SBCT Final EIS - Govsupport.us

Chapter 2 ⎯ Description of the Proposed Action and AlternativesManeuver TrainingThe No Action Alternative includes the maneuver training activities required to maintain the operationaltraining readiness of the 2/25 th ID (L) in Hawaii, the 4/25 th in Alaska, and the 4/4 th in Colorado.Under the No Action Alternative, the respective units would conduct maneuver training at thecrew/squad, platoon, company, battalion, and BCT levels. The 2/25 th ID (L) would only use lands thatwere available for maneuver training in 2004.The No Action Alternative assumes the baseline number of MIMs required to support the doctrinalmaneuver training requirements at each location discussed in this alternative. It should be noted thataside from the 2/25 th ID (L), all other Army IBCTs have converted or are in the process of convertingto a modular force structure. These BCTs have increased maneuver requirements in comparison the2/25 th ID (L). To meet their maneuver training requirements, the 2/25 th ID (L) would execute 39,320MIMs at maneuver training locations in Hawaii (see Table 2–6 of the 2004 FEIS). The standardmodular IBCTs would conduct 49,569 MIMs of maneuver training at the locations discussed as partof the No Action Alternative.Implementation of the No Action AlternativeThe Army is required to consider a No Action Alternative as a baseline for analysis. The No ActionAlternative does not meet the objectives of Army Transformation or the stated Purpose and Need ofthis EIS because it would create a brigade that could not be properly trained, deployed, supported andintegrated into Army operations. Implementation of the No Action Alternative is not feasible.The Army is well into the process of organization-wide transformation. This transformation was announcedin the Army’s ROD for transformation that was signed in 2002. Every unit in the Army haseither completed transformation or is in the process of transforming to a modular structure. ModularBCTs have fielded upgraded equipment and BCT organizational structure has evolved better to implementthe nation’s security and defense objectives. The Army no longer fields non-modular BCTconfigurations, such as the original structure of the 2/25 th ID (L), and it would be impossible to supportthe unit logistically as it existed in 2004. The 2/25 th ID (L) depended upon external combat supportand combat service support organizations for maintenance (Division Support Command), artillerysupport (Division Artillery), engineer support (Engineer Brigade), and many other units. All ofthese units have been deactivated or converted to other modular units. Their functions have now beenintegrated directly into all BCT organizations.Under the No Action Alternative, the Division in Hawaii would have one modular brigade and onepre-modular brigade. Half of the Division’s support elements, such as maintenance and artillery,would be included in the 3/25 th IBCT’s structure. For the 2/25 th ID (L), the Division would have toreestablish support organizations, such as the Division Support Command and Division Artillery, toprovide required support. These support organizations no longer exist in the Army force structure.2.9 ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED BUT NOT STUDIED IN DETAILThrough this EIS process, the Army considered more than 160 stationing locations for meeting thepermanent stationing needs of the 2/25 th SBCT before arriving at the three locations that are able tomeet the requirements of the Army and the SBCT. The screening criteria and the process to arrive atthese three locations are articulated in Section 2.4. This section provides further elaboration on somealternatives that were considered but not carried forward for full analysis because they were not reasonable.February 2008 2–51 2/25th SBCT Final EIS