10.07.2015 Views

How do you feel — now? The anterior insula and human awareness

How do you feel — now? The anterior insula and human awareness

How do you feel — now? The anterior insula and human awareness

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

PersPectivesin the representation of the sentient selfduring self­identification. Further, the demonstrationthat AIC activation is correlatedwith the “<strong>feel</strong>ing of k<strong>now</strong>ing” (ReF. 41) suggeststhat the AIC also engenders <strong>awareness</strong>of <strong>feel</strong>ings that are associated with mentalconstructs <strong>and</strong> operations 59,60 .<strong>The</strong> highlighted findings in the categories‘Risk, uncertainty <strong>and</strong> anticipation’,‘Time perception’ <strong>and</strong> ‘Cognitive control<strong>and</strong> performance monitoring’ are consistentwith the notion that the AIC contains arepresentation of the sentient self not only inthe immediate moment but at each momentacross a finite period of time. <strong>The</strong> AIC is acentral component of a neural substrate thatrepresents the passage of time 34 , it is sensitiveto time synchronization 30 <strong>and</strong> it is uniquelyinvolved in automatic comparisons of <strong>feel</strong>ingsin the present moment with those inthe past <strong>and</strong> the future 25 . <strong>The</strong>se findings alsoindicate that the AIC incorporates a ‘buffer’,or comparator, that is used for such comparisons.<strong>The</strong>se observations suggest that theAIC fulfils a requirement of the proposed 49,53evaluative <strong>and</strong> predictive role of <strong>awareness</strong>in the evolution of emotional communication,<strong>and</strong> that it affords an integral mechanismfor decision making. (Interestingly,a stable comparator might be perceivedintrospectively as an ephemeral observer, ora Cartesian theater, that nonetheless cannot‘see’ itself, as described 61 for ‘consciousness’.)Significantly, the evidence that the AIC isalso associated with predictions of future<strong>feel</strong>ings can explain its involvement in thedistorted interoceptive predictions thatare associated with anxiety <strong>and</strong> functionalsomatic disorders 62,63 .<strong>The</strong> findings I highlighted on perceptualdecision making (“choice”) 40 <strong>and</strong> cognitivecontrol (“free won’t” (ReF. 45), preparation forerror commission 47 <strong>and</strong> attentional transitions48 ) imply that the AIC has a role in thesubjective guidance of mental <strong>and</strong> physicalbehaviour. This inference is consistent withthe introspective <strong>feel</strong>ing that ‘I’ am not simplya passive observer (whether this is anillusion or not; see ReF. 64). Such involvement<strong>do</strong>es not contradict the idea that the ACCsubserves volitional agency (BOX 1), an ideathat is supported by the ACC’s joint (with theAIC) activation in almost all of these studies<strong>and</strong> by its association with action <strong>and</strong> thedescending limbic motor system 1,65 .Finally, the highlighted findings on theactivation of the AIC during musical enjoyment<strong>and</strong> ‘heightened <strong>awareness</strong>’ point tospecific characteristics of the AIC that needto be explained by any model of its role in<strong>awareness</strong>.Clinical observations. Clinical observationsoffer corroborative evidence for thehypothesis that the AIC engenders <strong>human</strong><strong>awareness</strong>. Supplementary information S1(table) lists clinical reports that indicateinvolvement of the AIC <strong>and</strong> the mid­<strong>insula</strong>with conditions that include anosognosia,anergia, anxiety, alexithymia, depression,aphasia, amusia, ageusia, drug craving, eatingdisorders, conduct disorder, panic disorder,mood disorders, post­traumatic stressdisorder, schizophrenia, Smith–Magenissyndrome, cardiac arrhythmia, vertigo <strong>and</strong>frontotemporal dementia (FTD). Many ofthese reports are quite narrowly focused <strong>and</strong><strong>do</strong> not describe comprehensive behaviouraltesting, whereas the evidence reviewedabove suggests that most patients with <strong>insula</strong>rdamage could have several significantneurological deficits.Several clinical studies indicate thatdamage to or abnormal activation ordevelopment of the AIC is associated withaltered <strong>awareness</strong>. Two studies reportedthat anosognosia for hemiplegia is specificallyassociated with damage in the rightmid­<strong>insula</strong> 66,67 ; a<strong>do</strong>lescents with conductdisorder were found to have a significantdecrease in grey matter volume in thebilateral AIC that correlated with a lack ofempathy <strong>and</strong> with aggressive behaviour 68 ;patients with borderline personality disorderwho are incapable of cooperating<strong>do</strong> not display the graded activation of theAIC that is associated with <strong>awareness</strong> ofsocial gestures in normal subjects 69 ; highfunctioningpeople with autism displayedincreased alexithymia <strong>and</strong> decreased empathy,both of which were correlated withreduced activation in the AIC (in a taskin which the subjects assessed their <strong>feel</strong>ingsabout unpleasant images) 70 (however,see ReFs 71,72); hyperactivity in the rightAIC was selectively associated with anxiety62 ; infarcts of the AIC were reported toproduce anergia, or complete listlessness 73 ;<strong>and</strong> congenital malformation of the bilateral<strong>insula</strong> (Smith–Magenis syndrome)produces childhood mental retardation <strong>and</strong>the disruption of self­guided behaviour 74 .Most significantly, patients with FTD associatedwith degenerate fronto­<strong>insula</strong>r <strong>and</strong>cingulate cortices display a selective lossof self­conscious behaviours <strong>and</strong> a loss ofemotional <strong>awareness</strong> of self <strong>and</strong> others 75 ;in fact, Seeley et al. reported the l<strong>and</strong>markfinding that the loss of subjective emotional<strong>awareness</strong> in patients with FTD is specificallyassociated with the degeneration ofVENs 76 . <strong>The</strong>se reports are especially notablein light of the obvious difficulties indemonstrating deficits in emotional<strong>awareness</strong> in adult <strong>human</strong>s who havewell­established behavioural patterns.Summary. Thus, the available data providecompelling support for the concept that theAIC contains the anatomical substrate forthe evolved capacity of <strong>human</strong>s to be awareof themselves, others <strong>and</strong> the environment.In my opinion, these data suggest that theAIC uniquely fulfils the requirements to bethe neural correlate of <strong>awareness</strong>. <strong>The</strong> brainis well organized into networks that distributefunctionality across multiple sites, <strong>and</strong>the localization of <strong>awareness</strong> of <strong>feel</strong>ings<strong>and</strong> existence in a single substrate might seemunlikely 67,77 . Nevertheless, the evidence suggeststhat the AIC <strong>and</strong> the adjoining frontaloperculum (on both the left <strong>and</strong> right sides)contains an ultimate representation of thesentient self in <strong>human</strong>s (<strong>and</strong> perhaps hominoidprimates, elephants <strong>and</strong> whales; BOX 2).<strong>The</strong>se data recommend a discussion of thepossibility that the AIC is a “neural correlate ofconsciousness” (ReF. 77) <strong>and</strong> of the questionof how the AIC might engender <strong>awareness</strong>.A model for <strong>awareness</strong> in the AICIn a recently published book chapter 78 , Iexp<strong>and</strong>ed on the ideas presented in the 2002Perspective article 1 by outlining a theoreticalmodel for the structural instantiationof <strong>awareness</strong> in the AIC. <strong>The</strong> evidencedescribed above of a role for the AIC in<strong>awareness</strong> is consistent with this model,<strong>and</strong> thus I elaborate the model here <strong>and</strong>incorporate these recent findings.Briefly, in this model the cortical basisfor <strong>awareness</strong> is an ordered set of representationsof all <strong>feel</strong>ings at each immediatemoment extending across a finite period oftime. <strong>The</strong> key to the cortical (that is, mental)representation of the sentient self is theintegration of salience across all relevantconditions at each moment. <strong>The</strong> salience ofany factor is determined by its significancefor the maintenance <strong>and</strong> advancement ofthe individual <strong>and</strong> the species. At the mostfundamental level, this means the energyefficientmaintenance of the health of thephysical body (<strong>and</strong> the brain) — in otherwords, homeostasis. In this view, the neuralbasis for <strong>awareness</strong> is the neural representationof the physiological condition of thebody, <strong>and</strong> the homeostatic neural constructfor a <strong>feel</strong>ing from the body is thefoundation for the encoding of all <strong>feel</strong>ings 1,78 .<strong>The</strong> phylogenetically new homeostaticafferent pathway from lamina I <strong>and</strong> thesolitary nucleus in primates providesthe basis for the sense of the physiological66 | JANuARy 2009 | VOLuME 10 www.nature.com/reviews/neuro© 2009 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!