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SBCT Final EIS - Govsupport.us

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Chapter 2 ⎯ Description of the Proposed Action and AlternativesTable 2–8 Active Duty Army Installations That Have an Infantry Brigade CombatTeam to Exchange with HawaiiFort Bragg Fort Drum Fort RichardsonFort Campbell Fort Knox Fort RileyFort Carson Fort Polk Schofield Barracks Mil. Res.3) Installations with Special Mission Requirements (Airborne, Air Assault): Select Army installationsand divisions support unique strategic mission requirements and capabilities to ensure theArmy can respond rapidly to contingencies with the appropriate forces. Some of these capabilitiesinclude the 101 st Air Assault Division’s (Fort Campbell) unique requirement to be air assault capableor the 82 nd Airborne Division’s (Fort Bragg) requirements for airborne qualification of all ofits Soldiers. IBCTs at these installations operate on a rotational readiness cycle to ensure that airborneor air assault IBCTs are capable of rapidly responding within a few days time to a crisis. Toensure a BCT is available to meet these rotational needs of airborne and air assault units, thesedivisions of the 82 nd airborne and 101 st air assault at Fort Bragg and Fort Campbell m<strong>us</strong>t maintaintheir integrity and operational capabilities at the divisional level. The <strong>SBCT</strong> could not be effectivelyintegrated with the light infantry airborne divisions or air assault divisions of the 101 st or82 nd to meet the rotational readiness requirements to rapidly deploy in a few days time from theseinstallations. Additionally, these units are collocated with the proper transport capabilities fortheir air assault and airborne equipment. Beca<strong>us</strong>e of the special mission requirements of theseunique divisions, the exchange of one BCT for the 2/25 th <strong>SBCT</strong> is not feasible. Moreover, neitherof these installations meets the minimum maneuver land requirements, which are disc<strong>us</strong>sed inmore detail below. Table 2–9 depicts the installations that remain viable stationing locations followingthe application of these considerations.Table 2–9 Remaining Installations After Special Mission Installations are Eliminatedfrom Further ConsiderationFort Carson Fort Polk Fort RileyFort Drum Fort Richardson Schofield Barracks Mil. Res.Fort Knox.4) Maneuver Training Land Requirements: With its increased speed and maneuverability, the<strong>SBCT</strong> requires the <strong>us</strong>e of considerable maneuver land resources. Maneuver lands m<strong>us</strong>t be capableof supporting the training tasks required to rehearse the full spectrum of war and peacetime supportoperations. The presence of adequate maneuver space is critical to allowing the <strong>SBCT</strong> totrain with its vehicles, weapons, reconnaissance assets, and communication systems. Withoutadequate training land, the <strong>SBCT</strong> cannot train to doctrinal standards and properly prepare itselffor missions in operational theaters abroad. The standard doctrinal maneuver land requirementsfor the <strong>SBCT</strong> are stated in TC 25–1 Training Land (Army 2004a). The <strong>SBCT</strong> requires approximately140,000 acres of maneuver space to train to doctrinal maneuver standards.Availability of maneuver training lands for unit maneuvers and land s<strong>us</strong>tainability are key factorsfor consideration. Installations m<strong>us</strong>t support the maneuvers of the units assigned to them. The installation’straining load is driven by the number of units assigned to that installation. Many installationsare having difficulty meeting all of the maneuver training demands for the units stationedthere. Installations may also have difficulty maintaining maneuver lands to support trainingactivities if severe training land shortfalls exist.HQDA conducted an analysis to determine the total land shortfall that would exist for the installationsthat remain in consideration for the stationing of the 2/25 th <strong>SBCT</strong>. The HQDA training com-February 2008 2–15 2/25th <strong>SBCT</strong> <strong>Final</strong> <strong>EIS</strong>

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