SBCT Final EIS - Govsupport.us

Chapter 2 ⎯ Description of the Proposed Action and Alternativesmunity uses a critical threshold of training land availability to determine which installations areexperiencing critical maneuver land shortfalls that would impede the scheduling of maneuvertraining and sustainment of training land resources. If an installation’s training land deficit as definedby Army doctrinal standards in TC 25–1 is twice as large as the training land the installationhas available to support all of its BCT’s maneuver space requirements, then the installation wasdetermined to be incapable of supporting the SBCT’s maneuver training requirements withoutsignificant impairment to SBCT maneuver training. Installations that do not meet this minimumthreshold of maneuver space were excluded from further consideration because they lack availablemaneuver lands to meet the training requirements of the SBCT. This lack of maneuver trainingland availability would not allow the SBCT fully to use its upgraded communications, tracking,and reconnaissance technology, and would limit the Army’s ability to provide time to sustaintraining land resources.Table 2–10 provides the amount of maneuver land available at remaining candidate installations,their total land requirement to support all unit maneuver-training activities for units stationedthere, and the total deficit of maneuver training land that would be experienced at the installation.These calculations assume the 2/25 th has been exchanged for the IBCT for all installation locations,with the exception of Hawaii. Those installations whose training land deficit is twice aslarge as the amount of training land available have been determined to be unable to meet the increasedmaneuver training requirements of the SBCT. The total maneuver land deficit factor ispresented below as a ratio of land deficit to maneuver land available for training. Any deficit lessthan -2.00 has been excluded from further analysis as a viable alternative because scheduling conflictsand the ability to maintain training readiness would become significant issues.Table 2–10Maneuver and Training Land Availability Assuming Stationing ofthe 2/25th at Each InstallationFortRichardsonand DonnellyTraining AreaU.S. ArmyGarrisonHawaiiFort Carsonand PCMSFortKnoxFortRiley Fort PolkFortDrumCurrent Training Acre (acres)Total 563,830 305,617 123,868 1 46,045 70,118 136,776 74,996Stationed Units (with the addition of the 2/25 th SBCT)HBCT 0 3 0 0 2 0 0IBCT 0 1 1 0 02½(JRTC) 2 2SBCT 2 1 1 1 1 1 1Land DeficitManeuverLand Deficit 3 0 502,190 157,059 96,789 395,630 351,291 344,024(acres)Land Deficit4Factor0 -1.64 -1.27 -2.10 -5.64 -2.57 -4.59Land Status 5 Green Amber Amber Red Red Red Red12345This figure does not include the ranges at MMR. Live-fire training is not currently allowed at this location. If MMR’s 4,227acres were included, the resulting Hawaii deficit would be lower.The 2½ IBCT requirement includes one permanently stationed IBCT and the Program of Instruction requirements to support theJRTC mission.The maneuver training land requirements are based on unit ground maneuver requirements for BCTs stationed at an installation.In addition, this includes the 10 th Special Forces group at Fort Carson. These numbers do not include National Guard andReserve Component training requirements or training requirements of units below the BCT level.Land Deficit Factor: Higher number is better; negative numbers indicate less land is available than what is requiredGreen – Meets full SBCT training requirement; Amber – SBCT training requirements can be met with significant adjustments;Red – Incapable of meeting SBCT maneuver training requirements, less than 50 percent of doctrinal training landsFebruary 2008 2–16 2/25th SBCT Final EIS