SBCT Final EIS - Govsupport.us

Appendix D ⎯ Responses to Comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statementrequirements that the Army was not able to meet in Hawaii. Training facilitiesfor the SBCT were not built and the unit had to make do with these other trainingfacilities to conduct training away from home station. While this had to bedone to meet deployment schedules, this lack of ability to train the SBCT totraining readiness standards for its deployment at home station is not consideredsustainable or feasible for the Soldiers and Families of the 2/25 th SBCT.Army deployments have taxed and stressed Soldier and Family relationshipsArmy-wide. The need to conduct additional training away from home-stationadded a month to the amount of time Soldiers were required to spend awayfrom their Families prior to a 15-month deployment overseas. Section 2.9Gclearly discusses why temporarily stationing Soldiers in Hawaii and movingthem to another location when facilities are ready is not a viable alternative.3. The No Action Alternative included in the DEIS is not the true No Action Alternative. TheNo Action alternative is the 2/25 th as a Light Infantry Brigade, not an IBCT. Accordingly,training would be conducted pursuant to pre-transformation standards, with lower levels ofmunitions expended and fewer maneuvers performed. The No Action Alternative improperlyincludes numerous, significant changes from the conditions that existed before the illegalconversion of the 2/25 th to an SBCT in Hawaii. These changes include facilities specificallymodified for Stryker training and several land easement and acquisition projects that have alreadyoccurred. Under the No Action Alternative, these easement and acquisition projectsshould be returned to the private ownership they had before the Army illegally proceededwith Stryker conversion. Also, the No Action Alternative has to be a feasible alternative.Response: The No Action Alternative is reflected in Section 2.8. This No Action Alternativereflects an appropriate baseline that includes training as a light infantrybrigade with conditions as they existed prior to the preparation of the Army’sSEIS. This matter was subject to litigation and as part of that litigation, thecourt permitted specific construction projects to proceed and appropriatetraining to ensure the 25 th was properly training as an SBCT. The appropriatebaseline for the No Action Alternative is provided in Section 2.8.4. How will the Army move the Strykers between Islands? Is the Army going to use new theatersupport vessels (high-speed vessels with a 15-foot draft and a top speed of 40 knots) or theSuperferry to transport troops, Strykers, and other equipment between Oahu and Hawaii Island?If the Army is going to use the Superferry, the terms of the contract need to be releasedto the public and the DEIS needs to disclose the impacts.Response: For the foreseeable future, the Army methods for the transport of Stryker vehiclesdo not include the theater support vessel. The concept of the theater supportvessel has evolved into what is now being called the Joint High SpeedVessel (JHSV). This concept is still in development by the DoD. The projecthas not been funded at this time. If the JHSV is funded it would take a minimumof 4 years to build one JHSV. This would be allocated to the Army, Navy,or Special Operations forces. The action is currently not funded and it is notknown where a JHSV (formerly TSV) would be positioned if it were funded byDoD in the future.The Army’s primary method of transporting the SBCT from Oahu to HawaiiIsland is the Logistics Support Vessel (LSV). If LSV’s are not available, theArmy would use private contract vessels for inter-island transport. When theFebruary 2008 D–4 2/25th SBCT Final EIS