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SBCT Final EIS - Govsupport.us

SBCT Final EIS - Govsupport.us

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Chapter 2 ⎯ Description of the Proposed Action and Alternativesreserve mobilization sites have undergone significant range modernization that could support thetraining requirements of an active duty <strong>SBCT</strong>. These installations, such as Camp Shelby and FortDix, are fully engaged in training and mobilizing Soldiers for on-going operations. Furthermore,these mobilization facilities provide only basic temporary ho<strong>us</strong>ing and dining facilities for reserviststo conduct pre-deployment training. These facilities are designed to different standards and donot meet Active Duty stationing requirements for permanently stationed Soldiers and their families.Although the 56 th BCT did transform to an <strong>SBCT</strong> in Pennsylvania, this ARNG <strong>SBCT</strong> does notrequire permanent ho<strong>us</strong>ing, garrison support, utilities, or the full range of facilities required tosupport the Soldiers and Families of an active duty BCT, such as the 2/25 th . Any conversion of anARNG or Reserve facility would require hundreds of millions of dollars in infrastructure expenditureand five to ten years to complete to meet the full measure of permanent facilities requiredfor the 2/25 th <strong>SBCT</strong>. Beca<strong>us</strong>e this set of alternatives is not capable of meeting the permanent stationingfor the 2/25 th <strong>SBCT</strong>, they have not been carried forward for detailed analysis.E) Permanently Home Station the <strong>SBCT</strong> with an Overseas Host Nation – Under this alternative,the Army would permanently station the 2/25 th at an overseas installation on foreign soil. Nationalsecurity and defense policy has prescribed through the NDS, QDR, and other documentsthat the U.S. will rely on the rapid projection and deployment of units from within the U.S. Insuch a way, the U.S. can fully control the availability and readiness of its units without having torely on host nation support. In accordance with this defense policy guidance, the Army is in theprocess of bringing 44,500 Soldiers home from overseas stationing locations in Europe and Korea.The Army will not be stationing any additional combat brigades overseas. Stationing the2/25 th at a foreign overseas location is not in accordance with security and defense policy directivesand decisions of the NDS and QDR. The consideration of overseas stationing locations istherefore not included in this document.F) Acquire Land to Support the Training Requirements of the <strong>SBCT</strong> – Under this alternative,the Army would acquire land at Fort Knox, Fort Drum, Fort Riley, or Fort Polk to mitigate landshortfalls to meet the training needs of the <strong>SBCT</strong>. The military land acquisition process is alengthy process that is very similar to military construction. To complete the process would take aminimum of five to ten years. A military land acquisition project m<strong>us</strong>t first be approved and fundingm<strong>us</strong>t be appropriated. In addition, the DoD m<strong>us</strong>t approve a waiver of its policy that places amoratorium on major land acquisition. Environmental surveys and studies m<strong>us</strong>t be completed beforeany real estate transaction may begin. The entire process would take too long to meet thepermanent stationing needs and requirements of the 2/25 th <strong>SBCT</strong>. In addition to the time constraintsof the process, there are land availability constraints. Discounting the fact that the landacquisition process takes too long to support the maneuver training needs of the 2/25 th , lack ofavailable land would preclude land acquisition as a viable solution to meet the training spaceneeds of the 2/25 th <strong>SBCT</strong>. Beca<strong>us</strong>e of these limitations, land acquisition at installations such asFort Knox, Fort Polk, Fort Drum, and Fort Riley is not considered as viable alternatives to carryforward for analysis.G) Permanently Headquarter the 2/25th in Hawaii but Conduct all Stryker-specific Maneuverand Live-fire Training at Locations other than Hawaii – These locations could include trainingcenters such as Fort Irwin, California and Fort Polk, Louisiana. This alternative would requirevery frequent movements of Soldiers and equipment. This would be both time-consuming andexpensive. The deployment would also be very disruptive to Soldiers and their Families. <strong>Final</strong>ly,alternative training areas are heavily <strong>us</strong>ed by other Army units, making it difficult to schedule the2/25 th requirements. For these reasons, this alternative does not meet the purpose and need for theProposed Action. It was therefore not carried though for full evaluation as a reasonable alternative.February 2008 2–54 2/25th <strong>SBCT</strong> <strong>Final</strong> <strong>EIS</strong>

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