HITLER'S SHADOW - National Archives and Records Administration

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might not be such a damn bad idea at that.” French intelligence officials, bitter at France’s loss of colonial territory in the Middle East, said they would enjoy having the Mufti around to embarrass the British. 22 Husseini was well treated in Paris. Meanwhile, Palestinian Arab leaders and various Muslim extremists agitated to bring him back to the Middle East. According to the American military attaché in Cairo, this plan initially embarrassed moderate officials in the Arab League. But as prospects for a peaceful settlement in the British Mandate for Palestine declined and as other Arab prisoners were released or escaped (Gailani escaped), sentiment changed. A delegate of the Palestine Higher Arab Committee went to Paris in June 1946 and told Husseini to get ready for a little trip. 23 According to another American source in Syria, at a meeting in the Egyptian Embassy in Paris, the ambassador, the ministers of Syria and Lebanon, and a few Arab leaders from Morocco and Algeria worked out the details of Husseini’s escape. The French government learned of, or was informed of, the plan, but chose not to intervene in order to avoid offending the Arabs of North Africa. Husseini flew to Syria, then went via Aleppo and Beirut to Alexandria, Egypt. 24 By 1947 Husseini denied that he had worked for the Axis powers during the war. He told one acquaintance that he hoped soon to have documentary evidence rebutting this slander, which the Jews were spreading. Similarly, after Adolf Eichmann was brought to Israel for trial in March 1961, Husseini, by now in Beirut, denied having ever met Eichmann during the war. He said that he had been forced to take refuge in Germany simply because British wanted to capture him. Nazi persecution of Jews had served Zionism, according to Husseini, by exciting world sympathy for them. Husseini never worked for American intelligence; the CIA simply considered him a person worth tracking. He died in Beirut in 1974. 25 Wilhelm Beisner, Franz Rademacher, and Alois Brunner The CIA and the CIC both compiled files on the versatile and French-speaking Wilhelm Beisner, who dealt with Husseini during and after the war. It is possible to trace Beisner’s long intelligence career better than has been done before. His tracks after the war intersected with those of German Foreign Office deportation specialist Franz Rademacher, and Adolf Eichmann’s subordinate Alois Brunner. All three spent most of their postwar years in the Middle East. 22 | Nazis and the Middle East
The CIA diagram shows a nexus of former Nazis––Beisner, Skorzeny, Rademacher, Brunner and Remer — with important Arab leaders––the Grand Mufti Hajj Amin el Husseini, Abbass Halim, and Gamal Nasser. RG 263, Central Intelligence Agency.
Page 1: HITLER’S O Nazi War Criminals, U.
Page 5 and 6: HITLER’S SHADOW Nazi War Criminal
Page 7 and 8: CONTENTS Preface vi Introduction 1
Page 9 and 10: INTRODUCTION At the end of World Wa
Page 11 and 12: For this report we have drawn selec
Page 13 and 14: CHAPTER ONE New Information on Majo
Page 15 and 16: of her former or present job. She w
Page 17 and 18: that surrounded it. How far to push
Page 19 and 20: Wartime information emanating from
Page 21 and 22: Hearing about the publicity about h
Page 23 and 24: Poland (New York: Oxford University
Page 25 and 26: CHAPTER TWO Nazis and the Middle Ea
Page 27 and 28: would also decide the fate of the A
Page 29: Today we have more detailed scholar
Page 33 and 34: In April 1945 an unnamed German def
Page 35 and 36: with a shadowy West German intellig
Page 37 and 38: a French intercept operation, the C
Page 39 and 40: 12 Final Interrogation Report of Re
Page 41 and 42: 54 EGMA-54517, Chief, Munich Operat
Page 43 and 44: CHAPTER THREE New Materials on Form
Page 45 and 46: Mildner also failed to mention that
Page 47 and 48: to organize last ditch resistance.
Page 49 and 50: depended partly on the individuals
Page 51 and 52: he was pleased to provide informati
Page 53 and 54: Agent Erhard Dabringhaus, who handl
Page 55 and 56: Detachment’s commanding officer,
Page 57 and 58: Mahler’s July 14, 1950, report on
Page 59 and 60: 24 Interrogation Report No. 47, Sep
Page 61 and 62: CHAPTER FOUR The CIC and Right-Wing
Page 63 and 64: September 1941 Kaufmann became the
Page 65 and 66: the Bruderschaft and regional offic
Page 67 and 68: trust the words of [NATO Commander]
Page 69 and 70: Kraus formed a private think tank i
Page 71 and 72: most violent Nazis, “a man who wo
Page 73 and 74: the thrown [sic]’ as far as the V
Page 75 and 76: 8 “Ex-General Advises Adenauer to
Page 77 and 78: 34 Special Agents Heinz C. Colbert
Page 79 and 80: 66 Memorandum for the Officer in Ch
Page 81 and 82:
CHAPTER FIVE Collaborators: Allied
Page 83 and 84:
vanguard of Muscovite imperialism i
Page 85 and 86:
described as “anti-partisan” op
Page 87 and 88:
The guerrillas said that most UPA f
Page 89 and 90:
opposed all political organizations
Page 91 and 92:
“would not resume [its] relations
Page 93 and 94:
But on October 15, 1959, only 10 da
Page 95 and 96:
Once in the United States, Lebed wa
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Ukrainian writers and poets. One CI
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shielded Lebed by denying any conne
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34 Special Agent William E. Larned,
Page 103 and 104:
69 Joint US-UK Conference, January
Page 105:
Operations, v. 35; Aerodynamic Proj
Page 108 and 109:
esearching a very broad range of to
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