10.07.2015 Views

Memorandum Opinion - the Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Memorandum Opinion - the Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Memorandum Opinion - the Circuit Court for Baltimore City

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Manager, at <strong>the</strong> expense of <strong>the</strong> shareholders. To support this contention, <strong>the</strong>y point to <strong>the</strong> factthat <strong>the</strong> proxies submitted by plaintiff Shaker were received and counted <strong>for</strong> purposes ofestablishing a quorum <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> meeting (which would not have existed without <strong>the</strong>m), but <strong>the</strong>ywere not counted <strong>for</strong> any voting purposes at <strong>the</strong> meeting. Additionally, plaintiffs note that <strong>the</strong>management-controlled board expended considerable sums of corporate money to engage in aproxy fight with Plaintiff Shaker after receiving <strong>the</strong> notices which defendants now insist wereineffective. This, <strong>the</strong>y argue, constitutes a waiver of objection and evidence that <strong>the</strong> directorstreated <strong>the</strong> 2004 election as contested.Plaintiffs’ most compelling argument is that <strong>the</strong> by-law notice provisions had adiscriminatory impact on <strong>the</strong> stockholders as <strong>the</strong>y were applied to this “control of <strong>the</strong> board”situation. Although plaintiff Shaker had reason to know that a Class II director position wasopen two months prior to <strong>the</strong> notice deadline, he was unlikely to engage in a costly proxy fightwith management over a single board position. It was only when <strong>the</strong> corporation announced inits July 23, 2004 SEC filing that two o<strong>the</strong>r director positions would be subject to vote at <strong>the</strong>annual meeting, that such an ef<strong>for</strong>t to seize board control became worthwhile. At that point, <strong>the</strong>stockholders had only ten days to give <strong>the</strong> board notice of any alternative candidate slate.In an analogous situation, where management attempted to advance <strong>the</strong> date of anannual meeting to ward off a proxy contest with dissident stockholders, <strong>the</strong> Supreme <strong>Court</strong> ofDelaware ordered that <strong>the</strong> new meeting date be nullified, stating:In our view, those conclusions amount toa finding that management has attempted to utilize<strong>the</strong> corporate machinery and <strong>the</strong> Delaware Law <strong>for</strong><strong>the</strong> purpose of perpetuating itself in office; and,to that end, <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> purpose of obstructing <strong>the</strong>5

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