SBCT Final EIS - Govsupport.us
SBCT Final EIS - Govsupport.us SBCT Final EIS - Govsupport.us
Chapter 3 ⎯ Affected Environmentclear pattern in the time of ignition. A number of different pyrotechnic devices, including smoke grenades,simulators, and star clusters, as well as blanks were the ignition sources (USARHAW and 25thID [L] 2003). KTA is not a live-fire training area, and smoke grenades and other pyrotechnics arepermitted only in designated areas. Blank ammunition, short-range training ammunition (SRTA), andpyrotechnics are the only types of ammunition used. KTA depends on the closest responding forces,such as the City and County of Honolulu Fire Department, for first response and immediate FederalFire Department/Range Control response. There is one RAWS on KTA to aid in determining weatherconditions and the threat of wildfires.A wildfire risk analysis requires that a parcel of land be divided by significant barriers to fire, eithermanmade or natural, in order to create units that are then given a presuppression priority based onwildfire risk. Because there are no readily definable barriers within KLOA, discrete areas with assignedfire risks have not been developed. Generally, areas at low elevation are dominated by flammablealien species, while higher elevations are less fire prone (USARHAW and 25th ID [L]. 2003).Only one fire has been recorded at KLOA. It burned 125 hectares (310 acres) in September of 2000.The reported ignition source was hot brass/muzzle flash, and must have been caused by blank fire,since no other munitions are allowed at KLOA. Despite the size of this fire, blanks represent a verylow fire ignition threat based on the number of fires they have caused throughout the USAG-HI firehistory. No analysis for fire trends is possible at KLOA with such a limited data set (USARHAW and25th ID [L]. 2003). It depends on the closest responding forces, such as the City and County of HonoluluFire Department, for first response and immediate Federal Fire Department/Range Control response(USARHAW and 25th ID [L] 2001a). There are no RAWS on KLOA to aid in determiningweather conditions and the threat of wildfires. Details of past fire occurrence on KTA and KLOA(frequency, location, number, and size), ignition sources, and weather monitoring capabilities havebeen compiled (USAG-HI 2004).3.1.3.5 Pohakuloa Training AreaFire Management AreasFive wildfire management areas have been designated, based on existing and planned fuel managementcorridors (USARHAW and 25th ID [L] 2003). The ordnance impact area is not considered becauseprevention activities there are not possible and resources at risk are largely unknown. Each areawas assigned an ignition potential, fuels hazard, and habitat value, based on the best currently availableinformation. Representatives of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and USAG-HIagreed on the ratings. The Kipuka Kalawamauna, Mauna Kea, and Kipuka Alala areas have a highwildfire prevention priority. The Keamuku Parcel and southwestern PTA area have a moderately highwildfire prevention priority.According to the IWFMP, fire protection in the fire management area includes firebreaks and fuelsmodification (USARHAW and 25th ID [L] 2003). Given the weather, topography, and fuel conditions,which make fire suppression at PTA difficult, implementing adequate prevention measures isall the more important for minimizing fire loss. Serviceable access roads and firebreaks should be ofhighest priority, as they can be reasonably implemented and provide an effective fire managementtool when properly planned and maintained. Existing roads will serve as firebreaks. Preconstructedfirebreaks need to be negotiable by four-wheel drive vehicles to facilitate fire and management access.All firebreak/fuelbreak measurements are additive. Most firebreaks at PTA will be combinedwith a fuelbreak to increase their effectiveness.February 2008 3–32 2/25th SBCT Final EIS
Chapter 3 ⎯ Affected EnvironmentFire History and Firefighting ResourcesHistorically, fire in the area of PTA was most likely rare and of little significance, limited to volcanicallystarted fires and occasional lightning ignitions. Military use for live-fire exercises and targetpractice has increased ignition frequency dramatically and resulted in numerous small fires, though itappears that much of the threat to endangered species populations is a result of off post ignitions.However, PTA is particularly susceptible to fire for numerous reasons (USARHAW and 25 th ID [L]2001b). First, there is a history of ordnance-induced fires because several ranges are used year-roundfor live firing of a wide variety of ordnance. Also, there is a high risk of wildfire ignition from the useof aerial flares and similar pyrotechnics. Since July 1990, over 8,000 acres have been recorded asburned. Of these, over 7,700 acres or 91 percent of all acres burned were burned by fires caused bylightning, arson, or carelessly discarded cigarettes and the largest of these started off Army lands andlater burned onto PTA (USARHAW and 25 th ID [L] 2003). Fire suppression is difficult in the impactarea’s rugged habitat, and UXO makes it difficult for helicopters to drop water in the impact area.Vehicles with catalytic converters, which pose a potential fire threat, are used on PTA. Highly flammablefuels and unique weather conditions also lead to high ignition rates. However, fires may alsooriginate from other sources, such as arson, cigarettes, or campfires, within or adjacent to training areas.Military live-fire activities start many of the fires in the ordnance impact area (USARHAW and 25 thID [L] 2001b). Most of these fires and other fires that start on PTA are prevented from leaving theboundaries of the installation; however, some fires have burned onto adjacent lands. Also, fires cancome onto the installation from off-post. The PTA Fire Chief is responsible for ensuring that wildlandfire responses are in accordance with the IWFMP (USARHAW and 25 th ID [L] 2001b). Four remoteweather stations on PTA are used for fire indexing. An auxiliary wildland firefighting force providesan initial attack on a fire before the fire department arrives. The Hawaii County Fire Department,HDLNR, and Hawaii Volcanoes National Park assist with wildland fire suppression.3.1.4 Cultural ResourcesCultural resources are defined as historic properties, cultural items, archaeological resources, sacredsites, or collections subject to protection under the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), theArchaeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA), the Native American Graves Protection and RepatriationAct (NAGPRA), Executive Order (EO) 13007, and the guidelines on Curation of FederallyOwned and Administered Collections (36 CFR Part 79). Cultural resources to be considered includeprehistoric and historic archaeological sites, historic buildings and structures, and Native American orNative Hawaiian traditional resources. In the source documents for this analysis, Native Hawaiiantraditional resources are discussed as areas of traditional interest (ATIs), and Native American traditionalresources in Alaska and Colorado are discussed as properties of traditional, religious, or culturalsignificance (PTRCSs). These categories include traditional resources, use areas, and sacredsites that are potentially eligible for the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) as traditionalcultural properties (TCPs). Principal issues to be considered are the impacts of renovation, construction,training exercises, exploded ordnance, and changes in access on prehistoric and historic archaeologicalsites; historic buildings and structures; and properties of traditional, religious, and cultural significance.These include intrusion of new buildings or structures within or near historic sites or districtsthat are out of character with the historic setting or characteristics of the site or district, renovationor demolition of historic buildings, ground disturbance at archaeological sites, removal of objectsor artifacts from eligible sites, increased access to archaeologically or traditionally sensitive areas, orrestriction of access to sacred sites. This section briefly discusses known cultural resources for thethree bases under consideration as alternatives.February 2008 3–33 2/25th SBCT Final EIS
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Chapter 3 ⎯ Affected Environmentclear pattern in the time of ignition. A number of different pyrotechnic devices, including smoke grenades,simulators, and star cl<strong>us</strong>ters, as well as blanks were the ignition sources (USARHAW and 25thID [L] 2003). KTA is not a live-fire training area, and smoke grenades and other pyrotechnics arepermitted only in designated areas. Blank ammunition, short-range training ammunition (SRTA), andpyrotechnics are the only types of ammunition <strong>us</strong>ed. KTA depends on the closest responding forces,such as the City and County of Honolulu Fire Department, for first response and immediate FederalFire Department/Range Control response. There is one RAWS on KTA to aid in determining weatherconditions and the threat of wildfires.A wildfire risk analysis requires that a parcel of land be divided by significant barriers to fire, eithermanmade or natural, in order to create units that are then given a presuppression priority based onwildfire risk. Beca<strong>us</strong>e there are no readily definable barriers within KLOA, discrete areas with assignedfire risks have not been developed. Generally, areas at low elevation are dominated by flammablealien species, while higher elevations are less fire prone (USARHAW and 25th ID [L]. 2003).Only one fire has been recorded at KLOA. It burned 125 hectares (310 acres) in September of 2000.The reported ignition source was hot brass/muzzle flash, and m<strong>us</strong>t have been ca<strong>us</strong>ed by blank fire,since no other munitions are allowed at KLOA. Despite the size of this fire, blanks represent a verylow fire ignition threat based on the number of fires they have ca<strong>us</strong>ed throughout the USAG-HI firehistory. No analysis for fire trends is possible at KLOA with such a limited data set (USARHAW and25th ID [L]. 2003). It depends on the closest responding forces, such as the City and County of HonoluluFire Department, for first response and immediate Federal Fire Department/Range Control response(USARHAW and 25th ID [L] 2001a). There are no RAWS on KLOA to aid in determiningweather conditions and the threat of wildfires. Details of past fire occurrence on KTA and KLOA(frequency, location, number, and size), ignition sources, and weather monitoring capabilities havebeen compiled (USAG-HI 2004).3.1.3.5 Pohakuloa Training AreaFire Management AreasFive wildfire management areas have been designated, based on existing and planned fuel managementcorridors (USARHAW and 25th ID [L] 2003). The ordnance impact area is not considered beca<strong>us</strong>eprevention activities there are not possible and resources at risk are largely unknown. Each areawas assigned an ignition potential, fuels hazard, and habitat value, based on the best currently availableinformation. Representatives of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and USAG-HIagreed on the ratings. The Kipuka Kalawamauna, Mauna Kea, and Kipuka Alala areas have a highwildfire prevention priority. The Keamuku Parcel and southwestern PTA area have a moderately highwildfire prevention priority.According to the IWFMP, fire protection in the fire management area includes firebreaks and fuelsmodification (USARHAW and 25th ID [L] 2003). Given the weather, topography, and fuel conditions,which make fire suppression at PTA difficult, implementing adequate prevention measures isall the more important for minimizing fire loss. Serviceable access roads and firebreaks should be ofhighest priority, as they can be reasonably implemented and provide an effective fire managementtool when properly planned and maintained. Existing roads will serve as firebreaks. Preconstructedfirebreaks need to be negotiable by four-wheel drive vehicles to facilitate fire and management access.All firebreak/fuelbreak measurements are additive. Most firebreaks at PTA will be combinedwith a fuelbreak to increase their effectiveness.February 2008 3–32 2/25th <strong>SBCT</strong> <strong>Final</strong> <strong>EIS</strong>