SBCT Final EIS - Govsupport.us

SBCT Final EIS - Govsupport.us SBCT Final EIS - Govsupport.us

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Chapter 2 ⎯ Description of the Proposed Action and AlternativesThe only remaining installations that possess available maneuver lands in a great enough ratio totheir maneuver land requirements are those installations that have access to satellite maneuvertraining areas to meet the maneuver requirements of the SBCT. Viable installations that remaincandidates for the stationing of the 2/25 th SBCT include SBMR and Hawaiian training sites, FortRichardson in conjunction with Donnelly Training Area (DTA), and Fort Carson in conjunctionwith PCMS. Fort Riley, Fort Drum, Fort Polk, and Fort Knox are all considerably short of maneuverland required to train the SBCT, and all of these installations have maneuver land deficitratios of less than -2.00. Table 2–11 below depicts the installations that remain as viable stationinglocations for the 2/25 th SBCT. It should be noted that between the publication of the DEIS andFEIS, the Army has announced the stationing of an additional IBCT at Fort Carson as part of theGrow the Army initiative (Army 2007c). This new IBCT is scheduled to begin standing up at FortCarson in 2011 and has been captured in Table 2–10.Table 2–11 Installations Capable of Meeting Minimum Maneuver Land ThresholdsFort Richardson andDonnelly Training AreaFort Carson and Pinon CanyonManeuver SiteSchofield Barracks MilitaryReservation5) Strategic Considerations: The installations that remain as viable stationing locations for the2/25 th SBCT are capable of rapidly deploying to support contingency operations in areas of interestaround the globe. All of these installations have access to airstrips and air transport capabilities.SBMR and Fort Richardson also have sea deployment facilities readily available, which providegreater strategic flexibility. While there are considerable geographic differences in the locationsof the installations that present strategic advantages, the capacity of large-scale modernizedair deployment facilities at each of the remaining alternatives serves to a certain extent to compensatefor the differences in geographic location. Because of this, all three remaining installationsremain viable alternatives for analysis as stationing locations for the 2/25 th SBCT.As discussed in Section 1.2.1.12, an important consideration is the need to station adequate forcesin the Pacific Ocean area of operations. Since the 2/25 th SBCT was originally designated for Hawaii,it became part of the mix of forces available to the Pacific Combatant Commander. Thepermanent stationing decision for the 2/25 th SBCT must maintain adequate forces in the Pacific.This allows Pacific Command to meet its requirements, such as regional rapid response, deterrence,disaster assistance, and other contingency missions.Army Screening Process Summary: In selecting the permanent stationing location for the 2/25 thSBCT, the Army is evaluating the ability of alternative locations to support the needs and requirementsof the 2/25 th SBCT while taking environmental, social, and public considerations into account.Sections 1.2 and 1.3 define the Army’s Purpose and Need for stationing the 2/25 th SBCT, and theseneeds have been broken out for further consideration in Table 2–12. This table provides a consolidatedqualitative comparison of installation stationing alternatives and summarizes discussion of theability of these locations to support the requirements of the 2/25 th SBCT.Qualitative ratings provided below include “Adequate but Constrained”; meaning conditions must bemodified to meet the needs of the 2/25 th fully and there may be constraints that cannot be resolved.“Adequate” indicates the requirements of the 2/25 th would not be hindered by the conditions at the alternativestationing location, but might require some level of modification to meet the needs of the2/25 th . “Favorable” indicates the conditions at the alternative installation stationing location are highlysupportive of the needs of the 2/25 th SBCT. A summary discussion is provided that articulates the ratinggiven for each area of need under each alternative considered.February 2008 2–17 2/25th SBCT Final EIS

Chapter 2 ⎯ Description of the Proposed Action and AlternativesTable 2–12Training RangesManeuver TrainingLandGarrison SupportInfrastructureSoldier and FamilyQuality of LifeStrategic CapabilityComparison of Army Installation Stationing LocationsAlternative A –HawaiiAdequateSupports the range requirements ofthe 2/25 th . Would require the constructionor modification of 3 ormore training ranges. Because mostranges are already programmed,ranges would be available in ashorter timeframe to support the2/25 th .Adequate but ConstrainedLand resources are capable of supportingmaneuver training of the2/25 th , though shortfalls exist inmeeting the doctrinal maneuvertraining requirement of the SBCT.FavorableGarrison possesses a majority ofthe necessary parking, office space,and garrison infrastructure to supportthe 2/25 th .FavorableFamily Housing and Single SoldierBarracks would be available tomeet the requirements of the 2/25 th .FavorableSupports U.S. commitments inPacific Rim with a versatile andflexible contingency force withSBCT’s enhanced capabilities.Alternative has capacity for rapidC–17 airlift and sealift capability.Hawaii provides a second set ofdeployment facilities for an SBCTto reach locations in the Pacificduring Alaska’s extended winterseason and inclement weather.Alternative B –AlaskaFavorableSupports range requirements of the2/25 th . Would require the constructionof two training ranges (UrbanAssault Course, MultipurposeMachine Gun Range). BAX atDTA would be ready for operationsin 2009.FavorableLand resources are fully capable ofsupporting the full maneuver landrequirement of the 2/25 th . However,spring/fall melt seasons and wetconditions limit maneuver training.AdequateOutdated temporary facilities initiallyavailable to support garrisonrequirements of 2/25 th . Space availableand projects are programmedto renovate these facilities.AdequateOutdated temporary facilities areinitially on hand to support singleSoldier housing. Surroundingcommunity has adequate capacityto accommodate Families off-postas new housing is constructed.AdequateSupports U.S. commitments inPacific Rim with a versatile andflexible contingency force, butconcentrates SBCT’s enhancedcapabilities in the Northern Pacific.Alternative has capacity for rapidC–17 airlift and sealift capabilitybut only one set of deploymentfacilities for use by both SBCTs.Inclement weather could disruptdeployment of both SBCTs.Alternative C –ColoradoAdequate but ConstrainedWould require the construction of 3or more ranges. A BAX would notbe able to be constructed because ofspace limitations at Fort Carson andabove ground natural gas pipelineslocated on Pinon Canyon. The2/25 th would need to use existingDigital Multipurpose Range Complexas a substitute to meet trainingrequirements.AdequateLand resources are capable of supportingmaneuver-training requirementof the 2/25 th , but maneuverland shortfall exists for all unitsstationed at Fort Carson.Adequate but ConstrainedLimited availability of combatvehicle parking space and outdatedoffice space. No space within theBCT area for expansion of facilities.Some elements of the 2/25 thwould need to park on unimprovedsurface separated from the unitmaintenance area.Adequate but ConstrainedSome single enlisted Soldierswould be required to live off-post.Shortfalls in Family and SingleSoldier housing would occur untiladditional facilities could be constructed.Off-post shortfalls exist inFamily Housing availability.Adequate but ConstrainedIs capable of supporting U.S. commitmentsin Pacific Rim withSBCT’s enhanced capabilities.Alternative has strategic airliftcapability, but would require railtransport to reach major seaportfacilities for deployment and mobilization.C–17 aircraft are not collocatedwith the SBCT. Infrastructureto access deployment airfieldmust be upgraded to facilitate rapiddeployment. Has decreased rapiddeployment capability and increasedlogistics requirement.2.4.3 Identification of the Preferred AlternativeOn December 12, 2007, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G–3/5/7 (Lt. Gen. Thurman) was presentedwith information and public comment from the DEIS. He considered that information andevaluated and compared the ability of each alternative to meet the Purpose and Need for the ProposedAction. He balanced the relative strengths and weaknesses of each alternative to meet the Army’sneed for the Proposed Action with environmental and socio-economic considerations and publicfeedback received from each stationing location.February 2008 2–18 2/25th SBCT Final EIS

Chapter 2 ⎯ Description of the Proposed Action and AlternativesTable 2–12Training RangesManeuver TrainingLandGarrison SupportInfrastructureSoldier and FamilyQuality of LifeStrategic CapabilityComparison of Army Installation Stationing LocationsAlternative A –HawaiiAdequateSupports the range requirements ofthe 2/25 th . Would require the constructionor modification of 3 ormore training ranges. Beca<strong>us</strong>e mostranges are already programmed,ranges would be available in ashorter timeframe to support the2/25 th .Adequate but ConstrainedLand resources are capable of supportingmaneuver training of the2/25 th , though shortfalls exist inmeeting the doctrinal maneuvertraining requirement of the <strong>SBCT</strong>.FavorableGarrison possesses a majority ofthe necessary parking, office space,and garrison infrastructure to supportthe 2/25 th .FavorableFamily Ho<strong>us</strong>ing and Single SoldierBarracks would be available tomeet the requirements of the 2/25 th .FavorableSupports U.S. commitments inPacific Rim with a versatile andflexible contingency force with<strong>SBCT</strong>’s enhanced capabilities.Alternative has capacity for rapidC–17 airlift and sealift capability.Hawaii provides a second set ofdeployment facilities for an <strong>SBCT</strong>to reach locations in the Pacificduring Alaska’s extended winterseason and inclement weather.Alternative B –AlaskaFavorableSupports range requirements of the2/25 th . Would require the constructionof two training ranges (UrbanAssault Course, MultipurposeMachine Gun Range). BAX atDTA would be ready for operationsin 2009.FavorableLand resources are fully capable ofsupporting the full maneuver landrequirement of the 2/25 th . However,spring/fall melt seasons and wetconditions limit maneuver training.AdequateOutdated temporary facilities initiallyavailable to support garrisonrequirements of 2/25 th . Space availableand projects are programmedto renovate these facilities.AdequateOutdated temporary facilities areinitially on hand to support singleSoldier ho<strong>us</strong>ing. Surroundingcommunity has adequate capacityto accommodate Families off-postas new ho<strong>us</strong>ing is constructed.AdequateSupports U.S. commitments inPacific Rim with a versatile andflexible contingency force, butconcentrates <strong>SBCT</strong>’s enhancedcapabilities in the Northern Pacific.Alternative has capacity for rapidC–17 airlift and sealift capabilitybut only one set of deploymentfacilities for <strong>us</strong>e by both <strong>SBCT</strong>s.Inclement weather could disruptdeployment of both <strong>SBCT</strong>s.Alternative C –ColoradoAdequate but ConstrainedWould require the construction of 3or more ranges. A BAX would notbe able to be constructed beca<strong>us</strong>e ofspace limitations at Fort Carson andabove ground natural gas pipelineslocated on Pinon Canyon. The2/25 th would need to <strong>us</strong>e existingDigital Multipurpose Range Complexas a substitute to meet trainingrequirements.AdequateLand resources are capable of supportingmaneuver-training requirementof the 2/25 th , but maneuverland shortfall exists for all unitsstationed at Fort Carson.Adequate but ConstrainedLimited availability of combatvehicle parking space and outdatedoffice space. No space within theBCT area for expansion of facilities.Some elements of the 2/25 thwould need to park on unimprovedsurface separated from the unitmaintenance area.Adequate but ConstrainedSome single enlisted Soldierswould be required to live off-post.Shortfalls in Family and SingleSoldier ho<strong>us</strong>ing would occur untiladditional facilities could be constructed.Off-post shortfalls exist inFamily Ho<strong>us</strong>ing availability.Adequate but ConstrainedIs capable of supporting U.S. commitmentsin Pacific Rim with<strong>SBCT</strong>’s enhanced capabilities.Alternative has strategic airliftcapability, but would require railtransport to reach major seaportfacilities for deployment and mobilization.C–17 aircraft are not collocatedwith the <strong>SBCT</strong>. Infrastructureto access deployment airfieldm<strong>us</strong>t be upgraded to facilitate rapiddeployment. Has decreased rapiddeployment capability and increasedlogistics requirement.2.4.3 Identification of the Preferred AlternativeOn December 12, 2007, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G–3/5/7 (Lt. Gen. Thurman) was presentedwith information and public comment from the D<strong>EIS</strong>. He considered that information andevaluated and compared the ability of each alternative to meet the Purpose and Need for the ProposedAction. He balanced the relative strengths and weaknesses of each alternative to meet the Army’sneed for the Proposed Action with environmental and socio-economic considerations and publicfeedback received from each stationing location.February 2008 2–18 2/25th <strong>SBCT</strong> <strong>Final</strong> <strong>EIS</strong>

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