece onAristide Briand’s concept of a European confederation and the German and U.S. roles in thedebate that ensued in the autumn and winter of 1929. Even if most of the exchanges werebetween Germany and France, the United States were involved in the discussion - with theDemocrats and Republicans unanimously rejecting the idea of a more unified Europe whichwas then largely seen as a powerful, and potentially dangerous, economic rival to the risingAmerican star. After the devastating experience of World War II, however, everything wasdifferent: Washington not only supported European integration, but insisted on it as a meansof Western stabilization and securing the West against both communist expansion and theresurrection of radical German nationalism (double containment); the governments of theFederal Republic and Western Europe, on the other hand, agreed upon new forms of cooperationthat - despite continuing mistrust, delays and roundabouts - eventually led to the creationof European institutions. In the present volume, Cyril Buffet writes about Franco-Germanrelations after the war, Ennio di Nolfo on Germany and Italy, Michel Dumoulin on theposition of Belgium, Jürgen Elvert on Scandinavia, Michael Gehler on Austria as a countrythat did not join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, and RaymondPoidevin - last but not least - on the Haute Autorité of the European Community for Coaland Steel (ECCS) and the United States from 1950 through 1967.All these essays, as diverse as they may appear at a first glance, reflect the desire of mostEuropean governments after the war to turn away from the traditional patterns and behavior ofthe classical nation-state and to open an era of European integration. Yet they also stress thedifficulties in reaching the compromises that were necessary to establish practical forms ofcooperation between countries that used to be competitors, rivals or, especially in the Germancase, enemies. How painful the process of European integration could be is particularly madeclear by Oliver Bange’s article on Edward Heath and Britain’s European policy in 1963 andFrank Costigliola’s essay on the U.S. reaction to France’s withdrawal from NATO in 1966.The final section of the volume is devoted to current issues. Not surprisingly, most of the contributionsdeal with the effects of German reunification on the future of Europe. Arnulf Baringbelieves that the “European Germany” faces new challenges which could bring back at leastsome of the problems that caused so much confusion and irritation after 1871. The return of thenation-state, he argues, puts Germany in the driver-seat for the stabilization of East-CentralEurope and might lead not only to delays in European integration but also to a revival of resentmentsagainst a more powerful Germany exercising its new sovereignty to create a Germansphere of influence toward the east again. Detlef Junker, on the other hand, stresses that “containmentof Germany has seized to exist as a goal of American foreign policy”, as “America’s successat its central mission in Europe has made this mission superfluous.” Therefore Franco-Germanrelations, Wilfried Loth argues, are ever more important to channel Germany’s greaterresponsibility in a European way, while Gérard Bossuat maintains in his essay on some historical

112 Book reviews - Comptes rendus - Buchbesprechungenaspects of the foreign policy of the European Union that - despite all deficiencies in the past - amore unified approach is needed in the future to prevent dead ghosts from coming back. Europeanintegration, one might conclude, will be as central to the architecture of the newly unifiedEurope as it was to Western Europe during the good old days of the Cold War.Manfred GörtemakerModern History at the University of PotsdamElisabeth du RÉAU (sous la direction de), - Regards croisés et coopération en Europeau XXe siècle, Espace Européen. Collection dirigée par Jean Claude Allain et Elisabethdu Réau, Paris, Presses de la Sorbonne nouvelle, 1996, 212 p.- ISBN 2-87854-109-X.This collection encompassing partly well researched articles, partly what justly should rather becalled statements represents the record of a conference held in 1993 and directed by the editor,who also briefly introduced and concluded the proceedings. This meeting was devoted to thevarying mutual perceptions (regards croisés) and attempts at a cooperation between France andthe Central East European nations with special emphasis on public opinion and cultural relations.The first part dealing with the interwar period introduces the reader to this particular blend bycombining analyses of the Franco-Czech cultural network (Antoine Marès) and exchanges in thefield of fine arts (Laurence Bertrand-Dorléac) with the study of mutual Franco-Polish perceptions(Janine Ponty and Josef Laptos). As the second part focussing on the immediate post-warperiod shows, this transitional phase, introduced by Pierre Gerbet, aroused some illusions as tothe chances of strengthening France’s ties with the former “little entente”. This applied to culturalrelations (Annie Guénard) as well as to the abortive project of a Franco-Czech treaty ofalliance (Isabelle Sallé). Such setbacks inevitably contributed to the French public opinion becomingmore critical of the Soviet Union and its new empire, the only exception being the communistinspired press (Christine Manigand). The Cold War, discussed in part three of this volumeand rightly traced back to the Yalta Conference by René Girault, then became something like aself-fulfilling prophecy, especially for the USSR. This is the topic of one of the most richly documentedcontributions to this publication written by the Russian historian Michael Narinski. Theauthor proves that the Soviet press began to identify non- or anti-Communist voices in WesternEurope as “reactionary-fascist” as early as immediately after Hitler’s defeat. In the Soviet Pressthe Cold War thus started long before Eastern and Western interests openly clashed. A testimonyof the poisoned relations between the Soviet ruled East and Western Europe was the rather dimview French diplomacy and press took of the newly founded German Democratic Republic - aview that soon prevailed over the more friendly attitude initially adopted by former Nazi victims(Chantal Metzger). The final contribution to this section by Gérard Bossuat addresses the issue ofAmerican cultural domination of France in the film market. It is related to the other articles byraising the question of French independence before the backdrop of East-West tensions generatedby the Cold War. The two final pieces by Bernard Haudeville and Frédéric Wehrlé combinedin the fourth section are related to the present in dwelling on opportunities for and limits of aneconomic cooperation between France and post-Soviet Eastern Europe.This volume tackles a set of problems still waiting to be treated in depth and in the totality of the timeframe chosen by the conference. The reader is struck by the discrepancy between euphoric expectationsand the limited possibilities of an effective French diplomacy in East Central Europe during theperiod under discussion. The volume is no more, but also no less than a promising beginning.Klaus SchwabeRWTH Aachen

113Notices - Informations - MitteilungenVIIème Colloque international du Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoireauprès de la Commission des Communautés européennes«Du traité de l’Elysée au sommet de La Haye: le projet européen de 1963 à 1969»(4 au 6 novembre 1999 à Essen)ProgrammeI. Défense européenne et projet MLFL’attitude françaiseLa politique allemandeLa politique européenne de Ludwig ErhardLes tentatives de relance de l’union politiqueGeorges-Henri Soutou, ParisMartin Koopmann, BonnUlrich Lappenküper, BonnCarine Germond, Strasbourg//. Les réalisations des CommunautésLa fusion des exécutifsFranz Knipping, WuppertalLa réalisation de l’union douanièreWolf D. Gruner, RostockLa création de l’organisation du marché agricole Ann-Christina Lauring Knudsen,FlorenceL’expérience de la zone de libre-échange Wolfram Kaiser, CambridgeLe projet de l’intégration monétaireRégine Peron, GenèveIII. La crise de la «chaise vide»L’initiative de Walter HallsteinLa politique des Pays-BasLa politique de l’ItalieLa réaction de Charles de GaulleLa réaction de Gerhard SchröderL’action de Paul-Henri SpaakLes conséquences de «Luxembourg»Matthias Schönewald, WuppertalJan van der Harst, GroningenAntonio Varsori, FlorenceMaurice Vaisse, ParisTorsten Oppelland, JenaMichel Dumoulin, Louvain-la-NeuveN. Piers Ludlow, London

114 Notices - Informations - MitteilungenRéorientationsKiesinger et le départ de HallsteinPhilipp Gassert, WashingtonLa genèse du rapport HarmelHelga Hafendorn, BerlinWilly Brandt, entre Monnet et de Gaulle Andreas Wilkens, ParisLa deuxième demande d’adhésionL’initiative du gouvernement Wilson Alan Milward, FlorenceLa demande du DanemarkJohnny N. Laursen, AarhusLa demande de la NorvègeHans-Otto Fr01and, TrondheimLa demande de l’IrlandeDermot Keogh, DublinLa Suède et la Finlande à l’écartMikael af Malmborg, LundLa réaction de Charles de Gaulle et l’échec Gérard Bossuat, ParisL’effet du mois de mai 1968L’Europe en marge des discoursN.N.La préparation du sommet de La Haye Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, StrasbourgColloque organisé en collaboration avec:Commission des Communautés Européennes, DG XChaire Jean Monnet en histoire, Universität/Gesamthochschule EssenKulturwissenschaftliches Institut im Wissenschaftszentrum Nordrhein-WestfalenResponsable: Wilfried Loth, EssenRenseignements:Prof.Dr.Wilfried LothUniversität Essen, Fachbereich l/Geschichte, D-45117 EssenFax +(49)/201 / 183 35 91 - E-Mail: Loth@uni-essen.de

115Abstracts - Résumés - ZusammenfassungenLorena RuanoElites, public opinion and pressure groups: the British position in agriculture duringnegotiations for accession to the EC, 1961-1975To what extent do the decision-makers have to respect the preferences of society when formulatingpublic policy? Whose opinion is ‘public opinion’? How do public preferences get through the politicalsystem to be taken into account by the decision-maker? These are some of the questions which guidethis study of the British position on the agricultural sector during the negotiations for accession to theEEC. This analysis of opinion polls, of the role of political parties and of interest groups, suggests thatthe ‘defects’ of these interest intermediation mechanisms left ample space for the discretion of decision-makers.Although British negotiators were constrained by certain societal preferences, the ‘public’did not have direct influence on the details of the famous ‘terms of accession’, which dominatedthe debate among elites.Elites, groupes de pression et opinion publique: les négociations d’adhésion à la CEE et laposition britannique en matière d’agriculture. 1961-1975Dans quelle mesure les décideurs doivent-ils respecter les choix de la société lors de la formulation deleurs politiques? Comment ces préférences du public passent-elles dans le système politique pour êtreprises en compte par les décideurs? Quelle opinion est à considérer comme ‘l’opinion publique’?Telles sont seulement quelques-unes des questions soulevées par l’étude de la position britannique enmatière d’agriculture au moment de la négociation d’adhésion à la CEE. L’analyse des sondagesd’opinion, du rôle joué par les partis politiques et les groupes d’intérêt fait ressortir au niveau de latransmission de ces préférences un certain nombre de ‘défauts’ qui abandonnent aux décideurs unegrande latitude et un pouvoir discrétionnaire. Même si les plénipotentiaires britanniques étaient contraintsde prendre en considération certains choix exprimés par la société, le grand public n’a pourtantpas exercé une influence directe sur les détails de la négociation des fameuses ‘conditions d’accès’ quidominèrent le débat des élites.Eliten, Lobbyisten und öffentliche Meinung: die Beitrittsverhandlungen zur EWG und diebritische Haltung in der Agrarfrage. 1961-1975In welchem Masse müssen Entscheidungsträger in ihrer politischen Beschlussfassung Rücksicht aufdie Wünsche der Gesellschaft nehmen? Wie werden diese gesellschaftlichen Vorstellungen in daspolitische Gefüge aufgenommen und inwieweit werden sie von den Entscheidungsträgern auch tatsächlichangenommen? Wessen Meinung kann als ‚öffentliche Meinung‘ gelten? Dies sind nur einigeder Fragen, die sich beim Studium der britischen Beitrittsverhandlungen zur EWG in Sachen Landwirtschaftspolitikaufdrängen. Die Untersuchung der Meinungsumfragen sowie die Analyse der vonden politischen Parteien, bzw. einzelner Lobbyisten verfolgten Ziele, lassen gewisse ‚Mängel‘ im allgemeinenInteressenausgleich erkennen. Dadurch gewinnen die britischen Unterhändler im Rahmender Beitrittsverhandlungen zur EWG beachtlich an Einfluss und Macht. Die Elite musste zwar gewissenAnforderungen der Öffentlichkeit Rechnung tragen, entschied aber letztendlich selbst über dieberüchtigten , Aufnahmebedingungen ‘.

116 Abstracts - Résumés - ZusammenfassungenAnne Dulphy et Christine ManigandFrench public opinion and the European June 1979 electionThe first election for the European Parliament through direct and universal suffrage is a privileged basis for theassessment of the French public opinion, and an incentive to conduct a quantified study from various sourcesthat reflect the elite versus opinion dialectic. The objective for the election is very clear: to satisfy the democraticdeficiencies of an unification process up to now exclusively technocratic, economic and diplomatic.President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was convinced that in France the European consensus has never been sostrong. Howewer this belief comes up against the facts: the increasing anti-European feeling, emphasized bythe attacks from the Communist Party and the right-wing RPR; the lack of enthusiasm for the unificationidea, defended only by cautious Eurocrats or by politicians who find in this vote a possible revenge for the1978 legislature or a prospect for the presidential 1981 election. How to reconcile this evident Europeanfeeling with the vacuum of the European campaign and the lack of interest among the voters?It is necessary first to point out the consistency and the boldness of the European feeling and to confrontit with file principle of the public election. Then the study of the campaign and of the vote itselfleads to question the reality of this new democratic dimension.L’opinion publique française face aux élections européennes de juin 1979Observatoire privilégié de l’état de l’opinion publique française, la première élection du Parlement européen ausuffrage universel direct incite à mener une étude quantifiée à partir de sources variées qui reflètent la dialectiqueélite-opinion. L’enjeu de cette échéance est en effet clair combler le déficit démocratique d’un processusd’unification jusqu’alors exclusivement technocratique, économique et diplomatique.Or la conviction du président Valéry Giscard d’Estaing que «jamais, (en France), le consensus européenn’a été si grand» se heurte au poids des faits: antieuropéisme montant, martelé par les attaques du PC etdu RPR; absence d’emballement pour l’idée d’unification dont les seuls avocats sont, soit des hommespolitiques qui trouvent dans le scrutin une revanche des législatives de 1978 ou une anticipation des présidentiellesde 1981, soit de prudents eurocrates. Comment concilier l’évidence du sentiment européenavec la vacuité cacophonique de la campagne et la faible implication des électeurs?Il convient de relever la constance et la hardiesse du sentiment européen avant de le confronter au principede la consultation populaire. Dans un deuxième temps, étudier la campagne puis le scrutin lui-même amèmeà s’interroger sur la réalités de ce nouvel espace démocratique.Frankreichs öffentliche Meinung und die Europawahl im Juni 1979Die ersten direkten Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament können als ein wichtiges Barometer zur Untersuchungder öffentlichen Meinung in Frankreich genommen werden. Anhand von unterschiedlichen Quellenwird eine quantifizierende Analyse durchgeführt, welche die Diskrepanz zwischen der Elite und demVolk widerspiegelt. Das Ziel der Europawahl ist offenkundig: es gilt den Mangel an Demokratie in einemEinigungsprozess zu überwinden, der bislang ausschliesslich das Interesse der Technokraten, bzw. der wirtschaftlichenund diplomatischen Kreise geweckt hatte.Die persönliche Einschätzung des damaligen französischen Präsidenten Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, derKonsens um Europa sei in Frankreich zu keinem Zeitpunkt bedeutender gewesen, hält allerdings denrealen Begebenheiten nicht stand. Die Wirklichkeit wird geprägt, einerseits durch das zunehmendeantieuropäische Gefühl, das durch Angriffe der kommunistischen Partei und der konservativen RPRentfacht wurde; andererseits durch den Mangel an Begeisterung für eine Einigung deren einzige Verfechterentweder äusserst vorsichtige Eurokraten sind, oder aber Politiker, die Revanche nehmen fürdie Wahlen zur Nationalversammlung von 1978, bzw. die gar bereits die Präsidentschaftswahlen von1981 vorbereiten. Die Frage stellt sich daher, wie das verbreitete proeuropäische Gefühl mit dem ödenWahlkampf und dem geringen Enthusiasmus der Wähler in Einklang zu bringen ist?Es gilt zunächst die Beharrlichkeit und die Entschiedenheit des europäischen Gefühls zu unterstreichen,bevor es mit dem Prinzip der Volksabstimmung konfrontiert wird. Darüber hinaus fuhrt die Untersuchungdes Wahlkampfs und der Wahlen selbst zu der grundlegenden Frage nach der Realität der neuen demokratischenDimension in Europa.

Abstracts - Résumés - Zusammenfassungen 117Julie SmithThe 1975 ReferendumOn 5 June 1975 the British electorate voted to remain in the European Community, or ‘Common Market’as it was typically called. This event was of deep and lasting significance for several reasons relatingto domestic British politics and to the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Community.This article analyses the referendum campaign and its implications for Britain’s membership of theEC. The first section gives a brief overview of Britain’s relationship with the EC prior to accession andconsiders the terms and conditions of entry. The main section then assesses the arguments put forwardduring the campaign, noting that the majority of pro-Europeans tended to play down the politicaldimensions of membership in the referendum campaign, just as they had in the pre-accession debate.The final section looks at the outcome of the referendum, assessing its impact on the British party systemand noting the precedent created by holding a referendum.Le référendum de 1975Le 5 juin 1975, les électeurs britanniques exprimèrent leur choix de rester dans la Communauté européenne,ou plutôt, dans le «Marché commun», comme ils préfèrent s’exprimer. Ce vote a eu une significationprofonde et il exerce une influence durable en Grande-Bretagne, tant sur le plan de la politiqueintérieure qu’au niveau des relations entre le Royaume Uni et la Communauté.La présente contribution analyse la campagne du référendum et ses conséquences. La première partieest consacrée à un bref aperçu des relations du pays avec la Communauté avant son entrée à la CEE;elle effleure aussi les termes et conditions du traité d’adhésion. La partie centrale évalue ensuite lesarguments avancés durant la campagne plébiscitaire, soulignant que la majorité des adeptes del’Europe - à l’instar de ce qu’ils avaient déjà fait pendant le débat précédant l’adhésion - tendaient àminimiser la dimension politique du vote. La section finale s’occupe des conséquences de la consultationpopulaire. Elle révèle son impact sur le système britannique des partis tout en soulignant l’importancedu précédent créé par l’organisation d’un référendum.Der Volksentscheid von 1975Am 5. Juni 1975 stimmen die Briten mehrheitlich für den Verbleib in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft,oder besser, wie sie sich auszudrücken pflegen, im “Gemeinsamen Markt”. Dieser Entschluss hat einetiefe und weitreichende Bedeutung gehabt, sowohl auf dem Gebiet der Innenpolitik des VereinigtenKönigreichs als auch unter dem Gesichtspunkt seines künftigen Verhältnisses zu der EWG.Dieser Artikel analysiert die Kampagne zur Volksbefragung und ihre Auswirkungen auf EnglandsMitgliedschaft in der Gemeinschaft. Ein erster Teil befasst sich zunächst mit den britisch-europäischenBeziehungen vor der Aufnahme des Inselstaates. Er streift auch kurz die Beitrittsbedingungen.Der Hauptteil ist der eigentlichen Kampagne zur Volksbefragung gewidmet und unterstreicht ganzbesonders, wie die europafreundliche Mehrheit versuchte, die politische Dimension einer Mitgliedschaftherunterzuspielen, genauso wie sie dies bereits im Vorfeld der Beitrittsdebatten getan hatte.Zum Schluss wird der Impakt des Plebiszits auf das britische Parteiensystem untersucht. BesondereBedeutung kommt hier dem durch die Volksbefragung entstandenen Präzedenzfall zu.

118 Abstracts - Résumés - ZusammenfassungenG. Wyn ReesBritish Strategic Thinking and Europe, 1964-1970The second half of the 1960s was a formative period in British defence policy as it witnessed the withdrawalof British forces from East of Suez and an increasing focus upon the European theatre. Thisarticle argues that the concentration upon Europe was not the result of a strategic reassessment nor theperception of a growing threat. Rather it resulted largely by default, due to the lack of resources tocontinue to support a global defence policy.La politique de défense britannique et l’Europe (1964-1970)La seconde moitié des années 1960 est une période charnière dans la politique de défense britannique.Elle est caractérisée à la fois par le retrait des forces à l’Est de Suez et un intérêt croissant pour le théâtreeuropéen. Le présent article soutient l’idée que cette réorientation est le résultat, ni d’une révision de lastratégie, ni de la perception d’une quelconque nouvelle menace. Les changements sont plutôt conditionnéspar le manque des ressources indispensables au soutien d’une politique de défense globale!Die britische Verteidigungspolitik und Europa. 1964-1970Die zweite Hälfte der sechziger Jahre ist eine Zeit des Umbruchs in der britischen Sicherheitspolitik.Sie ist gekennzeichnet durch den Rückzug aller Kräfte östlich von Suez und ein zunehmendes Interessefür den europäischen Schauplatz. Der vorliegende Aufsatz vertritt die Auffassung, dass dieseUmorientierung weder das Resultat einer neuen Strategie, noch die Konsequenz einer neuen, drohendenGefahr gewesen ist. Der Wandel wurde vielmehr bedingt durch fehlende Ressourcen, ohne dieeine globale Sicherheitspolitik gar nicht möglich war!

Abstracts - Résumés - Zusammenfassungen 119Andreas WilkensWestpolitik, Ostpolitik and the Project of the Economic and Monetary Union.Germany’s European Policy in the Brandt Era (1969-1974)Referring to new German and French archive material, the article outlines some of the importantthemes and positions of Willy Brandt’s “Europa Politik”. Before analysing the main cornerstones ofBrandt’s West European policy, the author examines in his introduction the consequences of the federalgovernment’s policy of agreements towards its Eastern neighbours. The program agreed upon duringthe European summit conference in The Hague at the beginning of December 1969 provided foran enlargement of the Community as well as for its consolidation, focusing the discussions on themedium-term project to create an economic and monetary union. From 1971, the international monetarycrisis brought to light the difference in German and French interests and concepts and led to apremature breaking off of the experience. The following efforts aiming at a French-German understandingin the monetary question limited themselves to more modest objectives, though on the wholethey represented an important learning process on the difficult way towards the development of aEuropean monetary solidarity.Andreas WilkensWestpolitik, Ostpolitik et le projet de l’Union économique et monétaire.La politique européenne allemande des temps de Willy Brandt (1969-1974)A base d’une série de nouvelles données extraites des archives allemandes et françaises, l’articleretrace quelques thèmes et positions clé de la politique européenne de Willy Brandt. Après avoirsoulevé la question de l’impact de {’Ostpolitik sur les orientations du gouvernement fédéral en matièrede relations internationales, l’étude analyse les principaux éléments de la politique allemande à l’égarddes partenaires de l’Europe occidentale. Depuis le sommet de La Haye en décembre 1969, l’élargissementet l’approfondissement de la Communauté sont à l’ordre du jour Dans ce contexte, le projet del’Union économique et monétaire occupe rapidement une place de choix. Mais la crise monétaireinternationale pèse lourd sur les discussions. A partir de 1971 elle fait éclater au grand jour les intérêtset concepts divergents défendus par les Français d’un côté, les Allemands de l’autre. L’ambitieux projetd’union est suspendu. Il cède la place à la poursuite d’objectifs bien plus modestes qui néanmoins constituentune étape importante dans ce difficile processus d’apprentissage qui aboutira finalement à laformation d’une solidarité monétaire européenne.Andreas WilkensWestpolitik, Ostpolitik und das Projekt der europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion.Deutsche Europapolitik in der Ära Brandt (1969-1974)Der Beitrag skizziert auf der Grundlage neuer deutscher und französischer Archivmaterialien einigeder hauptsächlichen Themen und Positionen der Europapolitik Willy Brandts. Einleitend wird derFrage der Tragweite der Ostvertragspolitik für die außenpolitische Orientierung der Bundesregierungnachgegangen, bevor die wesentlichen Eckpunkte der westeuropäischen Politik analysiert werden.Das auf der europäischen Gipfelkonferenz von Den Haag Anfang Dezember 1969 vereinbarte Programmsah die Erweiterung der Gemeinschaft wie ihre Vertiefung vor, wobei das mittelfristige Projektder Einrichtung einer Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion in das Zentrum der Diskussionen rückte. Dieinternationale Währungskrise ab 1971 ließ die Divergenzen in den deutschen und französischen Interessenund Konzeptionen aufbrechen und führte zu einem vorzeitigen Abbruch des Experiments. Dienachfolgenden Bemühungen um eine deutsch-französische Verständigung in der Währungsfragebeschränkten sich auf bescheidenere Zielsetzungen, bildeten insgesamt jedoch einen wichtigen Lernprozeßauf dem schwierigen Weg zur Herausbildung einer europäischen Währungssolidarität.

Armin von BogdandySupranationaler Föderalismusals Wirklichkeit und Ideeeiner neuen HerrschaftsformZur Gestalt der Europäischen Union nach AmsterdamDer Vertrag von Amsterdam hat in der Fachwelt ein überwiegend negatives Echoausgelöst und wird häufig als unzureichende Korrektur eines unförmigen Gebildesinterpretiert. Das Werk widerlegt diese Ansicht und skizziert die Union imKontrast hierzu als föderales und zugleich supranationales Gemeinwesen.Die zusammenfassende Analyse der Innovationen des Amsterdamer Vertrageszeigt seinen wesentlichen Beitrag zur Fortentwicklung der Union auf: Diese vermagnun die vielfältigen Integrationsbewegungen zu bündeln und vertikale wiehorizontale Verflechtungen im Integrationsverbund zu regeln, sie wird damit zumGaranten einer kollektiven Ordnung. Als weitere Ergebnisse des Vertragsbeschreibt der Verfasser die Fortschreibung der Vertragsziele und -kompetenzen,die Schärfung der territorialen und bürgerschaftlichen Ausrichtung sowie dieKonsolidierung der Union als einheitliche Organisation mit polizentrischer politischerStruktur ohne Gewaltmittel.Das Buch wendet sich an alle, die sich, insbesondere in Rechts- und Politikwissenschaft,mit der Verfassungsentwicklung in der Europäischen Union befassen.Der Verfasser ist Professor für Öffentliches Recht an der Goethe-UniversitätFrankfurt a. M.1999, 82 S., brosch., 28-DM, 204-öS, 26-sFr, ISBN 3-7890-6006-2(Forum Rechtswissenschaft, Bd. 28)NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft76520 Baden-Baden

121Contributors - Auteurs - AutorenAnne DULPHY, Chercheur associé au Centre d’histoire de l’Europe du XXèmesiècle (FNSP). Maître de conférences à l’Ecole polytechnique et à l’Institut d’étudespolitiques de Paris.Adresse professionnelle: Ecole polytechnique, département Humanités et sciencessociales, 91128 Palaiseau Cedex, France.Tel: 01 69 33 40 47Fax: 01 69 33 34 27Adresse personnelle: 35, rue Olivier de Serres, 75015 Paris, France.Tel: 01 40 43 94 99Fax: 01 48 28 29 48Christine MANIGAND, Maître de conférences à l’Université du Maine et à l’Institutd’études politiques de Paris.Adresse professionnelle: Université du Maine, faculté des Lettres et scienceshumaines, avenue Olivier Messiaen, 72085 Le Mans Cedex 9, France.Tel: 02 43 83 31 64Fax: 02 43 83 31 44Adresse personnelle: 6, avenue de Lowendal, 75007 Paris, France.Tel: 01 45 56 11 84Julie SMITH, Centre of International Studies, Fitzwilliam House, 32 TrumpingtonStreet, Cambridge, CB2 1QY.Tel: 01223 335 333Fax: 01223 331 965Email: jes42@cam.ac.ukLorena RUANO, International Relations, D. Phil. Candidate, Nuffield College,OX1 INF, Oxford.Email: Lorena.ruano@nuffield.ox.ac.ukG. WYN REES, University of Leicester, University Road, Leicester LE1 7RHEngland.Tel: 0116 252 2700Fax: 0116 252 5082Andreas WILKENS, Institut Historique Allemand, Deutsches Historisches InstitutParis, Hôtel Duret de Chevry, 8, rue du Parc-Royal, F-75003 Paris.Tel: 0033 1 42 71 56 16Fax: 0033 142 71 56 43

Wulfdiether Zippel (Hrsg.)Die Mittelmeerpolitik der EUDie Mittelmeer-Region ist heute mit Entwicklungen konfrontiert, deren weitererVerlauf für die künftige Sicherheit Europas von besonderer Bedeutung ist. Durchdie 1995 in Barcelona unterzeichnete Deklaration sind die EU und ihre Mitgliedstaatenfür zwölf Mittelmeer-Anrainer ein Partner im Rahmen vielschichtiger vertraglichdefinierter Beziehungen.Die Beiträge behandeln acht zentrale Fragestellungen: die Problematik des Dialogszwischen den unterschiedlichen Kulturen; die Mittelmeerpolitik der EU imSpannungsfeld unterschiedlicher Interessenlagen von ihren Anfängen bis zurGegenwart; die institutionellen und prozeduralen Restriktionen der EU-Mittelmeerpolitik;die geplante euro-mediterrane Freihandelszone aus entwicklungsundintegrationspolitischer Sicht; die EU-Türkei-Beziehungen und die Rolle derTürkei im Nahen Osten und in Zentralasien; der Zypernkonflikt und möglicheLösungsbeiträge der EU; wirtschaftliche Kooperations- und Entwicklungspotentialein einem befriedeten Nahen Osten; der Nahost-Friedensprozeß und die (mögliche)Rolle der EU.Der Tagungsband ist für die Wissenschaft und die Praxis von Interesse.1999, 184 S., brosch., 58-DM, 423-öS, 52,50 sFr, ISBN 3-7890-5918-8(Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises Europäische Integration e.V., Bd. 44)NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft76520 Baden-Baden

123Books received - Livres reçus - Eingegangene BücherPhilippe CLARET. - La personnalité collective des nations. Théories anglo-saxonneset conceptions françaises du caractère national. Bruxelles, Bruylant,1998, p. ISBN 2-8027-1107-5.Michel DUMOULIN. - Spaak. Bruxelles, Editions Racine, 1999, 768 p. - ISBN2-87386-162-2. - 1295,00 FB, 225,00 FF.Antoine FLEURY, Lubor JILEK. - Le Plan Briand d’Union fédérale européenne.Actes du colloque tenu à Genève. - Bern • Berlin • Frankfurt amMain • New York • Paris • Wien, Peter Lang AG, 1998, 610 p. - ISBN3-906760-61-8. - 82,00 sFr.Vassilis FOUSKAS. - Italy, Europe, the Left. The Transformation of ItalianCommunism and the European Imperative. Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998, 270p. - ISBN l-84014-450-5.(hardback) - 40,00 £.Ray HUDSON & Allan M. WILLIAMS. - Devided Europe. Society and Territory.London, Sage Publications, 1998, 315 p. - ISBN 0-7619-5752-9 (hardback)55.00 £, - 0-7619-5753-7 (paperback), 16,99 £.Vendelin HREBLAY. - Les accords de Schengen, origine, fonctionnement, avenir.Pratique du droit communautaire. Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1998, 196 p. -ISBN 2-8027-1156-3. - 1.200,00 FB.Tapani PAAVONEN. - Suomalaisen protektionismin viimeinen vaihe. Suomenulkomaankauppa- ja integraatioplitiikka 1945-1961. Helsinki, 1998, 381p. - ISBN 951-710-087-6. ISNN 0073-2559.Wolfgang Hans STEIN (bearbeitet von). - Die Akten des Wälder-Departementsim Landeshauptarchiv Koblenz 1794 - 1816. Inventar der Bestände 300(Wälder-Departement) und 352 (Generalgouvernementskommissariat desMittelrheins für das Wälder-Departement). Veröffentlichungen der LandesarchivverwaltungRheinland-Pfalz. Band 80.Koblenz, 1998, 286 p. -ISBN3-931014-41-X, ISSN 0556-834X.Antonio VARSORI. - L’Italia nelle relazioni internazionali dal 1943 al 1992.Roma - Bari, Laterza & Figli Spa, 1998, 277 p. - ISBN 88-420-5645-6. -40.000,00 Lire.

124 Books received - Livres reçus - Eingegangene BücherMartin WESTLAKE. - L’Union européenne au-delà d’Amsterdam. Nouveauxconcepts d’intégration européenne. Bruxelles, 1998, 249 p. - ISBN90-5201-809-10. - 1150,00 BEF.160,00 FF. 27,50 £.DUDEN - Praxiswörterbuch zur neuen Rechtschreibung. 1. Auflage. Herausgegebenund bearbeitet von der Dudenredaktion, Mannheim • Leipzig • Wien •Zürich, Dudenverlag, 1998, 432 S. - ISBN 3-411-70611-2. - 24,90 DM.

DiplomaticHistoryThe Journal of the Society for Historians ofAmerican Foreign RelationsEdited by Michael J. HoganDiplomatic History, the journal of record for the Society for Historians ofAmerican Foreign Relations (SHAFR), is the only journal devoted to U. S.international history and foreign relations, broadly defined, including grandstrategy, diplomacy, and issues involving gender, culture, ethnicity, andideology. It examines U.S. relations in a global and comparative context, and itsbroad focus appeals to a number of disciplines including political science,international economics, American history, national security studies, LatinAmerican, Asian, African, and European studies.Recent and forthcoming highlights:Symposium: Rethinking the Lost Chance in ChinaIntroduction: Was There a ‘Lost Chance’ in China? Warren I. CohenThe Myth of America’s ‘Lost Chance’ in China: A Chinese Perspective in Lightof New Evidence Chen JianLittle Chance John W. GanzerThe Triumph of Internationalism: CCP-Moscow Relations Before 1949 MichaelShengLosses, Chances, and Myths: The United States and the Creation of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1950 Odd Ame WestadDiplomatic History, ISSN 0145-2096, 4 issues per yearSubscription Rates, Vol. 23/1999: Institutions: N. America $99; Rest of World $118To subscribe to Diplomatic History, or for information on becoming a member of SHAFR,contact either of the following:• Journals Subscription Dept (DIPH), Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Maiden,MA 02148, USA. Tel. (781) 388 8200, fax (781) 388 8232, email:subscrip@blackwellpub.com• Customer Services Dept, Blackwell Publishers Journals (DIPH), PO Box 805, 108Cowley Road, Oxford 0X4 1FH, UK. Tel: +44 (0)1865 244083, fax +44 (0)1865381381SPECIAL OFFER for 1999Electronic access included in the institutionalsubscription price to the print editionFor more information visit our websitehttp://www.blackwellpub.com

Peter-Christian Müller-Graff/Eibe Riedel (Hrsg.)Gemeinsames Verfassungsrechtin der Europäischen UnionDie Frage nach gemeinsamem Verfassungsrecht in der Europäischen Union stelltsich aus unterschiedlichen Sichtwinkeln: auf der Ebene der Mitgliedstaaten horizontalrechtsvergleichend unter dem Gesichtspunkt übereinstimmender Ausprägungenund Wurzeln der nationalen Verfassungssysteme; auf der Ebene derEuropäischen Union vertikal gemeinschaftsrechtlich und unionsrechtlich unterdem Gesichtspunkt von Übereinstimmungen des europäischen Primärrechts zuden nationalen Verfassungsordnungen und von Wechselwirkungen zwischen beidenEbenen.Die Thematik wird in diesem Tagungsband auf drei Themengebieten erschlossen:der Frage nach den Grundlagen eines gemeineuropäischen Verfassungsdenkensund Verfassungsrechts, derjenigen nach einzelnen möglichen gemeineuropäischenVerfassungsprinzipien z.B. Wettbewerbsverfaßte Marktwirtschaft, Begründungund Ausübung von Hoheitsgewalt, gerichtliche Kontrolle von Legislative undExekutive) und derjenigen nach den Perspektiven gemeineuropäischer Verfassungsprinzipien(u.a. Verfassungsentwicklung der Union im Verhältnis zu mitgliedstaatlichenVerfassungsentwicklungen).Das Werk richtet sich an alle am Europarecht und am nationalen und vergleichendenVerfassungsrecht Interessierte.1998, 307 S., brosch., 78-DM, 569-öS, 71,-sFr, ISBN 3-7890-5184-5(Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises Europäische Integration e.V., Bd. 43)NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft76520 Baden-Baden

Alexis Jacquemin/Lucio Pench (Hrsg.)Europa im globalen WettbewerbBerichte des Rats für WettbewerbsfähigkeitMit einem Vorwort von Jacques SanierDie Berichte des Rates für Wettbewerbsfähigkeit befassen sich mit der politischen,wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit Europas und ihrerWeiterentwicklung.Der Rat für Wettbewerbsfähigkeit ist eine unabhängige Gruppe führender Industrieller,Gewerkschafter, Politiker und Wissenschaftler, die den Auftrag hat, dieEuropäische Kommission und die Staats- und Regierungschefs der Mitgliedstaatender Europäischen Union zu beraten.Die zunehmende Interdependenz im Welthandel und die daraus folgende Globalisierungder Wirtschaft erfordern eine neue Politik, um Wachstum und Beschäftigungzu sichern und den Lebensstandard sowie den sozialen Zusammenhalt zuverbessern. Der Rat für Wettbewerbsfähigkeit sieht die Notwendigkeit, die Informationsgesellschaftin Europa zu entwickeln, die Technologielücke zwischenWeltregionen zu schließen und eine größere Solidarität in internationalen Handelsfragenanzustreben.Das Buch ist an Politiker, Regierungsberater, Unternehmer und Wissenschaftlergerichtet, die sich mit der Zukunft der europäischen Wirtschaft und Gesellschaftauseinandersetzen.Herausgegeben und eingeleitet wird das Buch von Prof. Alexis Jacquemin undLucio R. Pench, Mitglieder der Gruppe für prospektive Analysen der EuropäischenKommission.1999, 182 S., brosch., 69-DM, 504-öS, 62,50 sFr, ISBN 3-7890-5821-1NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft76520 Baden-Baden

Josef Drexl/Karl F. Kreuzer/Dieter H. Scheuing/Ulrich Sieber (Hrsg.)Europäische DemokratieDie Auseinandersetzung mit Grandfragen demokratischer Legitimation und Kontrolledes europäischen Integrationsprozesses ist heute mehr denn je geboten.Der Band vereinigt sieben Beiträge zu dieser Thematik. Zunächst wird die Fragenach der Demokratiefähigkeit der Europäischen Union beleuchtet von Prof. Dr.Manfred Zuleeg (Universität Frankfurt am Main, ehem. Richter am Gerichtshofder Europäischen Gemeinschaften), von Prof. Dr. Peter M. Huber (UniversitätJena) und von Prof. Dr. Constance Grewe (Université Robert Schuman, Strasbourg).Prof. Dr. Christian Tomuschat (Humboldt-Universität, Berlin) und Prof.Dr. Stefan Kadelbach, LL.M. (Universität Münster) untersuchen anschließend dieBedeutung der Unionsbürgerschaft.Zwei Beiträge zur Rolle des Europäischen Parlaments runden den Band ab: Dr.h.c. Diemut R. Theato, MdEP, behandelt Probleme der Haushaltskontrolle durchdas Europäische Parlament, und Prof. Dr. Meinhard Hilf (Universität Hamburg)würdigt die Mitwirkung des Europäischen Parlaments an der Gestaltung derAußenbeziehungen der Europäischen Union.Der Band dokumentiert die Vorträge der »4. Würzburger Europarechtstage«, dieim Sommer 1998 von der Juristischen Fakultät der Universität Würzburg veranstaltetwurden.1999, 146 S., brosch., 46-DM, 336-öS, 42,50 sFr, ISBN 3-7890-6019-4(IUS EUROPAEUM, Bd. 6)NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft76520 Baden-Baden

Annual subscription: 75, - DM / 1500,- fb/250,- ff /30,- £/47,- $, including postage and packingSingle issues: 40,- DM / 800,- fb/135,- ff/16,- £/25,-$Payments can be made- by cheques payable to NOMOS Verlag- by bank transfers to Stadtsparkasse Baden-Baden,account no 5 002 266, bank clearing number(Bankleitzahl 66 250030) in the name of NOMOS.Please ensure you quote the Journal of EuropeanIntegration History when instructing your bank andenclose a copy of your instructions to the bank withyourorder.- by credit card (VISA, Masters, Eurocard).Subscriptions and orders should be sent to: NOMOSVerlagsgesellschaft, D-76520 Baden-Baden, Germany.Inquiries concerning advertisements should besent to the Editorial Secretariat, Centre d’études et derecherches européennes Robert Schuman, 4 rue JulesWilhelm, L-2728 Luxembourg.JOURNAL OK EUROPEANINTEGRATION HISTORYREVUE D’HISTOIRE DEL’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNEZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DEREUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION

JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORYThe purpose of The Journal of European Integration History is to encourage theanalysis and understanding of different aspects of European integration, especiallysince 1945, in as wide a perspective as possible. The Journal publishes theconclusions of research on diplomatic, military, economic, technological, socialand cultural aspects of integration. Numbers devoted to single themes as well asto diverse subjects are published in English, French or German. Each numberincludes reviews of important, relevant publications.REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNEL’objectif de la Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne est de promouvoir l’analyseet la compréhension des différents aspects de l’intégration européenneparticulièrement depuis 1945, mais sans exclusive. La Revue publie les résultats desrecherches sur les aspects diplomatiques, militaires, économiques, technologiques,sociaux et culturels de l’intégration. Les numéros à thème ou ceux ouverts à diversesperspectives sont publiés dans l’une des langues suivantes: anglais, français, allemand.Chaque numéro comprend des comptes rendus d’ouvrages importants.ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DEREUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATIONDie Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration bietet ein Forum zurErforschung des europäischen Integrationsprozesses in allen Aspekten: den politischen,militärischen, wirtschaftlichen, technologischen, sozialen und kulturellen.Ihren Schwerpunkt bilden Beiträge zu den konkreten Einigungsprojekten seit1945, doch werden auch Arbeiten zu den Vorläufern und Vorbereitungenpubliziert. Die Zeitschrift erscheint zweimal im Jahr. Neben Themenheften stehen„offene“ Ausgaben, und jedesmal werden auch Besprechungen wichtigerNeuerscheinungen veröffentlicht. Die Beiträge eines internationalenAutorenkreises erscheinen in englischer, französischer oder deutscher Sprache.1999, Volume 5, Number 1NOMOS VerlagsgesellschaftBaden-Baden