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ResearchReportStrategies to supportSouth Africansmallholders asa contribution togovernment’s secondeconomy strategyVolume 2: Case studiesEdited by Michael AliberReport commissioned by the second economy strategy projectPLAASInstitute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian StudiesSchool of Government • EMS Faculty

Project teamRauri Alcock, Church Agricultural ProjectsMichael Aliber, University of the Western CapeMike Antwi, North-West UniversityMompati Baiphethi, Human Sciences Research CouncilAbenet Belete, University of LimpopoBen Cousins, University of the Western CapeRick de Satge, Phuhlisani SolutionsJonathan Denison, Umhlaba Consulting GroupLarry Field, Umhlaba Consulting GroupTim Hart, Human Sciences Research CouncilPeter Jacobs, Human Sciences Research CouncilIrvine Mariga, University of LimpopoPatrick Masika, University of Fort HareSimeon Materechera, North-West UniversityDavid Mayson, Phuhlisani SolutionsNomakhaya Monde, University of Fort HareBarbara Tapela, University of the Western CapeWim van Averbeke, Tshwane University of TechnologyResearch assistantsTB Khosa, Tshwane University of TechnologySimon Letsoalo, Tshwane University of TechnologyMaite Mafa, University of LimpopoThemba Maluleke, University of the Western CapeTshililo Manenzhe, University of the Western CapeNape Mothapo, University of LimpopoGugu Mbatha, Church Agricultural ProjectsEric K Ralivhesa, Tshwane University of TechnologyMpfariseni Thagwana, University of the Western Capeiv

ResearchReport1 Abalimi Bezekhayaand the Philippi FreshProduce Market initiatives:contrasting attempts tostimulate smallholderagriculture in metropolitanCape TownRick de Satge, Phuhlisani SolutionsIntroductionThis case study provides a comparative analysisof two different initiatives designed to promotethe smallholder sector in metropolitan CapeTown.The City of Cape Town has developed an urbanagriculture policy and initiated a joint venturebetween itself, the Provincial Department ofAgriculture and private sector partners to putin place a fresh produce market in the Philippiarea. The objective of the market is to providethe “suction force to enable the establishmentof more than 2 500 emerging farmers and thedevelopment of more than 5 000 hectares offarmland over a five-year period in the Philippiand Cape Flats area” (Provincial Government ofthe Western Cape, 2006).Abalimi Bezekhaya is an NGO with over 20 yearsof experience in supporting homestead growersand group gardens. It has focused on developinga comprehensive range of services to promoteand ‘push’ small farmers to find their place ina production continuum encompassing survivalist,subsistence, livelihood and commercial scalesand modes of production. Abalimi supplies smallfarmers with inputs and infrastructure, providestechnical advice and institutional support, andrecently introduced a planned production andmarketing process known as the Harvest ofHope.We examine what is involved in these differentinitiatives which aim to pull or push smallgrowers into production and the market place.We profile the Philippi fresh produce market initiativeand the services provided by Abalimi. Weexamine the three groups which Abalimi characteriseas their most successful. In the processwe assess what must be put in place to developan enabling environment for a more vibrantand sustainable urban agriculture sector whichenhances household food security and generateslivelihood opportunities at different pointsalong the value chain and identify lessons forimproved policy and practice.ContextThe Western Cape is the second most urbanisedprovince in South Africa (89% of the populationis designated as urban), second only to Gauteng(for which the figure is 97%). According to theHSRC, it is also the province that experiencedthe fastest rate of annual population growth inthe country between 1996 and 2001, at 2% perannum (Kok, O’Donovan, Bouare, and van Zyl,2003). During this period the Western Cape experiencedthe highest net in-migration of metropolitanareas in South Africa, which accountedfor approximately 58% of population growthwithin the City. The rapid growth of the City isassociated with the urbanisation of poverty.1

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.2The 2003 Provincial Growth and DevelopmentStrategy, iKapa Elihlumayo, highlights the concentrationof extreme poverty in the province’surban centres. It observes that in the WesternCape, unlike many other parts of South Africa,the cities are where the poor live while the ruralareas are home to many of the wealthy.In the Western Cape 57% of households earnless than R3500 per month, and of those morethan half earn less than R1500. This economicprofile means that “the majority of the populationgenerally cannot afford service charges,let alone meeting home ownership obligations”(Department of Local Government and Housing,2007: 25).Smallholder agriculture as a povertyreduction strategyIn a context characterised by acute urban poverty,the low levels of skill of many of those inpoverty and high levels of unemployment, differentapproaches have been taken to try tostimulate small-scale agriculture within the Cityon the assumption that it represents a viablepoverty reduction and livelihood strategy. Interventionsto grow small-scale agriculture takedifferent forms. They range from policy formulationand investment in infrastructure developmentprojects through to small-scale support initiativesproviding a complete basket of servicesand facilitated market access.At one end of the continuum, the City of CapeTown has developed an urban agriculture policyand invested R35 million in a fresh produce marketin Philippi in a joint venture with the Departmentof Agriculture and private sector partners.However, this investment and infrastructure-ledapproach shows few signs of securing a returnon investment in the short term, as many of thesmall-scale farmers which the market is supposedto serve have either yet to ‘emerge’ or arenot yet a viable productive force. Overall, thereremains a significant gap between the assumptionsof policy and the complex realities whichcharacterise small-scale production initiatives onthe ground.These ‘complex realities’ are highlighted by theexperience of Abalimi Bezekhaya (“Planters ofthe Home”), a registered Non Profit Organisation(NPO) founded in 1982 which provides supportservices such as supply of low-cost bulkcompost, seed and seedlings, training and onsiteproject extension to groups and individualsin townships and informal settlements. Abalimiis based at the Business Place in Philippi, CapeTown. It runs two non-profit People’s GardenCentre’s in Nyanga and Khayelitsha, which annuallysupply agriculture and horticulture inputsto an estimated 2000 to 3000 home-based survivalistand subsistence gardeners and approximately200 community agriculture and greeningprojects on public land.With the introduction of their Harvest of Hopemarketing initiative in 2007, Abalimi have begunto provide an ‘outgrower’ model through whichgroups and individuals are contracted to groworganically grown but uncertified vegetables.These are harvested weekly and are sorted andpacked into vegetable boxes which are deliveredto collection points where they are picked up bysuburban consumers who sign up for the service.Abalimi provides these groups with comprehensiveservices and support as well as a significantsubsidy to enable them to begin to access themarket.The methodologyThe preparation of this case study has involvedthe following elements:• A rapid review of the literature on urban agricultureinternationally with particular referenceto Africa;• A review of the documentation informingthe development of the urban agriculturepolicy of the City of Cape Town;• A semi-structured interview with StanleyVisser, an official in the City of Cape Town’seconomic development unit who has overallresponsibility for urban agriculture policy developmentand support;• Telephonic and e-mail follow-up with stakeholdersinvolved in the Philippi Fresh ProduceMarket.• Attendance of an introductory Harvest ofHope tour involving a visit to the Eden gardenin Khayelitsha and a tour of the packhouse facility and surrounds at the BusinessPlace in Philippi;• An interview with five members of Abalimi’sfield support team;• Three separate interviews with membersof the Fezeka, SCAGA and Eden producergroups.

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Figure 1.1: Map of different land uses in the Cape Townmetropolitan areaMap source: http://planet.uwc.ac.za/nisl/Conservation%20Biology/Conservation_CCT/rural_plan_for_ CAPE%20Town.pdf4

ResearchReportCity of Cape Town is also under threat from urbanexpansion.The map on the following page highlights differentland uses in Cape Town.Agricultural land in Cape Town is also increasinglythreatened by a mix of illegal dumpingand occupation of public and private land toestablish informal settlements. A number ofconstraints have been identified which currentlylimit the growth and livelihood potential of urbanhorticulture and livestock keeping. Theseinclude (City of Cape Town, 2008):Conflicts of interest between livestock keepersand City officials (livestock keepers benefit fromgrazing their livestock on open land adjacent towhere they stay in that they do not pay grazingfees and remain in close proximity to localmarkets);• Lack of data on urban farming activities inthe area;• Insufficient agricultural knowledge andskills amongst urban farmers;• Lack of access to and affordability of water;• Availability of suitable land;• Very weak linkages to the commercial agriculturalsector in terms of supplies, marketingand sharing of opportunities;• Low level of alignment and coordinationbetween all main role-players;• Lack of tools and production inputs.Production in the CityStats SA Agricultural Census of 2002 indicatesthe extent of vegetable production within theCity of Cape Town. However, a reliable profileof who is actually growing and marketing thisproduce does not appear to be available.The Philippi horticultural area (PHA)A recent situation analysis for the MDP/PhilippiAgricultural Project (City of Cape Town, 2008)surveyed and assessed urban agricultural activitiesin the Philippi area between the R300 andLansdowne Road. The Philippi Horticultural Area(PHA) totals 3074 hectares in extent, howevercurrently only 60% (1800 hectares) of the potentiallyproductive land in the PHA is used toproduce vegetables. Growers mainly supply theEpping Market and/or grow on contract to chainstores. Currently it is estimated that about 2000people are (self-) employed in the PHA in varyingcapacities.It is in this area that the Philippi Fresh ProduceMarket has been constructed (see below) andwhere Abalimi Bezekhaya has its offices in thePhilippi Business Place – one of eight centressupported by Investec to grow small business inSouth Africa and Botswana. In Philippi, Investechas partnered with the American Tobacco Company,Abalimi Bezekhaya, and the SustainabilityInstitute. Investec acquired 11 hectares of vacantland around a defunct cement factory and seeksto develop the area into a site which will com-Table 1.1.: Overview of vegetable production in Cape Town,2002Type of vegetable Planted (Ha) Production (tons)Potatoes 489 12 274Tomatoes 85 2 949Cauliflower 194 4 768Cabbage 465 19 113Onions 115 2 559Beetroot 38 522Carrots 548 17 189Sweet potatoes 15 121Green beans 183 1 213Pumpkins 117 1 942Other 1 386 34 2485

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.bine housing and urban agricultural opportunities.Currently (2008) the plan is to sell or leasesmall plots to local growers for income-generatingcropping initiatives and subsistence foodgardening programmes.The urban agriculture policy processThe development of an urban agriculture policyfor the City of Cape Town has taken over fiveyears to be approved – partly a reflection of thechanging political character of successive municipaladministrations and the ongoing restructuringassociated with the adoption of a unicity inSeptember 2000.An additional complication was that the Constitutionof South Africa does not list agriculture asa function of local government and, “therefore,a lot of motivation and lobbying was necessaryduring the consultative process to convince citycouncil decision makers that the developmentof urban agriculture should be viewed as partand parcel of poverty alleviation and economicdevelopment, which are the concurrent responsibilityof all spheres of government” (Visser,2006).The City of Cape Town hosted the first ‘UrbanAgricultural Summit’ on 8-9 May 2002 in orderto initiate the process of formulating an urbanagricultural policy for the City of Cape Town.This included an attempt to determine thecurrent status of urban agriculture in the City,which was characterised as a “superficial assessment”(Visser, 2006).The following year, the City hosted the a followupsummit, on 18-20 June 2003, at which it introducedthe draft urban agriculture policy, discussedlivestock keeping in the City, and soughtto identify urban agricultural opportunities inthe City.The period between the second summit and thefinal adoption of the policy in March 2007 appearsto have largely been spent securing politicalapproval in a fiercely contested council environment.The City of Cape Town claims to be thefirst city in South Africa to have developed anurban agriculture policy. This has four overarchinggoals:• To enable the poorest of the poor to utiliseurban agriculture as an element of their survivalstrategy (household food security)• To enable people to create commercially sustainableeconomic opportunities throughurban agriculture (jobs and income)• To enable previously disadvantaged peopleto participate in the Land Redistributionfor Agricultural Development (LRAD) programmein attempts to redress imbalances• To facilitate human resources development(technical, business and social skills training).The City of Cape Town distinguishes betweenfour different types of operations:• Home producers – home dwellers usingtheir own gardens to grow vegetables and/or keep animals on a small scale in order tosupplement the family diet• Community groups – a group of people whoproduce food collectively for themselves orfor a community institution, mostly on publicland• Micro-farmers – individuals or groups ofpeople involved in urban agriculture togenerate an income on small pieces of unutilised(private or public) land• Small emerging farmers – individuals orgroups of people who are or aspire to befull-time farmersWhile community groups can count on varioustypes of assistance, home producers are supportedonly with small tools, basic production inputsand some extension services; excluded is assistancewith acquiring access to land or infrastructureas the Municipal Finance Management Act(MFMA) states that municipal capital may not beused to improve private assets (such as privateland) (Visser, 2006).The policy sets out to (City of Cape Town,2007b):• include urban agriculture in land use managementand physical planning• create linkage with other strategies• establish urban agricultural consultative forums• build strategic partnerships• release municipal land for urban agriculturalpurposes6

ResearchReportAccording to MBB, other role players in the strategyinclude an input supply company to provideseed, compost, fertiliser and planting programmesfor the correct cultivars to the farmers,and the extension officers of the Department ofAgriculture, who should visit the projects regularlyto ensure that the planting programmesare followed. The farmers will be responsible topre-sort their produce before it is sent to (or collectedby) the Market. This strategy was reportedto “still be in a developmental phase” (ibid).According to MBB the Market is currently about70% occupied, and combines food processors, abakery, fresh produce traders, a fresh producewholesaler, a fresh produce pack house (focusingon procuring produce from small farmers),a banana ripening and fresh produce exporter,and a dairy outlet. Furthermore, the market isin the process of establishing fresh produce productionon site for supplying the market, as wellas a vermiculture composting unit to compostorganic waste generated on-site into compostfor small farmers.MBB highlights that the major challenges remaintransport for small producers and finding away to coordinate supply from small producers,since individually the supply is still not consistentenough.MBB argues that the Market is still a new venturewhich is in a building and marketing phase.People of the surrounding area rather buy theirproduce from where they bought it for the pastdecade then at the new market; however it isanticipated that this will change over time. Thelow number of customers coming to the marketrelates to low volumes kept by the traders,which increases the prices which results in fewerpeople buying from the market – in other words,a vicious circle. The market has to secure a largervolume of customers to buy produce to increasethe volume that can be kept on hand to improvethe profitability of the tenants.MBB reports that:“[S]mall farmers that do not want to supplythe Philippi Market but rather try to markettheir produce elsewhere (like Cape Town/Epping Market) despite them complainingthat their produce is not sold at Epping(another vicious circle – the farmers probablydo not want to supply the market because ofthe low number of people buying from themarket, but more people would buy fromthe market if more produce were availableat competitive prices)”. (ibid)The Philippi Market model is based on privatebusinesses renting space from the Philippi MarketOperating Company, and trying to sourcesome of their produce from emerging farmers.An important factor of the model is thus thedrivers of these businesses – the nature of agriculture(and especially the resource-poor sector)requires dynamic businesses willing to pursuethe goal despite the challenges and the set-backsthat are more common than with the traditionalcommercial sector. MMB notes that sufficienttime should also be allowed for these businessesto establish themselves; the time required to establishoneself in agriculture and agribusiness(and once again especially for the resource-poorsector) should not be underestimated.Abalimi Bezekhaya and the‘Harvest of Hope’ programmeWe turn now to the other component of thiscase study, namely Abalimi Bezekhaya and its‘Harvest of Hope’ programme.Brief background on AbalimiThe work undertaken by Abalimi has a long historywhich spans the pre- and post-1994 eras:Pre 1994 – Abalimi started working in 1982 fromoffices in the Catholic Church in Cape Town. Itopened its first garden centre in Nyanga in thesame year and developed a second centre inKhayelitsha in 1989. However, Abalimi only reallytook off in the period post-1994 when accessto its constituency became easier.1995 – In 1995 Abalimi employed two additionalstaff and established a field programme. Fieldworkersstarted to visit people to introduce Abalimi’sservices. Abalimi began to get requestsfrom people for training, mainly in home gardens.1996 – In 1996 Abalimi supported the formationof the Siyazama Community Allotment GardenAssociation (SCAGA) in Macassar, Khayelitsha.The garden was developed on 5000 m 2 in a corridorunder low-intensity power lines that werelater decommissioned. Abalimi estimated thatSCAGA could provide three to four permanent,9

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.full-time formal jobs, but opted to promotea garden which would create 30 subsistenceor livelihood augmentation ‘jobs’ on a mixtureof individual and communal plots. At thesame time Abalimi started a programme for thegreening of schools. The Schools Environmentand Development Programme (SEED) grew upunder Abalimi’s auspices before becoming independentin 1997.1997 – In this year Abalimi employed more staff(two agricultural field workers) and expanded itsinstitutional footprint from Khayelitsha to coverPhilippi, Nyanga, Gugulethu and Crossroads.2001 – In 2001 Abalimi expanded further, employingthree field staff from amongst the membershipof the groups they served.2002 – In 2002 Abalimi facilitated the launch ofthe Vukuzenzele Farmers Association (VUFA),which brought together people from about 70groups of small growers. As Abalimi grew anddeveloped it conceptualised a production continuumto locate and track the growth and developmentof smallholders from what it characterisesas survivalist, subsistence, livelihood andcommercial levels of productive activity (seeFigure 1.2). Production ranges from individualhomestead gardens to groups who farm plotson vacant municipal land and in the grounds ofschools and other institutions. Abalimi also hasa focus on improving nutrition for people whoare HIV positive (Rob Small, Kaba, and Mahusa-Mhlana, 2005). Abalimi notes that agricultureremains an activity of last resort for those locatedat the survivalist and subsistence end of thecontinuum. At these levels many will abandonagriculture in favour of other economic opportunitiesshould they arise. However, as productionbecomes more consolidated and benefitsare more tangible, fewer people are likely toexit production.2007/8 – In 2007 Abalimi launched the Harvestof Hope programme. Current Abalimi staffingincludes eight contract staff and seven permanentstaff.Overview of the Harvest of Hope(HOH) programmeA range of support elements have been combinedin the Harvest of Hope (HOH) programme:• Abalimi Bezekhaya provides training to enablegrowers at different scales to produceorganically grown vegetables.• Growers learn about the business side offarming through AgriPlanner courses runFigure 1.2: The sustainable development continuum fororganic micro-farming projectsTHE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CONTINUUM FOR ORGANIC MICRO FARMING PROJECTSGreatest number of people move throughto other thingsLest number of people movethroughSurvival phaseSubsistence phaseLivelihood phaseCommercial phaseEat – Selling andsaving beginEat, sell, saveReinvestmentbeginsEat, sell, save, reinvestProfit earningbeginsSell, reinvest profitJob creationbeginsSocial impacts highest at all stagesGreatest number of people benefit and the povertyalleviation movement is most effectiveSocial impactsdecreasePoverty alleviationimpact dissipates10Source: R. Small, 2007

ResearchReportby the South African Institute for Entrepreneurship.• Vegetables are harvested fresh on order tocustomers who sign up to purchase a box oforganic vegetables weekly. Vegetables arecollected and packed at the Organic Packshed established at the Business Place - abusiness service centre in Philippi.• Support is provided by the Western CapeDepartment of Agriculture mainly in theform of improved infrastructure.Other support interventions identified include:• Horizontal learning (farmer-to-farmer) exchange• Savings schemes• Micro-credit to groups with consistent savingsrecords will be available in the nearfuture to projects entering the Livelihoodand Commercial levels of the DevelopmentContinuum.• Periodic farmers’ markets, tunnel greenhouses,cold-storage rooms and value-addingpacking sheds (Small, 2007).Currently, Abalimi supports 22 active vegetablegrowing groups at different scales. Most recentfigures (August 2008) indicate that 146 smallgrowers from 9 projects produce vegetablesfor the Harvest of Hope programme. Howeverthe bulk of the vegetables are currently sourcedthrough three groups – Fezeka in Gugulethu,and SCAGA and Eden in Khayelitsha which arethe focus of this case study.Assessment of the natural andphysical resourcesIn all three cases the groups started with unimprovedCape Flats sands (Figure 1.3). With thesupport of the City of Cape Town and the ProvincialDepartment of Agriculture, Abilimi hasplaced a major emphasis on soil improvement byinvesting in organic compost, manure and otherorganic fertilisers such as Rapid Raiser. Productionmethods also emphasise the importanceof mulch and the planting of indigenous windbreaks.Physical infrastructureEach garden has had substantial investment inphysical infrastructure including:• Perimeter fencing• Borehole drilling and pump installationFigure 1.3: Photograph of SCAGA prior to establishment ofvegetable farming schemePicture from http://harvestofhope.co.za/?page_id=3211

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.1 In the case of Fezekaelectricity is still provided free12• Electricity supply through the installation ofprepaid metres 1• Water tanks• Irrigation piping and microjets• Small nursery enclosures constructed fromcreosoted poles and shade-cloth• Hand tools and wheelbarrows• Containers for implement storage andmeeting space.Production systemsThe HOH production system is derived from anExcel-based planning and planting templatethat analyses weekly HOH box requirements including:• Land area required by crop type• Estimated yields per area of different cropsby weight and quantity• Production timelines and maturity dates ofindividual crops• A succession planting plan• An estimation of retail and wholesale pricesby weight or volume for different crops.Abalimi fieldworkers who support individualgardens manage the seedling orders, the plantingprocess and assess availability of differentvegetables for weekly harvesting on Tuesdays.Individuals in the group are responsible for watering,weeding and general husbandry of theHOH growing areas. In the SCAGA group thesetasks have been individualised with individualsresponsible for their own plots and receiving thevalue of produce sold from them. Any surplus orsubstandard produce is either sold or consumedby the growers. Where HOH runs short of producethey also buy from individual plots.Economic aspectsHarvest of Hope is an organic vegetable boxproject which originated from a partnership betweenthe South African Institute for Entrepreneurship,the Ackerman Pick ‘n Pay Foundationand Abalimi Bezekhaya. The project has focusedon the development of an organic pack shed atthe Philippi Business Place.Initially there was a focus on the training ofgrowers to comply with organic certificationstandards. However, the focus subsequentlyshifted to ensuring the throughput of sufficientvolumes of vegetables from the producer groupsthrough the pack house and to the market. Aconsultancy, Just Think, was contracted to developthe Harvest of Hope programme conceptwhich delivers a weekly box of vegetables to individualcustomers who collect their boxes fromscheduled distribution points at four participatingprimary schools in the Cape Town area. Aspart of the planning and implementation processJust Think has developed the Excel templatediscussed above, as well as a crop planning handtool. Initial crop targets were established for 110boxes per week and eight producer groups werecontracted to grow for HOH to specified targets(Just Think, 2008).The overall objective is to elevate HOH into aself-sustaining business enterprise. This dependson the ability of HOH to be able to produceand sell 600 boxes weekly. Income is distributedacross three cost centres:• Payment to growers – 50% the selling priceof a vegetable box• Running costs – Abalimi expenses, JustThink consultancy fees and marketing costs• Profit.The initial allocation of running costs was calculatedat 47% of revenue. As the number of boxesincreases so will costs, but these costs will fall asa percentage of overall revenue. The target is toreduce running costs from 47% to 28%, or by5% per quarter. From a start-up profit of just 3%for the first quarter (R1325/month) it is envisagedthat the profit margin on 600 boxes will be 22%(R48 583/month).Just Think has proposed that HOH be establishedas a for profit company with shares distributedas indicated in the chart below. The businessmodel sets out to provide incentives to Abalimistaff who become the largest shareholderwith the most to make from the success of thescheme.Actual performanceFor the first three months of HOH the combinedproduce of the three groups amounted to 440boxes of vegetables worth R37 410 from whichthey earned a total of R18 705.

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 1.3: Sales 1st February – 30th April 2008Project People HOHarea08-Feb 08-Mar 08-Apr TotalpaidProducevalueBoxesEden 4 640 R 2 676 R 2 634 R 1 804 R 7 113 R 14 226 167Fezeka 6 ? R 1 763 R 1 302 R 888 R 3 953 R 7 906 93SCAGA 10 756 R 1 613 R 503 R 572 R 2 689 R 5 378 63R 13 755 R 27 510 324Table 1.4: Summary of perceptions of product utilisationLost due totheftLost to disease Consumed Sold independently Sold throughHOHEden 3 10% 10% 25% 20% 35%Fezeka 0% 10% 20% 20% 50%SCAGA 0% 15% 20% 10% 55%Table 1.5: Value of individual SCAGA grower sales for Februarythrough April 2008Grower Feb March April TotalGrower 1 0 0 0 0Grower 2 R 100 0 0 R 100Grower 3 0 0 R 120 R 120Grower 4 0 0 R 351 R 351Grower 5 0 R 145 R 428 R 573Grower 6 R 171 R 291 R 132 R 594Grower 7 0 R 233 R 497 R 730Grower 8 R 56 R 288 R 407 R 751Grower 9 0 0 R 828 R 828Grower 10 0 R 315 R 588 R 903Totals R 327 R 1273 R 3350 R 49503 The three men interviewedfrom the Eden Group foundthis exercise difficult. Each manreworked the relative proportionssubstantially. The finalresult appeared to be more ofa compromise between themthan a consensus about theoutput split.14

Table 1.6: Eden’s input costs from February through April 2008ResearchReportInputs Quantity CostsBean seeds 200 g R 20Beetroot seedlings 600 R 120Broccoli seedlings 200 R 52Cabbage seedlings 400 R 80Cauliflower seetdlings 200 R 65Kale seedlings 600 R 120Kohl Rabi seedlings 1000 R 200Lettuce seedlintgs 1400 R 280Marigold seeds 1 R 11Mulch 40 bales R 1500Onion seedlings 1100 R 245Parsley 200 R 40Radish seeds 4 R 44Rapid raiser 200 kg R 585Total R 3362Table 1.7: Fezeka’s input costs from February through April2008Input Quantity Costs in RBamboo sticks 180 540Basil seedlings 200 40Bean seedlings 200 50Beetroot seedlings 400 80Broccoli seedlings 600 156Cabbage seedlings 400 80Carrot seed 40 pkts 100Fix well point 1 450Kale seedlings 200 40Lettuce seedlings 400 80Manure 10 m3 2 227Onion seedlings 1200 299Parsley seedlings 100 20Rapid raiser 360 kg 1 053Spinach seedlings 200 40Total 6 25515

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 1.8: SCAGA’s input costs from February through April2008Input Quantity Costs in RBean seed 500 90Beetroot seedlings 800 180Brocoli seedlings 400 80Carrot seeds 80 pkts 200Cauliflower seedlings 200 50Fix well point 1 850Kale seedlings 100 20Kohl rabi seedlings 400 80Lettuce seedlings 1400 280Manure 11 m3 2 587Onion seedlings 800 160Parsley seedlings 400 80Potato seed 11 kg 143Radish seed 5 pkts 63Rapid raiser 120 kg 351Spinach seedlings 1000 200Turnip seed 3 pkts 8Total 6 42116Table 1.9: Distribution of direct costs among various roleplayersDirect costs HOH Grower Abalimi City ofCT/SocialservicesDeptAgricNotesSeed/seedlings 100% Seedling costs deductedbefore growers paidCompost/100% Groups don’t paymanureMulch 100% Groups don’t pay butwe are realising thatcan’t do this for everPest and fungalcontrolsWater/electricityPeople buy onprepaid card –pay as you goor sometimesutilise illegalconnectionsSchool pays forthis where gardenis on DoEland. Other landwe apply forprepaid metreUse herbs with chilli,garlic sunlight liquidDepends. Groups pushedto get boreholeTransport 100% Struggling for transport– only one bakkie doingeverything for theproject. A significantexpense, but only once aweek. Fieldworkers getaround by taxiPost harvest100%processing andpackagingMarketing 100%

ResearchReportOverall, Abalimi estimates that the ongoing subsidyper farmer to support them indefinitely atthe survival/subsistence stage is between R1000-R3000 per farmer/gardener per annum, dependingon the farmer’s circumstances and context.This subsidy covers all costs including training,establishment, institutional development supportand ongoing permanent follow-up, takinginto account regular cheap and/or free key inputs.Abalimi estimates that to enable growers toshift from subsistence to a livelihood or semicommerciallevel requires a developmental subsidyof about “R1000/farmer (or farmer group)/month, including the pack-shed costs, transport,agricultural inputs and core fieldwork supportto contracted farmers”. However, Abalimi observesthat, “…if we include all possible associatedcosts (e.g. specialised focus training interventionsto enhance applied skills), then thefigure could easily go up to about R8000/month/farmer or farmer group during the transitionstage from Subsistence to Livelihood (personalcommunication, Rob Small, 2008).Livelihood significanceOverall it would appear that the Abalimi andHarvest of Hope initiative have had positive impactson the livelihoods of those participating. Itis also clear that these impacts are also a reflectionof the fairly substantial subsidy required toput in place an enabling environment for smallscaleagricultural production. The exact value ofthis subsidy could only be calculated by a morein-depth study than was permitted by the timeallocated to the research team.Social and institutional dimensionsThe Fezeka group currently consists of sevenmembers – six women and one man. All of themembers are of pensionable age. The groupmembers have individual plots and combine tocultivate plots from which the produce is marketedthrough the Harvest of Hope scheme runby Abalimi Bezekhaya.The SCAGA garden as a whole started in 1997.Abalimi reported that in 2005 the garden hostedits fifth group of 30 people. This suggests thatfour groups had come and gone prior to thisand that all the previous groups had given up.This reiterates the notion that agriculture is anactivity of last resort which provides marginalbenefits in relation to the input required. Thegroup reported that currently their membershipwas eight people – all women, down by morethan two-thirds from those who were there atthe outset.“Many people came to start with highexpectations of making money. When itbecame clear that they would not be paida cent except from what they got from thesoil many people left. Others also left in theperiod before the HOH project as the moneyfrom sales was not enough.” (SCAGA groupinterview, 2008)Respondents reported that members were encouragedto join by local SANCO members whoadvertised opportunities on the project with aloud hailer. There is some inconsistency in thedates and group sizes from different sources.The group reported that they had started in 2003and taken over from a previous group which hadgiven up, while Abalimi indicated that the currentgroup started in 2005.Initially, individual plots for home consumptionwere cultivated and communal plots for the localmarket. However, it appears that since theintroduction of the HOH programme internaldisputes amongst the group members concerninguneven labour investment in the group plotshave resulted in individualisation of production.Labour investment seems to account to somedegree for the earning differentiation amongstthe membership but the relative value of thedifferent crops grown and harvested in eachindividual’s plots is a significant other factor inearning differentiation. Given that the group isbilled jointly for seedlings, and that these are ofdifferent prices, growers of higher value cropsmay be receiving an indirect subsidy as the costof seedlings is not directly reflected in their salesfigures.The Eden group consists of seven men some ofwhom were illegally growing vegetables in awetland area adjacent to the N2. They were encouragedto move to the SCAGA 2 site in July2007. When they arrived much of the gardeninfrastructure, namely water and an electricpump, had already been installed, Irrigation infrastructurewas added in 2008.The men gave unemployment and hunger andbecause “we grew up planting at home” as theirreasons for becoming involved. Men have their17

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.own plots but there was a marked difference inquality and investment between plots grownfor home consumption and plots grown for theHOH market. The three members interviewedexpressed a preference for growing for the market.Interviewees reported that they dependedon social grants and sales from the vegetables.One informant whose household did not qualifyfor any social grants reported that his sole incomedepended on sales of vegetables togetherwith some informal selling of small items froma home spaza run by his wife. Given that thisgroup had only recently started the men statedthat they were not in a position to assess whetherproduction was a success.Clearly the projects make important social contributions.Women who have worked togetherfor several years in Fezeka reported that:“We support each other if a membergets sick. We also support some people inthe community who are sick with HIV bydonating vegetables”Fezeka reported that they paid themselvesR1500 each at Christmas time. However, otherbenefits included a daily meal cooked from theirproduce, which they shared in the garden.The groups with women members have also developedsmall savings schemes which memberscontribute to and can borrow from in proportionto their savings investments. The men in theEden group reported that members can requestto borrow money from the group in the eventof a death in the family or a similar problem athome. However, there was some uncertaintyabout how to manage this process and ensurethat there was not a run on the group’s resourceswhich would undermine their ability to continue.While there are both obvious and hidden benefitsit is also clear that the projects and associatedorganisation can also contribute to localconflict. This was evidenced by the SCAGA groupmembers’ decision to work and get paid individuallyas a response to perceived ‘free riders’ whowere set to benefit disproportionately to theirlabour investment.Institutional dimensionsThree institutional dimensions are examined:• The extent to which the groups of growersfunction effectively and are enabled to increasetheir control over their business• The extent to which growers are able torepresent their broader interests throughforming associations and engaging with theCity of Cape Town, the Department of Agricultureand other institutional actors• The extent to which the different spheres ofgovernment, NGOs and private sector partnerscombine effectively to support smallgrowers.Growers in different projects had also set out toestablish their own association with the supportof Abalimi. However management of the associationwas not without its challenges as observedby Abalimi manager, Christina Kaba:“The growers have their own organisationwhich they call Vukuzenzele Urban FarmersAssociation which has a Committee and anExecutive Committee. I have seen bad thingshappen when people get into management.If they see those funds (from donors) theythink it belongs to them. We get fundingfor seed and seedlings and funding formanure. People want to change this andsay they want a bakkie because our projectis big. Money even within Vukuzenzele hascaused problems. The groups are not all onthe same level. Some are big and others aresmall but to them they say we need to sharethe money equally.”As noted in the introductory section, there area number of role players attempting to make aTable 1.10: Perceptions of supportAbalimiDept ofSocial services City of Cape TownAgricultureEden 45% 30% 10% 15%Fezeka 20% 35% 20% 25%SCAGA 50% 50%18

ResearchReportTable 1.11: Abalimi’s self-assessment of its support servicesServices and support Yes / No? CommentsGroup formationFarmer to farmer extension –horizontal learningYesYesWe have taken people on trips from Cape Town to Transkei andMaritzburg. We organise farmers’ days for the different groups to meeteach other. We find that those groups supported by government oftenlack information. When we present what we do they always want tocome to us. But we don’t want them to come to us. We want them toget informationClarifying production options and costs YesProvision of production creditYesFacilitation of group savings schemes Yes SCAGA started last year and saved R2/member each week. Now SCAGAmembers have increased the amount that they are saving and arebanking R100/month in its own savings account which is separate fromthe project accountProduction of budgets and records Yes In-house and to some extent with groupsSecuring access to land Yes Assistance with contracts with government as landownersUrban agriculture advocacy andintegration into City of Cape Town IDPYes Played an initial role in policy development forums; however this rolehas diminished.Fencing and water infrastructureGarden design and layoutPlanting succession planning androtationAccess to tools and equipmentYes (applyto Agric)YesYesYesWe help them apply to Dept of Agriculture and the City of Cape Town ifwe can’t help them ourselvesSoil analysis Yes The Department of Agriculture does this. We have also examined thisas part of our exploration of organic certification. In those gardenswhich are close to informal settlements we frequently test for soilcontamination from human wasteSoil preparation Yes A big focus with investment in manure and organic compost to boostsoil qualityProvision of compost and mulching YesmaterialSeedling propagation/supply Yes Some gardens produce their own for certain crops and we also supply.HOH buy seedlings every two weeks for each planting. When thevegetables are sold the cost of the seedlings is deducted. We haveconsidered possibility of a separate enterprise to produce the seedlingsbut don’t have the labourpower to set this up at present. There areother projects like the Sustainability Institute who could becomeinvolved in this.Pest and disease management Yes Only companion planting and natural remedies used – garlic and chilli,handpicking of snails and good soil quality. Also, plant health to reducelikelihood of fungal infectionsQuality assurance Yes We do not have a big problem with this. Overall we have good soilpreparation which ensures good quality.Organic certificationAdvice and support for production forconsumption and exchangeIncomplete/abandonedYesWe were working on getting organic certification for 10 projects butthis fell to 3 and then to 1. Part of the problem is that people could notsee far enough into the future to know what they wanted to plant.Organic certification works best in the context of long term planningand reasonable certainty about what will be grown. What we think willwork best for us is to write our own organic standards. We work ona trust basis and we inspect every week. We can see when people areusing chemicals and we do not buy from them. Examples provided wereof a garden which had sprayed weedkiller and another which was usingsnail bait.19

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Services and support Yes / No? CommentsAdvice and support for production for Yeslocal markets, as well asproduction for Harvest of Hopeorganic marketGroup individual record keeping andproduction accountingYesWe are also working on local markets. We are examining the Hararemarket in Khayelitsha. (Interestingly no mention was made of the localPhilippi Fresh Produce Market)On a very simple basisConflict resolution Yes There are often leadership conflicts or financial issues. When money ison the table there are often big problems to do with spending priorities– how much get reinvested and how much people take home. We gethelp from other organisations in the Business place who specialise ingroup supportcontribution to urban agriculture. However, itis clear that the working relationships betweenthem are far from optimal.Participants in the three projects ranked the assistancethey received from different role playersquite differently. In some instances howeverit seemed clear that for the project participants,institutional roles, functions and boundaries hadbecome blurred.Unfortunately the Department of Agriculturewas not interviewed about its role. The groupsperceived the Department of Agriculture as providingcapital for pumps, equipment and someinputs but this is where their role appeared toend.Despite Abalimi and the Department of Agricultureworking from the same building it appearedthat working relations and communicationbetween them was far from optimal.“I don’t see them starting something. Theyjust support what we do and supply whatpeople ask them to give them. They are mainlyproviding things – fencing and equipment.They support projects but they support themfinancially. They don’t try to make themmore independent and then when they havefinished with them Agriculture walks awayand projects fold. They do not provide onsitefollow up and support.“When HOH was starting to try and secureorganic certification Agriculture providedgrowers with a whole consignment of nonorganic compost which was a problem. Theyasked us, ‘What is organic? Why are youtrying to grow organic?’ We tried to explainabout the compost and they said we only getcompost where it is cheaper.“They have got extension people but theydon’t touch the soil. They are not in touchand on the ground. They want to see urbanagriculture but they don’t know what theyare looking for or how to make thingshappen.” (Christina Kaba – Abalimi manager)None of the parties interviewed for this casestudy appeared to have a good understandingof the urban agriculture policy and the opportunitiesit might create. Within Abalimi all questionsabout the urban agriculture policy andwhat the City of Cape Town could be doing tostimulate urban agriculture were referred toRob Small. Neither the pilot project in the Philippiarea or the Philippi Fresh Produce market wasmentioned in any interview.Gender, class and human dimensionsThe group profiles highlight the predominanceof older women, although the Eden group consistsof men only. Overall the groups appear tobe catering for people with few economic alternatives.From our assessment of the membershipof the three groups it is clear that in the mainthe formal education of people is very low. Thisis likely to impact on members’ abilities to managethe key planning, technical and financialcomponents of the project which are critical fortheir short and long-term success.Abalimi has attempted to address the skills deficitthrough the design of an interactive enterprisesimulation based training process calledAgriplanner. This is designed to help growers“go beyond the practicalities of merely growingproduce…. [G]rowers learn how to get the mostproductive use out of their land as well as howmuch money their land could produce for them,if they use it well”. The programme has beendesigned to engage with key questions such as:20

ResearchReport• How much money can we make from ourland?• What can we plant? When can we plant it?• How can we keep our land productive forthe whole year?• How much money do we need to get going?• How much money can we make each monthfrom our land?The programme integrates a variety of planningsystems, charts and tools that growers use toplan what they will grow and what returns theyare likely to achieve.We were not able to assess this programme inaction or obtain any independent evaluationsof it in the time available. However it was clearfrom our interactions with group members interviewedthat numeracy levels were poor whichwas likely to present an obstacle to successfulparticipation in the learning programme.Overall the relative success of a HOH programmein producing sufficient and regular volumes ofvegetables for the market appears to dependon the strong and directive management inputby Abalimi. All the groups spoke about their dependenceon Abalimi to provide the plantingplan, provide the required seedlings, overseethe planting and harvesting processes, and getproduce to market.“There is a production plan where we plantvery two weeks. We know what we aregoing to plant when. At the moment it is thefieldworker who makes the decisions aboutwhat to plant when and where, as she hasthe information on the current growingconditions and plantings on the project shesupports. The next step is to increase theinvolvement and capacity of growers so thatthey can move up the hierarchy into thelivelihood and commercial zones”. (Interviewwith Abalimi field staff, 2008)Clearly the development of local technical andmanagerial skills must become a key focus forfuture development. However this seems onlylikely to succeed if the skills and age profile ofthe groups is to change. This creates a conundrumas it is clear from the case study that accessto land and ability to grow vegetables arenot sufficient to secure household livelihoods.Access to a reliable and expanding market andthe ability to secure a reasonable share in thevalue chain appears to remain the critical successfactor.Environmental aspectsAbalimi’s focus on organic production limits thelikelihood of negative environmental impacts. Inthe case of the Eden group it can be argued thatthe project has had a beneficial environmentalimpact as it has encouraged people farming ina wetland area to relocate to land more suitablefor agriculture.It is not clear however what permissions havebeen sought to sink boreholes and the extent towhich these may impact on ground water. It isalso not clear to what extent the water qualityof the groundwater is assessed. In informal settlementareas where there is inadequate sanitationAbalimi does take precautions to test soilsfor contamination.As Abalimi has noted, they function on relationsof trust with the different grower groupswith respect to adherence to organic farmingprinciples. This trust is not always well founded.On two occasions they have found growers usingherbicides or pesticides, but they argue thatclose and ongoing contact with growing groupswill usually ensure that pesticide use can be detected.This does however raise a potential concernwith respect to the lack of certification orindependent inspection to ensure standards oforganic practice are met. However, it is clearthat the transaction costs associated with organiccertification are much too onerous for smallproducers like the Abalimi groups to bear.The future of the HOH programmeThe Just Think business plan envisaged the establishmentof HOH as a for profit company asdiscussed above. However our interview withAbalimi fieldworkers indicated concerns thatthe introduction of HOH had resulted in someneglect of individual homestead production.Fieldworkers stated that they needed to renewtheir focus on household food security and wereconcerned that the HOH model resulted in a netoutflow of food to specialised middle class markets.21

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.22ConclusionsThe case study highlights different approachesto stimulate the development of smallholder agriculture:• Measures designed to create an enablingenvironment which helps pull emergingproducers into production and the marketfrom above• Measures to directly engage with, grow andsupport small producers and push them intoproduction and the market from belowThe effectiveness of ‘pulling’The City of Cape Town and the Provincial Departmentof Agriculture have invested millionsin the construction of the Philippi Fresh ProduceMarket. It seems that while there is a role for infrastructureinvestment in creating an enablingenvironment for small producers, that on its ownit is not sufficient to bring new smallholders intoproduction and the market place, or rather, thatthis process takes time. The construction of theFresh Produce Market does not appear to havebeen preceded by an in-depth study of existingsmallholder agricultural production in CapeTown and has proceeded on the basis of assumptionsabout would constitute an effective stimulusto this sector. Without other measures beingput in place the Fresh Produce Market may endup as an expensive white elephant.‘Pushing’ – the boundariesThe Fezeka, SCAGA and Eden cases show thatmany urban smallholders operate in a highlyconstrained operating environment which ischaracterised by low levels of human capital,inadequate access to land, equipment, financeand infrastructure for production, technical andinstitutional development support, market intelligenceand enterprise management capability.Abalimi Bezekhaya have attempted to put inplace a comprehensive and subsidised productionsupport system which systematically addressesthese constraints. However there remainquestions about its sustainability and the extentto which growers will become locked into relationsof dependency on the support agency(however benign the latter). While it seems undeniablethat these support measures are essentialif small growers are to develop and in particularto access the market in a remunerativefashion, the question remains how to extendthem at scale and in a way which will enablelong-term sustainability of both the services andthe enterprises which are established.The effectiveness of ‘pushing’ appears to dependon two things:• The capacity and co-ordination of the agenciesresponsible for grassroots developmentsupport, and• Clarity as to what role subsidies should playin developing an emerging smallholder sectorand the form in which they are targeted.Support capacity and co-ordinationThe case studies indicate the current limitationsof available support capacity. This seems particularlyacute with respect to government landidentification and agricultural extension capacityto support small growers in metropolitanCape Town. Interviews highlight the slow processesassociated with acquiring land that can beused for commonage purposes. They also indicatean approach to extension where it seemsthat extensions officers ‘do not touch the soil’and operate more as dispensers of infrastructureand equipment.Although Abalimi and the Provincial Departmentof Agriculture operate out of the samebuilding their functions and programmes donot appear to be aligned. Likewise the servicesoffered by the City of Cape Town and the ProvincialDepartment of Agriculture seem in somerespects to overlap.Reframing subsidies?Abalimi Bezekhaya and the Provincial Departmentof Agriculture provide support which substantiallyreduces the costs of growers who participatein the HOH scheme. But there remains alack of clarity about what constitutes legitimatesubsidy and support for smallholder production.In the EU, agricultural subsidies have been definedas “a benefit provided to individuals orbusinesses as a result of government policy thatraises their revenues or reduces their costs andthus affects production, consumption, trade, income,and the environment. The benefit generatedby policy may take different forms such asan increase in output-price, a reduction in inputprice,a tax rebate, an interest rate concession,

ResearchReportor a direct budgetary transfer” (Mayrand, Dionne,Paquin, and Pageot-LeBel, 2003).According to a recent OECD review of agriculturalpolicy reform in South Africa, policy transfersto South African agricultural producers – asmeasured by the OECD Producer Support Estimate(PSE) – equalled 5% of gross farm receiptson average in 2000–03. This is well below the averagelevel of support for OECD countries whichstands at 31%, but is similar to levels of supportprovided in Brazil, China and Russia (Organisationfor Economic Co-operation and Development,2006).Internationally, subsidies to producers in developedcountries have gone to the large farmersand have also contributed to an agriculturewhich is dependent on high inputs of fertiliserand chemicals and mechanised production witha high carbon footprint.It should be noted that the above definitionsand approaches are narrowly economistic in natureand ignore triple bottom line accountingprecepts that assess social, environmental andeconomic dimensions and their interrelationships.There are strong arguments for subsidies whichencourage and support organic and/or low inputagricultural production and which build socialcapital. In the WTO context such domesticsupport measures can be associated with theso called Green Box which includes support forenvironmental programmes, government research,extension, and infrastructure provisiontogether with income safety-net programs (LaVina, Fransen, Faeth, and Kurauchi, 2006). Overallthese need to provide incentives for the developmentof a more sustainable and low inputagriculture which has environmental benefits.Rethinking certificationThe Abalimi experience suggests that attemptingto secure formal organic certification is tooonerous for small producers. This requires a newapproach which either utilises state support oran alternative framework with more appropriatestandards and assessment measures.It is clear that the development of an urban agriculturepolicy is an important first step in thestimulation of urban smallholder production.However, for the policy to have meaning and tobe implementable there needs to be investmentin implementation capacity. This must combineand balance measures to simultaneously alignhuman and financial resources and that strategically‘pull’ and ‘push’ to secure the emergenceof new smallholder producers engaged in agriculturalactivities which are socially, ecologicallyand economically sustainable.ReferencesCity of Cape Town, (2005) Sakha iKapa 2030:Long-Term Metropolitan Spatial Framework –Strategic Direction, retrieved 28 August, 2008from http://web1.capetown.gov.za/idp/pdf/B.Spatial.Cape%20Town%202030.pdfCity of Cape Town, (2006) Brand new freshproduce market for Cape Town, retrieved 30August, 2008 from http://www.capegateway.gov.za/eng/pubs/news/2006/nov/147918City of Cape Town, (2007a) Philippi FreshProduce Market shows good potential forgrowth, retrieved 30 August, 2008 fromhttp://web1.capetown.gov.za/press/ Newpress.asp?itemcode=2051City of Cape Town, (2007b) Urban agriculturepolicy for the City of Cape Town, retrieved14 June, 2008, from http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/ehd/Documents/EHD__Urban_Agricultural_ Policy_2007_8102007113120_.pdfCity of Cape Town, (2008) Situational analysisfor MDP/Philippi Agriculture ProjectDepartment of Local Government and Housing,Western Cape (2007) Isidima: the WesternCape Sustainable Human Settlement Strategy.Ellis, F., and Sumberg, J. (1998) Food Production,Urban Areas and Policy Responses WorldDevelopment, Vol. 26, No. 2, 213-225.Just Think, (2008) Harvest of Hope BusinessDevelopment Proposal.Kok, P., O’Donovan, M., Bouare, O., and van Zyl,J. (2003) Post-apartheid patterns of internalmigration in South Africa. Pretoria: HSRC.La Vina, A., Fransen, L., Faeth, P., and Kurauchi,Y. (2006) Reforming Agricultural Subsidies:“No Regrets” Policies for Livelihoods and theEnvironment: World Resources Institute.Mayrand, K., Dionne, S., Paquin, S., andPageot-LeBel, I. (2003) The Economic andEnvironmental Impacts of AgriculturalSubsidies: An Assessment of the 2002 US Farm23

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Bill and Doha Round, retrieved 14 September,2008 from http://www.cec.org/ files/pdf/ECONOMY/ Eco-Envi-Impacts-Agric-Subsidies_en.pdfOrganisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment, (2006) Policy brief: Agriculturalpolicy reform in South Africa.Provincial Government of the Western Cape,(2006) Speech by Mr Cobus Dowry, WesternCape MEC for Agriculture, at the openingof Philippi Fresh Market, delivered by MECfor Sport and Cultural Affairs Whitey Jacobs,retrieved 30 August, 2008 from http://www.polity.org.za/article.php?a_id=97588SetPlan and Practiplan, (2002) A ruralmanagement framework for the Cape TownMetropolitan Council, Volume 1: Findingsand recommendation, retrieved 28 August,2008 from http://planet.uwc.ac.za/nisl/Conservation%20Biology/Conservation_CCT/rural_plan_for_CAPE%20Town.pdfSlater, R., and Twyman, C. (2003), Hiddenlivelihoods? Natural resource-dependentlivelihoods and urban development policyODI Working paper 225, Retrieved 30August, 2008 from http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/working-papers/225-naturalresource-dependent-livelihoods-urban.pdfSmall, R. (2007) Can community-based organicmicro-farming create food security? : CSIHandbook, 8th Edition.Small, R., Kaba, C., and Mahusa-Mhlana, S.(2005) Urban Agriculture projects and HIV-Aids: Abalimi’s experiences, paper presentedat the Workshop on urban micro farming andHIV/AIDS, Johannesburg/Cape Town 15 - 26August.Visser, S. (2006) Concrete Actions: Cape Town’sUrban Agriculture Assistance Programme, UAMagazine 16 - Formulating Effective Policieson Urban Agriculture, retrieved 30 August,2008 from http://www.ruaf.org/node/108224

ResearchReport2 Friemersheim agriculturalassociation: commercialsmallholder potato farmersin a Southern Cape landreform projectTim Hart, Centre of Poverty Employment and Growth,Human Sciences Research CouncilIntroductionThis example of land use by beneficiaries of landmade available through a Settlement and LandAcquisition Grant (SLAG) project was selectedfor inclusion into the study because those farmersengaged in potato cultivation do so predominantlyfor commercial purposes. Relative tothe size of the original beneficiary group, only ahandful of beneficiaries are still actively engagedin crop production. Most of these sell their seasonalharvests to local residents in the village andto hawkers (street vendors) in the neighbouringcoastal towns. However, one farmer collaborateswith his employer and through this relationshipis able to produce potatoes and vegetable cropsfor the commercial fresh produce market or oncontract to a local subsidiary of an internationalfood processing and packaging company. In essence,while most active farmers are engaged inproducing for the ‘second economy’, one farmer,who rents land that is owned by other SLAGbeneficiaries, is able to produce for the ‘firsteconomy’ by virtue of his relationship with hisemployer. Interestingly, this farmer is not one ofthe original SLAG beneficiaries but is a residenton a neighbouring farm.MethodologyThe author has conducted a number of studiesin this village over several years since April2000 until the end of August 2008. BetweenApril 2000 and January 2006 the author visitedthe village at regular intervals while conductingfieldwork on a number of agricultural projects.From January 2006 until March 2008 the authorlived in the village at various times for periods ofup to six weeks while conducting ethnographicfieldwork. The data obtained during the differentstudies has been used to compile the currentcase.Participatory Rural Appraisal tools (PRA) toolswere used at various stages and for a numberof purposes, but particularly during 2000 and2001 in order to get historical information aboutthe village, the farmers, agricultural projectsand practices and to generate an awareness ofwhat types of crops were produced, consumedand sold. Approximately 40 people from thevillage were interviewed or attended some ofthe workshops. Most of those interviewed weremale (thirty) as agriculture is predominantly amale activity in this village. About ten femaleswere interviewed during the course of the study,only one of whom was engaged in any agriculturalactivity. Those interviewed were betweenthe ages of twenty-five and eighty-five years.Except for four men and one woman, most wereover forty-five years of age at the start of thefieldwork in 2000. Attendance of the workshopswas entirely voluntary and the numbers fluctuatedbetween two and fifteen farmers andsometimes their wives. Data from the workshopswas further explored by means of participantobservation, and semi-structured and informalinterviews. Interviewees included some of themen and women who attended the workshopsas well as a number of others who were unableto attend the workshops. Interviews and partici-25

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.26pant observation sessions were typically carriedout during the course of the researcher’s interactionwith farmers and other village residents. Ascrops can be grown throughout the year, participantobservation sessions on agricultural practiceswere conducted during both growing seasons.Eight potato farmers were surveyed during2006 and were interviewed on a number ofoccasions between June 2006 and August 2008.Data collected at workshops and during interviewsinformed the design of the survey questionnaire.The average age of those surveyed in2006 was fifty-one years.Historical perspectiveThe village of Friemersheim lies close to thesouth-eastern seaboard of the Western Cape.The climate is temperate with a number ofsmallholder farmers and large-scale farmers inthe area producing potatoes and other vegetablecrops. Dairy farming is also a common activityamongst neighbouring large-scale farmers.The village and the surrounding agriculturalholdings fall within the winter rainfall area ofthe Western Cape.The village dates back to the early 1800s withsome residents tracing their ancestry back tothis period. In the middle of the 19th Centurythe Dutch Reformed Church (NGK) established achurch and mission station. There are currently186 households in the village. Approximately95% have electricity and 98% have access topotable water on their property. Infants andschool going children were said to make up thegreatest proportion of residents. Most of theadult residents either work seasonally on neighbouringlarge-scale commercial farms (mainlyfemale residents) or as artisans in the surroundingtowns (mainly male residents). Some femaleresidents work as shop assistants or as part-timedomestic workers in the neighbouring townsand villages. A very small minority of the residentswork for local and provincial governmentorgans in the village, such as the primary schooland the municipal offices. About four to fivehome-based (spaza) shops are operating in thevillage and provide a limited range and quantityof essential goods. There is a local generaldealer that provides other supplies such as gas,electricity, groceries and even some seed. Accordingto local residents very few people in thevillage are extremely poor although there are afew households that are considered to fall intothis category.The closest town is about 50 kilometres awayand the neighbouring village is about 20 kilometresaway on a gravel road. Once there residentscan take a taxi to the towns. While there are notaxi services to the nearest towns or the neighbouringvillage there is a bus service betweenthe two villages. However, the bus service onlyoperates during weekdays, leaving the village at6:30 am and returning in the evening at around6:30pm. Consequently, travel outside of thesetimes makes it necessary for households to havea motor vehicle or at least access to one. Theclosest hospital is in the nearest town and highschool learners need to go to the neighbouringvillage to attend classes. Transportation to medicaland educational facilities is problematic if aresident does not have a motor vehicle. As a resultmost households have a motor vehicle.In 1995 one of the village elders, who was a localcouncillor, heard about the new land reformprocess and the SLAG in particular. He discussedit with about six of his contemporaries and theyorganised a meeting with the nearest Departmentof Land Affairs. At the meetings it was explainedthat in order to get enough money topurchase any land in the area they would haveto form a communal property association (CPA)and get more members, as the proposed grant ofR16 000 per household for the seven householdswould not be sufficient to purchase any local agriculturalland. The group then approached otherresidents until a group of thirty members wasobtained. A CPA was formed and consisted of 30households, of which 28 were male-headed andtwo were female-headed. Nine of the householdheads were pensioners and three were recipientsof disability grants. A further three workedin the village and the remainder all worked outsidethe village with some only coming home onweekends or on a more irregular basis. Despiteclaims that all these people had a long history ofexperience in agriculture, for most these claimswere unfounded. Probably less than half theCPA members had any experience in agricultureand for many it was confined to small vegetablegardens at their homes. A handful had beenengaged in limited agricultural production onthe local commonage. In the 1970s a number ofresidents had been engaged in dairy activities.However, most of the beneficiaries were not involvedin these agricultural activities. Most agriculturalactivities in the village up until this timehad been on a micro-scale.

ResearchReportIn 1996 the Kagiso Trust supported this group inimplementing a potato production project withthe purpose of making the CPA some money forfuture agricultural activities. (At this stage theCPA had not yet acquired its own land throughthe land redistribution programme. However,adjacent to the village was a portion of farmlandin extent of 115 hectares. While it was administeredby the local town council its ownershipwas in dispute and it is still pending a decisionfrom the Land Claims Commission. It was decidedto use about five hectares of this farm for thepotato project. The Kagiso Trust, local farmers,local agrochemical suppliers, and the WesternCape Department of Agriculture all supportedthe CPA members and the potato project. Interestingly,none of the claimants were part ofthe CPA and none of them were invited to bepart of this project which was exclusively for CPAmembers. However, there was a lot of internalconflict within the CPA as many members couldnot help with the project, either because theydid not want to or because they were employedand not available to help. A lot of friction aroseand when it was decided to pay those who hadhelped and not the other members, furtherantagonism arose between members and thechairperson and those who had actually helpedout on the project. In the end the CPA made verylittle money and a lot of ill-feelings were createdamongst the members.In September 1999, the CPA formally took possessionof its own piece of land through the landredistribution programme. However, contraryto the original intention, the chairperson of theCPA organised with the Department of Land Affairsthat the land be subdivided. This was a directconsequence of the conflict that arose whenthe farmers attempted to work together duringthe 1996 potato project. As a result, each householdhead was to obtain ownership of approximatelytwo hectares of the land and this landwas to be farmed on an individual basis. Theremaining thirty-nine hectares was held in trustby the CPA. The balance of the SLAG money wasused to purchase a tractor and some implementsin 1999. These were and still are managed by theCPA which formed into a local farmers’ association.The subdivision of the land was effected in early2000 and each household was allocated its stand.However, formal transfer of the subdivisionsonly came about in September 2007 as therewere a lot of problems relating to water access.Since transfer, three households have sold theirland to people from outside of the village. Thesewere households that had not used their land atall since they obtained it in 1999.When the land and new machinery were obtainedin 1999, approximately twelve of the beneficiariescultivated their land between January2000 and January 2003. However, following thisinitial burst of excitement, there have been nomore than seven farmers actively producingcrops, and perhaps another four cultivating fodder,during any season. A recent visit in 2008indicated that only five farmers had actuallyplanted any vegetable crops for that year. Overthe years discussions with the farmers – thosewho had planted crops at some time on this land– elicited the information that farming was formost a secondary activity. Employment off-farmwas the main activity and farming was done toincrease income or to increase household foodsupply. Some farmers did not farm for two orthree seasons because they were too busy withoff-farm employment activities. While the moreenergetic farmers considered the acquisition offarmland to be a post-retirement benefit, manyof the non-farmers considered this to be an investmentin land, the value of which they correctlysurmised would increase in the future.As a result of the subdivision, most farmers farmindividually. In some instances related land holdersmay pool land and share input costs, for examplesiblings. Amongst the active farmers theland is predominantly used for vegetable andpotato production, especially if the farmerswork in the village or are pensioners or disabilitygrant recipients. Others who are engaged infarming, but who work outside of the village,tend to use their land as grazing for cattle andto this end will plant oats and other fodder. Theactual amount of land under cultivation at anyone time depends largely on the season, weatherpatterns, the farmers’ time for agriculturalactivities and his or her access to inputs. Most ofthese individuals are employed or are recipientsof private or state disability grants.Natural resourcesThe village is situated at the foot of the OuteniquaMountains in the Southern Cape and is between300 and 325 metres above sea-level. Rainfallthroughout the year is relatively consistentand ranges between 580 and 695 millimetresper annum. According to farmers the driest peri-27

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.28ods are during the months of December, Januaryand February, and again during June and July.The area is considered to have a mild climatewith temperatures ranging from a low of 8 degreesCelsius in mid-winter to 29 degrees Celsiusin mid-summer.Until the 1960s most agricultural productionamong Coloureds was conducted on residentialplots for household consumption. Initially theseplots were about 8000 m2 but as the populationincreased in the village the residential plotsbecame smaller, curtailing the volume of agriculturalproduce that could be generated in thehome gardens and on the commonage. In 1999thirty households each got access to approximatelytwo hectares of land when a neighbouring99 hectare farm was purchased through thestate land reform programme. The thirty-ninehectares that are held in trust are currently overgrownand much of the land is unsuitable foragriculture as it is mountainside and gullies.A March 1998 report by the Western Cape Departmentof Agriculture describes the landscapeas undulating, with deep ravines in places andthat 25% of the land has a gradient of 1:4. Thesoils are deep and have good horizontal and verticaldrainage. They are acidic, severely leacheddue to the high rainfall and low in phosphorous,copper, zinc, potassium and manganese. Parentsoil material is Tafelberg sandstone and the soilson top of that have a residual nature. Red andyellow apedale soils occur on the shale layersfound in the Tafelberg sandstone. Mechanicaland/or biological protection of the fields is consideredessential. The report pointed out thatany crop could be grown on this land with theexception of tropical and sub-tropical crops, aslong as the chemical content of the soil is adjustedaccordingly. Small grains were not recommendeddue to the heavy reliance on expensivemechanised machinery. The climate was consideredunsuitable for deciduous and other fruit.Vegetables from the root crop (potatoes andcarrots), legumes, onions, curcubit and brassicafamilies were recommended. Sweet corn wasalso recommended. The veld is largely coveredin fynbos and grass and the investigators determinedthat it has a very low livestock carryingcapacity. The natural rangeland has a carryingcapacity of one livestock unit per 15 hectares.The outcome of this report was that as a resultof the limited water supply only five hectares ofirrigated vegetables could be cultivated duringany season on the land to be acquired. This recommendationwas not followed by the farmersbecause they wanted to farm individually andwere not interested in working together.The farm lies adjacent to the village in a southeasterlydirection. It is almost L-shaped and thisprovides those farming on it with problems ofaccess to water for agricultural purposes. Onlythose farming on the westerly side of the farmhave access to water from the dams fed by thelocal irrigation network. This network suppliesthe village and the large-scale commercial farmsin the area. Water allocation is based on a quotasystem. Sluice gates can only be opened oncertain days for a few hours in order to fill thedams. This farm receives access to the system oneday per week for 24 hours. Those smallholdersfarming close to this network have no problemwith access to water as the sluice opens directlyinto two dams. This sluice is only really openedregularly during early summer when the area isparticularly dry. Those farming on the easterlyside of the farm have virtually no access to irrigationwater. Initially they attempted to makeuse of a dam situated on adjacent land but asthey do not have permanent access to this land,they have had very insecure access to irrigationwater since 2000. Now there is a land claim applicationpending on this land and the water isnot accessed at all. The distance between thedams that came with the farm is so great andthe terrain so uneven that no attempt has beenmade to channel water to the other side of thefarm. The Provincial Department of Agricultureand the Department of Water Affairs and Forestryconducted a number of visits over the yearsto determine how best to supply water to thestands on the eastern side of the farm. However,as of September 2008 this problem has not beenresolved. All the proposed solutions are deemedunworkable as a result of the costs involved.Since 2003 some beneficiaries and one or twonon-beneficiaries, leased fallow uncultivatedland from the inactive SLAG beneficiaries ortheir families. This was done in exchange fora small portion of the harvest or in exchangefor clearing alien Hakea species from the land,which had been fallow for about a decade. In2006 there were approximately thirteen peoplewho were farming on this land, although onlyabout seven were engaged in any form of vegetablecropping. Those who lease land are farmingon anything between two and six hectaresbut not more than half of this is under cultiva-

ResearchReporttion at any one time. This is due to crop rotationrequirements and also limited finances topurchase inputs. The most sought after land isthat situated next to the two dams that are fedby the local irrigation network.The agricultural stands are split almost equallybetween the two different sides of the farm andsome of the farmers have now borrowed landfrom those owning, but not farming, the landclosest to the irrigation network. This is a shorttermsolution and many are concerned aboutthe future when the owners either return tofarming or decide to sell the land. The sale ofthree stands in late 2007 was met with regret bysome of the more active farmers. The current arrangementsallow farmers temporary access tomore land for agricultural purposes. Changesin access will curtail their agricultural activities.One farmer reported that he was already noticingthe constraints. As he developed his agriculturalactivities and experience, his ability toincrease in scale was restricted by lack of accessto more agricultural land and also to finances.During the first two years after receiving thefarm the farmers identified that they had a rootknotnematode problem. A subsequent surveyby the ARC indicated that the problem was severe.However, because farmers did not have themoney to fumigate the soil it was recommendedthat they plant cabbage and work the residuesinto the soil as a form of bio-fumigation. Thealternative, and one which most farmers optedfor, was to sow oats on their field for a numberof years in order to reduce the root-knotnematode problem. Oats are a bad nematodehost and their presence tends to drive down thepopulation numbers. Farmers used the oats asfodder for their cattle and consequently it wasmainly those who had cattle in the beginningwho followed this practice.Physical resourcesSome mechanised agricultural implements werepurchased by the CPA members using own fundsand the balance of the SLAG monies, and somewere provided by the Provincial Department ofAgriculture. The list in Table 2.1 was first compiledin October 2002.At the initial assessment in 2002 the farmersrequested building materials in order to buildproper storage facilities for their implements.They were concerned that these would get damagedas a result of the lack of adequate storage.A store was eventually built in 2005 with moneyprovided by the Department of Agriculture. Initiallythe tractor had been stored at the chairperson’shouse and upon his death in late 2003it was moved to one of the containers. Currentlyit is stored in the new storeroom.A cursory inspection was carried out in 2008 andthis indicated that most of the equipment wasstill there plus a bushcutter obtained from theDepartment of Agriculture in 2005. The implementswere still usable but many had been damagedand farmers complained about this. Someof the second-hand ploughs and potato harvesterscould no longer be used as they were damagedand not repaired. Farmers reported thatthey were no longer looked after as well as theyhad been although the tractor was being servicedat the allotted periods.Basically it is the responsibility of the chairpersonand the treasurer to look after the implementsand see to the hiring and maintenance ofthe implements. Those currently responsible forthis were often not available due to work commitments,many of which took them away fromthe village for weeks at a time. Many accusationswere made during the interviews about abuse ofthe implements, stealing of diesel and failure toreport damage.In order to ensure that the implements could bemaintained in good order and replaced after anumber of years, the Department of Agriculturerecommended in 2000 that an initial fee of R150per hour be charged for the use of the tractorand implements. This included diesel for thetractor. Since acquiring the implements in 2000the hourly charge was R50 for CPA members andR60 for non-members. In 2002 this fee was stillthe same. At the time the treasurer said that itwas unlikely that the CPA could make a profit oreven manage to cover the maintenance and dieselcosts if the fee remained so low. Oppositionvoices said that the tractor was theirs becauseit was bought using the remainder of the SLAGfunds and that the government could not dictateto them what they had to pay for its use. Itwas also felt that the rising costs of diesel wouldmake the use of the tractor prohibitive if the feewas increased at that time. By August 2008 thefarmers were paying R100 (R110 for non-members)an hour to use the tractor and implements.They had been doing so for the past two yearsdespite the rising costs of diesel. The same com-29

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.32ing the available mechanised implements is notworth the return. Similarly, if they hired theseimplements as often as they wanted, this wouldput pressure on all the farmers who wished touse them, members and non-members alike.During the 2006 survey only one household outof the eight surveyed owned a tractor but alongwith the other seven households it also had accessto the tractor and implements owned andmanaged by the local CPA. Seven of the households,as members of this association, had accessto irrigation equipment, including pipes, sprinklersand a pump. The other household reportedhaving no access to irrigation equipment, mainlybecause there was no water source nearby. Infact only two of the households were farmingland near the local irrigation network and couldaccess the water that came into the two damsvia this network.Since obtaining their plots the active farmershave fenced in their land and most have removedalien vegetation. Hakea trees are oftenused as fencing poles and droppers. The landheld in trust is also enclosed but the alien vegetationhas not been removed. People seldomventure on this land for any agricultural relatedpurpose.Production systemFarmers in the area grow a number of crops suchas potatoes, green beans, beetroot, carrots, cabbage,maize, pumpkin and peas. The two maincommercially produced crops are potatoes andpumpkin. Potatoes cover the largest portion ofthe fields at any particular time, so the data referredto in this case relate mainly to potato production.Also, many of the other crops such aspeas are only found in home gardens tended byfemale residents. The men initially planted carrotsand beetroot, but the nematode problemdiscouraged them from continuing with this ona large scale. It has not, however, prevented themost active farmers from planting potatoes.All the farmers interviewed reported that in thisarea there are two potato seasons in a twelvemonth period. However, one farmer pointed outthat he only planted potatoes in winter becausehe experienced many problems with regardto water access during summer. In summer hewould plant pumpkins as these were more tolerantto drought. As he was involved in contractfarming he was able to sell his pumpkin harvestas he had a ready market for this crop. Sevenof the respondents had planted and cultivatedpotatoes at some stage between 2003 and 2006.Only four had actually done this during the previouspotato season, which was winter 2006.Those who had not, reported the following variedresponses:• one farmer was working with his brotherand was experimenting with changing tocattle farming as crop farming inputs werebecoming too costly and his employmentwas taking up too much of his time;• one farmer was ill for some time and had allowedthe land to fallow for the past threeyears but then planted pumpkins in 2005and potatoes in the 2006 summer season;• one farmer was still concerned with thenematode problem and had planted oats inan attempt to reduce the nematode population;• one farmer had not planted at all as it wastoo dry in September 2005 and the accessto water for irrigation purposes was a problem;also, this farmer was no longer plantingas his wife had started to receive a pensionand the household now had the benefitof his and her pensions.Most farmers considered production of potatoesfor sale as the most important reason for engagingin agriculture. One farmer, a pensioner, producedfor household consumption and did notsell his harvest. All the farmers kept potatoes forseed and all ate some of their harvest. However,for seven of the farmers the primary purpose ofproduction was cash income. Potatoes were notproduced for any other purpose such as animalfodder.Four of the respondents sold directly to local villagersfrom their homes or from their fields. Twofarmers sold to hawkers who came to the villageto purchase the pockets of potatoes. Only onefarmer had access to the fresh produce market inone of the district towns, and this was a result ofhis farming in conjunction with his employer. Thelatter provided this access to the formal marketin the form of contract farming and included hisemployee’s produce along with his own whentravelling to the market. He also did all the pricenegotiating and marketing on behalf of himselfand the employee. This farmer was not particularlyhappy with this arrangement as he felt hewas being under-rewarded by his employer.

ResearchReportIrrigation of potatoesOnly four of the respondents actually irrigatedtheir potatoes. The fact that the others did notcan be attributed to the water problem on thefarm, as previously discussed, and the fact thatirrigation equipment was shared amongst thefarmers who were members of the local association.This last point meant that people often hadto wait for others to finish irrigating their cropsbefore the equipment was available. Of coursewhen there was a dry spell everybody wantedto irrigate immediately. The four respondentswho irrigated their potato crops all reportedusing sprayer irrigation, as this was the equipmentto which they had access. The sharing ofirrigation equipment could lead to water stressof the crop. However, some sharing is still betterthan total dryland production, which is associatedwith higher risk. As has been mentioned,one farmer does not plant potatoes at all duringsummer in order to reduce his risk to crop failurefrom seasonal stresses and lack of sufficient irrigation.Alternatively he plants pumpkins andhas an established market for this crop.Methods for obtaining seed potatoesFarmers were asked where they sourced theirseed from in an effort to identify the cultivarsthat are used and in an effort to determinethe use of farmer-kept seed practices. The seedsources could explain some diseases experiencedby farmers and the possible health status of theplants before they emerged. It would also indicatethe reliance of farmers on certain forms ofseed supply such as self-stored or purchased tubers.Farmers saved potatoes for seed and alsopurchased seed potatoes from a local producerand sometimes the local co-op. These activitieswere carried out irrespective of the cultivars andfarmers predominantly bought what was availableor what other farmers suggested. Farmersindicated that they kept seed from the previousseason’s crop and when it came to planting forthe next season they would purchase more seeddepending on the quality and quantity of thesaved seed and the size of the land they intendedto plant. They did not always plant the samesize of land every year or every season. With theexception of the farmer who was involved incontract farming with his employer, some mightplant a hectare at a time but most planted aquarter to a half hectare every season. The reasonfor this was the limited finances for inputs.The effectiveness of the seed planted could notbe established as too many variables determineif these farmers buy seed or not. Generally mostof the farmers purchased second generationtubers (uncertified) from a neighbouring largescalefarmer because these proved cheaper thanpurchasing from the co-op. Combining the practiceof planting uncertified and certified seedraises more questions than it answers. This is especiallyin light of the extremely short rotationcycle that these farmers use. If the seed is onthe same fields, season after season, the effectivenessof buying seed becomes questionable,especially if uncertified seed are infected withsoil-borne diseases, as the two are often plantedtogether.Potato variety preferenceFarmers only cultivate BP1, Vanderplank, Astridand Mondial. The order of preference in termsof area of land under cultivation is as follows:• All the respondents reported producing thepotato variety BP1. BP1 is a versatile cultivarthat has multiple uses and generally goodyields. While one person reported that itwas mainly grown for food purposes, theremaining seven all said that it was grownprimarily for sales and then for food becauseit had a good taste and was readilyavailable in the area. One of these sevenreported that it was a good summer crop.Six of the respondents reported that mostof their potato production area was primaryplanted with BP1. Five of the respondentsranked this as their preferred cultivar.• Four farmers indicated that they cultivatedVanderplank for food and one of these reportedthat it was a good cultivar for wintersales. Only one of these four farmers consideredthis variety to be of primary importancein terms of area under cultivation.Two of the respondents ranked it as a highlypreferred cultivar. This cultivar tends tohave a small but dedicated consumer groupwho prefer the taste and the fact that itdoes not go very soft when cooked. It is anexcellent salad and French fry potato.• The potato variety Astrid was cultivated byfour of the farmers. Only one of the farmersconsidered it to be of primary importancein terms of area under cultivation and thisfarmer also ranked it as a highly preferred33

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.cultivar. Astrid is a yellow coloured potatowith a very specific taste that is preferred bysome people. This cultivar is mainly grownin the western and southern parts of theWestern Cape.• Five of the farmers cultivated Mondial, andwhile all mentioned that they producedthis variety mainly for sales, one of themreported that the fact that it was resistantto blight was an important reason for plantingthis variety. None of these respondentsreported that Mondial was of primary importancein terms of area under cultivation.Nor was it ranked as number one in terms ofpreference. Mondial is an imported cultivarthat is slightly drought resistant.Careful analysis of where farmers obtained theirseed tubers and what they planted indicatesthat because BP1 was the most common potatothat their seed supplier had it was consequentlythe most common one which they had access toand therefore planted. It was available locally ata cheaper price than that supplied at the co-opand this was the main reason it was purchased.Also, its versatility means that there is a marketfor it in the surrounding area. In essence the appearanceis given that farmers will plant what islocally available as long as the yields are generallygood and there is a market for the harvest.Crop rotation patternsIn order to understand farmers’ crop rotationpatterns, they were asked to indicate what cropthey had planted in the two preceding plantingseasons on the land where they had mostrecently planted potatoes. Previous experiencehad shown that most farmers had trouble rememberingwhat was planted more than twoseasons previously as most farmers do not recordfield histories. In an effort to get some idea ofthe rotation it was limited to just two seasons,as it tends to identify rotation with solanaceousand other unsuitable crops. At least six of thefarmers have a rotation system that would generallybe regarded as too short. It is suggestedthat the rotation for potatoes is every four years,thus limiting the build-up of soil-borne diseasesthat affect potatoes. One farmer indicated thathis field was fallow for several seasons; however,the fallow period was due to his illness andwas probably not normal practice. Poor rotationpractices of farmers need to be addressed,since this can lead to a build-up of diseases thatcan eventually lead to the loss of these soils forpotato production. Crop rotation must take thefarmers’ needs into consideration, as well as thespecific agro-ecological environment where theyfarm. Making use of brassicas for biofumigationto help control nematodes (an important pestfor them) and not planting host crops are veryimportant strategies. Ensuring that no solanaceousplants are incorporated into the cycle isalso very important. A four year crop rotation isseen as the best in most cases. Where crop rotationis shorter the use of certified seed becomescrucial as the chances for infection of the soilwith soil-borne diseases is reduced. However,this does not mean that a rotation shorter thanfour years is acceptable. These farmers need toget help from a knowledgeable potato productionperson who would be able to help themestablish the best rotation practice for theirspecific circumstances. Combining their fields tohelp establish a longer rotation is probably notan option as local farmers prefer to take responsibilityfor their own land and crops.Support from the various state and parastatalresearch and extension services has not beenforthcoming is this regard. Since farmers obtainedthe farm in 1999 they planted potatoes.However, nobody has ever assisted the farmersto develop an appropriate crop rotation systembased on the crops they selected to plant. Thiscould be one factor that led to the rise in rootknotnematodes after the first three years ofproduction.Potato storage practicesFarmers stored potatoes for three specific purposes:food, seed and for sales. The latter practice– followed by only two of the farmers – wasto allow them to introduce potatoes onto themarket when prices might be more favourable,and is also common among local large-scale commercialpotato producers. However, this practicecan be risky as market prices fluctuate and mightnot be favourable, and because storage conditionsare not necessarily such as to maintain thequality of the potatoes, typically for a period ofabout four months. While seven farmers storedpotatoes for food purposes, all eight stored potatoesfor seed which they would plant in theirnext planting season.Farmers were asked how they currently storedtheir ‘table potatoes’ (those they intend toconsume) and seed potatoes. Cold storage was34

ResearchReportunavailable in this village so none of the farmerscould make use of such a facility. The mostcommon method for storing potatoes was eitherin bags or in crates in the store. Often individualfarmers made use of more than one storagemeans or facility. Use of a facility or storage typeis dependent on availability of space and bagsor crates in which to pack the stored potatoes.All respondents reported storing table potatoesin bags no matter what structure was used. Usingbags for table potatoes helps limit exposureto light, thus preventing greening of the tubers.This is essential as they cannot sell green potatoesand greening breaks the dormancy of thetubers, thus causing sprouting. Consumers willbuy neither green nor sprouting tubers, if theyare aware that potatoes are in this stage.A positive point is that the farmers do not storetheir tubers in the soil. This is especially fortunategiven their expressed root-knot nematodeproblems. This would increase nematode populationsin the soil. The piling of seed on the floorcan result in many storage losses due to rodents,poor ventilation and the diseases that are associatedwith this. Piling of tubers makes goodmanagement of seed during storage difficultto nearly impossible. Storage of seed potatoesin bags is not always the best, as the ventilationcan be compromised if the wrong types of bagsare used. Ventilation is one of the most importantaspects of successful storage, as the heatgenerated by respiration needs to be removedfrom the environment in order to prevent waterfrom forming around the tubers and thus creatingconditions for diseases. Storing loose tubersin crates or in thin layers tends to be the bestmethod for storage under non-cold-room conditions.The use of diffused light during the storageof seed greens the tubers, breaks dormancyand encourages the formation of thick sproutsthat do not easily break-off. Storage trials ofseed at ARC-Roodeplaat and on-farm found thismethod to be effective for up to eight months.Potato storage problemsRespondents were shown photographs of 23pests. They were asked to identify which of thepests they experienced as problems with regardto potato production, table potato storage andseed potato storage. Once the pests were identified,respondents were asked to rank them in orderof significance. The most significant problemwas given a ranking of 1, the second a 2, and soon. With regard to problems encountered duringthe storage of both food and seed potatoes,the most commonly identified problem was thepresence of potato tuber moth larvae damage.In this village this damage was not originally attributedto the potato tuber moth but in factto mites. However, when the farmers examinedthe photographs of various pests and the damagethey cause, they identified this mite damageas being potato tuber moth damage. Althoughnematodes are mentioned as storage problems,they are actually a consequence of productionrather than storage practices. The open methodof seed storage (in piles, open on floor, in crates)can lead to tuber moth infestation at this stage,as the tubers are unprotected from tuber mothswho can lay their eggs on these tubers. However,it is not always certain where the tubermoth problem comes from. Poor managementpractices in the field could result in infestationbefore or during harvesting. These farmers arewell aware that steps to control nematodes andtuber moth should be implemented during production.They were both identified during thediscussions on storage as it was often only afterperiods of storage that the farmers uncoveredthe damage. Some basic production and storagetraining could help these farmers to minimisetheir losses.General potato production problemsIn response to being asked what problems theygenerally encountered with regard to potatoproduction the respondents provided the followinginformation, presented here in terms ofthe frequency of responses:• Lack of access to water (7 responses)• Blight (6 responses)• Nematodes (5 responses)• Millipedes (3 responses).In total the respondents reported fourteen problems,but the above list only refers to those thatwere mentioned by more than one respondent.Given the problems with the water supply for alarge portion of the farm, it is not surprising thatthe lack of access to water ranked the highest.This has been a problem since the farm was obtainedand nine years later there does not seemto be any solution in the immediate to longtermfuture. High levels of root knot nematodepopulations in the soil are another problem thathas been around for a number of years. Some35

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 2.3: Potato input costs as of August 2008Input costs per hectare (oftrplant 0.25-o.5 ha in a setason)How often purchased Amount purchased ActualCostWhere purchasedSeed (tubers) Every season 3-4 X 25 kg crates @ 18 X R60 per R3780 Neighbouring farmcrateFertilisersFertiliser 2-3-4 30% Every season 2 X 50 kg per ha @ R486 per 50kg R902 Local depotKAN/LAN 28% Every season 2 X 50 kg per ha @R400 per 50kg R556 Local depotFertiliser 101 44% Every season 2 X 50 kg per ha @R400 per 50kg R758 Local depotFertilisers (organic)None Insignificant and no cost R0 NoneHerbicideGranazon Every season R400 per 5 litre but uses 2 litre per R160 Local co-ophaPesticideNone R0 NoneTractor use (R100 per hourincludes implements, diesel andmaintenance)Soil preparationPlough Every season 2 hours @ R100 per hour R200 Farmers associationDisc Every season 2 hours @ R100 per hour R200 Farmers associationSmooth Every season 2 hours @ R100 per hour R200 Farmers associationPlantPlanter Every season 2 hours @ R100 per hour R200 Farmers associationWeed controlSpray Every season 2 hours @ R100 per hour R200 Farmers associationHarvestMechanical harvester Every season 2 hours @ R100 per hour for 2 days R400 Farmers associationLabour - only for harvesting and sortingFemale labour Every season 4-6 for 2 days @ R80 per labourer R800 Neighbouring farmper dayOwn transport for purchases Every season 100 km @ R2 per km R400 Own carand salesRates on land Monthly R2.10 per month for 12 months R25Packaging Every season R1.20 per pocket R1200Total expenditure R9982farmers are trying to control the population byplanting oats; however, there is some evidencethat this might not be a good strategy for reducingthe population if the varieties are not resistantto root knot nematodes. If the oats varietiesare resistant to the nematodes, they shouldassist in reducing the root knot nematode populationin the soils. The soil population of rootknot nematodes has been exacerbated by thepresence of numerous Australian black wattletrees on the farm. These are hosts of root knotnematodes. Advice on integrated pest management(IPM) that incorporates aspects of biofumi-gation might help these farmers to reduce thenematode population, but this will only be effectiveif they change their rotation to four years(eight planting seasons). Given the small piecesof land actually planted this might well be possible.Blight and millipedes are also consideredsignificant problems with regard to potato production.However, during the interviews farmerssaid that these could be controlled if the correctchemical controls were applied when necessary.However, most farmers admitted not using thesechemical controls due to the expense associatedwith them.36

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.38However, in an interesting turn of events, thefarmers who have recently become most activetend to be those who are situated the furthestfrom the irrigation dams; these are the farmerswhose plots are closer to the village, and thusfor whom combining farming and other livelihoodactivities is most convenient.Some of the SLAG beneficiaries have cattle ontheir land, although these are mainly those whodo not plant crops. Discussions were held to determinethe viability of cattle rearing and selling.All the farmers who had at some time keptcattle reported that this was not really an enterprise.Rather, the cattle performed the functionof a savings account which could be accessedwhen required. The return was fairly good andthe input costs were minimal. Those who nolonger practised this said it was not a viable wayof saving money because if the cattle died youlost all your money. They also said that they didnot have sufficient land with adequate grazingcapacity. Most of those who did not keep cattlesuggested that it was only the poorer householdswho did so. However, observations clearlyillustrated that this was not the case. People hadvarious reasons for keeping cattle and access todifferent resources. These determined the carethat the cattle were given. The figures given inTable 2.5 below are reported for what can beconsidered the general costs incurred to rear acalf in the manner practised by most householdswho planted feed and occasionally used communalland for grazing. Those who only used communalland would spend less money. Animalswere usually sold off after three years but thiswas by no means a rule. The current expectedprice was between R2700 and R3200 per animalafter three years. The figures illustrate that if theanimal has no serious illnesses and the ownerexperiences no uncommon expenses, then cashcosts are less than half of cash earnings.Policy aspectsIt can be realistically argued that the South AfricanGovernment does not really have any real policy with regard to addressing the needs ofsmallholder farmers. It can also be strongly arguedthat any policies that are aimed at bringingabout agrarian reform in South Africa are largelycommercially oriented and focus specifically onsupporting groups rather than individuals. TheSLAG aspect of the land reform programme is agood example of this group focus and as notedabove it resulted in the active farmers having toco-opt a number of predominantly non-farmersinto the CPA in order to access land. While thesuccessor to SLAG – the Land Redistribution forAgricultural Development (LRAD) programme– has somewhat reduced the pressure for applicantsto form groups, it tends to ignore the poorand especially resource-poor farmers. Accordingto officials with the Western Cape Provincial Departmentof Agriculture, the SLAG beneficiariesin this village are entitled to submit applicationsunder the LRAD support programme. However,this has been done by very few as the fundingis predominantly for infrastructure developmentand not for implements and solutions to individualproblems, etc. The store was built fromsome of this money. It seems that the waterconstraints cannot be addressed under this supportprogramme as it is too costly an exercise.With the arrival of an Agricultural DevelopmentOfficer in the village, some of the beneficiarieshave accessed funds from the ComprehensiveAgricultural Support Programme (CASP). However,they have had to do this in groups andthese are all new projects and do not necessarilybuild on existing activities. Only one land reformbeneficiary really has anything to do with thisAgricultural Development Officer. Others arguethat this official has nothing to offer except piggeriesand household gardens. None of the currentproblems are being addressed such as thewater problem and the high price of inputs.Social and institutionalaspectsBesides organising the occasional trainingcourse, suggesting and financing the occasionalproject and providing some advice, local stateagricultural extension does not interfere withfarmers’ activities. The establishment of themechanisation centre has been useful to farmers.Farmers in the village, more specifically theland reform beneficiaries, have access to onetractor and associated implements. However,non-beneficiaries generally do not make use ofthis facility unless they are farming large tractsof land. Probably because numbers are smalland some farmers have their own mechanisedimplements, they did not emphasise access tomechanisation as a constraint. Also evident fromthe time spent in the village is that there is alot of conflict around the care and payment forthe use of the implements at the centre. Oneconcern was that many people were abusingthe implements and accurate records were not

ResearchReportTable 2.5: Cattle rearing costs and return for a singlelivestock unit over three yearsInputHow oftenpurchasedAmountpurchasedCost perunitWherepurchasedCost of 1livestockunit forthreeyears ifpurchasedCalves 0 0 R200 - R320 NeighbouringfarmerBreeding services 1 per year 1 service R50 - 100 Local bullownerR300R75Feed (planting ofoats)2 per year 8 50 kg bagsper yearR86 per bag Co-op R229Growth acceleratorfeed1 bag per calf andmother for first year1 bag 50 kg R120 Co-op R120Block of vitamins 1 block per year 1 block forall the cowsR85 Co-op R85Actoban 1 per year 250 ml R90 Co-op R270Tick fever,Redwater -Teramycin1 per year 250 ml R80 - R110 Co-op R300Shelter Once only R500 R500 Hardware 0Fencing Once only R1 500 1 ha - 2 ha Co-op 0Maintenance When necessary R100 R100 Co-op 0TotalR1379being kept. Consequently, this compounded bythe low hourly tariff would prevent the futurereplacement of the tractor. The mechanisationcentre is seen as useful and a necessity in orderto access mechanised implements, but some feelthat it has brought its own set of problems. Similarly,the CPA very seldom meets and this meansthat problems or uncomfortable issues are neverresolved.Farmers cultivating on the land reform farmtended to exchange information and also toshare inputs when appropriate. Exchange ofinformation was common between peers. Oftenduring discussions over the years farmersreported to the researcher that they conductedcertain agricultural practices. However, it waslater uncovered through participant observationthat they in fact did not carry out these practicesbecause they were expensive. The rationalefor telling these ‘white lies’ appears to be thatthese farmers were aware from other farmersthat these were ‘good commercial practices,’and did not want to be seen wanting. It alsobecame evident over the years that farmer-tofarmerexchange is most often between peersand family members and not between differentage groups, making it difficult for the young tolearn from older residents.Peers noticed that they did not always trust oneor two of their number and as a result would notcollaborate with a particular person or personswhen it came to farming together. One must recallthat the first group farming activity in thevillage was seen as a disaster by most of thoseinvolved. Also, it seems that local and oftenlong-term disagreements prevent people fromworking together.Local farmers and particularly the beneficiarieshave always cooperated well with outside39

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.40agencies such as the Department of Agriculture,Department of Land Affairs, AgriculturalResearch Council and various non-governmentorganisations. This cooperation was historicallyextended to local large-scale farmers, on whosefarms some residents worked and elder residentsenjoyed good relationships. Relationships withmany of these organisations has enabled themto obtain many of the resources they require forfarming, such as land, inputs, implements andsome technical knowledge. Those beneficiaries,especially the active farmers, who see theserelationships as being valuable, are hesitant tocriticise and go to great lengths to keep up goodrelations. It is felt by maintaining these relationshipsmore resources may be obtained in the future.Six farmers purchase their seeds, plant materialand agrochemicals from the co-operativein the nearest town. However, many of thesealso purchase potato tubers from a local commercialgrower in the area, seemingly becausethe price is significantly less. These tubers aresecond generation and are not certified, hencetheir significantly lower price. Most of the fertilisersare bought at the local depot because thisis closer than the co-operative and also becausea local farmer has agreed to pay their valueadded-tax,making their cost significantly lower.The co-operative only seems to be a source ofagrochemicals in the form of weedkiller. Otherinputs are only purchased from the co-operativewhen they are not available locally. Generally,most of the active farmers have a good relationshipwith local large-scale farmers. Often implementsare lent and advice is given. On a few occasionslarge-scale farmers have also given oldimplements and tractors to local farmers. Thereappears to be a good supportive relationshiphere but again it is largely between the olderand active farmers and their large-scale peers.One farmer who had no access to a motor vehiclepurchased his seeds and plant material fromthe local general dealer in the village or he obtainedthese from other farmers in the village.He also obtained his agrochemicals in this fashionbut indicated that he did not use very much.The contract farmer obtained all his seeds, plantmaterial and agrochemicals from his employerof 22 years on credit. He repaid these debts fromthe sales of his harvest, which as mentionedabove was marketed by his employer. The otherseven respondents had accessed neither formalmarkets nor credit facilities. However, in respectof markets, this is mainly because they preferredto get paid at the point of sale (whereas withformal markets there is often a considerabledelay), produced at too modest a scale to justifymarketing at great distances, and generallywere unable or unwilling to cooperate with oneanother in order to market collectively. However,with regard to credit, one permanentlyemployed farmer had previously made use of aLand Bank loan to purchase a second-hand tractor,but was disappointed at the interest ratescharged at the time of his loan in 2001. In 2008he was still repaying this loan after eight yearsbecause of the increasing interest rates.The human dimensionHistorically farming is a male activity in this villageand very few women are actively engagedin any form of agriculture. In 2002 a daughterof a beneficiary inherited her father’s land whenhe died. She planted a wide variety of vegetableson the land but water constraints eventuallymade her stop this activity. Her husband nowuses the land to graze cattle. She is busy with achicken layer project and manages this with anothervillager.The arrival of the Agricultural Development Officerin the village in 2005 saw five women getinvolved in household gardening using rainwaterharvesting technologies supplied by the Departmentof Agriculture.At present all the potato and other vegetableproduction on the farmland is done by malebeneficiaries.Farmers have received ad hoc training from varioussources over the years starting in about 1996,soon after they had established the CPA, as partof the requirements to apply for the SLAG. TheDepartment of Agriculture has provided trainingto some of the farmers, both beneficiaries andnon-beneficiaries. This has included pig farming,vegetable production, layer production, someadvice on cattle husbandry and also training oncrop spraying and irrigation scheduling. Twobeneficiaries were trained in tractor maintenanceand driving. However, it is the opinion ofthe author that the farmers need more trainingin some of these skills along with more regularsupport and advice. Currently they get no advicefrom the extension services and only one of theactive beneficiaries and farmers was aware ofthe presence of the Agricultural Development

ResearchReportOfficer. Discussions with this person indicatedthat she was aware of many of the social constraintsexperienced by the farmers but was notaware of technical constraints due to virtually nointeraction with most of the active farmers.The Agricultural Research Council had conducteda few courses on general soil preparation andcrop management in 2000 and 2001, but this waslargely focused on fynbos cultivation which onlyone farmer experimented with. They also provideda series of business development coursesin 2003 and 2004 that were well attended. However,these unfortunately clashed with beneficiaries’other commitments and many were unableto attend.During the 2006 survey two of the respondentsreported that they had no access to agriculturaltraining and a third reported the use of his experienceof 22 years as a farmworker on a commercialfarm in the area. Five of the respondentsreceived agricultural training and advice fromthe local office of the Provincial Department ofAgriculture when this was available. This includedattendance of some of the courses indicatedpreviously. One reported getting his adviceexclusively from other farmers. During discussionsit became clear that all those in the sampleshared experiences and practical advice withone another at some stage. They also used oneanother as sources to obtain inputs or at least toget an idea of what the purchase price of inputsshould be. There is a potential within this groupfor sharing information and experience, but it islimited to peers. However, farmers do not wantto farm communally and prefer being in chargeof their production activities.Household livelihoodsDuring the 2006 survey the following profile oflivelihoods was obtained and in 2008 a review ofthis status illustrated that it was unchanged overthe past two years. Two of the respondents werefull-time farmers and both received disabilitypensions (one private and one from the state).However, they both engaged in other off-farmincome generating activities when the situationarose. Five of the farmers considered themselvesto be part-time farmers with full-time employment,either in the village or in the surroundingarea. However, their actual involvement inagriculture depended largely on the time theyhad available and their desire to experimentwith new sources of livelihoods. One person wasa pensioner whose agricultural activities had declinedin recent years due to old age, ill-healthand the fact that his wife was now receiving apension. In essence, all respondent householdshad some other form of income besides that derivedfrom agricultural activities. This status appliesgenerally to all the SLAG beneficiaries asmost were employed or received social grantsat the time they applied for and eventually obtainedthe farm. While sometimes consideredan important source of income for rural households,none of the respondent households receivedany form of remittances from membersresiding outside the household. In any eventthey all indicated that agriculture was not theprimary livelihood of the household.State social grants do not constitute an importantcontribution to most of the households,except for one household that was dependanton two state pensions as the sole form of cash income.Only three of the other seven householdsreceived at least one social security grant. Themean annual income derived from formal employmentfor the remaining seven householdswas R31 714 with a minimum of R5 400 and maximumof R63 600 per annum. The sample meanfor annual income derived from formal employmentfor the eight households was R27 750 andthe median R23 100. Only two households hadmembers engaged in part-time employment andtheir average annual income from this sourcewas R10 200.Annual income generated from the productionand sale of crops was estimated between R1500and R20 000. Only seven households were currentlyengaged in this activity. While one householdwas realising a value of R100 per annumfrom household consumption of their agriculturalproduce, six were realising between R1000and R2000 per annum. One household had notproduced any food crops during the 12 month2005/2006 period under review. This situationremained approximately the same when furtherenquiries were made in 2008.None of the respondent households had generatedany income from animal production as noanimals had been sold during the period. Sixhouseholds reported not consuming any animalsduring the period. For those two households thathad consumed livestock, one reported realisinga value of R100 per annum and the other a valueof R2000. It appears that very few householdsconsume livestock and seem to only sell livestock41

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.in specific instances. Sometimes, a particularanimal would be purchased four or five monthsbefore it was intended for slaughter, e.g. for afeast or special occasion such as Christmas. Thiswas especially the case if it could be obtained ata good price. When clarity was sought on thesepoints it was indicated that livestock, in particularcattle, are an investment and are used byhouseholds as a form of savings. They are soldwhen the household needs money for somethingspecific. Even where households were tryingto build up their numbers of livestock, thesewere not to be sold on a regular basis but whenthe household needed some extra income.The total annual household income was calculatedby including the above sources, except forthe in-kind values as these proved uncertain dueto possible under-reporting. In this village thevalue of R100 in a year from one household doesnot seem correct. The total annual income forthe households ranged from R19 680 to R83 600with a mean of R46 318. None of the householdshad a total annual income from agriculturethat exceeded total annual income from othersources. This suggests that agricultural activitieswere predominantly for the purpose of supplementinghousehold income. However, for one ofthe respondents the income derived from agricultureslightly exceeded personal income fromother sources. For another it was only slightlyless than income from other sources. Table 2.6indicates the percentage of household incomespent on agricultural inputs and the percentagecontribution of agriculture to householdincome. Given the fact that income is oftenunder-reported and expenses are over-reported,these figures should be treated with caution. Atbest they indicate a pattern rather and a fixedincome or expenditure.From Table 2.6 we can see that six of the householdswere getting a better percentage returnon household income when investments in agriculturewere made. But for some this returnwas not that great when compared with otherhouseholds. Interestingly enough, household 8was following conventional practices and thereturn on income in terms of input costs wasnot remarkable when compared to some of theother households. Household 1 can be explainedaway by the fact that the respondent was nolonger actively involved in household food cropproduction because of his age and health andit is likely that he was unable to recall accuratefigures. It is also probable that he could not calculatethe correct return on his investment, asthe figures he cited for return on investmentwere very low (R100/annum). The performanceof household 5 is understood by the fact that thefarmer had sown oats to improve the soil healthand that he had only planted a small portion offood crops.Local significance ofagricultureDuring 2006 farmers were asked a number ofquestions with regard to their agricultural practicesfor household food security, as a source ofincome, production patterns, input expendituretrends and general agricultural trends over theprevious five years. The purpose was to get someidea of the changes in agriculture as a significantTable 2.6: Percentage of household income spent onagricultural inputs and the percentage contribution ofagriculture to household incomeRespondent HHAnnual HH inputexpenditure% income spent onagricultural inputs% contribution ofagriculture to HHincome1 420 2.0 1.02 1100 2.8 35.93 1295 3.5 0.04 1380 1.8 11.75 1720 4.5 6.76 2485 6.7 45.87 5430 6.5 26.38 19700 46.9 50.042

ResearchReportsource of food or income and also to see whatchanges had taken place with regard to inputexpenditure, which is often considered to be animportant constraint to agricultural participation.One farmer reported that agriculture had becomeless important as a source of food duringthe past five years because his wife started receivingher state pension during this period andhis health was declining due to his age. Also, hewas not a beneficiary of the land reform programmeand only had access to approximatelya 0.5 hectare piece of land which was exclusivelyrain-fed. The other seven reported that agriculturehad become more important. Six reportedthat increased access to land had allowed themto produce fresher and cheaper food for theirhouseholds. One reported that improved accessto land enabled increased production for bothhousehold consumption and sales. Two of therespondents noted that agriculture had becomeless important for them as a source of income.One pointed out that it was never a source of incomeas produce was used exclusively for householdconsumption. The second said that his otherenterprise (non-agricultural) required fewerinputs and was a better source of income if oneconsidered the input expenditure required forthe two different income generating activities.He farmed with his brother who was in the sameline of off-farm work. Later discussions indicatedthat the brother felt the same way. The other respondentsgave the following individual replies:• One accessed land from land reform beneficiarieswho did not farm, so he was nowable to produce more and sell more of thesurplus;• Few village residents plant crops and thosethat do have only small pieces of land,therefore there is a good local market;• One farmer felt that access to more landmeant it was now cheaper to plant forhousehold consumption and for sales;• Agriculture and subsequent sales helps improvethe household’s standard of living;• Agriculture increases household incomeand pays for cost of school-going child’seducation;• Agriculture both reduces household incomeexpenditure on food and brings in an extraincome.With regard to household expenditure on inputsduring the previous five years, one respondentnoted that less was being spent at presentbecause he now farmed much less than he didpreviously. The remaining seven currently spentmore on agricultural inputs. One reported thatthe increase in expenditure was a result of theincreasing costs of inputs, although he was notalways buying more as the size of his land underproduction varied seasonally. Three farmersnoted that the high price of inputs was the solereason for spending more on inputs. The otherthree also cited the high costs of inputs but notedthat they were farming more land than theyhad been five years previously. Generally, inputcosts had increased but the impact of this differedfrom individual to individual according totheir different farming activities.IdentityLand reform beneficiaries in the village whowere still actively producing crops in 2008, andthose other farmers who were now farming onthe land that belonged to other beneficiaries,felt strongly that for a farmer to be successfulone had to have farming ‘in the blood’. A personneeds to know how to work with the soils,the crops, water and the environment and needsthe knowledge and experience to do this. It wasstrongly felt that to be a farmer one must havea love for farming, otherwise one cannot trulybe a farmer. The person must also be willing toexperiment with new ideas and have sufficientmoney to farm. All the farmers raised the problemof the rising costs of inputs and that oftenthe rising food prices were not enough to setoffthese costs, so profits remained low. Noneof them felt that they could make a living exclusivelyfrom farming and relied on pensions,disability grants, and permanent and occasionaloff-farm employment. The two farmers with disabilitygrants were adamant that they also neededto do occasional off-farm work in order tosurvive and were both fortunate that their wivesworked.The contract farmer makes a living from onfarmemployment as a farm worker and alsothrough farming the land he has borrowed fromtwo SLAG beneficiaries, so in some sense hederives an income exclusively from agriculture,but not from ‘own agriculture’. He is far fromhappy with the arrangement with his employerwho dictates what crops should be planted andhow much is required. If the farmer wants to43

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.plant more that is fine but the employer doesnot guarantee that he will market the extra produce.There is also discord regarding the moneyput on credit and that received after the cropsare harvested and sold. Consequently, this doesnot seem to be a happy relationship, althoughit has been going on for almost four years andthe farm worker is not willing to stop. Also, therelationship increases this small-scale farmers’household income significantly and it also raiseshis prestige amongst the SLAG beneficiaries whofarm similar crops, who respect his ability to provideinformation on inputs, pest, diseases andprices. But at the same time they are jealous thathe is able to enjoy the support and cooperationfrom his employer, despite any problems thathe may have with this relationship. He is able tofarm up to two hectares of crops during a seasonwith this support. None of the beneficiaries areable to do this.EnvironmentThe farming operations are so small that theireffect on the environment at present seemsinsignificant. Very little land is actually undercultivation during any one year on the recentlyacquired farm. Apart from the contract farmer,those who are farming seldom use any pesticides.Their use of herbicides is of much lesscause for concern than that of their large-scaleneighbours. The trust land has never been usedfor agricultural purposes since it was obtained in1999. It was used for grazing by a few livestockowners in the beginning but this practice hasstopped due to its unsuitability: cattle died fromtick fever and some broke free into neighbouringfarmland. In any event, livestock numbers inthe village are relatively small. Those owned bythe SLAG beneficiaries and a few other residentsare grazed in enclosed camps and fodder isplanted for them. A few local residents make useof a neighbouring large tract of enclosed landto graze their cattle. However, the beneficiariesdo not use this land as the ownership thereofis under dispute and a claim has been submittedby a group of village residents to the LandClaims Commission. In general the beneficiariesmake use of conventional agricultural practiceswhich are neither organic nor environmentallyfriendly. However, their use of agrochemicals isvery limited. One concern in this regard is theobservation that none of them wears any protectiveclothing when spraying.The futureGenerally, the various farmers consulted overthe years are far from optimistic about the futureof agriculture. Some were concerned aboutthe recent sales of land by three of the SLAGbeneficiaries to outsiders whom they did notknow. They believed that this meant that thefarm land was being taken out of circulation andthat if they ever needed to expand in the futurethis land would become less and less if the trendto sell off the land continued. Some of the landthat was on the market was that next to themain irrigation dam and this might complicatetheir access to this water. The lack of a solutionto their water problem and the continual risingcost of agricultural inputs were regularly reportedas concerns. One farmer has emphasisedover the years that while his father was able tosupport and educate a family of eleven membersas a sharecropper; this would be impossibleto do nowadays. Another farmer reported thatagriculture appeared to become more technologicallyadvanced with each year. He cited theexample of the increased diversification of agriculturalactivities among many neighbouringfarmers, including into tunnel farming. He saidthat obtaining the latest technology required increasedcapital expenditure and also more land.He summed up these changes by noting that thesmall-scale farmer would not be able to do thisas both the finances and the land were extremelylimited. The water problem was the biggestconstraint for farming and he said that even ifagriculture was not becoming so technologicallyadvanced, the beneficiaries would always have aproblem because of the water constraints.A number of farmers in the village and land reformbeneficiaries were interviewed to determinehow their production trends and those inthe village had changed since 1999. Most beneficiarieswho had been consistently active since1999 noted that they had been very involved inpreparing their land and in producing vegetablesin the first three years. However, these activitieshad declined for various reasons. Somebeneficiaries noted that they were producingmore crops since 1999 as a result of accessto more land and the fact that over the ensuingyears they had developed more experiencein farming. One farmer attributed this to accessingmore land but indicated that access toa tractor and associated implements were alsomajor contributing factors. The farmer who wasengaged in contract farming pointed out that44

ResearchReportdue to some beneficiaries not making use of theland he was able to borrow land in the village.In 2008 he was farming two hectares of land(and would be / had been? for three years) andhad access to at least another two to three hectares.In 2004 he had not farmed in the village.As a result of this relationship and that with hisemployer, contract farming was increasing hishousehold income by almost 100%.Responses during discussions on whether agriculturalactivities were generally increasing ordecreasing in the village were mixed. Some feltthat it was decreasing and gave the followingreasons:• Married couples were getting grants fortheir children these days so households hadmore disposable income. Consequently,fewer households were planting crops intheir home gardens.• It was also reported that the youth (includingthose in their thirties) are increasinglyuninterested in farming and while manyfarmers recalled helping their fathers ortheir uncles when they were young theynoted that this trend had stopped. However,some youth are interested in agriculturebut have no access to land.• High input costs have put farming out of thereach of many households so people withsmall pieces of land farmed less or stoppedaltogether. Money is now spent on boughtfood rather than on the production thereof.• Only a few of the households and the landreform beneficiaries are actually engaged inagricultural activities. Some are no longerinvolved due to ill-health or old age. Therefore,they are no longer able to farm as efficientlyas they had done previously.One person felt that people were farming morebecause some now had access to large pieces ofland. He was considering output and area undercultivation rather than the number of localpeople engaged in farming. Other residentsmentioned that the agricultural activities in thevillage as a whole had largely remained unchangedand gave the following reasons:cultivation. People had simply shifted fromthe commonages to the newly acquiredfarm. However, this argument appears unsoundas the commonage has not been usedfor many years and houses now take up alarge part of it.• Receipt of land from the state land reformprogramme meant that some people nowfarm on bigger pieces of land and thus producemore, placing greater emphasis oncommercial production. This does not meanthat the numbers of people engaged in agriculturehave increased. Often these havedecreased but people are now able to farmlarger areas of land.• Generally households tended to plant lessbecause land was scarce in the village. Onlya few households and farmers planted atpresent. This was a trend that had startedin the 1960s with the rising population andthe scaling down of land (commonages) allocatedfor agricultural activities.The author’s perception, based on several yearsof work in the village, is that agricultural activitieshave decreased at household level and alsoon the land received from the state. However,those few beneficiaries still planting crops onthe land received from the state seemed to bedoing so more intensively and indicated thattheir incomes were improving as a result of theirincreased farming experience and access to thisland, despite occasional seasonal mishaps suchas dry spells or flooding. In terms of numbers ofpeople actively involved in agriculture in the village,the current impression is that this has declined.However, it is also clear that none of theactive beneficiaries farm all their land at any onetime. There are a number of reasons for this andthe most commonly mentioned one is the cost ofinputs and the water constraints which preventthem from planting more than about half a hectareto a particular crop. Often only one hectareof any crop is planted in a particular season. Onthe other hand the contract farmer who is supportedby his employer never plants less thantwo hectares of crops during a season. His areaof land under cultivation is decided each seasonby his employer.• There was no significant change in agriculturalactivities in terms of the number ofpeople involved or the extent of land under45

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.46

ResearchReport3 Prince Albert Commonage:diverse individual and groupenterprises on municipalcommonage landDavid Mayson, Phuhlisani SolutionsIntroduction and historyPrince Albert is a village located in the southeastern part of the Great Karoo in the WesternCape. It is situated at the foot of the SwartbergMountains and this location provides a strangesituation where there are significant water resourcesfor agriculture close to the mountain,from water that flows to the area from the otherside of the range, but it decreases rapidly withina few kilometres from the town. The rainfall inthe area is between 150-200 mm per year andthus it is a semi-arid area.Small-scale farmers have been farming in andaround Prince Albert for many years but thisfarming has been on existing portions of municipalland (which is not large in size) and on otherland obtained through ad hoc negotiations withcurrent land owners. This meant that their enterpriseswere severely constrained and many livestockfarmers have had to sell their stock whensuch conditions have become too restrictive.In the late 1990s, the farmers gathered intothree farmers’ groups based on particular activities– pig farmers, vegetable farmers and smallstock farmers (primarily sheep and goat) – andalso to lobby jointly for more land as the PrinceAlbert Small-scale Farmers Association. The targetof their request was the municipality and theDepartment of Land Affairs (DLA). After differentoptions were explored it was decided thatthe Municipal Commonage route would be followed.5 In association with the Department ofAgriculture (DoA) and the DLA, the Treintjiesrivierfarm was identified and acquired. Theland was to be held by the Municipality and tobe farmed by the local emerging farmers in theAssociation.Commonage policyMost of the towns in the Western Cape andNorthern Cape have acquired land over the last150 years which became designated as municipalcommonage. Such land was granted to themunicipalities by churches, by individuals and bythe national state (or Crown) and was grantedfor the specific use of the residents of the town. 6Such municipal commonage land, because it isacquired as a result of a grant (as opposed tobeing bought by the municipality) becomes landof a special type with specific constraints on thesale and other adjustments to it. Moreover, thecost to the user of that land should only be toensure the maintenance of the land and otherassets – it should not be used for the generationof additional income by the owner, i.e. the municipality(Anderson and Pienaar, 2003).Under Apartheid, commonage land increasinglybecame reserved for white people only, andover the years, increasingly became more privatised– most often being subject to a contractualarrangement with an individual commercialfarmer, with market-related rentals attached.This was contrary to the law related to the useof commonage.With the introduction of the White Paper onLand Policy introduced by the Department ofLand Affairs in 1997 (Department of Land Affairs,1997), the Department brought back the conceptof municipal commonage for the use of the community.It introduced a municipal commonagepolicy with an associated grant to municipalitiesin order to acquire such land and ensure that theinfrastructure and resources were in sufficientgood order for the use of people in the town.A number of requirements were included with5 The Municipal Commonageprogramme is one DLA’s ‘redistributionproducts’, alongsideSLAG, LRAD, etc.6 This was the era beforeSouth Africa had ‘wall-to-wall’municipalities, rather the ‘municipality’generally referred tothe jurisdiction of a town.47

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.this grant: 1) that a notarial deed be placed onthe property to ensure that it was used for thepurpose for which it was bought and to place aconstraint on the sale of the land (the Premierof the province must authorise such a sale); 2)that a commonage committee be established tomanage the land (Department of Land Affairs,2005); and so forth.The Commonage Policy expressly aims to provideaccess to land for two primary purposes: forfood security purposes, and as an initial steppingstone for those emerging farmers who want accessto land from which to expand further. Importantly,commonage land only provides leaseholdrights – the land remains the property ofthe municipality.MethodologyThe methodology used for project-specific informationand analysis was essentially primaryresearch in the form of documentation collectionand analysis; semi-structured interviews andobservation. In addition, documentation regardingthe related policy, industry specific information,and other more general information wasobtained and analysed.The documentary sources include the following:• Government reports and policies includingthe White Paper; the Commonage Policy;the Grants and Services documents of theDepartment of Land Affairs; the ComprehensiveAgricultural Support Policy (Departmentof Agriculture); and others.• Specific plans and reports on the commonageproject and the Treintjiesrivier farm, includingthe initial land reform business planfor the acquisition of the land; applicationsfor the CASP and Land Care Funding; theConstitution of the Commonage Committee;agricultural plans for the Truitjiesrivieras a whole as well as for specific portions.• Contracts between the specific farmers andthe Mohair South Africa, Klein Karoo SeedMarketing (Pty) Ltd, National DevelopmentAgency and the Municipality.• Legal documents of the Farmers Associationand the Onion Producers.Semi-structured interviews were undertakenwith the following people:• Emerging farmersFigure 3.1: Location of Prince Albert48Source: Municipal Demarcation Board

ResearchReport• Officials from the Department of Land Affairsand the Department of Agriculture.• Officials from Mohair South Africa and fromKlein Karoo Seed Marketing.• Municipal councillors and officials.A number of visits were undertaken to the farmand it was during these visits that most of theinterviews with farmers took place. At the sametime, the condition of the animals, the infrastructureand the natural vegetation was observed aswere the relationships between the differentparties in their working operations.Natural and physical resourcesand farm layoutThe farm Treintjiesrivier (portion 1 of the farmDamascus no.153 in the Prince Albert area) waspurchased in 2005. The farm is situated 6 kilometreswest of Prince Albert and has a harsherclimatic aspect than properties situated on theeast, where river systems are stronger. It is locatedon the edge of the mountain range and thusincludes mountain land as well as ‘karoo plains’.The size of the farm is 5580 hectares and includesthe following resources, according to thevaluation report submitted to the DLA at thetime of purchase:As the table above highlights, the previousowner used the land for both arable and grazingpurposes and farmed with onion seed andlucerne and, in addition, raised ostrich chicks oncontract to ostrich farmers in the Oudtshoornarea.The Department of Agriculture undertook asoil potential assessment of the area where theprevious owner cultivated. The assessment wasdivided into 6 profile areas. The dominant soilform is Oakleaf 2120 and Oakleaf 2220, both ofwhich the Department indicates provide mediumto high potential for vegetable production.One area on this section of the farm has Westleigh2000 soil and this is indicated as poor soilfor vegetable production.There are 12 hectares of land that are currentlybeing used for cultivation purposes, and thisland is fenced with stock-proof fencing. However,a major problem is the fact that kudu roamfreely on the farm and are able to scale thenormal cattle-proof fencing and thus decimatethe crops. The erection of Kudu-proof fencingis included in a current application for fundsfrom the Comprehensive Agricultural SupportProgramme (CASP) of the Department of Agriculture.The key resource in this area for both arable andgrazing farming activities is water. The farm haseight dams in total – two earth dams with watersupplied through capture of mountain water,and six cement dams supplied by as many boreholes.The water is led to the dams and drinkingtroughs in each camp through the use of windmillsand gravity feed. In addition, there areoverflow dams which capture additional waterduring the winter rainfall season.All the grazing land on the farm is natural grazingand includes pioneers karoobossieveld andgrass types such as ‘Boesmansgras’. The carryingcapacity is estimated at 42 hectares per largestock unit. The total number of small stock possibleon the farm therefore is in the order of800 small-stock units. The farm is divided into 10grazing camps.Table 3.1: Summary of agricultural assetsType of asset Extent (ha) Valuators estimatedvalue (R)Irrigated land (lucerne) 7.0 280 000Irrigated land (cash crops) 1.5 52 500Dry with potential to irrigate 11.5 57 500Grazing 5 560.3 3 058 000Total land value 3 448 000Accommodation 867 000Other buildings 336 480Dams 362 000Total value 5 013 98049

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Figure 3.2: One of the two earth dams built by the previousownerFigure 3.3: Diagram of the location of the various camps,dams and windmills50

ResearchReportAccording to the valuation report, when thefarm was acquired the 10 grazing camps and thefarm boundary were all fenced with stock fencing,none of which is jackal-proof.The farm also has the following additional infrastructure:• A house of 235 m 2• A storeroom of 175 m 2• A steel shed of 162 m 2• A chicken house of 60 m 2• Three farm workers’ houses of a total of210 m 2 .Farm layoutThe Department of Agriculture has supportedthe project from the beginning and developed afarm plan based on separating the grazing areainto three sections (with the ten grazing campsdivided between the three) and dividing thearable area into different sections as indicatedbelow.The farmersThe project was initiated in 2004/05 to accommodatethe immediate needs of 26 farmers, ofwhom 5 were women and 21 were men. Ten ofthe men were youth (35 and younger) and 18were farm workers. Since the initial applicationhowever, the numbers of farmers in the groupincreased substantially to 87, with an activegroup of 35 active members. 7It was reported above that there were threegroups of farmers initially – those undertakingvegetable production, pig farmers and smallstockfarmers. At the time that the project wasinitiated, the pig farmers had formed themselvesinto a formal group for the sale of thepigs, called Zwartberg Varke. They had sixty fivepigs at the time.Also, at that time (2004/05), the livestock farmershad in the order of 64 sheep and goats, aswell as eight calves, thus they went beyond‘small stock’ farming. The vegetable farmerswere farming on a small piece of land but hadundergone a variety of training courses, andhad worked with the DoA in order to developa proposal to “move from subsistence farmingtowards the semi-commercial farming sector.” 8It was with this development in mind that thegroup was seeking access to additional land.In 2008, at the time of this research, the numberof actual farmers on the land was the following(note that some of the farmers are involved inmore than one activity):• 15 onion seed farmers• 15 stock farmers farming with sheep andboergoats• 3 stock farmers farming with Angora goats• 3 farmers farming independently with vegetables;and• 15 farmers (or workers) farming as part ofthe NDA project.Onion seed farmersIn 2006, the Municipality started a project whereit organised the planting of 2 hectares of onionsas a community project in which certain peoplewere employed. However, once the land wasplanted, the Municipality changed the approachand provided the opportunity for a group ofpeople to harvest and sell the seed. Fifteenpeople, focused around a particular family (theHinkmans), came together into the ‘Group of15’. A section of this group then formed themselvesinto a close corporation, given that a CChas a limit of 10 members, but the group nowwant to form a cooperative which will allow thelarger group to join.The group members include older people andyouth; most of the youth are the children of themain Hinkman family. The older people are allex-farm workers who have experience of fruitfarming, vegetable and vegetable seed farming,ostrich chick rearing, and extensive livestockfarming. The key person in the group has beenpart of the farmers’ association since 1996, andheld stock on municipal land until he was forcedto sell it by the Municipality.These farmers have entered into a contractualagreement with the Klein Karoo Seed Marketingcompany whereby they will be provided with arange of resources to produce onion seed of aparticular quality, and market this through thecompany. Once the sale of the seed has takenplace, the expenses will be recouped and the remainingamount (profit) will then be paid overto the farmers. This contract arrangement has7 According to the Chairpersonof the Association.8 Fundraising proposal for thePrince Albert vegetable farmersassociation.51

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Figure 3.4: Diagram showing the use of the extensive grazingareaFigure 3.5: Department of Agriculture’s plan showing theexisting arable land and the dams with their proposedland uses52

ResearchReportentered its second year, the first year in whichthe group has been responsible for productionfrom planting through to harvest. In the previousseason the farmers took over the productionprocess after the planting had already happenedas part of a municipality project.Angora goat farmersThe Angora goat farmers’ enterprise began asa result of an interest by Mohair South Africa(MSA) to start a training project with emergingfarmers, modelled on a similar arrangementsupported by MSA in the Eastern Cape. In thisarrangement, Mohair South Africa provided aherd of 174 Angora ewes with 7 rams to a groupof four emerging farmers who are being trainedand mentored over a three year period. Duringthis period, the clip from the animals and all theprogeny are acquired by the emerging farmers.At the end of the period, the farmers arerequired to give back a similar quality herd toMSA, who will then give that to the next groupof emerging farmers. The goats were given inApril 2008 so it is still a new arrangement.The opportunity of going into the arrangementwas advertised in the broader emerging farmersassociation and interested people were asked toapply. Only four members applied and they thenformed the group. All of them are ex-farm workers,one of whom has extensive experience withAngora goats. In the early period, however, oneof the members withdrew from the group, indicatingthat he was no longer interested. Threemen therefore remain.Sheep and goat farmersThe sheep and goat farmers mostly includefarmers who, prior to the acquisition of the commonageland, held stock in the residential area.These animals roamed freely during the day andthen were kept in the backyards of the ownersat night.The current group of farmers are all membersof the Farmers Association. There are currently atotal of 15 stock owners who have sheep or goatson the farm. The stock holdings range from 2 to64 animals per owner. Only one of these farmersis a full-time farmer; this person happens to alsobe the key onion seed farmer. All the rest of thefarmers engage in stock farming as an additionto the other sources of income, e.g. from smallenterprise (taverns), wage employment, etc.Vegetables farmersThe vegetable farmers include two types – thereare farmers who have access to individual plotsof land and there is a group that is drawn togetherinto a group production process in aproject funded by the National DevelopmentAgency (NDA).Of the three farmers who have their own portionof land, two work together and one separately.The NDA-supported project appears to have 35people working formally in/for it. It has an employedproject manager, and the other peopleare employed on the basis of a daily wage ofR35. The funding, and thus the beginning of theproject, was delayed as a result of the fact thatthe contract with the Municipality for the use ofthe land took time to finalise. It therefore onlybegan in June 2008, more than a year after theintended start.Production systems andeconomicsEach of the different enterprises undertakesfarming in a different way and has different economicarrangements.Onion farmersThe onion farmers are organised into a productionco-operative. The production systems weredeveloped through consultation between thementor (De Wit), who was appointed by the KleinKaroo Seed liaison person, and Mr Hinkman, themost experienced of the emerging farmers, whomaintains strict control of the process.The farmers do not own any major equipment– specifically a tractor, plough and rake whichHinkman indicated are the most important itemsfor onion farming. They have developed a mentoringarrangement with the previous owner ofthe farm (De Wit) as a result of the interventionby a councillor. De Wit continues to have an interestin the success of the farm and so providesvarious resources to the onion seed producers.He initially offered a service to plough and otherwiseprepare the land for the farmers. Butwhen he arrived to plough the land, a numberof the other farmers, including the leadership ofthe Farmers Association, refused to allow him toplough, as it had not been agreed that the onionfarmers should have access to the land where hewas going to plough. The onion farmers thennegotiated that they should borrow the tractor53

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.for a period and do the work themselves, oncethey had clarified which land would be availableto them. De Wit then agreed to this andthe farmers now only provide the diesel for thetractor and have constant access to it.The onion plants are provided by Klein Karooon an annual basis. In the most recent season,starting in April, the plant material was in factsurplus material provided by the Klein Karoo,which meant that the farmers did not have topay for it.The production process is as follows:Preparation of seedlingsOnion seed is planted in March/April of year 1 inwell-preparedsoil which should not have a highclay content. It is planted at a density of about4 grams per square metre. It is important thatweeds, diseases and pests are managed and thisis done with the intervention and under guidanceof the production advisors of Klein KarooSeed. This advisor also guides the irrigation andfeeding of the plants.Bulb productionThe seedlings are transplanted after about 12 to14 weeks (from June to August) and sowed in adensity of about 600 000 plants per hectare. Thebulbs that develop are then dug up during Decemberand are taken to the drying sheds whichwere built by the previous owner of the farm.Once dried, the bulbs are stored in a well-ventilatedspace for 3 to 4 months.Planting of bulbsThe bulbs are planted again during April (year2) and are planted in a density of about 100 000bulbs per hectare, depending on the variety.Weeds, diseases and pests are strictly controlledby prescribed chemicals and a detailed sprayingprogramme is worked out in conjunction withthe advisors from Klein Karoo Seed. Regular visitsare made by the company advisors and thelocally based mentor is also close at hand duringthis period to address any problems as theyarise.PollinationThe flowering period is between 32 and 40 daysand begins in the third week of October. This is asensitive period and it is important for the processto be done correctly. The Klein Karoo Seedadvisors are on hand and recommend a densityof 8-10 beehives per hectare – for the Prince Albertfarmers this means that that have had toacquire about 30 hives for their three hectares.HarvestingThe harvesting of the seed takes place when25% of the seed heads have turned black andthis is about three weeks after the pollinationprocess and is generally in the last two weeks ofDecember.Figure 3.7: The shed for drying onion seed with extractor fans54

ResearchReportDrying, threshing and winnowing ofseedDrying of the seed on the farm takes place inthe drying sheds where air is forced throughthe seed heads with the help of fans. Once theseed is sufficiently dry, the seed is drawn out ofthe heads with a machine and then further winnowed.Once this is done, and the seed is clean,it is delivered to the Klein Karoo Seed offices forfurther working and packaging and sale. Thefarmers were complimented in the last seasonfor the cleanliness of the seed they produced.Economics of onion productionThe costs per hectare incurred in the course ofproducing onion seeds are as follows:The estimated income from production dependson the type of onions produced but the followingis a guide assuming an exchange rate ofR7.74= $1:Given that the farmers had not had a full seasonwhere they had been involved in the full productionprocess, it is unclear yet how the farmerswill fare. The farmers do not appear to have aclear understanding of all the financial aspectsof their production but have been informed thatthey produced a profit of R30 000 in the previousseason. By agreement, the Klein Karoo Seedcompany is keeping this for the various productioncosts for the current season.Angora goat farmersThe Angora goat farmers are in a training contractrelationship with Mohair South Africa 9 . ForMohair South Africa, the longer term aim ofthe training programme with the Prince Albertfarmers is to increase the throughput of mohair,while at the same time contributing to the developmentof black farmers in South Africa. Forthe emerging farmers, the aim is to maximiseproduction in order to obtain as much return ontheir animals.Table 3.2: Per hectare costs related to the production of theonion seedItemFuel 600Fertiliser 5 900Pest control 533Cost (Rand)Bulbs 10 000Bulb planting costs 2 200Pollination 2 400Weed control 842Pest control 3 718Insurance 0Harvesting costs 3 190Drying 700Irrigation and electricity 4 840Machinery 129Cleaning costs 3 000Total 39 052Table 3.3: Estimated income from onion productionOnion typeProduction perha (kg)Expected incomeper ha (R)Profit (range)OP 1000 69 660 25 000 - 30 000 400F1 450 80 109 36 000 - 41 000 220Break even – (kg/ha)9 Mohair South Africa Ltd wasestablished as the representativeorganization of the industry,to facilitate functions suchas research, training, information,national and internationalrelations, and activities aimedat enhancing the entire mohairindustry. The board of directorsof Mohair South Africa reflectsrepresentation by all the majordirectly affected groups, mostlyin the early stages of production,namely growers, labour,breeders, processors, buyersand brokers. J. M. van derWesthuysen, P. D. Wentzel etal. (2004).55

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.The visit to the farm was only four months afterthe farmers had started operating on the farmand so the production methods for the farmerswere still being sorted out and adjusted to theirspecific conditions.The farmers have developed a system where oneperson will be responsible for looking after thestock for a month at a time, and the person willbe paid a wage of R1000 which is paid by MohairSA and then recouped from the wool sales.All the activities are undertaken by the farmers,with additional labour or support brought inwhen needed. During the research visit to thefarm, it was lambing time, and the farmer thatis deemed most experienced with Angoras wasthe person that was asked to work during theAugust month (he had recently also been retrenchedfrom his formal job and so was available).Importantly, he had brought another personto the farm on the day of the visit in order tohelp him with the lambing tasks – marking thenew lambs with the same mark at their mothers.There are usually two shearings per year, in Januaryand July. The shearing is undertaken by thefarmers themselves and they had done the firstshearing in the July. The clip was then taken bythe representative of Mohair SA and, in a carefulassessment of the market, was sold at a timewhen a good price was paid. Such a system ofthe Mohair SA representatives obtaining theclip from farmers and selling it is undertaken bymost commercial farmers as well.The project coordinator of the training programme(Grobler), while highlighting that “itis difficult to estimate with any degree of certainty”what the income of the project wouldbe, provided initial estimates of a twelve monthbudget for the enterprise, based on two shearingsand on 2006 Cape Auction prices:While this estimation is given for the gross income,Grobler stresses that “the students needto get an income from the project; the amountsinvolved will depend on the net income, budgetrequirements for the next year, and whetherthey wish to build up reserves for when theystart out on their own”. 10It is clear that from a financial point of view, theAngora goat farmers are being provided with animportant opportunity to build the basis of theirstock holdings for future farming.Boer goat and sheep farmersThe boer goat and sheep farmers are all individualfarmers and generally farm their stock individually.A number of the farmers do, however,farm in a more cooperative manner – looking aftereach other’s stock, dosing the stock together,working out ways to look after the new-borns togetherand so forth. There is also some ill-feelingor competition between the farmers, with somefarmers accusing others of being drunkards andlazy, and not looking after their animals.The animals of the farmers are obtained froma variety of sources. Some farmers obtain theFigure 3.8: Piet Loff and his helper herding the goats into theenclosure for marking10 Personal communication andunpublished document providedby Grobler for this research.56

ResearchReportFigure 3.9: Piet Loff and his goatsTable 3.4: Estimated income associated with the Angora goatenterpriseMass Price/Unit Number ValueProduction incomeHair: kid 1.8 kg 122 80 17 568Hair: young goats 3.5 kg 74 70 18 130Hair: ewes 4.0 kg 50 100 20 000Sub-total 55 698Trade incomeOld ewes 40 kg 8 20 6 400Kapater kids 20 kg Sold as farmingstock35 8 750Ram 60 kg 6 1 360Sub-total 15 510Gross income/100 ewes 71 208animals as gifts from farmers where they havepreviously worked; others buy the animals fromother emerging farmers, from commercial farmersor other sources.At this stage the aim of the sheep and goatfarmers is to either just keep the stock that theyhave, or to grow their herds or flocks. Not manyof the offspring are therefore sold – only thespare rams are sold. The key spokesman indicatedthat he had had 18 goats prior to the farmbeing bought, but had been forced to sell them.With the current lambing season he had onceagain built his stock up to 18 – but he “dreamsof animals” and so was intending to expand hisstock significantly.The goat and sheep farmers generally sell theirstock in the local township, but those that aregrowing their stock numbers have begun discussionsand negotiations with local large-scalefarmers to understand the marketing arrangementsand to see how they can tie into these sothat they can get better prices for the stock thatthey do sell. In addition, they have begun discussionsabout changing the breed of the goats inorder to get a better quality animal and thus abetter price when they are sold.57

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Figure 3.10: Oom Elvis and his prize ewe that gives him twinsor triplets each season11 It is assumed that this istotal income from the sale ofproduce – primarily tomatoes,pumpkin and water melons.58Vegetable farmersThere are two types of vegetable farmers – thosewho farm for themselves and those who are partof a project sponsored by the National DevelopmentAgency. There are four farmers who farmindividually on portions of land that are putaside by the chairperson and endorsed by all.The right to the specific portions of land seemsto have gone on for a number of years with onefarmer claiming that some of the other farmerswant his piece of land because it produces verygood sweet potatoes.The individual farmers produce on about half ahectare of land each. Mr Christiaan Witbooi, themost successful of the vegetable farmers, farmswith his brother on their allocated plot. They tryto get the various inputs in the cheapest waypossible:• He bought seed (tomato, pumpkin and watermelon) in the first year that he farmedon the land, in 2006; since then however,he has successfully produced his own seed.• He is also a pig farmer, and has got linkswith a beef farmer that used to gather hisstock in the town before selling them; Witbooihas used the manure from these animalssuccessfully in the last two years.• He has purchased insecticides and otherpoisons from the local nurseries and othershops in the town at prices higher than hewould pay if he was a member of the co-operative(which he can not become becauseof the high joining fees).• His highest cost is transport – to take thefresh produce to town to sell.While he could not provide the detail of his costsduring the season, the payment of which is donefrom various sources through the year, Witbooiindicated that he had made a “profit” 11 of R6000in the previous season. Most of the produce issold to residents in the local town of Prince Albertbut some is kept for the use of Witbooi andhis brother.Livelihood impactsThe farmers currently on the farm employ arange of livelihood strategies other than agriculture,the key ones being pensions and otherstate social grants, the running of taverns inthe local township, wage labour, taxi ownershipand so forth. More importantly, however, itseems that many of the farmers engage in otherincome-generating activities to be able to investin agriculture. In the onion co-operative, for example,some of the members have specificallyobtained work in other jobs to provide some ofthe finances for the farming whereas the Angorafarmers have adjusted work responsibilities to

ResearchReportenable some members to take up opportunitiesthat became available outside of the farm 12 .Most of the farmers that use land at Treintjiesrivierappear to use the social relationship developedthere for those specific activities only –they do not appear to engage in joint activitiesoutside of the farm. The key exception here isthe relationship between the chairperson andthe deputy chair of the Association, who farmtogether on the farm, engage in joint familysupport activities when needed in the town, andare continually involved in organisational activitiesaround the Farmers’ Association.The farm does not seem to be used for other livelihoodstrategies such as the collection of wood,flowers, and other natural resources, nor doesit seems to be used for other business premises.As is normal in municipal commonage situations,the use of the other natural resources is assumedto be against the contracts that users have, butthis is not clear as the contracts have not been finalisedas yet. The management of the resourceswill be important and fortunately, as this point,it is under control. It is known, however, that theonion seed farmers cut down and sold some ofthe trees on the farm in order to get funds tobuy fertiliser and other production needs in theprevious season. Importantly, they were not disciplinedor reprimanded for this and so it mayhave a negative effect for the future attempts tomanage resource use.Environmental dimensionsThere are two key environmental issues thatface farmers in the Karoo, in particular the stockfarmers, namely dealing with predators andmanaging grazing regimes in a context of ongoingdrought. The main factor in this is fencingso as to manage the movement of stock and tokeep predators out.With regard to grazing, the history of land use inthe area is worth noting:“Early white colonial pastoralists adopted themigrant herding strategies of the Khoikhoiherders. Transhumance practices (migrationwith livestock to more productive areas, asand when seasons or rainfall dictated it)constitute an appropriate and sustainableenvironmental management strategy in theKaroo. Where rainfall is sparse and patchy,this arid, ‘event-driven’ eco-system could onlybe used on an opportunistic basis by highlymobile human groups taking advantage ofhighly localised conditions.” (Atkinson, 2005,2)With the shift to freehold tenure, on a surveyedpiece of land, Atkinson quotes Hoffman to showthat:“Settlement around privately owned watersources and rangeland meant that grazingorbits shrank dramatically. Livestock washerded from rangeland to water source tokraal on a daily basis… (and) (t)his kraalingsystem has been blamed for a great deal ofthe degradation of the Karoo rangelands.”(ibid, 2)A report by Phuhlisani goes on to say that:“(i)t was only with significant interventionof the state and the provision of a spread ofinfrastructural support (windmills, fencingand so forth) that enabled the introductionof rotational grazing methods of farming andthus the relative sustainable continuation‘of alien land use practices’ on ‘inherentlyincompatible indigenous ecosystems.’”(Phuhlisani, 2008, p.79)This sensitive context needs to therefore betreated with care because once damaged, it willtake a long time to rehabilitate.The Prince Albert Commonage has a lack offencing on the farm – it does not have jackalprooffencing on the perimeter and internallythe stock-proof fencing has broken. Besides thesocial difficulties of managing grazing in a communalmanagement arrangement (discussed below),the lack of good fencing means that it isalmost impossible to manage the grazing in anenvironmentally sustainable manner. The resultis essentially as described in the Hoffman quoteabove – that overgrazing is evident around afew water sources while much of the land is notgrazed at all. It is therefore fortunate that thetotal number of stock on the farm is well belowthe carrying capacity for the whole farm at themoment. The Department of Agriculture is usingits CASP funding programme to try to addressthis fencing problem over the current two years.The management of predators is a nationalproblem of increasing proportions; as state supportfor agriculture decreased over the years, itappears that fencing of large extensive grazing12 One of the farmers is anexperienced fencing specialistand an opportunity came upfor him to fence a local farmer’sfarm. The farmers adjustedschedules and responsibilitiesto enable him to do this outsidework.59

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.13 Farmers in the Central andHantam Karoo, as well as in thenorthern areas around Kimberleyreported these developmentsin separate interviews.60farms has been one of the main areas that hassuffered .13 The result is that jackal, caracal andother small predators essentially have free reignon vast areas of the central parts of the country.All the farmers on the Prince Albert Commonagefarm have suffered stock losses as a result ofjackal and caracal attacks – the most severe wasa loss of 20 sheep from a flock of 40! The Departmentof Agriculture is once again assisting in theupgrading of the perimeter fencing throughtheir CASP funding, but the problem is then goingto be getting rid of the many predators thatare already on the inside, who have open accessto the vulnerable stock. This is an issue which theFarmers’ Association will need to address as thenew fencing goes up.Social and institution issuesTenure arrangementsThe land is commonage land acquired throughthe Department of Land Affairs’ Commonageprogramme. The land is therefore owned bythe Municipality, from which the farmers arerequired to lease it. Formally the Municipality issupposed to manage access to the land througha system of contracts and via land allocation.In practice, however, the Farmers’ Associationleadership have played that role in the absenceof such management by the Municipality, whichappears to be distracted by a state of perpetualpolitical transition and turmoil.Contractual issuesAccording to the Commonage programme of theDLA, when a municipality receives land throughthe programme, it is required to establish a commonagecommittee to provide overarching managementof the land, as well as entering intolease agreements with the users of the land.At Prince Albert the users of the land have nocontract with the Municipality despite havingrequested such a contract for a number of years.For the users, contract will provide them with aformal document enabling access to governmentand non-government grant funding and othersupport. Given the intense political infightingthat has been prevalent in the Municipality, aswell as the lack of capacity to develop such acontract, it has been an ongoing issue.A local NGO, the Southern Cape Land Committee(SCLC), has been assisting the Farmers’ Associationand the Municipality in developing thecontract but it appears that there has been aninability to find solutions to what appear to bedifferent approaches. The SCLC has developed adraft contract which would be signed betweenthe Municipality and the Farmers’ Association,rather than between the Municipality and thespecific users. The Municipality has objections tosuch a formulation, preferring to sign a contractwith specific individual users. However, giventhe political tension in the Municipality, this approachhas not been formally communicated tothe SCLC and to the Farmers’ Association, and noprogress has therefore been achieved in finalisingthe contract.The current situation therefore is that the onlyfarmers who have any formal contract are theAngora goat farmers, which is a jointly signedagreement between the ‘trainees’, the Municipalityand the SA Mohair Association. The otherfarmers, including the NDA project participantswho received a total of R817 000, are all farmingwithout signed contracts.Importance of the Farmers’Association – inhibiting open accessThe lack of involvement by the Municipality, andtherefore the absence of any external managementintervention, is not uncommon in municipalcommonage situations around the country.Anderson and Pienaar’s study has highlightedthis clearly (Anderson and Pienaar, 2003). In thePrince Albert situation, however, the tenure arrangementshave not disintegrated into openaccess. While there are complaints about theleadership of the Farmers’ Association from themembership, it is apparent that the associationhas stepped into the void and maintained somecontrol over the process of acquiring and usingland. The following process is required if a personwants to use land on the farm:• They must take a copy of the Association’sconstitution and their identity document tothe police station to be stamped.• They must get a stamped certificate fromthe police to say that the livestock that theymight want to bring onto the farm are notstolen.• They must take the Constitution and thecertificate to the Municipality to be registered.

ResearchReport• The Association leadership will then identifythe area where they can farm on the land.While this system is new, and there are tensions,it is apparent that there is control over the entranceand exit of land users. While on the farm,the researcher witnessed the approach by a newentrant who requested, and was granted, a specificsite in order to farm with livestock, separateto the other farmers already on the farm.The Farmers’ Association has a managementstructure which, besides the formal portfolios,includes a ‘coordinator’ in each of the variousdivisions through whom other people work – inthe goat and sheep farmers, the Angora goatfarmers, the vegetable farmers and the onionfarmers. While this is quite a loose arrangement,these coordinators act to ensure there is someorder maintained in particular sections.The role of the ‘Champion’The chairperson of the Farmers’ Association playsan extremely important role in the whole commonageinitiative. He has been part of the groupfor a number of years although only joined thegroup in the latter period as the moves towardsacquiring the land were at an advanced stage.While he grew up on the farms, as a child offarm worker parents, he moved to town at anearly age, where he completed his matric. Importantly,he joined the South African army permanentforce and the commandos and in the process– according to him and others in the town– developed a number of organising and managementskills. While there are a number of peopleamongst the farmers’ group that complainabout him and feel that he favours one groupabove another (the onion farmers, for example,felt that he favoured the vegetable producers),it is apparent that he is successful in balancingthe interests of the different groups. There are anumber of key roles that he plays:• If there are any disputes, he is called uponby the participants to mediate or arbitrate.• He has developed a number of links to variousservice providers and grant makers andis able to combine the different needs ofthe different farmers’ groups and developtraining programmes and seek fundingopportunities and market linkages for thedifferent groups of farmers and other membersof the Association. Importantly, he isassisted by the SCLC in this regard.• He develops unity amongst the farmers andacts as their spokesperson. Any individualor company trying to consult with the Associationor its members is required to gothrough the Chairperson. The Chairpersonindicated that some people have had aproblem with this approach, fearing thathe is a gate keeper. However, it was evidentthat where formal procedures were notfollowed, misunderstandings by outsiderscreated expectations and assumptions byfarmer members which could not be metin the context. The onion producers, for example,wanted to expand their production,and the previous owner of the farm (theirmentor) encouraged them to do so and arrivedto plough additional land one day.The land that they were to plough howeverhad been allocated to other farmers eventhough they had not yet worked the land.The result was an unhappy group of onionfarmers (antagonistic to the chairperson)and a disgruntled previous owner who feltthat his offers of support were not appreciatedand that “the farm was in chaos”.• He provides a ‘service’ to the members to explainthe complicated issues involved in thedevelopment of the farm and their farming,particularly the legal aspects, in terms thatthey understand.• He takes the initiative in formalising issuesin an attempt to ensure security of tenureof the farmers on the land; other arrangementsare also formalised through othermechanisms. In particular, with the help ofSCLC, they have developed legal entitieswhere these are necessary.• He plays the crucial role of mobiliser or ‘dynamiser’,particularly in getting the farmersto work together in a cooperative manner.In the context where there is a significant lackof support from the state, the role performed bythe chairperson has been absolutely critical forthe success of the farmers in their various enterprises,and for the initiative as a whole. A project‘champion’, ‘dynamisor’ or development facilitatorappears to be crucial for the success of landand agrarian reform initiatives.Commonage CommitteeThe DLA’s Commonage Policy also requires theformation of a Commonage Committee and in61

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.62the Prince Albert situation a Committee was establishedfor Prince Albert municipal area as awhole – not just for the Treintjiesrivier farm. TheCommittee includes the following role players:• Prince Albert Municipality• Prince Albert emerging farmers and tourismentrepreneurs• Klaarstroom emerging farmers• Prins Albert Weg emerging farmers• Leeu-Gamka emerging farmers• Vyebossie Women’s Association• Southern Cape Land Committee• Department of Agriculture (Laingsburg)• Department of Land Affairs (BeaufortWest).Its primary task, according to the Constitution, isto provide a “platform for all role-players to facilitatecooperation and communication for thesustainable use of commonage land in the PrinceAlbert Municipal area” (Prince Albert MunicipalCommonage Committee, 2008). The Committeehas the following secondary roles, amongst others:• To develop contracts to hold people responsiblefor the sustainable use of the land andto ensure that these contracts are reasonableand affordable;• To establish commonage committees foreach farming enterprise or group and tostipulate roles and responsibilities of thecommittees;• To support users in their land rights to ensuresecurity of land rights• To identify resources for funding and technicaltraining for livelihood projects• To identify markets for products, and• To identify and obtain additional land,where necessary.While these aims are important and relevantfor the success of the various initiatives on theland, the fact that the Committee falls under theMunicipality has meant that its role has beenlimited. It does however provide a crucial pointaround which the various important role-playerscan meet and engage on the issues facing thefarmers. In reality, therefore, the Committee appearsto provide the institutional backup for theChairperson and the role he plays. If the Chairpersonwas not there, playing the role he does,it is unlikely that the Committee would have anyrole.Extension supportThe different farmers have differing levels ofextension support, depending on who they arelinked to. The goat and sheep farmers appearto have no extension support from any sourceand the vegetable farmers are similarly not supported.The onion farmers and the Angora goatfarmers, on the other hand, are supported intwo ways – there is a local farmer who acts asthe mentor and then each farming group alsohas an external specialist (or ‘project manager’)that visits the farm regularly to monitor developmentsand offer advice.It appears that the Department of Agriculture,while they have a local “community developmentworker”, do not provide any ongoingextension advice to the farmers. The nature oftheir support appears to be:• As a funder of the infrastructure developments(through their CASP funding);• As a training facility, providing general agriculturalcourses at their offices in Oudtshoorn;and,• Providing full farm planning services(through their implementing agency –CASIDRA).Departmental support to individual farmers intheir enterprises is therefore essentially nonexistent.Moreover, if farmers do not have arelationship with a local farmer, or through amarketing company, they have had to developthis on their own.Mohair TrustThe Angora goat project is specifically designedas a mentored programme of farmer developmentinitiated and guided by the industry.The aim of the project is to train emerging Angoragoat farmers who, after an approximatethree years hands-on training period, can graduatefrom the project and have the necessaryskills to become active, self-sufficient commer-

ResearchReportcial producers of mohair. It is envisaged thatevery project should be able to rotate a group ofstudents every three years.The training includes breeding, kidding, theshearing process and classing of mohair, animalhealth, grazing management, financial management,budgeting, as well as management of infrastructure.Where necessary, experts in theirspecific fields will be involved to assist with thetraining (personal communication, G. Grobler,2008).In the Prince Albert arrangement, there is aproject coordinator who is based in Jansensvillein the Eastern Cape. He provides the qualitycontrols on the hair that is produced, the maintenanceof the infrastructure and the overarchingmanagement issues. He also manages thesale of the hair and animals in order to get thebest price. Locally, a commercial farmer, who isalso a very successful mohair farmer and on theboard of the Mohair Growers Association, providesmore immediate mentoring on farmingpractices.At the time of this research, the programme hadjust begun and so it is unclear how successfulthis mentoring programme would be with thisgroup of farmers; however, a similar approachis in process with another group of farmers inthe Eastern Cape, and reportedly has been verysuccessful thus far.Karoo SeedThe onion seed farmers are in a more formalcontractual arrangement, and while the companymakes allowances for the fact that these arenew farmers, through providing access to cheapplant material, for example, the relationship ismuch more of a commercial contract farming arrangement.The ‘mentoring’ from the company,while important, is therefore much more that ofa monitoring role where the company wants tobe assured of quality produce in the end, especiallygiven that the company is extending creditthrough the season.The onion farmers therefore approached theagricultural representative on the MunicipalCouncil to assist them in identifying a suitablementor for their operation. The councillor approachedthe previous owner of the farm, whowas also a vegetable seed producer, and heagreed to provide such a service to the farmers.This relationship appears to be based on a personalcommitment by the farmer to supportingemerging farmers (and a link to the farm – thathe was forced to sell due to a family tragedy).It has been extremely advantageous to the seedfarmers, as it has included access to a tractor andother equipment, continuous and immediateadvice through the season, and encouragementin the process of farming.The futureThe future opportunities for the farmers involvedin farming at the different levels of the farmare dependent on a number of aspects: accessto land to expand their initiatives, the extent towhich they are able to develop the expertise andcapital to expand, the extent to which they wantto remain at a small-scale level, and so forth.Taking these issues into account, the followingissues impact on the different groups of farmers,affecting their future prospects:• For stock farmers, the Area Based Planprovides for access to increasing numbersof hectares acquired under the DLA’s ProactiveLand Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) programme– these are conceptualised in termsof PLAS 1 farms (where farmers will be ableto grow their stock numbers to 90 smallstockunits) and PLAS 2 farms (where theywill be able to grow their stock numbers to300 small-stock units). Currently, land acquisitionin the district is proceeding accordingto plan according to the DLA but the additionalsupport and management systemsproposed in the ABP are not being implementeddue to confusion between the DLAand the Department of Agriculture on theimplementation of the Land and AgrarianReform Project (due to be coordinated byAgriculture). Land will be available, but itappears that the necessary controls, whichoperate on the commonage farm throughthe farmers’ association, will not be presenton the new farm acquired.• The problem facing the goat and sheepproducers is that they have little support interms of access to capital and expertise. Theexpansion of production, as is the intentionof those that were interviewed, is thereforelikely to be slow even with the acquisitionof additional land.• Angora goat farmers are being well set upto become independent producers (with63

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.support in all areas) and, with access toadditional land after the three year initialtraining programme (through the PLAS programme),it is likely that they will be successfulproducers in the future.• Arable land is limited in the area, with waterthe primary constraint particularly furtheraway from the mountain. There are no specificproposals to acquire arable land underthe ABP, but there are allocations to jointventures which are primarily on arable landin this district. The onion seed producershave the opportunity to become independentfarmers but access to land is going to betheir greatest constraint – and is already aconstraint. The group has a number of skillsand experience beyond onion seed and optionsto diversify are also possible – ostrichchicks, vegetable and other seed productionhave all been highlighted as options by thefarmers and, given that they are all producedin a contract farming arrangement, itis certainly possible that such developmentscould happen – if the primary constraint ofaccess to land is addressed.• The lack of formal contracts has been a constraintfor all the farmers as it has inhibitedtheir sense of security of tenure and of theinvestment in the land that they have obtainedaccess to, and they have been unableto use the contract as a means to secure aloan of whatever size. If there is increasinginvolvement of municipality in managementof the farm and in the finalisationof the contracts then it is likely to providethe possibility for more structured developmentsby all farmers in the future. This isunlikely at present, however, as the currentpolitical battles are too strained betweenthe ANC and the DA.• The ABP proposed realistic institutional arrangementsin the district (building on alreadyexisting institutions) – in terms ofsupporting the organisation of farmers,the provision of technical support and soforth. If these structures are implemented,then greater, coordinated support to allthe farmers can be expected. This may thenprovide the much needed support at a generallevel, but also at a specific level with, inparticular, the goat and sheep farmers. Asdiscussed above, however, this is dependenton LARP being clarified in the province andthen in the district, and sufficient resourcesbeing applied to its implementation.ReferencesAnderson and Pienaar, (2003) MunicipalCommonage, Evaluating Land and AgrarianReform in South Africa series, no. 5,Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies(University of Western Cape), Cape Town,South Africa.Atkinson, (2005) People-centred environmentalmanagement and municipal commonage inthe Nama Karoo, in Commons South Africa,no.11, published by Programme for Landand Agrarian Studies (University of WesternCape), Cape Town, South Africa, and theCentre for Applied Social Sciences (Universityof Zimbabwe), Harare, Zimbabwe.Department of Land Affairs, (1997) White Paperon Land Policy, Department of Land Affairs.Pretoria, South Africa.Department of Land Affairs, (2005) TheCommonage Programme, Department ofLand Affairs, Pretoria, South Africa.Phuhlisani Solutions, (2008) Central KarooLand and Agrarian Reform Area-based Plan,Phuhlisani Solutions, Cape Town, and theDepartment of Land Affairs (Western Cape),Beaufort West.Prince Albert Municipal CommonageCommittee, (2008) Draft Constitution ofthe Prince Albert Commonage Committee,Department of Agriculture, Laingsburg,South Africa.Prince Albert Municipality, (n.d.) Prince AlbertVegetable Farming Project Business Plan,Prince Albert Municipality, Prince Albert,South Africa.Van der Westhuysen J. M, Wentzel. D, andGrobler M. C, (2004) Angora Goats andMohair in South Africa, Mohair South Africa,Port Elizabeth, South Africa.List of interviewees:The Onion Farmers including Mr Koos, Freekand Isak Hinkman, Bianca Alexander and MrsHinkman.The vegetable project workers including MrPieter Williams, Ms Hester Abrams, Ms MarieApril and Mr Klaas Stols.64

ResearchReportThe individual vegetable farmer – Mr HendrickWitbooi.The Angora goat farmers – Mr Piet Loff.The Goat farmers – Mr Elvis Guga.The Chairperson of the Association – Mr JanLoff.The Acting Mayor – Ms Gaye von Haselt.The Angora goat mentor – Mr Clive van Haselt.The Angora project manager – Mr GielieGrobler.The representative of the Klein Karoo Seedcompany – Mr Nantie Fourie.The Department of Land Affairs official – MsGaynor de Jager.The Department of Agriculture official – MrCharl du Plessis.65

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.66

ResearchReport4 Chata Irrigation Scheme:individuals pooling theirland and farming as a groupLarry Field, Umhlaba Consulting GroupIntroductionChata Irrigation Scheme is an example of smallholderirrigation scheme where landownershave grouped their plots together to farm togethercommercially. The case is particularly interestingfrom the perspective that the scheme ispartly managed by its support non-governmentalorganisation (NGO). In this case the NGO haslargely taken over the essential aspects of themanagement of the business, including financialand production management. This relationshipis however structured in a typical NGO/communitypartnership manner, whereby the partnershipis not defined by a paper contract, butrather by relationships, and where consultationand joint-decision making takes place on a reasonablyextensive scale. In other words there isperceived mutual ownership of the outcome ofthe partnership work.The scheme is located in the village of Chata onthe slopes of the Amathola Mountain Range,some 230 kilometres from East London, and 17kilometres beyond the town of Keiskammahoek.Chata is within the Amahlati Local Municipality.The scheme is 22.75 hectares in size, made upof 20 individual plots. The plot owners becamemembers of the scheme. Although 22 farmerswere initially trained for participation, currentlyonly 15 work and benefit from the scheme.Historical evolution of theschemeThe context of revitalisationThe revitalisation of the scheme is one outcomeof the settlement of the restitution claim originatingfrom the betterment planning that occurredin the 1960s. The settlement was finallyawarded in 2000. As part of the settlement, 50%of the award went to individual households,while 50% was allocated to community development.The development process has been administeredby the Amatole District Municipalitysince mid-2001. Between 2001 and 2003, the communityand various stakeholders participated inan integrated planning process which outlinedhow the community was to be re-developed andhow the award money was to be allocated.The success of the restitution case (particularlyas a betterment case) rested on the partnershipbetween the community and the Border RuralCommittee (BRC), an NGO based in the EasternCape. This partnership around land rights laidthe foundation for the ongoing relationship inrelation to the planning and implementation ofthe community development initiative.The Chata Integrated Development Plan sets outdifferent focus areas for development, namely:infrastructure, forestry, agriculture and otherLED initiatives (including tourism). Infrastructuredevelopments flowing out of this plan have includedroads (including tarring of certain steepaccess roads), a community hall which containsa resource centre and a crèche, as well as schoolclassrooms. The forestry investment includedrehabilitation of the wattle plantation and theplanting of a pine plantation.The main focus of the agricultural sphere hasbeen the irrigation scheme. The scheme wasbased on individual family-owned plots whichhad been developed in the past with a flood irrigationsystem.The socio-economic profiling of the villages thattook place in 2000 identified 422 households livingin Chata encompassing some 2300 individuals.Most of these families depended on remit-67

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.tances from family members working outside ofthe area, and government grants, while only anestimated 8% of household income was derivedfrom agriculture. Of the people living in the villageonly 58 had formal employment, and 13 ofthose were employed in the agriculture and forestrysector.1999–2002: pre-scheme establishmentA small number of the land owners worked theirland individually. BRC provided basic agriculturalsupport to the land owners who wantedto cultivate their land. The results and outputswere disappointing, leading to BRC putting theirsupport on hold until the scheme could be revitalised.This was the period in which the focus ofwork for BRC was on facilitating the settlementof the land restitution case.2003–2004: initiation with groupmanagementThe first years of the group scheme were a difficultperiod for the initiative. The scheme was initiatedin 2003 with a focus on infrastructure rehabilitation,training, and group establishment.The first harvest by the group occurred in 2004.The infrastructure rehabilitation included fencing,levelling for irrigation, cleaning irrigationfurrows, dam repairs, and soil preparation. Approximately30 people gained short-term employmenton this work. As part of the overallcommunity development, the road that leadspast the scheme was upgraded and is now agood quality gravel road.The most important aspect of the initiation wasthat the scheme was established as a groupscheme with the plot-holders as members. Thegroup became the Masiphathisane Farmers Association,a constitution was developed, andmembers were provided with institutional training.The arrangement was that the memberswould be assisted by BRC, who would provideinputs, administer the finances, and ensure thatadvice and direction were provided. For the purposeof technical support, a farm manager fromEast London was contracted to provide planning,instruction and in-field production advice.Members were to receive any income earnedfrom the crops, based on the amount of workthey had put in, as tracked through the ‘labourregister’.The first planting was only about 1 hectare insize and consisted of maize and cabbage, andthe crop was not very successful. The maize waslost due to the lateness of planting and wastherefore affected by the weather. This problemwas partially due to the difficulty in securingthe timely services of a tractor for ploughing.The cabbages were successfully harvested andsold, although size and quality was poor. Themembers estimated that their earnings were betweenR320 and R1000 per member for the year.Participation in the scheme rapidly dropped toabout 13 from the original 22.In the members’ own evaluation of this periodproblems were identified as: a lack of visionamong themselves, not receiving any income(wages) to motivate work, and members being‘lazy’.2005–2006: evaluation and transitionBy 2005 those involved in the project began tolook for a new direction to save the initiative.The key problem areas were identified as beingthe lack of real motivation from the participantsand inadequate management on theproject. The first issue was linked to the lack ofconsistent and adequate levels of financial returns.Members perceived the situation to beone of ‘volunteerism’ on the project, and peopleclearly did not ‘buy into’ the concept of earningsthrough profit. In this context, it became understandablewhy external, contracted management/mentorshipwould prove inadequate. Thecontracted farm manager expected members totake responsibility without being managed on adaily basis, and react to farming needs on theirown initiative as well. For their part, BRC felt thecontracted manager was unable to overcome localproblems and motivate the project memberssufficiently.It was therefore agreed that the project wouldbe ‘taken over’ by the CPA. Formally, that meantthat the project members would be employed asworkers, and that the CPA would take ownershipof the project. In terms of what the projectmembers wanted, the CPA resolved to use itsfunds already ring-fenced for agricultural developmentto pay monthly wages. This was initiallyagreed for a one year period and later extended.In terms of management, agreement wasreached with BRC that it would expand its roleon behalf of the CPA and take over as full-timeproject managers.68

ResearchReport2006-2007: expansion and newbeginningsThe following year and a half saw a substantialfinancial injection into the scheme as well as anincreased level of management support aimedat improving the scheme’s productivity.Funds were secured from Tina Sinakho and theNational Development Agency during this period.Funds went to upgrading the scheme’s assets.The old shed on the scheme was renovatedso as to accommodate an office, equipmentstorage, produce storage and a large garage forfarm vehicles. A one-ton truck was acquired formarketing purposes.In terms of management arrangements, the contractwith the East London based consultant wasnot renewed, in favour of appointing a managerfrom among the beneficiaries. This managerworks under the direction of the designated BRCproject officer. The members received regularwage payments leading to greater commitmentto the scheme.Production levels were also increased significantlyduring this period. In 2006, about 15 hectareswere planted with a wider variety of vegetablecrops. Maize was dropped off the planting list.In 2007, approximately 300 fruit trees (mainlyapples and pecan nuts) were planted. However,the scheme continued to be plagued by poorcrops. The 2005/2006 summer season crop wasaffected by heavy rains which caused water loggingin the fields.During this period the scheme began to attractattention as a success story, seeing a variety ofvisitors, including the MEC for Agriculture, anddelegations of foreign funders.2008: striving for profitabilityThe 2008 period appears to be one in whichthe focus has begun to shift to increasing productivityand effectiveness, in search of schemeprofitability. Existing crops were been successfullyproduced and marketed both locally and inthe East London area. Crop diversification andexperimentation continued. New crops such aswheat and tomatoes were planted for the firsttime. The failed fruit orchard was replaced witha new planting of 500 apple trees, this time withbetter advisory support.New equipment was purchased with NDA funds,including a tractor, a ridger, a disc, a ripper and atrailer. Two Rotivators (weeding machines) werealso bought and replaced use of hand hoes.However, concerns about the long-term viabilityof the scheme are evident. BRC and the schemehave begun to lobby the Amathole District Municipalityto support the installation of a dripirrigation system to replace the flood system.This is expected to improve crop productivitysubstantially.Institutionally, a management committee wasset up, including the project members, BRC, andthe CPA, with the intention of improving localparticipation in decision making and managementprocesses.Natural resourcesThe scheme is located in the upper reaches ofthe Amatola Mountain range. Altitudes in thearea range from 800 metres to 1800 metres atthe mountain top.Climatic conditions recorded in the Keiskammahoekarea are as follows:However, being higher in the mountains, conditionsin Chata may be more extreme than presentedin this table. Greater detail of the climaticconditions can be found in the Chata IDP (2003).The main water source for the area is the ChataRiver and the many small mountain streamswhich feed it. The river is dammed about a kilometrebelow the scheme (the Chata dam).Thequality of water is reported to be extremelypure. Water is used downstream for domesticneeds. The vegetation above the scheme is richin natural Afromontane forest, as well as largeareas of pine and wattle plantation. The landsimmediately surrounding the scheme comprisegrasslands of the Dohne Sourveld variety.A soils analysis was carried out by the Departmentof Agriculture in 2001. Approximately 51hectares have been irrigated in the past. Soilsidentified were Oakleaf, Cloverly, Shortlandsand Vaalriver. The depth of the soils varies considerablyand this and the different soil types indicatethe need to carefully match crops to areaswithin the scheme.A generalised vegetable crop suitability framework,based on the assessment of climatic conditionsand the soils, was identified as follows:69

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 4.1: Minimum and maximum temperatures andprecipitationJan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov DecMean min temp(Celsius)Mean max temp(Celsius)Mean precip.(mm)16 16 14 12 8 5 5 6 8 11 13 1530 29 20 18 14 11 10 13 16 18 25 2788 95 111 62 48 29 30 38 64 87 91 8370• Crucifers (cabbage, broccoli, spinach, etc.)are suitable climatically and for Cloverly,Shortlands and Vaalriver soils, with the bestgrowing period being October to April.• Bean varieties are suitable for any of thesoils as long as the drainage is good, and ismost optimal from November to March.• Cucurbit (squashes, cucumbers, etc.) aresuitable in well drained soils between Novemberand March.• Potatoes are suitable on well drained soils,with optimal growing periods being Decemberto February.Physical infrastructure andresourcesThe scheme is 22.75 hectares in extent. The landsare divided into five sections. Sections 1 to 4 arefenced and farmed. Section 5, the southernmostsection next to the school, is not fenced or utilisedat the moment.The irrigation system is a gravity-fed system viacement furrows with two water draw-off weirson the Chata River. There is also a storage damthat is fed from a furrow from the river. Section1 is fed directly from the river. The dam feedsSections 2 and 3, and can also feed Section 4.Section 4 is primarily fed from the lower weir,except in times of very low river flow. Section 1’sirrigation channel requires maintenance (leakages/unmaintained),but the other channels arein reasonably good condition.The in-field irrigation is a flood system. However,many of the flood channels are not adequatelylevelled, and coupled with poor drainage soils insome sections, achieving appropriate irrigationfor all crops is difficult. This problem has resultedin parts of Section 2 and 3 being left unutilised.The installation of a drip irrigation system is proposedto overcome the problems of the floodsystem. A cost estimate of R700 000 has beenobtained for the installation of the system forthe whole scheme. It is hoped that the AmatholeDistrict Municipality will fund this development,even if installation takes place in phases.The project has a relatively new storage and administrativecentre, which includes office space,equipment storage facilities, and a large storage/shed area for vehicles and crop storage (but stillwaiting for doors to be put on the shed area).The scheme has its own tractor, plough, discs,ripper, a one-ton delivery vehicle, two weedingmachines, sprayers, hoes, spades, buckets andother small equipment. All equipment is in goodto excellent condition, with much of it beingless than two years old. The tractor, however, isformally registered in the name of the CPA andalso utilised on the forestry project. Equipmentis maintained, and during the assessment one ofthe weeding machines had been taken in to thesupplier for repairs.The fencing around the sections is in good conditionand is goat-proofed. The gravel access roadto Chata is in excellent condition. The scheme islocated along this road.The production systemCrop selectionThe scheme has focussed on vegetables for itsincome. In the longer term, income is to be realisedthrough fruit and nut orchards. Futureplanting will include fodder crops.In the 2007/2008 summer season approximately14 hectares were planted. Current land utilisationis as follows:

ResearchReport• Section 1: mainly pecan nut trees (of which90% are dead)• Section 2: replanted with 500 apple trees• Section 3: planted with vegetables andwheat• Section 4: planted with vegetables andwheat.For the 2008/09 summer season the followingvegetable crops have been planted: cabbage,spinach, beetroot, broccoli, green pepper, butternut,potatoes, tomatoes and two hectares ofwheat. Approximately 10 hectares of vegetableshave been planted so far.In 2007 the scheme expanded into fruit and nuts,in a bid to become more profitable. These weremainly pecan nuts and apples, but also includedpeaches, plums and pears. Some 300 apple treeswere planted. However, the scheme membersand farm manager had had no prior experienceof deciduous trees and training was onlyreceived after the trees were all planted. It is believedthat due to incorrect watering (linked tothe positions in which the trees were planted)and incorrect fertilisation the trees all died.Similar problems were experienced with the pecannut trees with the majority of the trees dying.It is believed that the cause of the problemis related to the poor drainage from the floodirrigation channels, and possibly also frost problems.The scheme has recently replanted 500 applestrees and is hoping for better results. Besides theFigure 4.1: Photos of Chata Irrigation Scheme71

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.one-day training on apples, they get ad hoc visitsand telephonic advice from the specialist whosupplied the saplings.Production planningThe BRC utilises a simple production plan guidewhich sets out crop cycles, seed and planting requirements,and establishes types and quantitiesof fertiliser, pesticides and herbicides needed.The plan also requires crop rotation in the fields.The costs and anticipated income associatedwith this are set out on a spreadsheet.Purchases of inputs are done through Umthizain Keiskammahoek, although sometimes purchasesare made in King William’s Town. Ordersalways go through BRC, although needs can beidentified to the farm manager, if the plannedinputs prove to be insufficient or there are unexpectedneeds. BRC pays the accounts directlyto the suppliers.Staff structureThe scheme operates with 16 landowners employedon the scheme. Besides land ownersthere are three full time labourers employedand two drivers. The non-landowner employeesstarted in August 2008. The labour component isstructured as follows:Of the five non-labourer posts, four are held bymales and one assistant supervisor is female.Management responsibilitiesWhile responsibilities can broken down towhere responsibilities primarily lie, the overallapproach is a consultative one which emphasisesreaching consensus. BRC’s management roleon the scheme has developed out of its formalappointment as implementation agent for therestitution development by Amathole DistrictMunicipality, which administers the restitutionfunds. BRC takes primary responsibility for:• Annual planning (strategy and productiongoals)• Financial planning• Administration• Production planning (quarterly)• Marketing.The farm manager takes primary responsibilityfor:• Implementation of production plans• Monthly and weekly task planning meetingswith members• Oversight of labour management and instructionsto supervisors• On-site management• Ordering of inputs as and when required• Representing the scheme.Supervisors take responsibility for:• Organisation of their teams in the field• Keep of timesheets• Advising farm manager of needs and problems• Standing in for the manager when he isaway.This division of responsibilities is reflected in theapproach to the farming of the apples. The decisionto plant apple trees would be motivated byBRC to the scheme members as part of the an-Table 4.2: Employment structure at ChataPosition Wage (per month) EmployerFarm manager R3 000 BRCSupervisor R1 300 CPAAssistant supervisors (2) R1 100 CPALabourers R900 CPADrivers (2) R1 300 BRCRecords clerk R900 CPA72

ResearchReportnual planning. Once this was agreed, BRC wouldsource the funding and put the contracts andarrangements into effect. Consultation wouldoccur with the farm manager as to which landsto allocate, and arrangements around the implementationof the planting, training, etc. Thefarm manager in turn would discuss this withthe members, and a team would be selected towork on the planting and looking after the apples.The details of what needs to happen whenwould be agreed with BRC, and the farm managerwould ensure its implementation throughthe weekly meetings and in-field guidance.Administration and financialmanagementThe scheme employed a records clerk in 2007.The clerk is a scheme member from a familywhich owns a plot in the scheme.Every Friday BRC collects records of sales andstock utilised, as well as cash from sales, and returnsthe records on the following week.The project does not employ any security fortheir office or fields, and have not had any needfor security.The scheme does not have a separate bank account.All credit and financial arrangements aremade via BRC. Income from sales are not used tooffset expenditure (as input costs are from grantfinance), and this income is paid over to the CPAtwice yearly to utilise at its discretion. As thescheme members receive salaries they have noclaim to this income.Marketing arrangementsCrops are sold through the following avenues:• Direct purchases from the office• Selling via the scheme’s truck in nearby villagesand towns (in Keiskammahoek theydiscount by R2 per bag for purchases of over10 bags)• Selling according to arrangements/ordersin King William’s Town and East London(BRC arranges for the orders and the price,phones through the orders to the office,and money is collected by BRC into the accountdirectly).It is estimated that roughly half the crops aresold in the Keiskammahoek area, and half inthe King William’s Town / East London area. Butthis depends on production levels. For the massproduction planned for 2007, 80% of the cropswould have been sold to commercial outlets.During 2007 some retailers were collecting directlyfrom the scheme. Prices vary from crop tocrop but staple crops like cabbage achieve betterprofitability locally.Local sales take place regularly, but sales arealways better at month end (after payday) andafter pension payouts. For August 2008 averagedaily sales from the office were between R100and R120 rand.Clients in the Buffalo City area include:• East London: Pick ‘n Pay, Fruit & Veg City,Pro Veg, Spar (2 branches), OK Bazaars,Sanans• King William’s Town: Fruit & Veg City,Popular Market.Marketing with the retail outlets is undertakenby the project officer and an administratorin the BRC offices. The marketing approach isfairly basic, in that retail prices are established,and then offers are made to the various outlets.Prices are highly negotiable depending on whatthe retailers are willing to pay. There are no formalcontracts in place. The main weakness in themarketing is that no ongoing arrangements canbe established in respect to retailers’ needs be-Table 4.3: Some examples of prices recently achievedCrop Price local Price Buffalo CityButternut R12 R20Onion R15 R20Cabbage R2 R3.50Source: figures provided by the farm manager.73

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.cause of the lack of stability in production quantityand quality. BRC must first assess what is athand before attempting to market.The scheme members do their own packaging.In terms of the new wheat crop, the scheme willhave to find a miller before attempting to selland arrangements are not yet in place. In thelonger term the intention is to mill locally andproduce bread for local sales.There is no formal marketing strategy that hasbeen evaluated for the apples, but there is anintention to process the apples in Chata and producejams for selling.Overview of external support to theschemeBorder Rural Committee supportAs the project initiator and manager BRC is intensivelyinvolved in supporting the project. Thissupport includes:• Production management• Marketing• Finance and administration (including contractadministration)• Liaison and administration related to restitutionfunds and various donor funding• Public relations• Strategic planning and capacity building.In 2006 the value of BRC support (direct costs)were budgeted at R278 500, which included:• Wages of the farm manager and the driveron the project• BRC staff wages• Finance and administration costs• Farming input subsidies.In 2007 this budget had undergone a major reevaluationand was increased nearly threefoldto R828 000, and in 2008 this again increasedsubstantially to R1.2 million, with major increasesin all categories of expenditure.The budgets have been funded from the NationalDevelopment Agency (NDA) to an amount ofR940 000, by Tina Sinakho to an amount of R1.58million, and various other smaller grants.It must be noted that this is the first major agriculturalmanagement job undertaken by BRC.BRC lacks an experienced irrigation crop specialistand has had no prior experience in marketing.BRC is learning ‘on-the-job’, and while thefresh approach of the NGO in managing the projecthas paid dividends in overcoming the initialcrises, many serious production and marketingproblems could have been overcome with adequatetechnical knowledge within the BRC teamor if BRC had more effectively brought in specialistinputs.Other technical support for productionThe private company Earth Innovations was contractedto provide farm management servicesfor the period up to June 2006. This was the periodin which the project experienced its worstperformance, although the causes underlyingthese problems are varied and cannot be allocatedwithout further investigation. The schememembers still recall this relationship in a positivemanner. This farm manager and BRC partedways partially due to different visions as how totake the scheme forward.Currently technical support is provided for thegrowing of the new apple trees. As part of thesupply contract, the supplier (from nearby Hogs-Table 4.4: Key budget items for BRCBudget Item Budget 2006 Budget 2007 Budget 2008Administration costs R21 000 R49 500 R95 000Motor vehicle expenses R10 000 R22 000 R37 500Programme costs R22 000 R74 000 R140 000Project resources R70 000 R420 000 R577 890Salaries R65 000 R110 000 R407 60074

ResearchReportback) assessed the lands for suitability and nowprovides advisory services. However these servicesare low intensity.Support from the Department ofAgricultureIn the early years of the project BRC made it aspecific objective to get the Department involvedin the project. However, the response ofthe extension services from Keiskammahoek hasalways been limited. It was noted that extensionofficers periodically visited the scheme, but havedone little more than collect information on thescheme. The extension service’s slow response torequests for assistance in identifying diseases,etc., was highlighted as an example of the lackof support from the Department.The Department has donated a tractor to thecommunity of Chata (not the irrigation project),but this is currently parked at the communityhall and evidently remains unused.Economic aspectsProduction figures for 2007 and 2008 were madeavailable although figures provided were notfor the full year. The information is presentedon an annual basis, due to the major differencein production levels between the two years. In2007 production was planned at maximum farmutilisation with the intention of achieving financialprofitability. However, there were massivelosses due to heavy crop damage from rains. BRCstaff acknowledge that these losses were largelycaused by a lack of farming experience on theirpart. The impact of such losses caused traumawithin the organisation and resulted in a scalingback of production levels in 2008. While this isunderstandable considering the losses sustainedin 2007, production levels in 2008 will, for theyear at least, require heavy subsidisation of thescheme.Production in 2007Following the take-over of the farm management,BRC attempted production at maximumpossible levels in 2007. The intention was toachieve overall profitability. Figures providedfrom May 2007 set out the following plans:Production costs and returns were anticipated asfollows (8 month period):In terms of actual production the followingplanting and harvesting returns were achieved(9 month period):This level of production should have generatedat least R250 000. However, quality of thecrop was reportedly to be mostly poor. Particularproblems were also experienced in gettingcertain crops like spinach to the market freshenough, resulting in further losses. In all a totalincome of only R110 000 was achieved during2007, resulting in losses of over R200 000,excluding management/support costs or takingaccount of capital investments.Production in 2008Following the problems of 2007, planting hasbeen scaled down to about two thirds of 2007levels (at a rough estimate) in terms of vegetables.However, with the planting of the new appletrees the scheme is still planting intensively.Table 4.5: Production plansCropNumbers to be planted(8 month period)Actual Planted(9 month period)Cabbage 180 000 137 000Broccoli 20 000 19 600Cauliflower 20 000 25 000Spinach 20 000 17 000Beetroot 13 000 16 000Lettuce 8 000 10 500Potatoes160 kilograms of seedOnions 0 10 000Peas, green beans, carrot, pumpkin,butternut, sweet potatoesVarious smaller amounts75

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 4.6: Anticipated production costs and returnsItem (up to August 2008)AmountCost of seed inputs 31 234Other input costs 81 865Wages 164 809Total production costs 277 908Total income achieved 42 450Table 4.7: Actual returnsCropActual Planting (Jan-Aug 2008)Harvest Potential (Jan-Aug @100%)Actual Harvest(recorded)Cabbage 55 000 25 000 6131Broccoli 2 000 1 000 23Spinach 6 000 6 000 371Beetroot 16 000 16 000 1596Onion 27 000 0 0Potatoes 35 bags seed 1225 bags 7Table 4.8: Recent plantings and harvest potentialCrop Actual planted Actual harvested Percentage harvestedCabbage 137 000 51 000 37%Broccoli 19 600 9 600 49%Cauliflower 25 000 12 050 48%Spinach 17 000 12 000 70%Beetroot 16 000 9 750 60%Lettuce 10 500 4 875 46%Onions 10 000 7 500 75%Table 4.9: Total costs and incomeItemAmountCost of seed inputs 61 688Other input costs 138 000Wages 135 000Total production costs 334 688Total income expected (anticipated 70% production returns) 354 820Table 4.10: Annual wage billYear Details Amount Monthly Average2006 End year only R26 0002007 Full Year R223 000 R19 4002008 January to August R165 000 R20 600Note: figures have been rounded off.76

ResearchReportNote that these figures do not reflect input suppliesin stock or unsold crops. It also does notseparate out the fertilisers and soil preparationcosts for the planting of the apple trees.The supplier costs for the apple trees wasR20 000.Wage costsWages on the project are paid both from theRestitution Fund allocation (the labourers, supervisorsand records clerk) and through BRCutilising their grant finances (the farm manager,the tractor driver and the vehicle driver).The annual wage bill, since the adoption of thewage framework on the project, is as follows:At full land utilisation, this equates to a requirementof R11 200 in income per hectare per annumjust to cover the wage bill.General observationsThe lack of profitability from the vegetable operationsis a major problem for the scheme. Thefailure to break even is mainly based on poorproduction levels and high fixed salary overheads.Scheme members are clearly aware that theproject is running at a loss. They indicated thatthis had been made clear from the AGM meeting.Members still expressed hope that a profitwould be generated. However, profitability isnot a day-to-day concern for the membershipand the ongoing losses do not appear to cloudmembers’ positive outlook on the project.For BRC, profitability is clearly a much greaterdaily concern, and the staff hold a real worryabout the future of the project unless losses canbe turned around. Nevertheless, there appearsto be a sense of uncertainty on how to turn thefinancial situation around. BRC is hoping thatthe additional activities of the fruit orchard andfodder production will assist with improving incomelevels.Institutional frameworkLand ownershipAs part of the former Ciskei the scheme is establishedon communal tenure land. The ‘land owners’who are part of the scheme are in fact fromfamilies with Permission to Occupy (PTO) certificates;in most cases the PTO is in the name of adeceased grandfather. The individual membersinvolved therefore do not necessarily have soleland ownership rights, but rather exercise theirinvolvement and claim their benefits as a memberof a family with historical rights to the land.Project ownershipIn 2006 the rights to the scheme were technicallytransferred to the Communal Property Association(CPA). However, in practice the CPAdoes not see its role in managing the scheme,but merely in providing a legal framework forthe scheme’s business operations. The CPA’s roleis described in terms of “providing vision andoverall guidance”. This role also includes resolvinginternal problems.The project is currently not separately registeredas a legal entity. Its bank account, credit arrangementswith suppliers, and other legal commitments,are all conducted in the name of the BRC.The intention is however to set up a separate legalentity. This was provided for in the 2007 BRCAnnual Plan, but is it is not regarded as a priorityat this stage.Institutional structureWhile daily and weekly decision making is madeby BRC in liaison with the farm manager, monthlydecision making and longer term strategicplanning is done in a representative committeecalled the Company Committee. This committeecomprises BRC representatives, CPA representatives,the farm manager, two workers, and therecord keeper (as secretary). Both BRC and thefarm manager present reports to this committee.The outcome of reports and issues from thismeeting are fed to the CPA Managing Board,who in turn are responsible for keeping thegeneral community informed of issues. The CPAappears to limit its role, leaving actual managementto its management agent (BRC) and thescheme members.There is a multi-stakeholder steering committee,involving government departments andmunicipal representatives, which deals with thedevelopments in Chata in general, including theirrigation scheme.77

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Profile of scheme participantsThe farm manager: Mr Mongameli RodeThe farm manager has a visible passion forfarming and is the ‘champion’ or ‘driver’ of thescheme. Thirty-eight year old Mr Rode is a plotowner and has been farming since 1997. He hadbeen the farm manager for 18 months as of theundertaking of the research for this case study.His previous farming experience has been inmaize and vegetable production on his familyplot. He has not had any special training but indicatedthat besides practical experience he alsolearns through reading.Mr Rode perceives himself to be a farmer for life,proudly declaring that he was born in Chata andwill never leave. His farther was a farmer, andhe is very clear that he would like his children tolearn farming as well.they would attempt to continue with the farming(although this commitment is clearly tingedwith knowledge of the past failure to farm ontheir own), albeit possibly with less commercialaspirations.The project also generates a sense of communitycommitment. The project is seen not only to begood for those directly involved but also for thevillage. “There are no families starving in Chataanymore”. The scheme provides a source ofcheap food. For example non-commercial qualitycabbages are sold for 50c and scraps are givenaway. Further examples of community benefitscited by the members included: fruit and nuttrees encourage birdlife which will benefit thetourism venture in the village; the planned fodderproduction will benefit the livestock project;and the planned process operation (milling/bread; jams from fruit) will also provide the communitywith cheaper food.78Profile of other scheme membersAge levels of the scheme members range between35 years and 65 years. Education levelsrange between grade 2 and grade 12, with themean being grade 6. Members however expressedthe opinion that formal education isrelatively unimportant for successful farmingin comparison to local knowledge and practicalskills.Seven of the scheme members are the sole breadwinnersfor their families. Three families receivegovernment grants, one member has a secondbusiness (spaza shop and steel works) and theother families have another member earningwages as well.A variety of reasons is given for individual participationin the scheme ranging from householdfood security and household survival, tothe satisfaction of deriving value out of the land.Scheme members tended to express the opinionthat it is unlikely that their children will ever getinvolved in farming as their children see betterfutures elsewhere.Perspectives of performanceScheme members are currently very positiveabout the scheme, largely because of stablewages and a marked improvement in their livelihoods,as well as providing them with a sense ofachievement and purpose. The members indicatedthat even if the BRC support was withdrawnConclusionsThe Chata Irrigation Scheme is perhaps a storyof potential. Whether the future will show a lostpotential or a sustainable enterprise will largelybe dictated by how current problems are addressed.On the positive side certain key foundation conditionsfor the success of the scheme are in place.These include:• A clear institutional framework withinwhich the group functions, which sets outroles, responsibilities and how benefits areallocated.• A clear contractual relationship betweenscheme members, BRC and the CPA.• Ownership rests in a body divorced fromthe daily management, so it can intervenein internal disputes which so often lead togroup paralysis.• A clear and accepted management frameworkwith a farm manager and a supervisordirecting work in the fields.• An established support environment.• A highly committed NGO supporting thescheme which has also brought in supportfrom funders and technical specialists. Andalthough the limited technical support is arguablyone of the key weaknesses on the

ResearchReportproject, the mechanism within which tobring in such support is in place.• The scheme initiative is taking place withina context of overall community development.This results in livelihood improvementsfrom a number of sources, meaninggreater demand for produce from the community,and greater household food securityfor participants in the scheme.• The project driver appears to be in place inthe person of the farm manager; a groupproject requires the dynamism of at leastone person with commitment, passion, abilityto learn, and an entrepreneurial vision.• Although he has limited experience of cropvarieties and of running the farm as a business,the farm manager demonstrates therequired characteristics.• Beneficiaries are able to recognise benefitsand receive direct benefits• The outlook of the membership is very positivein terms of the impact of the schemeand they value the income received fromtheir work on the project, a marked improvementfrom when the scheme was initiallyrevitalised.• The means of production is sufficiently inplace for efficient production.• The scheme has been rehabilitated and hasreceived key resources needed for productionand for marketing.In terms of weaknesses, the following aspectsraise concern about the sustainability of the project:• The scheme is hugely subsidised withoutany clear perspective on how long this subsidywill be (or needs to be) in place or whataspects are appropriate for subsidisation.• The management lacks critical technicalskills and/or experience and this is resultingin significant production failures.investment (drip irrigation, etc.) which deflectsa focus from other core problems.• The framework for building the businessskills and business management within theproject is not in place or adequately visualisedby role-players.• While the effect of paying wages has beenpositive on the scheme members’ motivation,it has also removed the rationale forbuilding a profitable (i.e. sustainable) businessfrom the members.References and sourcesInterviews:Mr Mongemeli Rode (Scheme Manager).Group interview with all the Scheme Membersin attendanceFanelwa Mhaga (Border Rural Committee,Project Officer responsible for the scheme)Charmaine Cockcroft (Border Rural CommitteeFinancial Manager).Additional ad-hoc consultation / discussionstook place with:Zanelwa Semane (Border Rural CommitteeProgramme Manager)The Manager, Sanans Vegetable Shop(Purchaser of scheme vegetables)Documentation:Chata Integrated Development Plan (2003)Chata Agricultural Business Plan (undated copy)Border Rural Committee Web Site (www.brc21.co.za)Border Rural Committee, Annual Plan, 2005Border Rural Committee, Annual Plan, 2006Border Rural Committee, Annual Plan, 2007Border Rural Committee, 6 Monthly Report,January to June 2006Border Rural Committee, 6 Monthly Report, Julyto December 2006• The scheme’s overheads (e.g. its fixed wagebill) place the potential future profitabilityof the scheme under constant pressure.• The solution to current problems is frequentlyidentified to lie in further capital79

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.80

ResearchReport5 Mr Booi and theZanyokwe IrrigationScheme, Keiskammahoek:a successful smallholderrelative to his peersNomakhaya Monde, Department of AgriculturalEconomics, University of Fort HareIntroductionIn the new municipal demarcations, ZanyokweIrrigation Scheme (ZIS) falls under the AmahlatiLocal Municipality of the Amatole District. Theclimate of the area where the scheme is locatedcan be described as semi-arid with a mean annualrainfall of about 590 mm per annum (VanAverbeke et al., 1998). The ZIS is divided intosix sections, namely, Kammafurrow, Burns Hill,Zingcuka, Zanyokwe, Ngqumeya and Lenye.These are villages that make up the scheme. TheLenye section is divided into three sub-sections,namely Lenye West, North and South. Figure 5.1shows the fields of Lenye South. Mr Booi, thesubject of this case study, is one of the farmersin that section.Historical perspectiveMr Booi is 56 years old, married and has fourchildren. For five years he worked as a mineworker at Carletonville. According to Mr Booi,most farmers at ZIS started working as mineworkers. However, while most of them were affectedby retrenchments that began in the early1990s, Mr Booi did not leave the mines due toretrenchments. He decided to leave his job in1981 as he was earning very little. Back at homehe made a living by selling chickens until 1984,after which he was employed as a farm workerat the scheme.The ZIS was established in 1984, initially with48 members (Van Averbeke et al., 1998). Atthe time, the Ciskei government had a strongrelationship with Israel. The two governmentssigned a five-year agreement whereby skilledIsraelis would run the scheme. The main objectiveof this agreement was to build the capacityof the local farmers in the areas of farmingand farm management. The local farmers wouldthen take over and run the scheme at the end ofthe contract period. During the contract period,the farmers – of whom Mr Booi was one – wereengaged as workers under the guidance of theIsraeli managers.During this era, all agricultural inputs were subsidisedby government, and all machinery andequipment were provided by government. Supportservices such as marketing and extensionwere government priorities. Most marketingfunctions (grading, packing, selling and buying)took place at field level. The scheme wasendowed with a lot of infrastructure, includingmarketing facilities. A store was built on thesite where buyers could come and buy products.Facilities like potato washers and maize drierswere on the site. The Ciskei government employeda large number of extension officers ofwhom three served various sections of the ZIS ona full-time basis (Bembridge, 1999).In 1989, the contract with Israel expired, and thescheme was handed over to the 48 members underthe management of Ulimocor, a parastatal.The scheme entered a phase in which farmersbegan to struggle to make a profit. According toMr Booi, the main problems that affected farmersduring this time were poor management,81

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Figure 5.1: Zanyokwe Irrigation Scheme82poor record keeping, and reduction in extensionservices. In addition, government withdrewmany services (input and tractor subsidies) andsold most of the scheme’s equipment and implements.With very little government support,farmers struggled to pay the labourers and asa result, many labourers stopped working forfarmers.In 1996, Ulimocor was disbanded and farmerswere advised to form a trust whose main responsibilitywas to manage the scheme’s affairsand look after its infrastructure and equipment.The scheme was supposed to be managed by aBoard of Trustees, but it would appear that thetrust deed was not registered with the relevantauthority, and as a result, the proposed trust didnot have the authority to run the scheme (VanAverbeke et al., 1998). So, the period between1996 and 2001 was the worst time at ZIS as therewas neither production nor management at thescheme. The scheme’s infrastructure began todisintegrate, partly through vandalism.In 2002, the farmers received a grant of R1 millionfrom government in an effort to revitalisethe scheme. Farmers were advised to elect amanagement committee to run the scheme. Acommittee of 12 members was elected. They alsoreceived loans from Uvimba Bank in King William’sTown. However, farmers struggled to payback the loans. In 2005, the trust was changed toa Producers Assembly (PA) committee (Monde etal., 2005).Currently, the ZIS farmers have a co-operative,which was registered in 2007 (Monde etal., 2008). They also received a further sum ofR3 million from government to improve thescheme’s infrastructure. In addition, ZIS’s farmersare members of the Eastern Cape government’sMassive Food Programme, which aimsat increasing the production of maize by smallscalefarmers. In the Massive Food Programme,farmers benefit from subsidised inputs (seed,fertilisers and herbicides), while governmentarranges for their maize to be marketed. Thefence around the scheme has been repaired, thescheme’s offices refurbished, and most irrigationequipment replaced. The main problems at ZISare markets and extension services. According toMr Booi, the extension services have gone frombad to worse.Natural and physicalresourcesThe area under irrigation in Zanyokwe is uncertainbut the land area is estimated to be 635 hectares.Altogether there are 66 individual smallfarms ranging from 1 to 20 hectares. Mr Booihas access to 6.3 hectares of land. Of this land,5.3 hectares is the land allocated to him, and heleases an additional one hectare from another

ResearchReportfarmer on the scheme. The average land holdingat the scheme is 3 hectares.The soils at the scheme are rated from moderatelyto highly suitable for irrigation, howevera significant percentage are classified as havinga moderate potential (Monde et al., 2005). Themain limitations are: poor depth, heavy textureand a high percentage of fine sand and silt. Cultivationdifficulties and slow permeability occuron some of the heavier soils. This shows that irrigationshould be carefully managed to avoidsoil-related problems on the scheme and theneed for appropriate training.ZIS receives its water via an 80 centimetre pipelinefrom the Sandile Dam. The pipeline tapersdown to a smaller diameter towards the end ofthe scheme. The Kamma Furrow section, which isat the very far end of the scheme, has a separatepump unit to pump water from the KeiskammaRiver into their reservoir or directly into the distributionsystem.Because the dam also supplies domestic water,the pipeline is operated and maintained by theAmatola Water Board on behalf of the Departmentof Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF).There is very little contact between the schemeand the Water Board. The assured yield from thedam is 12.7 million cubic metres and its capacityis 30.7 million cubic metres. Depending on thedam level the pressure or head at the wall variesbetween 10 and 50 metres. The outlet of thedam is fitted with state-of-the-art water controland measuring equipment that is in good workingorder.There are nine main off take points along thepipeline to distribute water to the scheme (seeFigure 5.2). The water supply to the scheme isdesigned with a duty of about 0.9 litres/secondper hectare. This is considered to be adequateat this level of scheme utilisation. If all of thescheme were to come into production, the waterwould still be adequate if well managed. Eachoff-take was originally fitted with a flow metre,pressure gauges and filters, but at all the pointsvisited during the fieldwork, these devices wereno longer functioning and many pipes leaked(Monde et al., 2005).ZIS makes use of sprinkler irrigation system. Thesprinklers are mounted on quick coupling pipesand the water is delivered from a hydrant foreach block. The hydrants receive water from anetwork of subsurface pipes, which are connectedto the off-takes from the Sandile pipeline, orfrom the booster pump station or from a nightstorage dam. Until recently, the irrigation infrastructureat ZIS was in very bad condition. TheFigure 5.2: Example of block off take showing flow metre,pressure gauge, filters, non-return valve and electricalsupply for booster pumps83

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Figure 5.3: A stack of new pipes in Booi’s homesteadFigure 5.4: A facility used to dry maize (maize drier) atZanyokwe Irrigation Scheme84

ResearchReportpipes were damaged and leaking, there were nohydrant pipes, and the valves did not work properly.But the infrastructure upgrade that tookplace in early 2008 has substantially improvedthe situation (see Figure 5.3).Most of the lands on the irrigation scheme areirrigated by gravity from the pipeline, but waterat Lenye North has to be pumped to a reservoir,from which irrigation is by gravity. About15 farmers depend on this pump. Until recently,the electrical power to the pump was disconnectedand apparently this had been the casefor 10 years because of money owing to Eskom.The reservoir into which water is pumped leaks.Mr Booi has access to the scheme’s other physicalinfrastructure as well. However, most of thisinfrastructure is either not working or is in verybad state. For instance, the various storage facilitieson the scheme are generally unusable, sofarmers either use their own storage facilitiesor, more typically, none at all. Also, the schemeused to have maize driers (see Figure 5.4) and apotato grader (see Figure 5.5), but these are nolonger in working condition.However, the one aspect of non-irrigation infrastructurethat has been recently restored is thescheme’s offices; the building has been repairedand furniture and office equipment acquired(see Figure 5.6). This was largely through additionalfunding which the farmers managed tosecure from the National Development Agencyand the Small Enterprises Development Agency,which was also used to purchased some farmmachinery to improve tillage and cultivation services,and to install drip irrigation on about 20hectares of the scheme area.Production systemsMain farming enterprisesMr Booi is involved in the production of threemain crops, namely, cabbages, butternuts andmaize. Apart from these crops, he also growsvegetables such as spinach, carrot and onionson relatively small plots. In summer, the largestshare of the land is allocated to cabbage (2.5hectares), followed by butternut (2 hectares),and then maize (1.5 hectares); the other threevegetables are each planted on about one tenthof a hectare. In winter, he again plants cabbage(though less than in summer), as well as variousvegetables. The method of cultivation is by tractortraction. Farmers at ZIS have access to threeFigure 5.5: An old potato grader85

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Figure 5.6: Renovated ZIS officestractors that are hired by farmers for tillage purposes.For cabbage and maize, Mr Booi buys allproduction inputs at cost while those of butternutsare subsidised by government.Maize and butternut farmers at ZIS are membersof the Massive Food Programme (MFP) of theEastern Cape Department of Agriculture. Governmentpurchases and delivers all inputs to theproduction site. When maize is sold, farmers paya certain percentage of the production costs.The MFP is a five-year programme. During thefirst year, farmers did not pay for inputs, whilein the second year they paid 25% of productioncosts, and every year the proportion increasesuntil farmers incur the full costs of producingmaize. Although Mr Booi is a member of theMFP, he no longer produces maize under MFP. In2007, he decided to pull out and produce for anothermarket. Therefore, he buys maize inputshimself from Umthiza Co-op in Alice, about 40kilometres from Zanyokwe. With regard to cabbageand butternut, Mr Booi obtains the productioninputs (seed, fertilisers and chemicals)either from King William’s Town or East London,and hires transport to fetch them.Labour inputsMr Booi has one permanent farmworker, butalso calls upon ‘semi-paid’ family labour. Thefarmworker is paid a salary of R45/day (aboutR900 per month), which is a lot higher thanthe average of R30/day that other farm workersearn at ZIS. Mr Booi’s wife is also activelyinvolved in farming and his two children, whoare scholars, also participate in some farmingactivities such as weeding and harvesting. MrBooi keeps his children motivated by payingthem for the tasks they undertake on the farm.Apparently, the school children in the areahave a tendency of working for other farmerswhen they do not receive payment in their ownhouseholds. Another source of labour is ‘labourexchange’, which is mainly used during harvesting.The only crop that demands a lot of labourat harvesting is maize. While some farmers resortto temporary labour which is paid in cashduring the harvesting (especially for maize andbeans), Mr Booi turns to his relatives and paysthem in kind through ‘food parcels’. Those whoresort to hired labour complain about the untrustworthinessof the exchange labour, however,Mr Booi does not encounter this. Instead,people are willing to help him. He thinks thatthey feel obliged as he usually gives them farmproduce even when they did nothing for him.He usually donates food when they have socialfunctions or simply when they do not have food.Mr Booi therefore cultivates these relationshipsas a means of guaranteeing a relatively cheapsource labour.86

ResearchReportMarketing and transaction costsDuring the past three years efforts have beenmade to improve access to markets by small-scalefarmers in this scheme. Before these efforts themarketing ‘system’ consisted mainly of farmersseeking to hawk their produce at informal markets,so in parallel with the revitalisation programme,government has sought to make surethat these farmers have access to formal marketsas well. As a result the farmers have been linkedto supermarkets such as Pick ‘n Pay in Port Elizabeth,the Umtata market, Provege in East London,Fruit and Veg City? in King William’s Town,as well as the University of Fort Hare’s Agriparkprocessing unit. The main problems howeverwith these markets are high transport costs anddelays in payment. Farmers either hire transportto take produce to the market or the buyers pickup the produce from the production site usingown transport. Either way, farmers have to payfor the transport. Most farmers complain thatthey do not make money as almost all profitgoes to transport costs.Farmers not only lose money on transport, buton poor quality and packaging as well. Mr Booimakes an effort to improve quality and makesure that he performs extra marketing functionssuch as grading and packaging. In addition, hismarketing strategy is different from that of theother farmers at the scheme, as he does not relyonly on the buyers or markets arranged for him,but rather searches for his own buyers and makean effort to comply with their demands. Theproduction of maize at ZIS is supported by theEastern Cape Department of Agriculture underthe Massive Food Programme (MFP). The marketfor this product is Umthiza, which was also organisedby the Department. Umthiza buys a 40kilogram bag of grain at R40. This means thatfarmers get R1000 for a ton of maize. When MrBooi noticed the poor price the MFP maize wasfetching, he began to search for an alternativemarket. In 2006, he found one in Seymour in theFort Beaufort area. He then pulled out of MFPand began to produce maize for this buyer. MrBooi and his buyer (who is a dairy farmer), havean informal contract. The buyer wants bothwhite and yellow maize, and when the produceis ready he collects it from the production site.The agreed price for yellow maize is R40 for abag of cobs, which is about twice the price ofR40 for a bag of grain as earned under the MFP.Mr Booi sells his white maize at R100 per 40 kilogrambag of grains. The difference is again hugeas the kilogram fetches twice as much (R2.5/kg)compared to only R1/kg in the MFP. Mr Booi ishappy with this arrangement and is even thinkingof expanding the maize area by renting-inmore land. At the time of this investigation healready contacted the land owner and the conditionsof the lease were being finalised.Mr Booi’s main markets for his cabbage arehawkers and the Umtata market, which is about300 kilometres away. According to Mr Booi, theadvantage of selling to hawkers is that he doesnot have to pay for transport; they make use oftheir own transport and if the cabbage is sold atR3/head, as a producer that is exactly what hegets. In other markets such as the Umtata market,it is that price less transport costs. Togetherwith other farmers, Mr Booi hires a truck to takethe produce to this market. The cost of transportfor one trip is R2000. In order to make money,the truck load must be at least 2000 bags of cabbages,i.e. so that transport costs account for R1per bag. If the load is less than that, the effectivecost per bag increases. According to Mr Booi, itis quite an effort to achieve this target. He sayssome farmers are not committed to production,and therefore they rarely reach the targetof 2000 bags, and as a result, the cost is alwaysmore than R1/bag.Economic aspectsThe financial analysis of agricultural enterprisesis demonstrated in Tables 5.1 (farming expenses),5.2 (gross farming income) and 5.3 (net farmingprofits).The net farming profit figures of all enterprisesare positive, showing that Mr Booi is making aprofit in all these enterprises. However, thesefigures are still very low for Mr Booi to makehuge investments on the farm. Maize has thelowest net farming profit (R2 715/1.5 ha) of allthe crops. But in terms of maize yield, Mr Booireceives about 164 bags (50 kg) of maize, whichtranslate to 8.2 tons from land of 1.5 hectares.This means that he is producing about 5.5 tonsper hectare, which is an acceptable yield underirrigation. The main problem is high productioncosts, especially the costs for permanent labour.By the standards of the commercial farming sector,the wage paid by Mr Booi is average, but hiswage bill is exceedingly high relative to the smallnumber of hectares he is farming. Taking thesecond cabbage crop into account but excludingincome from the vegetables that he plants on a87

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 5.1: Farming expenses of cabbage, butternut and maizeInputCabbage (2.5 ha)Butternut (2 ha)Maize (1.5 ha)AmountCostAmountCostAmountCostSeed/seedlings 10 000 1 800seedlings60 kg 250 40 kg 1 200Fertiliser 6 50 kg bags 1 156 8 50 kg bags 1 476 8 50 kg bags 1 476Pesticide 5 litres 200 10 litres 429 6 kg 30Ploughing 2.5 ha 1 250 2 ha 1 000 1.5 ha 750Discing 2.5 ha 875 2 ha 700 1.5 ha 525Marker 2.5 ha 750 2 ha 600 1.5 ha 450Casual labour 30 days 900 30 days 900 20 days 600Permanent labour* 3 375 2 700 2 025Transport – inputs 150 50 200Transport – outputs 575 120 -Total 11 031 8 225 7 256* Permanent labour costs about R10 800 per year, which as been roughly apportioned to the different enterprises.Table 5.2: Gross farming income of different enterprisesCabbage Maize Butternut (10 kg bag)Yield(head)Price/unit(R)Income(R)Yield (50kg bag)Price/unit (R)Income(R)Yield(10 kgbag)Price/unit(R)Income(R)ProducesoldProduceconsumedProducedonatedProduce fedto animals9 000 2 18 000 70 white 100 7 000 900 15 13 50083yellow40 3 32050 2 100 3 100 300 6 15 90120 2 240 5 40 200 14 15 2100 - 0 3 40 120 - - -Total 9170 18 340 164 10 940 920 13 800Table 5.3: Net farming profits of different enterprisesCabbages (R) Maize (R) Butternuts (R)Gross income 18 340 10 940 13 800Farming expenses 11 031 8 225 7 256Net farming profit 7 309 2 715 6 54488

ResearchReportsmall-scale, Mr Booi’s annual total net income isapproximately R22 415, which takes into accountthe imputed value of own consumption.Livelihood significanceAlthough farming contributes more than 70%of his household income, Mr Booi’s household isone of the few who have other means of survivingas well. One reason is that, like Mr Booi, mostof the other farmers are in their 40s and 50s, thuscontradicting the stereotype that black farmersare invariably pensioners, but also implying ofcourse that they are not eligible for old age pensions.Mr Booi, however, has access to a monthlydisability grant of about R870 for chronic disease(diabetes), and moreover has the good fortuneto have two grown-up children who are workingelsewhere and who send home about R300per month. Apart from crop production, Mr Booiis also involved in animal production. He keepscattle and chickens, which are sometimes soldfor income. The money earned from the sale ofanimals is sometimes used to purchase agriculturalinputs or pay for children’s education.Access to natural capital is a general problem atZIS. The majority of original farmers have discontinuedfarming due to factors such as old age,ill health or lack of interest. Most current farmerseither rent or borrow the land they cultivate.Most of those who are renting are in fact sharecroppingit, i.e. the owner is rewarded not withan up-front cash payment, but with a share (e.g.50%) of the crop or the proceeds from the saleof the crop. Whether sharecrop or loan arrangementsexist, these are short-term and thus generallyunstable. A typical pattern is that whena cropper does well, the owner decides not torenew the arrangement for the following plantingseason but rather try to resume farming fortheir own account, or at least threaten to doso. The common perception of sharecroppers isthat owners are ‘jealous’ of them whenever theyshow signs of succeeding.However, Mr Booi’s situation appears to be betterthan that of most farmers at ZIS, becausehe owns most of the land he is using. He onlyrents about a fifth of the land he uses, and thisby means of an upfront cash payment, whichowners find highly preferable to sharecroppingarrangements. In other words, it is mostlyhis land, and in that respect he has more secureland rights than most farmers who are cultivatingland that belongs to others.The problem of land tenure affects all farmersat ZIS. According to Mr Booi, it not only preventsthem from accessing loans from formal financialinstitutions, but discourages farmers from remainingin farming. While in 2004 there were60 farmers at the scheme (Monde et al., 2005),in 2007 there were only 47 farmers. Land tenurewas mentioned as one of the reasons for discontinuingfarming.Mr Booi’s strategy to deal with limited accessto physical capital is to sell all his produce fromthe production site. Other farmers have adoptedthis strategy as well. However, most of themexperience problems such as product spoilagedue to lack of market. Mr Booi hardly experiencesthis problem because, to the extent thathe is able, he first finds buyers or markets for hisproducts. In other words, despite not having hisown transport does he does not passively waitto see if buyers arrive at his doorstep or not, butorganises for his produce to be purchased. Hislabour strategy, too, is different. He has at leastone permanent worker; other farmers believethey cannot afford permanent labour. Havingpermanent labour gives Mr Booi a sense of securityand peace of mind, knowing that everythingis taken care of when he cannot be at hisfield. Most farmers make use of family labourbut do not pay for it. Mr Booi also makes use offamily labour, but pays for it, and to some extentpre-pays for it. Donations of farm produceto relatives and friends provide him with accessto willing workers, which is most needed to accomplishfarming activities such as weeding andharvesting.The most important livelihood outcomes forMr Booi’s household are cash and food. Hungeris not a problem at all in this household. Theycan afford three meals a day. The adequacy ofdiet in terms of quality is however another issuethat is beyond the investigation of this study.But the main source of vegetables is own productioneven though most other food items arepurchased.Social and institutionaldimensionsThe land tenure in ZIS is complicated and varied,with close relation to the history of the villagesthat make up the scheme. A bigger share of thescheme is located around Lenye and Burnshill villages.Mr Booi is a resident of Lenye village. Lenyeis located on what used to be white-owned89

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.90farms. When the whites left the area, the landwas taken by the state and registered under thetrust tenure system. Land under trust tenureconsists of formerly white-owned land situatedin proclaimed native areas. The land was eventuallymade available to people through theNative Trust and Land Acts. Hence the land occupiedin Lenye North and South is referred toas the State or Trust Land and the farmers fromLenye therefore do not have title deeds for theland they have access to.Mr Booi is also one of the few who have relativelysecured rights over land. When the schemewas established, the fields allocated to individualswere combined, and the owners of thesefields were made members of the scheme. Butthe labour force of the scheme included bothland owners and landless. When the farmerstook over, landless people were also interestedin farming. There was not enough arableland and so some surrounding range land wasbrought into the scheme for cultivation. Thisland had been commonage land, in that, historically,it did not have individual owners. MrBooi received his share of scheme land from thisrange land. Some of the original share-croppershave put in applications to reclaim the land andhave documentation of proof of ownership.Those ZIS farmers presently using this land livein fear, not knowing when original land ownersmight want their land back.The support for the scheme comes from varioussources. The Department of Agriculturesupplies farmers who are members of the MFPwith inputs at subsidised prices. Through thisprogramme, farmers also received free implementsand a tractor. Although Mr Booi is nolonger producing maize under the MFP, he isstill involved in butternut production under thescheme, and thus is still a member. Therefore, hebenefits from the input subsidy. The farmers atZIS also benefit from the MAFISA and CASP programmesin the form of loans and infrastructuregrants, respectively.Furthermore, Mr Booi has access to the extensionservices of the Department of Agriculture.However, the quality of service has gone frombad to worse, supposedly because of the introductionof the ‘ward system’, whereby the alreadylimited number of extension officers hasto serve an even larger area. This results in fewerand less regular visits. Fortunately, however, ZIShas a full-time manager who provides farmerswith advice.Mr Booi is a member of the Best ManagementPractices (BMP) project, run by the University ofFort Hare. Researchers sometimes conduct trialsin farmers’ fields, and farmers have to giveup land for these trials. Not many farmers arekeen to do so, but Mr Booi always cooperates.Unlike many other farmers, he is open to newideas and is always willing to learn new things.So, he benefits from the technical advice givenby researchers.The Department of Agriculture together withthe University of Fort Hare have provided marketsupport to ZIS. This support takes differentforms, including a specific effort to link farmerswith Pick ‘n Pay, providing training courses andarranging visits to formal markets in order to exposefarmers to how formal markets work.Gender, class and humandimensionsAlthough there are women farmers at ZIS, themajority are men. The wives of the male farmers,however, do participate in the scheme, but usuallyon a temporary basis, e.g. during weeding orharvesting times. As it is the case with communalareas, ownership of land at ZIS is in the hands ofmen. The few women farmers are either widowsor tenants. Although not intentional, men farmersbenefit more, and this is reinforced by a managementstructure composed mainly of men.In terms of class, Mr Booi classifies himself asan emerging farmer coming from a historicallydisadvantaged background. In terms of schooling,he passed standard five. However, when theZIS scheme was established in 1984, he receivedtraining in agronomic practices at Fort Cox College(a nearby agricultural college) for a periodof six weeks. Following this course, he wastrained to do book keeping at the Border Technikon(now Walter Sisulu University). However,he claims that most of his agricultural knowledgewas obtained from the Israelis who managedthe scheme in its early days.Perceptions of performanceAccording to the economic analysis of his mainenterprises, Mr Booi is makinga modest profitand not enough for him to purchase capital. Hisdream is to have transport of his own, as well asa tractor because the three scheme tractors inadequate(only two are in good condition as thethird one often breaks down). There are often

ResearchReportdelays in planting as farmers have to wait for thetractors to become available.Policy environmentSmall-scale farmers in irrigation schemes in theEastern Cape have benefited from a number ofpolicies aimed at the improving this sector in the1980s. However, most of these initiatives wereshort-lived due to financial or political reasons.During the homeland era, new irrigation schemeswere established with funding from South AfricanGovernment. Irrigation development duringthe independent homeland era was characterisedby modernisation, functional diversificationand centralisation of scheme management (VanAverbeke and Mohammed, 2006). Overhead irrigationsystems were used instead of surface irrigationin most schemes including ZIS. Also, theirrigators enjoyed benefits of subsidised inputs(including tractor services) and institutional supportservices (extension services) during this era.However, these were withdrawn for financialreasons.With political changes in the 1990s, attentionwas focussed on irrigation management transfer.The closing down of parastatal organisationssuch as Ulimocor left a vacuum and an effort wasmade to transfer the management to farmers.ConclusionThere are a number of factors that makes thecase of Mr Booi interesting:• he has secure property rights unlike mostof the other ZIS farmers. Most farmers haveaccess to land that belongs to others, whichthey access either through renting or borrowing.• he has arranged access to additional landon his own, and is not waiting for governmentand its Land Reform Programme.While most farmers at the scheme obtainmore land by borrowing or sharecropping,Mr Booi rents the land and pays cash. Withthis kind of arrangement, he has not hadproblems, because land owners appear toprefer to rent their land for cash insteadof a share of the produce, the amount ofwhich is uncertain.• his marketing strategy is interesting andmakes him one of the successful farmers. Heseeks out buyers and adheres to their specifications.He knows his limitations (e.g. lackof storage facilities) and decides to go forcontract farming in which he does not haveto store the produce.• he is a hard worker and always willing to trynew things.ReferencesBembridge, T. J., (1999) Guidelines forrehabilitation of small-scale farmer irrigationschemes in South Africa. WRC report No891/1/00, Water Research Commission,Pretoria, South Africa.Monde, N., C. Chiduza, M. O. Brutsch, P. N. S.Mnkeni, S. Mtshali, R. Dladla, A. T. Modi,B. E. Mthembu, I. Van Der Stoep, and J.Stevens, (2005) A Situation Analysis Reporton the Zanyokwe and Tugela Ferry IrrigationSchemes for the Water Research CommissionProject NrK5/1477.Monde, N., C. Chiduza, and A. Mushunje, (2008)A Socio-Economic Impact Assessment of theZanyokwe Irrigation Scheme, report for TheWater Research Commission Project NrK5/1477Van Averbeke W., C. K. M’marete, C. O. Igodan,and A. Belete, (1998) An investigation intofood plot production at irrigation schemesin the central Eastern Cape, Water ResearchCommission Report No: 719/1/98, Facultyof Agriculture and Agricultural and RuralDevelopment Research Institute, University ofFort Hare.Van Averbeke, W. and S. S. Mohamed, (2006)Smallholder irrigation schemes in SouthAfrica: past, present and future, Centrefor Organic and Smallholder Agriculture,Department of Crop Sciences, TshwaneUniversity of Technology, Pretoria.91

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.92

ResearchReport6 Rabula freehold farmers:two established middleclassfarming householdswith contrasting farming/livelihood strategiesLarry Field, Umhlaba Consulting GroupIntroductionRabula is a small rural traditional authority administrativearea within the Magisterial Districtof Keiskammahoek, now part of Ward 11 of theAmathlati Local Municipaly. Rabula is no morethan 40 kilometres from King Williams Town,easily accessed from the main tar road linkingKeiskammahoek and King Williams Town. Tothe north of Rabula is the town of Keiskammahoek,to the west the well known irrigation areaof Zanyokwe, to the east the wooded mountainslopes and forests of the Pirie area, and to thesouth the outskirts of Dimbaza.Rabula currently comprises a number of communaltenure villages, commonage lands, andprivately owned freehold farms (see Figure 6.1).The freehold farms are particularly interestingfor study for a number of reasons:• Firstly, these farmers come from a generationof family farmers. They have had occupationand ownership of their land forgenerations. In the two case studies one hashad occupation of the current land parcelfor nearly 30 years (but had occupation ofa nearby farm long before), while the otherfamily has had occupation and ownershipsince 1908.• Secondly, these examples reflect on blacksmallholder farmers who have historicallyacquired their land through their own financialmeans. This is a very different contextto households moving onto land post1994 as part the government’s subsidisedland redistribution programme.• Thirdly, these smallholders are interspersedwith communal (Trust) villages and sharedcommonage lands. As such they representa context which may emerge as the norm ifthe Communal Land Rights Act is applied tocommunal areas in the future.• Finally, it can be argued that these farmersare small independent smallholders, asperhaps one perceives the vision of agrariantransformation goals of the current (emerging)policy of government. These farmersown small farms with multiple land uses,and in independent landholdings; i.e. theyare not part of a state-initiated and organisedscheme.This case study attempts to explain the social,political and economic context within which thefreehold farmers have functioned and then explorethe circumstances of two freehold farmersin Rabula, namely Mr Tswengiwe and Mr Njemla.While these two farmers cannot be said to berepresentative of all farmers, their circumstancesdo reflect the realities of established freeholderfarmers in the area. The farmers were selecteddue to their involvement in the Rabula FarmersAssociation, and their continued attemptsto make a livelihood out of farming. The onefarmer, Mr Tsengiwe, is mainly a livestock farmer,but with cropping activities as well. He livespredominantly from his farming activities. Thesecond, Mr Njemla, has more substantial offfarmincome, and his approach is far more basedon a mix of many different types of activities onthe farm.93

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Figure 6.1: Map of Rabula villages showing farm boundaries94Unfortunately, none of the farmers were willingto go into detail in relation to their profitability,and the research parameters did not allow thetime to develop a more detailed picture of theeconomic aspects of the case studies. However,the case studies will show that the challengesthat the farmers face are multi-faceted, fromeconomic, technical, and social perspectives.These challenges are located not only in currenteconomic realities but also in the strong historicallegacy of how Rabula was shaped from colonialtimes, through apartheid, and finally howcurrent government policy is impacting on smallholderstoday.The historical context of landownership and land rights inRabulaRabula was established by the British colonialauthorities on land vacated during the FrontierWar of 1850-1853. Lots were demarcated andbecame available for purchase from 1865. Bothblacks and whites were allowed to acquire landin terms of British colonial laws. Land was originallysold as freehold, but later sold as quitrent.Records indicate that by the end of the nineteenthcentury 186 lots had been establishedin Rabula of which the majority had been purchasedby blacks (De Wet, 1995). At this stageRabula was characterised by individual land parcelsowned through freehold or quitrent, whilethe land owners also had user rights to commonageland.Land settlement initially existed almost exclusivelyon the farms, consisting of the land ownersand their ‘farm workers’, who were usually ina labour tenancy relationship. Over the years labourtenants began to settle on the commonageto gain more freedom from the land owners.Children of land owners, unable to secure theirown land, are also recorded as having movedonto the commonage. These people were effectively‘squatters’ and were known as such by thelandowners.In 1936 Rabula became a ‘released area’ in termsof the Native Trust and Lands Act (18 of 1936).Whites were no longer allowed to buy land inthe area and the South African Native Trust(SANT) began a process of buying up whitefarms. The government began a process of resettlingthe landless people residing on the commonageon the Trust farms, giving them householdplots and arable lands. Initially the emphasisof this betterment process was on establishingviable farmers on the Trust lands, but laterthe emphasis appears to have shifted to settlementneeds. However the betterment process

ResearchReportTable: 6.1: Summary of tenure typesTenure typeNumber (percentage)Freehold/quitrent Approximately 500 (60%)Trust areas 59 (7%)New residential areas (on Trust land) 237 (28%)Informal settlement on commonage Approximately 40 (5%)never completely removed all ‘squatters’ fromthe commonage. Research carried out by DeWet (1995) identified the following breakdownof households by tenure:Thus Rabula today is characterised by peoplewith different land rights histories, which formsthe basis for deeply rooted social tensions thatare still evident today. In the early years the landowners treated the landless as a subordinateclass of people. Landowner families tended tobe bigger, wealthier, and dominate importantsocial events and positions (De Wet, 1995). Thebetterment process however seems to have createdopportunities for those in labour tenancyrelationships with the provision of land rights forlandless families. De Wet notes that landownersappear to make greater use of own family forlabour in the post-Betterment period (1970s onwards).For this and a number of other reasons,Betterment in Rabula appears to have had a lessnegative impact than in many other areas of itsapplication.During the homeland period, landowners embracedthe opportunities provided by the newhomeland bureaucracy. These opportunities includedboth an extensive agricultural supportprogramme initiated by the Sebe Government,and employment opportunities in the bureaucracyfor those with education. However, in thepost-1994 breakdown of the land administrationsystem in the communal areas, tensionsbetween land owners and the landless / villageresidents was re-focused on the commonage,with land owners’ claims of exclusivity of rightsbeing largely ignored. Land owners also foundthemselves increasingly marginalised in terms ofstatus and influence within the community. Thenew government’s land reform programme, andother social and development benefits, have allbeen focused on the historically landless and resettledvillage groups. Black freehold land ownershave been largely ignored both in policy documentsand in local application of agriculturaldevelopment support.De Wet’s research turned up the following farminginformation in Rabula as at 1990:• Only one third of landowners used theirentire property. Cultivation levels, as an averageper hectare, appeared to be higherin the Trust areas than on the landownerfarms. This situation possibly reflects a lackof capital, support, and availability of labourfor landowners to make appropriateuse of their greater land assets.• However, landowners tended to investmore in livestock, which has greater statusand requires less intensive managementand labour inputs. Landowners had, onaverage, 7.85 cattle, 10.39 sheep and 11.04goats per household. In comparison, nonlandownershad, on average, 0.16 cattle, 0sheep and 5.0 goats per household.The natural resource baseThe Rabula area consists of the Rabula River valleyand three smaller valleys encircled by steephills, bordered by the foothills of the Amatholemountain range. The hills that border the Rabulaarea are covered in thick indigenous bush(Afromontane forest), while the lower slopesare covered in thicket and grasslands with sweetthorn. The eastern mountain and hill slopes areparticularly thick in indigenous forest as well ascultivated plantations (Kingwill, 2008).The altitude within the small Rabula area rangesbetween 500 metres and 800 metres above sealevel, although heights of up to 1400 metres arereached just to the east of Rabula villages.The climatic conditions recorded in the Keiskammahoekarea are shown in Table 6.2.The main water source for the area is the RabulaRiver and the smaller tributaries of the Gxuluraand the Gqubushe.95

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 6.2: Minimum and maximum temperatures andprecipitationJan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov DecMean min temp(Celsius)Mean max temp(Celsius)Mean precip.(mm)16 16 14 12 8 5 5 6 8 11 13 1530 29 20 18 14 11 10 13 16 18 25 2788 95 111 62 48 29 30 38 64 87 91 83Profile A: Mr TsengiweProfile of the farmerMr Mtobi Tsengiwe grew up on the farm andremembers working on the land as a school boy.As an adult he obtained employment in the Departmentof Agriculture as an extension officerin the Ciskei area. He eventually specialised in establishingagricultural co-operatives for the CiskeiDepartment of Agriculture, having receivedtraining in England for such activities. However,even while he worked as an extension officer, hecontinued to run the farm. Mr Tsengiwe is nowover 70 years old, having gone on pension in1996. He indicated he expects his son, who currentlyworks as an official in the Provincial Governmentin Bisho, to take over the farm uponhis death.Mr Tsengiwe’s history as a farmer is in manysenses not unusual for South Africa, but is certainlynot common for a black farmer in presentdaySouth Africa. Mr Tsengiwe is also ‘not unusual’as a commercial farmer in South Africa interms of personality, being strong willed andoutspoken on a range of problems and issuesfacing farmers.Despite his age Tsengiwe remains an active individualand an active farmer.Farm details and land useThe Tsengiwe family owns five portions of landin Rabula. One portion (farm 1439) is owned byIsaac Tsengiwe, Mtobi’s brother. Mtobi Tsengiweowns one portion in his own right (farm1410, comprising 16 hectares), and three portions(of farms 1440, 1441 and 1438, totalling 104 hectares)are owned in equal shares by Mtobi andhis three sisters. Most of this land has been inhis family’s name since 1908. In 1932 his fartherpurchased additional portions. The portion ofland owned by Tsengiwe’s brother is unoccupiedas this brother and his household have left thefarm.The major part of the farm is in the Lower Rabulaarea, past the villages of Lower Rabula in thevalley below the Ntsusa Forest. The gravel accessroad is in reasonable condition, and eventuallylinks Rabula with Zanyokwe. In addition, MrTsengiwe has access to the commonage land forhis livestock. However, the exact extent of theavailable commonage, and the utilisation of thecommonage by livestock owners, could not beobtained within the scope of this study.The separate portion of land (farm 1410) is only16 hectares in extent, and is located near themain tar road below the Trust village. However,this portion is not farmed at present. MrTsengiwe indicated that problems of squattersand theft prevent him from utilising this land.The utilised portions of his farm consist of grazinglands and arable lands. The main farm enterprisetoday is livestock, with the farming ofcattle, sheep and goats. Although Mr Tsengiweis unsure of the size of his arable lands, the sizewas estimated to be about 20 hectares. This landis farmed as dryland. About 3 to 4 hectares usedto be farmed under sprinkler irrigation until thepump was stolen. The dry land is mainly used forfodder for the livestock, with some commercialand home-consumption vegetable productiontaking place.Additionally, the farm has a small orchard withorange and pecan nut trees. Mr Tsengiwe alsokeeps chickens and pigs around the homestead.These are for home consumption, although hewill occasionally sell if approached by a memberof the community.96

ResearchReportInfrastructure and equipmentThe infrastructure on the farm can be summarisedas follows:• The main Tswengiwe homestead, includinggarages and numerous water tanks. Thehomestead is in good condition.• The homestead of Mr Tsengiwe’s brother,which is more traditional in nature (wattleand daub / rondaval construction) and is inaverage condition.• The homesteads, arable lands and farmboundaries are all fenced. The fencing isgenerally old but mostly still functional, althoughrequires frequent repairs.• A number of stock dams, fed by surface waterrun-off from the rains.The following equipment list was provided:• 2 old tractors (1 working, 1 in need of repair).• 3 disc ploughs• 1 planter• 1 disc harrow• 1 harrow• 1 cultivator (7 tooth)• 1 bakkie.The equipment is old but, except for the 1 tractor,in working condition.Mr Tsengiwe had a pump for irrigating about 4hectares, but this was stolen in 1993. He has notreplaced the pump, most likely due to his focuson investing in livestock farming for his income.The production systemLivestockUntil a few years ago, Mr Tsengiwe’s herd included120 goats and 80 sheep. However, he lostall of his sheep and the vast majority of his goatsto tick-related disease and is now attempting torebuild his herd. He has 30 goats and recentlypurchased a ram for R2000 from a commercialauction in Bedford. He currently also has 35 headof cattle.CroppingCrops planted in the past 12 months includewheat (1 hectare), maize, oats, and a range ofvegetables (potatoes, cabbage, pumpkin, onion,spinach, beans and peas). The maize and oatsare used for stock feed. The vegetables are usedfor a mix of commercial and home consumption.As of September 2008, Mr Tsengiwe had only 4rows of vegetables planted in one field, alongwith the wheat. He indicated he is waiting forthe rains, which usually come in October, beforeplanting any further.Field preparation is done by tractor, which isan important asset and needed in the community.However, Mr Tsengiwe does not hire outhis tractor, although he may occasionally do aneighbour a favour in ploughing their lands ifthe family is experiencing particular hardships.He used to be a member of the tractor associationin Rabula, but the association is no longeractive.Mr Tsengiwe has cut back on crop production.This is likely due to a number of factors, includingold age and Mr Tsengiwe’s limited marketingstrategies (see below). Another factor, whichMr Tsengiwe himself identifies, relate to labourproblems and the situation of the freeholdfarmers within the Rabula area. Mr Tsengiweis clearly reluctant to be reliant on labour fromthe Rabula area and expresses his unhappinesswith the lack of willingness of people from thevillages to work in agriculture. He indicated hispurchase of a planter for the wheat was a resultof his desire to be able to plant without labour.With his age he is obviously able to do less thanpreviously, hence it is understandable that productionon labour-intensive activities has beenreduced. For regular work Mr Tsengiwe has theassistance of members of his extended family.When he does use labour from the communityhe uses traditional methods of compensation,i.e. by providing food and beer for workers,along with a little monetary compensation. Heusually ‘employs’ about 15 people during harvestperiods.Mr Tsengiwe indicated that although small, croptheft does occur. Bigger problems in terms of‘theft’ occur with troops of monkeys raiding hisfields.97

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.WheatAlong with other farmers he received assistancefrom the Department of Agriculture through theMassive Food Campaign in 2006, receiving seedand fertiliser. However, he indicated that thissupport was not a result of active governmentinitiative, but only after the Rabula Farmers Associationhad approached the Department andshown the Department that they were alreadyplanting wheat on their farms. No assistance wasgranted beyond the 2006 supplies.Assistance from the Department ofAgricultureBesides the transitory assistance with the wheatfarming, Mr Tswengiwe has received no assistanceand has limited contact with extensionofficers. His perspective on the Department’sextension services since the integration of theCiskei Department of Agriculture into a singleDepartment under Bisho is that the officers havebecome ‘desk clerks’ who don’t know how tofarm.The Rabula Farmers Association (representingfreehold farmers) has asked for fencing for arablelands, fencing for the commonage (whichis disputed in terms of rights), a tractor for thefarmers in the area, and machinery for threshingand milling of wheat. They have also asked forimproved control over the commonage to preventthe informal expansion of housing onto thecommonage. To date this support has not beenforthcoming.MarketingLivestockOxen are sold to traders who visit the area.Most sales though are to local households forceremonial needs. A large livestock unit is soldfor between R3500 and R4500 per animal. Mr Tswengiweis not selling any goats at present, butwhen his herd was at its optimum size (given at120) he was selling up to 60 goats per annum.He does not currently participate in the stocksale days that take place at Keiskammahoek.There used to be stock sale facilities in Rabuladuring the homeland days, but this has longsince stopped and the facilities have been vandalised.VegetablesMr Tsengiwe previously sold vegetables in Stutterheimand King Williams Town, but presentlyappears to be less interested in, or able to copewith, regional marketing than in the past. Hiscurrent approach to marketing involves drivinghis loaded bakkie to town to sell to retailers, butwithout prior arrangements or negotiations. Hisexperience has understandably been increasinglyunsatisfactory in terms of prices offered.On a recent trip to King Williams Town in February2008, he returned home with his full bakkieload of pumpkins, refusing to sell at the pricesoffered.He also used to sell to hawkers in Keiskammahoek.However, he became dissatisfied withthese arrangements as hawkers kept trying tonegotiate credit with him. Mr Tsengiwe refusesto sell any produce on credit, even within Rabula,citing past experience of such arrangementsresulting in financial losses as people default ontheir debts.The following Marketing information per croptype is shown in Table 6.3.Profile B: Mr NjemlaHistorical backgroundMr Makuza Njemla owns a 14 hectare farm inupper Rabula near the village of Magcumeni.Table 6.3: Overview of marketing information per cropCrop typePumpkinsPotatoesMaizePrice informationOffered R2 per pumpkin by small retailers in February 2008. Declined to sell and ismostly utilising the crop for home consumption.Good demand, a 10 kg pocket is sold for between R10 and R15 locally.Sold in 50 kg bags or smaller tins. He however has not sold for a while as he utilises themaize as stock feed. He estimates a price of R120 per bag would be attainable.98The wheat is sold to the mill in Fort Jackson (East London).

ResearchReportThe family took ownership of the farm in 1980as part of a land swop organised by the Ciskeigovernment. The Njemlas had land (farm 1431)that was wanted for forestry development, andthe current farm was vacant, having been takenover from the previous white land owner in1966. The Njemla family was therefore persuadedto move as part of a land swop. Although thefarm is legally owned by Mr Njemla, the land isconsidered a family asset, and both his brotherand his sister have homesteads on the farm.The white family that previously owned the farmwas the Cookes. During their period of ownership,the Cookes farmed oranges using an irrigationsystem they established based on accessto an off-farm river which fed a holding damabove the land. This dam is still evident today.The Cookes also ran a small farm shop servicingthe neighbouring village, which was establishedfrom 1938 onwards as Hamans 6, in terms of theBetterment processes.The Cookes left in 1966 after being bought outby the SANT in terms of the 1936 Native Trustand Land Act. When the Cookes left, the Departmentof Agriculture removed all the citrus treesand the land was left vacant from 1966 until1980, during which it was used as commonage,presumably for the new Trust village. During thisperiod the property was extensively vandalisedand the buildings, irrigation and other infrastructuredestroyed.The only assistance given to the Njemla’s in reestablishingthe farm was from the Departmentof Agriculture, which bulldozed the thorn treesout of the arable lands so the lands could beplanted once more.Profile of the farmerMr Njemla is a part-time farmer. His primary occupationwas as a teacher, following which hebecame a school principal. During this period heran the farm with the help of a foreman. However,when Mr Njemla retired at the age of 65,he carried on farming without a foreman.Mr Njemla is now 73 years old. As he has gottenolder, he has cut back on his farming, and estimatesthat he currently spends no more than 20hours per week on farming. He indicated that hewould be willing to lease out the arable lands ifthere was a serious offer. When he dies, the familywould select a new family member to run thefarm. However, the farm will never be sold as itis the family’s home.The Njemla family could be considered middleclass. Both Mr Njemla and his wife were employedby the state and now they receive governmentpensions. His brother and sister alsoreceive pensions. He has four daughters, two ofwhom are earning salaries (one is employed ingovernment), and the other two are engaged inad hoc or temporary employment activities.Farm details and land usesMr Njemla is best understood as a smallholderengaging in mixed income generating practices,all of which contribute to the total household income.These household income sources include:• Employment / pension• Crop production (vegetables and wheat)• Tractor services (ploughing and cartage)• Milling (grinding maize for other farmers/villagers).• Chickens (selling eggs and meat)• Ad hoc cattle sales.The 14 hectare farm has about 6 hectares of arableland. The lands are farmed as dryland. Theonly stream on the farm is insufficient to supportirrigation, and the previous (off-farm) irrigationnetwork could not be re-established due to anumber of factors, including costs, tensions withthe villagers around water use, and possible vandalismor theft.Besides the cropping, Mr Njemla keeps a smallnumber of cattle for his family use. The cattleare not for commercial purposes, although ananimal may occasionally be sold to a local familyfor ceremonial needs. Besides the small amountof grazing lands on the farm, he has access tothe commonage lands for grazing.Infrastructure and equipmentThe farm has three homestead areas for the twobrothers and sister. The homesteads are largeand in good condition, reflecting significant investment.Even for the residential uses, waterremains a problem. Besides the many rain tanks,Mr Njemla has a water tank on a trailer which hefills from the river.99

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Besides the residential buildings, there is a zincand pole construction garage facility in poorcondition, and there is a self-built chicken houseand pig sty.Mr Njemla has significant ploughing equipment.This includes four tractors, all purchased secondhand.Three of the tractors are still in use. Thefourth tractor no longer works, but was alreadyin poor condition when purchased. The threefunctioning tractors are all Massy Fergusons, includingtwo 240s (one 1992 and one 2000 model),and a 2004 290.The MF 290 was purchased for an amount ofR69 000. Mr Njemla paid R15 000 in cash fromhis savings, and took a Land Bank loan for theremaining amount of R54 000. This loan was repaidwithin the three-year loan period.Besides the tractors the following equipment isavailable:• 3 ploughs (all in good condition)• 1 disc harrow (in poor condition)• 1 disc plough (not in working condition)• 1 trailer• 1 hammer mill (old but in working condition).The production system andmarketingTractor servicesAlthough not an income derived directly fromfarming his family’s own land, the tractor servicesare perhaps the most lucrative income generatingactivity for Mr Njemla. His services appearto be in high demand, and he is apparently theonly service provider residing in Rabula.Ploughing is charged at R450 per hectare, whichappears to be an accepted rate for the area. MrNjemla only ploughs in the Rabula area, and refusesto service needs beyond this. For carting ofwood he charges R200 a trailer load, irrespectiveof the actual distances travelled within Rabula.Mr Njemla either drives the tractors himself oruses the services of a driver when necessary. Thetractors are serviced by a part-time mechanicfrom Keiskammahoek. 14Vegetable productionVegetables planted include: maize, potatoes, tomatoes,beans, pumpkins, cabbage, spinach andpeas. At least half of what is planted is utilisedfor home consumption, although this dependson amounts planted and harvested. The maizeis also used as feed for the chickens and pigs,although a portion is usually sold.Since going on pension, Mr Njemla no longeruses the services of a foreman for his crops. Atthe beginning of a season he has no specificplans as to what to plant. He will first gauge therains and then decide on what to plant and theappropriate quantities. All supplies are obtainedfrom Umthiza in Keiskammahoek.Those vegetables that are sold are sold off-farmto local villagers. This is mainly because thequantities being sold are fairly small.Prices achieved in the recent past are shown inTable 6.4.LivestockMr Njemla currently has a herd of 20 cattle. Aherder is employed to look after the cattle. Interestingly,the herder is from Lesotho and nota local person. The herder is given accommodation,food and a very small wage.No small stock are kept due to problems withpredators living in the forest, such as lynx andwild pigs.14 According to Mr Njemla,this man’s situation reflects thecollapse of the services fromthe Department of Agriculture.This mechanic is employed bythe Department of Agriculture.Within the Ciskei homelandperiod he was employed as amechanic, but as no such postswere allocated to Keiskammahoek,he is now employed asa watchman and does vehiclerepairs in his spare time.100Table 6.4: Prices (2008) received per cropCropPrice informationPotatoesR20 per pocketTomatoesR4 to R6 per dish (depending on the size of the dish)CabbagesR7 to R8 per headSpinachR3 to R5 per bunch

ResearchReportPoultryMr Njemla buys batches of 50 chicks at the ageof 4 days, from a nearby white farmer. He growsthe chickens until 3 to 4 months old, at whichstage he sells the cocks for meat and keeps thehens for egg production. Once the hens becometoo old for good egg production he sells thesefor meat as well.Eggs are consumed by the family, and whateveris surplus is sold locally.MillingMr Njemla uses the hammer mill to grind maizeand wheat for home consumption and as an additionalway to earn income. He charges R20 forgrinding a 50 kilogram bag of maize. The levelof demand for this service is dependent on howgood the maize crop is in the area. As the mill ispowered by a tractor, there are diesel costs associatedwith the milling operation.ConclusionsThe two case studies reveal interesting differencesas well as similarities. In terms of differences,the farms are considerably different insize, offering very different economic opportunities.The smaller farm (14 hectares) is such thatthe Njemla’s middle class lifestyle is crucially dependenton agri-services (such as the tractor andmilling services) and non-farm income, whilethe larger farm (100 hectares) is such that theTsengiwes are far more focused on traditionalland-based farming activities. The other noticeabledifference relates to the farmers themselves:where Mr Njemla appears to have integrated hiseconomic activities with the needs of the localcommunity, Mr Tsengiwe has largely made hisactivities independent of the wider community.This situation may be partially personality based,and partially related to the different enterpriseorientations of their farms.In terms of similarities both case studies reflectedthe following situations:• Both farmers have reasonable non-farmbased income sources (employment andthen retirement pensions).• There is evidence that household residencefor the wider family remains an importantcomponent in the utilisation of the farm(i.e. the land is not just a market commodity).This family-based understandingof ownership of the land is also the basisfor succession of one farmer to the next(though whether succession of farming actuallytakes place remains to be seen and issomewhat doubtful).• Both farmers have made considerable personalfinancial investment into their farmingoperations without any governmentassistance (e.g. tractors, fencing, breedingstock, etc.).• Interestingly, neither farmer was preparedto invest in irrigation, preferring to focuson other enterprise opportunities. This maybe the result of the cost of irrigation investment,but also appears to be related toother factors which could bring the farmersinto difficult social negotiations, especiallyover water and labour. This meant that, althoughdryland cropping was practiced, itwas regarded as too risky to constitute theprimary enterprise.• Indeed, both case studies indicated problemswith labour. While Mr Tsengiwe indicatedthis directly, there is indirect evidenceto the same effect from Mr Njemla’s case,for example the employment of a foreignerand lack of any real other employment onthe farm. Clearly the social context of smallholders(including and perhaps especially‘freeholders’) located within a context ofcommunal land / resources, is important.• Both farmers indicated that they receive nostate assistance, either in the form of grantsor extension support. It is also noteworthythat the nature of assistance that farmersare seeking is different to that of the groupbasedprojects. The individual farmers arefirstly seeking support in developing theirenabling environment (roads, fencing ofthe commonage and along the roads, managementof the commonage); and secondlyassistance in equipment / support that canbe pooled for their operations (shared millingand tractor equipment under the auspicesof the Farmers Association).• In the same vein, the support that wasbriefly received in the form of subsidisedseeds and fertilisers for the wheat farming,appeared to be welcome, but was not pri-101

Strategies to support South African smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.mary on the list of needs considered. Thisis probably because the farmers recognisethat without the milling infrastructure theplanting has more limited financial opportunities.Furthermore, the farmers engagein a diverse range of cropping types, andany ‘massive’ food mono-crop focus runscounter to their diversification strategies.In conclusion, it is also important to note thatboth farmers are over 70 years old. However,with adaptations to their farming practices theyare both still active and able to generate an incomeout of their farms.References and sourcesInterviews:Secondary material:De Wet C: (1995) Moving Together DriftingApart, Witwatersrand University Press.Kingwill R (2008) Rabula: Patterns of LandOwnership, in Parts and Parcels: Landadministration in South Africa andthe disjuncture between formal landmanagement system and customary andoffregister systems, draft chapter for doctoralthesis, University of Western Cape.Documentation:Deedsweb Enquiry Farms 1360, 1410, 1438, 1440,1441, 1439Census 2001 Stats for Rabula enumerator areasMr Makuza Njemla (farmer).Mr Mthobi Tsengiwe (farmer)Rosalie Kingwill (researcher)102

ResearchReport7 Phakamani MawethuDevelopment Trust,Stutterheim: an emergingcommercial farming projectPatrick Masika, Agricultural and Rural DevelopmentResearch Institute (ARDRI), University of Fort HareIntroductionThe Phakamani Mawethu Development Trustproject (Figure 7.1) is situated in Bolo, an areabordering Mgwali village in Amahlathi LocalMunicipality. The nearest town is Stutterheim,which is about 28 kilometres away along a dirtroad that follows the perimeter fence of theDohne Agricultural Technology Transfer Institute.The members of the project come fromMgwali Village, which was established in 1873.At the turn of the century, its population greatlyincreased due to the eviction of farm workersfrom surrounding white-owned farms. Mgwaliwas declared a ‘black spot’ in the 1960s and thecommunity was faced with relocation to Frankfortin the former Ciskei, which they resisted(Border Rural Committee, 1998).This case study presents a profile of a projectthat is locally considered to be very successful.Considering the project members’ backgroundof having worked on white-owned farms, theyhad the urge to own a farm to generate an incomeand also provide employment to others.Historical perspective1998-2000In 1998 the owner of the farm Renan, Mr RodBuchler, was shot and killed. This was during atime when there was a wave of farm murders inthe region. After his funeral, his family decidedto sell the farm because of their sense of insecurity.They gave the first option to buy the farmto their four farm workers. The workers mobi-Figure 7.1: Panoramic view of the project farm103

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.104lised others from the village of Mgwali, basedon work ethic and trustworthiness. Eventually,they formed a group of 21 people in order forma large enough applicant group to raise the necessaryfunds. At the time, they were each eligiblefor a Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant ofR16 000, meaning the group would be able tocommand a total of R336 000. The farm was initiallypriced at R600 000, but through negotiations,it was reduced to R400 000. In the end, thegroup was awarded a total grant by the Departmentof Land Affairs of R328 500 and secured aloan of R71 500. Transfer of the land took placein February 2000.2000In the process of buying the farm, a constitutionand a business plan were crafted by an attorneyin Stutterheim. The same attorney processed thetransfer and registration of the farm on behalfof the previous owner. The project memberswere advised to form a trust, which was ultimatelyregistered in the year 2000. In order toget commitment from the 21 people who hadexpressed interest to be part of the project, eachmember was required to contribute a once-offjoining fee of R250, a cow and a monthly fee ofR50 per person. This was done in order to raisefunds to start operating the farm. However, becauseof these requirements, ultimately only 13members were able to contribute as requiredand thus were the active members. Recently,one of the members passed-on, leaving 12 activemembers. On selling the farm the previous ownerbought 2000 day old chicks, together with thenecessary drinkers, feeders, heater (gas and electric)and abattoir equipment (stunner, plucker,bleeder) to kick-start the farming enterprise ofthe ‘new farmers’. The new owners had to buyfeed from their own funds. As it was the firsttime they kept broiler chickens on their own,they lost more than a tenth of them.2002This was a period when job creation was promotedby Cosatu, and a few years after thelaunch of the Job Creation Trust, administeredby the Development Bank of Southern Africaand funded by money donated by workers. Themanagement team of Phakamani Mawethu DevelopmentTrust approached the DBSA to securea loan. When the project was assessed it qualifiedfor R1.5 million as a soft loan and R300 000as a grant, so they applied for R1.8 million.2003DBSA approved the amount of R1.8 millionwhich was used to buy a second-hand tractorand various implements, as well as cattle, goats,10 000 broiler chicks, feed, abattoir equipment,and office equipment. Everything went well inthat year; the group even employed 15 internsfrom the community to assist in the abattoir andin weeding the fields.2004The group formally launched the project wherean ox was slaughtered (equivalent to R4500)and 10 sheep that cost R500 each. Among thosewho attended were delegates from COSATU andLand Affairs. The project used part of the moneythey got from DBSA to organise the launch withthe understanding that the funds would be refunded.Unfortunately, the money was neverrefunded.2005This is the year when there was an outbreak ofNewcastle disease among chicken farms acrossthe Eastern Cape. The project also was badlyaffected, with the loss of 2000 chickens in onehouse and 5000 overall; this resulted in a loss ofclose to R30 000. The poor condition of the poultryhouses contributed to the occurrence andspread of the disease. Wild birds, which are carriersof this disease, have access to the feed andwater because the poultry houses are not birdproof.The project was granted a loan of R100000 from Uvimba Bank. The project was ableto re-stock with day-old chicks, 2000 every fortnight.The same year, Eskom gave the project agrant of R300 000, which was used in the buildingof additional poultry shelters. Unfortunately,the contractor who built the shelters did not doa good job because the floor started chipping afew weeks after completion. In addition the sailsthat were provided were of a poor quality suchthat they are already torn. The project did nothave a say in the selection of the contractor, butdepended on who the funder had decided on.2006This was the year when there was a shortage ofchickens in the country due to the country-wideNewcastle disease in 2005. As a result the parentstock used in the production of day-old chickswas destroyed. So farmers could only buy 200chicks at a time. The project continued stockingabout 500 in order to supply their customers.

ResearchReport2007This is when the project had a problem with theabattoir. It was inspected by inspectors from EastLondon who found that it was not up to standard.For example, there was no ceiling and therewere holes in the cement floor.2008The group secured support for getting a newand improved abattoir with a bigger capacityand ability to slaughter both chickens and otheranimals. It is funded by the National Departmentof Agriculture for an amount of R500 000. Thechicken shelters will also be improved.ManagementBefore starting the project, the group selectedoffice bearers based on previous experiences.The positions were Chairperson, Deputy, Secretary,Vice Secretary and Treasurer. The managementteam was sent for training and also theperson who was tasked to run the animal productionwas sent for technical training at FortCox College of Agriculture. Further training wasoffered through the Department of Labour onvegetable, poultry, and pig production and fencing.A great concern is the lack of youth involvementin the project. When the project has work, theproject employs casual workers who are mostlyyouth. A problem is that they reportedly wantpayment on a daily basis and do not want towork long hours. However, each of the membershas to include one of their children in their willsto ensure the continuity of the project.At the time of registration there were 21 members,but as a result of the reduction of members,they would like to change from a Trustto another entity because it is a requirementof their registration that they be 21 in number.Their fear is that if they were to bring in newmembers in order to reach the stipulated number,they might in the process bring in peoplewho could turn out to be disruptive to the project.Since the original members contributed acow as one of the criteria of joining, this criterionhas remained in place for new membership.It id felt that f a person is willing to contributethe cow it is an indication of their seriousnessabout the project.Another approach they have decided on is thatthe married members of the project can includetheir spouses as memebers rather than introducingtotally new individuals to the project.Natural and physicalresourcesThe farm comprises a total of 515 hectares, ofwhich 30 hectares are arable with approximately10 hectares of irrigable land. Soil tests were conductedby the extension officers from the Stutterheimoffice to determine suitable crops to begrown on the farm. Rain comes in mid-Septemberand farmers grow vegetables, potatoes andmaize.There are a total of five chicken houses, butas already mentioned, two suffered from poorworkmanship and are in unsatisfactory condition.The farmers converted one of the shedsthat was previously used as a shearing shed intoa poultry shelter, which stocks 2000 birds. Theother two buildings are rondavels, each with capacityto house 1000 chickens. Another buildingthat is located close to the entrance of the farmhas a capacity to house 3000 chickens. Several ofthe houses on the farm will have to be moved toensure that the farm conforms to the requirementsof good abattoir practice, where there isa clean area and a dirty area.Each of the houses is fitted with feeders, drinkersand all are wired with electricity which isused for lighting and heat for the chicks.The farm has a relatively new fence which wasprovided by the Department of Agriculture in2006. The project also has a 3-ton Toyota truckthat was funded by Shell in 2005. The project hasstock dams used to water the animals. Water toirrigate the crops is from a borehole that uses anelectric pump.Production systemsThe project is involved in both livestock and cropproduction.The group is involved in the production of threebreeds of beef cattle, namely Beefmaster, Brahman,and Nguni. Their aim is to produce weanerswhich tend to fetch relatively high prices atthe auctions compared to older animals. At thetime of conducting the fieldwork, there were120 cows and 3 bulls. Cattle are dipped weekly insummer and fortnightly in winter.The project also raises goats, especially the Boergoatbreed. Goats are dipped only when they105

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.have lice, mites or when there is a high incidenceof limping. At the time of conducting the fieldworkthere were 80 goats.Kraal manure from both the goat flock and thecattle herd is used as fertiliser, either on its own(especially for fields planted to a single crop)or in conjunction with chemical fertiliser. Thislowers costs for fertiliser, but at the same timeproject members report a reduction in yields.The project also keeps pigs. In 2003 they boughtfour sows and one boar; in 2004 they sold about24 piglets at R150 each. In 2006, there was widespreadswine fever, which resulted in many communitieslosing their pigs, and as a consequencegovernment introduced a process of 100% terminationof pigs in some areas. Although theproject farm did not experience the disease,they had decided to reduce numbers; at thetime of conducting fieldwork, there were onlytwo sows and the one boar. This reduction waspartly a precaution and partly in response to theproject’s unrelated cash flow problems (i.e. dueto the closing of the chicken abattoir), as pigsare expensive to feed.The project produces broiler chickens which theyraise from day-old chicks. They use a deep littersystem using wood shavings as bedding. Withgood feeding and management it takes approximately6 weeks for a broiler chick to reach marketweight. At the end of a production cycle thelitter, which is by then mixed with the chickendroppings, is used as fertiliser, but also reportedlyfed to the ruminants. The droppings are asource of non-protein nitrogen which is utilisedby ruminant animals in their digestion. At thetime of conducting the filed work, the broilerenterprise had been suspended because of theclosure of the chicken abattoir, though why thegroup did not figure out a way of marketing itsbroilers to someone else’s abattoir is unclear. Infull operation the project used to stock close on2000 chickens per week.In 2005 the Department of Agriculture providedfertiliser to the project; however the farmers hadto buy their own seeds. In addition the Departmentalso provided the farmers with veterinaryproducts for their chickens.In the beginning, before they had cattle, twoprivate farmers leased some of the project landat R20/month per cow. In fact the project’s firstbakkie was obtained through an exchange arrangementwhereby one of the neighbouringwhite farmers paid in-kind for cattle grazingwith a bakkie.At present, each of the project members keepstheir own animals on the farm, but separatelyfrom the project animals. Pressure on grazingresources is contained by practising rotationalresting.ChallengesTheft is starting to be a problem, which is attributedto unemployment in the area exacerbatedby hard economic times. At the time of conductingthis case study, thieves had broken into thechicken houses three times. And because of thefear of theft, the project does not keep sheep,because they are easily stolen.The project bought a second-hand tractor, whichhas been giving the group problems (Figure 7.2).As a result it is used for light duties only.Economic aspectsThe project uses a range of marketing strategies.They sell locally directly to Spaza shops, but inother instances they transport their broilers tothe former Transkei, Alice, Middledrift, Whittlesea,East London, to a poultry packing company,and even to KFC fast food outlet in Stutterheim.Their chicken marketing strategy has evolvedgreatly since they began; in fact, they sold theirfirst batch of chickens in 2000 to the brother ofthe late former owner of the farm, largely owingto the fact that they did not know what todo with them. They also sold some of their broilersin the village of Mgwali.During the time when they produced chickens,they would earn a profit of about R800 permonth. But as mentioned above, when they werestopped from slaughtering chickens in the abattoir,they stopped keeping chickens. High chickenmortalities also eroded the project’s funds.The project is now dependent on the goats andcattle, which they sell in order to service theirloans. As a result of cash flow problems, theyscaled down on the use of electricity to pumpwater and thus cannot irrigate the crops.Cattle are sold at auctions when they are 18months old, which results in higher prices comparedto mature cattle. Cattle are only sold whenthe project has to pay loan instalments. This is atemporary measure to ensure they do not fallbehind with the repayment of their debts. Goats106

ResearchReportFigure 7.2: The project’s tractorare mainly sold on the farm, especially duringJune and December which is when traditionalceremonies take place.Sows are kept to produce piglets, which are soldoff at R150 each. Ultimately the mature sowsare slaughtered and the meat sold amongst theproject members and the remainder sold to thecommunity of Mgwali.Over the years the project has managed to establishand produce profitably from various enterprises,as detailed in Tables 7.1 through 7.5.Of interest to note is the major contribution thebroiler enterprise had made to the income ofthe project. This enterprise was possible becauseof easy access to finance, but now that the broilerenterprise is temporarily grounded, the membersdo not receive any wages and discipline isrequired and practised to pay outstanding loans.The production cycle for broiler chickens is 6weeks, following which the houses have to becleaned, disinfected and left standing for a weekor so. Overall it takes two months to restock inthe same house. Considering that the projectstocked 2000 day-old chicks on a weekly basis,using 4 houses, they would stock 8000 chickensin a period of 4 weeks. There would be 4 othercycles of this nature, giving a total of 32 000chickens produced in a year. Assuming an industryacceptable mortality level of 5% (1600 chickens),and the number of chickens donated toeach member at the end of each cycle (total of192), the number sold would be 30 208 chickens.As previously indicated, during the period whenthe project kept chickens, the members receiveda monthly wage of R800. Assuming that it wasover the whole 12 months, this would come to atotal of R115 200.Farming expenses for broilers include wages for12 members for a year R115 200. Farming expensesfor livestock were not accessible, but they shouldbe minimal and include dipping and treatmentcosts. Although the gross income from livestockseems to be on the lower side, it should be rememberedthat the project sells livestock onlyto pay the instalments on bank loans. The grossincome does not include the produce that theproject members receive in-kind.Participation in other sections ofagricultural commodity chainsThe project engages in various activities of valueaddition, mainly slaughtering and packaging ofvarious livestock products, and milling of maizeinto maize meal for household use. Plans areunderway to plant peach trees facilitated by a107

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 7.1: Purchased inputs – crop-related (2008)InputHow oftenpurchasedAmount purchasedCost(Rand)Where purchasedSeeds/ seedlingsCabbageSpinachPotatoesMaizeJuneJuneEnd AugustEnd August50 000 seedlings5000 seedlings10 Kg x 70 pockets25 Kg x 4 seed6 50055011 2003 000Umthiza StutterheimUmthiza StutterheimUmthiza StutterheimUmthiza StutterheimFertiliser, chemical2:2:3 or 3:4:3 July – August 50 Kg x 20 bags 3 700 Farmarama, East LondonLAN50 Kg x 15 bags 1 500Fertiliser, organic Own kraal 3 cubic metres/ 50 ha FreeHerbicide Seasonally 2 480PesticideFolicur 250 EWSeasonally Donation Donation Department ofAgricultureDieselDieselMaintenanceMillingElectricity to irrigatecropsDaily ifploughingEvery 3 dayscartingWhennecessaryWhenevernecessaryR600 x 24 days 14 400 StutterheimR300 x 10 days 3 000Done by members Free Project members30 litres of fuel atR10/ litre300 StutterheimMonthly 1 500 EskomTotal 41 080Table 7.2: Purchased inputs – broiler related (2008)Input How often purchased AmountpurchasedCost (Rand)Where purchasedDay-old-chicks Used to stock every 2weeks32 000 64 000 IQP East LondonFeedPhase 1Phase 2Phase 3Vet productsTerramycin pwdrNewcastle DivacGumboro vacElectricity(lighting, heating,pumping water)BeddingAt the beginning of acycleAt beginning of cycleBeginning of cycleBeginning of cycle(50 Kg bags)192640448500 g x 12832 vials32 vials28 41680 64047 04019 2001 2801 216Epol, BerlinUmthiza at timesUmthizaUmthizaUmthizaMonthly 64 000 EskomStutterheim5 bales (eachabout 50 Kgbag x 6FreeTotal 305 792Rance timber108

ResearchReportTable 7.3: Revenue from crops (2008)Type of crop Quantities Price (Rand) Revenue (Rand)Potatoes 10 Kg x 750 bags 20 15 000Cabbages 40 500 heads 2 90 000Spinach 10 000 bunches 2 20 000Maize 250 x 50 Kg bags 100 25 000Total 150 000Table 7.4: Changes in stock and revenue generated (2008)AdultfemalesRevenue(Rand)AdultmalesRevenue(Rand)Non-adultsRevenue(Rand)Cattle current 93 4 33Sold within past 12monthsSlaughtered forfuneral1 bull 6 000 8 units 20 0001 oxGoats – current 60 1 5 (kiddingtime)Sold 12 monthsago7 4 900 6 4 200Slaughtered 1 ( R600)Pigs – current 2 1 -Pigs as of 12months ago4 1 16 2 400Poultry sold 12months agoSlaughtered30 208 @R251 permemberat end ofproductioncycle755 200Total 760 100 10 200 22 400Table 7.5: Net farming profits of different enterprises (2008)Crops (R) Livestock (R) Broilers (R)Gross income 150 000 37 500 755 200Farming expenses 41 080 - 420 992Net farming profit 108 920 37 500 334 208109

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.stakeholder from Paarl who is funding the seedlings.The project members are to be trained inthe processing of fruit into various products likejam.Livelihood significanceIt is apparent that the Phakamani Mawethu DevelopmentTrust project has had a positive impacton the livelihoods of the members. Membersderive both income and food. In addition,members are provided with alternative grazingfor their animals. Seasonal workers also derive asource of income from the project. The projectprovides a sense of belonging for the members,especially important since most of the membersof pensioners.Social and institutionaldimensionsThe Phakamani Mawethu Development Trust hasa good relationship with Mgwali Village whichborders the farm where this project is located.All the project members are from that villageand the project also provides seasonal jobs forsome people from the village. In addition, theproject farm provides grazing for the members’livestock, especially in times of droughts.Since the project’s initiation, several institutionshave provided support in the form of funds,training, infrastructure development, and inputs.Table 7.6 shows the type of support andthe respective institutions responsible for eachinput.Gender, class and humandimensionsThe management of the project is by men. Themembership profile indicates the predominanceof older people and especially men. The membershave identified their age to be a big challengein the sustainability and thus the futureof the project. The strategy they have adoptedis for each member of the project to enrol twoyounger people from their families to participatein the project.Out of the 12 members, there are only threewomen. These women tend to be responsiblefor carrying out relatively light tasks. They areresponsible for the cleaning of the compoundand removing grains from the cobs.Generally the education level of the members isvery low, (many of the people in Mgwali werepreviously farm workers who were retrenched).The exception is two people in the managementof the project who have tertiary education qualifications.Despite the low level of formal education,members have the technical skills necessaryfor the enterprise or activity they are responsiblefor. Relevant skills were acquired through trainingoffered to the group, but also from theirprevious places of work on farms.Perceptions of performanceAnalysis shows that the profits of this projectare good, especially from the broiler enterprise.Focus was mainly on the broiler enterprise, andwhen production was halted all the other enterpriseswere affected negatively. Irrigation of thevegetables was not possible due to the decisionto rationalise in order to reduce the electricitybill.The project has established a good quality herdof cattle and flock of goats that match commerciallivestock herds and flocks. The adoption ofstandard production practices, like disease preventionin the form of vaccination scheduling,strict tick and worm control measures, and theselling yearlings brings in higher practices.Table 7.6: Institutions and types of support offered tothe farmType of supportFunding (loansand grants)InfrastructureTrainingVehicle (3 ton)InputsInstitution(s)Department of Land Affairs, Land Bank, Development Bank of Southern Africa,Uvimba Bank, Eskom, National Lotteries, National Department of AgricultureNational Department of AgricultureFort Cox College of Agriculture and Forestry, AgriSetaShellEC Department of Agriculture110

ResearchReportFigure 7.3: Some members of the projectThe project has been able to pay its loans as required.This is due to good management basedon experience of running projects of this natureand a cohesive and supportive membership.Despite these achievements, the fact that themembers go for long periods without any incomemay eventually lead to loss of morale. Thisis also why youth are not interested who, accordingto members, want to receive immediatepayment for work.Some machinery, notably the tractor, will needto be replaced, although it is still used for lighttasks like carting.Success is a subjective concept. From an outsider’sview, one notes that despite the severalgrants and support from various stakeholders,there is a shortage of cash flow. This could beexplained mainly by failure of the broiler project.Despite setbacks and challenges, the commitmentof all project members has helped tokeep this project together. In addition, technicalability to run the enterprise with minimal outsideintervention is admirable.The ability to establish a market, to dispose ofall produce is one of the fundamentals of successand one the project has complied with well.The ability to fulfil the project’s financial commitmentsto the repayment of loans is anotherindicator of success.Environmental aspectsThe Phakamani Mawethu Development Trusthas incorporated an environmental protectioncomponent in their operation. One such practiceis the use of organic manure from their cattle,goats and broiler enterprises, which results inthe reduction of synthetic fertiliser use in cropproduction. Organic manure also increases thewater retention abilities of soil that results in thereduction of water loss to the atmosphere. Ultimatelyless water will be required for irrigation.The project uses a lot of herbicides in the effortto control weeds. These may impact negativelyon to the soil and the water.The futureFunding from the National Department of Agriculturewill see the erection of a modern abattoirand the poultry houses will be rebuilt orupgraded to a standard acceptable to industry.Following this, one expects that the project willresume its broiler production enterprise whichis its main money earner. Longer-term sustainabilityof the project will depend on getting theyouth involved. To its credit, the group is tak-111

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.ing active steps to try to involve the youth now,showing an unusual degree of forward-thinking.ConclusionMany Land Reform Programme projects, especiallyredistribution projects, have failed. Thisparticular project was selected for a case studyto provide some understanding of the challengesit had to overcome to succeed. Of importanceare the following observations:• Members are all elderly; no youth participateson a membership basis although seasonallabour involving youth is used.• The size of the operation is relatively big,but this is managed through the allocationof individual responsibility for certain operationsor enterprises on the farm.• Despite the members going without wagesor income for long periods, they still carryon. This is due to a sense of ownership anda strong work ethic. They have shown commitmentand dedication.• All members are constantly active in thevarious operations on the farm, which eliminatesfree riders and absentee members – afactor that has contributed to the failure ofmany projects.• The success of the project thus far is alsopartly attributed to the management,which is consultative in style. As a result themembership gives them all the support anddecisions are owned by all. This is also reflectedin the financial discipline exhibited,so that the project is able to pay its loansas planned, despite financial hardships attimes.• The fact that many members have technicalknowledge and skill has ensured betterperformance than in many other similarprojects.• The project has been able to solicit resourcesfrom various stakeholders and to maintaina good relationship with the variousorganisations.112

ResearchReport8 Marang Womenin Agriculture andDevelopment: a profitablemulti-enterprise groupproject in North WestMike Antwi and Simeon Materechera, Department ofAgricultural Economics, North-West UniversityIntroductionThe Marang Women in Agriculture and Developmentproject is a women-driven initiativewith a long history of financial independenceand demonstrated job creation capacity. It islocated in Phokeng, which is about 15 kilometresfrom Rustenburg, North West Province. Itis involved in vegetable production, bee farmingand training. The farm has committed andhardworking beneficiaries who have won recognitionand various awards from different institutions.The members of the project depend solelyon the incomes from the project for their livelihoods.There are also some spin-off benefits tothe immediate community in the form of affordable,quality vegetables and honey. The projectblends well with a number of technologies insupport of its enterprises. Some of the elementsof success that can be drawn from this case studyare that:• The individual members of the projectare strongly motivated and committed toachieve a sustainable living from their holdings.Each member shows clear satisfactionwith her achievement.• The project demonstrates effective partnershipsand cooperation between community,government and NGOs.• The project facilitates development throughproviding appropriate training, and linkageswith institutions which can provide technicalguidance.However, in some respects the project bears thetraits of a ‘magnet project’, i.e. one which attractsa disproportionate share of external support.Together with the unusually high educationalattainment of the project’s leaders, thereare doubts as to the project’s replicability.Historical evolutionIn 1997, in the face of escalating crime, unemploymentand poverty, twelve unemployedwomen came up with an idea of establishing anagricultural project. Due to lack of financial andtechnical support, the number of participantsquickly dropped to four during the initial conceptualisationphase. The four remaining memberseventually came up with an idea of providingtraining and development in agriculture forthe disadvantaged communities. This women’sgroup is called Marang Women in Agricultureand Development (“Marang” means “SunRays”). Initially, the group utilised the members’own small backyard plots for small-scale vegetableproduction. In 2000, however, the RoyalBafokeng Administration, in partnership withthe Department of Agriculture, allocated a twohectareplot to the project. In the same year, theNational Development Agency (NDA) assistedthe Marang group to access training in commercialbee farming.Marang was registered as a Non-Profit Organisation(NPO) in 2001. When members realised thatthe production of vegetables and honey wasrapidly growing, the women founded the Mar-113

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.wa Honey Queens Close Corporation in 2003,which specialises in honey production and byproducts.Also in 2003, Marang requested moreland from the Royal Bafokeng Administration,and were allocated an additional four hectares.In 2007, Marang registered a co-operative.The organisation has been functioning well andhas had consistently good results because itis headed by a strong, skilled team who sharethe same vision. The organisation’s activities aremonitored and evaluated at specified times toensure sustainability. The organisation generatesincome through various activities and servicesincluding:• Training services.• Honey and by-products – income generatedfrom sales.• Pollination service – commercial farmersrent hives populated with bees to pollinatetheir crops.• Bee removals – problematic bees are removedfrom homes and buildings at a fee.• Vegetables – income generated from sales.• Networking – negotiating with sponsors,donors and institutions for funds.Although Marang is involved in a variety of enterprises,they see their core business for thefuture in vegetable and honey production, becausetraining is an irregular activity. Produceactivities have grown from backyard plots totwo hectares to the current five hectares. Theyintend to de-bush the remaining two hectaresfor further expansion of vegetable production.Marang has won various awards from differentorganisations and institutions in various categoriessince 2001 as shown in Table 8.1.The major challenges facing the organisationhave been:• Financial – limited funds that do not fullycover the operational costs.• Infrastructure – especially farm equipmentthat needs to be upgraded.• Water – the project has no borehole anddepends on municipal water. This sourcesometimes gives problems to the extentthat the project can stay for more than aweek without water.Natural and physicalresourcesThe main type of soil on the project site is a redbrown sandy loam classified as Hutton. The particlesize distribution of the soil is given in Table8.2 while its chemical properties are presentedin Table 8.3. The textures of the soils are withinwhat is considered optimum for irrigation. Althoughno field measurements of infiltrationrate were undertaken during the survey, measurementscarried out in similar soils elsewheresuggest that both soils would have sustained infiltrationrates in the range 60-100 mm per hour,implying that it is suitable for irrigation.Table 8.1: Awards and achievement certificates won byMarang since its inceptionYear Name of awarding organisation Name of award2001 National African Farmers Union Farmer of the Year2002 Department of Agriculture Certificate of Achievement2002 Department of Economics and Tourism Achiever Award Woman in Business(‘Overall Winner’)2002 Impumelelo Innovation Award Trust Silver Innovative Award2003 Department of Agriculture Runner-up Female Farmer2004 Eskom Development Foundation Sustainable Development Award2005 Mail & Guardian SMMES Award (‘Overall Winner’)2006 Sowetan/Old Mutual/SABC District Community Builder2006 Eskom Development Foundation Bronze Award Best Exhibitor2007 Shoprite Checkers/SABC Runner-up Woman of the year114

ResearchReportThe phosphorus content of the soil at the site isquite high compared to soils found in many partsof the province. Phosphorus (P) is an importantnutrient, the absence of which limits crop productionin many soils. The general requirementis likely to be of the order of 80 to 120 kg/haP for most crops. Use of adequate amounts ofmanure will help to build up the soil P levels inthe long term.In terms of the calcium and magnesium contentsand pH values, the soil at the site does not requireliming either for nutritional or pH ameliorationpurposes. In the longer term, however,with prolonged irrigation, applications of dolomiticlime might become necessary to ensure optimalplant growth. Thus, the changes in the pHand concentration of bases in the soils need tobe monitored continuously. It may be concludedthat the soil of the site has an excellent potentialfor irrigated crop production. This is mostly becausein addition to being located on relativelyflat terrain, the soil has a deep, well-drainedprofile. It has an effective soil depth of over 90cm and the topsoil is porous. The soil is thus suitablefor crop farming and is good for most typesof vegetables, orchards, use as a nursery and indigenousplants.According to hydrological investigations previouslyundertaken in the area, the hydro geologicalpotential is classified as moderate to good.The quality is also considered to be suitable forirrigation. However, although there are fourboreholes, they are not well endowed with waterand dry up during the summer. Since projectimplementation requires substantial water,the participants carry water in buckets on theirheads from far away. However, in late 2003 theDepartment of Agriculture provided the projectwith a R3100 grant to tap municipal water fromthe Bafokeng Tribal Authority to the trainingsite. This has alleviated the problem and reducedthe drudgery and water is now being drawnvery close to the project. Recently, the projectwas granted permission by the Royal BafokengAdministration to use local Magalies water fortheir activities. The connections were sponsoredby Impala Platinum Mine.Figure 8.1 shows the monthly distribution ofrainfall for Phokeng, which is the closest stationto the location of the project. The area fallswithin the dry winter and wet summer region,since 86% of the annual rainfall comes duringthe summer months of October to March. Therainfall is quite unreliable in both quantity andTable 8.2: Particle size distribution analysis and texture of thesoil at the project siteSoil Depth (cm) 0 -15 15 -30Horizon Name Top SubParticle size distribution (%)Sand (>0.002 mm)Silt (0.053-0.002 mm)Clay (

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Figure 8.1: Monthly distribution of rainfall at PhokengRainfall (mm)14012010080604020124958938166 571443801050JanFeb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec116distribution. Because of frequent prolonged drynesshowever dryland crop production is bothrisky and unreliable. Irrigation will thus have tobe utilised for vegetable production. The areahas hot summers with mean monthly maximumtemperatures for December to February rangingbetween 29° and 30° C. During this time, extremetemperatures of 39° C may be recorded.These extremely high temperatures may causeheat stress in crops resulting in damage, especiallyfor fruit and orchard crops. Winter temperatures,on the other hand, are cool to cold,with monthly means of 7° to 9° C. The area enjoyshigh levels of radiation and light is probablythe least limiting factor of all the climatic variablesinfluencing the agricultural potential ofthe area.The risk of frost incidence in the area is consideredto be relatively low, although ground frostcan be expected for some 5 to 10 days each winter.However, the temperature regime in thearea, which determines the frost-free period,does not pose major constraints that would restrictagricultural activity, as most crops are cultivatedduring the summer months. The projectarea is relatively flat and has a slope of less than1:120. This slope is generally ideal for crop productionand amenable to irrigated agriculture.The vegetation in the project area lies in a savannahbiome called Kalahari Plains Thorn Bushveld(or commonly as ‘Kalahari Thornveld’). Thevegetation is characterised by a fairly well developedtree stratum with Camel Thorn (Acaciaerioloba) and Boscia albitrunca as the dominanttrees, along with scattered individuals of Acacialuederitzi and Terminalia serecea, which is conspicuous.An array of infrastructure and equipment usedat the farm include:• Tractors• Garden tools• Hydroponics structures• Honey processing machines• Cold room• Beehive boxes.An inventory of moveable and immovable assetsat the farm as at September 2008 is presentedin Table 8.4. Most of the assets were acquiredthrough grants from government and miningcompanies around Rustenburg. However, a fewof the assets such as a farm tractor and accessorieswere acquired with own funding.Production systemsThe enterprises undertaken by this project are:Vegetable production – This involves the productionof a variety of vegetables under irrigation intunnels and under net structures. The vegetablesproduced on the project include tomatoes, carrots,spinach, beetroot, green pepper and chillies.In some of the tunnels, the seedlings areplanted in polythene bags while in other tunnelsthey are planted on seed beds. The productionfollows a well designed rotation that incorporatesboth summer and winter crops. The vegetablesin the tunnels are irrigated by drip whilethose under the nets are irrigated by a furrow irrigationsystem. The members also fill used tyres

ResearchReportTable 8.4: Inventory of movable and immovable farm assetsItemYear ofpurchasePresentvalueConditionHowit wasacquiredPredictedlifespanHow assetmaintained?Who operatesthe asset?Stallionbakkie2002 R15 000 Old butfunctionalNDAgrant3 years ServicedwhenneededSupervisorVolkswagenCiti Golf2003 R45 000 Old butfunctionalNDAgrant5 years ServicedwhenneededSupervisorHydroponicstructure2004 R30 000 Good Impalagrant5 years SelfmaintenanceFarm workersRotovatorhandpropellertractor2005 R35 000 Good NDAgrant10 years MaintenancemonthlyFarm workersMacFergusontractor2006 R30 000 Average Ownfunds5 years MaintenancemonthlyFarm workersHoneyprocessingmachines2006 R20 000 Good NDAgrant10 years MaintenancewhenneededFarm workersNetStructures2007 R180000GoodCASPgrant(Dept. ofAgric)10 years SelfmaintainedFarmworkerswith soil and plant vegetables in them. Sometimes,sprinkler irrigation is utilised in the latter.Both fertiliser and organic manure are usedduring production. Disease and pest control aremaintained by spraying with appropriate chemicals.Weeding is mostly done by hand on theproject. The vegetables are harvested and sold,mostly without any value-adding.Honey production and by-products – This involvesthe rearing of bees in wooden beehives.The beehives are placed in the uncultivatedareas of the project site and on some nearbycommercial farms. The honey is harvested usingconventional technology that Marang hasmastered over the years. The honey is processedusing both motorised and manual centrifugesas shown below. The processed honey is thenbottled for market. The main by-product is wax,which is made into candles which are sold locally.The beehive boxes are made by the womenthemselves and also sold to other interestedsmallholder farmers in the province.Training and development – Marang providestraining to farmers and the community in variousdisciplines such as agriculture, HIV and AIDS,basic computing, project management andbook-keeping. This training is conducted at theproject site, but generally only when a tenderis won, hence it does not represent a reliablesource of income.Establishment of nursery – This is in the processof being established. The idea is to produce vegetablesand tree seedlings that can be sold to thecommunity.Table 8.5 gives a summary of the enterprises,goals, activities and implementation of theseactivities.All the production and marketing activities onthe farm are done by the project members andby hired workers. There are also no gender-specificroles in the production and marketing ofthe various enterprises.About 88% of the products from the farm are sold,3% are consumed directly by the beneficiaries, 7%given away to ‘social responsibility’ projects and2% is lost through damages. The technologieswhich are employed in the production of thevarious enterprises are mostly manual withlimited modern technology. There is some valueadding that is done to the honey and some ofthe vegetables (i.e. cleaning and packaging, butonly for some of the produce). The products aremarketed locally in the informal settlements117

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Figure 8.1: Honey extraction machinesTable 8.5: Enterprises, goals, activities and theirimplementation118Enterprises Goals Activities ImplementationVegetableproductionHoney productionand by-productsTraining anddevelopmentEstablishment of anurseryTo promote freshand healthyproductsTo promotenatural andhealth productsTo empowercommunitiesPromotehealthy, cleanand attractiveenvironmentDifferent vegetablesare planted, marketedand supplied to localcommunities and formalmarketsAdvertising, promotions,exhibitions and salesTraining in farming skills;creation of awareness ofopportunities in farmingsector.Trained people areencouraged to start theirown enterprises.Liaise, communicate andnetwork with Dept. ofWater and ForestryCommunities includingpeople living with HIV/AIDSencouraged to eat fresh andhealthy food.Vegetables donated to needy,hospices, foster and old agehomes.Communities are encouragedto use natural medicationfrom the hive e.g. pure honey,propolis, pollen, etc.Trained in trainees’ languagepreference.Hands-on and on-site trainingLevels of literacy areconsidered and training isdone in an environment thatis conducive to visible results.Promote nursery projects inthe communities

ResearchReportTable 8.6: Inputs used on the farm and their sources ofsupplyInputSeedlingsFertilisersOrganic fertilisersSource of supplyBought from profit at Dan Man Boerdery and Multi-plantBought from DICLASelf-made (compost from crop residues)Table 8.7: Dealing with stresses and shocks in the pastStress/shockDroughtHigh fuel pricesHigh fertiliser pricesHigh temperaturesExcessive rainfallDrop in marketing pricesHIV/AIDS epidemicWater scarcityRemedyIrrigationTried to reduce operational costsTried to use self-made organic fertilisersThe use of net structures and irrigationDrainage channels around the fieldSecure more marketsTrained staff in HIV/AIDS programmesNew connection to Magalies water; large storage tanksand to the major food retail outlets. The farmhas a special market arrangement with DWF,which is a subsidiary company to Tshwane FreshProduce Market. Also, the farm has marketingagreements with other companies like Smith’sDairy and local Spars for the supply of honey.The major production and marketing challengesfacing the farm were listed as lack of:• Sufficient operational funds• Improvement of corporate image budget• Improved infrastructure• Modern technologies• Additional cold room facilities for storage.A list of inputs used on the farm and their sourcesof supply are presented in Table 8.6, whileTable 8.7 indicates how Marang has dealt withfarming stresses and shocks experienced in thepast.Economic and livelihoodsaspectsAnalysis of the economic aspects of the project’soperations focuses on purchased inputs(Table 8.8), regular labour (Table 8.9), casuallabour (Table 8.10), capital inputs (Table 8.11),other general expenses (Table 8.12), and cashincome over 12 months (Table 8.13). Loan repaymentsand rentals were stated as R15 000 peryear. Gross cash income from farming and trainingwas given as R587 950, and in-kind incomeas R57 650. Input costs excluding maintenancewere given as R35 711. Expenses on regular labourand maintenance were stated as R493 200and R4 500, respectively.In order to determine what share of the labourcosts should be regarded as farming expenses asopposed to training-related expenses, we consideredthe ratio of income derived from farmingon the one hand (meaning vegetables andhoney) versus training on the other. The totalincomes from farming and training are R315 600and R272 350, respectively, thus the income ratioof farming to training is 0.54 to 0.46. Basedon this income ratio, farming expenses cometo R296 142, and so net farm profit is R19 458.While this amount is very modest, it should beborne in mind that it already takes into accountremuneration to project members via their salaries/wages.And yet, it is also worth comparingthis figure to the net profit from training, whichis R45 478, i.e. over twice as much as that fromfarming. The fact that training was more remunerativethan farming, however, is regarded bythe project leaders as neither here nor there,in the sense that the training income is erraticand unpredictable. Moreover, if one takes intoaccount the in-kind consumption ‘income’ from119

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.non-marketed agricultural products, then thetotal net profit from agriculture value of agriculturewould be R77 108. 15The project creates employment for a total of42 people (both men and women) as shown inTable 8.14. The income from these jobs was consideredas the major contributor to the householdfood security and livelihoods of the projectmembers.Social and institutionaldimensionsThe project has over the years benefited fromthe support of many institutions in the formof resources (e.g. land), information, training,marketing, conflict resolution and funding. Theinstitutions that have been involved with theproject are listed in Table 8.15. These instancesof support have helped Marang to sustain its ac-Table 8.8: Operational expenses, crop-related (2008)InputHow oftenpurchasedAmountpurchasedCostWhere purchasedSeedlings Once a quarter 66 000 R11 165 Dan Man Boerdery(Haartebeesfontein)Fertilisers – chemical Once a quarter 20 bags R6 498 DICLA (Krugersdorp)Fertilisers – organic As needed N/A n/a Self-made (compost)Pesticide Once a quarter 10 x 20 litrecontainersR 3 220DICLA (Krugersdorp)Diesel Monthly 450 litres R5 828 Shell Garage(Phokeng)MaintenanceNet structures, selfmadeNet structures,purchasedOnce a year or asneededR4 5002 big & 1 small R15 000 n/aRietvlei Trok &Trekkers (Rietvlei)2 big R180 000 Obaro (Rustenburg)Table 8.9: Labour – regular (2008)InputNumber ofwomenNumber of menAveragepayment eachper monthTotal paymentper monthDirectors 3 0 R7 500 R22 500Managers 0 2 R4 500 R9 000Farm workers 0 6 R1 200 R7 200General workers 1 1 R1 200 R2 400Total 4 9 R41 100Total cost for 12 months R493 20015 Two caveats regarding thisfigure: first, it does not takedepreciation of assets intoaccount, and thus in that respectis an over-statement; andsecond, it is arbitrary to haveused the case income ratiosfrom farming and training tohave allocated the wage bill,when one might just as wellhave used the fuller (cash plusimputed own-consumption)income in deriving the ratio.Table 8.10: Labour – casual/seasonal/irregular (2008)InputNumber ofwomenNumber of menAverage dayseach over yearPaid facilitators 10 7 As per availablecontractSeasonal workers 6 4 20 R45Pay per dayAs peragreement120

ResearchReportTable 8.11: Capital inputs (2008)Item Year acquired Year made Cost / value attime of purchaseHow acquiredStallion bakkie 2002 1989 R7 000 Govt. Tenderpurchased withgrantVolwagen Citi Golf 2003 1993 R45 950 NDA FundsHydroponic structure 2004 2001 Unknown Impala FundsRotovator handpropeller tractor &implements2005 2003 R58 000 NDA FundsMac Ferguson tractor 2006 1998 R44 000 NDA FundsHoney processingmachines2006 Unknown R30 000 NDA FundsNet structures 2007 Unknown R191 000 CASP FundTable 8.12: Other general expensesItemRent and interest on debtBank transactions costTime taken to complete marketingarrangementTaxesDetailsPayments to Bafokeng Authority for office andequipment rentals and interest payments on loan(R15 000 pa)Bank charges as per funds grantedOngoingPayment to SARS for taxes (not available)Table 8.13: Cash income over past 12 months (2008)ItemDetailsVegetable sales R129 600Honey sales R186 000Sub-total farm income (vegetables & honey) R315 600TrainingSoul CityR235 000CargillR26 950SynerconR10 400Sub-totalR272 350Total R587 950Table 8.14: Employment created by MarangNature of employment Men Women TotalPermanent employment 9 6 15Seasonal labour 11 16 27Total 20 22 42121

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 8.15: Institutions and types of support offered to thefarmType of supportResourcesInformationNetworkingFundingTrainingMarketingConflict resolutionInstitution(s)NDA, CASP, Impala Mines, Eskom Foundation, Bafokeng Tribal AuthorityLocal Municipality and District MunicipalityVarious stakeholdersNDA, National LotteriesAgriSeta, Soul City & IDTNational Marketing CouncilDepartment of Labour CCMAtivities and its benefits to the beneficiaries. Thesocial benefits of Marang to the surroundingcommunities include the supply of free vegetablesto the old age homes and orphanages, andthe use of the farm as learning centre for schoolsin the province.Gender, class and humandimensionsMarang was initiated by women and continuesto be managed by women. The ratio of directbeneficiaries of the project is 5 women to 8 men.However, the three directors of the project areall women. Table 8.16 shows the demographicsof the beneficiaries of the project. Out of the 13direct beneficiaries of Marang, only three arebelow thirty-five years of age. The majority ofthe beneficiaries are over forty years of age. Thethree women directors of the project are theonly ones who have been with the project sinceit began in 1997; the rest joined the project after2001. Six of the beneficiaries have tertiary andcollege education. Most of the coordinating andmanagerial/directorship positions in the projectare held by women while the direct field activitiesare done by the men.Perceptions of performanceThe project is sustainable in its activities becauseit has been in operation without fail for the past11 years. This farm is considered to be successfulbecause of the following:• Commitment – the group consists of memberswho are very committed to the farmoperations.• Networking – the farm has established andsustained good networks that have providedthem with appropriate information,technology and resources required for optimaloperation.• Infrastructure – over the years of its operation,the farm has acquired a good technologicalinfrastructural base required for effectiveoperation.• Skills – skills development initiatives havebeen undertaken by the members whichhave enabled them especially with managementand technical skills.• Leadership – it has a leadership which sharesthe vision of the farm.Policy environmentMarang currently relies on municipal water forits farming activities. However, in some areas ofthe province, there are policies that do not allowthe use of municipal water for farming purposes.There may come a point when this becomes aproblem for Marang as well.Marang also needs more land in order to expandits operations. The beneficiaries indicated that itis difficult to acquire more land from the tribalauthorities in the area. There is a need for policiesthat facilitate easy access and acquisition ofland by smallholder farmers.Environmental aspectsIn executing their cropping and bee farmingactivities, Marang considers the protection ofthe environment. Among the environmentallysound practices on the Marang projects are: theuse organic manure to supply crops with nutrients;the use of hand weeding in order to reducethe amount of chemicals applied; the use of wa-122

ResearchReportTable 8.16: Demographics of project membersName ofparticipantAgeYear joinedprojectGenderPosition inprojectPlace ofresidenceEducationalLevelResponsibility in projectTshidi Mataboge 55 1997 F ManagingDirectorBoipelo Kubyana 50 1997 F TrainingDirectorMato Mputle 53 1997 F ProductionDirectorPhokeng Tertiary Spearheads all projectsTlhabane Tertiary Coordinates trainingLuka High School Coordinates productionBeauty Raseleka 25 2005 F Office Admin Phokeng College Administrate officeactivitiesKelebogile Nakedi 23 2007 F Secretary Phokeng College Typing and filingBicorly Segwape 43 2003 M TrainingManagerThami Mathunda 32 2007 M ProductionManagerBethanie College Overseer training activitiesWonder-kop Tertiary Overseer productionactivitiesShimi Mokgatle 38 2004 M Supervisor Phokeng High School Supervises ProductionactivitiesHappy Mabeko 39 2003 M Farm worker Phokeng Primary Operates farm activitiesPogiso Phiri 55 2001 M Farm worker Phokeng Primary Operates farm activitiesDoctor Mogapi 35 2002 M Farm worker Holfontein Primary Operates farm activitiesHendrick Modikela 52 2006 M Farm worker Rietvlei Primary Operates farm activitiesLetima Molokwane 2007 M Farm worker Pella Primary Operates farm activitiester filtration to reduce the amount of salt in thewater before irrigation helps to prevent soil salinisation;recycling and paper-making projects;the use of environmentally friendly techniquesof honey harvesting from beehives.The futureThe future expectation for this farm is to growits agricultural production activities to a commerciallevel and to add value to the products.The group also wants to raise the level of theirtraining centre to that of a Further EducationalTraining (FET) accredited unit, allowing it toshare and transfer information to other interestedpeople. According to the group, these aspirationscan be achieved by having flexible policiesthat allow access to financial and other relevantresources.The group sees their children having a future inthis project, particular as the leadership of theproject are in their 50s. The group leaders arehoping that the visible benefits they derive fromthe project will inspire their children to replacethem when they retire.ConclusionThe main reasons why the project was selectedfor a case study include:• Although the project was not designed toinvolve only women, it was interesting toobserve that five years after its initiation,only women were left. Technically, thecommitment of the women and dedicationof the local extension workers has ensuredsuccessful application of technology on theproject.• The size and organisation of the project wasstable. Compared to other similar communityprojects, the size of this project is smallin terms of number of participants. Moreover,the clear management hierarchy in theproject appears to prevent discontent fromeither arising or erupting to a point that itbecomes disruptive.• The design of the project capitalises on aneffective blend of modern technology andlocal knowledge. This ensures improvedproductivity and sustainability.123

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.• The location of this small-scale communityagricultural poverty alleviation projectwithin the surroundings of Rustenburg,a rapidly growing city that provides manyother competing non-agricultural employmentopportunities, especially in the miningand tourism sectors is conducive to growthand development.Some of the elements of success that can bedrawn from this case study are briefly summarisedas follows:• The individual members of the projectare strongly motivated and committed toachieve a sustainable living.• The project members have successfullytaken modern technology and advice fromexternal agents, then blended these withtheir own indigenous knowledge systemsand skills• The project demonstrates effective partnershipsand cooperation between beneficiaries,government, NGOs and private institutions.• The project facilitates development throughproviding appropriate training, linkageswith institutions which can provide technicalguidance and financial support• National and provincial policies and institutionsthat create an enabling environmentfor the projects are required.124

ResearchReport9 Wadela Trust vegetableand broiler project: agroup-based povertyreduction project withunrealised potentialMike Antwi and Simeon Materechera, Department ofAgricultural Economics, North-West UniversityIntroductionThe Wadela Trust project is involved in the productionof vegetables and broilers. Most of thebeneficiaries are from a peri-urban squatter areanear the town of Potchefstroom. The location ofthe project is about 30 kilometres from Potchefstroomwithin the mining areas of Carletonville.The project activities are conducted on a previouslycommercial farm which was owned by awhite farmer and which therefore has most ofthe infrastructure needed for farming. The membersof the project depend solely on the incomesfrom the project for their livelihoods. One ofthe elements of success that can be drawn fromthis case study is that the major infrastructurerequired for sustainable production is in place.The individual members of the project are alsostrongly motivated and committed to achieve asustainable living from their holdings.Historical evolutionThis project was an initiative of the then WadelaTransitional Local Council (TLC). (‘Wadela’stands for Western Deep Levels and Elandsrand.)In 1998, the Wadela TLC tasked a consultant toconduct research in the area on the issues of unemploymentand HIV/AIDS, with a view to recommendingpossible interventions. Accordingto the research, many of the Wadela inhabitantsstated that they were interested in agriculture.This led the Council to purchase a 36-hectarefarm that was on the market. The Councillorswere tasked to bring people from within theirwards to be registered and to offer their serviceson the farm and receive some remuneration fortheir work. The project started in 1999 with 136people from Wadela Township.Initially, about five hectares of the land wereplanted under tomatoes and green beans, includingsome tomato production in a tunnel.Production was also begun in the two broilerhouses, each of which has a capacity for accommodating800 birds. The project quickly encounteredproblems due to the fact that the farm’sproduction could not generate enough incometo pay wages to the workers. The project didnot identify a reliable market; rather productswere sold to poor residents within the township.These problems led to the removal of the firstproject manager.The project was revived in 2000 using fundsfrom the Department of Provincial and LocalGovernment. A consultant was appointed to runthe farm, which was to include six broiler houseswith a capacity of 1500 birds each, to be builtaccording to the specifications of a well-knowncompany that develops poultry enterprise infrastructure(DICLA). A drip irrigation system wasalso installed to meet the requirements of thevegetable production. The chicken productionin the six new poultry houses was staggered inorder to optimise production for maximum profit.The chickens were processed in abattoirs inElandsfontein and sold to Top-Chicks in Pretoriaon a weekly basis. The project’s income was putin the Council’s coffers, to which the beneficiar-125

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.ies did not have access. The Council subsequentlyinformed the beneficiaries that the coffers wereexhausted. Thereafter, the project become ineffectiveand was vandalised. At around the sametime the consultant’s contract was terminated.The beneficiaries could not produce any moreand requested to have an audited statement oftheir account.Between 2001 and 2004, some of the beneficiariesmoved to stay on the farm with the aimof reducing vandalism and theft on the farm. Bythis stage, there were only nine beneficiaries stillcommitted to the project. These nine stayed onthe farm and produced vegetables in order tosustain themselves. They later leased the farm toa white farmer from Khutsong who paid rent foruse of the land. The new lessee used the nineremaining members as a source of labour, butsubsequently failed to pay either the rent ortheir wages, which resulted in the terminationof the lease agreement. In 2004, the MEC for Agriculturesent a task team to look at what wasneeded to refurbish the farm. Following this, theDepartment of Agriculture allocated R1.2 millionto the project for the construction of three tunnels,cables, repair of four boreholes and otheroperating expenses.Some of the major achievements of the groupare that the project once supplied President Hypermarketwith tomatoes, and had a contractwith a commercial farmer from Randfonteinwho purchased chickens from them on a weeklybasis. The project managed to sustain itselfthrough the profits and beneficiaries realisedmonthly wages of R1200 for all nine beneficiaries.At the time of the fieldwork for this casestudy, the project had managed to accumulatean amount of R100 000 in the project’s bank account.It is one of the only commercial projectsaround in which women outnumber men. Majorchallenges of the project have been theft byneighbouring community members and emergingbroiler producers in the immediate area whocould compete in the future for the same market.In respect of the theft and vandalism problem,the police have responded by conductingregular patrols around and inside the farm.Natural and physicalresourcesThe farm’s soil is sandy loam which varies fromAvalon to Hutton with a mid-slope topography.The soil is deep and has no limiting layer withinthe effective rooting depth (1.2 metres). Theborehole water used on the farm is Class 1 LowSodium water. The vegetation of the land ismixed Bankenveld of Cymbopogon contortusand Themeda Triandra. The climate variesfrom warm summer to cold winters. The goodquality soils have allowed the continual plantingof vegetables, which is in demand by hawkersfrom Carletonville and the Greater WadelaCommunity. The physical resources on theproject include:• 3 tunnels (10 x 30 metres)• 1 tunnel heater• 6 1500-bird broiler houses• 2 800-bird broiler houses• 4 boreholes (of which only 2 are equipped)• 1 tractor• 2 ploughsThe inventory of the farm assets is presentedin Table 9.1. Most of the assets were acquiredthrough funding from Local Government andthe provincial Department of Agriculturethrough the Comprehensive Agricultural SupportProgramme (CASP).Production systemThe enterprises undertaken on the farm includevegetables in tunnels and in the open field(spinach, carrots, beetroot and green peppers),and broiler production. The group takes 6 weeksto raise and sell chickens with an average weightof 1.8-2.0 kg and sells to President Hypermarketat Fochville and the Carletonville hawkers.They take about 60-80 days to raise tomatoesin the tunnels, which are then packaged inplastic bags and boxes (value adding) and soldto President Hypermarket; the surplus is sold inthe local communities. The technology used inthe tunnels for vegetable production involvesthe planting of tomato seedlings on sawdustand the scheduling of the fertigation machineto supply water and fertilisers. The vegetablesare irrigated with a well designed drip irrigationnetwork in which drippers are allocated directlyto the rooting zone. The humidity inside thetunnel is controlled by vents that are locatedaround the side and top of the tunnels. Othervegetables grown on the farm include spinach,carrots, cabbage and beetroot and this is done in126

ResearchReportTable 9.1: Investments in farm assets over time (2008)Itemn/a=not applicableYear ofpurchasePresentvalueCondition How it was acquired Predictedlifespan2 x broiler house (800 capacity) 1998 R25 000 Good Through Local Gov’t 20 yearsFunds (DPLG)6 x broilers houses (1500 capacity) 2000 R20 000 Good Local Gov’t funds (DPLG) 20 years1 x tunnel 1998 R11 000 Vandalised Local govt funds 5 years3 x tunnels 2006 R70 000 Good DACE (CASP) 5 -10 years1 x tunnel heater 2007 R110 010 Good DACE (CASP) 5-10 yearsBorehole testing equipping 2007 R65 029 Good DACE (CASP) 10 years3 x tunnels 2007 R148 029 Good DACE (CASP) 10 yearsBroiler houses refurbishment 2007 R123 179 Good DACE (CASP) 10 yearsElectrical equipment for boreholes 2007 R2 856 n/a DACE (CASP) n/aWater connections 2007 R2 875 n/a DACE (CASP) n/aBroiler house equipment 2007 R50 196 Good n/a n/aHydraulic lift pump 2007 R4 372 Good DACE (CASP) n/arotation. The vegetables are cleaned and packedfor sale in surrounding areas.The chickens are produced in deep litter houseswith semi-automated waterers and feeders.The day-old chicks are bought from SerfonteinKuikens in Potchefstroom and DICLA Farm andSeed Company at Muldersdrift at a rate of 1500chickens per cycle. The feed is high grade Agroconcentrate that is purchased form Farmer City(Silverlake). The bedding for the floor is purchasedfrom Hansie Millers. The productionuses hygienic practices and follows disease controlprocedures in each house. The chickens aredressed and wrapped at the farm and sold tonearby shops. However, the farm’s facilities donot constitute a proper abattoir, and would notqualify for an abattoir license.The group decided to engage in these enterprisesbecause the infrastructure was available, andbecause they have a brief production cycle andthe potential for high turnover. The other factorconsidered was the low input costs of vegetableproduction. Another consideration was that thefarm is only 36 hectares indicating the appropriatenessof intensive production systems. Membersof the group normally consume non-marketablechickens and surplus vegetables whichare over-ripe. Excess production (tomatoes) isstored temporarily in the farm house and poultryin the broiler houses. The production andmarketing challenges facing the farm are thatthey cannot supply orders for processed chickenproducts to the mining houses and restaurantsin the area due to the lack of a licensed abattoir.Another concern are the steep increases in inputcosts experienced over the past few years, e.g.for fuel and feed product. The security on thefarm is also of much concern in that there havebeen several break-ins.Economic and livelihoodaspectsThe analysis of the economic aspects of theproject focuses on purchased inputs (Tables9.2 and 9.3), regular labour (Table 9.4), capitalinputs (Table 9.5), other general expenses (Table9.6) and cash income over a 12 months period(Table 9.7). The loan repayments and rentalswere stated as R43 000 per year. The 15% intereston the loan was given as R6450. The gross cashfarming income was given as R678 000. Thefarming expenses on inputs, regular labour andmaintenance was stated as R550 510. The netfarm profit is therefore R121 040.00. The projectcreates employment for a total of nine people,of whom three are men and six are women.The income from these jobs was considered asthe major contributor to their household foodsecurity and livelihoods. The group consumes theunmarketable vegetables and chicken producedfrom the farm, and this seemingly constitutestheir main source of food. Currently, there isgross under-utilisation of the resources by thebeneficiaries. The capacity of the resources onthe farm is capable of generating over R2 millionannually. Presently, the group is using only one127

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 9.2: Purchased inputs – crop-related (2008)InputHow oftenpurchasedAmountpurchasedCostWhere purchasedSeed/seedlings Quarterly 950/tunnel R14 500 DICLA Farm and SeedCo; MuldersdriftFertilisers – chemical Bi-annually 15 items R450 DICLA Farm and SeedCo; MuldersdriftFertilisers – organicNone (get chickenmanure from farm)N/A N/A Get it freely from thefarmPesticide Annually 5 litres R390 RJ Besproeing;PotchefstroomDiesel Annual exact quantityunknownR5 000Excel Service Station;CarletonvilleTotal R20 340Table 9.3: Purchased inputs – livestock-related (2008)InputHow oftenpurchasedAmount purchased Cost perunitTotal costWhere purchasedDay-oldchicksWeekly 1500 chicks R4.50 R6750/cyclex 4 cycles x4 houses=R108 000Serfontein Kuikens -Potchefstroom andDICLA Farm and SeedCo; MuldersdriftFeed Monthly 4 kg/2 kg chick x1500 chicks = 6000kg/50 kg bagR145/bag R278 400 Farmer City (Silverlake);Potchefstroom=120 bags x R145/bag =R17 400 x 4cycles= R69 600 x 4houses=R278 400Vet products Monthly 5 items R55 x 6monthsElectricity Monthly 3 KVA R2000 x 6monthsR330R12 000SENWES and SerfonteinKuikens; PotchefstroomESKOM; CarletonvilleBedding Quarterly 3 tons R50/ton R600 Hansie Miller;ViljoenskroonMaintenance Monthly 3 x tunnels and 4x broiler houses,tractor andmachineryR3 500 x 6monthsR21 000DICLA Farm and SeedCo; MuldersdriftTotal R420 330Table 9.4: Labour – regular (2008)InputNumber ofwomenNumber ofmenAverage paymenteach per monthTotal payment peryearPaid; managers 6 0 R1200 R86 400Paid; non-managers 0 3 R600 R21 600Total 6 3 R108 000128

ResearchReportTable 9.5: Capital inputs – e.g. tractors, vehicles, implements,livestock, etc.(2008)Item Year acquired YearmadeCost/value at time ofpurchaseHow acquiredTractor andimplements1999 1992 R60 000 Bought by Merafong CityCouncilBakkie 1999 1999 R230 000 Bought by Merafong CityCouncilTable 9.6: Other general expenses (2008)ItemLocal transportTransport hireRentCommission paidStorage costBank transactions costTime taken to complete marketing arrangementInterest on loan. R43 000 on feed (Farmer City, Potchefstroom):15% p.a.TotalRelevant detailsR800R500R0R0R0R45/month x 12 = R5403 daysR6450R8290Table 9.7: Cash income over past 12 months (2008)ItemDescribe and capture relevant detailsPoultry 1450 chickens x R25 = R36 250 x 4 = R145 000 x 4 houses = R580 000Vegetables (spinach) 500 bundles x R300 = R15 000 x 3 weeks = R45 000 x 2 cycles = R90 000Poultry manure R800/bag x 100 bags = R8 000Total income R678 000Table 9.8: Overall financial performance (2008)Gross farming income R678 000Farming expenses – R550 510Net farming income = R127 490Interest on loans –R6 450Net farming profit = R121 040129

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.130of its seven tunnels and uses a fraction of itsbroiler capacity.Social and institutionaldimensionsThe identification of this project followed the‘sacred cow approach’ – an announcementwas made by senior officials to the effect thata project would be created, and junior officialswere compelled to create it regardless of themany problems they saw with the idea. Thisdivision has carried on over time, whereby theproject enjoys high-profile support, but onlygrudging support from implementation-levelstaff. One dimension of the misgivings of governmentstaff is that the project resources areof such great value and represent such greateconomic potential, and yet the beneficiariesare primarily ethnic Xhosas (in an overwhelminglyTswana area), whose ability to cling to theproject is subtly but strongly resented.One peculiar feature of the project is the degreeto which it remains under the control of civilservants; for example, a Department of Agricultureofficial maintains the books and determineswhat money may be paid out as wages andwhat must be deposited into the project’s bankaccount. While this is not necessarily the normamong agricultural projects in North West, it isnot unique. The need for continued ‘support’ ofsuch projects is partly a function of their usualgroup nature: virtually all of the agriculturaldevelopment projects in North West promotedby the provincial department of agriculture andsupported by the National Development Agency,are group projects, and the general perception isthat external management support is requiredto compensate for groups’ internal inadequacies.Why this is the case rather than a distancingfrom group projects is unclear.Gender, class and humandimensionsThe demographics of the project beneficiariesare shown in Table 9.9. The group consists of sixwomen and three men. The age range amongthe beneficiaries was 44 to 62 years. None of thebeneficiaries had reached matric. The projecthas created nine permanent self-employmentopportunities for the beneficiaries and six temporaryjobs for other people from the WadelaTownship. Other sources of income to the beneficiariesbeside the project were mainly oldage and child support grants. Task distributionamong the beneficiaries is not influenced bygender. One peculiar characteristic about thegroup, as mentioned above, is that all the womenare Xhosa speakers. One possible interpretationis that when the project shrunk from itsoriginal number of 136, the few that remainedbehind were the most marginal in the community,i.e. ethnic outsiders.There was no indication of serious conflictsamong the beneficiaries, although it was indicatedthat the project had its own internalmechanisms of dealing with conflicts when theyarise.Perception of performanceEven though the project can be said to be sustainable,its performance at this stage is still nowherenear optimum capacity. The tunnels andsome of the poultry houses are currently grosslyunder-utilised. A conservative estimate of theannual income possible from the existing infrastructureis R2 million. All the poultry houses andthe tunnels are fully equipped but are not fullyutilised. In 2007, when the project managed toimprove the scale of operation, it made a profitof R212 000 out of which R100 000 was saved. Inorder to improve the output, a farm managerhas to be appointed to take charge of all theproduction activities on the farm.Policy environmentThe Council bought the land for the WadelaTrust around 1999. The farm is leased for free tothe beneficiaries with the intention to purchase.The policy of the provincial Department of Agricultureof providing support to smallholder projectsfor one year only is impacting negatively onthis project. The Department provided fundingfor the farm’s operation and some of the infrastructureon the farm through CASP. Now, operatingcapital is needed to fully utilise the assets,but the Department cannot provide any furtherfinancial assistance in terms of its own policies.Since the group does not have a title deed tothe land, acquiring loans through the commercialbanks is problematic.Environmental perspectiveThe project has tried to practise environmentallyfriendly approaches to production including theuse of organic manure from chicken droppingsin the vegetable production. This avoids the use

ResearchReportTable 9.9: Demography of the project beneficiariesName ofparticipantAge(yrs)YearjoinedprojectGenderPosition inprojectEdulevelResponsibilityin projectIs HHfoodsecure?Income/monthfromprojectOthersourcesof foodsecurityOtherbenefitsfrom projectAngel Mxoli 44 1998 Female Treasurer Grade10Makes cashrelatedtransactions,Keeps recordsof receiptsand expensesYes R1200 Own grant(disability)+ 2 x childsupportgrantEmployment,incomegenerating,training site,experienceandknowledgeJoyceTshapile45 1998 Female Blank cell? Grade 8 Rears chicksand generalfarm workYes R1200 3 x childsupportgrantEmployment,incomegeneration,training anddevelopmentsite andknowledgeMonicaSiko46 1998 Female Chairperson Grade10 Overseer ofthe wholefarm/projectYes R1200 2 x childsupportgrantEmploymentFlorenceNkotswana64 1998 Female GeneralsecretaryGrade10Keepsrecords andminutes of allmeetingsYes R1200 Old agegrantEmploymentNobantuPato46 1998 Female AdditionalmemberGrade 5Overallproject work– tunnels andbroilersYes R1200 None EmploymentDeliweMamkeli45 1998 Female AdditionalmemberGrade 2Overall projectwork – openfield cropsand broilersYes R1200 None EmploymentAlfredNkotswana61 1998 Male AdditionalmemberGrade 2Repairs andmaintenanceto broilerand tunnelequipmentYes R1200 Old agegrantEmploymentBenMothibedi62 1998 Male AdditionalmemberGrade 1Tractor driver,repairs andmaintenanceto all broilerand tunnelequipmentYes R1200 None Employmentof chemical fertilisers which tend to be detrimentalto the soil environment.The futureThis project has the potential to be successful inthat it has good infrastructure and committedbeneficiaries whose livelihood and futures dependon the success of the project. The projectalso enjoys a lot of support from the MerafongCity Council and the Department of Agriculture.The future expectation of the beneficiaries is toexpand the project by adding more enterprisesand also to meet market-related demands, especiallyto the mining companies in the area. Tobring about the described changes require aninjection of extra capital and training of the participantsin agribusiness. There is also the needto appoint a farm manager as an overseer. Thegroup would also like to purchase the farm fromMerafong City Council and transfer it into theirown names.131

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.ConclusionThe Wadela Trust Vegetable and Broiler Projectis one case of a small-scale agriculture initiativethat has succeeded due to the persistence andcommitment of its members despite experiencingmany problems. This project is interesting inthat it has a well developed infrastructure andcommitted beneficiaries who need little motivationand operational finance to succeed. Thevegetable and poultry enterprises work well together.The project seemed to be well aware ofthis idea and was willing to increase the numberof enterprises. The marketing potential for theproducts from this project is readily availablefrom the mining companies surrounding theproject. However, this potential can only be realisedif the scale of production is increased tothe optimum of the available infrastructure. Thelevel of technology and infrastructure providedto this project and the current status of productionrequires that higher levels of productivitycould be achieved. This cold be achieved if amentor or manager is engaged. During this timethe beneficiaries could be appropriately trainedand guided to enable them to sustain all farmingactivities on which they embark.132

ResearchReport10 Msinga smallholder irrigationfarmers: commercially successfulsmallholders using mixedtechnologiesBarbara Tapela, Institute for Poverty, Land andAgrarian Studies, University of the Western CapeRauri Alcock, Church Agricultural ProjectsIntroductionMsinga smallholder irrigation farmers are renownedwithin the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands fortheir production and marketing of green mealiesand vegetables. Although productivity varieswidely among farmers (Mkhabela, 2005), a numberof smallholders have maintained vibrant levelsof crop production despite the withdrawal ofgovernment subsidies after 1994. This contrastswith the collapse of many similar irrigationschemes in former homelands across the countryfollowing the same move. While smallholderirrigators in provinces such as Limpopo and theEastern Cape have since received substantialgovernment and private sector assistance in infrastructurerehabilitation, revitalisation of cropproduction and integration into the mainstreamcommodity markets, Msinga smallholders havereceived no such assistance, apart from a vegetablepack house that was established in 2001through donor funding. However, in light of thefailure of assisted agricultural commercialisationin many reported cases, such as projects underthe Revitalisation of Smallholder IrrigationSchemes (RESIS) Programme of Limpopo ProvinceTapela 2009; Denison and Manona, 2007),the success of Msinga farmers is not only ironicbut may shed light into alternative ways of assistingSouth African smallholder irrigators. Thiscase study sought to gain insights into factorsunderlying the success of the Msinga farmers.Socio-economic contextThe Msinga Irrigation Scheme is located alongthe Tugela River, close to the small town of TugelaFerry in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands. The areafalls within Msinga Local Municipality, which isone of the four local municipalities that comprisesUmzinyathi District Municipality. The nearesturban centres include Greytown, Pietermaritzburg,Weenen, Kranskop, Dundee, Ladysmithand Mooi River. Umzinyathi District Municipalityis one of the rural poverty nodes prioritised bySouth Africa’s Integrated Sustainable Rural DevelopmentProgramme (ISRDP). Of the District’sfour local municipalities, Msinga has the lowestlevels of basic services (Table 10.1).The population of Msinga is 171 071, with morewomen (58%) than men (42%) owing to highermigrancy rates among men. The municipality islargely rural in character, with 69% of the area(1725 km²) comprising Traditional Authority landheld in trust by the Ingonyama Trust and the remaining31% consisting of commercial farmland(Msinga Local Municipality, 2008).As in many other predominantly rural municipalities,the rate of unemployment is relativelyhigh. The main sources of livelihood in Msingaare remittances from migrant workers, socialgrants (pensions, child support grants and disabilitygrants), crop and livestock production,sales of craftwork, sales of fuel wood andthatching grass, as well as informal trading(Mkhabela, 2005). Labour tenancy is still foundon some farms in the district, and some peopleare employed as waged farm workers (ibid). Asmall number of people are formally employedin the local service sectors, such as health, educationand retail, while others are self-employedin the informal economy, where they run small133

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 10.1: Descriptive statistics of Msinga and other localmunicipalities within Umzinyathi District Municipality, 2008LocalArea Population Population Percent of households having access to…Municipality (km)densityelectricity water sanitation Refuse(people/km)removalNquthu 1454 150 000 103 11 – 20% 11 – 20% 11 – 20% 0 – 10%Endumeni 1612 50 000 31 61 – 70% 71 – 80% 71 – 80% 71 – 80%Msinga 2500 171 071 68 0 – 10% 0 – 10% 0 – 10% 0 – 10%Umvoti 2509 90 000 36 31 – 40% 31 – 40% 31 – 40% 21 – 30%Source: Msinga Local Municipality IDP, 2008-09.134enterprises such as taxi services, vehicle repairs,retail shops and micro-manufacturing industries(Msinga Local Municipality, 2008; Mkhabela,2005). A significant number of people practisesmall-scale agriculture on an estimated 1967 hectaresof land, of which 767 hectares are underirrigation.There seem to be ongoing shifts in the patternof livelihoods in Msinga. According to Mkhabela(2005), remittances appear to be in decline,due to high levels of unemployment in the formaleconomy. However, they remain an importantsource of income for households, and manyyoung men are absent either at work or seekingwork in urban areas, especially Gauteng. Oldermen generally have a history of migrancy andsome have invested earnings in large herds oflivestock (ibid), with the municipality recording46 000 head of cattle and 45 000 goats(Msinga Local Municipality, 2008). The dry areawith a relatively low average summer rainfallof around 600 mm is indeed better suitedto livestock than crop production (Cousins andMwheli, 2008; Mkhabela, 2005). In contrast withthe past, fewer households presently grow cropsin rain-fed arable land on a reasonably largescale. The main crops are maize, sorghum (forbeer making), beans, pumpkins, melons andimifino (spinach). Some people grow dagga, alucrative but risky crop given periodic police effortsto destroy dagga fields. However, drylandcrop production has been in decline as a sourceof livelihood for some years and increasing numbersof households do not cultivate all their arableland (Mkhabela, 2005; Cousins and Mwheli,2008). Due to the limited formal employmentopportunities in the area, the decline of remittancesand the aridity of climate, irrigated agriculturehas become more central to livelihoodsof many people in Msinga, directly and indirectlycontributing to livelihoods of an estimated twothousand five hundred (2500) households.Profile of the Msingairrigation schemeThe Msinga Irrigation Scheme has existed forover one hundred years and comprises anarea of 767 hectares, which is divided into five‘blocks’. The younger blocks were establishedaround 1960. This was soon after the Bantu Promotionof Self-Government Act of 1959, whichpaved the way for the establishment of ‘homelands’and ‘independent states’ in South Africa.Each of the blocks has a sub-committee, andthree members of each sub-committee togethercomprise the umbrella management committeefor the scheme. Sub-committees are responsiblefor the day-to-day operation and maintenanceactivities, and the umbrella committee coordinatesand oversees the overall management ofthe scheme.The irrigation scheme falls within the TraditionalAuthority Land Area held in trust by the IngonyamaTrust. Plots of land within the scheme areallocated by chiefs and chairpersons of irrigationscheme committees. Access to land withinthe scheme is also through inheritance, informalleasing and share-cropping. Some of the plotshave been passed down through inheritance forthree to four generations.Between 500 and 1000 smallholder farmers areestimated to eke livelihoods from the irrigationscheme. Difficulty in determining the exactnumber of farmers relates to the constantlychanging pattern of the use of plots and a co-existenceof single and multiple plot users, sharingof plots and unused plots. Plots are called umthatheor ‘beds’ in the local vernacular. The averageplot size is 0.162 hectares or 180 metres x 90

ResearchReportmetres (Mkhabela, 2005), with plot sizes rangingfrom 800 m² to 0.2 hectares. Some farmers haveaccess to more than one plot while many havefour plots. This study identified one farmer whohad access to 12 plots through a combination ofinheritance, informal leasing and share-croppingarrangements. Farmers can lose their access toplots of land if they do not use these for a fewconsecutive years.Msinga smallholders have had a fairly long historyof involvement with formal institutionalstructures. Involvement with the IngonyamaTrust, through traditional leadership, has beenand remains consistent. Smallholders have alsointeracted with the Zulu homeland governmentDepartment of Agriculture, which in the 1980simplemented irrigation scheme reorganisation,infrastructure development and the introductionof furrow irrigation. After 1994, irrigationscheme management passed on to the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) provincial Department of Agricultureand Environmental Affairs. Msinga smallholdersbegan intersecting with this structure at a timewhen government subsidies were abruptly curtailed,partly to dismantle apartheid systems andpartly in line with international developments inIrrigation Management Transfer (IMT). Whilesmallholders perceived support by governmentat that time as lacking, the department appearsto have redeemed itself through its mandate todevelop small-scale farmers and the launch ofseveral farmer assistance programmes, includingsubsidy schemes for seed, seedlings, fertiliser andextension services. More recently, through IMT,Msinga smallholders have assumed responsibilityfor operational and maintenance functions. Itis within the IMT framework that block committeesand the umbrella committee for smallholdershave been formed.Production systemMsinga smallholders practise furrow irrigation.Farmers dig furrows from canals to their plotsand flood channels in the cropped area. Allfarmers interviewed expressed a concern overwater losses from leaking canals. A few farmershave connected pipes to the canals in orderto increase efficiency of water supply to theirfields. Concerns were also voiced about watershortages, which resulted in farmers oftenspending days and nights tending the flow ofwater to guard against crop water stress. Apartfrom the problem of water shortage, farmerswere concerned about crop losses from livestockbreaking through the old, dilapidated fence. Althoughfarmers had attempted self-reliance bycontributing R50 each for fence repairs, the totalamount of money raised was not sufficient. Consequently,farmers spend additional time in theirplots guarding against entry by stray livestock.Msinga smallholder farmers grow green mealiesand vegetables, such as tomato, butternut,green peppers, sweet potatoes, spinach, mustardgreens, beetroot, peas and beans. Farmersgrow these crops primarily for the market andsurplus is consumed by households. Each farmerworks individually in the production process, oftenwith the assistance of household members orhired labour. Increasingly, household membersare demanding to be paid for their labour. Remunerationfor hired labour varies, with workerspaid R30 per day (the work generally beingto prepare or weed a plot), a share of the cropproduced, or a larger amount of money after thecrop is harvested and sold, where the work hasinvolved preparing or weeding multiple plots. 16In some circumstances, farmers voluntarily pooltheir labour to work on each others’ plots (i.e.‘labour exchange’) using hoes, shovels, picks andrakes. Ploughing is done mostly using donkeydrawnploughs and sometimes by tractor. Itcosts R110 to hire a tractor from the municipalityand R120 - R190 to hire a donkey-drawn ploughfrom local community members. Most farmers,however, use the more expensive donkey-drawnploughs because there are too few municipaltractors.Inputs, such as fertiliser, seeds and seedlings,are sourced either from the small local town ofTugela Ferry or from the more distant urban centres,such as Greytown and Pietemaritzburg. Theprovincial Department of Agriculture and EnvironmentalAffairs assists farmers with extensionservices and subsidy schemes for seeds, seedlingsand fertilisers. The Department also providesfarmers with transport for inputs sourced frommore distant suppliers. This is part of the Department’smandate to develop the smallholderfarming sector in the province. Msinga smallholderirrigators have also received support inthe form of technical advice and extension servicesfrom non-governmental organisations andtertiary institutions, such as Church AgriculturalProjects, the University of KwaZulu-Natal, andZakhele Agricultural College. Such support, however,is far below that received by smallholdersin Limpopo and Eastern Cape provinces underthe RESIS and RESIS-Recharge Programmes. The16 Many farmers have fourplots and when they hire workerswill hire them to work allfour, which is why many farmersreport total labour costsper season of R120 (i.e. four xR30). The payment is typicallymade after selling the producebecause many farmers are toocash constrained to pay at thetime the work is done.135

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.performance of Msinga smallholders followingthe support given has been varied, with somefarmers achieving impressively high levels ofproductive efficiency while others not improvingtheir productivity significantly (Mkhabela,2005). The present case study was interested ingaining insights from the more successful farmersamong the smallholders.Marketing strategies vary depending on thetype of crop. For green mealies, buyers travelto Msinga from places as far afield as Durban,Ladysmith, Dundee, Mooi River, Pietemaritzburgand Weenen. In the 2007 season, the more successfulsmallholders earned net profits rangingfrom R2000 to R2500 per bed from selling greenmealies (Table 10.2). With most farmers cultivatingtwo beds of green mealies per season,farmers typically earned net profits of R4000 toR5000. By contrast, the marketing of vegetablesrequires farmers to go out in search of buyers.Crops such as tomato and green peppers arepacked in crates and transported either by privateor public means. It costs farmers R7.00 percrate and R16 per person to transport farm productsfrom Msinga to markets in Greytown andPietemaritzburg, for example. Since these cropsare highly perishable and markets not assured,farmers invariably express concerns about thehigh levels of risk associated with these crops despitetheir high value (Table 10.2). A few farmersdeliberately refrain from producing these cropsas a measure of risk-avoidance. For other crops,such as sweet potatoes and butternut, there is arelatively low risk of spoilage. The bulkiness ofthese crops, however, entails high public transportcosts, which restricts the range of producesince many farmers are compelled to marketthese crops mostly within local markets in andaround Tugela Ferry. Although market prices forsweet potato are relatively low (Table 10.2), thelow input costs for producing the crop have resultedin most farmers growing sweet potatoes.Over-supply of the crop reinforces the low marketprices.Success criteriaAlthough the study took cognisance of observationsby Mkhabela (2005) of the relatively highlevels of mean technical efficiency (84.3%) inthe Msinga Irrigation Scheme, this study deliberatelyrefrained from relying solely on conventionalcriteria for gauging smallholder farmers’success, namely ‘economic viability’ and ‘technicalefficiency’. An attempt was made to broadencriteria for assessing success, both from the pointof view of farmers and their communities andfrom perspectives of outsiders, such as agriculturalextension officers, social researchers andnon-governmental organisations (NGOs). Thefollowing criteria were therefore used:• Income from crop production• Technology• Labour• Ownership of the production system• Individual versus collective action• Number of plots used in crop production;• Productive versus non-productive use ofplots• Number of crops planted per year• Nature of involvement in contract farming• Land ownership versus leasing• Achievement of specific livelihood objectives• Attainment of social well-being.Factors contributing tothe success of the MsingasmallholdersIn many ways, factors contributing to the ‘success’of the Msinga smallholders go against con-Table 10.2: Illustrative net income from selected cropsCropGreen maizeTomatoesGreen peppersSweet potatoesProfit (Rands)2000 – 2500 per bed5000 – 8000 per bed6000 – 9000 per bed1290 per bed136Source: fieldwork, 2008

ResearchReportventional thinking in South African governmentand other circles on requisite interventions toassist smallholder farmers. The Strategic Planfor South African Agriculture (DoA, 2001) andWater Allocation Reform (WAR) Programme resonatewith NEPAD’s Comprehensive Africa AgriculturalDevelopment Programme (CAADP) intheir inclusion of the objective to enable smallholdersto become integrated into the mainstream,globalised and highly competitive commoditysectors within agricultural value chains.At the launch of the Water Allocation Reform(WAR) Strategy on 12 April 2005, the Minister ofWater Affairs and Forestry stated:“We will continue to strive to help ourpeople along the journey from beingsmall subsistence water users to, if theyso wish, large commercial, productive andcompetitive water users not just in SouthAfrica but internationally.”Prescriptions for achieving smallholder integrationand commercialisation include rehabilitationand upgrading hydraulic infrastructure andshifts from subsistence to commercially-orientedfarming. The support to smallholders is often articulatedthrough government-facilitated jointventures or strategic partnerships between resource-poorfarmers and private investors, andthe promotion of capital-intensive productionof high value crops. Evidence from post-1994smallholder farmer assistance programmes suchas RESIS in Limpopo Province (Tapela 2009; Dennisonand Manona, 2006; Veldwisch, 2004) andRESIS-Recharge in the Eastern Cape (Dennisonand Manona, 2006) shows that the “revitalisation”of smallholder irrigated agriculture hasoften compelled smallholders to shift away fromlow-cost production methods, such as furrowirrigation and small implements like hoes andspades, towards the use of sophisticated irrigationtechnology, such as micro-filter sprays and‘floppy’ systems. By contrast, Msinga smallholdershave not received such assistance, apart froma donor-funded vegetable pack house that wasconstructed in 2001 and remains unused. Whilethe non-use of the pack house resonates withpost-1994 smallholder assistance cases such asHereford (Tapela 2005), in many ways the caseof Msinga smallholders runs contrary to prevailingprescriptions and interventions.Msinga smallholders have retained the use oflow-cost farming technology, such as furrow irrigation,donkey-drawn ploughs and small implementslike rakes, hoes, spades, picks and shovels.As already mentioned, Msinga farmers hire municipaltractors at a cost of R110 for ploughing a‘bed’, but rely mainly on donkey-drawn ploughs,(R120 - R190 per bed) because of the unavailabilityof enough tractors. In the context of risinginput costs and an absence of massive subsidies,reliance on low-cost technology has ensuredthat Msinga smallholders obtain relatively higherprofit margins than many similar smallholderselsewhere.Labour intensityMsinga smallholders use labour-intensive methodsof crop production. This is linked to theirwidespread use of small implements as wellas the continuing traditional practice by somefarmers of pooling labour resources to help eachother with specific tasks. Other farmers havemoved away from this practice and prefer to hireneighbours and household members to work ontasks such as planting, cultivation and harvesting.Problems of water shortage and the risk ofcrop losses due to stray livestock, which are citedby all respondents, also compel farmers to tendirrigation furrows throughout much of the dayand overnight to ensure that their crops get adequatewater and are not eaten by stray animals.Despite the disadvantages of long hours spentguarding against crop losses, labour intensivefarming seems to contribute to higher yields andquality produce, while providing employment toa larger number of local people. This is not toargue, however, for the preservation of a statusquo that obviously disadvantages smallholders.Ultimately, there is a need to repair infrastructureand secure access by smallholders to sufficientwater.Individual ownership of theproduction systemIndividual ownership provides an incentive forfull-time commitment to farming by Msingasmallholders. The farmer is in control of most ofthe decisions and actions relating to crop production.Individual ownership of the productionsystem also removes problems of free-riding andpower dynamics that are often observed whenfarmers work in groups.Low-cost technologyShared procurement of inputsAlthough crop production is on an individualbasis, farmers voluntarily cooperate in specific137

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.activities. Apart from the pooling of labour resourcesby some of the farmers, most farmersalso cooperate in the procurement of inputs,thus taking advantage of economies of scale associatedwith bulk purchasing. For example, a25 kilogram bag of maize seed is shared amongtwo to ten smallholders, such that each smallholderultimately pays a lower price per unit ofseed than what they would otherwise pay whenindividually purchasing the same amount insmaller quantities.Cooperation in determination ofproducer pricesThe Msinga smallholders also cooperate in determininga common price for green mealies.Such cooperation seems borne out of a realisationthat when farmers rather than buyers determinecrop prices, there is a greater possibilitythat producer prices will be fair. The strategy (or‘closing of ranks’) by Msinga smallholders, however,only works for prices of green mealies andnot for vegetables. The reason is that the strategyworks because it is employed in conjunctionwith related adaptation and innovation strategiesfor ensuring that Msinga smallholders succeedin establishing and maintaining a niche inmarkets for green mealies.Adaptation and innovation strategies have includeda re-orientation from ‘subsistence’ to‘commercial’ production. This change seemsto have emerged voluntarily and organicallyfollowing the reorganisation of the irrigationscheme, construction of gravity-fed irrigation canalsand promotion of furrow irrigation by theZulu homeland government in the 1980s. A fewfarmers led the adoption of commercially-orientatedfarming and awareness of the advantagesof this type of farming spread to the rest of thesmallholders through diffusion. Many Msingasmallholders made the shift from subsistence tocommercially-oriented production between themid-1980s and the early 1990s. It is worth notingthat this shift also coincided with the return ofmany Msinga men from the mines in Kimberleyand Gauteng during the hostel-based violenceof the 1980s. These men needed to continueearning incomes. Their return to Msinga appearsto have exerted a strong influence on decisionsto adopt commercially-orientated farming.Innovation and adaptation strategies have alsoincluded a shift by smallholders from producingthe more common 4.1.4.1 strain of maize seed tothe Zimbabwean developed SC-701 strain, whichis in greater demand in green maize markets. Acob of the latter strain retails a higher price thanthe more common varieties like 4.1.4.1. While thehigh demand for the crop variety and relativelyhigh retail price for SC-701 has allowed Msingafarmers to raise producer prices for the crop, thisstrategy has been complemented by the practiceof early planting to ensure that Msinga farmers’produce gets to the markets long before thatof other farmers, particularly established largescalecommercial farmers.The production and marketing of green mealiesreflects the capacity of Msinga smallholders toadapt and innovate. While the high demandfor early green mealies has been a strong pullfactor drawing buyers to the irrigation schemeto purchase the produce in situ, a critical factorhas also been the farmers’ use of cell phones tolink up with prospective buyers. Those investingin and making effective use of cell phones werethe leading farmers, who recognised the criticalimportance of communication in the setting ofmarket prices and in securing buyers for a highlyperishable crop such as green mealies. The strategyof using cellular networks is particularlyeffective in light of the fact that most Msingasmallholders do not farm under formal contractsand therefore have no assurance that the cropwill be bought other than the certainty that theproduce is in high demand when it enters themarkets.The use and non-use of marketcontractsAlthough conventional wisdom is that contractsprovide the required regulation and coordinationmechanism for transactions between producersand buyers, many Msinga farmers viewformal contracts for green mealies as a sourceof risk in that they restrict farmers’ freedom todetermine prices or decide to whom to sell theirproduce. Smallholders have therefore tended toavoid market contracts, preferring to enter intoloose arrangements with buyers. Such arrangementsare not strictly binding, and if a buyerdoes not turn up at an agreed date, the farmerhas the freedom to sell his green mealies to analternative buyer. The logic behind the successof this strategy seems to hinge precisely on thetiming of sales of green mealies at peak demandin November. Despite the absence of formalcontracts, which embody the conventional institutionaleconomics notions of coordination and138

ResearchReportsecurity, Msinga farmers’ niche and competitivenessin markets for green mealies seem resilientso far. This is evidenced by the fact that in spiteof a number of incidents of violent attacks onand armed robbery of buyers by local criminals,buyers continue to ‘run the gauntlet’ in orderto gain access to the produce. It is not certain,however, whether the smallholders’ success withgreen mealies would be able to withstand unexpectedfactors, such as competition by otherfarmers for the same niche market.By contrast, contracts for vegetables, such asgreen peppers and tomatoes, are seen as desirable.Farmers with contracts to produce thesevegetables are among the more successful farmers.Presently, however, most vegetable producersfarm without entering into contracts withbuyers. They frequently experience losses dueto the uncertainty of markets. Despite theselosses, many Msinga farmers continue to growtomatoes and green peppers because of envisagedprofits from these high value crops. Consequently,there is often an over-supply of tomatoes,resulting in the spoilage of surplus produceand lowering of producer prices. In a contextwhere most tomato producers use the more expensivepublic transport to take their produce tomarkets, the lowering of prices narrows profitmargins and increases the risk of smallholders’financial losses. A number of smallholders deliberatelyrefrain from producing tomatoes inparticular, in order to avoid risk. For crops suchas sweet potatoes, with low input costs and lowperishability, the level of risk is relatively low. Almostall farmers therefore grow sweet potatoesas some form of security to hedge against possiblelosses from the more perishable, more input-intensiveand higher value vegetable crops.Income from sweet potato, however, is relativelylow (Table 10.2).Income from farmingThe amount of income earned from farming isviewed as an important success factor by smallholders.Farmers, however, do not compute thisincome using conventional agricultural economicsapproaches. For example, they do not calculatethe opportunity costs associated with thetime they spend farming, which is not to saythey do not recognise the value of their time.Their work on the plots, which at times involveslabouring days and nights, is taken as a necessarycomponent of a successful production system.This might be construed by economists asan uneconomic practice by smallholders to subsidisetheir own production system, to the pointwhere taking the value of farmers’ time into accountthrough proxies could be used to demonstratethat farmers are actually incurring ‘losses’.However, since Msinga farmers compute theeconomic performance of their enterprises differently,the result is one of profitable incomes.What this perhaps indicates is that smallholderfarmers’ conception ‘economic viability’ doesnot squarely match that of project planners andeconomists.Achievement of specific livelihoodobjectivesSuccess among the Msinga smallholders is alsomeasured in terms of achievement of specificlivelihood objectives. Respondents consistentlyallude to farming having enabled them to buildhouses for their families, buy vehicles, educatetheir children and ensure food security for theirhouseholds. In a context where Msinga LocalMunicipality, which is an ISRDP poverty node,has a very high rate of unemployment, low incomesand low levels of infrastructure and socialservices (Table 10.1), such achievements aresignificant. A number of smallholders who havebeen able to achieve livelihood objectives usingincome from farming are elderly, widowedwomen, who have single-handedly providedcomfortable homes, food security and educationfor their children and grandchildren. Withoutaccess to productive land in the irrigationscheme, these women farmers may have beenconfined to a life of abject poverty. For that reason,contributions of smallholder agriculture tothe livelihoods of these farmers and their progenyshould not be under-estimated.Attainment of social well-beingThe attainment of a sense of social well-beingwithin the community is considered by all respondentsto be important. Social well-being inthis instance is indicated by a sense of self-esteememanating from being gainfully employedand from contributing to the livelihoods of othersin the community. Such esteem enables farmersto command a degree of respect from theirfellow community members. Social well-beingderived from farming, however, is not attainedin isolation, but is strongly linked to farmers’contributions to the maintenance of healthy socialrelationships within the community. This isoften at the smallholders’ own expense.139

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.17 Real name withheld toprotect the privacy of therespondent.140For example, smallholders consciously make effortsto adopt peaceful means of resolving problemsof crop losses due to stray livestock ratherthan engage in conflicts with owners of suchlivestock, who may or may not be fellow irrigators.Smallholders have in the past unanimouslycooperated in contributing R50 each towardsmending old fences, although the total amountraised was insufficient to resolve the problem.As a result smallholders are compelled to spendlonger hours in the plots guarding against entryby stray livestock.Another example is that of smallholders adheringto the customary practice of ukuzila, whichis abstinence from farming for a few days beforeand after the death and burial of a fellow communitymember. Contravention of this practiceentails a high cost in terms of social relationshipsand farmers’ well-being within the community.Seen from an outsider’s narrow economic viabilitylens, these two examples might be construedas wasteful and inefficient aspects of the Msingasmallholder production system. What the outsiders’lens would fail to account for, however, arethe less tangible social losses that might resultfrom conflicts between livestock and crop farmersor between aggrieved and bereaved membersof the community and ‘errant’ smallholderswho break the ukuzila custom. Where there isa recognised need to reduce the time spent onukuzila, for example, negotiation might be auseful approach to ensuring that the interests ofboth smallholders and the community are reconciled.Number of plots used in cropproductionAmong smallholders, an important measureof success is the number of plots used in cropproduction. The more ‘successful’ farmers useat least four plots. This study identified a smallholderwho produced crops on 12 plots. Thereseems to be a need, however, to guard againstcapture of plots belonging to indigent smallholdersby the more affluent farmers.Productive versus non-productive useof plotsClosely linked to the number of plots used is theproductivity of farmers using plots. While manyof the more successful farmers used severalplots, those perceived to be the most successfulare often smallholders who made productive useof all the plots.Number of crops planted per yearProductive use of plots is related to the numberof crops planted per year. Farmers who producethree to four crops per plot per year are perceivedby their peers and external agencies, suchas extension officers and NGOs, to be among themore successful. An example is Mrs MM 17 , a widowedpensioner, who produces four crops perplot per year in each of her four plots (Figure10.1).Land ownership versus leasingA critical factor with respect to land is security oftenure. Those with secure tenure tend to makemore investments in developing their plots. Thisis regarded as generally true among smallholdersworldwide, but was also vividly demonstrated inthe course of our fieldwork with smallholders atMsinga. For example, Msinga smallholders areable to invest in hydraulic infrastructure such asirrigation pipes and water pumps. Smallholderswhose tenure is most secure are those who haveinherited the land through kinship ties. Othertenure arrangements, such as informal leasingand sharecropping, do not seem to providesmallholders with sufficient levels of security toenable long-term investments. All respondentsallude to constraints due to insecure tenure.While smallholders have no problems with requirementsby lessors for lessees to either ploughlessors’ plots or to give them a share of their producein lieu of cash rentals for use of land, thereis a strong sentiment that the short-term of useof leased land severely disrupts production andperpetuates insecurity among smallholders.Short-term leasing needs to be understood inthe context of the need to retain rights to theland by those whose extended families hold permissionto use it. Such land rights extend severalgenerations into history and provide an importantsafety net for members of that family group.Such land rights, however, can be lost if the landremains unused for an extended time (Cousinsand Mwheli, 2007). There are deep-seated fears,though, about such land being lost if it remainsfor too long in the hands of people outside theparticular extended family holding rights, hencethe short duration of informal lease arrangements.Although the short duration of informalleasing is a constraint to production, the fact that

ResearchReportFigure 10.1: Mrs MM’s annual cropping patternMAYCabbageJULY – AUGUSTMaize(green mealies)FEBRUARYBeansPotoatoesDECEMBERButternutGreen PepperSweet Potatoesit allows for unused land to circulate and hencebecome productive is a positive factor. What isperhaps required are mechanisms to ensure thatleasing affords both the land rights holders andlessees security of tenure.ChallengesMany of the voiced challenges experienced bythe Msinga smallholders revolve around institutionalissues. The less known challenges pertainto implications of narrow definitions of commercialand subsistence farming against the backdropof water sector reforms.Institutional organisation, capacityand coordinationThe role of the block committees is to maintaincanals and fences, manage the sharing of waterand collect administration fees from farmers.The role of the umbrella committee is primarilyto coordinate all management functions. Thetransfer of management functions to smallholderinstitutional structures has not been matchedwith resources to enable these institutions toperform their responsibilities.Farmers’ committees lack the capacity to resolvechallenges, such as leaking canals and aged andbroken fences, which require funding and technicalknow-how. Although farmers’ committeesare tasked with the management of water use,they lack the technical capacity to determinethe percentages of water lost through leakages.While committees have made attempts to raisefunding for repairing fences, such funding hasfallen short of required amounts.A second institutional problem is the poor coordinationbetween farmers and relevant governmentdepartments. For example, water shortageis cited by all respondents as a major constraintto crop production. Apart from a lack of informationon water losses due to canal leakages,none of the respondent smallholders, committeerepresentatives or agricultural extensionofficers knows how much water is allocated toMsinga smallholders from the Tugela River. Suchinformation should be available from the Departmentof Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF).The problem of poor coordination is also evidentin the lack of awareness by respondents of theavailability of subsidies to repair dilapidated infrastructure,such as canals and fences. An exampleof such subsidies is that availed through theDWAF 2005 Policy on the Financial Assistance toResource Poor Irrigation Farmers. Another examplerelates to subsidies provided through the141

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.LandCare and WaterCare Programmes of theDepartment of Agriculture under the Conservationof Agricultural Resources Act (CARA). Improvedcoordination and communication wouldcontribute to a reduction in the amount of timespent by farmers guarding against crop lossesdue to water deficit or stray livestock.Narrow conceptual definitionsof ‘commercial’ and ‘subsistence’farmingA major challenge for Msinga farmers is the prevailingnarrow definitions of ‘commercial’ and‘subsistence’ farming in various South Africancircles. Such definitions view these types of farmingas discrete and mutually exclusive. The narrowdefinitions consider commercial farming assimply involving market-orientated productionand subsistence as entailing production strictlyfor own consumption. In practice, however,there is an overlap between the two conceptsand definitions are therefore broader than oftenrealised. The distinction is that commercialfarming, on the one hand, is primarily gearedtowards the markets, with the surplus oftenconsumed by producer households. Subsistencefarming, on the other hand, is mainly aimed atown consumption, with surplus produce oftensold in order to generate extra income. In light ofongoing reforms in South Africa’s water sector,the narrow definitions of subsistence and commercialfarming pose significant implications forthe sustainability of livelihoods of smallholders,such as Msinga irrigators.In terms of the National Water Act (Act 36) of1998, Msinga farmers are currently using TugelaRiver water lawfully, since such use predatesthe promulgation of the National Water Act bymore than two years. The same Act requires allcommercial water users to register their use andobtain licenses for such use. In the interests ofadministrative efficiency, licensed users are requiredto pay the full economic cost of waterresource management services. Exemptions tothe licensing requirement apply to water ‘rights’namely, water for basic human needs and theecological reserve. Human rights to water areadministered under the Water Services Act (Act108) of 1997, and refer principally to domesticuses for food preparation, hygiene and sanitationpurposes. Under the National Water Act,exemptions to licensing relate to Schedule Onewater use, which refers to limited abstractionsfor narrowly ‘subsistence’ crop production onplots of less than 0.1 hectare, provided such plotsdo not collectively constitute significant levels ofwater use. Schedule One use also refers to stockwatering and ad hoc uses of water, such as incases of emergency.While a concerted effort has been made tobroaden access to water for basic needs, a largenumber of the poor, particularly the rural poor,still do not have adequate access to water. Accessproblems are compounded by the narrowfocus of water policies on allocations of waterfor basic needs and narrowly-defined commercialand subsistence uses. Provisions of the waterpolicy for direct abstractions of water withoutthe requirements for registration and licensingof use, limit such abstractions to non-commercialuses. Effectively, therefore, resource-poor farmerssuch as the Msinga smallholders, who ekeout livelihoods in informal economies, are oftenleft without means of access to water for livelihoodstrategies that are neither basic nor narrowly‘commercial’ or ‘subsistence’, but contributenonetheless to local economic well-being.It is also inappropriate that the articulation ofSouth Africa’s National Water Act should viewthe market orientation of crop production byresource-poor black smallholders as not muchdifferent from the highly industrialised and establishedlarge-scale white commercial farmers.It is essential therefore that measures to supportsmallholders should start by correctly defining, inbroader terms, the different categories of commercialand subsistence producers, and make appropriatelegal provisions to ensure that the livelihoodsof these farmers are not compromised inthe interest of neo-liberal notions of economicefficiency in water resources management.ConclusionThe Msinga case demonstrates a need for greaterflexibility in the definition of ‘viability’ offarming. Any programme of interventions tosupport resource-poor smallholders should beginby shifting away from:• Narrowly-conceived notions of viability interms of conventional economic approachesand agricultural technical efficiency to, forexample, a suite of measures that includeslivelihoods;• Narrow definitions of commercial and subsistencefarming to a recognition of theexistence of a middle ground where both142

ResearchReportforms of production orientation overlap,and in which many smallholders eke out aliving for themselves, their households andtheir communities. Such recognition shouldbe accompanied by relevant practical mechanismsthat address the interests of smallholderssuch as those of Msinga;• The commonly practiced one-size-fits-all approach,which ignores the social differentiationof smallholders and therefore theirdifferent interests, to an approach that accommodatesthe variety of socio-economicneeds and objectives;• The equally common group approach usedin projects to support black smallholders,which has been dogged by problems offree-riding and group power dynamics, toan approach that recognises and accommodatesthe value of individual enterprise inblack farmers;• The prevailing poor institutional coordination,communication and capacity to a moreeffective governance framework that drawson synergies between various sectors to ensuremeaningful support to smallholders.What is perhaps most important is that interventionsto support smallholders should build uponwhat is already in place, rather than radically introducecompletely new farming practices. Whilethe intention to enable smallholders to successfullycompete in national and international commoditysectors is perhaps a worthy goal, such anambition needs to be tempered by the sober realitythat attaining the goal will necessarily bea process that requires interventionists to workhand-in-hand with smallholders rather than hurriedlypush them ‘into the deep end’. This viewis based on observations that smallholders facesignificant constraints to establishing nicheswithin the highly competitive and globalisedcommodity sectors. While contract farming hasthe potential to launch enterprising smallholdersinto mainstream commercial production andmarkets, due care should be taken to ensurethat smallholders are not exposed to inordinatelyhigh levels of risk.ReferencesCousins, B and Mwheli, M (2007) Rules andpractices in a communal land tenure regime:Emerging findings from the Mchunu tribalarea, prepared for the LEAP symposium,Goedgedacht, 6-8 November 2007.Denison, J and Manona, S (2007) Principles,approaches and guidelines for theparticipatory revitalisation of smallholderirrigation schemes: Volume 2: Concepts andcases, WRC Report No. TT 309/07, Gezina:Water Research Commission.DoA (Department of Agriculture) (2001)Strategic Plan for South African Agriculture.Pretoria: Department of Agriculture.Mkhabela, T S (2005) Technical efficiency in avegetable based mixed-cropping sector inTugela Ferry, Msinga District, KwaZulu-Natal,Agrekon 44(2): 187-204.Msinga Local Municipality (2008) IntegratedDevelopment Plan 2007/08.Tapela, B (2005) Joint ventures and livelihoodsin emerging small-scale irrigation schemesin Greater Sekhukhune District: Perspectivesfrom Hereford. Research Report No. 21.Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies(PLAAS), School of Government, University ofthe Western Cape, Bellville.Tapela, B (2009) Agricultural commercializationof smallholder irrigation schemes in povertynodes in Limpopo Province, South Africa,paper presented at the Working on theMargins workshop, 26 and 27 March, CapeTown.143

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.144

ResearchReport11 Smallholder irrigation schemes inSouth Africa with a focus on DzindiCanal Irrigation Scheme in Limpopo:dynamic smallholders amidstcontested policy prioritiesWim van Averbeke and T. B. Khosa, Department of CropSciences, Tshwane University of TechnologyIntroductionSmallholder irrigation schemes inSouth AfricaSouth Africa is a dry country and the productivityof much of its arable land can be substantiallyenhanced when irrigation water is available.South Africa has about 1.3 million hectares underirrigation but only about 0.1 million hectares(7.7%) is held by smallholders (Backeberg, 2006).Du Plessis et al. (2002) categorised smallholderirrigators into four groups, namely,• farmers on irrigation schemes;• independent irrigation farmers;• community gardeners; and• home-gardeners.Backeberg (2006) estimated that there werebetween 200 000 and 250 000 smallholder irrigatorsin South Africa but among them at leastfour out of five were community gardeners orhome-gardeners, who farmed very small plots ofthe order of 0.1 hectares or smaller, primarily toprovide food for home consumption. Less thanone out of five smallholders were operating asindependent irrigation farmers or as plot holderson irrigation schemes, cultivating somewhatlarger plots, of the order of one or more hectares,for subsistence or commercial purposes.Not much is known about the population ofindependent irrigation farmers but a considerablebody of knowledge has been compiled onsmallholder irrigation schemes.Denison and Manona (2007a) define South Africansmallholder irrigation schemes as multifarmerirrigation projects larger than 5 hectaresin size that were either established in the formerhomelands or in resource-poor areas byblack people or agencies assisting their development.Using this definition, they counted 317smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa in2003. Different estimates of the combined commandarea covered by these irrigation schemesrange between 46 000 hectares and 49 500hectares (Bembridge, 2000; Backeberg, 2003;Denison and Manona, 2007a). On average theseschemes cover about half (47%) of the totalsmallholder irrigation area in South Africa and3.6% of the 1.3 million hectares under irrigation(Backeberg, 2006). Denison and Manona (2007a)estimate that the land on smallholder irrigationschemes was held by about 31 000 plot holders.Dividing the total smallholder irrigation schemearea by the number of plot holders, the averagesize of irrigated plots on these schemes is about1.5 hectare. By comparison, the average size ofirrigated holdings in the large-scale commercialirrigation sector is about 42 hectares.Most smallholder irrigation schemes are foundin the economically under-developed formerhomelands of South Africa, where the incidenceof poverty is high. In these areas, smallholder irrigationschemes present an opportunity for localeconomic development. For homesteads thathold land on these schemes, the irrigation plotis an asset that can be used to augment or diversifytheir livelihood (Mohamed, 2006). Smallholderirrigation schemes can also have positive145

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.economic impacts on people other than plotholders. On the plots there may be employmentopportunities for farm workers, whilst additionallivelihood opportunities may arise from backwardand forward linkages, such as the provisionof land preparation services, the trade in freshproduce, and processing of farm produce.Historical developmentof smallholder irrigationschemesThe history of smallholder irrigation schemedevelopment in South Africa was influenced bypolicy perspectives and the technology that wasavailable at the time. Accordingly, Van Averbeke(2008) identified three important smallholder irrigationscheme development eras, namely,• The smallholder canal scheme era (fromabout 1930 until about 1969)• The homeland era (from about 1970 until1994); and• The irrigation management transfer (IMT)and revitalisation era (1995 to present).Table 11.1 provides an indication of the origin ofexisting smallholder irrigation schemes in SouthAfrica in relation to these three developmentaleras.Smallholder canal schemesMost of the schemes that were established duringthe smallholder canal scheme era were constructedbetween 1946 and about 1960. Theirestablishment was aimed at providing Africanfamilies residing in what were then called the‘Native or Bantu Areas’ with livelihoods thatwere entirely based on farming. During the1950s they were considered to be highly successfuldevelopment projects. A country-wide surveyconducted during 1952-53 found that the meanfarm income derived from plots of 1.5 morgen(1.28 ha) and a livestock holding of 5.2 animalunits was £110 on these types of schemes. Onaverage, 55% of farm income was obtainedin the form of food for own consumption and45% from the sale of produce. By contrast, thenationwide mean annual income among ruralfamilies with livelihoods that were completelyland-based was only £57 (Commission for the Socio-EconomicDevelopment of the Bantu Areaswithin the Union of South Africa, 1955).Socially and institutionally, tenure and farmingon canal schemes differed from traditional arrangements.When the state identified land forscheme development it first sought to transferownership of the land from the tribe to the stateand then imposed Trust tenure and Bettermentplanning. Farmers held their plots by means ofPermission to Occupy (PTO). Trust tenure providedthe state with the necessary powers to prescribeland use and to expel and replace farmerswhose practices did not comply with its prescriptions.In selected cases, the state effectively usedthese powers to enforce the production objectivesof the scheme by evicting poorly performingfarming families. A similar authoritarian andpaternalistic approach by the state prevailed onwhite settler schemes established during thegreat depression and WWII period (Backebergand Groenewald, 1995).From a design perspective, many smallholdercanal schemes relied on a concrete weir to di-Table 11.1: Categorisation of existing smallholder irrigationscheme development in South AfricaEra No of schemes Area (ha) Mean area perscheme (ha)Smallholder canalscheme (1930-1969)Independenthomeland (1970-1996)IMT and revitalisation(1997-present)Year of establishmentuncertainMain irrigationtechnology used74 18 226 246 Gravity-fed surfaceirrigation62 12 994 210 Different forms ofoverhead irrigation64 2 383 37 Pump and sprinklers ormicro-irrigation117 15 897 136 Mostly overheadirrigationTotal 317 49 505 156146Source: Van Averbeke, 2008.

ResearchReportvert water from a river, from which a system ofconcrete canals and furrows conveyed it to fieldedge. Plot size typically ranged between 1.5 and2 morgen (1.28 to 1.71 ha) (Bembridge, 1997).Independent homeland schemesSmallholder irrigation development during theindependent homeland era was characterisedby modernisation, functional diversification andcentralisation of scheme management. Examplesof large projects (>500 ha) in the Eastern Capethat were characteristic of irrigation developmentduring this era were the Keiskammahoek,Tyefu and Ncora irrigation schemes (Van Averbekeet al., 1998) (see Table 11.1).On large schemes, economic viability was pursuedby means of a strategy of functional diversification.Typically included were a commercialfunction in the form of a central unit which wasfarmed as an estate, a commercial smallholderfunction in the form of medium sized plots (alsocalled ‘mini farms’), which were 5 to 12 hectaresin size, and a subsistence function in the formof food plots, ranging from 0.1 to 0.25 hectaresin size (Van Averbeke et al., 1998). It can be arguedthat functional diversification was a way ofcatering for rural livelihood diversity, althoughthis concern was not necessarily stated explicitlyin the plans. In practice, however, functional diversityprovided rural homesteads with differentoptions to benefit from irrigated agriculture, dependingon the structure of their existing livelihood.For example, the mini farms were meantto cater for homesteads that sought full landbasedlivelihoods, whilst the food plots providedhomesteads that derived their livelihood fromexternal sources – such as male-migration or oldagepensions – with an opportunity to enhancethese livelihoods by producing food for homeconsumption. The estate component offeredopportunities to members of rural homesteadswho were searching for employment and monetaryincome close to home. Management ofthese large schemes was centralised in the handsof specialised parastatals, such as Ulimocor inCiskei, Tracor in Transkei and Agriven in Venda.Socially and institutionally, the large schemeswere very complex. Arrangements to use theland for irrigation development often involvedthe provision of services to historical land holders(Van Averbeke et al., 1998). Social unrest andconflict during the late nineteen-eighties furtherreduced the sustainability of these schemes.When the post-1994 provincial governments decidedto dismantle the agricultural parastatalsin the former homelands, these large schemeswere particularly affected, because they werethe most complex and had been centrally managedfrom inception, resulting in exceptionallyhigh levels of dependency among farmers (VanAverbeke et al., 1998). Partial or total collapse ofproduction followed this decision almost immediately(Bembridge, 2000; Laker, 2004).In terms of design, the irrigation infrastructureon the large schemes established during the independenthomeland era was amongst the mostmodern that was available at that time, but evenon smaller schemes, pressurised overhead irrigationwas used instead of surface irrigation.The irrigation management transfer(IMT) and revitalisation eraThe irrigation management transfer and revitalisationera started in earnest around 1997 andis still continuing. During this era, the focus ofsmallholder irrigation development has mainlybeen on the transformation of existing schemes,but the approach used by the state to achievethis has been subject to review and change. Asa result, this era can be subdivided into severalphases.The first phase, which was transitional, occurredduring the political transition period between1990 and 1996, when several new small irrigationschemes were established as part of the Reconstructionand Development Programme (RDP) insupport of rural poverty alleviation. Denison andManona (2007a) counted 62 irrigation schemesthat were established during this era. Combined,these new schemes added about 2400 hectaresto the total smallholder irrigation scheme area(Table 11.1), at an average of about 39 hectaresper scheme. Typically, they use mechanical pumpand sprinkler technology to extract and apply irrigationwater.The second phase commenced more or less whenGEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution)superseded the RDP as the overall economic developmentpolicy of South Africa. Under GEAR,the strategy to eradicate poverty shifted fromfunding community-based projects à la RDP, topursuing economic growth through private sectordevelopment. Existing irrigation schemeswere identified as important resources for economicdevelopment in the rural areas, but they147

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.148required revitalisation first. Revitalisation waslinked to Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT).IMT refers to the transfer of the responsibility ofmanaging, operating and maintaining irrigationschemes from the state to farmers themselves.Elsewhere in the world IMT had been implementedas a strategy to improve scheme managementperformance, increase the profitabilityof irrigated agriculture and reduce recurrentpublic spending on the operation and maintenanceof irrigation schemes (Vermillion, 1997;Shah et al., 2002). Adoption of the policy of IMTwas aligned with GEAR, because it promised toimprove the lives of poor people by means of aprocess that empowered them to take control oftheir own resources and destiny, typically with acommercial economic focus.Among the different IMT initiatives in thecountry, the Revitalisation of Smallholder IrrigationSchemes (RESIS) of Limpopo Provincestands out for its comprehensiveness. The RESISprogramme evolved from the WaterCare programmelaunched in 1998, which aimed to revitaliseselected smallholder irrigation schemes inLimpopo, not only infra-structurally but also interms of leadership, management and productivity.Using a participatory approach, WaterCareinvolved smallholder communities in planningand decision-making, and provided training toenable these communities to take full managementresponsibility over their schemes (Denisonand Manona, 2007a). In 2000, much of Limpopowas ravaged by severe storms, which resulted inwidespread floods and damage to roads, bridgesand also to the weirs that provided water tomany of the smallholder canal schemes. Declareda disaster area, Limpopo Province was allocatedspecial funding to repair the damage to its infrastructure,providing impetus to the WaterCareprogramme.In 2002, the provincial government of Limpopobroadened the scope of its irrigation schemerehabilitation intervention by launching a comprehensiverevitalisation programme, calledRESIS (Revitalisation of Smallholder IrrigationSchemes). RESIS adopted the participatory approachof the WaterCare programme, butplanned to revitalise all smallholder schemes inthe province (Limpopo Department of Agriculture,2002). As was the case in the WaterCareprogramme, RESIS combined the reconstructionof smallholder irrigation infrastructure with IMT.In support of IMT, the programme dedicatedone-third of the revitalisation budget to capacitybuilding among farmers. RESIS also sought toenhance commercialisation of the smallholderfarming systems on the schemes, in order to improvethe livelihood of plot holder homesteads(Limpopo Department of Agriculture, 2002).However, during the WaterCare programmeand the first phase of RESIS (1998-2005), the emphasiswas primarily on the rehabilitation of theexisting scheme infrastructure and on sustainableIMT, and less on commercialisation. Canalschemes that were revitalised during this phaseremained canal schemes.The third phase of the IMT and revitalisation eracommenced around 2005, when commercialisation,water productivity and water use efficiencybecame the principal development objectives ofsmallholder scheme revitalisation. In LimpopoProvince the Department of Agriculture developedthe view that canal irrigation was associatedwith subsistence farming and inefficientwater use. Consequently, the Department terminatedthe revitalisation of canal infrastructureand only considered applications for revitalisationof canal schemes if farmers agreed to thereplacement of their canal systems with modernirrigation technology, such as micro-irrigation orfloppy sprinkler systems. However, the Departmentsoon discovered that commercialisationwas not just a function of irrigation technology,and in 2007 it encouraged plot holders of revitalisedschemes to enter into partnerships withexperienced commercial farmers to form jointventures. Makuleke Irrigation Scheme becamethe flagship project of the Department’s newapproach.Under RESIS, Makuleke had been revitalisedwhen new sprinklers and pumps were installed.Supported by CottonSA, farmers agreed to producecotton, but low prices marginalised theproduction of cotton and the project collapsed.Subsequently, the Department financed the replacementof the sprinkler system with centrepivots and arranged for a joint venture with acommercial farmer. The joint venture was structuredaround 43 smallholders supplying a totalof 138 hectares of irrigation land for the commercialpartner to farm. Profits were sharedat the end of each production cycle (60% forthe commercial partner and 40% for the plotholders). During the first year of production(2007/08), smallholders twice received R5000/hectare as a share in the profit of a potato anda maize crop. Considering that each smallholderon average contributed 3.2 hectares, they each

ResearchReportearned about R32 000 during the first year ofproduction. Plot holders received this incomesolely by making available their plots as all costswere carried by the commercial partner, whoalso brought in his own labour force. Highlysatisfied with this outcome, the Departmentannounced the application of the joint ventureapproach on 15 other smallholder schemes thathad been revitalised and equipped with modernirrigation technology.Options for smallholderirrigation schemedevelopmentDenison and Manona (2007b) point out that successfulrevitalisation of smallholder schemes dependson a clear and unambiguous statement ofthe objectives of revitalisation. They argue thatone of the weaknesses of smallholder irrigationscheme revitalisation in South Africa has beenthat the objectives guiding revitalisation effortswere sometimes contradictory, making it impossiblefor revitalisation to achieve all its statedobjectives. Moreover, they identified schemespecificfactors that preordained the objectivesthat could be achieved in any particular case.This made them conclude that the directionof smallholder irrigation scheme developmentneeded to consider the locally specific circumstances.They outlined four principal developmentpathways or trajectories that could be considered,depending on local conditions. Theseare described as follows:• The ‘business farmer’ – commercial productionon consolidated farms: This developmentalpathway involves the establishmentof farm enterprises held by individuals whoproduce commodities on relatively largefarms ranging between 5 hectares and 40hectares, depending on the commoditybeing produced. Business farmers are expectedto have the required technical andmanagerial capacity and financial resourcesto deal with the risk associated with commercialfarming, and to sustain the use ofmoderately to highly sophisticated irrigationtechnology. Under certain circumstances,particularly in relation to produce markets,business farmers could also act as outgrowersproducing one commodity only, asin the case of the cane growing sector. Revitalisationobjectives congruent with this trajectoryare increased production, economicviability, commercialisation, establishmentof an African peasant or commercial farmerclass, and Black Economic Empowerment(BEE). It must be noted that for many smallholderschemes, selecting this particular developmentaltrajectory would require theconsolidation of existing plots into largerunits.• The ’smallholder farmer’ – diversified farmingand reduced risk: This development trajectoryaccommodates livelihood diversityamong plot holders, with particular referenceto the various roles farming plays intheir livelihoods. Denison and Manona pointout that this trajectory is unlikely to be a financiallyfeasible proposition on schemeswhere the cost of the overheads and managementof the irrigation are high, andsuggest that this trajectory is best suited forlow-cost canal schemes. The only tangiblerevitalisation objective of this trajectory isimproved efficiency of the canal system resultingin increased delivery of water to theplots, but from an economic perspective theimpact of revitalisation is highly dependenton how farmers make use of the improvedconditions.• The ‘equity-labourer’ – plot holders inlarge-scale commercial partnerships: Thisdevelopment trajectory calls for commercialpartner investment to cover the cost ofoverheads and management of irrigationand production. Denison and Manona postulatethat this trajectory is probably bestsuited for large and complex schemes thatare remote, such as the Ncora IrrigationScheme in western Transkei. They point outthat this trajectory largely transfers controlover the assets and the mode of productionto the commercial partner in return for jobs,probably at the minimum wage level andthe opportunity to earn some dividends. Assuch, job creation is the revitalisation objectivecongruent with this trajectory, butevidence from Makuleke indicates that dividendspaid to plot holders can be an importantobjective also.• The ‘food producer’ – irrigated food plotsand home gardens: This development trajectoryaims to provide homesteads withthe opportunity to enhance their access tofood through own production on small irrigatedplots of 0.25 hectares or less. Poverty149

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.150alleviation and enhanced homestead foodsecurity are the revitalisation objectives thatare congruent with this trajectory.Denison and Manona (2007b) indicate that revitalisationof a particular scheme could involvethe adoption of more than one developmenttrajectory. For example, the business farmer trajectorycould be combined with the food producertrajectory by subdividing the scheme intoparts, each with its own specific revitalisationobjectives.Current smallholderirrigation schemedevelopment in LimpopoProvinceOf the nine provinces in South Africa, Limpopodominates in terms of smallholder irrigationscheme development. Mohamed (2006) reportedthat in 2004, 57% of the total numberof smallholder irrigation schemes (154 out of287), and 54% of the total area under smallholderirrigation (24 795 hectares out of 46 000hectares), occurred in Limpopo Province (Table11.2). Combined, the Limpopo smallholderschemes were farmed by 15 919 plot holders,which represented 51% of the national total offarmers on smallholder irrigation schemes. Theaverage size of smallholder irrigation schemesin Limpopo Province was 161 hectares, the averagenumber of plot holders per scheme was 103,and the average land holding per plot holderwas 1.5 hectares. Other provinces in which smallholderirrigation schemes are important includethe Eastern Cape with 21% of the total irrigatedarea and 7 845 (25%) plot holders, and KwaZulu-Natal with 14% of the total irrigated area and 6174 (20%) plot holders (Table 11.2).The current policy of the Limpopo Departmentof Agriculture favours the ‘equity labourer’ developmenttrajectory and funds for smallholderirrigation scheme revitalisation are allocatedaccordingly. The case study presented in this reportargues that this policy is too narrow. Reasonssupporting this argument include:• The policy does not take into account thatcircumstances among irrigation schemesdiffer substantially, as pointed out by Denisonand Manona (2007b). At some schemesthe application of the ‘equity labourer’ developmenttrajectory is likely to be problematicbecause factors such as slope or plotsize may limit the possibilities for consolidationof the land.• The application of the ‘equity labourer’development trajectory may not be acceptablesocially because on some schemes plotholders have built sustainable agrarian livelihoodsand they may not be interested inbecoming share holders or farm workers.Whereas the ‘equity labourer’ development trajectorymay yield impressive financial returnsfor plot holders, these only materialise followingsubstantial public investment in new irrigationsystems, which have a limited lifespan. Thequestion of who will take responsibility for therepair and replacement of these systems whenthey start to age or reach the end of their lifespan arises.Moreover, the application of the ‘equity labourer’development trajectory at Makulekeindicates that this trajectory contributes little towardsthe establishment of a commercial Africanfarmer class. On the contrary, the way in whichthe joint venture operates at that scheme completelydivorces plot holders from productiondecisions and practices.The case study presented here analyses farmingon a smallholder canal irrigation scheme calledDzindi. It draws on reports by Mohamed (2006)and Van Averbeke (2008), which elaborate differentaspects of this scheme, but uses new fieldworkto present up-to-date farm enterprise information.Updating the enterprise informationprovided indications of how farmers have copedwith changes that have occurred since 2003,when Mohamed (2006) collected enterprisebudget data at the scheme. During the five-yearperiod that has elapsed since then, importantmacro-economic developments have occurred,such as the rapid increase in the cost of dieseland chemical fertilisers.The case study provides material that supportsthe revitalisation of selected canal irrigationschemes, such as Dzindi, using the ‘smallholderfarmer’ development trajectory proposed byDenison and Manona (2007b). From an irrigationtechnology perspective, this trajectory calls forthe refurbishment of the canal infrastructure,which may be cheaper than replacing the canalsystem with another type of irrigation. Furthermore,the study argues that under specificcircumstances, the development of new canalschemes could be considered. The study dem-

ResearchReportTable 11.2: Summary data on South African smallholder irrigation schemes by provinceProvince Schemes Number offarmersMean plotsize (ha)Active schemes Number of schemes by size categoryNo. Commandarea (ha)Mean size(ha)Proportionof totalcommandarea (%)No. % Area(ha)% < 5 ha 5-50ha51-150ha151-500ha501-1500ha> 1500haLimpopo 154 24 795 161 54 15 919 1.6 95 62 10 962 44 0 46 70 27 9 1Eastern Cape 74 9 624 130 21 7 845 1.2 50 68 3 843 40 16 41 7 4 3 2KwaZulu-Natal36 6 621 184 14 6 174 1.1 35 97 3 097 47 17 4 2 8 3 1Mpumalanga 8 990 124 2 209 4.7 8 100 556 56 0 5 3 0 0 0Western Cape 9 425 47 1 737 0.6 8 89 386 91 0 7 0 1 0 0North West* 3 3 524 1 175 8 423 8.3 2 67 2 816 80 0 2 0 0 0 1Free State* 3 20 20 0 2 10.0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0Total 287 45 999 - 100 31 309 - 198 69 21 660 - 33 108 82 40 15 5*Data on North West and Free State scheme sizes were incomplete. Subsequently, an additional 30 schemes were added to the data base.Source: Mohamed, 2006.151

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.onstrates that enterprises on smallholder canalschemes can generate financial returns per unitarea that match those obtained by plot holdersinvolved in joint ventures, using MakulekeIrrigation Scheme as a benchmark. One of themost powerful arguments in favour of canal irrigationis the longevity of the system. At Dzindithe canal system is 54 years old and there areseveral other functioning canal schemes that areas old if not older. In addition, canal schemes usegravity for the conveyance of water, making itindependent of the cost of energy. Some of theweaknesses and limitations of smallholder canalschemes are also pointed out.MethodsStudy siteDzindi (23o 01’S; 30o26’E) is located in Itsani,about 6 kilometres southwest of the town ofThohoyandou, in the Thulamela Local Municipality,Vhembe District, Limpopo Province (Figure11.1). The scheme was established in 1954 andhas a total command area of 135.6 hectares thatis subdivided into 106 plots of 1.28 hectares each,which are held by 102 plot holders. In terms ofscheme size, plot size and plot holder populationDzindi more or less typical of smallholdercanal irrigation schemes in Limpopo (Mohamed,2006).At Dzindi, water is supplied by the diversion ofthe Dzindi River by a concrete weir. The DzindiRiver is perennial, but its water flow is subject toconsiderable seasonal variation (Van der Stoepand Nthai, 2005). At the weir, water enters themain concrete canal, which runs over a distanceof about 14 kilometres and conveys the water tothe four irrigation blocks (Figure 11.2). The irrigationblocks are divided into plots, which receivetheir water by means of secondary concrete canals.Most of the land at Dzindi is sloping and forthis reason, the plots are terraced. Farmers referto these terraces as beds. On average, a plot consistsof 15 beds but the number varies considerablyfrom plot to plot. Contour bunds separatethe beds from each other and the area occupiedby these bunds occupies about one-quarter ofthe plot. As a result, the effective cropping areaof a plot is just under 1 hectare.Dzindi has one night-storage dam, which suppliesBlock 1. The amount of water entering thescheme is sufficient only to allow each farmerone irrigation per week. Each day, two farmersper secondary furrow have the right to draw water,one during the morning and the other dur-Figure 11.1: Location of Dzindi Irrigation Scheme152

ResearchReportFigure 11.2: Schematic layout of the water distributionnetwork at DzindiWeir in Dzindi RiverMakhado /Thohoyandou roadBalancing damM 1Inverted siphonM 6Block 1M 3M 5M 4Block 2M 2Block 4Block 3Source: Van der Stoep and Nthai, 2005.ing the afternoon. This rule applies during daylighthours only. During the night anyone whoneeds water may irrigate except farmers in Block1, because the night storage dam is replenishedduring the night. According to Van der Stoepand Nthai (2005), water conveyance at Dzindi iswithin the acceptable irrigation efficiency limits,even when water losses through seepage andspillage due to the poor conditions of the waterconveyance system are taken into account.For various reasons, such as the lack of moneyto pay for land preparation or the occurrence ofwater shortages, not all the available irrigatedland at Dzindi is cultivated (Table 11.3). Duringthe period August 2005 to March 2007, the proportionof land that was covered with a growingcrop ranged between 22.7% and 65.4%. Theintensity with which land is cropped varies fromplot to plot. Summer use is higher than winteruse because that is the season when many plotholders produce grain for their families. Table11.3 shows that maize was by far the most importantcrop and featured throughout the year atDzindi, because maize is not only grown for grainbut also for the harvest of green cobs, which arenearly all marketed. Conditions at Dzindi allowfor the planting of maize throughout the year.Winter plantings are aimed at exploiting out-ofseasondemand for green maize. In 2002, abouttwo-thirds of the grain produced at Dzindi wasused for home consumption and the other thirdwas sold. Besides maize, farmers also grow exoticvegetables (cabbages, Swiss chard and onions),and African leafy vegetables (Chinese cabbageand nightshade) during winter, and pulses(mostly groundnuts), tubers (sweet potatoes),traditional vegetables (pumpkins and melons)and exotic vegetables (tomatoes, green peppersand cabbages) during summer.The 2003 livelihood survey by Mohamed (2006),which covered 97 of the 102 plot holder homesteadsat Dzindi, demonstrated high levelsof livelihood diversity. All of the homesteadsfarmed their plots but only 20 of the 97 homesteadsobtained more than half of their incomefrom farming. Using main source of income(>50% of total) as the criterion for differentiation,plot holder livelihoods at Dzindi can be categorisedinto five main types, namely:• Social grant holders-37%• Employees-22%• Farmers-21%• Petty entrepreneurs-11%• Diversified-income households-9%.Mohamed (2006) also reported considerablevariability in the way homesteads approached153

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 11.3: Land use at DzindiLand useAug-05 Dec-05 Mar-06 Jun-06 Aug-06 Dec-06 Mar-07Proportion of total irrigated area (%)Fallow 34.23 33.91 61.26 41.62 36.58 22.90 44.27Prepared 23.52 8.66 16.06 27.74 32.33 11.73 23.06Maize 22.70 47.37 13.65 2.12 8.65 58.60 6.98Indigenous leafyveggies 4.27 0.00 3.80 15.13 7.97 0.00 11.66Chinese cabbage 0.79 0.00 3.75 10.28 3.02 0.00 10.95Nightshade 3.48 0.00 0.05 4.85 4.95 0.00 0.71Exotic leafyvegetables 6.55 0.16 2.30 8.88 8.92 1.05 5.98White cabbage 3.74 0.05 2.30 6.52 5.64 1.05 5.71Swiss chard 2.85 0.11 0.00 2.36 3.28 0.00 0.27Root and bulbcrops 2.95 1.28 0.99 2.25 2.13 1.19 3.06Sweet potatoes 1.53 1.11 0.99 1.75 0.77 0.81 2.98Onions 1.42 0.00 0.00 0.40 1.22 0.00 0.08Beetroot 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.15 0.24 0.00Carrots 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00Vegetable fruits 0.69 0.69 0.07 0.14 0.52 0.40 1.71Tomatoes 0.69 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.32 0.84Green peppers 0.00 0.32 0.07 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.05Chillies 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82Cucurbits 3.35 3.75 0.25 0.00 0.41 1.40 0.02Pumpkins 3.35 3.54 0.18 0.00 0.11 0.37 0.02Butternut 0.00 0.21 0.07 0.00 0.30 1.03 0.00Pulses (freshand dry) 1.74 4.18 1.62 2.12 2.49 2.73 3.26Dry and greenbeans 1.32 0.16 0.49 1.81 2.22 0.00 2.31Bambaragroundnuts 0.00 0.11 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19Groundnuts 0.42 3.91 0.89 0.00 0.00 2.73 0.76Peas 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.27 0.00 0.00Total undergrowing crops 42.25 57.43 22.68 30.64 31.09 65.37 32.67Source: Van Averbeke, 2008.154farming. Diversity in farming was described usingthe farming style concept. Van der Ploeg(2003) defined farming style as an integratingconcept that portrays a particular way of practisingagriculture and called it an expression ofhow farmers combine and order the elementsthat are used in the process of agricultural production.Analysing 96 farm enterprises at Dzindi, Mohamed(2006) identified three distinctly differentfarming styles at Dzindi, namely foodfarmers, employers and profit makers. A fourthcategory, designated ‘other’, was created toaccommodate homesteads whose farming didhave the defining characteristics of any of thethree main farming styles.The key objective of food farmers was to producefood for own consumption at low cost andlow risk, funding production using income derivedfrom other sources, mostly social grants.Employers typically left farming to full-timefarm workers because they were involved inother livelihood activities, or because they were

ResearchReporttoo old to farm. Employers adopted a partiallymarket-oriented approach to recover at leastpart of the cost of labour, which was the principalvariable cost in this particular farming style.Profit makers farmed to earn cash income andin pursuit of this objective they adopted a strategycharacterised by relatively high levels of risk.Production of white cabbages and green maizefeatured prominently in their farm enterprises.Profit makers tended to be highly dependent onfarming for income. They mainly relied on familylabour but hired casual labour on a daily orpiece-work basis during peak times. Additionalinformation on farming styles at Dzindi werepresented by Van Averbeke and Mohamed(2007). Table 11.4 shows the frequency distributionof livelihood types and farming styles atDzindi in 2003.Data collection during 2008Fieldwork conducted for this case study involvedinterviews with nine plot holders during Julyand August 2008. The main objective was to findout to what extent change in circumstances hadaffected farming of the selected homesteads.For this purpose, particular attention was paidto the enterprise budgets, which were collectedfor the period 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008. Additionalinformation that was collected was thelife history of the plot holder, the current structureof the livelihood of the plot holder homestead,the marketing strategy of the plot holderand involvement in collaboration, perceptionsof success and perspectives on the future.Sampling of the nine plot holders was purposivewith a bias for the selection of plot holders whowere making a living from farming (the ‘farmer’livelihood type) while using a commercial approachto agriculture (the ‘profit maker’ farmingstyle). Table 11.4 shows that in 2003, 20 of 96plot holder homesteads had a farmer livelihoodtype and 16 out of 96 had a profit maker farmingstyle. For this reason, generalisations of thefindings of this case study to scheme level arenot warranted.Table 11.5 indicates the livelihood type and farmingstyle of the nine plot holder homesteadsincluded in the sample using the same criteriafor categorisation as those used by Mohamed(2006).Case studiesHistorical perspectiveThe focus of this section is on the life history ofthe nine plot holders who were selected for thecase study. Considering that the Dzindi smallholdercanal irrigation scheme started 54 yearsago, most plot holders are second- or even thirdgeneration,but one of the original plot holdershas been included in the study (Case 5). Table11.6 summarises the life histories of the nine plotholders featuring in this study.The nine life histories illustrate how agrarianlivelihoods are or were constructed using theirrigation plot as the central asset. One of theprominent themes is the association of youthwith off-farm work and urban migration. Alleight male farmers covered by the study firstsought to make a living off-farm, often as migrantworkers. For various reasons, they choseor were forced to return home and decided tomake a living from farming. They then (re)-activatedthe plot that was left to them by theirfamilies and set out to develop their farm enterprises.In some instances this was achievedsuccessfully (Cases 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 9), whilst inothers the plot holders lacked the resources toTable 11.4: Relationship between livelihood type and farmingstyle at Dzindi (2003)Livelihood typeFarming styleFood farmer Employer Profit maker Other AllSocial grant holder 17 9 1 9 36Employee 11 4 3 3 21Farmer 4 2 11 3 20Petty entrepreneur 8 1 0 1 10Diversified-income household 4 0 1 4 9All 44 16 16 20 96155

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 11.5: Livelihood type and farming style of the nine Dzindi plot holderhomesteads sampled in 2008Case number Age of farmer Gender of farmer Livelihood type Farming style1 44 Male Farmer Profit maker2 56 Male Petty entrepreneur Other3 41 Male Farmer Profit maker4 40 Male Farmer Profit maker5 74 Male Grant holder Other6 44 Male Diversified income household Other7 63 Male Diversified income household Food farmer8 43 Female Farmer Profit maker9 56 Male Employee (spouse) Profit makerTable 11.6: Summary of life histories of selected plot holders at Dzindi (2008)CaseBrief life history1 The eldest son of a Dzindi plot holder, Mr Musecho grew up in a homestead that had an agrarian livelihood. Livelihoodactivities included irrigated cropping, the marketing of produce in town using a donkey cart for transport, and a spazashop. Mr Musecho left school after Grade 5 at the age of 17 and migrated to Gauteng to look for work. He remained amigrant worker until 1994. In the meantime he got married and started a family. At the age of 30 he was retrenchedand returned home to take over the plot of his father, who had passed away. He has based his livelihood on farmingthe plot ever since. His spouse is a security guard, earning R1500 per month, and they also receive two child supportgrants.2 Mr Baloyi grew up in a farmer homestead. Livelihood activities included irrigated cropping on the scheme andlivestock farming. He left school after Grade 2 and travelled to Gauteng to look for work at the age of 17. He remaineda migrant until 2004, holding a variety of jobs. He combines farming the plot with earning income from paintinghouses. His spouse is not working but they receive one child support grant.3 Mr Mushidzi grew up in a farmer homestead and applied for work in the army after completing high school, butwas not successful. He found work as a driver for a supermarket in the region but did not enjoy the work and felt hecould do better farming the plot left to him by his father. He has since added broiler production to irrigated cropping,growing four batches of 100 chickens per year. His spouse is working and earns R2500 per month.4 Mr Mabulanga dropped out of school in Grade 8. He never left Dzindi. He was given two beds (about 1200 m2) by hisplot-holding father to start farming on his own and worked as a tractor driver at the scheme for 12 years. He savedto buy his own tractor and received an additional 10 beds when his father retired from farming. The use of the rest ofthe plot was given to his four siblings. During winter, he rents in excess of 40 beds from other plot holders. He earnsincome from irrigated cropping and the provision of land preparation services.5 Mr Tshikhudo grew up in a family that practised irrigated farming near Lwamondo using river diversion. Hecompleted Grade 7 and became a shop assistant. His life story is a classical example of the growth and developmentof a smallholding. Through the accumulation of assets in support of an agrarian livelihood, Mr Tshikhudo was able toprovide for the tertiary education of his children, but his success meant that there is no successor. He is now well past70 years old and his enterprise is now in decline.6 Mr Mawela grew up at Dzindi and when he was a high school student his father lent him a bed which he croppedto pay for school and to earn pocket money. After high school he became a migrant, working for a Johannesburgconstruction company. He saved enough to enrol in a teacher training college in 1992. He qualified in 1995 but failed tofind work. To assist him his father gave him 12 beds in 1997 but after 10 years he still struggles to lift his enterprise tothe level where he can earn an adequate income to invest in high-value crops.7 Born in 1945, Mr A Nethonzhe is a first-generation plot holder at Dzindi because his father registered a plot inhis name in 1956. He completed Grade 7 and in 1965 he joined other young men to become a migrant worker inJohannesburg, until he returned to Venda in 1975 to earn a living as a driver. In 1983, at the age of 38, he decided tofarm full-time. As in the case of Mr Tshikudo (Case 5), his enterprise flourished at one stage but now it is in decline.8 Mrs Mudau is the spouse of a migrant worker but her husband has more or less abandoned her, making her thedecision-maker. In many ways her situation resembles that of Mr Mawela, being characterised by a lack of financialresources to make full use of her plot.9 Mr B Nethonzhe grew up in a very large farming family and attended school until Grade 10. He became a migrantworker in 1978 working for a construction firm. He returned to Venda in 1978 and started his own constructioncompany, building schools and later on houses, but business slowed down and in 2002, when his father transferred hisplot to him, he became a full-time farmer. He is considered an innovator and he is also a prominent scheme leader.156

ResearchReportachieve full development (Cases 2, 6 and 8). Inthis way, the case studies illustrate the lifecycleof plot enterprises, characterised by phases ofdevelopment, growth and then finally declinein line with the lifecycle of farmers, which is acommon feature of family farms throughout theworld.Natural and physical resourcesFrom a natural resource perspective, irrigatedfarming centres on land and water. Generally,the quality of the irrigated soils at Dzindi isgood. Approximately three-quarters of the commandarea is covered by deep, well-drained soils(Hutton form), which are considered suitable forirrigation. The rest of the land is of lesser qualityincluding a small portion of coarse sandy soilswhich, from a plant nutrition perspective, is ofvery low quality. Access to irrigation water atDzindi is limited as a result of the water sharinginstitutions and the seasonal variation in theflow of the Dzindi River. During drought, accessto irrigation water is severely limiting.From a physical resource perspective, canal irrigationcentres on the conveyance system. Tofunction optimally, the canals and concretefurrows must be maintained and kept clean atall times. Cracks and breaks result in seepageand leaks and these reduce the conveyance efficiencyof the system. Sediment, weed, algaeand other obstructions in the canals and furrowsreduce water flow. At Dzindi, cleaning of theconveyance system and the execution of simplerepairs are a collective responsibility. When thescheme started, the state enforced this collectiveresponsibility but since about 1975, state controlhas been withdrawn. During the past 15 years,scheme leadership has found it difficult to maintainthe old patterns of collective action, ultimatelyresulting in the outsourcing of the cleaningworks to local contractors. Plot holders haveto contribute financially towards the services ofthese contractors.Production systemWithout exception, farmers at Dzindi practiseshort-furrow irrigation. When a bed is prepared,it is usually ploughed, then disced and thenridged. The bed is then subdivided in smallerparcels by filling the longitudinal furrows at 10to 20 metre intervals. When a bed is irrigatedthe water flows along the ridge closest to thecontour bund. As the water flows it is divertedinto the first parcel and each of the furrows inthe parcel is filled with water. Then the passageinto the first parcel is closed off and entry to thesecond parcel is created. This process is continueduntil all parcels in the bed have received water.Short-furrow irrigation typically has a highdistribution efficiency, meaning that along thelength of the plot the amount of water that isapplied is more or less constant.Characteristic of production at Dzindi is thatplantings occur on a small-scale of the orderof 0.1 hectare. This allows farmers to do all operationsmanually, with the exception of landpreparation. Differences in approach tend toreflect risk. Crops such as green maize and cabbagecarry more risk than traditional vegetablesand maize grown for grain, primarily becausethe variable costs per unit area are higher andquality assurance is critical. Profit makers tend totake risks whilst food farmers avoid risk.Farmers and Dzindi make use of chemical fertilisersand plant protectants. They are also familiarwith hybrid seed. The presence of a farm supplyoutlet close to the scheme facilitates access tothese inputs. Use of animal manures is also common.Cattle manure is purchased from kraalsin neighbouring villages, whilst poultry litter ispurchased from broiler units in the area.Economic aspectsTable 11.7 provides summary information on the2007/08 enterprise budgets for each of the ninecases.When evaluating the information in Table 11.7 itshould be kept in mind that at Dzindi it is possibleto grow two or even three crops per year onthe same piece of land, explaining why in someinstances the amount of land that was croppedexceeded 1 hectare, being the effective areaavailable for crop production on the 1.28 hectareplots. Another important fact is that farmsize differed among the enterprises. Some farmerswere renting-in land or had activated parcelsof unscheduled irrigation land, whilst others didnot have use of a full plot.Gross income data in Table 11.7 represent themonetary value of the produce. When producewas sold, the actual income was recorded. Whenproduce was consumed at home, the local Randvalue of the produce was used to impute themonetary value of the produce.157

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 11.7: Summary of the 2007/08 enterprise budgets of nine plot holders at DzindiCaseLivelihoodtypeFarmingstyleVariable costs (R) GrossincomeLandpreparationSeed Fertilisers PlantprotectantsHiredlabourTotal(R)Grossmargin(R)Total areaCropped(ha)Grossmargin perunit area(R/ha)1 Farmer Employer 3 990 2 366 6 644 649 1 520 15 169 29 470 14 301 1.7564 8 1422 PettyentrepreneurOther 1 680 678 3 784 572 0 6 626 10 180 3 554 0.8320 4 2713 Farmer Profit maker 2 100 1 720 7 266 840 3 570 15 496 43 740 28 244 1.1093 25 4614 Farmer Profit maker 2 310 541 5 060 407 1 980 10 298 25 500 15 202 0.8716 17 4415 Grant holder Other 1 440 1 138 4 158 568 2 520 9 824 9 580 -244 0.6807 -3586 DiversifiedincomehouseholdOther 760 463 4 803 545 0 6 571 9 380 2 809 0.4877 5 6007 DiversifiedincomehouseholdFood farmer 1 365 0 2 327 520 1 120 5 332 11 390 6 058 0.4576 13 2398 Farmer Profit maker 735 255 2 334 396 600 4 320 14 940 10 620 0.6131 17 3219 Employee(spouse)Profit maker 2 310 541 5 060 407 1 980 10 298 25 500 15 202 0.8716 17 441Mean 1 854 856 4 604 545 1 477 9 326 19 964 10 638 0.8533 12 062Proportion of total (%) 19.9 9.2 49.3 5.8 15.8 100158

ResearchReportTable 11.7 shows that all but one of the sampledfarmers achieved positive returns from farming.Mean gross income was R19 964 and mean totalvariable costs amounted to R9 326, resulting in amean gross margin of R10 368.Reporting on the 2002/03 production season,Mohamed (2006) reported a mean total grossfarm income of R4 692 and mean total variablecosts of R3 429 for all farmers at Dzindi, resultingin a mean gross margin of R1 263. Focusing onplot holders with a profit maker farming styleonly, which is more in line with the sample ofplot holders contained in this case study, he reporteda mean total gross farm income of R8966, mean total variable costs of R3 256 and amean gross margin of R5 710.Based on the nine cases presented here, farmersappear to have adapted well to changes inselected factors that affect the variable costs ofproduction, namely sharp increases in the priceof diesel and fertilisers.Livelihood significanceAgriculture plays a very important role in thelivelihood of most of the nine plot holders thatfeature in this case study, but this does not applyto all plot holders at Dzindi. Mohamed (2006)pointed out that the way the plot is used dependson the structure of the livelihood of plotholder homesteads.Social and institutional dimensionsCanal maintenance, sharing of water, land tenureand marketing of produce are importantsocial and institutional domains at Dzindi. Canalmaintenance was dealt with above. Sharing ofwater on canal irrigation is an important sourceof conflict because of the front-ender versus tailendereffect. Farmers who are located near thefront-end of the canal tend to get more waterthan those at the tail-end, unless the rules thatgovern access are strictly adhered to. Duringtimes of water scarcity, which typically occur inspring when farmers prepare to plant maize butthe summer rains have not yet arrived, conflictsover water occur most frequently. Since plotholders are responsible for scheme management,it is the elected scheme leadership thathas to deal with conflicts of this nature, and inthe event it often struggles to do so (Van Averbeke,2008).When Dzindi was established, the land was‘detribalised’ and Trust tenure was implementedbefore the scheme was settled. Strict land use instructionsapplied and non-compliance resultedin plot holders being expelled. Transfer of theplot was controlled by the state but in practiceplots tended to remain in the family. Plots had tobe transferred wholly to a single person. Whenresearchers from the Tshwane University ofTechnology (TUT) first arrived at Dzindi in 2003,renting land to others was not permitted, but asa result of encouragement by TUT researchers,this practice has taken root. Another practicethat has gained prominence is the transfer of aplot to multiple family members even thoughthe plot is registered to a single person. It appearsthat this arrangement also existed in thepast but was hidden from officials.Farmers at Dzindi market individually. Freshproduce hawkers play an important role in thechain from producer to consumer, and manyfarmers depend on them to market their crops.Hawkers seek to exploit competition amongfarmers for markets to keep the price as low aspossible. In 2008, farmers in Block 2, who mostlydeal with hawkers from Muledane, colluded tofix the price of commodities as a strategy to dealwith this practice of hawkers.Gender, class and human dimensionsMen dominate at Dzindi, primarily because plotsare transferred to males. Widows can hold theirhusband’s plot, but when they pass on the plot itis usually once more allocated to a male person.On the farms themselves, women feature moreprominently, but at scheme level they have littlesay in decision-making even though they attendmeetings.Plot holders at Dzindi are not rich but few if anyare destitute. Most are able to educate theirchildren and maintain a reasonable standard ofliving. All but a few have brick homes. Severalamong them own a vehicle.The level of education among plot holders isprobably not much different from that in otherrural areas. As elsewhere, the trend is for formaleducation levels to rise with successive generations.Plot holders take their children to the fieldto transfer farming skills but most of them desiretheir children to become professionals throughtertiary education. Farming is usually seen as afall-back option, as indeed it was for some of thenine cases presented above.159

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.160Perceptions of performancePerceptions of performance differed among thenine cases. The plot holders described in Cases 2and 8 were of the opinion that their enterpriseswere performing below potential because theylacked financial resources. The plot holders inCases 5 and 7 were of the opinion that their enterpriseswere on the decline because they weregetting too old to handle the work. The otherfive cases were positive about the performanceof their enterprises.Policy environmentThe current policy of the Limpopo Departmentof Agriculture, which is responsible forsmallholder schemes in the Province, is highlynegative towards canal irrigation. Requests byfarmers for upgrading of the canals have beenrejected. Small repairs are being done by the Departmentof Public Works, but plot holders haveto purchase the materials. Dzindi has not receivedany financial support for at least the past10 years. Even the extension officer, who used tobe dedicated to Dzindi, now serves a much moreextensive ward.Environmental aspectsThe impact of the scheme on the environment ismostly through the extraction of water from theDzindi River, which undoubtedly has an impacton the base flow and the river ecosystem. Inflowof nutrients may be another impact.The futureThe future of Dzindi is uncertain given the currentpolicy towards canal irrigation. Yet, thiscase study shows that canal irrigation presents aviable option for successful livelihoods and localeconomic development.ConclusionsThis case study shows that smallholder canalschemes such as Dzindi are durable and resilientand such projects contribute significantlyto the local economy and to the livelihoods ofplot holders and other people making a livingin or around such schemes. Homesteads whofocus on farming for their livelihood continuouslyadapt their farming to maintain positivereturns from their enterprises. The evaluation ofcurrent enterprise budgets against those of fiveyears ago shows that this is being achieved successfully.The peri-urban location of Dzindi contributesto the ability of smallholders to exploreand exploit new markets for produce. The questionarises whether smallholder communities onschemes such as Dzindi should not be consideredas sources of land reform beneficiaries. The casestudies show that some plot holders are interestedin farming on a larger scale. Elsewhere inthe world it has been shown that experience inrunning a farm enterprise is a key success factorin successful land reform.ReferencesBackeberg, G. R. (2003) Water usage andirrigation policy” in Nieuwoudt, L. andGroenewald, J. (eds.). The challenge ofchange: Agriculture, land and the SouthAfrican economy, Pietermaritzburg:University of Natal Press: 149-170.Backeberg, G. R. (2006) Reform of usercharges, market pricing and management ofwater: problem or opportunity for irrigatedagriculture? Irrigation and Drainage 55 (1):1-12.Backeberg, G. R. and Groenewald, J.A. (1995)Lessons from the economic history ofirrigation development for smallholdersettlement in South Africa., Agrekon, 34(3):167-171.Bembridge T. J. (1997) Small-scale farmerirrigation in South Africa: Implicationsfor extension, South African Journal ofAgricultural Extension, 26: 71-81.Bembridge, T. J. (2000) Guidelines forrehabilitation of small-scale farmer irrigationschemes in South Africa, WRC report No891/1/00. Gezina: Water Research Commission.Commission for the Socio-EconomicDevelopment of the Bantu Areas within theUnion of South Africa (1955) Summary of thereport, Report U.G. 61/1955, Pretoria: TheGovernment Printer.Denison, J. and Manona, S. (2007a) Principles,approaches and guidelines for theparticipatory revitalisation of smallholderirrigation schemes: Volume 2: concepts andcases, WRC Report No. TT 309/07, Gezina:Water Research Commission.Denison, J. and Manona, S. (2007b) Principles,approaches and guidelines for the

ResearchReportparticipatory revitalisation of smallholderirrigation schemes: Volume 1: A rough guidefor irrigation development practitioners, WRCReport No. TT 309/07, Gezina: Water ResearchCommission.Du Plessis, F. J., Van Averbeke, W. and VanDer Stoep, I. (2002) Micro-irrigation forsmallholders: guidelines for funders,planners, designers and support staff in SouthAfrica, WRC Report TT 164/01, Gezina: WaterResearch Commission.Laker, M. C. (2004) Development of generalstrategy for optimising the efficient useof primary water resources for effectivealleviation of rural poverty, WRC ReportNo KV149/04, Gezina: Water ResearchCommission.Limpopo Department of Agriculture (2002)Revitalisation of smallholder irrigationschemes: A business plan for the revitalisationof smallholder irrigation schemes inthe Limpopo Province, Polokwane: TheDepartment.Mohamed, S. S. (2006) Livelihoods of plotholders on a smallholder canal irrigationscheme, D Tech. Agric. Thesis, Department ofCrop Sciences, Pretoria: Tshwane University ofTechnology.Shah, T., Van Koppen, B., Merrey, D., DeLange, M. and Samad, M. (2002) Institutionalalternatives in African smallholder irrigation:Lessons from international experience withirrigation management transfer, ResearchReport 60, Colombo: International WaterManagement Institute.Van Averbeke, W. (2008) Best managementpractices for small-scale subsistencefarming on selected irrigation schemes andsurrounding areas through participatoryadaptive research in Limpopo Province, WaterResearch Commission Report TT 344/08,Gezina: The Water Research Commission.Van Averbeke W., M’Marete C.K., Igodan C.O.and Belete, A. (1998) An investigation intofood plot production at irrigation schemes incentral Eastern Cape, WRC Report 719/1/98,Gezina: Water Research Commission.Van Der Ploeg, J.D. (2003) The virtual farmer:past, present and future of the Dutchpeasantry, Assen: Royal van Gorcum.Van Der Stoep, I. and Nthai, M.M. (2005)Evaluation of the water distribution systemat Dzindi Irrigation Scheme, University ofPretoria.Vermillion, D. L. (1997) Impacts of irrigationmanagement transfer: A review of evidence.Research Report 1, Colombo: InternationalWater Management Institute.161

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.162

ResearchReport12 African vegetables and foodsecurity for poor agrarianhouseholds in Limpopo Province:effective but neglected indigenousknowledge under threatTim Hart, Centre of Poverty Employment and Growth,Human Sciences Research CouncilIntroductionAfrican indigenous people, including manySouth African ethnic groups, have survived formillennia by consuming plants collected fromthe wild (Fox and Norwood Young, 1998). Suchpractices are still prevalent in South Africa today.The different parts of the plants that areused as foodstuffs include roots, tubers, stems,rhizomes, leaves, flowers, fruits, nuts, gumsand berries. Generally, at least two parts of theplant can be eaten, of which the young leaf isalmost always one. This has resulted in manyresearchers calling these plants African leafyvegetables (ALVs) (Laker 2007). However, giventhat more than one part is generally consumedand because dishes, the morogo dish, for example,often contain more than just the leavesof a single plant, 18 in this case study we use theterm ‘African vegetables’. This more inclusiveterm is used by many rural consumers. Morogois the sePedi word that refers to a relish madefrom a number of these leafy and fruit plantsthat are either harvested in the wild or are locallygrown for food consumption. This relish isalso known as marog, imifino or miroho and isregularly consumed in rural areas as an accompanimentto maize porridge. The plants whichmake up this relish may be indigenous to ruralareas or they may be exotic vegetables that havebeen indigenised and incorporated into the localdiet over a number of generations throughmigration or trade, either prior to or during thecolonial era (Schippers, 2002).According to Jansen van Rensburg et al. (2007)the most prominent of these plant species thatare used as a relish in South Africa are Amaranth(Amaranthus spp.), Spider flower (Cleomegynandra L.), Jute or Jew’s Mallow (Chorchorusolitorius and C. tridens), Black Jack (Bidens pilosaL. and B. bipinnata L.), Nightshade (Solanum nigrumcomplex), various Curcubits and Cowpeas(Vigna inguiculata L.). The leaves of all of theseplants are consumed and in some instances thefruit are also consumed (e.g. nightshade, curcubitsand cowpeas). Many other plants arefound in different regions of South Africa andare harvested and consumed as food, the prevalenceof which depends on local availability andpreference. Some of these plants have not yetbeen identified by researchers. While many ofthe identified plants occur naturally in the wild,some are actively cultivated or their presenceencouraged in homestead food gardens wherethey appear after the first seasonal rains. Inparts of South Africa, active cultivation of someplants needs to be encouraged because they arebecoming a diminishing resource due to overharvestingin the wild (Hunter et al., 2007).This study of two villages in Limpopo was selectedbecause it illustrates how rural households inarid areas practise agriculture for food securitypurposes. While a handful of residents, not morethan 32, are active members of two extensionsupportedcommunal vegetable garden projects,they and most senior female household membersalso grow crops in their home gardens. Duringdifferent temporal dimensions (when wateris available or unavailable) and spatial dimensions(at home and at the communal garden projects),they resort to different agricultural prac-18 Morogo may contain leavesof other plants, the fruit ofthe same or other plants suchas unripe pumpkins, cowpeas,tomatoes and groundnuts.163

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.19 By ‘conventional’, we meanthose practices that tend tobe promoted by government’sextension officers.164tices, either ‘conventional’ (as for wider scalecommercial production) or ‘traditional’ practices.19 The case illustrates how people resort tolocal agricultural practices and ‘traditional’ cropswhen the infrastructure in extension-supportedcommunal food gardens is stolen or not workingand that this is the predominant form of productionat home for food security or householdconsumption. The shift in practices is despite theextension officers’ emphasis on conventionalpractices involving high volumes of costly andlocally scarce inputs and the emphasis on irrigation.It is a result of the need to reduce risks andcosts when the necessary resources for conventionalcrop production are unavailable.MethodologyBetween January 2005 and May 2006 the authorand four researchers conducted a study of agriculturalpractices of African vegetables usedby resource-poor rural households in a rural villagesituated in the northeast part of LimpopoProvince. While one of the fieldworkers waspermanently based in the village, the rest ofthe team lived in or visited the villages for upto twenty-one days at a time for certain periods,in order to get more involved in village life andto conduct the fieldwork. The author made twofollow-up visits in August 2008 to obtain furtherinformation. A variety of research methods andtechniques were used for data collection, complementingone another and allowing for triangulationof data.Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) tools wereused at various stages of the study, but particularlyat the beginning of the study in order toobtain background information about the village,agricultural projects and practices and togenerate an awareness of what types of cropswere produced and consumed. Approximately42 people (forty women and two men) from thevillage attended the workshops at various times,and all except ten women were involved in thetwo vegetable garden projects introduced bygovernment extension services. Thirteen of theparticipants were between the ages of thirtyand sixty years. The remainder were all over theage of sixty. Workshop attendance was entirelyvoluntary. Data from the workshops were furtherexplored by means of participant observation,semi-structured and informal interviews.Interviews were conducted with some of thewomen and men who attended the workshopsas well as a number of others (two women andfour men) who were unable to attend the workshops.Interviews and participant observationsessions were typically carried out during thecourse of the researchers’ interaction with residents.Most of the participant observation sessionson agricultural practices were conductedduring the planting and growing season betweenNovember 2005 and March 2006. A formalquestionnaire survey of 108 randomly selectedhouseholds was conducted in June 2005, inorder to get inferential socio-economic statisticson the population of the villages and to get anidea of the extent of consumption patterns andthe significance of African vegetables as a foodstuffat the household level. Data collected atworkshops and during interviews informed thedesign of the questionnaire.The visits in August 2008 involved discussionsand interviews with several local women, theinitial extension officer (who has subsequentlymoved to another area), and a local male resident.The main purpose here was to get updatedknowledge about the projects, practices and tonote changes over time.Historical perspectiveHistorical overview of the villageLimpopo Province is described by governmentsources as poor. The village which is the focus ofthis case study is situated in an area of MopaneDistrict Municipality, in which 71% of the populationlives in poverty (AGIS, 2008). The village issituated in the northern part of the Nkuna TraditionalAuthority Area, which formed part of theformer Gazankulu homeland, about 15 kilometresnorth of its major town, Nkowankowa. Thepopulation of the area consists primarily of sePediand Tsonga speakers and the village consistsof two adjacent but distinct settlements, eachwith its own Nduna (headman). However, theyare collectively serviced as one unit by the localgovernment and extension services. The GreaterTzaneen Municipality provides minimal servicesto this and other villages in the surrounding ruralareas. A gravel cul-de-sac links the village tothe tarred road and the nearby village of Mafarana(which houses the local municipal clinic),which is about 10 kilometres west of the smallagricultural town of Letsitele.The older of the two settlements comprises thevillage we will call Settlement A. It consists of

ResearchReportthe descendants of local families that have livedin the area for generations, before any formalisationoccurred. Settlement B is made up of thedescendents of farm workers, who, in 1963, withtheir families were living on the South AfricanGovernment-owned citrus farm near Letsiteleand were then forcibly removed in terms ofthe Group Areas Act to this area. Despite therebeing no clear boundary between the two settlements,locals give the settlements differentnames. It was only in 1969 that any formalisationof the area took place. The Ndunas from eachsettlement and officials from the South AfricanGovernment marked out stands and roadsin the area. The people who had been living inthe surrounding hills moved onto the stands, asdid other people from neighbouring areas whowere looking for places to stay. In 1986 morepeople moved into the area and were allocatedstands between Settlement B and the tarredroad in the west. Over time this portion of landwas gradually settled.Census figures obtained from the Greater TzaneenMunicipality indicate that in 2003 the villagehad 3821 residents in approximately 721households. In 2005 researchers estimated thenumber of households in both settlements to beapproximately eight hundred. During the August2008 visit it was evident that the numberof households had modestly increased over theprevious three years, as previously unsettled areaswere now being settled. It is estimated thatthe number of households is probably around830 at present (2008). The data that follow arebased on the survey of 108 households in June2005 and on qualitative interviews and workshopsthat were held during 2005/2006 and inAugust 2008.Ninety-one percent of the survey respondentswere directly involved with household foodproduction, harvest and preparation. Of thesurvey respondents, 93% were female and 7%were male. The mean household size was 4.77people per household with 81% of the householdshaving six or fewer members and 19% betweenseven and eleven members. On averagethe households had 2.64 members who were 18years or older and would be in the position toseek employment. About 55% of the householdssurveyed were de jure female-headed and 24%were headed by pensioners.The vegetable garden projectsIn 1983 a number of women in Settlement Aformed a care group. This was a group of womenwho shared sentiments and information,and collaborated and supported one another invarious situations. In 1984 members of this caregroup started a vegetable garden using land acquiredfrom the Nduna. Each woman broughtseeds to plant on her demarcated plot. Theygenerally grew cowpeas, maize, groundnuts,pumpkins and beans, and maintained Africanvegetables already growing on the plots. In1985 the Gazankulu Department of Agricultureprovided the group with a borehole and pump,irrigation piping, a reservoir and a fence. Unfortunately,in 1991 the borehole pump was stolen.The group continued to plant crops in the fieldbut were now once again dependent on rainfallfor yields. They concentrated on traditionalcrops as they considered these to be droughttolerant. No crops were produced during winterdue to the lack of irrigation. Members reportedthat the harvests were usually insufficient, asthey had no surplus to sell. Between 2003 andearly 2006, the extension officer (now with theLimpopo Provincial Department of Agricultureand Environment) organised various donors toprovide the project with a new fence, irrigationpipes, a water tank and an electric boreholepump and some other inputs. The new boreholepump, installed in late 2006, was ineffective as itdid not have the capacity to irrigate a plot biggerthan about 400 m 2 . This problem had notbeen resolved by August 2008. The Departmentof Agriculture also initiated a broiler projectwith the members and the chicken houses werebuilt by late 2005. However, the ineffectivenessof the borehole pump meant that water had tobe transported in containers from a householdtap to the chicken houses. As a result of limitedwater only a small number of chickens are produced.After the first democratic elections in 1994, theNkuna traditional authority was given moneyfor the development of the villages within itsarea of influence. The Nduna for Settlement Bdecided that their allocation should be used fora vegetable garden project so that the peoplecould produce more food and sell any surplus.He approached the Limpopo Department ofAgriculture for assistance. The Nduna allocatedland for the project and used the allocation toobtain irrigation piping, taps, a borehole anddiesel pump, and a reservoir, and the Depart-165

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.166ment provided fencing. The members initiallyeach paid a R12 registration fee and R2/monthto purchase diesel for the pump. In 1995 the localextension officer started supporting themby providing advice and organising training onexotic vegetable management, fertilisation andirrigation practices. In 1998 project memberstook part in a local agricultural competition ina neighbouring extension ward and won firstprize for their crops. This created an awarenessof their products, with people coming fromneighbouring villages to purchase their produce.In late 2004 the extension officer had organisedwith the SPAR supermarket in Tzaneen to purchasetheir produce. However, in November2004 the borehole pump was stolen. As a resultof the lack of irrigation and unfavourable rainsin 2004/2005, the project members lost the majorproportion of their summer exotic vegetablecrops and were unable to sell any produce tothe SPAR. In 2005 an anthropologist who hadlived in the village for a number of years duringthe late 1980s organised another boreholepump. However, given the good rains duringthe summer of 2005/2006, the group decided toonly begin using it in the winter of 2006. Therewere also concerns about its security and giventhat the borehole for the domestic water sourcehad not been installed, some residents were demandingthat this pump be used to supply waterfor all the Settlement B residents. However,when the pump was to be connected in late2006 it was found that it did not fit properly andthat extra parts and adaptations were necessary.A visit in 2008 indicated that this pump had stillnot been installed and connected, as the groupdid not have the money to pay for the adaptations.While they attempt to save money to purchasethe necessary fittings, the pump remainsstored at the chairperson’s house – where it hasbeen for the past two years. The Department ofAgriculture is not prepared to pay for the necessaryadaptations.During 2005/2006, 32 people were active inthese projects. The project at Settlement B had12 active members, of whom two were men, andthe Settlement A project had 20 active femalemembers. The chairpersons of each project wereboth women. The extension officer – who spentone day per week at each project – moved toanother area at the end of 2006 and anotherextension officer took over his role. This latterperson is very ill and contact with the villagers israre and irregular.The problems related to the borehole pumps atboth garden projects and consequent lack of irrigationrenders these two projects largely ineffectivein improving the livelihoods of members,and decidedly not the other village residentswho are not reached by the extension services.Natural resourcesAttempts to obtain natural resource data fromthe local Department of Agriculture officeproved difficult as they did not have this information,despite servicing the village since 1995.Most information was obtained from the AGISwebsite and is not specific to the village butrather a projection of the surrounding area. Thesettlements are situated on sloping terrain (13-20% slope according to AGIS, 2008), backed bysteep hills. Officially, the area is classified as anarid zone and has limited potential for agriculturalproduction (ibid.). Annual pan evaporationis relatively high at between 2001 and 2200 mm a-1(ibid). Official figures for average annual rainfallin this area estimate it to be around 500 mm(ibid.). From mid-April 2005 until the end of April2006 daily rainfall readings were monitored andrecorded by the fieldworker who lived in thevillage. Daily readings were done at 8 am everymorning and then the instruments were reset. Atotal of 906 mm fell during this 13-month period.For four months (July to October 2005) there wasno rain at all and for a further two months (Mayand June 2005) the rainfall was insignificant ataround 1 mm. In essence there was no rainfallduring six months of the year. Most of the rainfell between November 2005 and March 2006.This totalled 867 mm and was considered muchhigher than normal by local residents, suggestingthat official projected figures are closer tothe reality. Local residents also mentioned thatthe first summer rain was delayed as it usuallycame during September, suggesting that theyhad experienced a heavier rainfall but over amuch shorter period. During discussions in May2006 residents reported that they had obtaineda better than usual harvest during the 2005/2006summer cropping season as a result of the unusuallyhigh rainfall. The rainfall pattern was largelydue to the El Nino and La Nina weather patternsthat prevailed during this period.Using a Trend Line during the various workshops,residents indicated the rainfall patterntrend for the previous ten years. The TrendLine showed that the villages last received veryhigh rainfall during the summer of 2000/2001.

ResearchReportResidents reported that the rainfall during thatseason was excessive and recalled flooding andthe destruction of crops. Since then the rainfallhas reverted back to low ‘normal’ patternsduring the summer seasons between 2001and2005. According to residents, the high rainfallexperienced in 2005/2006 was nowhere near theamount experienced during 2000/2001, but wasstill significantly more than usual. The pattern illustratedby the Trend Line suggested that highrainfall is abnormal with the local perceptionbeing that the area usually has a low rainfallduring the summer months. Thus, the rainfallfigures recorded during 2005 and 2006 seem tobe unusually high for this village and while it increasedcrop yields it also caused erosion whichis likely to negatively affect production in thefuture. Rainfall erosivity is officially consideredto be high in this area.Household gardens and fieldsDespite the shortage of water and limited periodof summer rainfall, usually between Septemberand April, in the 12 months prior to June 2005most households grew a number of food cropsin their household gardens (90%) or allowed anumber of naturally occurring African vegetablesto grow in their gardens (5%). The remainderdid not cultivate any crops during the previoustwelve months for various reasons. Theseincluded having recently moved to the area, nothaving implements, money or material to erect afence to protect crops from roaming livestock.While 94% of the households had access to onehome garden only, 6% had access to two orthree gardens. These figures include the plots allocatedat the vegetable garden projects, whichprovided the affiliated households with accessto additional land on which to grow food crops.Home gardens were on average 853 m 2 with thesmallest being 100 m 2 and the largest being 4550m 2 . During the 2005 survey the respondents indicatedthat households intercropped the followingcrops in different ways: African vegetables(87%); maize (89%) and legumes (83%). Table12.1 reports a detailed list of crops produced.Winter crops reported by the extension officerincluded: spinach, cabbage, onions, beetroot,carrots, green peppers, tomato and sweet potato.With the exception of sweet potato, thesewinter crops were almost exclusively producedat the two vegetable garden projects and onlywhen the irrigation systems were working. Duringthe survey, 3% of the households, all with awater tap on their property, indicated that theyproduced some exotic vegetables during theprevious twelve months. About 61% of householdsreported growing fruit such as paw-paw(papaya), marula (Sclerocarya birrea), avocado,litchi and mango.According to the respondents, 88% of theirhome gardens were managed and maintainedby adult female household members. Othersmight be managed by men but maintained bywomen. Observations indicated that the activityof young and old men was limited to ploughingwith donkeys, ensuring that crops such asmaize were planted, and taking care of fruittrees. During summer, the women responsiblefor the household garden spent on average 2.6hours per day (with the median being 3 hours)and an average of 3.65 days per week (with themedian being 4 days) working in the householdfood garden. However, 30% indicated that theyspent five days per week working in these gardens.Usually this was from early morning untilmidday, by which time it was too hot to workin the gardens and other household chores requiredattention. Producing food for the householdis predominantly an activity undertaken bywomen.A handful of men and even fewer women accessedlarger fields surrounding the village(approximately one hectare in size) which theycropped during the summer period, relying onseasonal rainfall. Large fields were predominantlyintercropped with maize and groundnutsor cowpeas. On occasion curcubits were also intercroppedwith maize. These producers reportedthat they cultivated traditional crops on thesefields in order to generate a little extra incomefor themselves, but that often these crops weremainly for consumption by household members.One farmer was known for selling small quantitiesof his maize and other produce locally.Physical resourcesWater supplyAgriculture in this village is highly dependenton seasonal summer rainfall. While the physicalwater infrastructure is available, its usesand availability need to be clearly understood,especially the reasons why it is seldom used foragricultural purposes. In 1979 communal tapswere installed for household purposes. Waterwas pumped from the Letaba River to reservoirs,167

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 12.1: African vegetables, grains and exotic vegetablesfound in the villages168Tsonga English LatinAfrican vegetablesTinhwembe Pumpkin / squash leaves Cuccurbits sp. (often local landrace of C. pepo)Kwembe Pumpkin / squash fruit Cuccurbits sp. (often local landrace of C. pepo)Swiluva Pumpkin / squash flowers Cuccurbits sp. (often local landrace of C. pepo)Tinyawa leaves Cowpea leaves Vigna unguiculateTinyawa fruit Cowpeas Vigna unguiculateMuxiji Blackjack Bidens pilosa L. and B. bipinnata L.Mihlata Sweet potato tubers Ipomoea batatasTshimbu Sweet potato leaves Ipomoea batatasGuxe Jews/jutes mallow Corchorus tridensNtsumbula Cassava / manioc Manihot esculentumXiyakayana Wild gherkin Cucumus anguriaGumbu-gumbu Milk thistle Sonchus oleraceusMariwa Tsamma Citrullus lanatusNkaka Balsam apple Momordica balsaminaVilolo Purple flower Talinum spRirhudzuSpiderflower plant / cat’swhiskersCleome gynandra L.Thyeke Amaranth Amaranthus grassians / spinosum/ cruentusPhuphuruka Kale Brassica oleracea L. / Sabellica L.Sindza mbita Meidebossie Waltheria indicaNkeketi Wild bindweed Convolvulus farinosusMarhanga Calabash / bottle gourd Lagenaria sicerariaMandhanda Okra Abelmoschus esculentusMapampunu Boerpampoen Cucurbita maximaVurhakarhaka Wild gherkin Cucumus spBiriviri Local chilli Capsicum frutescens L.Makalavatla leaves Bitter melon Citrullus lanatus var lanatusMakalavatla fruit Bitter melon Citrullus lanatus var lanatusTimanga Peanut / groundnut Arachis hypogaeaTindluwa Bambara groundnut Vigna subterranean L.GrainsMavele Maize Zea maysMatimba Soetriet / chewing sorghum Sorghum bicolourExotic vegetablesSwikwembyana Butternut Cucurbita moschateSwikwaribani Gem squash Cucurbita pepoMatamatisi Tomatoes Lycopersicum lycopersiconTinyala Onions Allium cepaTikherotsi Carrots Daucus carotaKhavichi Cabbage Brassica oleracea var. capitataTiherekisi Peas Pisum sativum

ResearchReportwhich supplied the taps in the village. In 1986three boreholes were established in SettlementA and fed the communal taps by means of twodiesel pumps and one electric pump, the latterinstalled in 2003. A single borehole was introducedin Settlement B during 1986, equippedwith a diesel pump. It was connected to the existingnetwork of taps. Because this single boreholeand pump supplied a settlement equal insize to Settlement A, certain parts of SettlementB had access to water only on certain days. Inpractice the schedule was not adhered to andthe supply of household water was erratic. InAugust 2005 the diesel pump was removed andthere were plans to install an electric pump. Althougha new pump house was built in early2006 the pump was only installed at the end ofthat year. In the meantime, people relied on thetaps in Settlement A and the summer seasonalstreams for household water supply.The 2005 survey indicated that one householdhad plumbed in cold water from a self-installedborehole on its homestead. Only 11% of the surveyedhouseholds had a tap on their stand, accessto which they shared with their neighbours.About three quarters of the respondent householdshad to travel more than one hundred metresin order to obtain water for household purposes,an activity mainly carried out by womenand children. A number of residents in SettlementB reported having to access water from astream during summer for household purposesas this was the closest source of water. This illustratesthat the municipal provision of water isinadequate for domestic use and that water is avery scarce resource in the village.During workshops respondents noted that thewater they collected from the taps and thestreams was used exclusively for domestic activities,such as washing, cleaning, drinking andcooking. Household garden crops were generallynot irrigated because the collection of sufficientwater for irrigation purposes would require toomuch time. Similarly, the use of communal tapsfor the collection of water for irrigation wouldprevent other households from collecting sufficientwater for important domestic uses. Particularlyin Settlement B, this is a result of the watersupply being irregular and only being availablein certain areas on certain days of the week. Consequently,home gardens were rain-fed and generallycrops were only grown during the summerrainfall season. Some residents mentioned usingvery small amounts of household water to irrigatepumpkin/squash and kale plants when firstplanted if they deemed this necessary.Despite the water problems experienced by mosthouseholds, rainwater harvesting was not reallypractised. About 92% of all dwellings had slopingcorrugated zinc roofs, but none of them hadgutters. When a heavy downpour occurred somepeople would place bowls and other containersunderneath the roofs but this was a very ineffectivemeans of rainwater harvesting as mostof the water was not collected. The little waterharvested in this fashion was typically used fordomestic purposes.Agricultural implements owned byhouseholdsAccess to agricultural inputs and resources oftendictate the type and extent of agricultural activitiesthat can be undertaken. It was noted previouslythat conventional input usage was restrictedby household income. A similar situation appliesto access to agricultural implements. Mosthouseholds owned handheld implements only.One household owned a tractor which was sometimeshired by a few households to plough thelarger fields. This household also had a ploughand some other implements for the tractor. Only6.5% of the households owned donkeys and hadploughs that could be drawn by donkeys. During2005 donkeys were hired out at between R60and R80 per span to plough a household garden.In 2008 this price had increased to R100 perhousehold garden. This price could be higher ifa household had a larger-than-average size garden.Observations suggested that many womenused handheld implements to prepare the soilbefore planting as they could not afford to hiredonkeys. Table 12.4 indicates the percentage ofhouseholds that owned handheld implements.This data suggest that most households are notin the position to actively pursue agriculturalactivities requiring modern technologies, implementsand associated inputs. Most householdsdo not own more than the implements withwhich to perform basic agricultural activities ongarden plots. These handheld and animal tractionimplements were also used at the vegetablegardens projects. At the time of the June2005 survey, 97% of household gardens andplots were fenced as were the community gardenprojects. During winter most households allowedtheir livestock and that of others to graze169

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 12.2: Percentage of households having various handheldimplementsAgricultural ImplementsPercentSpade 82%Handheld hoe 83%Fork 57%Rake 66%Pick-axe 61%Watering can 4%Hosepipe, sprinkler or drip system 14%Handheld pump sprayer for agrochemicals 7%on the previous season’s crop residues. This wasoften considered necessary as very little wintercropping was done and livestock needed fodderin winter.Production systemNaturally occurring and cultivatedplantsAfrican vegetables start growing at the beginningof the summer rains and some can be harvestedfrom two weeks after the first rainfall.A list of the identified African vegetables andother prominent crops grown in the settlementsare indicated in Table 12.1. Groundnuts, alongwith pumpkins and cowpeas, are so entrenchedin the Tsonga and Pedi food culture that theyare discussed as part of the African vegetablegroup. The June 2005 survey revealed that 95%of the respondents had African vegetables intheir home gardens or fields at some time duringthe preceding twelve months. When it cameto prioritising a particular African vegetableplant, local residents attached highest priorityto those plants that could provide a householdwith more than one foodstuff during the plant’slifecycle, such as curcubits, which can provide atleast three products at different times. Secondhighest priority was given to those plants whoseleaves could be dried and stored for consumptionduring the winter months. Perceived nutritionalvalue and drought tolerance were givensome subsequent priority. Taste only became apreference after these factors. For example, elderlyrespondents said that the cowpea plantprovided leaves and fruit (peas), and that bothwere dried making it a very important Africanvegetable. When it came to taste they preferredthe dried peas to the leaves as these were saidto be tastier and could be eaten alone or addedto other dried leaves to increase the flavour andnutrition of the dish. However, both were consideredimportant foodstuffs. The order of prioritisationsuggests that food security is a veryimportant consideration when it comes to selectingplants and ranking their usefulness.About 95% of the surveyed households indicatedthat African vegetables were important foodstuffsfor their households. Reasons for attributingimportance to African vegetables were:• local availability and in plentiful quantities(more than similar exotic vegetables) (90%);• better productions capacity under localconditions without irrigation requirements(97%);• taste is preferable to that of similar exoticvegetables such as cabbage and spinach(96%);• they are believed to be nutritious (98%);• some can easily be dried and stored for consumptionduring the winter months whenthey are not freshly available (94%).It is evident that their local availability over aprotracted period, perceived nutrition contentand the ability to produce them within the constraintsof the local environment are importantcriteria for using African vegetables to ensurehousehold food security. Local production allowshouseholds to spend limited householdincome on other goods and services which theycannot produce locally.170

ResearchReportIdentified naturally occurring food plants inhome gardens included Thyeke (Amaranthussp.), Guxe (Chorchorus sp.), Xiyakayana (Cucumisanguria), Rirhudzu (Cleome gynandra),Nkaka (Momordica sp.), Muxiji (Bidens pilosa),Vilolo (Talinum sp.), Gumbu-gumbu (Sonchusoleraceus) and Nkeketi (Convolvulus farinosus).Another nine plants were mentioned but the researchteam was unable to identify these. Lessthan 8% of households reported actually plantingany of the plants listed above, but 82% reportedencouraging their growth. This was doneby turning over the soil and working the previousseason’s crop residues into the soil prior tothe first rain (all households), working manureinto the soil (only those households owninglivestock that supplied sufficient manure) andin some cases by adding fertiliser mixes (SASOL2:3:4 (30%) + Zn 5grms/kg) (about 6% of households).Only those households that could affordsynthetic fertiliser applied it in conjunction withmanure. Poorer households did not use manureor fertiliser but merely ploughed the plant residuesfrom the previous season back into the soil.Agricultural practices invoked the use of localagricultural knowledge – especially low externalinput principles. Ploughing was usually done byhand using a handheld hoe. The crops selectedand planted tended to be drought tolerant. Asmost households could not afford to purchaseagrochemicals, fungicides, pesticides and herbicideswere generally not used. Intercroppingand companion planting were the order of theday. For example, maize was often intercroppedwith cowpeas. The cowpeas protect the soil fromerosion, and fertilise it with nitrogen and organicmatter. These local practices prevail whenwater is a constraint, both at home and at thegarden projects.Once the African vegetable plant has germinatedit is not weeded out of the garden unlessthere are too many in one place and theythreaten the growth of a planted crop. Only afew women, mainly the elderly, collect seedsof Thyeke (Amaranthus), Guxe (Corchorus),Rirhudzu (Cleome gynandra), Muxiji (Bidens pilosa),Vilolo (Talinum sp), Nkeketi (Convolvulusfarinosus), Gumbu-gumbu (Sonchus oleraceus)and Xiyakayana (Cucumis anguria). When theplants are not growing in areas where they arewanted, then the women broadcast the seeds intheir gardens. All other naturally occurring Africanvegetables are allowed to flower and reseedthemselves at the end of their growth cycle.However, this practice is gradually resultingin the depletion of the seedbed, which is madeworse by rainfall erosivity.A high number of households (79%) plantedother plants that they also categorised as Africanvegetables because these were indigenisedinto the local food culture. Tinwhembe (Curcubitssp.) was the most popular, being cultivatedby 79% of the households; Tinyawa (Vigna unguiculata)was the next most popular (74%), followedby Mandhanda (Abelmoschus esculentus)(40%), Marhanga (Lagenaria siceraria) (40%),Makalavatla (Citrullus lanatus) (31%), Tshimbu(Ipomoea batatas) (28%) and Phupuruka (Brassicaoleracea L. / Sabellica L.) (8%). These plants’seeds (or vines in the case of sweet potato) weresown or broadcast at the time of ploughing.Depending on the household’s resources, manureand compost might be added. Curcubitissp., Abelmoschus esculentus and Brassica oleraceaL. / Sabellica L. might be watered duringthe first month by some households. All othercultivated and naturally occurring African vegetablesrelied exclusively on rainfall. Except forthe seeds of okra (Abelmoschus esculentus) andkale (Brassica oleracea L. / Sabellica L.) the seedsof the other actively cultivated African vegetablescan be purchased at the co-operative in thenearby town of Letsitele. Despite this availabilitymany women reported preferring to saveand store seeds as this not only saved money butalso allowed them select the best seeds for storageand replanting. Consequently, a number ofthe more entrenched cultivated African vegetableswere local landraces. Seeds were typicallyreplaced if they were damaged during storageor if the yields appeared to be deterioratingdespite sufficient rainfall. Women reportedexchanging seeds amongst themselves but acknowledgedthat if many people were short ofseed then people usually purchased seed in Letsitele.Seed saving and storage is mainly doneby older women and it is clear that most of theyounger women have no idea how to collect andstore seeds. Because of the introduction of newcrops some women, again mainly the elderly,were interested in learning how best to collectand store the seeds of these crops. It must alsobe noted that while men might contribute moneyfor maize seed they did not do so for Africanvegetable seed.Consumption patternsDuring the survey all of the respondents reportedeating African vegetables at some stage during171

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.the preceding twelve months. Most householdssurveyed generally consumed three main mealsa day (93%), with 72% typically consuming Africanvegetables at two of these meals. In winter,cabbage was often the replacement for Africanvegetables, especially at times when the householdhad money. While brown bread was usuallyconsumed at the first meal of the day by 95% ofthe households, maize porridge was consumedat the other two meals by 89% of the households.When they could afford to do so householdsindicated that they tended to consumered meat (79%), chicken (mainly necks, head andfeet) (82%) and fish (mainly canned fish or fishheads) (76%) with their maize porridge. The regularityof consuming any type of meat dependedlargely on a household’s access to livestock andincome. Limited food diary recording, facilitatedby the fieldworkers, indicated that meat (usuallychicken parts) was seldom consumed morethan twice a week and that vegetables wereconsumed at most midday and evening mealsalthough not necessarily twice a day.The leaves of some of the naturally occurringand cultivated African vegetables were oftendried and stored for later consumption. Formost households (94%), dried African vegetableswere the main source of vegetables inwinter when fresh vegetables were scarce. As aresult of drying and depending on the volumeharvested per household, respondents said thatdried vegetables could be the main source ofvegetables consumed for up to nine months(25%), with 29% indicating that they could beconsumed for twelve months of the year if theyhad harvested and dried sufficient quantities.However, this is probably not strictly true as veryfew households were able to harvest sufficientquantities to store for several months and stockswere generally depleted two months before thenext summer rains, indicating that they wereconsumed for approximately four months afterthe summer rainfall season. Follow up interviewsconfirmed that this was the most common pattern.It was also noted that some householdswould combine the dried leaves of amaranthus,spiderflower and black jack (only freshly availableduring October to December) with the freshleaves of other plants to diversify the flavour ofthe dish and that this would last as long as thesupply of these dried leaves was available duringthe summer period. As the stored supply of driedAfrican vegetables decreases during winter, sothe households consume them at fewer meals,typically replacing them with the less nutritiousand locally purchased cabbages. Given this declinein stocks, it is unlikely that householdswould consume African vegetables in any formtwice a day although twice-daily consumption islikely in the summer months when incomes arelower and the availability of a wide range offresh African vegetables is greater.A seasonal calendar was compiled with localresidents to determine when the fresh and driedleaves were consumed. These are summarised inTable 12.3 and indicates that some leaves couldbe consumed fresh for up to seven or eightmonths, such as Guxe (Corchorus). In other instancesthe time period was generally shorter(approx. five to six months) as in the case ofNkaka (Momordica sp.), Tinwhembe (Curcubitssp.) and Mandhanda (Abelmoschus esculentus).It should also be noted that the preference wasfor young and tender leaves and the leaves ofTable 12.3: Seasonal consumption patterns of Africanvegetable fresh and dried leavesCrop Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov DecGuxe F F F F F D D D D F F FTinhwembe F F F F D D D D D D D FTinyawa F F F D D D D DTshimbu F FNkaka F F F F D D D D F FMandhanda F F F F D D D D FRirudzu D F FThyeke D F FMuxiji D F FD=Dried, F=Fresh, Blank Space=Not consumed in any form172

ResearchReportolder plants would generally not be harvestedfor fresh consumption.The percentages of the households that driedand stored leaves are provided in Table 12.4. Anothertwo naturally occurring plants were mentionedbut because they were not easily foundand the research team was unable to identifythem they are not indicated in the table. Dryingand storing is an important part of the productionsystem. Most leaves of the plants are harvestedwhen young and dried on a corrugatedzinc sheet. Some leaves are blanched before beingdried as this makes them tender and speedsup the drying process. After a few days the driedleaves are placed in old maize meal sacks and arestored for latter consumption.The significance of African vegetablesin household food securityThe survey indicated that 80% of householdsfelt that African vegetables were important inensuring food security. At the same time, 51%said that exotic vegetables were not importantto the household for food security because theywere expensive, could not be grown locally andcould not be dried. While 18% felt that exoticvegetables were important, only 2% said thatboth were important. During discussions on theimportance of these crops for food security, thegeneral impression was that attributed importancediffered vastly from household to household.Households without a constant incometended to be more reliant on African vegetables,both in summer and winter. This was especiallytrue where unemployment was high andin households where children no longer qualifiedfor child support grants and adults were notyet eligible for state old age pensions. In SouthAfrica, food is generally more expensive in therural areas and in winter certain crops are moreexpensive. Therefore dried African vegetablesformed the basis of nutrition in most rural householdsand especially the poorer households,contributing up to 80% of their total vegetableconsumption in winter. In summer this figurewas closer to 95% due to the greater availabilityof these foodstuffs. Given the manner in whichAfrican vegetables are prioritised, it is clear thatmost rural households attached importance tothese plants for their food security. However,their label as a ‘poverty or backward food’ negativelyaffected the youth’s perception of thesefoodstuffs. The youth (generally adults under35 years) strongly preferred exotic vegetables,such as cabbage and spinach, to African vegetables.Taste seemed to be a big issue regardingpreference for the youth. Elderly residents, onthe other hand, preferred African vegetables asthey said they could produce these locally withtheir limited resources and also because theygrew up with these plants and foodstuffs, whileexotic vegetables were a relatively recent additionto the food basket. Only 3% of householdsreported growing any exotic vegetables in theprevious twelve months. This was attributed tothe lack of irrigation and other required productioninputs. Despite their preference for exoticTable 12.4: African vegetable leaf drying and storing practicesTsonga name Common name % dried and storedPredominantly naturally occurringGuxe Jutes mallow 88%Muxiji Black jack 47%Thyeke Amaranthus 43%Rirhudzu Cleome / spiderflower 43%Nkaka Balsam apple 42%Xiyakayana Wild gherkin 34%Predominantly cultivatedTinwhembe Pumpkins/squash 95%Tinyawa Cowpeas 74%Makalavatla Melon 21%Mandhanda Okra 19%Marhanga Bottle gourd 9%Tshimbu Sweet potato < 1%173

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.174vegetables, the youth acknowledged having toconsume African vegetables as their socioeconomicand local agroecological circumstancesprevented them from purchasing or producingthe preferred exotic vegetables most of the time.Affirming the benefits of African vegetables(much of which has already been done by recentresearch on nutrition) and addressing the statusissue would help to promote the consumption ofAfrican vegetables amongst the youth.Economic aspectsEconomic significance of maize andAfrican vegetables in the villageIn August 2008 approximate figures were obtainedwith regard to costs and yields for maizeand African vegetables for the 2007/2008 summerrainfall season. While some attempt is madeto understand the direct (sales) and indirect (savingsby not having to buy) financial implicationsof own production and consumption of maizeand African vegetables, the usefulness of thisdata to determine any real value to the householdis limited. This is because of factors such asthe size of the land under cultivation, the sizeof the household and the amounts harvested.Also, a comprehensive economic analysis wouldhave to accurately determine the costs of all theinputs required and other costs involved. The informationprovided indicates a general patternand does not distinguish poorer from wealthierhouseholds and larger from smaller plots. Householdsused in this study ranged from three toseven members in size and access to land rangedfrom one to two plots of varying sizes.The amount of maize harvested for own consumptionranged from 50 kilograms to 350 kilogramsof grain. Generally it was felt that theproduction of their own maize could feed ahousehold for between three and five months.If this amount of maize was purchased from thelocal shops it would cost the household betweenR160 for 50 kilograms of maize meal and R1120for 350 kilograms, and thus implies a similar savingfor the year.When discussing the consumption of Africanvegetables, respondents reported that the consumptionof fresh leaves was difficult to determineas these were picked from the plants asrequired. This ensured that the leaves consumedduring the season were always fresh. They estimatedthe volume of fresh leaves to be between25 kilograms and 50 kilograms and that theseplants would be consumed by the households forbetween four and six months. This consumptionwould contribute to a saving for the householdof between R1000 and R2000 during the season.Similar figures were given for dried leaves withthe exception that they were consumed for onlythree months after the season. This paints a differentpicture to the survey which suggested alonger period of consumption for dried leaves.African vegetables generally cost nothing toproduce as the people involved in this exerciseall attempted to save seeds of the most popularAfrican vegetables. Maize and African vegetableswere planted and cultivated (or encouraged)at the same time. Most of the expensesinvolved are considered to be a result of growingmaize rather than growing African vegetables.The cost of ploughing using donkeys wasR100 at the beginning of the season. Betweentwo and five bags of maize seed were purchasedand the cost was between R10 and R20 per bagdepending on the supplier. The largest amountsown was five bags at R20 per bag resulting ina cost of R100. Only one household bought fertiliser(LAN) and this cost about R50, while theothers used differing amounts of kraal manure,which had no cost implications. No pesticides,herbicides or fungicides were used during theplanting and growing season. The maximuminput costs are therefore R250. Based on thesefigures own production, harvesting and storageof maize and African vegetables could provide ahousehold with a saving of up to R4870 (R5120– R250) during the year. While on the face of itthis might not appear significant, it is neverthelesssubstantial if the household income is lessthan R12000 per annum, for example a pensionerheaded household with between two and fiveunemployed dependents.The villagers regard dried African leafy vegetablesas a very important part of their diet in thesix (6) months of May to October – depending onrainfall patterns – when fresh vegetables are notavailable. They have to buy exotic vegetables ifthey do not have enough Miroho (dried leaves),and they usually buy cabbage. If they do nothave to buy cabbage because they have enoughMiroho, they then use the money to buy otherfood such as chicken, bread, etc. or they save themoney for other expenses such as clothing andschooling requirements. They say they eat betterif they have dried Miroho during the wintermonths. During discussions many households re-

ResearchReportported giving Miroho to neighbours and familythat did not have their own supply.Sales of African leafy vegetables inthe study areaSome African vegetables are sold in the nearbytowns of Letsitele and Nkowankowa. Sales areconducted in informal markets at the taxi ranksor other well-visited public places. Guxe (Corchorus)and Thyeke (Amaranth) were the main Africanvegetables sold in these towns. However,pumpkin leaves (Tinhwembe) and okra pods(Mandhanda) were sold on a few occasions.While these vegetables are generally sold freshin bags, some informants reported that out ofseason one might occasionally come across driedAfrican vegetables, but that this was rare. Researchersdid not observe this at any time duringthe past three years. Like the fresh produce,dried leaves are apparently sold to urban residentswho do not have access to them in theirhome gardens.The Letsitele informal market area has a fewvendors that sell African vegetables. In 2006 onewoman was regularly selling pumpkin leaves(R3 a bunch) and pumpkin flowers (R1 a handful),Muxiji leaves (R3 a bag), and ground peanutsat R2 for a small sandwich-bag-sized bag.Sometimes green okra pods were sold at R3 for aone-kilogram bag. Another woman sold a largebunch of pumpkin leaves and flowers for R5.She also sold pumpkins and cowpeas. In winterthe vendors sold exotic vegetables such as cabbage,spinach and kale. They refused to disclosetheir suppliers to the researchers and generallyseemed concerned about competition. Thepumpkins seemed to originate from a farmerwith good access to water.Two customers at the Letsitele market indicatedthat they come to Letsitele from Nkowankowaas the vegetables are much cheaper at Letsitele,and that although they are happy with the qualitythey would like to have more variety than islocally available.One woman was selling African vegetables nextto the Nkowankowa police station in October2005. She was the only African vegetable vendorin the area. She sold pumpkin leaves and flowerstogether (R3/bundle), Guxe (Corchorus) forR3 per 1 litre container, spinach (R3/bundle), kale(R3/bundle) and peeled groundnuts. In Januaryand February 2006 she sold kale and spinach.She was also vague about her suppliers. She keptmost of her stock in huge blue plastic bags thatshe kept closed to ensure it remained fresh. Herdisplayed produce looked very attractive.In January 2006 there were eighteen stalls at theNkowankowa taxi rank. Five out of the eighteenstalls sold African vegetables. The pricesthroughout the market were the same for theproduce. The sizes were smaller, but not enoughto warrant the cost of driving to Letsitele to purchasethem. Prices do not fluctuate over the season.One woman had a tub of water in which theproduce was kept and she was almost sold outbecause her produce still looked fresh. Only oneperson had produce that looked poor, and shewas not selling anything. There is evidence thatbuyers are critical of the produce, and the freshestlooking produce is sold first. Pumpkin leavesand flowers are sold for R3/bundle. All stalls soldthis and it was the most popular product. Mostof the stalls sold Guxe at R3 per double handful.One stall sold red amaranth at R3 per 2 litrecontainer of compressed leaves. Tinyawa (cowpeas)are sold when available. Some stallholderscannot find Cleome but would sell it if available.One stallholder said she sold pumpkin, cleome,Muxiji (Bidens pilosa) and amaranth in the summertime.She sold spinach and Mukwariba (notidentified during the study) in winter. Powderedpeanuts cost R4 for one and a half cups. Onlyone stallholder sold pumpkin flowers separately,at R2/handful. Only one woman indicated thatshe sells Nkaka when available. If the plants donot sell they perish very quickly due to the sunand the heat. Keeping the plants in water helpsto improve their shelf life, but this techniquewas the exception rather than the rule.Trade on pension day in the village is very active.However, local people only sold pumpkin leavesand groundnuts. The pumpkin leaves went forR5 per 2 litre container of compressed leaves.The other traders are usually from outside thevillage and tend to sell crops and products thatare not available in the village such as broilerchickens, tomatoes, cabbage, etc. They alsosold maize seed, both traditional and pesticidetreatedseed.All three areas of sale suggest that the sellingof African vegetables could be profitable, butin most cases transport is required. Shelf life offresh produce is a problem and wastage can behigh if there is a lot of competition. The marketfor African vegetables needs to be studied toidentify the best vegetables, prices, location and175

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.presentation thereof. When compared to othercrops, the profit margin on African vegetables islow. When compared to cabbage that sold at R5per head in 2006 and R7 per head in 2008, thepumpkin leaves were inexpensive.Any attempts at increasing commercialisationwill need to be approached with caution. Thereare some concerns about the possible effects ofchanging African vegetables from a predominantlywomen-produced household food securitycrop to a cash crop. Several cases (personalcommunication during several conferences andexperience in East Africa) have shown that mentake over cash crops, thus leaving women withfewer crops available for their home gardens.Women might stand to lose the small amount ofmoney they do make from sales of these cropsif they attained commercial significance. Higherprices and the development of less tolerantand adaptable varieties could remove them asa ready source of food from rural households.Research on Amaranthus as a commercial cropwas recently undertaken by the ARC-Roodeplaatwith funding from the Department of Agriculture.It focused predominantly on large scaleproduction.Income sources andlivelihoodsThe total monthly household incomes for June2006 are indicated in Table 12.5 and suggest thatmost households do not have a very high incomeand that almost half the households are poor bySouth African standards 20 . At the extremes, onehousehold reported having no monthly incomeand another reported having a total incomeof more than R5000 per month. Some of thesefigures may be higher than usual because thesurvey was carried out at a time of year whenhouseholds were more likely to benefit fromseasonal employment.To get a deeper understanding of the contributionof household income to food security, respondentswere asked about constraints relatingto household income. Most significant was thefact that 48% of the households experiencedproblems relating to food security and reportednot having enough food or income to purchasefood for the household at various times duringthe preceding twelve months. This is a concernaccording to Stats SA’s national General HouseholdSurvey of 2004; slightly less than 20% ofrural households in Limpopo Province reportedexperiencing food insecurity at some stage duringthe twelve months preceding that survey.Food insecurity seems to be a problem for justunder half the households in this village. Onlyfive percent of the surveyed households had atleast one member who was involved in the twovegetable garden projects run by the LimpopoProvincial Department of Agriculture and Environment(LPDAE) or other agricultural associations(not necessarily in this village). Throughinteraction with project members, the researchersdetermined that probably no more than 32people were active in the two garden projectsduring the study period. This indicates that thereis very little opportunity for the majority of theresidents, who are not members of a project orassociation, to get agricultural information as allengagement in this area is done at the vegetablegarden projects. It is questionable whetherthese services are contributing to the food securityof the majority of the villagers, especiallyas almost half of the households reported beingfood insecure at some stage.Table 12.6 indicates that employment outsideof the village and state grants are the widestcontributors to household income. Seasonal employmentis highest during the late autumn andwinter months, from mid-May until mid-September.At this time of the year some men and wom-Table 12.5: Household incomes20 With an average householdsize of 4.77 members, 83% ofthe residents would be livingon less than US$2 per day and49% would be living on lessthan US$1 per day.Household total monthly incomePercentR2000+ 14%R1000 – R1999 34%R750 – R999 22%R500 – R749 10%R1 – R499 19%No monthly income 1%Total 100%176

ResearchReporten are employed on the citrus farms and packingsheds in the area, providing 20% of householdswith a necessary income during the dry wintermonths. Few people are employed in seasonalwork outside of this period. Consequently, onlyabout 46% of households have members whoare employed regularly for the remaining eightmonths of the year.State grants are an important source of householdincome in the two villages and are the mostcommon source of income, although amountsare relatively small, especially given the meanhousehold size of almost five members. Old agepensions and disability grants in 2005 were R810per person per month (females 60 years andover and males 65 years and over). Child supportgrants were for children up to the age of 14 yearsand were R180 per child per month. While theseamounts can be considered low, most peoplereported that they were vital for the householdand contributed to the survival of all householdmembers and not just the grantees.Remittances from household members livingtemporarily or permanently away from the villagealso make a contribution to householdincome, but most people reported that thesecontributions were irregular and often only receivedwhen the person visited or returned tothe village. Often remittances would be in theform of food or clothing and not in cash.Very small numbers of the households indicatedthat they harvested the natural resource basesurrounding the villages for food and otherlivelihoods, such as selling firewood. However,observations clearly indicated that most householdsharvested fuel-wood in the areas surroundingthe village. A visit during winter 2008indicated that barren areas had increased andthat trees on the surrounding hills were now beingharvested for firewood.Residents indicated that they relied on a numberof other lesser and infrequently used incomegeneratingstrategies for their survival and generalwell-being. These included the making oftraditional beer and clay bricks which are soldlocally.While Table 12.6 illustrates that households havea number of diverse sources of livelihoods, it isTable 12.6: Household livelihood sourcesHousehold livelihood sourcesPercentAt least one member with some form of employment 66%A member with full-time employment 22%A member with regular part-time employment 24%A member with seasonal employment (predominantly in winter months) 20%State grant recipient households 83%State old-age pension 24%State child grant or disability grant 59%Remittances from temporary migrants 22%Remittances from family member permanently living away from village 7%Collecting wild edible plants 7%Hunting, trapping or collecting wild animals and insects 3%Collecting and selling firewood 2%Agricultural activities 90%Production of crops 90%Extra source of household food 83%Primary source of household food 5%Extra source of income 2%Production of livestock 59%Extra source of household food 29%Primary source of household food 26%Extra source of income generating purposes 4%Other – including reselling of crops/groceries and making traditional beer 5%177

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.evident that social grants and off-farm work arethe most common sources of income for households.Agricultural activities are the most widespreadmeans of livelihood and involve livestockand crop husbandry. About 59% of householdsacknowledged producing various livestock atintervals during the previous twelve months.While 29% did so for extra food, 26% did so as amain source of food and only 4% produced livestockprimarily for income generating purposes.Although livestock husbandry was common, thefigures in Table 12.6 indicate that the percentageof households owning livestock other thanpoultry was low. Wealthier households tendedto own more livestock, particularly cattle andgoats. Slightly more than half of the householdsowned chickens during the preceding twelvemonths. Households owning donkeys used theseanimals to generate an income through theiruse in ploughing household gardens and transportingfirewood and water. All livestock, withthe exception of poultry and pigs, grazed oncommunal land in and around the village. Mostlivestock were unattended while they grazedalthough some cattle owners with large herdswould employ a local herdsman to look afterthe cattle during the day. Goats roamed the areafreely with only a handful being tethered whilethey grazed.Crop production is the most widespread livelihoodactivity and is primarily practised forhousehold food security purposes. This seemsto be done more as a food safety-net, ratherthan for income, and is heavily reliant on summerseasonal rainfall. Of the 90% of householdsthat produced agricultural crops as a livelihoodsource 83% noted that this was to ensure an extrasource of food for the household and 5% reportedthat it was the main source of householdfood. Cropping is practiced at the two vegetablegarden projects in the village and at most homesteads.However, the practices at the vegetablegarden projects and the home gardens differ attimes and this needs to be examined in order todetermine the relative contribution of agricultureto food security at these different sites.Policy issuesThe Strategic Plan for South African Agriculture– which represents the founding document ofthe Presidential Working Committee on Agricultureand is effectively government’s primarystatement regarding agrarian reform – says virtuallynothing about specific measures to supportsmallholders. Rather the document speaksbroadly of allowing/promoting “the entire spectrumof enterprises and farm sizes” (DoA, 2001:8). It also does not directly address the questionof agricultural production for household foodsecurity. Despite the vegetable garden projectsand their exotic crops appearing to be failures,the extension services and the government donot seem to be able to develop a better andmore focused food security strategy for ruralhouseholds facing similar conditions as thosefound in this village. The dogged commitmentto introducing high-input technologies andcrops seems to prevent government agriculturalservices from addressing the problems at hand.If nothing else, the predilection for communityprojects that involve readily stolen boreholepumps must be recognised for the stalematethat it is. Rainwater harvesting and water managementstrategies may well be more appropriatehelp in the long-term than merely replacingthe pumps or purchasing the missing parts.The extension officers involved are currently notmaking any comments in this regard except tosay that the people cannot afford to maintainor replace the pumps as they are too poor. It ispossible that support might be obtained underTable 12.7: Livestock ownershipLivestock resourcesPercent of households owninglivestockDairy cattle 6% 7.6Beef cattle 13% 6.6Goats 15% 8.2Pigs 4% 11.2Poultry – chickens and pigeons 53% 14.2Donkeys 6% 7.0Mean number ownedamong owninghouseholds178

ResearchReportthe Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme(CASP) but similar questions about appropriatenesswould arise given the content ofthe existing support programme.Social and institutional issuesOne consistent benefit of the vegetable gardenprojects is that they provide the thirty or so affiliatedhouseholds with access to an extra pieceof land on which to grow food crops. So despitetheir problems they have some benefit. Especiallyfor the women who started the care group,this has provided them with a social environmentto produce what they want and discuss relevantmatters away from male influences. The projectsalso enable the women and few men involved tointeract with outside agricultural service providers,which does increase their knowledge of agriculture,and this has resulted in a few womenexperimenting on their own in their home gardens,and is a reason for some households usingfertiliser at their home gardens (althoughdiscussions with project members highlightedthat very little technology that was practiced atthe projects could be used in the household gardens).They also remain expectant of receivingmore resources and inputs from the extensionservices.Women are also engaged in their own seed storageand exchange network with other women inthe village. While some women were willing toshare information freely with one another, otherstended to keep information to themselves.Human dimensionsMost people reported that they learned their agriculturalskills from their parents and grandparents,and developed them further by exchanginginformation with one another. They noted greatdifferences between practices at home and onthe projects; at home they practised agriculturethe ‘traditional’ way and did not want to losethis part of their culture as it enabled them tosecure food, even in times of poor rainfall.One or two of the wealthier men who werenot part of these projects were affiliated to agriculturalassociations outside the village andreported that they obtained information fromthese sources. Some people had also developedknowledge about conventional farming fromexposure to commercial farms at some stagein their employment histories. Others had obtainedthis from interacting with the extensionsupportedprojects. However, it was clear that irrespectiveof whether or not these technologiesare agro-ecologically appropriate, most peopledid not practise them because of the associatedcosts.Local people argued that despite the presenceof the vegetable projects with their conventionalapproaches to agricultural production, theirown local and traditional practices were equallyimportant to agriculture and food security. However,despite the problems experienced with thewater and borehole pumps over the years, theydid not frown upon technologies, as they hadseen the benefit of these under certain conditions,i.e. when everything worked well. Theyreasoned that perhaps they could blend certainaspects of the two approaches. At the end of the2005/2006 study they had compiled a list of potentialareas of cooperation between their practicesand what they considered to be ‘conventional’(technologically-based) or external practices.This was due to the fact that many peoplecould see the strengths of both types of farmingas well as the constraints evident in both.The discussions and observations indicated thatmost of the more active farmers, who were acknowledgedas such by their peers, tended to bethose who were either very poor or by contrastthose with enough money to be able to affordexternal inputs. Interestingly, both of thesegroups seemed to be more open to experimentationthan those in the middle. Wealthier farmerstended to adopt more conventional practicesmore readily than the poorer ones; however,many of the poorer farmers were engaged intheir own experimentation.Environmental issuesDespite African vegetables being significant forhousehold food security, various agro-ecologicalconditions, combined with social circumstances,are contributing to a decline in their availabilityas a foodstuff. The preferences and attitudeof the local youth mentioned above is only oneof these factors. Others are soil erosion due toovergrazing and poor land and water management.During the dry winter season the vegetation onthe communal lands and home gardens is reducedand the ground is left bare after harvestingand grazing. A significant amount of erosioncan be attributed to the mismanagement of thecommons. This is a result of the extensive and179

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.21 The reader should bear inmind that the intention wasnever to assess the currentProvincial Department of Agricultureprojects. In fact whenthe field site was selected wewere unaware of their purposeand only knew that two projectswere located in the area.This case is not an assessmentof the two projects but rathersuggests that they are inappropriatein their current form dueto various technological and localsocial constraints. Given thisthey could be altered in variousways so that available technologycould serve the majority ofthe residents as opposed to thefew people who are involved inthe two projects.180unmanaged harvesting of wood for fuel andthe overgrazing of livestock, especially unattendedgoats, donkeys and cattle. There weresome plans to reduce overgrazing, but in winterit was said that this was hard to enforce becauseforage in any form is scarce. Measures includedtethering livestock and rotating them on a dailybasis so that they are not able to overgraze anyparticular area. However, not everybody compliedwith this practice and during the study veryfew tethered livestock were actually seen on thecommons.The village experiences most of the summerprecipitation in the form of thunderstorms. Therainfall is hard but generally short in duration.The water rushes down the hills, through thevillage, and removes the topsoil from fields andhomestead gardens. This has a significant negativeimpact on soil availability, suitability andthe presence of seeds of self-seeding plants inthe area. A few women residents have tried tocontrol water flow and run-off by erecting stonebunds and digging furrows. However, ratherthan collecting the water or controlling theflow, these measures tended mainly to divertthe water away from these homesteads towardsothers and the gravel roads, thus exacerbatingdownstream problems. In some areas patchesbare of topsoil had developed, and even duringthe rainy season these patches were not coveredwith any vegetation due to the loss of nutrients,seeds and the bare soil being too hard for rootpenetration. These areas were especially proneto water and wind erosion.In the smaller home gardens it was observedthat people did not plough across the slope inorder to restrict the water flow. Inadvertently,much of the rain ran down the slope withoutpenetrating the soil sufficiently. While intercroppingmay contribute to erosion control it isnot as efficient as it could be under current practices.It was also observed that people in the villagehad no knowledge of simple and effectivewater management technologies such as grassstrips, planting pits, semi-circular pits, earth basinsand raised beds. Similarly, there was no useof household grey water for crop production.Management of this water could allow for theproduction of certain crops during winter. It waspreviously mentioned that the majority of dwellingshave zinc roofs and therefore the potentialfor rainwater harvesting. However, the lack ofguttering prevented this from being used withany effectiveness.The futureOfficial agricultural activities generally and alsoin the study area tend to overlook the benefit(and constraints) of local agricultural knowledgeand practices while exclusively focusing on thetransfer of conventional technology .21 By andlarge this is inappropriate, as virtually none ofthe households have the resources to use thistechnology. Also, those who are involved inthe projects ironically practise one type of agricultureat the project site and another in theirhome gardens and fields. by focusing more onlocal practices and knowledge and supportingand enhancing the principles inherent in thisknowledge, more households could receive thebenefits of conventional agricultural technology.An effective mixture of the principles inherentin the two systems would go a long way toachieving this.During the discussions at focus group workshopsand also during informal interviews with residents,a number of areas were identified wherethey requested support and information. Theseare described below:• Seed systems – Many women stored seedsand some requested further informationon this practice, especially with some ofthe exotic vegetables that were becomingindigenised. There would be value in sharinginformation on all aspects of exotic andtraditional vegetable seed systems, such ashow and when they can be harvested andcleaned, how long they can be stored, etc.Emphasis should be placed on promotingseed systems for African vegetables andre-introducing the selection of fruits andplants for seed harvesting to ensure thatadequate and good quality seeds are harvested.Effective nursery establishment ona small-scale within home gardens wouldhelp many households to increase their accessto healthy and nutritional plants. ‘Seedfairs’ could be one way in which awarenessof the importance of seed systems in ruralvillages might be improved.• Appropriate training – There is a need formore appropriate training that is relevantto specific local circumstances. This oftenrequires follow-up visits by specialists tohelp with adaptation of technologies tolocal conditions. In some cases technologyis not being used optimally, and might infact be causing a loss of total yield per area.

ResearchReportResearchers, extension officers and farmersneed to work together to determine the effectivenessof practices, and to promote adaptationsthat are locally appropriate andwhere needed. The appropriateness andtiming of training in communities shouldbe decided together with the communitymembers for whom it is intended.• Livestock care – During the study and thesurvey a number of male residents indicateda concern about their livestock, especiallycattle. In winter forage is scarce and a fewmen mentioned cattle dying from diseaseat this time. Livestock information seems tohave been lost at several levels and to varyingdegrees. The following are possible areasfor training: breeding and selection ofall livestock, dipping practices (found to beineffective in many communities, probablyalso here), livestock management, stockingrates, feeding alternatives in winter.Farmers should know when to decide tosell, rather than let their livestock die duringwinter. The services of donkey expertsshould be made more widely available toprovide advice and support to local donkeyowners and users. This would be especiallyuseful with regard to nutrition and the repairingand fitting of harnesses, carts andploughs to ensure comfort and efficiency.There were some other areas in which localresidents require information so that they couldinclude this in their practices. These include thefollowing:• Utilisation of African vegetables – Africanvegetables make a significant contributionto food security and household nutrition.However, there are some possibilities ofthis being undermined if the crops are notprotected – e.g. being kept free of aflotoxinand mycotoxin contamination – duringcropping, harvesting, processing (drying)and storage. Improved hygiene and foodsafety during drying and storage would reducecontamination and losses. This couldbe done by introducing a number of healthsafety principles to the residents. At thesame time, awareness should be created ofthe different methods of food preparationthat will help to increase the nutritionalcontent of the food (e.g. the addition of alittle fat, chopping, optimal boiling times,etc.). There is an argument for specificallypromoting the production of yellow fleshedsweet potatoes as these are high in betacarotenefrom which vitamin A is derived.• Cultivation – Local residents are very awareof the principles of their soil preparationand cropping activities. However, collaborativeresearch might improve this withinthe constraints of the resources which areavailable to them. Pension and other socialgrants are often used to purchase inputssuch as seed and fertiliser. Research couldoptimise production and possibly reducethe expenditure on these items. There is aneed to evaluate the possible use of liquidmanure in the communities and also the useof grey water. Trench/door gardens, raisedbeds and micro-gardens might prove viablealternatives and enable basic food productionwith minimal effort, even in winter. Thiswill enable households with sick membersand working women to produce some cropsif they so desire. It is possible that plantingpatterns can be optimised, even with someform of rotation, and here farmers and researcherscan combine their knowledge.• Soil and water management – The studyindicates that there are two primary areasthat need to be addressed in order for anypreviously mentioned requests and suggestionsto achieve optimal benefit. Withoutaddressing soil and water management, itis possible that agricultural production willdecline and people will move towards othersources of livelihood. Some villagers mentionedthat already they are unable to producesome crops. The youth are averse toa number of traditional crops and very fewseem to be involved in any sort of agriculturalproduction. If water and soil managementare optimised in the local situation,then residents will not only be able to optimisetheir cropping of traditional foods andAfrican vegetables, but will most probablybe able to introduce some exotic vegetablesinto their home gardens. This will enablethem to diversify their diets. Such cropsmight even be sold for income generationpurposes, thereby taking food security beyondmere household consumption. However,the production of these crops is clearlynot going to come about if people have torely on communal boreholes and projects.The handful of farmers who have access towater in winter along with other resources181

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.is already involved in production for selling,but there is scope for more people to becomeinvolved. The information and trainingtransferred by the Department of Agriculturewould then benefit more households.This information could be shared by meansof farmer-to-farmer extension throughoutthe villages and surrounding areas.Data collected during the course of the study indicatethat water is a problem for two reasons: itis scarce, and when it does rain it often promoteserosion. Existing water management practicesare inadequate. This means that the water needsto be controlled and the soil managed so that itcan maximise the use of the limited water supply.The water needs to be controlled so that it isabsorbed by the soil. Also, alternative sources ofwater need to be investigated. In addition, thesoil structure and nutrient quality need to be improved.These two practises go hand in hand andneed to be done together. It is clear that farmersalready have certain local knowledge and agriculturalresearch could assist in enhancing thisknowledge and improving farmers’ managementpractices. Collaborative or participatoryresearch could help find solutions for problemsrelating to these two primary constraints.With regard to water and soil management, thefollowing is suggested as initial practices to beshared with and discussed in collaboration byfarmers and researchers:• Water harvesting strategies and peopleshould be encouraged to test the methodsfor themselves, thus ensuring that they usethe most appropriate techniques for theirresources and conditions. A number of optionsare available and include terracing,stone bunds, trench or raised beds, semicircularbunds, furrows, and even small damsor catchments for those living adjacent tothe hillside.• Water retention methods for decreasingwater loss during thunderstorms would increaseyield potential by decreasing the lossof topsoil. These methods would also reducethe loss of seeds in the seedbed.• Water recycling methods could be investigatedfor non-root and tuber vegetables.The soil’s fertility along with its ability to absorband retain sufficient water for production purposesneeds to be improved. Practices such asmulching, composting, and the use of liquid andgreen manure need to be investigated. Workingsufficient organic matter into the soil will improveits nutrient content by encouraging animaland micro-organism life in the soil and thesubsequent conversion of organic matter intohumus. This will also ensure that the soil is of theright texture so that it retains sufficient moisturefor crop production and simultaneously reduceswater and top soil run-off.ReferencesAGIS (Agricultural Geo-referenced InformationSystem) (2008) AGIS comprehensive atlas.www.agis.agric.za/agisweb/agis.html,accessed 23 June 2008..Fox, F W, and Norwood Young, M. (1998) Foodfrom the veld: edible wild plants of southernAfrica. Johannesburg: Delta Books.Hunter, L, Twine, W and Patterson, L (2007)‘Locusts are now our beef’: Adult mortalityand household dietary use of localenvironmental resources in rural SouthAfrica, Scandinavian Journal of Public Health35(Suppl 69): 165–174.Jansen van Rensburg, W S, van Averbeke, W,Slabbert, R, Faber, M, van Jaarsveld, P, vanHeerden, I, Wenhold, H and Oelofse, A (2007)African leafy vegetables in South Africa.Water SA 33(3): 311–316.Laker, M C (2007) Introduction to the specialedition of Water SA on indigenous crops,water and human nutrition. Water SA 33(3):317–326.Schippers, R R (2002) African indigenousvegetables: An overview of the cultivatedspecies 2002, revised version on CD-ROM. Aylesford, UK: Natural ResourcesInternational Limited.182

ResearchReport13 Madiba Trust Farm, Limpopo: aredistribution project exhibiting‘classic’ group problems and elitecaptureAbenet Belete and Irvine Mariga, Department ofAgricultural Economics, University of LimpopoIntroductionThe Madiba Trust Farm is located in the MarulengDistrict Municipality in a village called Lafdal, 30kilometres south of Tzaneen. The farm is a registeredlegal entity under the Trust Property ControlAct of 1988. The Madiba Trust Farm is a 165hectares farm involved in the production andmarketing of mangoes and horticultural crops.The farm has been under the ownership of 187beneficiary households from Sekororo and Ballonsince 2000. The beneficiaries acquired theland through the land redistribution programmeusing the Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant.The governance and leadership of the farm ishandled by a board of trustees while daily operationsof the farm fall under the responsibilityof a farm manager. Currently, only two beneficiariesreside at the Madiba Trust Farm, includingthe farm manager.The farm has a significant amount of necessaryinfrastructure in place, including two functionalboreholes (with another two boreholes to beequipped in the future), 10 hectares of land withmain line pipes for irrigation, two reservoirs with20 000 litre capacity each, a workshop and afarm house. Other valuable assets include a 5-tontruck, a tractor, a bakkie and a disc plough.Historical evolutionThe Madiba Trust Farm was bought in 1998 fromJohn Green on behalf of the beneficiary groupat the market value of R2.1 million. The farm wasofficially handed over to the beneficiaries in theyear 2000. The farm had been in operation formore than 15 years before it was handed over tothe group. At its peak, the farm employed about50 permanent workers in addition to many casuallabourers.According to the business plan that was formulatedduring the planning stages of the project:“The vision of the project is an agro-basedfirm engaged in the primary productionof high value horticultural crops and subtropicalfruits driven by the need to builda first-class sustainable and profitable ruralagricultural hub.“The mission of the farm is to expand itsoperations to its full production capacityand to produce high value crops satisfyingcustomer needs and creating a sustainableand profitable farming venture for itsbeneficiaries.”However, while the project never collapsed asmany other land reform projects have, it certainlynever came close to satisfying its loftyambitions. The problem had many of the characteristicfeatures of ‘rent-a-crowd’ redistributionprojects in particular, whereby the reality of theparticipation of many of the official beneficiarieswas questionable from the beginning, whilethe functioning of the project faltered earlyon. This is despite significant spending early onto improve the irrigation infrastructure (to anamount of about R800 000, which came out ofthe ‘balance of grant’), and efforts to providetraining and management support. For example,in the first two or three years, a non-governmentalbody, Technoserve, was brought on board toassist with management and securing of loans.Through Technoserve, a local commercial farmerwas engaged to advise the farm management183

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.on production and marketing aspects. However,for reasons that are unclear, this relationshipended.The project has effectively been taken over bythe Board of Trustees and the farm manager(who is himself a beneficiary). Divisions withinthe Board, which appears to pit most of theBoard members against the chair on questionsof control over and allocation of revenues, contributeto a sense of paralysis and paranoia. Presently,production carries on under the day-to-dayguidance of the manager and assistant manager,who are the only two permanent members ofstaff on the project. The manager reiterates thegrowth objectives of the project (in terms thatecho the language in the business plan regardingthe project’s ‘vision’ and ‘mission’), but it isclear that the necessary capital to realise thesegoals will not be forthcoming any time soon.Natural and physicalresourcesMadiba Trust Farm has a total area of 165 hectares,of which 105 are arable land. The wholefarm has flat fields of mostly fertile red soils. Thefarm is partially fenced and has several buildings,including the main farm house and anotherhouse that is being leased to an Eskom worker.The main house currently serves as the farm officeand is mostly bare, reflecting the currentproduction and possibly financial situation ofthe farm. There are workers’ quarters for aboutfour workers on the farm. The farm has two 30m 2 pack houses and an old pack house that wasformerly equipped with a cold room and packingequipment. Moreover, there are two shedsfor equipment and a workshop. There are twoor three concrete water tanks and a total of 8boreholes. Most of the infrastructure on thefarm has been neglected for a long time and allthe physical structures on the farm need someform of refurbishment.Production systemsMango trees cover 33 hectares of the total areaof the land, while another six hectares are carriesvarious vegetable crops, including greenpepper, green beans, baby marrow, butternutand tomatoes. Butternut and tomatoes are currentlyproduced on relatively small plots. Thereis potential to increase the production of vegetablesto about 30 hectares, provided all theboreholes are brought into service.Observations showed good management of thevegetable crops but rather poor management ofthe mango orchards. Some of the mango treesneed to be rejuvenated through pruning, thereis tall grass in some of the mango orchards, andthere are no basins at the bases of the trees toenhance moisture conservation given that theorchard is not irrigated. It seems there is nomanagement related to fertilisation or pesticidespraying effected on the mango trees.Economic aspects: grossmargin analysis of fruit andvegetable cropsMadiba’s primarily mango customers are neighbouringatchar processing factories around Tzaneenand the Johannesburg Fresh Produce Market,the latter also being the market for about60% of the farm’s vegetable produce since 2003.The balance of the produce is sold to bakkietraders and local customers at farm gate.Figure 13.1: Photos of Madiba Trust Farm184Baby marrow showing powdery mildewPoorly tended mango trees

ResearchReportThe vegetables produced are presented andpacked in various bags per size and weight rangingfrom 1, 4, 10 and 25 kilograms, as well as 1000kilograms for mangoes. The farm plans to secureoff-take contractual agreements for 80% of thevegetable produce and to supply mangoes toatchar processing factories, juicing companiesand local customers. Other envisaged crops tobe incorporated in the marketing plan includebaby marrows and patty pans.According to the information obtained fromthe farm manager and assistant farm manger,the selection of vegetable crops included in thecurrent production system is informed by a numberof general factors such as suitable climaticconditions and soils, availability of water for irrigation,and availability of market. Currently,the three main vegetable crops that are grownon the farm are baby marrows, green beans andgreen peppers, while smaller amounts of landare devoted to butternut and tomatoes. Accordingto the information obtained from thefarm manager, these latter two crops may notbe grown in the future. Thus, the gross marginanalysis was done on the three main vegetablecrops only and for the mangos. It should be notedthat the farm does not keep proper farm records,making quantitative estimation of inputsand outputs difficult. Analysis of gross marginsis based on recall and assisted estimation of inputcosts and revenue from the sale of crops. Thegross margins for all crops were worked out on aTable 13.1: Gross margin for mangos (2008)Item Rand/ha DetailsA. Gross income 25 000 1000 boxes/ha @ R25/boxB. Total variable costs 12 123Land preparation (tractor) 1 000Transplants (labour) 1 200Fertiliser 800Herbicides 350Irrigation (electricity) 2 500Harvesting (labour) 1 500Packing and grading (labour) 2 000Marketing, transport 2 773C. Gross margin (A-B) 12 877Note: there are about 200 mango trees per hectare of land.Table 13.2: Gross margin for green beans (2008)Item Rand/ha DetailsA. Gross income 26 250B. Total variable costs 9 600Land preparation (tractor) 950Seeds 200Planting materials (staking supports) 1 200Irrigation 1 000Fertiliser 900Pesticides 1 000Labour (weeding, harvesting, etc.) 1 850Packing, marketing, transport 2 500C. Gross margin (A-B) 16 650875 boxes/ha @ R30/box (box= 4 kg)Note: The farm manger and extension agent of the area have indicated that the yield of green beans on a hectareof land is 3.5 tons on average.185

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 13.3: Gross margins forgreen pepper (2008)Table 13.4: Gross margins forbaby marrow (2008)ItemRand/haA. Gross income 24 000 *B. Total variable costs 12 543Land preparation (tractor) 1 500Fertilisers 850Irrigation (electricity) 1 200Crop protection 500Labour 1 993Materials (crates, cartons) 3 000Packing and marketing 3 000Other sundry expenses 500C. Gross margin (A-B) 11 457* 4 crates/tree, 800 crates/ha, @ R30/crateItemRand/haA. Gross income 30 000 *B. Total variable costs 15 300Land preparation (tractor) 975Irrigation (electricity) 2 979Fertiliser 2 678Pest control 568Weed control 1 144Transplanting (labour) 1 421Harvesting (labour) 1 350Packing and grading (labour) 1 900Marketing, transport 2 315C. Gross margin (A-B) 14 670* 1200 boxes/ha @ R25/box22 This is despite the fact thathaving an accountant attachedto the farm is a requirementfor registration as a trust. Thefarm’s financial records aretherefore evidently kept byan accountant based in Polokwane.We did not have accessto these records and thus cannotcomment on how accurateor up-to-date they are; as forwhy the farm manager did nothave copies, or why he wasnot willing to share them, isanother question.186hectare basis. It should also be noted that grossmargins are taken as relative indicators, ratherthan absolute enterprise profitability as they excludefarm overheads.The three vegetable crops show varied profitmargins ranging from R12 877/ha for greenpeppers to about R14 670/ha for baby marrow,while the margin for mango was R11 457.The gross margins for green beans and babymarrows are relatively high and thus make thesevegetable crops very attractive. However, therosy picture painted by the figures is probablynot accurate. In particular, there is a concernthat the figures – which were provided by thefarm manager and who, as mentioned above,could not produce anything like detailed andcomprehensive records 22 – over-state income,seemingly by using the best price achieved forthe whole harvest when in fact different priceswere paid according to different markets,product quality, etc. Another importantconsideration is that, although the land plantedto vegetables is irrigated, it does not appear thatthe project regularly gets more than one harvestper year, suggesting that it is operating at belowpotential in more ways than one.The area where the farm is situated is known forgood mango production, however due to thepoor agronomic practice (e.g. no timely pruning)on the farm, the yield of mangos per treeand hence per hectare is quite low. Land allocationfor each vegetable crop does not seem to bedone proportionately based on profit margins asthe current land allocation for baby marrows isone hectare and that of green beans four hectares.Notwithstanding concerns about the accuracyof the enterprise-level figures, we estimatedthat the total turnover for the farm was aboutR950 000 per annnum in 2008, total operationalcosts were R480 000, and net farm income wasR470 000. The total wage bill was a conspicuouslylow R81 000, which excluded payments madeto the manager and assistant manager, aboutwhich we were unable to obtain any information.An essential component of successful vegetableproduction is the ability to access markets. Marketchannels for these crops are the JohannesburgFresh Produce Market and large supermarketssuch as Pick ’n Pay and Woolworths. Also,bakkie traders are very visible in the area wherethe farm is located.It should be noted that the farm has a total areaof 165 hectares and yet only about 39 hectaresof land are under production. Of the remainingland, most appears to be unutilised, thoughsome is rented out to a nearby commercial cattlefarmer for grazing.Livelihoods significanceWhile this net farm income seems quite ample,it works out to only about R2500 per beneficiary

ResearchReporthousehold for the year. Even adding the wagebill as a form of benefit to project members, ifone takes (estimated) overhead into account,the potential income per beneficiary still probablyworks out to about R2500. However, weknow little about how the income from thefarming operations is shared out, and still lessabout what happens with the lease incometheoretically accruing to the project. In effect,the benefits accruing to beneficiaries are somewherebetween very modest to non-existent.To what extent this is because the farm is operatingbelow potential, and to what extentthis is intrinsic to the nature/design of the project,is uncertain. If the farm were operated atits commercial potential, the scale of benefitswould be decidedly more significant. Assumingthe project were able to boost the area undervegetable production to 30 hectares and plantmultiple crops per year, then the profits could bethree or more times what they presently are. Butthis begs the question how any such additionalprofits would actually be used. In short, the acquisitionof Madiba Trust farm 10 years ago hashad little impact on the livelihoods of the beneficiariesand surrounding communities, unlessthat impact is negative as a result of the loss ofregular employment.Social and institutionaldimensionsThe project is supposed to promote people’s incomesand improve their social status in terms offood security, improved health, ability to caterfor their families and a secured future. However,the current state of organisation and membershipat Madiba makes these goals appear farfetched.The salient aspect of the project is theextent to which it has effectively been capturedby a small number of individuals, meaning themanager, assistant manager, and half a dozenmembers of the Board of Trustees.Of course, this ‘institutional’ dysfunctionality hasimplications for the operational performance ofthe farm, but not to the extent that productionhas collapsed entirely. Indeed, this is perhapsthe single most significant insight from the casestudy: in contrast to the many land reform projectsthat collapse entirely because of a lack ofleadership or severe in-fighting, Madiba Trustis an example of a situation where, throughundemocratic and unsavoury means, enoughleadership is maintained to keep commercialproduction going, albeit at a reduced level. Thisreinforces the importance of looking beyond thestrict economic performance of projects, whichin this instance reflects what has gone wrong asmuch as what has gone right.Possibly the most astonishing and offensiveaspect of the project is the fact that it offersonly casual employment, except of course tothe manager and assistant manager. If the enterprisemargins are even remotely correct, thiscannot be for lack of project income. Whether itis ever advisable or desirable for project beneficiariesto assume the role of ‘wage earners’ (asopposed to co-owners and/or farmers) is its owndebate; what seems less ambiguous is the factthat regular employment is preferable to casualemployment, particularly on a farm that used tomaintain such a large regular workforce.What are the responsibilities of government in acontext like this? Certainly it is understandablethat Land Affairs officials do not perceive it tobe their role to provide indefinite mediation inprojects whose land was transferred some yearsago (particularly given the urgency of progressingtowards the ‘30% target’), and similarlyone can understand why extension agents feelill-equipped to resolve what are complex socialproblems. However, across Limpopo, the provincialdepartment of agriculture did embarkon something like an attempt to re-engineerredistribution projects such as Madiba Trust.The process of “de-registration” began two orthree years ago and involved a systematic sweepthrough all of the older redistribution projectsto encourage inactive project beneficiaries toagree to have their names removed as officialbeneficiaries. The thinking seemingly was thatmuch of the problem with these first-generationredistribution projects was the large numberof inactive members lingering on the farmboundaries and interfering with the efforts ofthe committed few to get operations onto amore solid footing. By de-registering, non-activebeneficiaries would acknowledge that they hadno right to expect anything from their (former)projects, and simultaneously would be eligibleto apply for assistance all over again.While there are instances where this type ofinterference of non-active beneficiaries is veryreal, it does not appear to be the norm, andmoreover non-participation is not necessarily achoice. While the sequence of events around the187

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.dramatic downsizing of Madiba Trust is murky,it seems clear that it was those who seized controlof the project who left no space for the participationof the majority. Meanwhile, extensionofficers and land reform officials are waitingon the sidelines at Madiba to be provided witha revised list of official beneficiaries, i.e. nowthat the de-registration process being handledfrom Polokwane has run its course. On the otherhand, it would appear that in reality the de-registrationprocess has been quietly dropped, havingfailed to convince more than a fraction ofnon-active project members to sign away theirmembership.Gender, class and humandimensionsLittle was learned through our research aboutthe composition of the beneficiary group, but ina sense this is immaterial because most of thesebeneficiaries are such only in an official sense,while probably not deriving any actual benefitsfrom the project at all. It was observed howeverduring one of the fieldwork visits that most ofthe casual workers who happened to be thereon that particular day were women; however isnot possible to make assumptions about whetherbeneficiaries are exclusively or even mainlyfemale.Similarly, little was learned about the compositionof the Board of Trustees, and whether theBoard members belong to a different class stratumfrom the ordinary beneficiaries.Perceptions of performanceThe Land Affairs official and the agriculturalextension staff perceive production levels atMadiba as very low. The farm has high potentialand a lot of money has been spent, includingthe R800 000 to enhance irrigation capacity. Themanagement of the mango orchards is very poorand only a very small area is under horticulturalcrops. Even the managers acknowledge that thecurrent levels of production are rather low. Someof the unused fields are currently rented out toa neighbour for cattle grazing. It is thought thatproduction at the farm could be increased by diversifyingthe enterprises, for example by keepingcattle and adding avocado and macadamiato the fruit grown on the farm.Environmental aspectsThere are no obvious threats to the environmentfrom current farming activities at Madiba TrustFarm, or at least, those that exist are typical ofcommercial farming of orchard and horticulturalcrops in South Africa. The farm is generally flat,thus the risk of water erosion is low. One aspectthat needs to be effected however is the neglectof making fireguards to protect the farm fromexternal veld fires, as they are rampant in thearea.ConclusionMadiba Trust Farm is in some sense a productof its time, that is, one of the first-generationredistribution projects characterised by too largea group and too naïve a business plan. The particulargrant mechanism that was used to createit has largely been superseded by other grantmechanisms, and generally there is awarenessand wariness nowadays of group projects thatwas absent (or muted) in the period from 1994to 2000. Perhaps we are not certain what to doabout the projects like Madiba Trust that are alreadyout there, but at least we are not creatingnew ones along the same lines. If the farm thatwas acquired on behalf of Madiba Trust in 2000were instead to have been acquired today forredistribution, the project would look quite different,especially in light of the further increasesin the redistribution grant that were introducedlast year.That might be consoling on the one hand, butalso a cause of concern. With today’s redistributiongrant structure, it is perfectly conceivablethat the farm which became Madiba Trust couldhave been acquired by three families. To put thisin broader perspective, as a consequence of allocatingmore funding per beneficiary for landacquisition and other capital needs, in 2007/08the Department of Land Affairs spent R1.3 billionon redistribution, of which the vast majoritywent to support a mere 2100 emerging farmerbeneficiary households.This type of assistance might have its role,but it clarifies that much of what falls underredistribution cannot be described as broadbasedpoverty reduction. Thus there remainsa need to use agriculture somehow to benefitlarger numbers of people, and almost inevitably188

ResearchReportthis returns us to the question of groups. Indeed,the impetus of government agencies to workwith groups rather than individuals is still verymuch in evidence, even though it may takedifferent forms. The compelling logic to workingwith groups is that it allows limited governmentresources to touch larger numbers of people.In agriculture, there is an added incentive inthat many of the technologies are lumpy (e.g.tractors and irrigation systems), and it is difficultto justify giving them away to single individuals(though this is happening more frequently inlight of the). Thus we might be clear that wewill not create new projects like Madiba Trust,but to the extent we are committed to the useof agriculture to pursue large-scale povertyreduction, it is not altogether clear we haveidentified robust alternatives.189

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.190

ResearchReport14 Nkuke Ketla Ema vegetableproject, Limpopo: individual marketorientedvegetable production inthe context of group-managedinfrastructureIrvine Mariga and Abenet Belete, Department ofAgricultural Economics, University of LimpopoIntroductionThis small vegetable project is located in Ga-Sebati village about 30 kilometres south-west ofMankweng (60 kilometres from Polokwane). Thearea is accessed through an all-weather gravelroad. The project is located on the eastern edgeof the village. The 3.2 hectare plot on which theproject is located was given to the group by thechief according to an indefinite ‘permission tooperate’’ arrangement. It is a typical communityproject whose main objectives were to fighthunger and poverty. The project was initiated bylocal villagers and continues to be run by them.All the members belong to the same chiefdom.Project membership is restricted to residents ofthe Ga-Sebati area only. Currently, there aretwelve members, of whom ten are women andtwo are men.Historical evolutionThe project was formed in 1992 by villagers fromGa-Sebati as a tool to fight poverty and hungerby providing vegetables for consumption bymembers and sale of excess produce. The projectwas conceptualised as a self-help project hencethe name “Hold my hand I can stand,” and itsformation was the idea of the current ‘manager’of the group. The project started with 72 farmersbut over time this figure dwindled to 12. Someof the reasons advanced for that are: i) somemembers found better opportunities elsewherefor making money, ii) some stopped as soon asthey qualified for social grants, iii) some had notime because they had to look after children orgrandchildren in the village, and iv) others didnot like periodic contributions to maintain thefacilities and pay for electricity.At the start of the project each farmer had onlyone bed, but now each has access to six bedsbecause of the drop in active members. The remainingfarmers now have much better potentialto produce excess produce for sale. The remainingfarmers feel they have invested much inthe project and this coupled with better incomesfrom the sale of the vegetable crops perhapsmade the 12 beneficiaries stay on the project.Initially, the farmers had dug an open well outsidethe scheme and were pumping water intobuckets and carrying them to the vegetableplots by hand or in wheelbarrows. This entailedlots of hard work and indicates the level of commitmentof the farmers. Also, during these firstfour years the garden area was fenced off usingAcacia brush and project ran without any externalassistance, including extension advice.In about the fifth year of the project’s existence– by which time the group had already dwindledto its current size – the then Department of Agricultureof the Northern Province assisted thegroup with fencing, a borehole and an irrigationsystem. This group was very pleased with thesedevelopments, even though the Departmentprovided little if any assistance subsequently byway of planning or technical advice.The group is frequently approached by communitymembers who wish to join it. However, thegroup refuses, saying that there is only enoughland for their present number.191

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Natural and physicalresourcesThe project is located on well drained sandyloam soil. The area is fairly flat, with a depressionin the South eastern corner. The Ga-Sebatiarea has scrub vegetation dominated by Acaciaspecies, and is typical of Limpopo bushveld. Thearea is characterised by low and erratic rainfallestimated at about 400 mm per annum. The rainseason extends from November to April. Therainfall is not adequate and hence all the cropsrequire total or supplemental irrigation. The Ga-Sebati area is prone to frost from mid-June toearly August.The scheme plot is 210 metres long and 150 metreswide, giving an area of 3.2 hectares. Theproject has a brick under asbestos storeroomnear the entrance. This is used to store tools,hose pipes and produce. It also serves as a rainshelter during the rainy season. There is a pit latrinein one corner of the scheme. There are only3 small trees that can provide shade within thescheme. The scheme is fenced with barbed wire(8 strands and reaching about 2 metres high) butonly half of the perimeter is reinforced with 2metre high diamond mesh fencing. It is becauseof this that small animals such as rabbits and impalasometimes feed on the vegetables at night.Adjacent to the eastern edge of the project areais a borehole. The capacity and depth specificationsof the borehole are not known but it providesirrigation water throughout the year. Theborehole is fitted with a submersible electricpump and an irrigation network of pipes andwater outlets runs in the scheme. Irrigation isdone using hose pipes (see Figure 14.1).Production systemsThe scheme’s 3.2 hectare garden is subdividedinto small plots of 22 metres by 15 metres in extent.These are arranged in six rows each with12 plots, making a total of 72 plots. Each farmerhas two plots in each row. There are 18 irrigationpoints at which 30 metre long hose pipes are fittedto irrigate the individual plots.The vegetable crops grown in the project arebeetroot, spinach, onion, tomato, cabbage,sweet potato, butternut, groundnut, bambaragroundnut, carrot, pea, sugar bean, chillies andgreen pepper. From the interaction with farmers,the main crops are sweet potato, butternut,spinach, beetroot, carrot, tomatoes, onion, andcabbage. The choice of crop is left to the individualfarmers as well as when they want to growit. Crops are grown throughout the year butFigure 14.1: Farmer irrigating spinach crop (see uneven stand)192

ResearchReportthere is little activity during the period of highfrost probability, i.e. June to August.Land preparation is mostly done by hired tractor,with the final seedbed prepared manually.Farmers use individually owned hand hoes andrakes, but these are mostly in poor condition.There are some project tools that are stored inthe storeroom at the production site. These includeseven hose pipes, a knapsack sprayer, ahand sprayer and 5 wheelbarrows.At Nkuke Ketla Ema project, there is very limiteduse of agrochemicals. A few farmers occasionallyapply LAN (limestone ammonium nitrate) (28%nitrogen) and pesticides, mostly insecticides.These are procured from the local shops. It appearsthere is no use of fungicides at the projectdespite growing fungal disease prone crops suchas tomatoes and green pepper. Soil fertility is toa limited extent managed by applying decomposedleaf litter collected from nearby bushes orcompost manure made from a mixture of grassand weeds from the scheme. A few farmers applysmall amounts of chicken and goat manure.Most of the farmers depend on family labour,which occasionally involves their children andgrandchildren. The farmers stated that in Ga-Sebati very few youths willingly work on theirparents’ plots. The labour is mostly required tomake irrigation furrows in the beds and to irrigatethe vegetables.The project has a borehole just outside thescheme. The borehole and the irrigation pipingwere installed with the assistance of the ProvincialDepartment of Agriculture in the thenNorthern Province. The borehole is fitted witha submersible pump. The transformer was oncestolen but of late theft is not a major concern forthe project. The capacity of the borehole is notknown but the project members indicated thatwater was not a limiting factor. The electricityused for pumping was the problem due to anescalating electricity bill. The crops are surfaceirrigated using hose pipes to put water into theshallow furrows or into basins. This form of irrigationdemands formation of appropriatestructures prior to planting the crop. The farmersindicated that this is challenging in termsof labour requirements. The crops are irrigatedtwice a week despite stage of growth. This suggestspossibilities of inefficiency of either overor under-irrigation during some part of thecrop’s growth. Each member contributes R50 permonth towards irrigation electricity costs.As far as the project members are concerned,they do not have any marketing problems. Theysuccessfully sell all their produce at the farmgateor in the village. The crops mostly soldinclude sweet potato, beetroot, spinach, butternut,carrots, onion, tomatoes, and cabbage.The farmers estimated that they consume abouta quarter of their production with the rest sold.Figure 14.2: A good stand of beetroot193

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.194Farmers stated that they fetch prices similar tothose at the markets in Mankweng.Production constraintsThe farmers indicated a number of productionconstraints and the following are the most importantones:a) The farmers stressed their limited ability toprocure inputs as the key limiting factor,particularly as it relates to fertilisers, pesticidesand electricity for irrigation. In effect,low production levels mean that the moneyrealised from vegetable sales is too little tobe used for both household cash needs andpurchase of inputs, thus they cannot affordinputs and the monthly electricity bill of R50per farmer is on the high side. Some farmersindicated that sometimes they do use socialgrant money towards project obligations.b) The project farmers lack technical advice.They stated that the government extensionofficer responsible for their area doesnot visit the scheme despite the assistancethey rendered the group earlier by way ofinfrastructure. Another aspect that clearlyunderscored this problem was the poor cropstands in some plots. There were many gapsin some spinach and beetroot plantings, aswell as too densely populated carrots.c) Another production constraint was animaldamage at night. The farmers indicated thatrabbits, rodents and birds damaged theircrops as half of the scheme is not fencedwith diamond mesh fencing. There were nomeasures in place to control these pests.d) The farmers stated that in Ga-Sebati veryfew youths willingly work on their parents’plots.e) Sub-optimal pesticide and fertiliser use (bothinorganic and organic) also adversely affectstheir vegetable crops. The farmers indicatedheavy insect pressure among the productionconstraints.f) The farmers also do not have any organisedrotational system.g) The Ga-Sebati area is prone to frost. This restrictsplantings in the May to August periodand farmers indicated that crops that toleratefrost also do grow slowly during that period.At the time of visits to the area in earlyAugust 2008, all the sweet potato vines haddried up to ground level from frost damageand very few beds had any plantings.Economic aspects: grossmargin analysisGross margin analysis is undertaken of the vegetablecrops in order to better understand theeconomic viability of the project. Fixed costs forsome of the basic tools for the vegetable productionas well as the enterprise budget for thedifferent vegetable crops are presented below.It should be noted that numeracy among beneficiariesis low such that quantitative estimationof inputs and output was very difficult. Therefore,analysis of gross margins for the variousvegetable crops is based on recall and assistedestimation of input costs and revenue from thesale of crops. Initially, the gross margin analysiswas done on the basis of actual plots that thebeneficiaries own and then the gross marginsfor all crops were converted to a ‘per hectare’basis.Most of the labour for harvesting and other activitiesis provided by the plot holders, howeversome additional labour is hired by some of thosewho grow sweet potatoes and beetroot.Hand tools mainly include hand hoes (with atypical purchase cost of R30), garden forks (R85),spades (R60), and rakes (R40).The vegetable enterprises show varied profitmargins ranging from about R4000 to aboutR17 000 per hectare across the different vegetables.These margins are relatively high and thusmake the vegetable enterprise very attractive,although of course the actual amounts of landin production are relatively small. Productionof butternut, sweet potato and spinach are favouredby the project beneficiaries as these vegetablecrops are easier to produce compared toa crop such as tomato.An essential component of successful vegetableproduction is the availability of and easy accessto market. Market channels for these crops aremostly the local community.Livelihoods significanceThe project contributes to household nutritionand income. The precise extent of these benefitsis difficult to establish, as the farmers donot keep production or sales records. However,

ResearchReportif we assume that the average number of plotsfarmed in a typical year is 9 (each farmer has sixplots, roughly half of which they plant twice ina year), and from each planted plot one earnsan average amount of R430 (this is averagingacross the different enterprises captured in theprevious tables), then the cash income per groupmember per year would be in the order of R3500to R4000. In addition, since sales represent onlyabout 75% of members’ production, one wouldhave to take into account the value of what iskept back for home consumption, a rough imputedvalue for which we would put at anotherR1000 to R1500.These figures are not large, on the other handthis is not a full-time activity, and may also explainwhy some of the 12 group members regardthe amount of land as too small. Some membersindicated that there are times they use socialgrant money or other cash for project contributionsfor electricity or ploughing, implying thatthe cash earnings are generally not sufficient toallow accumulation of savings that can be drawndown to keep participation in the project going.In fact, the researchers observed an interestingrelationship whereby better-off group members– generally meaning those with wage incomefrom teaching or some other activity – tend touse less of their land than worse-off members,suggesting the ‘compensatory’ nature of the agriculturalactivities at the project.Social and institutionaldimensionsThe ages of the project farmers range from 44 to75 years. One member is below 50 years of age,two are in the 50-59 age brackets, four between60 and 69 years, and four are above 70 years.Table 14.1a: Gross margin analysis for selected vegetables,2008Tomato Cabbage Spinach ButternutRevenue (R/ha) 7 576 16 674 21 212 18 182Variable inputs (R/ha)Tractor operations (R/ha) 1 212 1 000 1 051 910Seedlings (R/ha) 910 910 1 516 859Irrigation (R/ha) 1 300 1 500 1 334 1 364Hired labour (R/ha) 0 0 0 0Total input costs (R/ha) 3 422 3 410 3 901 3 133Net profit (R/ha) 4 154 13 264 17 311 15 049Plot size (ha) 0.033 0.0165 0.033 0.033Actual net profit (Rand) 137 219 571 497Table 14.1b: Gross margin analysis for selected vegetables,2008Sweet potato Onion Carrots BeetrootRevenue (R/ha) 24 242 21 212 15 152 16 667Variable inputs (R/ha)Tractor operations (R/ha) 1 455 2 121 910 910Seedlings (R/ha) 2 424 1 516 1 212 1 136Irrigation (R/ha) 3 030 3 030 1 516 1 515Hired labour (R/ha) 1 000 0 0 500Total input costs (R/ha) 7 909 6 667 3 638 4 061Net profit (R/ha) 16 333 14 545 11 514 12 606Plot size (ha) 0.0165 0.0165 0.033 0.033Actual net profit (Rand) 269 240 380 416195

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.23 This accords well with theargument in Tim Hart’s chapteron “African vegetables andfood security for poor agrarianhouseholds in LimpopoProvince” in this volume, whichcontrasts community gardensalong the lines of Nkuke KetlaEma with household’s use oftraditional African vegetablesin their home plots.Most of these farmers receive social grants. Projectmembership is restricted to residents of theGa-Sebati area. This aspect may help to createcohesion in the group.The small group of farmers is led by a committeecomprising a manager, assistant manager,secretary, treasurer and assistant treasurer. Thecommittee is selected every three years, mostlyon the basis of interest and potential to lead.The project members meet every Monday morning.The secretary keeps records of meetings butthere are no production-related records. Thecurrent manager is male while the secretary isfemale. The group is religious, all members areteetotallers, and meetings begin and end withprayers. All money contributed for project activities,such as payment for electricity and pumpmaintenance, is kept by the treasurer as thegroup has no bank account. The group does nothave any security measurements for the projectother than locking up the storeroom and themain gate. No deliberate effort is made to guardthe project site.Gender, class and humandimensionsThe group at Nkuke Ketla Ema vegetable projectappears to operate in harmony. There appearto be no gender problems, and there isa dominance of women both in the project atlarge and on the current committee. Indeed, themanager is a man while all of the other committeemembers are women, a pattern that is surprisinglycommon among community projectsof this sort. During discussions all farmers presentwere participating freely. In other Africancommunities the tendency is for women to onlyendorse what their male leaders have stated. Althoughit became clear that there is some classdifferentiation among the group members – bywhich we mean that some are more educatedand have secure employment – this does not appearto influence interpersonal interactions atthe project. There are some farmers who owncattle and goats and can therefore access manureto fertilise their vegetable crops. Anotherfactor which may contribute to the harmony inthe group is that all members come from thesame village under the same chief. The orderlynature of interactions and operations could alsobe due to the maturity of the farmers.Perceptions of performanceThe project members are aware that their productionlevels are low, primarily because of pooragronomic practices such as little or no use oforganic and chemical fertilisers and pesticides,poor spacing and other practices. They citedpoor plant growth and insect damage as someof the reasons for their poor yields. They howeveremphasised their limited capacity to purchasethe required fertilisers and insecticides. 23Policy environmentObservations of the cropped plots and discussionswith the farmers at Nkuke Ketla Ema projectclearly suggest that small farmer-initiatedprojects cannot be sustainable without extensionbackup by local extension services or nongovernmentalorganisations. The local traditionalauthority supported the farmer initiativeby granting them the land to use but has nocapacity for anything else. It seems the responsibilityfor support of such projects should primarilylie with the Department of Agriculturethrough their municipal managers. Accordingto the farmers, the nearest extension officefrom Ga-Sebati is located 30 kilometres away atMankweng. However, the extension supervisorfor the area indicated that the extension officerwho serves Ga-Sebati area is located at Makatevillage, 12 kilometres from the project. The samesupervisor strongly indicated that it is the policyof the Department to provide technical advice toprojects such as the Nkuke Ketla Ema vegetableproject and was surprised at the claim that thiswas not the case. He indicated that only recentlythey held a road show at Ga-Sebati focusing oncontrol of fruit fly in mangoes. The Departmenthas planned several activities to revive agriculturein Capricorn District. The supervisor also indicatedthat the Department encourages smallprojects to link up with relevant NGOs for additionalsupport. If the project was big, it couldalso attract agro-chemical salespeople who alsoprovide technical back-up.Environmental aspectsThe vegetable garden for the Nkuke Ketla Emaproject is well planned in that soil erosion isunlikely to be a major problem. There were novisible signs of soil loss at the time of the visitsto the project. The only activity that farmers196

ResearchReportembark on which can impact the environmentnegatively is the use of Acacia brush to reinforcethe two sides of the perimeter fence which donot have diamond mesh fencing. The farmersseemed to be aware of the need to conserve thesoil for the long-term sustainability of their project.The futureThere are positive and negative prospects forthis project, briefly summarised below.On the positive side:• The spirit of self-reliance is very strong inthe group as seen by their ability to pay forelectricity, pump maintenance and the tractor.• The project has a reliable water source.• The tenure for the plot seems almost guaranteed.• There is land for possible expansion of theproject.• The large population in Ga-Sebati and otherneighbouring villages almost guaranteesthem a market.• The current garden contributes to meetingthe households’ food and income needsof participants, albeit in a supplementarymanner. Indeed the extent of their successin this regard has led to other communitymembers expressing an interest in joiningthe project.doubt, not least since the farmers indicatedthat only very few young people are interestedin assisting them.• The farmers’ lack technical ability to farmefficiently.• The farmers’ lack adequate inputs, includingthose that can be sourced locally such asforest tree leaf litter, compost manure andanimal manure.• The project is not being supported with extensionadvice.ConclusionThere are a number of interesting lessons fromthis project:• Self-reliance is possible even among fairlypoor communities.• There is need to involve the local youthsin agriculture. This is a big challenge but itneeds to be addressed urgently if agricultureis to contribute to rural livelihoods infuture.• Smallholder farming projects require technicalsupport, otherwise performance levelswill remain at unsustainably low levels.• There may be need for more stringent supervisionof agricultural extension officers.• Erection of a shed by the roadside next tothe vegetable garden will assist in marketingthe fresh produce on a regular basis.On the negative side are the following points:• Most of the farmers are elderly and hencethe future continuity of the project is in197

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.198

ResearchReport15 Small-scale broiler productionin the Thohoyandou area: anenterprise that can be conductedsuccessfully at different scales butwith contrasts between individualbasedand group-based enterprisesWim van Averbeke and Eric Ralivhesa, Department of CropSciences, Tshwane University of TechnologyIntroductionThere is general agreement that small-scale poultryproduction can stimulate local economic developmentand improve human nutrition in ruralareas (Wynne and Lyne, 2004). In South Africanrural settlements, poultry, primarily chickens, areraised by means of different production systemsof which the scavenging system is the most thecommon. In this system, a small number of birds,typically about six in total, roam freely aroundthe homestead during the day, scavenging forfood. At night they are usually locked up for securityreasons (Smith, 1990). Also common is theimproved scavenging system in which poultrykeepers supplement the food intake of the birdsfrom scavenging with leftovers from homesteadmeals and stored grain that is no longer fit forhuman consumption. The general objective ofthese two systems is to obtain a modest supplyof eggs and meat whilst maintaining the birdpopulation through natural processes of reproduction.There are also rural households that operatesmall- or medium-scale broiler or egg productionunits (Sonandi, 1996; Lent and Van Averbeke,1998; Wynne and Lyne, 2004). The objectiveof the poultry unit system is to generateincome from sales. Producers operating the unitsystem have to invest in production inputs. Typicallythese inputs consist of high-performancechicks, energy for heating during the broodingperiod (which lasts for the first three weeks),vaccines and medicines to prevent or control diseases,and high-protein feeds, vitamins and mineralsto ensure the birds’ optimum growth and/or laying (Sonandi, 1996). The birds are rearedin dedicated structures to protect them againstthe elements.Small- and medium-scale poultry units tend tospecialise in either broilers or eggs, and broilerunits are especially common. Broilers grow veryrapidly and typically reach a live weight of abouttwo kilograms in just under 40 days. The marketfor small poultry units consists mainly of theneighbourhood. Medium-scale units have to accessadditional markets to ensure that the birdsare sold as soon as possible after reaching theirtarget weight. Delay in the sale of market-readybirds reduces gross margins. Access to markets,both input and output, tends to be the most importantconstraint to the financial sustainabilityof poultry unit enterprises.In 2004, a survey of household consumptionof poultry products was conducted in the areaaround Thohoyandou (Ralivhesa and Van Averbeke,2005). Broadly speaking, the boundary ofthe study area was located at a distance of 10kilometres from the centre of Thohoyandou,but minor adjustments were made to take intoaccount spatial features of the physical landscapethat were thought to limit (e.g. mountainrange) or facilitate (presence of a tarred road)access to Thohoyandou. The instrument usedin the household consumption survey took intoaccount household income and sampling wasstratified into urban and rural.199

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.The results of the 2004 household consumptionsurvey showed that on average, rural householdsconsumed five dozen eggs per month and11.6 kilograms of chicken, of which 5.6 kilogramswas purchased in the form of live birds. Urbanhouseholds also consumed five dozen eggs onaverage and 14.2 kilograms of chicken, of which6.0 kilograms was purchased as live birds. It wasestimated that the 67 231 households residing inthe study area annually consumed 4.6 millionchickens, of which 2.1 million were purchased aslive birds. Annually, they also consumed about48.4 million eggs.In 2005, an audit was done of small-scale poultryenterprises that used the unit system in the areaaround Thohoyandou. The results of the auditare presented in Table 15.1.Following the audit, a survey of a sample of poultryproduction enterprises was done (Ralivhesaet al., 2006). The survey showed that broilerenterprises more or less used the same productionsystem across the different size categories.In terms of production costs, there was no realevidence of economies of scale except for heating,where costs were proportionately lower forlarger units. The mortality rate was also inverselyrelated to scale. On average, the mortality ratewas 17% in small enterprises, 10% in medium enterprisesand 1% in large enterprises. Marketingpractices and prices differed among the size categories.Small enterprises marketed directly toconsumers at an average price of R29 per bird.Medium enterprises marketed to both consumers(R25 per bird) and to traders who purchasedin bulk at R23 per bird. Sales directly to consumersat R25 per bird represented a minor proportionof the sales of large enterprises. The bulk oftheir sales were to fairly large traders at R20 perbird. As a result, enterprise size did not really affectfinancial sustainability of broiler enterprises,because while larger units enjoyed modestlylower unit costs, they were also compelled to sellon average at modestly lower prices.As with broiler units, layer units also more orless practised the same production system acrossthe different size categories. There was evidenceof economies of scale because production costsincreased as scale was reduced. An inverse relationshipwith scale also applied to mortality ratesand productivity. The average mortality rate was5% in micro enterprises, 2% in small enterprisesand less than 1% in medium enterprises, and onaverage hens produced 25 dozen eggs per yearin micro enterprises and 29 dozen in small andmedium enterprises. Micro enterprises chargedslightly less for a dozen of eggs (R7.80) thansmall and medium enterprises (R8.40) but slightlymore for a cull (R27.50 per cull in micro enterprisesversus R25 per cull in small and mediumenterprises). Micro and small enterprises alsoderived income from the sale of manure (aboutR8.50 for a 50 kilogram grain bag filled with manure),whilst owners of the medium enterprisesthat were sampled all used the layer manurein their own cropping enterprises. In terms offinancial sustainability, micro layer enterpriseswere by far the most vulnerable of the three sizecategories of layer enterprises.Using the information in Table 15.1 and the resultsof the household consumption survey, itwas estimated that smallholder poultry unitswithin the study area annually produced 300 000birds (6.5% of total household consumption)and 112 120 dozen eggs (2.7% of total householdconsumption).Table 15.1: Number of poultry enterprises in the various sizecategories in the Thohoyandou area (n=71; 2005)Number of birds per productioncycleBroiler production enterprises(number)Micro (< 50) * 11Small (50-199) 10 5Medium (200-1 999) 42 2Large (>2 000) 1 0Total 53 18Source: Ralivhesa et al., 2006.Layer production enterprises(number)200*Information on micro broiler enterprises was not available. Consequently, even though this category of broilerunits may have been present in the study area, they were not included in the audit.

ResearchReportOn the whole, the results of the 2005 survey suggestedthat these poultry unit enterprises werefinancially viable, successful ventures, but beforesuch a conclusion could be reached there wasneed for a longitudinal study. This warrantedthe conduct of a case study in the same studyarea. The sharp increases in the cost of feed,energy and chicks during 2008 presented an interestingchange in the circumstances of production,which offered an ideal opportunity to assessthe sustainability of these enterprises and toidentify the strategies they had adopted to copewith the changes.MethodsThe common methodology developed for thecase studies was such as to preclude the conductof a simple follow-up visit to the enterprises thatwere surveyed in 2005, i.e. using the same surveyinstrument to collect data. To some extent, thiswas fortunate, because one of the methodologicalweaknesses of the 2005 poultry unit surveywas that enterprise budgets were compiled bymeans of interviews with owners or managers.When analysing the data, anomalies were identifiedfor some of the enterprises and these castdoubt on the trustworthiness of the entire bodyof data. Consequently, the decision was made tolimit the study to broiler enterprises only and tosurvey a smaller number of elements.For the purposes of the current case study, 16broiler enterprises were selected purposively soas to represent the full spectrum of enterprisesin the same study area as for the 2005 enterprisesurvey. Enterprise budget information was obtainedby combining interviews with owners,managers or representatives of the enterpriseswith the inspection of enterprise records. In addition,data were not collected for a single (average,normal, typical) production cycle as was thecase in 2005, but for an entire production year(1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008). Several enterpriseskept full records for each cycle (batch), whichassisted application of the new method of datacollection greatly. In other cases, the enterprisebudgets were constructed painstakingly in collaborationwith producers, primarily by sortingthrough boxes of receipts.Historical perspectiveSmallholder broiler enterprises in Vhembe aremostly new-millennium developments. Onlythree of the 16 enterprises included in the samplewere established before 2000 (Fig. 1).The broiler projects consisted of both individually-ownedand group projects. Table 15.2 summarisesthe ownership and origin information ofthe 16 enterprises that were sampled.The origin of nearly all 16 enterprises was unemploymentand the need to generate income.Figure 15.1: Year of establishment of smallholder broilerenterprises (n=16; 2008)876Frequency5432101994 or earlier 1995–1999 2000–20042005 and laterYear of enterprise establishment201

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 15.2: Origin of smallholder broiler enterprises in Vhembe (n=16; 2008)CaseType ofprojectGenderandclass ofowner(s)*1 Individual Female,singlemother, 2children,very poor2 Individual Male,marriedpoliceman,not poor3 Individual Female,marriedmother, 4children,poor6 Individual Male,single wholives withparents,not poor9 Individual Male,married, 3children,poor11 Individual Male, notpoor12 Individual Female,not poorName and origin of the enterprisesThe Nephulu Broiler Farm started as a micro-layer project that was established with publicfunds (Limpopo Department of Agriculture). Proceeds from asset disposal (culls) were investedin a broiler unit.The Tshitimbi Broiler Farm was started in 1993 by the father of the owner. After returningfrom Gauteng, the owner first worked in his father’s broiler enterprise, was then handedthe business and developed it. Has since joined the police. His spouse now runs the broilerenterprise.The Netshikulwe Broiler Farm was started by the female spouse to add to husband’s wageincome.The Dzivhani Poultry Farm was started by a university graduate who after failing to find workstarted to sell live cull hens and produced eggs on a small scale to generate income. Later onhe switched to broiler production.The Nyadenga Broiler Farm was started by a migrant worker who returned home andultimately found work in a broiler project. He subsequently started his own business byrenting the facility of another individual who discontinued production following a disastrousbatch.The Tamisani Poultry Farm is run by a man who rents the facility from a collapsed groupproject. Nothing is known about the man’s status.The Mulondi Poultry Farm was started by a young educated female who, after failing to findwork, started her own broiler enterprise using a Land Bank loan.13 Individual Male, poor The Mamilasigidi Poultry Farm was started by an uneducated female migrant worker whofollowing her return home engaged in various small-scale rural business ventures, includingbroiler production.15 Individual Female,widow, 6children,poor4 Group 9 females,poor5 Group 1 male, 1female,poor7 Group 7 females,very poor8 Group 12 females,very poor10 Group 9 females,poor14 Group 4 males, 6females,very poorand poor16 Group 6 females,poorThe Netshiongolwe Poultry Farm was started by a widow who combined motherhood withsmall income generation projects and ventured into broiler production. Her brother, a medicaldoctor in Gauteng, financed the infrastructure on her new farm.The Iyaphanda Co-operative started as a self-help initiative by 27 participants that obtainedfunding from Department of Health and Welfare to establish a broiler enterprise.The Mega Poultry Project was to be the show-case of the Department of Health and Welfare. Itstarted with 14 members, collapsed and was then revived by two members of the group.The Tshamutilikwa Poultry Project was a poverty alleviation project initiated by 15 women.It remained very small until it obtained modest funding from the Department of Health andWelfare.The Kondelela Poultry Project was started by 33 women to alleviate poverty. It obtainedfunding from the Department of Health and Welfare.Vhuawelo started as a home-care initiative that added broiler production to its activities toraise the income of members.The Lwamondo Farmer and Service Project was started by 10 people to create employment. Itrents its poultry house. It has not been funded.The Thusashulaka Poultry Farm was started by 13 people to alleviate poverty. It receivedmodest funding from the National Development Agency and the Department of Agriculture.* Categorisation of class in “very poor”, “poor” and “not poor” refers – somewhat impressionistically – to the time when the broiler enterprisewas started and may not reflect the current status.202

ResearchReportGenerally, people who started broiler projectswere poor or very poor, but several of the ownersof individual projects have since improvedtheir financial status and are no longer poor.Four of the nine individually-owned projectswere started by migrant workers who returnedfrom Gauteng, following retrenchment or dissatisfactionwith the kind of work they wereable to find. Six of the nine individually-ownedprojects started as small enterprises that wereexpanded over time. Gender appeared not to bea factor in starting individually-owned broilerenterprises as both men and women had startedsuch projects. Two of the nine individuallyownedprojects were started by obtaining accessto disused facilities through renting.Five of the seven group projects were started ascommunity-based poverty alleviation and employmentcreation initiatives that succeeded inobtaining funds, mostly from public agencies,to acquire infrastructure and in some instanceseven the necessary working capital for the firstproduction cycle. Group projects were dominatedby women.Natural and physicalresourcesCentral to broiler production is the broiler house,which needs to provide the desired environmentfor the growth of the broiler chicks. During thefirst three weeks of growth, called the broodingperiod, conditions need to be warm, whichmeans that heating is necessary, especially duringthe winter period. Thereafter ventilationbecomes very important to maintain fresh airand avoid excessively high temperatures, whichcause heat stress. The provision of water andfeed are also critical for optimum growth. Theprovision of sufficient drinkers and feeders ensuresthat these are available to all the birds allof the time. Lastly, there is a need to provideartificial light, because darkness slows growth.Usually this is achieved by means of electric lightbulbs. Table 15.3 provides a summary of the mainattributes of the broiler houses that were foundin the 16 projects.The terminology used to categorise the broilerhouses in Table 15.3 was as follows:• “Rudimentary” refers to a house that wasconstructed using home-made, waste orsecond-hand materials (Figure 15.2, upperleft). Functionally rudimentary houses tendto be sub-standard because of poor ventilationor insulation.• “Elementary” refers to a house that is functionallymore or less adequate but the materialsused tend to be of fairly low quality(Figure 15.2, upper right).• “Comprehensive” refers to a house that isfunctionally adequate but it differs fromthe sophisticated house in terms of durabilityand cost of the materials used (Figure15.2, lower left).• “Sophisticated” refers to a house that isbuilt using durable and expensive materialsand that enables high levels of environmentalcontrol (Figure 15.2, lower right).Broilers are space-efficient and can be housedat densities of up to 15 birds/m 2 . Practically, thismeans that a 3 metre by 3 metre room can accommodate100 chickens from day-old to marketreadiness. The space efficiency of the productionsystem enables rural people to site small-scaleproduction units on their residential plots, buttypically as they grow their enterprises the useof residential land becomes problematic, notonly from the perspective of available space butalso from an environmental perspective. Broilerunits are smelly, especially during summer, andthis upsets neighbours (see Case 2).There were important differences between individually-ownedand group-owned projects interms of average capacity and average cost ofthe broiler infrastructure. Individually-ownedprojects tended to have a greater capacity (2561birds on average) than group-owned projects(1586 birds on average), but the average cost ofthe infrastructure in group projects (R187 783)was 5.6 times higher than that in individuallyownedprojects (R33 393). Expressed as a cost tocapacity ratio (cost of infrastructure per bird),the contrast between the two types of projectswas even greater. In the case of individuallyownedprojects, the average cost of infrastructurewas R13.04 per bird, whilst in group projectsit was R118.40. The difference can be largely attributedto the fact that a number of the groupownedprojects had received relatively copiousmaterial support from public agencies.Production systemAcross the 16 enterprises the production systembeing used was highly standardised. Day-old203

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 15.3: Summary attributes of the broiler houses used insmallholder broiler production in Vhembe (n=16; 2008)CaseNumber ofhousesTotal capacity(batch size)Estimated totalcost (Rand)CategorisationIndividually-owned enterprises1 1 200 3 000 Rudimentary2 3 3 000 72 000 Elementary3 2 1 600 30 000 Elementary6 1 400 2 250 Rudimentary9 1 1 500 Rented Elementary11 4 10 000 Rented Sophisticated12 2 900 22 000 Elementary13 1 450 4 500 Rudimentary15 3 5 000 100 000 1 elementary and 2 comprehensiveMean 2 2 561 33 393Group-owned enterprises4 2 2 700 160 000 Comprehensive5 2 5 000 880 000 Sophisticated7 1 700 27 500 Elementary8 3 1 800 127 000 1 rudimentary and 2 elementary10 1 500 75 000 Sophisticated14 1 100 1 200 Rudimentary16 1 300 43 780 Comprehensive with three partitionsMean 1.5 1 586 187 783Figure 15.2: Categories of smallholder broiler houses found inVhembeRudimentary broiler houseElementary broiler house204Comprehensive broiler houseSophisticated broiler house

ResearchReportbroiler chicks, usually of the Ross breed, are purchasedfrom commercial hatcheries and are suppliedto the units in boxes of 100 chicks, eitherdirectly or through intermediation by the VhembeDistrict office of the Limpopo Department ofAgriculture in Thohoyandou.The Ross breed was developed to grow veryrapidly. When conditions are optimal, dayoldRoss broilers can attain a live weight of 2kilograms after 38 to 40 days. They have beenbred to eat much more than other chickens andthis trait has certain negative side effects, suchas susceptibility to leg problems and the suddendeath syndrome. Leg problems are expressedas struggling to get up and move around. Thesudden death syndrome, also called ‘flip over’, isessentially the result of birds eating themselvesto death.To achieve optimum growth rates the birds aresubjected to ad libitum, phased feeding. Thismeans that the birds are allowed to eat as muchas they want and that the composition of thefeed is modified as the birds grow. Normally,the birds are fed a high (22%) protein diet calledthe ‘starter’ diet, which may be offered in mashor pellet form, during the initial three weeksof growth. During the fourth and fifth weeks,the birds are then put on a medium (20%)protein diet called ‘grower’ diet and duringthe last week they are fed a low (19%) proteindiet called ‘finisher’ diet. All producers appliedphased feeding but they all tended to have theirown schedule, with some only using two phases,namely starter and finisher. Without exceptionthe 16 enterprises sourced their feeds from commercialsuppliers.To minimise the effects of stress, the birds aresometimes provided with extra vitamins afterarrival in the units. Health management is essentialbecause the birds are very susceptible todiseases. Day-old chicks arrive inoculated againstimportant poultry diseases, such as the infamousNewcastle disease, and during production in theunits their immunity is boosted by providingvaccines through the drinking water. The provisionof medicines becomes necessary when thebirds get ill. Health management also involvesthe prevention of infections by means of disinfectingshoe-baths at the entrance to the unitsand the cleaning, disinfection and resting of thefacility between batches.Economic aspectsAverage budgets for the two types of broilerprojects are presented in Table 15.4. Budgets forthe individual enterprises appear in Table 15.5.Production costsTotal production cost per chicken ranged betweenR19.28 and R31.22 in individually-ownedprojects and between R19.62 and R30.71 ingroup-owned projects (Table 15.5). The averagetotal production cost was R23.49 per broiler inindividually-owned projects and R23.10 in groupownedprojects. Table 15.4 shows the purchaseof day-old chicks (about 21% of the total cost ofproduction) and feed (about 69% of the totalcost of production) to be the two major productioncosts. The interviews revealed that ownersmade limited use of the discount opportunitiesthat arise from bulk purchases. Some of the enterprisesthat had a capacity that exceeded 1000chickens operated contracts with a Gautengbasedhatchery. This contract stipulated thatchicks had to be purchased in quantities of 1000or more and in return the client received a discountof R10 per box of 100 chicks purchased.Collaboration among small enterprises to makeup the numbers to take advantage of this discountappeared rare and inconsistent, possiblybecause of difficulty in synchronising timing ofre-stocking. There were also opportunities to negotiatediscounts on bulk feed purchases (5 tonsor more), but only one instance was identifiedin which this opportunity was exploited, eventhough the discount was substantial (R30 per 50kilograms of feed).During the interviews, two factors that affectedvariability in production costs were identified,namely mortality rate and the period the chickensremained in the house after reaching marketreadiness. Both factors deserve attention as theyappear to affect the economic sustainability ofsmallholder broiler enterprises in the study area.Mortality rateA chicken that dies before it is sold representsa financial loss because the costs of the inputsthe chicken had consumed until the time of itsdeath, as well as of the chick itself, cannot berecovered. In commercial broiler production themortality rate is considered too high when itexceeds 10%. Table 15.5 shows that during theJuly 07 to June 08 production year, the average205

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Table 15.4: Average farm budget for individually-owned andgroup-owned broiler enterprises (July 07-June 08)Input per chicken Individual (n = 9) Group (n = 7)Rand % Rand %Day-old chick 5.09 21.67 4.74 20.52Feed 16.04 68.28 15.86 68.66Transport 0.53 2.26 0.69 2.99Sawdust 0.45 1.92 0.61 2.64Energy 0.41 1.75 0.38 1.65Medicines and disinfectants 0.34 1.45 0.67 2.90Labour 0.60 2.55 0.00 0.00Rent 0.22 0.94 0.00 0.00Maintenance 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.65Total production cost 23.49 100.00 23.10 20.52Gross income 29.20 27.35Gross margin 5.71 3.76Total number of birds produced 9 533 4 114Mortalities (%) 6.8 14.5Net income (July 07-June 08) (Rand) 43 484 13 528mortality rate in individually-owned broiler enterprisesranged between 2.7% and 9.5%, withan overall average of 6.8%. In group-ownedprojects the average mortality rate ranged between4.2% and 38.0%. Three of the sevengroup-owned projects recorded average mortalityrates in excess of 10% and the overall averageof 14.5% was also well above the industrialtolerance limit. Scrutiny of the full enterprisebudgets of the individual projects shows thathigh mortality rates were characteristic of someof these projects, such as the Khondelela Project(Case 8), but not of all. Take for example, thegroup-owned enterprise called the LyapandhaCo-operative (Case 4). It produced 11 batches ofchickens during the July 07 to June 08 productionyear. In 10 of these 11 batches the mortalityrate varied between 1.75% and 6.25% and theaverage was 3.6%, which was excellent. However,the November 2007 batch was a disaster witha mortality rate of 41.7%. Some of the individually-ownedprojects experienced similar events.For example, the Tshitimbi Broiler Farm (Case 2),the oldest of all 16 enterprises with an averagemortality rate of 7.2%, experienced a mortalityrate of 30% in its November 2007 batch of 3000chickens. By comparison, the average mortalityrate in the other 11 batches was only 2.4%, indicatingthe excellent performance of this farm. Indicationswere that group projects found it moredifficult to recover from setbacks than individualprojects. High mortality rates are expected toreduce the average cost of feed per chicken asfewer chickens have to be raised to market readiness.This could possibly explain why the averagefeed cost of group-projects was 18c lower thanthat of individually-owned projects (Table 15.5).The higher overall average mortality rate experiencedby group projects was mostly reflected inthe lower gross income per chicken because thisparameter was calculated using the batch sizesas reference. Overall average gross income perchicken in individually-owned projects was R1.85more than in group projects.Duration of stock clearanceOnce chickens have reached market readinessthey need to be sold as soon as possible. Aftersix weeks the growth rate of the birds declinesbut the birds’ feed intake remains high astheir maintenance requirement increases withgrowth. Keeping the birds longer than necessaryerodes the gross margin even though the costof their extended stay is partially recovered bycharging higher prices. There was no evidencethat individually-owned projects cleared theirstock faster than group projects as both identifiedthis to be a major challenge.206

ResearchReportTable 15.5: Production costs, gross income and gross margin per bird in 16 smallholder broiler enterprisesin Vhembe (n=16; 2008)Input perchicken(Rand)Individually-owned broiler enterprises Group-owned broiler enterprises1 2 3 6 9 11 12 13 15 Mean 4 5 7 8 10 14 16 MeanChicks 5.09 5.03 5.71 4.70 5.30 5.15 4.98 4.98 4.90 5.09 5.01 4.78 4.73 4.79 4.50 4.74 4.60 4.74Starter feed 2.11 4.32 4.13 2.36 4.64 3.74 2.09 3.55 3.44 3.38 3.85 5.83 4.20 4.15 2.08 4.19 3.57 3.98Grower feed 2.01 9.30 8.07 2.01 5.59 6.31 6.87 4.89 1.43 5.16 0.00 1.10 3.80 4.88 3.91 4.40 4.36 3.21Finisher feed 18.62 0.00 3.85 17.45 4.97 4.87 4.62 4.09 8.99 7.50 19.58 9.30 6.50 5.13 6.75 3.92 9.49 8.67Transport 1.22 0.23 0.24 0.62 0.15 0.22 0.72 0.93 0.43 0.53 0.37 0.27 1.05 0.16 0.56 1.76 0.65 0.69Sawdust 0.97 0.08 0.30 0.48 0.31 0.47 0.36 0.93 0.18 0.45 0.22 0.55 0.38 0.25 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.61Energy 0.64 0.20 0.13 0.53 0.44 0.40 0.17 0.46 0.74 0.41 0.52 0.29 0.68 0.03 0.56 0.26 0.30 0.38Medicines anddisinfectants0.56 0.13 0.32 0.54 0.34 0.13 0.28 0.59 0.19 0.34 0.17 0.30 0.57 0.22 1.68 1.14 0.63 0.67Labour 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.54 1.00 1.79 0.00 1.10 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Rent 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.10 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Maintenance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 0.00 0.15Total prodncost31.22 19.28 22.76 28.68 24.39 23.19 20.08 20.42 21.41 23.49 30.71 23.42 21.90 19.62 20.99 23.91 24.55 23.10Gross income 35.03 23.77 28.53 36.87 30.34 26.41 27.90 28.45 25.52 29.20 30.91 29.92 30.13 21.27 29.08 23.22 26.94 27.35Gross margin 3.80 4.49 5.77 8.19 5.95 3.22 7.82 8.03 4.11 5.71 0.20 6.50 8.23 1.65 8.09 -1.14 2.39 3.76Total birdsproduced (no)1400 21500 9700 1900 3400 31500 5600 2100 8700 9533 8400 9600 1200 7100 900 600 1000 4114Mortalities (%) 7.4 7.3 5.8 2.7 8.1 8.9 4.6 7.2 9.5 6.8 9.2 5.9 10.2 22.1 11.9 38.0 4.2 14.5Net incomefor the year(Rand)5321 96436 55955 15560 20222 101434 43769 16865 35790 43484 1685 62425 9873 11733 7280 -686 2389 13528207

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Marketing and salesSmallholder broiler enterprises sell their birds intwo ways, namely to individual customers and tohawkers. Selling to individual customers has theadvantage of being able to charge high prices,but sales tend to move slowly. Selling to hawkershas the advantage of being able to sell largenumbers of birds at once, but hawkers demandsubstantial discounts. Typically hawkers operatebakkies that are equipped with cages for thetransportation of chickens. They move arounddaily and target places of likely sales, such aspension pay-out points.Marketing of the birds is done by word ofmouth, by advertising availability of chickens usingposters at the entrance of the enterprise, byinforming hawkers and by phoning to a weeklyradio programme on a local radio station thatallows smallholders to advertise their producefree of charge.The prices enterprises charged for their chickensvaried from R21 to R45 per bird. Price wasaffected by the type of customer (individual consumersor hawkers), the size of the bird and thepresence of competition (remoteness tended toincrease the price).Broiler litter was another source of income forsome of the enterprises. Empty feed bags werefilled with litter and sold to gardeners and cropfarmers. For example, during the July 07 to June08 production year, the Tshamutilikwa PoultryProject (Case 7) produced 1400 chickens andgenerated R294 from the sale of broiler litter atR7.00 per bag. Income from the sale of litter contributed0.8% of the total gross income of thisenterprise.Overall economic performanceThe information that was collected on the economicperformance of the 16 enterprises indicatedthat smallholder broiler projects in Vhembeare economically viable enterprises. Those casesthat were not performing particularly well hadexperienced one or more batches in which themortality rate was exceptionally high. Therewere reasons to believe that the quality of theday-old chicks delivered to projects during Octoberand November 2007 was suspect. Individually-ownedenterprises appeared to be more resilientto setbacks caused by exceptionally highmortality rates than group projects.Livelihood significanceFrom a livelihood outcome perspective, the differencebetween individually-owned and groupownedbroiler enterprises was striking. Withoutexception individual owners obtained considerablefinancial benefit from their enterprises,with several relying entirely on their enterprisesfor their livelihood (Cases 1, 6, 9 and 12). In fourof the nine cases, the enterprises even providedlivelihoods for others through employment (Cases9, 11, 12 and 15). Group projects, on the otherhand, stood out for the absence of livelihoodbenefits to participants. With the exception ofthe Tshamutilikwa Poultry Project, where membersreceived a single payment of R400 each duringthe production year under consideration andalso received up to five birds each for both Easterand Christmas, responding members of theother group projects were adamant that so farthey had not received any material benefit fromparticipating in their broiler projects. The totalgross margin data for the production year underconsideration (Table 15.5) show that in threeenterprises (Cases 4, 14 and 16) there was nothingor very little to distribute among members.Another three enterprises (Cases 7, 8 and 10)recorded gross margins ranging between R7280and R11 730 for the year, which would have allowedfor the payment of at least one modestdividend, but this did not occur. One groupenterprise (Case 5), achieved a gross margin ofR62 245, but this was a project that had been revivedrecently and the two members running itwere probably building up a financial reserve.The exact reasons for the sharp contrast betweenindividually-owned and group-owned enterprisesin terms of livelihood impact can only partiallyexplained by differences in the economicperformance, including differences in capacityand productivity. Further research is needed topinpoint the constraints that limit the livelihoodbenefits participants in group projects obtain.In some cases participants claimed to have beenengaged in broiler production for seven yearswithout obtaining any material reward for theirlabour and this begs for an explanation.Social and institutionaldimensionsSocially, smallholder broiler projects appearedto be well embedded in their local settings eventhough residents complained about the smellof enterprises that were located on residential208

ResearchReportsites in their midst. Important to group-ownedprojects were internal social relationships, butonly limited attention was awarded to the investigationof the social arrangements that guidedcollaboration and management of the enterprise.Considering the public and private investmentsthat have been made in these projectsand the lack of material benefits accruing tomembers of these projects from participation inthe enterprise (in one case no benefits after sevenyears of production), this aspect begs for additionalresearch. Only in one group enterprise(Case 5) was corruption mentioned as a factorthat had affected performance.The support system being provided by the Departmentof Agriculture and other public andprivate institutions in Vhembe was considerableand seemingly quite effective. The Departmentfacilitates the purchase of quality day-old chicksusing a system of bank deposits and bulk ordering.People interested in purchasing chicks depositthe purchase price in the bank account ofthe hatchery and present the deposit slips to adedicated staff member of the Department ofAgriculture in Thohoyandou. Here orders arecommunicated to the hatchery and within oneweek the order is delivered to the DepartmentalOfficer, who informs clients of the date andtime of arrival of their orders. Clients collect thechicks from the Office in Thohoyandou. The Departmentclaims to ensure quality of the chicksbeing delivered. The dedicated staff member isalso the District expert in poultry production,whose sole responsibility is to provide producerswith technical advice and to organise trainingand special occasions (farmers’ days) at whichnational experts present lectures on poultryproduction. Training, which is offered free ofcharge, is done through the Madzivahdila Collegeof Agriculture, which is located about 10kilometres from Thohoyandou. The six-weektraining programmes combine theory and practice,with trainees being guided through a completebroiler production cycle. At the local level,producers can also obtain information from thevillage extension officer. As indicated, a localradio station, Phalaphala FM, has a weekly programmeat 5:30 am on which smallholders canadvertise their produce.Several donors, both public and private, havefunded smallholder broiler development in theDistrict, but donations are limited to groupprojects. The interviews indicated that individualswho have sought financial assistance to establishor expand their broiler infrastructure dependedon the Land Bank or family members.Groups on the other hand have been supportedby a wide range of donors. The interviews indicatedthat the Department of Health and Welfarewas the main public agency that renderedfinancial support for the objective of povertyalleviation. Other public funding agencies includedthe Department of Economic Developmentand the Department of Agriculture. TheDepartment of Agriculture was claimed to fundabout three applications per year. Selection ofthe projects was said to be primarily based onevidence of commitment to succeed among theapplicants. Private and parastatal donors includedEskom, the National Development Agencyand Old Mutual.Tenure arrangements that applied to the landon which broiler enterprises were establishedwere entirely traditional. Tribal leadership in theform of the village headman were responsiblefor the allocation of residential sites on whichmost of the individually-owned projects werelocated. Group projects were mostly located ontribal farmland with the headman responsiblefor initial allocation and in some cases the chiefand the municipality endorsing the allocation.Gender, class and humandimensionsThere was no evidence of gender bias in broilerproduction because both men and women werefound to have started such enterprises. However,it needs pointing out that group-owned projectshad a membership that was dominated by women,not only from the start, but increasingly soover time. Men who joined group projects at thestart tended to withdraw more readily from theprojects when material benefits were not forthcoming.The evidence that was collected suggested thatindividually-owned broiler enterprises werestarted by people from different walks of life,including very poor, poor and not so poor, educatedand uneducated, young and old. Groupownedproject, on the other hand, were dominatedby poor and very poor women of variableage, usually married, who had not received mucheducation. The reason for the dominance of thisparticular class in group-owned enterprises wasthat nearly all of these projects arose as povertyalleviation interventions. It needs pointing outthat broiler production is a rather ‘simple’ activ-209

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.210ity because the system is applied following welldevelopedguidelines. Even without educationit is still quite easy to learn the recipe of goodpractices that need to be applied to be successful.Perceptions of performancePerceptions of performance reflected the economicperformance of the different enterprises,and therefore also the contrast between individually-ownedand group projects. Whereasnot all owners considered themselves as entirelysuccessful, most were conscious of the positivecontribution their enterprises had made to theirlivelihood outcomes. Group projects mostly proceededin the hope that circumstances and performancewould improve in future.Policy environmentThe current policy environment is particularlysupportive of group projects, especially financially,but individuals do benefit from access totraining, information and inputs in the form ofday-old chicks. To what extent growth in smallholderbroiler production can be sustained inVhembe is not certain, but the Department ofAgriculture believes that there is still considerablepotential. Spatial analysis of the distributionof small-scale broiler enterprises with a viewof avoiding high levels of competition could beadded to the institutional support services onoffer. One reason for believing potential stillexists overall is the evidence provided above tothe effect that smallholder broiler units withinin the Thohoyandou area account for less than7% of the area’s total household consumptionof birds.Environmental aspectsAir pollution was identified as a problem forenterprises that were located within residentialenvironments. Facilitating the translocation ofgrowing enterprises onto farmland was identifiedas a possible way to alleviate this problem.The futureThe study of 16 smallholder broiler enterprisesindicated that this type of enterprise has thepotential of being economically viable. Thedevelopmental approach that is being used inVhembe, particularly in terms of training andtechnical support, has a lot of merit and could beconsidered as a model for other Districts wherehuman population densities are high. The problemsidentified with group-enterprises need additionalresearch to identify why such projectsfail to provide sustainable benefit streams toparticipants.Individually-owned enterprises held realisticviews of the future, seeking to improve the efficiencyof their enterprises and associated activities.Group projects, on the other hand, had lessrealistic visions, with many identifying furtherexpansion in capacity combined with the establishmentof an abattoir as the way forward tosustainability and improved returns.ConclusionsThe case study of a selection of 16 smallholderbroiler enterprises in Vhembe served the objectivesof the overall study into ‘strategies to supportSouth African smallholders as a contributionto government’s second economy strategy’ becauseit provided several examples of enterprisesthat had been established successfully in ruralareas by people who had experienced difficultiesbecoming usefully integrated into the firsteconomy. Broiler production, as it is applied bythe enterprises that were included in the study,follows a well established production systemthat can easily be learnt, even by people withlittle or no education. It is the opinion of theauthors that modification of the system to reduceeconomic leakages could further enhancethe impact of these enterprises on village economies.At this stage, all the inputs are sourcedexternally. System modification could internalisemost inputs, but this would require majorchange in terms of breed selection and also theadoption of crop production and processing systemsthat would enable local manufacturing ofpoultry feed.ReferencesLent, P.C. and Van Averbeke, W. (1998) A surveyof commercial farmers in the Transkei region,Eastern Cape Province, ARDRI Report 2/98,Alice: Agricultural and Rural DevelopmentResearch Institute, University of Fort Hare.Ralivhesa, K.E. and Van Averbeke, W. (2005)Household demand for poultry productsin the Thohoyandou area, Pretoria: Centrefor Organic and Smallholder Agriculture,Tshwane University of Technology.

ResearchReportRalivhesa, K.E., Siebrits, F. and Van Averbeke,W. (2006) Integrating crop and poultryproduction systems: 2005/06 Annualreport, in: Van Averbeke, W. (Comp.) Bestmanagement practices for small-scalesubsistence farming on selected irrigationschemes and surrounding areas throughparticipatory adaptive research, Pretoria:Centre for Organic and SmallholderAgriculture, Tshwane University ofTechnology: 225-252.Sonandi, A. (1996) Evaluation of small scalepoultry projects in rural and suburban areasof the central Eastern Cape. ARDRINEWS,June 1996:8-11.Wynne, A.T and Lyne, M.C. (2004) Ruraleconomic growth linkages and small scalepoultry production: a survey of producers inKwaZulu-Natal, Agrekon, 43 (1): 1-21.211

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ResearchReport16 Munzhedzi restitution project,Limpopo: a restitution project thatwent wrong in a good way?Michael Aliber, Institute for Poverty, Land and AgrarianStudies, University of the Western CapeIntroductionMunzhedzi is a land restitution project locatedin Limpopo about 30 minutes east of Makhadotown. Munzhedzi is one of the few land reformprojects encountered in which the absence ofdeliberate planning or attempts to devise andadhere to a business plan are so extreme, thatin a sense it is a model of land reform that is obviousbut also uncommon. Because of its ‘openaccess’ aspect, Munzhedzi therefore revealssomething about the strong demand for landfor homestead purposes, whereas official policytends to recognise housing on the one hand, andland for agricultural purposes on the other. Howprecisely to characterise this land demand is notaltogether clear; it would appear that a largeshare of the residents are younger householdswhose heads saw the relatively cheap, well-locatedland as a good opportunity to move outof their parents’ households. However, otherpeople clearly seized the opportunity to moveaway from land that is inferior in terms of soilquality and rainfall predictability, e.g. the areasouth of the Soutpansberg ridge and west of theN1 (Kutama, Sentamule, etc.).Historical evolutionIn July 1998, a chief by the name of T. J. Rambaulodged a claim with the Restitution Commissionon behalf of the Munzhedzi community. Theland had been dispossessed from the Munzhedzipeople through various mechanisms betweenthe mid-1930s and the mid-1960s. In 2000, whilewaiting for word on the fate of the community’sclaim, Chief Rambau learned that the local municipalityintended to use some of the claimedland to enable the extension of VleifonteinTownship. He then organised an ‘occupation’by claimant and other households so as to preventthis. The occupiers immediately set aboutdemarcating residential plots and constructingshacks.In 2002, the Commission formalised the returnof the land to the Munzhedzi claimants, whonumbered 486 beneficiary households. The landis situated on the west of Vleifontein Township,about 5-10 minutes southeast of Elim along theElim-Bandelierkop (R578) road. Prior to its settlementby the Munzhedzi claimants, it was vacantstate land, though some of the Vleifonteinresidents grew crops there and residents of variousneighbouring communities grazed their livestockthere.Although a communal property association (CPA)was formed in order to accept the property titleand to manage the land, the CPA committee hasnever had any effectively meaningful function.When Chief Rambau died shortly after the restorationof the land, one of his sons took over aschief, and quickly set about demarcating plots toanyone who wanted one and could pay a modestfee (about R220 for claimant households andR320 for non-claimants). As of early 2008, therewere 1160 demarcated residential plots. Of these,a total of 931 were occupied, of which 178 wereoccupied by claimant households and the othersby non-claimant households. The vast majority(88%) of claimant households who settled atMunzhedzi relocated from Nthabalala, which isabout 10 minutes’ drive away over a hilly gravelroad. While about a third of the non-claimanthouseholds also came from Nthabalala, anotherthird came from other adjacent communities,and another third came from elsewhere, includingsome from other provinces and indeed othercountries.213

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Why did people re-settle at Munzhedzi in suchnumbers? The fact that the chief allowed peopleto acquire plots at Munzhedzi merely explainswhat made it possible, but why did so many peoplechoose to, despite the absence of services orany credible development plan? In answer to thisquestion, people’s responses fall into two categories,namely those who praise the fact that agriculturalconditions are better at Munzhedzi thanwhere they came from (in terms of being flatterand having better soil and rains), but roughly asmany cite the fact that they are now closer totransport routes through which they have betteraccess to piece jobs in Makhado. In essence, interms of its settlement pattern and style of landuse, Munzhedzi is a recreation of a communalarea, but more favourably located and with betteragricultural conditions than many. Communalwater taps were only installed in 2007 (butfrequently do not work), and neither electricitynor schools have been forthcoming.Natural and physicalresourcesThe extent of the land is 1204 hectares. Forroughly two decades prior to the settlement ofthe claim, the land had been unoccupied andlargely unused. Rainfall averages 660 mm peryear (versus e.g. 440 mm for Mara Research Station,located 56 kilometres to the west). Commercialfarms in the immediate area are eithercattle farms or irrigated orchards; grain farminghas not taken place on a commercial scale in thearea for several decades (South African WeatherService, 2009).Figure 16.1: Satellite image showing location of Munzhedzirelative to other settlements214

ResearchReportWithin Munzhedzi, plots average 30x50 metres.In general, 60% of stands have homesteadgardens, however about 15% of non-inhabitedstands also have gardens. (The percentage ofstands with gardens is highest for those parts ofMunzhedzi which were settled earliest, possiblyindicating that there tends to be a lag betweensettlement and using land for gardening; this inturn would imply that the overall percentage islikely to have risen and continue rising from the60% figure estimate from earlier 2008.) Only afraction of the land has been demarcated forresidential use (see figure below), while an additionalmodest amount is being used by about20 households on smallholdings outside/beyondtheir homesteads (mostly in the order of 0.5 to1 hectare in size). The rest of the land is not beingused for farming, though it is extensivelyused for the collection of firewood, thatch, wildfoods, etc. The extent to which the ‘excess’ landat Munzhedzi is used for grazing livestock is notentirely clear, however the grazing is classifiedas sourveld and thus is not ideal for large stockhusbandry.The allocation of residential plots appears tohave slowed, owing to the perception that theland is now full. In a recent interview with thechief, he indicated that he is no longer allocatingplots, though other key informants implythat in fact the chief has been reallocating plotsthat had been allocated earlier but never settled,but not actually demarcating and allocatingnew plots.The contradiction between the obvious fact thatthe land remains largely unoccupied, with theperception of community members that it is full,can be resolved by understanding that peoplehave fairly strict ideas as to what parts of theland are desirable for settlement, and the keyissue is proximity to a good road. The primaryroad is the Elim-Bandelierkop road (which is themore or less straight road that runs diagonallyacross the top of Figures 16.1 and 16.2), and secondlythe road that passes Vleifontein townshiptowards Nthabalala to the south. In other words,the road is the most significant physical resourcenext to the land itself, or perhaps one could sayFigure 16.2: Satellite image showing pattern of settlement atMunzhedzi215

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.216that a plot is of value to the extent it is closeto the road. Indeed, it is worth pointing outthat there is no electricity, and communal watertaps were installed a few years ago but functionpoorly. In choosing to move to Munzhedzi,many people effectively decided to sacrifice accessto some of these services, in favour of beingcloser to a good road, but also to have a plot onrelatively good land, however small.Production systemsVirtually all of the households who engage ingardening or farming at Munzhedzi grow maizeon a rain-fed basis. Just under half of thesehouseholds also grow other crops and vegetables,including sweet potatoes, tomatoes, beans,groundnuts, sugar cane; and some also maintainfruit trees such as mango and pawpaw.Of 135 ‘agriculturally active’ households interviewedin mid-2008, just over half hired tractorservices for soil preparation (mainly from an adjacentland redistribution project), while the othersrelied exclusively on hand hoes. Of the latter,about a sixth hired labour to undertake (or assistwith) land preparation. Most households whohire tractor services spend about R140 for this,however those with larger or multiple plots, orthose with extra land outside the demarcatedarea, spend more. One individual hired donkeyservices, on which he spent R300. In termsof other inputs, 44% of households use at leastsome hired labour, virtually all purchase at leastsome of their seeds, 11% use chemical fertilisers,and only 2% use pesticides. It is worth notingthat only five of these 135 households also practisedagriculture on land outside of Munzhedzi.A smaller number of households keep livestockat Munzhedzi, and these primarily within theirhomesteads. Altogether about one sixth keepchickens (overwhelmingly for home consumption),and a handful keep goats, pigs and cattle.Among the few households who keep cattle,the main reason however is for income-earningpurposes, but the largest ‘herd’ observed is 20(with the second largest being 5). There is arelationship between arable production andkeeping of livestock, for example while 41% ofthose with gardens or fields keep livestock, only14% of those without gardens do so. Only eighthouseholds incurred cash costs associated withlivestock, generally for parasite control amongthose few with cattle. Only two households, beingcattle owners, spent money on hired labourfor livestock.Economic aspectsWhile all of the 135 ‘agriculturally active households’interviewed in mid-2008 incur some cashcosts for inputs related to garden or crop production,only 6 (about 4%) had any cash income.This was by design rather than, say, because2007/08 was a poor growing season (threequarters of respondents reported that it was arelatively good season). As mentioned above, bycontrast only 8 households incurred cash costsassociated with keeping livestock, versus the 5who had cash income from livestock sales.One way in which the economic significanceof own production can be appreciated – especiallyin light of the emphasis placed on growingmealies – is by considering the extent towhich households satisfy their own mealie mealneeds. The figure below summarises, by lookingat the percentage of households from thesample of 135 ‘agriculturally active’ households.The figure shows that for 60% of households,own-produced maize in the 2007/08 season wassufficient to satisfy only 1 to 2 months’ worth ofmealie meal needs, while only about 5% actuallyproduced a surplus. However, given that mealiemeal accounts for about 9% of total householdexpenditure (i.e. despite some own production),it can be argued that own production of maizeis potentially meaningful for marginal households.As a more comprehensive measure of the economicsignificance of agricultural production atMunzhedzi (including garden/crop productionas well as livestock production), we have estimatednet farm income for the 2007/08 season.The calculation is incomplete in the sense that itdoes not seek to place a value on own (i.e. nonhired)labour, whereas it does seek to impute avalue for production for own consumption, usingmarket prices as proxies for ‘value’. The figurebelow summarises the findings, distinguishingbetween those who hired tractor services forland preparation versus those who did not.What the figure shows is that almost 15% of ‘agriculturallyactive’ households derived a negativenet farm income in the 2007/08 season. Notably,however, almost all of these were thosewho hired tractor services, reflecting the factthat these services constitute one of the maincash costs among those who employ them. Foranother 20% of households, net farm incomewas less than R250, and again, these were dominatedby those who hired tractor services. At the

ResearchReportsame time, however, those who hired tractorservices predominate among the relatively fewwhose net farm income exceeded R1500.Livelihoods significanceAgriculture is clearly not the most importantcomponent of people’s livelihood strategies atMunzhedzi. In fact, according to the census ofall households conducted in early 2008, onlyone household (representing 0.1% of all settledhouseholds), identified agriculture as its mainsource of (cash) income.However, as noted above, generating cash incomeis not most residents’ purpose in ‘farming’,particularly those who are gardening withintheir homestead stands. Thus ‘imputed income’Figure 16.3: Distribution of estimated own-produced mealiemeal expressed in terms of months of need70%60%50%Share of sample40%30%20%10%0%

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.is of more interest. The figure below seeks togive an idea of the relationship between netfarm income and average annual householdexpenditure, where the latter is a proxy for totalhousehold income. While the pattern is notvery well defined, there appears to be a generalnegative relationship, i.e. higher economic benefitsfrom agriculture are associated with lowertotal household expenditure/income. This runscounter to the often-told story that householdsderive more benefit from agriculture the betteroff they are in the first place, simply becauseit is easier for them to invest in inputs. Rather,with the exception of an outlier point for thosehouseholds with net farm income in the R2000to R2999 range, it seems that poorer householdsget more out of agriculture, presumably becausethey need to. It is not that the other logic doesnot also play a role, however it may be the casethat Munzhedzi simply does not offer much opportunityfor investing in agriculture, so agriculturalparticipation is driven more by need thanby opportunity.An obvious reason for the fairly modest pay-offfrom gardening is the limited size of most of thegardens. Indeed, 60% of the 135 ‘agriculturallyactive’ survey respondents indicated a need ordesire for more land. The explanations capturedin the survey for this desire to have more landtend to be opaque (“Because I am not satisfiedby what I harvest”), however some give a clearerindication that the purpose of having more landwould be to be able to pursue subsistence productionon a (somewhat?) larger scale: “If I getmore land I can farm and harvest better and stopbuying food for a long time as it is expensive”;“Because what we harvest cannot support usfor long time”; “Because if I have a big field, Ican farm and get good harvest and stop buyingFigure 16.4: Relationship between net farm income andaverage annual household expenditure40,000Average annual householdexpenditure35,00030,00025,00020,00015,00010,0005,0000

ResearchReportmaize meal;” etc. What are absent are unambiguousdeclarations to the effect that the respondentwants more land to enable production on acommercial basis.However, there is seemingly a contradiction betweenthis predilection for having more land,and maintaining the sort of convenient ‘peri-urban’lifestyle people have opted for. Many peopleat Munzhedzi would appear to be interestedin accessing more land there so as to garden ona larger scale, which would imply larger homesteads,i.e. so that the land would be close. (Thechair of the CPA Committee indicated that, hadthe chief not usurped the Committee’s functionof land allocation, then larger plots might havebeen created.) But this would imply either thatmany of the homesteads would end up furtheraway from the main roads, or that there wouldbe fewer homesteads, i.e. fewer households andpeople.One other livelihood issue bears mentioning,namely that gardeners/farmers at Munzhedzihire casual workers to undertake tasks related tocrop or garden production. Our rough estimateis that the total amount spent on labour in the2007/08 season was around R57 000; while thisis not much in the greater scheme of things (itrepresents less than 1% of aggregate householdexpenditure/income among Munzhedzi’s residents),it does equate to about 1600 person-daysof work (at R35/day), which is not trivial.Social and institutionaldimensionsResidents of Munzhedzi who garden or farm, doso on an individual household basis. The exceptionsare two projects which were initiated bya local NGO (which also organised donor fundingto cover start-up costs, e.g. for structures), ofwhich one is a piggery and the other a broilerproject. The piggery closed down within the firsttwo years, while the broiler project is still carryingon, albeit with only a handful of householdsremaining active. While neither projectwas closely examined for the purposes of developingthis case study, the impression generatedis that they are typical of group agriculturalprojects, in which quality of management andability to operate ‘entrepreneurially’ are weak.There is no sign of support from the provincialdepartment of agriculture at Munzhedzi. Thusthe vast majority of those involved in agricultureat Munzhedzi do so independently, and withoutoutside support apart from informal supportfrom neighbours, which is fairly commonand mainly involves borrowing of hand tools.Neither is there evidence of residents cooperatingin order to purchase inputs in bulk. As formilling services to turn maize grains into meal,virtually all maize growers at Munzhedzi rely onHluvukani Mills, a business north of Elim whichhas an elaborate and efficient system of collectingmaize from many of the villages in the areaat specified points on pre-arranged days, afterwhich it mills the grain (according to individuals’preferences) and returns the meal for a fee.Larger maize producers may however makeother arrangements, for example with mills inMakhado town.Arguably the biggest institutional issue at Munzhedziis the discord between the current chiefand the CPA committee. There are two consequencesof the discord; first, as mentioned, thechief 24 feels free to allocate plots regardless ofthe CPA’s (legally-based) objectives; and second,it is unclear who represents the community, forexample to coordinate appeals to the municipalityfor improved services. Beyond this, thereis another problem at Munzhedzi, in the formof a power struggle between the ‘chief’ and aheadman who claims that part of Munzhedzifalls under his governance. This confuses theinhabitants of Munzhedzi, since some of themdon’t know if they fall under Nthabalala or underMunzhedzi.Notwithstanding the fact that these are real issues,the discord does not flare up into nastyconflict, and most importantly there are nodiscernible simmering tensions between claimantand non-claimant households. Indeed, thedegree to which people resettled at Munzhedzifrom different places and for different reasons,and over such a brief period of time, and yetseemed to create a harmonious community, isalmost uncanny. Neither focus group discussionswith Munzhedzi claimants and non-claimants(which were conducted separated), nor the focusgroup discussion with claimants who had notre-located to Munzhedzi, nor discussions withthe police stationed across the road in Vleifontein,turned up deep divisions or pervasive socialproblems within the community. However, thereare indications that the one or two Zimbabweanhouseholds residing at Munzhedzi are victimised,though they refused to be interviewed sothat we could hear their first-person accounts.24 Another dimension of thisstory is that the chief’s legitimacyis regarded by many as questionable.It is not doubted thathe is the son of the late ChiefRambau, but he did not growup in the chief’s household andappeared to show up mainly inorder to reap the benefits of allocating/sellingplots. However,his legitimacy is not openlychallenged by anyone.219

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.Gender, class and humandimensionsThirty-eight percent of ‘agriculturally active’households are women-headed. The averageage of women household heads is 59 versus 46for male household heads, a discrepancy whichis usual given that a high proportion of womenhousehold heads tend to be widows. It is furtherinteresting to note however that 61% of women-headedhouseholds hired tractor service versus51% of male-headed households.Respondents were asked to describe who werethe ‘rich’ and who were the ‘poor’ at Munzhedzi.The most common answers referred to housingquality or employment or both.The ‘rich’ are:• “Those with big houses”• “Those who are working so they can buildbig houses”• “Those who have better houses and eatwell”.And the ‘poor’ are:• “Those who live in small houses”• “Those who are not working”• “Those who stay in shacks and sometimesgo to bed with empty stomachs”.To the extent quality of housing is a good indicator,the wealth-differentiation at Munzhedziis quite visible, with scatterings of shacks interspersedwith three-bedroom brick houses sportingtile roofs. As implied by some of the quotesabove, there is seemingly a close correspondencebetween employment status (and takinginto account the nature of the employment),and household wealth. Moreover, using ourown crude classification of housing quality (‘below-average’,‘average’, and ‘above-average’),we observe that the ‘rich’ are well-representedby women headed households: of the 13% of agriculturallyactive households residing in ‘aboveaverage’dwellings, almost two-thirds belong towomen-headed households, even though women-headedhouseholds represent the minority ofall households.One other implication of the fact that somehouseholds build very nice homes at Munzhedzi,is that they must therefore perceive there tobe little tenure insecurity, despite the fact thattheir actual tenure status (especially among nonclaimants)is highly ambiguous. The most salientaspect of land tenure in Munzhedzi is the lackof clarity regarding land tenure, which is closelyrelated to the general crisis in respect of governancementioned above. Since Munzhedzi is partof a restitution project, in principle Munzhedzi’smain authority in respect of land matters is theCPA, which in fact is the ‘legal person’ in whosename the land is titled, i.e. in the form of freeholdtenure. However, whereas in principle aCPA holds land on behalf of the CPA’s members,at Munzhedzi the CPA has become eclipsed bythe chief, not least by allocating plots to households,including to households who are not technicallymembers of the CPA or even notionallypart of the claimant community. The CPA committeehas decided to be cooperative rather thancombative, but in effect the result is that thereis no authority at Munzhedzi that is widely regardedas legitimate, which also calls into questionthe security of tenure of the plots allocatedby the ‘chief’. One particular problem is that the‘chief’ appears to have sold some stands morethan once, i.e. to different people. In the wordsof one respondent, “It can happen that onestand is sold to 5 different people at the sametime, without them knowing it; the problem isthat people don’t always receive receipt, so theyoften cannot prove they paid the money for thestand.” This may be true, but it does not appearto happen with developed plots, and perhaps itis the case that tenure security is established bybuilding structures, rather than the building ofstructures having to wait for some kind of formalindication of tenure security.As for who are the biggest producers atMunzhedzi, it appears to be neither the poorestnor the wealthiest households, but rather fromamong those who are intermediate in wealthand income. Our inference is that the poor donot have the means to produce much (e.g. topay for the tractor services), while the well-offlack either the interest or the time to farm on alarger scale.Perceptions of performanceWhen agricultural extension officers and localcouncillors see Munzhedzi, they see two things:a land reform project that went wrong, and astyle of settlement that has precluded meaningfulagricultural development. As an opportunity220

ResearchReportfor agricultural land reform, Munzhedzi hasnow been ruined by the fact that probably thebest part of the property has been taken over byresidential plots.The level of satisfaction among Munzhedzi’sresidents, however, is very high. Of the 135 agriculturallyactive households interviewed, onlythree regretted having moved there, identifyingthe lack of service delivery as their reason. Thevast majority, by contrast, are happy that theyhave moved, indicating a mix of reasons as indicatedearlier: 25• “We are glad because we farm and harvestbetter than before.”• “I am able to farm, the soil is more fertilehere than where I was staying.”• “I’m feeling much better when I am hereand I can do my business of selling sorghumbeer.”• “Beautiful land, we can have maize andvegetables and we harvest better.”• “We are free now without relatives.”• “We are next to town and there is lots oftransport.”• “I am next to the bus stop.”• “I was [previously] far away from town andthere were no jobs.”• “We are happy in our forefathers’ land.”It is no coincidence that similar tensions are playingthemselves out in the adjacent land reformprojects of Mavungeni and Shimange, wherethe desire of many to establish homesteads andfarm on a small scale, is pitted against visions ofestablishing modern, large-scale commercial agriculturalenterprises.Policy environmentMunzhedzi points to an abandonment of the‘official’ line of thinking about agricultural landreform projects, which is rather focused on commercialfarming and land use plans that prioritiseland for farming purposes rather than settlement.On the other hand, even if Munzhedzihas not been embraced, it has been tolerated.There are no efforts to remove people from theland, for instance. The real question is whetherany government officials might begin to regardMunzhedzi as a model, not necessarily to be replicated,but at least to be borrowed from. Thereis no indication at present that this is happening.And yet, in other respects, settlements like Munzhedziare congruent with government’s thinkingabout socio-economic development of thebroader Elim area, whose population has growndramatically over the past 30 years. This thinkingis that the growing population density of Elimpresents opportunities to make Elim a more selfsufficientshopping and services centre, i.e. ratherthan being a mere satellite of Makhado townor Thohoyandou. To that end, Trade and InvestmentLimpopo, which is a parastatal subordinateto Limpopo’s Department of Economic Development,Environment and Tourism, commissioneda series of “nodal scoping reports”, in essencemarket studies meant to inform investors of thepotential for building malls in rural towns. Onesuch study was commissioned for Elim, and in2006 Hubyeni Mall was built at Elim’s main intersection.Anomalous as it may seem, Munzhedzi is part ofthe ‘peri-urban’ development of which HubyeniMall forms part of the overall logic. The beautyof Munzhedzi – as with many peri-urban settlementoptions – is that it combines the advantagesof residing close to a town with being able topursue agriculture on a small scale while maintaininga more or less typical rural lifestyle. However,while this might implicitly be the thinkingbehind the spatial development initiatives beingpushed by Trade and Investment Limpopo, it hasnot until very recently been part of the thinkingwithin the agriculture and land portfolios. 26The futureMunzhedzi is here to stay. What remains uncertainis whether the large portion of land thatis presently unoccupied will eventually be settledor used more extensively for agriculture.Another question is whether the good soil thatmany recent arrivals cite as one of the mainadvantages of living Munzhedzi, will remaingood. In terms of interventions to improve thequality of life of those already residing at Munzhedzi,is eagerly awaited electricity, improvedwater access, and other services. And yet, thereis much that in principle could be done to supportagriculture, however modest it may be. Thiscould include for example technical support togardeners, promotion of household water harvestingtechniques, etc. It could also involve im-25 Presumably if we had posedthe same question to thosehouseholds who are not agriculturallyactive, we wouldhave heard more unhappyvoices.26 The recent development ofnote is the passing mention bythe newly established Departmentfor Rural Developmentand Land Reform (which subsumesthe former Departmentof Land Affairs) that it see thedevelopment of malls as oneaspect of rural development.The pronouncement has beenmet with a stunned silencefrom most academics workingon rural development.221

Strategies to support South african smallholders as a contribution to government’s second economy strategy, Volume 2.proving investment in fencing so that the unoccupiedand unfarmed parts of Munzhedzi couldbe used as a controlled commonage.ConclusionMunzhedzi represents a kind of land demandthat is presently not catered for through land reform,and a style of small-scale agriculture that isnot sufficiently valued by agricultural extensionofficers and agricultural policy. In fact, Munzhedzirepresents a peri-urban livelihood strategythat is widely recognised in policy circles as an‘opportunity’, but which is not clearly accommodatedin the policies of some of the relevantdepartments, e.g. Land Affairs.One reason for believing that Munzhedzi representssomething of wider significance is thefindings from other research that demonstratesthat the type of land demand manifested atMunzhedzi is in fact common. A survey conductedin Limpopo, Free State and Eastern Capein 2004-05 (HSRC, 2005), which among otherthings sought to understand the nature of landdemand among rural blacks, revealed that themajority of those who want land, want relativelysmall plots (i.e. 5 hectares or less). Furtherinspection revealed that those who want smallpieces of land are primarily interested in subsistenceproduction and tenure security, as opposedto farming for income-generating purposes.However, this is not to suggest that Munzhedziserves as a model in terms of process. The uncontrolled,even chaotic manner in which Munzhedzicame about is not to be romanticised, andthere is reason to suppose that better outcomescould have been achieved had it evolved as a deliberateand properly planned project.ReferencesHSRC (Human Sciences Research Council) (2005)Auditing the Realisation of Democracy andHuman Rights in the Context of Rural LandReform in South Africa: Technical Report,Report for the multi-country OECD study onMeasuring Human Rights, Democracy, andGovernance (METAGORA), Pretoria: HSRC.South African Weather Service (2009).Electronic data222