SBCT Final EIS - Govsupport.us

Appendix D ⎯ Responses to Comments on the Draft Environmental Impact StatementArmy uses private contract vessels, typically barges, it is required to requestbids from multiple vendors, and no particular vender is assured a contract fortransport. The Army does not know if the Superferry would ever bid on such acontract or if it could even be configured to carry military equipment with thechains and bracing needed to transport Stryker vehicles. No contract currentlyexists or is being formulated between the Army and the Superferry for transportingthe SBCT. The Army has no deliberate intent to solicit bids to use theSuperferry. It is therefore not a reasonably foreseeable Army action that requiresimpact analysis in this EIS.5. The Hawaiian Islands are too small to provide the maneuver and training space needed by the2/25 th SBCT. The EIS should state whether Hawaii has adequate training land without the recentlyacquired 25,000 acres. Installations with more training lands are better suited as thepermanent station for the 2/25 th SBCT. Why were more locations not considered?Response: As discussed in Section 2.4.2, the Army did not arbitrarily exclude or eliminateany potential alternatives from consideration in its assessment of alternativesfor permanently stationing the 2/25 th . The Army initially considered the fullspectrum of Army installations as potential sites. Many Army facilities, such asArmy ammunition production facilities and Army National Guard or ReserveComponent training sites, were eliminated because they did not meet one ormore of the screening criteria (see Appendix A). The installations that were ultimatelydetermined to be reasonable alternatives met all of the screening criteria.Section 2.4.2 fully discloses the maneuver acreage of sites that have beenconsidered as part of this process. Large training and maneuver areas areneeded to train SBCT units and their equipment. Reasonable alternatives forpermanently stationing the 2/25 th SBCT are Hawaii, Colorado, and Alaska.6. The Army considered too few alternative locations for the permanent stationing of the 2/25 thSBCT.Response: As discussed in Section 2.4.2, the Army did not arbitrarily exclude or eliminateany potential alternatives from consideration in its assessment of alternativesfor permanently stationing the 2/25 th . The Army initially considered the fullspectrum of Army installations as potential sites (see Appendix A). Many Armyfacilities, such as Army ammunition production facilities and Army NationalGuard or Reserve Component training sites, were eliminated because they didnot meet one or more of the screening criteria. The installations that were ultimatelydetermined to be reasonable alternatives met all of the screening criteria.Section 2.4.2 fully discloses the maneuver acreage of sites that have beenconsidered as part of this process. Large training and maneuver areas areneeded to train SBCT units and their equipment. Reasonable alternatives forpermanently stationing the 2/25 th SBCT are Hawaii, Colorado, and Alaska.7. What are the proposed uses of Stryker’s in Makua Valley?Response: Section 2.5 explains that attainment of operational readiness by the 2/25 th isnot dependent on the use of MMR. While the MMR is an integral part ofUSAG-HI training capabilities and historically used by other services, theunits of the 2/25 th could perform dismounted live-fire training at other ranges.February 2008 D–5 2/25th SBCT Final EIS