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SBCT Final EIS - Govsupport.us

SBCT Final EIS - Govsupport.us

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Executive Summarydinate units and each brigade m<strong>us</strong>t conduct maneuvers every 12 to 18 months and in advance ofoperational deployments, as required. Maneuver training requirements are described in FieldManual (FM) 7–1 Training the Force.Alternatives Analyzed in DetailThe Army <strong>us</strong>ed the elements of need for the Proposed Action in conjunction with other external limitingfactors to narrow the field of installations to those capable of supporting the requirements of the 2/25 th<strong>SBCT</strong>. The screening criteria include availability of training infrastructure, maneuver-training land, andgarrison support infrastructure; compatibility with special mission requirements; and ability to supportstrategic considerations. These screening criteria were applied to the full range of reasonable alternativesto determine the installation locations that meet the five primary areas of need for the implementation ofthe Proposed Action. The Army did not arbitrarily exclude or eliminate any potential alternatives fromconsideration in its assessment of alternatives for permanently stationing the 2/25 th . The Army began thealternative identification process with approximately 140 installations, and through the process detailed inChapter 2, determined three installations to be reasonable alternatives met all of the screening criteria.The reasonable alternatives for permanently stationing the 2/25 th <strong>SBCT</strong> are installations in Hawaii, Colorado,and Alaska. Consequently, four alternatives were analyzed in detail:• Alternative A — Permanently station the 2/25 th <strong>SBCT</strong> at Schofield Barracks MilitaryReservation (SBMR) while conducting required training at military trainingsites in Hawaii;• Alternative B — Permanently station the 2/25 th <strong>SBCT</strong> at Fort Richardson while conductingrequired training at military training sites in Alaska and replacing the <strong>SBCT</strong>in Hawaii with an IBCT from Alaska;• Alternative C — Permanently station the 2/25 th <strong>SBCT</strong> at Fort Carson while conductingrequired training at military training sites in Colorado and replacing the<strong>SBCT</strong> in Hawaii with an IBCT from Colorado; and• Alternative D — No Action Alternative.In addition, the <strong>EIS</strong> looks at the installations as they are today and does not consider the possibility ofland acquisition. The military land acquisition process is a lengthy process that is very similar to militaryconstruction. To complete the process would take a minimum of between five to ten years. A militaryland acquisition project m<strong>us</strong>t first be approved and funding m<strong>us</strong>t be appropriated. In addition, the DoDm<strong>us</strong>t submit a waiver authorizing land acquisition, beca<strong>us</strong>e a moratorium exists that bans the DoD fromacquiring new lands authorization. Environmental surveys and studies m<strong>us</strong>t be completed before any realestate transaction may begin. The entire process would take too long to meet the permanent stationingneeds and requirements of the 2/25 th <strong>SBCT</strong>. For example, the potential expansion of PCMS, Colorado isnot considered.Identification of the Preferred AlternativeOn December 12, 2007, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G–3/5/7 (Lt. Gen. Thurman) selectedHawaii as the Army’s Preferred Alternative. In determining the preferred alternative, the Army balancedthe relative strengths and weaknesses of each alternative to meet the Army’s need for the Proposed Actionwith environmental and socio-economic considerations and public feedback received from each stationinglocation. Hawaii was selected as the Army’s Preferred Alternative primarily beca<strong>us</strong>e it is best able tomeet the Army’s strategic defense and national security needs in the Pacific theater.The rapid deployment capabilities of the <strong>SBCT</strong> currently represent the Army’s most credible threat ofprojecting force in the Pacific region to shape the U.S.’ strategic national security interests. Stationing theFebruary 2008 xx 2/25th <strong>SBCT</strong> <strong>Final</strong> <strong>EIS</strong>

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