Thematic Network

Thematic Network 

Road Safety and Environmental Benefit-Cost and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for 

Use in Decision-Making 

- WP 4 – 

Testing the efficiency assessment 

tools on selected road safety 

measures 

Public 

Funded by the European Commission 

May 2005

- WP 4 – 

Testing the efficiency assessment 

tools on selected road safety 

measures 

Public 

ROSEBUD 

Road Safety and Environmental Benefit-Cost and Cost-Effectiveness 

Analysis for Use in Decision-Making 

Contract No: GTC2/2000/33020 

Network co-ordinator: Federal Highway Research Institute - BASt, Germany 

WP 4 co-ordinator: Austrian Road Safety Board – KfV, Austria 

Editors: Martin Winkelbauer and Christian Stefan (KfV) 

Partners in WP 4: Centre d’Etudes Techniques de l’Equipement du Sud 

Quest – CETE SO, France 

Technion, Transportation Research Institute – TRI, 

Israel 

National Technical University of Athens – NTUA, 

Greece 

Transport Research Centre – CDV, Czech Republic 

Technical Research Centre of Finland – VTT, Finland 

Austrian Road Safety Board – KfV, Austria 

Report N o : D6 

Date: May 2005 

Thematic Network funded by the European 

Commission, Directorate General for Energy 

and Transport responding the Thematic 

programme “Competitive and Sustainable 

Growth” of the 5 th framework programme

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................7 

CASE A: ANTI-LOCK BRAKING SYSTEMS FOR MOTORCYCLES ..............................12 

by Martin Winkelbauer, ......................................................................................................12 

Austrian Road Safety Board (KfV), Austria ........................................................................12 

CASE B1: SECTION CONTROL – AUTOMATIC SPEED ENFORCEMENT IN THE 

KAISERMÜHLEN TUNNEL (VIENNA, A22 MOTORWAY)..................................24 

by Christian Stefan ............................................................................................................24 

Austian Road Safety Board (KfV), Austria .........................................................................24 

CASE B2: AUTOMATIC SPEED ENFORCEMENT ON THE A13 MOTORWAY (NL) .....44 

by Christian Stefan ............................................................................................................44 

Austian Road Safety Board (KfV), Austria .........................................................................44 

CASE C1: DAYTIME RUNNING LIGHTS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC ............................53 

by Petr Pokorný .................................................................................................................53 

Transport Research Centre, CDV, The Czech Republic....................................................53 

CASE C2: DAYTIME RUNNING LIGHTS IN AUSTRIA....................................................63 



CASE E1: FOUR-ARM ROUNDABOUTS IN URBAN AREAS IN THE CZECH 

REPUBLIC............................................................................................................72 



CASE E2: SPEED HUMPS ON LOCAL STREETS ..........................................................82 

by Victoria Gitelman and Shalom Hakkert, ........................................................................82 

Transportation Research Institute, Technion, Israel ..........................................................82 

CASE E3: TRAFFIC CALMING MEASURES ...................................................................96 

by George Yannis and Petros Evgenikos ..........................................................................96 

NTUA / DTPE, Greece.......................................................................................................96 

CASE F1: GRADE-SEPARATION AT RAILROAD CROSSINGS..................................114 

by Marko Nokkala, ...........................................................................................................114 

VTT Building and Transport, Finland ...............................................................................114 

CASE F2: GRADE-SEPARATION AT ROAD-RAIL CROSSINGS.................................128 

by Victoria Gitelman and Shalom Hakkert, ......................................................................128 

Transportation Research Institute, Technion, Israel ........................................................128 

CASE G: MEASURE AGAINST COLLISIONS WITH TREES ........................................141 

by Philippe Lejeune,.........................................................................................................141 

CETE SO, France............................................................................................................141 

CASE H: INTRODUCING SIGNAL CONTROL AT A RURAL JUNCTION.....................155 



CASE I1: INTENSIFICATION OF POLICE ENFORCEMENT (SPEED AND 

ALCOHOL) .........................................................................................................168 

by George Yannis and Eleonora Papadimitriou ...............................................................168 

NTUA / DTPE, Greece.....................................................................................................168

CASE I2: CONCENTRATED GENERAL ENFORCEMENT ON INTERURBAN 

ROADS IN ISRAEL ............................................................................................185 



CASE J1: 2 + 1 ROADS IN FINLAND ............................................................................204 



CASE J2: 2 + 1 ROADS IN SWEDEN ............................................................................214 



CASE K: COMPULSORY BICYCLE HELMET WEARING.............................................222 

by Martin Winkelbauer, ....................................................................................................222 

Austrian Road Safety Board, KfV, Austria........................................................................222 

SHORT TRAINING COURSE ON EFFICIENCY ASSESSMENT....................................241 

CONCLUSIONS ..............................................................................................................249 

ANNEXES .......................................................................................................................261

INTRODUCTION 

by Victoria Gitelman and Martin Winkelbauer 

INTRODUCTION 

Every year, more than 1 million injury accidents (including 50,000 fatalities and 1.7 million 

people injured) occur on public roads throughout the European Union. Hence, improving 

road safety was given top priority in the European Union’s Transport Policy. To reach the 

overall objective of halving the number of fatalities by 2010, it is essential to know the 

reduction potentials of the wide variety of already-existing road safety measures. A 

prerequisite for this task is reliable knowledge about the effectiveness and efficiency of the 

road safety measures considered. Previous ROSEBUD work packages answered the 

question how efficiency assessment tools are currently used in different countries (WP1), 

what factors prevent the use of those tools (WP2) and what can be done to overcome 

existing barriers and shortcomings (WP3). The main task of work package 4 (WP4) is to 

test the developed efficiency assessment tools on selected road safety measures. The 

WP4 program was as follows: 

• to carry out a certain number of Efficiency Assessment Studies 

• to report experiences gained from those studies 

• and to evaluate, through these practical examples, the results of previous work 

packages (in treating barriers and the use of standardised procedures, respectively) 

1.1 Selecting the cases for Efficiency Assessment 

In accordance with the above program, eleven test cases were chosen, covering as many 

types of road safety measures as possible (see Table 1). The applicability of the 

developed analyses techniques of WP3 were tested in light of both the limitation of 

available data and restrictions of decision-making procedures in different countries. 

Table 1: Selected cases for evaluation in work package 4 

Nr. Case Study Road Safety Approach Level Countries Responsibility 

A ABS motorcycle Vehicle National AT AT 

B Section control User + Enforcement Local AT, NL AT 

C Daytime running lights Vehicle + User National AT, CZ CZ 

D Speed cameras 1 

User + Enforcement Local FI, IL IL 

E Traffic calming (urban areas) Infrastructure Local CZ, GR, IL IL 

F Railroad crossings Infrastructure Local FI, IL FI 

G 

H 

I 

Measures against collisions 

with trees (guardrails) 

Road improvement mix (rural 

areas, national network) 

Intensive police enforcement 

(speed and alcohol) 

Infrastructure 

Infrastructure 

Local + 

National 

Local + 

National 

FR FR 

IL IL 

User + Enforcement National GR, IL GR 

J 2+1 roads Infrastructure Regional FI, SW FI 

K 

Compulsory helmet regulation 

for cyclists 

User National AT, DE AT 

1 At the workshop in Bordeaux in December 2004, WP4 members decided to cancel the whole of case D 

due to missing data on the topic. Furthermore, speed enforcement is covered quite extensively by two 

other cases - case study B and I. 

Page 7

INTRODUCTION 

Selected cases were carried out by several working groups consisting of one to three WP4 

members and a non-specified number of URG members. Various considerations were 

taken into account before a safety measure was considered a test case. They are: 

1. Different categories of safety-related measures as defined by WP1, i.e. user-related 

measures, vehicle-related measures, infrastructure related measures, organisation 

and rescue services. The available experiences and data from different countries 

have been analysed with the purpose to cover as many safety-related categories as 

possible. 

2. Safety measures can be attributed to different levels of implementation (national, 

regional and local) which influences the effect of the treatment on its environment. 

Local measures are limited to certain spots on the road network and small areas, 

respectively, while national measures like Daytime Running Lights affect the whole of 

a (driver) population. Therefore, decision-making as well as implementation becomes 

more complicated as measures leave the local level and advance to the regional and 

national level. It was agreed that all levels of implementation should be considered 

during case selection to guarantee an overall analysis of the various decision-making 

processes. 

3. Selecting the cases, preference was given to the measures mentioned in different 

national road safety programmes. Such programmes are characterized thorough 

long-term and clearly worked-out methods, as well as a detailed catalogue of 

measurements. Furthermore, road safety programmes are guaranteed by having 

passed legislation and having all the necessary financing. By selecting cases already 

incorporated in road safety programmes, medial as well as political attention for the 

work of WP4 is at its highest and cooperation of decision-makers is most likely. 

Besides, consultations with the URG members were carried out, to point to the 

measures of high interest for different countries. 

4. A Cost-Benefit Analysis is sometimes conducted for measures that have already been 

implemented (ex post evaluation). The goal of such studies is to assess if a certain 

measure made sense from an economic point of view. However, decision-makers are 

frequently interested in an ex ante analysis, to compare potential costs and benefits of 

certain road safety measures that have not yet been implemented. It was agreed that 

the test cases should present a mixture of both approaches. 

The selected cases (see Table 1) were carried out by several working groups consisting of 

one to three WP4 members and a non-specified number of URG members. All relevant 

steps of applicability testing have been conducted in close cooperation with the user 

reference group, which gave the users the opportunity to be trained in the application of 

these tools. 

1.2 Evaluation techniques 

The selected cases should be evaluated using standardized techniques. This section 

provides a concise description of the main steps and data components, which are needed 

to perform a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA)/ Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) of a road 

safety measure 2 . The description includes: basic formulae, safety effects, implementation 

units, target accidents, accident costs and implementation costs. The evaluation of WP4 

case-studies was performed in line with these evaluation techniques. 

2 This is a concise compilation of Chapters 2, 3 of the WP3’s report. More details can be found in the report. 

Page 8

a. Basic formulae 

INTRODUCTION 

The cost-effectiveness of a road safety measure is defined as the number of accidents 

prevented per unit cost of implementing the measure: 

Cost-effectiveness = Number of accidents prevented by a given measure/ Unit costs of 

implementation of measure 

For this calculation, the following information items are needed: 

• A definition of suitable units of implementation for the measure, 

• An estimate of the effectiveness of the safety measure in terms of the number of 

accidents it can be expected to prevent per unit implemented of the measure, 

• An estimate of the costs of implementing one unit of the measure. 

The accidents that are affected by a safety measure are referred to as target accidents. In 

order to estimate the number of accidents it can be expected to prevent (or prevented) per 

unit implemented of a safety measure, it is necessary to: 

• Identify target accidents, 

• Estimate the number of target accidents expected to occur per year for a typical unit 

of implementation, 

• Estimate the safety effect of the measure on target accidents. 

The numerator of the cost-effectiveness ratio is estimated as follows: 

Number of accidents prevented (or expected to be prevented) by a measure = The number 

of accidents expected to occur per year X The safety effect of the measure 

The benefit cost ratio is defined as: 

Benefit-cost ratio = Present value of all benefits/ Present value of implementation costs 

When a CBA is applied, then, besides the above CEA’s components, the monetary values 

of the measure’s benefits are also required. The monetary values imply, first of all, 

accident costs and, depending on the range of other effects considered, may also include 

costs of travel time, vehicle operating costs, costs of air pollution, costs of traffic noise, etc. 

In order to make the costs and benefits comparable, a conversion of the values to a 

certain time reference is required. Such an action needs a definition of the economic 

frame, i.e. the duration of effect (length of service life of the project) and the interest rate, 

which are those commonly used for the performance of economic evaluations in the 

country. 

In a basic case, where the benefits come from the accidents saved only (and no influences 

on travel expenses and the environment are expected), the numerator of the benefit-cost 

ratio will be estimated as: 

Present value of benefits = Number of accidents prevented by the measure X Average 

accident cost X The accumulated discount factor, 

where the accumulated discount factor depends on the interest rate and the length of life 

of the measure. 

Page 9

. Safety effects 

INTRODUCTION 

The most common form of a safety effect is the percentage of accident reduction following 

the treatment. The main source of evidence on safety effects is from observational beforeafter 

studies. Other (theoretical) methods for quantifying safety effects are also possible. 

One should remember that the safety effect of a measure is stated as available if the 

estimates of both the average value and the confidence interval of the effect are known. 

One should also ascertain that both the type of measure and the type of sites (units) for 

which the estimates are available, correspond to those for which the CBA/CEA is 

performed. 

For WP4’s evaluations, it was desirable to apply the local values of safety effects, i.e. 

those attained by the evaluation studies performed in the country. When the local values 

do not exist, the summaries of international experience can be used 3 . 

If the value of a safety effect is supposed to be provided by a current study (for which the 

CBA is performed), the estimation of safety effect should satisfy the criteria of correct 

safety evaluation. This implies that the evaluation should account for the selection bias 

and for the uncontrolled environment (e.g. changes in traffic volumes, general accident 

trends). 

c. Implementation units 

In the case of infrastructure measures, the appropriate unit will often be one junction or 

one kilometre of road. In the case of area-wide or more general measures, a suitable unit 

may be a typical area or a certain category of roads. In the case of vehicle safety 

measures, one vehicle will often be a suitable unit of implementation, or, in the case of 

legislation introducing a certain safety measure on vehicles, the percentage of vehicles 

equipped with this safety feature or complying with the requirement. For police 

enforcement, it may be a kilometre of road with a certain level of enforcement activity (e.g. 

the number of man-hours per kilometre of road per year); in the case of public information 

campaigns - the group of road users, which is supposed to be influenced by the campaign. 

d. Target accidents 

The accidents affected by a safety measure present a target accident group. Depending 

on the type of safety measure it can also be a target injury group, target driver population, 

etc. 

Target accidents depend on the nature of the safety measure considered. There are no 

strict rules for this case. For general measures like black-spot treatment, traffic calming, 

speed limits, etc. the target accident group usually includes all injury accidents. 

One should remember that if we apply a specific and not general accident group, proper 

corrections should be performed for the accident costs, as well. 

3 Such as: Elvik R. and Vaa T (2004) The handbook of road safety measures. Elsevier. 

Page 10

e. Accident costs 

INTRODUCTION 

As known, a detailed survey of practice in estimating road accident costs in the EU and 

other countries was made by an international group of experts as part of the COSTresearch 

programme 4 . Five major cost items of accident costs were identified as follows: 

(1) Medical costs 

(2) Costs of lost productive capacity (lost output) 

(3) Valuation of lost quality of life (loss of welfare due to accidents) 

(4) Costs of property damage 

(5) Administrative costs 

The relative shares of these five elements differ between fatalities and the various degrees 

of injuries, and also differ among countries. 

We assume that each country has its official valuations of accident injuries and damage. 

Otherwise, the comparative figures from the recent studies can be of help 5 . All the values 

are applicable for the WP4’s evaluations but, in every case, there should be a clear 

indication which components of the above accident costs are included. 

For the sake of comparability of the evaluation results, the monetary values will be 

converted to € at 2002-prices. 

The literature discusses mostly the valuations of fatalities and injuries whereas a CBA 

usually needs average accident costs. In a simple case, the average accident cost can be 

estimated as the sum of injury costs multiplied by the average number of injuries with 

different severity levels, which were observed in the target accidents’ group; the damage 

value per accident should be stated and added to the injury costs. 

f. Implementation costs 

The implementation costs should be determined for each safety measure considered. The 

implementation costs are the social costs of all means of production (labour and capital) 

that are employed to implement the measure. 

The implementation costs are generally estimated on an individual basis for each 

investment project. As no strict rules are available on the issue, performing a WP4’s 

evaluation, all the components of the implementation costs should be explained. Typical 

costs of engineering measures, which are recommended for the CBA evaluations in the 

country, are desirable. 

The implementation costs should be converted to their present values, which include both 

investment costs and the annual costs of operation and maintenance. Similar to the case 

of accidents costs, for the sake of comparability of the evaluation results, the monetary 

values will be converted to € at 2002-prices. 

4 Alfaro, J-L.; Chapuis, M.; Fabre, F. (Eds): COST 313. Socioeconomic cost of road accidents. Report EUR 

15464 EN. Brussels, Commission of the European Communities, 1994. 

5 see Chapter 2 of WP3’s Handbook 

Page 11

case A: Anti-Lock braking systems for motorcycles 

ROSEBUD 

WP4 - CASE A REPORT 

ANTI-LOCK BRAKING SYSTEMS FOR 

MOTORCYCLES 

BY MARTIN WINKELBAUER, 

AUSTRIAN ROAD SAFETY BOARD (KFV), AUSTRIA


ANTILOCK BRAKING SYSTEMS FOR MOTORCYCLES 

1 PROBLEM ............................................................................................................15 

2 DESCRIPTION......................................................................................................15 

3 TARGET GROUP .................................................................................................16 

4 ASSESSMENT METHOD.....................................................................................16 

4.1 Choice of efficiency assessment method ..............................................................16 

4.2 Assessment Tool, Calculation Method ..................................................................16 

4.3 Types of assessed impacts: safety, environment, mobility, travel time .................16 

4.4 Considered cost of the measure ...........................................................................17 

5 ASSESSMENT QUANTIFICATION......................................................................17 

5.1 Target group..........................................................................................................17 

5.2 Accident statistics, number of licensed vehicles....................................................18 

5.3 Unit of implementation ..........................................................................................19 

5.4 Crash costs ...........................................................................................................19 

5.5 Vehicle lifespan .....................................................................................................20 

5.6 "NoVA": the tax to reduce......................................................................................20 

5.7 ABS market prices ................................................................................................21 

6 ASSESSMENT RESULTS....................................................................................21 

7 DECISION-MAKING PROCESS...........................................................................22 

8 IMPLEMENTATION BARRIERS ..........................................................................22 

9 CONCLUSION/DISCUSSION...............................................................................22 

1 PROBLEM ............................................................................................................27 

2 DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURE.....................................................................27 

2.1 System description................................................................................................28 

2.2 Target accident group ...........................................................................................29 

2.3 Objectives of the measure ....................................................................................29 

2.4 Impact of Section Control on average speed ........................................................30 

3 COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS.................................................................................31 

3.1 Costs of the measure ............................................................................................31 

3.2 Economic benefits due to reduced road traffic emissions .....................................31 

3.3 Effect on accidents................................................................................................34 

3.4 Revenues due to speed violation ..........................................................................38 

3.5 Computation of the Cost-Benefit Ratio..................................................................39 

4 CONCLUSIONS....................................................................................................40 

5 DECISION-MAKING PROCESS...........................................................................41 

Page 13

CASE OVERVIEW 

Measure 


1. Fitting motorcycles with anti-lock brake systems (ABS) 

2. Reducing vehicle-specific taxes on ABS for motorcycles 

Problem 

On the one hand, ABS is highly beneficial in reducing motorcycle accident numbers and 

severity. On the other hand, ABS is relatively expensive and still not very popular among 

motorcycle riders, mostly due to the high costs. From the traffic safety point of view, 

measures must be taken to support ABS equipment for motorcycles, i.e. to raise 

consumers' willingness to invest in ABS. 

Target Group 

Motorcycle riders 

Targets 

Reduction of motorcycle accident numbers and severity 

Initiator 

Motorcycle dealer organisation 

Decision-makers 

Motorcycle dealer organisation, specific motorcycle manufacturer, Ministry of Finance 

Costs 

1. Costs of fitting motorcycles with ABS 

2. Tax reduction on this share of the total motorcycle price 

Benefits 

Reduction of motorcycle accident numbers and severity, and all related costs. 

No impacts on the environment, mobility needs and time consumption. 

Cost-Benefit Ratio 

crash reduction potential 

8% (min) 10% (max) 

Cost/Benefit Ratio of ABS 1.11 1.39 

Cost/Benefit Ratio of ABS – tax reduction 9.39 11.73 

Page 14

1 Problem 


Elaborate scientific studies clearly indicate that anti-lock brake systems (ABS) are highly 

beneficial in reducing the number of motorcycle accidents and their severity. But still, only 

a small number of motorcycle manufacturers offer motorcycles with ABS. Particularly in 

the cheaper segments, motorcycles with ABS can hardly be found. Only in the segment of 

expensive motorcycles are ABS frequently offered. It is quite obvious that the price of a 

heavy, expensive motorcycle covers more easily the cost of fitting it with ABS. 

Furthermore, only in the expensive segment is ABS frequently found as standard 

equipment, while in the cheaper segments ABS has to be ordered and paid for separately. 

It was found that the reasons for motorcycle drivers not to buy a motorcycle with ABS are: 

• ABS not available in the class of motorcycle they want to buy 

• ABS not available for the model they want to buy 

• lack of knowledge on the safety potential 

• price 

• biased opinions against ABS 

If safety features for powered vehicles have to be promoted, tax reductions frequently are 

named as an effective option. This option has been used effectively several times 

particularly for measures reducing air pollution from passenger cars. 

2 Description 

Anti-lock brake systems are a very effective countermeasure against driver misbehaviour 

in emergency situations. The daily training of a driver - including each and every braking 

manoeuvre performed - creates a clear message: the closer the stopping distance, the 

harder you have to brake. In an emergency situation where the expected stopping 

distance exceeds the available space, the driver takes countermeasures within fractions of 

a second according to this message. This means that the driver will pull the emergency 

brake lever as hard as he or she can. This emergency reaction (reflex) cannot be 

influenced by an average driver and can only be corrected afterwards by experienced and 

well-trained drivers. 

For the motorcycle, the reflex of emergency braking usually leads to blocking one or both 

wheels, which immediately creates a very high danger of falling off the vehicle. Motorcycle 

drivers are well aware of this danger and leave a huge "safety gap" between the 

decelerations they actually apply and the real decelerating potential of their vehicles. 

Motorcycle drivers use practically only about 60% of the decelerating potential of their 

vehicles [VAVRYN, WINKELBAUER, 1998]. 

Anti-lock brake systems use different technical approaches. In general what they do is 

avoid the blocking of wheels during braking. In most of the cases this will keep motorcycle 

drivers from falling off their vehicles when braking under emergency conditions. In 

addition, this will also enable motorcycle drivers to significantly improve their braking 

performance [VAVRYN, WINKELBAUER, 2002] 

Within this study, two different approaches are assessed. The first approach is anti-lock 

brake systems itself as a vehicle-based safety measure. The second is tax reduction on 

Page 15


safety features, which generally reduces the price of a "safe vehicle". Applied to this case, 

a lower price of ABS may encourage motorcycle drivers to buy motorcycles with ABS. 

3 Target group 

Basically, the target group for this measure is all motorcyclists purchasing a new 

motorcycle. For the quantification of the safety effect [KRAMLICH, SPORNER, 2000] 

relevant accident types (target accidents) were identified and the impact was assessed. 

These results were combined in the end to give figures about the reduction potential on 

the bases of all motorcycle accidents. 

4 Assessment method 

4.1 Choice of efficiency assessment method 

• ABS was assumed to have an impact on accidents of all severity categories. 

• Environmental impacts were not expected. 

• Time consumption impacts were not expected. 

• Effects on mobility needs were not expected. 

Although there are only safety impacts to consider as benefits, these effects occur at 

different levels of severity, i.e. fatal, severe and minor injuries and property damage. None 

of the categories can be left out due to the size of impact. To combine all of these into a 

common criterion, a cost/benefit analysis is needed. 

4.2 Assessment Tool, Calculation Method 

A self-made calculation method was chosen using a spreadsheet program. 

4.3 Types of assessed impacts: safety, environment, mobility, travel time 

Safety 

To estimate the direct accident-reducing impact of ABS, a very elaborate study from 

Germany was used as a reference for this efficiency assessment. Other direct impacts 

than these were not expected. But it was not obvious how having an ABS on the vehicle 

changes driver behaviour. Many studies have been performed to assess the safety impact 

of ABS in passenger cars, most of them detecting that the safety effect of ABS is close to 

zero. A survey based on accident data from the United States [FARMER et al, 1996] 

indicates a small but significant increase of fatalities to occupants of ABS-equipped 

passenger cars. Particularly, fatal single-vehicle crashes are more frequent if cars are 

fitted with ABS. However, this particular study does not address impacts on other than 

fatal injuries, and all these studies were based on passenger car accident data. 

Although single-vehicle accidents are more frequent among motorcycle accidents, the 

results found for passenger cars cannot simply be adopted for motorcycle accidents. 

Particularly because the main effect of motorcycle ABS (avoidance of drivers falling of the 

vehicle instantly after blocking one or both wheels) is not applicable to passenger cars. 

Page 16


There was no evidence that ABS have any impacts on motorcycle drivers' risk-taking 

behaviour. 

Environment, mobility, travel time 

As indicated above, impacts on the environment, mobility and travel time were not 

expected. 

4.4 Considered cost of the measure 

Initially, this study was intended to assess the effectiveness of reducing taxes on ABS, i.e. 

the share of the total motorcycle price in terms of fitting it with ABS. This is an easy task if 

ABS is offered as extra equipment and is not included in the regular price. For reasons of 

comparability and to avoid complexity (not referred to in the studies estimating the 

accident reduction potential), it was decided to also use these values for motorcycles with 

ABS as standard equipment. 

5 Assessment quantification 

5.1 Target group 

KRAMLICH and SPORNER published a study on accident reduction potential of 

motorcycle ABS at the 2000 Ifz motorcycle conference. They identified accident types 

where ABS may influence accident numbers and severity by using in-depth data from 910 

motorcycle accidents that occurred on German roads. 

Among 610 crashes involving one motorcycle and one passenger car, 65% involved the 

motorcycle driver using the brake prior to the collision. Among these, 19% of the 

motorcycle drivers fell off the vehicle. In 93% of these cases ABS would have avoided the 

crash, or at least reduced the severity of the accident. 

300 single-vehicle crashes were identified. 82.7% were accidents at corners (with 40% of 

the drivers falling off the vehicle before a collision with an obstacle or running off the road) 

and 17.3% on straight roads (50% drivers falling off). For least 40% of the single-vehicle 

crashes, ABS would be beneficial by avoiding the accident or at least reducing its severity. 

Applying these results to all motorcycle accidents including all types of crashes, ABS 

would be beneficial in 54% of the cases. This gives a final estimate of reducing all fatal 

and severe injuries to motorcycle drivers by 8 to 10% in Germany. To apply these findings 

to Austria, two issues had to be checked: 

• Distributions of accident types in Germany and Austria were compared and were found 

to be very similar. 

• There is no evidence that the reduction potential found for each of the accident types 

should differ between Germany an Austria (e.g. the number of drivers braking prior to 

the collision). 

Another question concerned which categories of motorcycles to integrate into the study. 

The options were: 

• Light motorcycles: this term changed in definition during recent years; currently this 

means motorcycles with a maximum of 25 kW engine power and mass/power ratio of 

Page 17


at least 0.16 kg/kW. This vehicle category has existed since 1991 with the introduction 

of the graduated licensing system, which defines this category as a novice driver bike. 

• "Kleinmotorrad": motorcycles with 50 cm³ capacity at most, but no speed limit. This 

category no longer exists, but there are still several thousand vehicles registered. 

• Moped: 50 cm³, 45 km/h speed limit. 

• Motorcycles with a side car. 

• Motorcycle: more or less all vehicles besides the categories mentioned above. 

Since the light motorcycle is a sub-category of motorcycle, there is no difference in speed 

limits and there are similar conditions in daily use. It was decided to select both these 

categories, i.e. motorcycle and light motorcycle, and to leave out all other categories. 

Besides, it is very unlikely that mopeds fitted with ABS will be on the market soon (or will 

have a considerable market share). Driving dynamics of all vehicles running on more than 

two wheels cannot be compared to powered two-wheelers (PTW). 

5.2 Accident statistics, number of licensed vehicles 

During recent years, motorcycle accident numbers changed significantly in Austria. The 

number of licensed vehicles increased enormously. Although the total number of fatalities 

and injuries has been relatively constant over the last decade, there was a significant shift 

within the age distribution. While the number of younger accident victims went down, the 

number of 35 to 55 year old persons injured or killed as motorcycle drivers grew 

significantly. Particularly due to the strong increasing numbers of registered vehicles, it 

was decided to focus on recent years. Between 2001 and 2002 the method of collecting 

data on registered vehicles changed significantly, making data up to 2001 not comparable 

to later numbers of registrations. Taking all this into account, accident and registration data 

from 1999 to 2001 was taken as a basis for this assessment. The average of these years 

was used for calculating total crash costs and crash costs per registered motorcycle. By 

selecting this method, the latest available accident data without the shortcoming of 

unsuitable registration data was chosen. 

Page 18


Table 2: Accident and vehicle statistics, Austria, 1987 - 2001 

Motorcycle occupants and registrations in Austria 

slight severe fatalities total number of registered 

injuries injuries 

vehicles by the end of the year 

1987 1718 1,492 104 87,920 

1988 1713 1,597 117 99,445 

1989 1763 1,524 123 104,840 

1990 1664 1,468 96 105,177 

1991 1664 1,483 106 112,219 

1992 1758 1,452 80 124,904 

1993 1519 1,300 96 138,034 

1994 1743 1,426 94 154,297 

1995 1502 1,256 85 174,907 

1996 1470 1,233 84 193,685 

1997 1550 1,364 111 212,791 

1998 1673 1,446 87 236,314 

1999 1833 1,602 103 261,744 

2000 1997 1,656 112 278,118 

2001 1935 1,628 107 293,053 

Mean 99-01 1,921.7 1,628.7 107.33 277,638 

5.3 Unit of implementation 

There were two options do define a unit of implementation: 

• The entire vehicle park (i.e. all registered motorcycles in Austria) 

• one motorcycle 

To make estimates for the whole vehicle park, it would have been necessary to predict 

sales statistics on motorcycles in total and the share of motorcycles equipped with ABS. 

The only advantage would have been to be able to predict the total budget needs when tax 

reduction is given to safety equipment. Selecting one motorcycle gives a clearer picture of 

the cost/benefit relation and is independent from future market development. 

5.4 Crash costs 

The accident costs for Austria were taken from the Austrian Road Safety Programme 

2002-2010. The study by METELKA, CERWENKA and RIEBESMEIER (published 1997, 

data from 1993) used does not include humanitarian costs and added value of the market. 

As it was agreed upon for all ROSEBUD WP4 case studies, these values were adopted to 

the 2002 price level. 

A study to recalculate the accident costs for Austria is currently being prepared and will be 

supported by the Federal Ministry of Transportation, Innovation and Technology. Referring 

to the fact that this assessment deals with motorcycle accidents, is was decided to assume 

the occurrence of major material damage in case of fatal and severe injuries, and minor 

material damage only in cases of slight injuries. 

Page 19

5.5 Vehicle lifespan 


Table 3: Crash costs in Austria 

1993 2002 

fatalities € 805,33 € 949,897 

severe injuries € 43,605 € 51,439 

slight injuries € 3,695 € 4,359 

major material damage € 4,870 € 5,745 

minor material damage € 1,242 € 1,465 

The average lifespan of a motorcycle is a crucial question since it directly impacts the 

annual implementation costs. Unfortunately this question is very difficult to answer; only 

some basic conditions could be found to finally reach an estimate. The current vehicle 

licensing statistics (including all vehicles currently having a licence plate) showed an 

average age of 8.77 years for motorcycles, 8.06 years for light motorcycles and 8.53 years 

all together if "old-timers" (first registration 1979 and earlier) are excluded. If these vehicles 

are included and an average age of 28 years is estimated, the total average age is 11.19 

years (9.86 for motorcycles and 13.27 years for light motorcycles). But these numbers 

include all vehicles currently registered and therefore only determine a minimum for the 

average lifespan. 

It was estimated that a motorcycle with one calendar year, on average, is used for 78% of 

the year, considering the sales per month and the duration of the motorcycle season in 

Austria from April to October. 

Some detailed data provided by Honda Austria showed that in the segment of touring and 

Enduro motorcycles, about 15 years after some representative models were taken from 

the market, more than 50% of the vehicles once sold were still registered. Crosschecks 

have been performed by looking at the sales of spare parts that are regularly replaced. 

This showed that these vehicles are not only in the licensing statistics, but also being 

used. For the super sport segment, this procedure leads to much shorter estimates for 

lifespan, what may be caused by the way these vehicles are used and who is using them. 

In the luxury segment, after 20 years more than 90% of the vehicles are still on the roads. 

To determine exactly the impact of vehicle park development on accident statistics 

considering the market penetration with ABS equipped vehicles, detailed data on mileage 

by vehicle age would have been necessary. Unfortunately such data was not available. 

Considering all this input, the average lifespan of a motorcycle was estimated to be 

12 years. 

5.6 "NoVA": the tax to reduce 

In Austria, 20% VAT has to be paid in most cases for powered vehicles. Additionally there 

is the "Normverbrauchsabgabe" ("NoVA"), which can be translated as "fuel consumption 

tax". For motorcycles, this tax equals 0.02% of the net price multiplied by the capacity in 

cubic centimetres, then reduced by 100. On average, about 10% NoVA has to be paid 

(data provided by Honda Austria). Generally, the NoVA percentage is applied to the price 

of the vehicle including all extras and VAT. It was intended to discount the value of ABS 

from the NoVA assessment base. 

Page 20

5.7 ABS market prices 


There are different types of ABS systems on the market available at different costs. There 

is a difference in the construction of these systems, but no evidence of different accident 

reduction potential. Generally speaking, the cheaper system is used for motorcycles in a 

lower price segment of vehicles. 

Without VAT and NoVA the current market prices for the two systems were € 454.55 and € 

862.07. Considering a market share of 67% for the cheaper system and transferring to 

2002 prices, the average net market price for an ABS was considered to be € 561.11. The 

average tax reduction would therefore be € 66.39 per vehicle. 

6 Assessment Results 

The calculation procedure: 

• Injuries of all severity levels were investigated, evaluated and the numbers from the 

years 1999 to 2001 were determined to be most useful for further assessment. 

• Total annual crash costs were calculated in reference to the unit of implementation, i.e. 

one motorcycle using average numbers of registered vehicles within this period. 

• Using the minimum and maximum of crash reduction potential, minimum and maximum 

monetary values for annual cost reductions were calculated. 

• The average lifespan of a motorcycle was investigated. Using statistics on currently 

registered vehicles, monthly sales statistics and statistics on specific vehicles 

comparing sales and number of vehicles still running, the lifespan was estimated at 12 

years. 

• Total cost reduction over the lifespan of a motorcycle was calculated. 

• ABS market prices were investigated and brought to 2002 price level. 

• Average tax rates were investigated. 

• Using all this data, the cost/benefit ratio was calculated for motorcycle ABS and for a 

NoVA tax elimination on motorcycle ABS. 

Table 4: costs and benefits of motorcycle ABS over the lifespan of an average vehicle, Austria 

costs per vehicle 

crash reduction potential 

8% (min) 10% (max) 

average crash costs € 623.24 € 779.06 

ABS costs € 561.11 € 561.11 

Cost/Benefit Ratio of ABS 1.11 1.39 

Cost/Benefit Ratio of ABS – tax reduction 9.39 11.73 

Page 21

7 Decision-Making Process 


The case study "motorcycle ABS" was intended to be a "real life” case in the frame of 

ROSEBUD WP4. This included taking the risk of not having feedback from the decisionmaking 

process within the duration of WP4. 

Before starting this case, it was intended to bring the case forward to the Ministry of 

Finance together with another case, a change of taxes on particle emission filters for 

diesel engines. This could not be achieved, besides, when this was done, the CBA on 

motorcycle ABS was not finished. Another attempt to bring the case forward to the Ministry 

of Finance was not successful. This was the current status when the work on WP4 cases 

had to be finished. 

The initial intention to integrate the Austrian Motorcycle Importers' Association into the 

decision-making process had to be dropped due to political reasons. However, there will 

be another attempt to reduce the tax on ABS for motorcycles using this CBA as a core 

argument. If this step should be carried out with the duration of ROSEBUD, the 

experiences will be considered for the final product and published in the ROSEBUD 

newsletter. 

8 Implementation barriers 

Before starting this assessment, frame conditions were scanned for possible barriers, 

considering the barriers identified in ROSEBUD WP2 and WP3. 

None of the fundamental barriers seemed to play a significant role within this work. 

A fundamental question was raised within this study: Is it appropriate to consider tax 

reductions on safety equipment of vehicles as a road safety measure? This would mean to 

only take this tax reduction into account as costs of the measure. Or will the entire cost of 

the safety equipment have to be considered in a public economic sense? 

Some shortcomings were found in the data available. There is no appropriate data on 

vehicle mileage, particularly mileage data referring to the age of the vehicle. 

At the beginning of this study it was clear that tax reductions on safety equipment had 

never been granted before. Even internationally, no such cases could be found although 

tax reductions are frequently proposed to promote safety equipment of vehicles. 

9 Conclusion/Discussion 

General 

It was proposed by a research institute to carry out this assessment to support motorcycle 

manufacturers and dealers in their intention to ask the Ministry of Finance for a tax 

reduction on ABS for motorcycles. Particularly, if the Ministry of Finance is the recipient of 

such a claim, the cost/benefit assessment seemed to be promising as an argument. 

• It was unclear whether tax reduction on vehicle safety equipment may exclusively be 

considered as a cost in the context of public economy, or the entire cost for this safety 

equipment has to be accounted for. 

Page 22


• If elimination of the "NoVA" tax on ABS purchase costs in Austria is considered as a 

road safety measure, it is cost effective by a factor of 9.39 to 11.73 (reduction of fatal 

and severe injuries by 8 to 10%). 

• The cost/benefit ratio of fitting motorcycles with an ABS is between 1.11 and 1.39 

(reduction of fatal and severe injuries by 8 to 10%) in Austria. 

Technical 

• Accident data was easily accessible at an appropriate level of quality. 

• Vehicle registration data was easily accessible, however, a strong trend during the 

recent years gave some limitations on the time period to include. 

• The average lifespan of a vehicle (i.e. motorcycle) could not be determined directly. 

• There was no appropriate data on vehicle mileage and mileage by vehicle age to 

exactly determine exposure. 

• There was good evidence of the impact of the measure. Since this data was from 

abroad, it was necessary to check its validity in Austria, which was also easy to do. 

• It was easy to determine the costs of the measure, i.e. ABS market prices and average 

tax rates. 

• The calculations could easily be carried out using a spreadsheet program. 

REFERENCES 

KRAMLICH T., SPORNER, A. (2000): Zusammenspiel aktiver und passiver Sicherheit bei 

Motorradkollisionen. GDV, Institut für Fahrzeugsicherheit, 

München. 

VAVRYN K., WINKELBAUER M. (1996):Bremsverzögerungswerte und Reaktionszeiten 

bei Motorradfahrern, KfV. Wien. 

SPORNER A. (1996): Ansatzpunkte für die Bewertung der Risikoexponierung bei 

PKW/Motorrad - Kollisionen, Büro für Kfz-Technik, VdS. 

München. 

VAVRYN K., WINKELBAUER M. (1998): Bremskraftregeverhalten von Motorradfahrern, 

KfV. Wien. 

VAVRYN K., WINKELBAUER M. (2003): Bremsbedienung von Motorradfahrern mit und 

ohne ABS, KfV. Wien. 

ROSEBUD WP3 Report (2004): Improvements in efficiency assessment tools. 

ROSEBUD WP2 Report (2004): Barriers to the use of efficiency assessment tools in road 

safety policy. 

Page 23

CASE B1: Section Control – Automatic Speed Enforcement in the Kaisermühlen Tunnel (Vienna, A22 motorway) 

ROSEBUD 

WP4 - CASE B REPORT 

SECTION CONTROL – AUTOMATIC SPEED 

ENFORCEMENT IN THE KAISERMÜHLEN TUNNEL 

(VIENNA, A22 MOTORWAY) 

BY CHRISTIAN STEFAN 

AUSTIAN ROAD SAFETY BOARD (KFV), AUSTRIA

SECTION CONTROL – AUTOMATIC SPEED ENFORCEMENT IN THE KAISERMÜHLEN TUNNEL 


1 PROBLEM ............................................................................................................27 



2.2 Target accident group ...........................................................................................29 

2.3 Objectives of the measure ....................................................................................29 

2.4 Impact of Section Control on average speed ........................................................30 


3.1 Costs of the measure ............................................................................................31 

3.2 Economic benefits due to reduced road traffic emissions .....................................31 

3.3 Effect on accidents................................................................................................34 

3.4 Revenues due to speed violation ..........................................................................38 

3.5 Computation of the Cost-Benefit Ratio..................................................................39 

4 CONCLUSIONS....................................................................................................40 

5 DECISION MAKING PROCESS...........................................................................41 

Page 25

CASE OVERVIEW 

Measure 


Section Control - Automatic Speed Enforcement in the Kaisermühlen Tunnel (Vienna, A22 

motorway) 

Problem 

Traffic accidents due to excessive speeding 

Target Accident Group 

All accidents in the tunnel 

Objectives 

Reducing accidents and harmonization of traffic flow (reduction of “Stop-and-Go” traffic or 

congestion during peak hours) 

Initiator 

Austrian highway operator (ASFINAG) 

Decision makers 

Austrian highway operator (ASFINAG), Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and 

Technology, Federal Ministry of the Interior, local government of the municipality of Vienna 

Costs 

Capital costs are divided into costs for construction and maintenance costs; investments 

into the construction of the Section Control are covered by the ASFINAG, whereas 

operating costs are covered by the Federal Ministry of the Interior 

Benefits 

Benefits include reductions in accidents and savings in road traffic emissions. Running 

costs of the system are cleared by fines from speed violators 


Cost-Benefit Ratio for tunnels on urban motorways: 5.4 

Page 26

1 Problem 


Exceeding the speed limit is probably the most common law violation among drivers. Yet, 

only a small proportion of all traffic violators are detected, i.e. the risk of being 

apprehended is usually very low. According to the Federal Ministry of the Interior, 

inappropriate speed is responsible for more than a third of all fatal accidents occurring on 

Austrian roads. Measures to reduce the percentage of speeders would therefore amount in 

a significant reduction of both casualty accidents and severity of injuries. Speed limits are 

usually set in accordance with road conditions, traffic volume, proximity to sensitive areas, 

such as residential areas and schools, and a host of other factors. Motorists are expected 

to obey posted speed limits at all times. 

Traditional manual and stationary speed enforcement methods are limited in their effects 

and require a lot of human resources. Automatic speed enforcement on the other hand is 

intended to provide enhanced capacity for enforcement by applying technical solutions that 

do not require the presence of police officers at the scene of an offence. Systems for 

automatic speed enforcement (including Section Control) are designed to detect and 

identify traffic violators automatically. Identification is solely based on photographs of the 

vehicle or the driver, respectively. 

2 Description of the measure 

The Kaisermühlen Tunnel is an urban tunnel with separate tubes for each direction of 

traffic. More than 90,000 vehicles use this part of the A22 motorway everyday; about 10% 

consist of Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGV). Due to a nearby tank lot, the share of HGV 

carrying flammable liquids (e.g. motor spirits, diesel oil) is extremely high. The tunnel 

offers 3-4 lanes per direction with entrance and exit ramps within the tunnel. 

Figure 1: Site overview of the Section Control in the Kaisermühlen Tunnel 

Page 27


Table 5: Road characteristics of the Kaisermühlen Tunnel 

KAISERMÜHLEN TUNNEL 

Road classification Urban motorway (A22) 

Type of road Tunnel with two tubes 

Number of lanes per direction 3-4 

Width per lane 3.5 m 

Length 2.3 km 

Speed limit 

Passenger cars, buses, motorcycles: 80 

km/h 

Heavy Goods Vehicles (>7,5 t): 60 km/h 

Daily traffic (2003 6 ) 91,915 vehicles/24 hours 

Amount of Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGV) 10.0% 

Source: Vienna Municipal Department 34, own calculations 

2.1 System description 

In close cooperation with the Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology, 

the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the municipality of Vienna, the Austrian highway 

operator (ASFINAG) introduced a new instrument of traffic surveillance to reduce 

accidents and traffic delays in the Kaisermühlen Tunnel on one of Vienna’s most 

frequented motorways (A22) in August 2003. This so-called Section Control does not 

measure speed at a certain point in space and time, but calculates the average speed by 

means of passage time in a defined area (see Figure 2). The aim is to force drivers not 

only to slow down at certain points of stationary speed control (e.g. automatic speed 

cameras), but also adhere to the speed limit over the entire distance. It also provides live 

monitoring of traffic flow behaviour and thus contributes to harmonizing traffic flow 

performance. 

The system consists of two facilities, one for each driving direction. Vehicle detection is 

carried out optically. A video system placed above the road on gantries (one camera 

above each of the three lanes) takes two pictures of each passing vehicle, one at the 

beginning of the tunnel and one at the end. These photographs provide details of the event 

(passage time, use of lane) and the license plate number. Furthermore a laser scanner 

installed adjacent to the video system is programmed to differentiate between passenger 

cars and lorries (HGV), which is fundamental to keep different speed limits under 

surveillance. 

At the entrance and exit of the Kaisermühlen Tunnel, laser scanners are installed to obtain 

the required data. The system continually looks for two matching license plates - if a match 

is found, the average speed is calculated and if it exceeds a defined level, an image of the 

license plate is transmitted to the traffic supervision department. This information is used 

to establish the owner of the vehicle via the national motor vehicle and driver’s license 

registration database. Data of vehicles not exceeding the pre-set speed limit (plus a 

6 Computed data by means of a linear regression model. Vehicle data related from the automatic counting 

station have been inadequate due to false HGV readings in one direction. 

Page 28


certain tolerance) are deleted immediately afterward. Only aggregated data is kept for 

statistical reasons. 

Figure 2: Scheme of Section Control in the Kaisermühlen Tunnel 

Source: Vienna Municipal Department 34 

The Section Control system is designed to operate with speeds up to 250 km/h and a 

maximum traffic flow of 2 vehicles per second and lane. Vehicle detection is independent 

of the position of a vehicle on or between lanes. There is no necessity for pavement 

installations (like inductive loops) or disruption of the traffic flow. 

2.2 Target accident group 

The target accident group of this measure consists of accidents occurring in the 

Kaisermühlen Tunnel. This survey concentrates on injury accidents because data for 

material damage accidents could not be collected without enormous strains on budget and 

working hours. Thus, the cost-benefit ratio computed in the following chapters 

underestimates the real impacts on accidents to a certain extent. This should be kept in 

mind whenever Section Control systems are considered for further use in traffic safety 

programmes. 

2.3 Objectives of the measure 

The main task of Section Control is the measurement of average speed of motor vehicles 

for the purpose of speed control and traffic enforcement. Contrary to the majority of 

commonly used speed control systems, which mostly operate in combination with Doppler 

radars, the Section Control system supervises the traffic performance along a defined road 

section. It also offers a wide range of additional features regarding traffic surveillance. 

Objectives 

• Monitoring different speed limits that apply to different vehicle classes 

• Harmonization of traffic flow (reduction of “Stop-and-Go” traffic or congestion 

during peak hours) 

• Surveillance of closed lanes (in combination with route information and 

management systems) 

Page 29


• Detection of wrong-way drivers (“ghost cars”) 

• Image triggering (including alarm release) for vehicles exceeding height limits 

• Detection of stolen vehicles 

• Traffic surveillance (for the tunnel operator) 

• Statistical data (traffic speed, loads, headways) 

2.4 Impact of Section Control on average speed 

According to the Federal Ministry of the Interior 7 , in 2003 more than 35% of fatal accidents 

on roads in Austria occurred because of inappropriate speed. As mentioned in the 

previous chapter, the main objective of Section Control is harmonization of speed, which 

has a positive influence on accidents. In its first year of operation, a reduction in average 

speed by more than 10 km/h was recorded (see Figure 3). Traditional mobile and 

stationary speed surveillance (in use before the Section Control started operating) showed 

the average speed of all vehicles to be 85 km/h, whereas this value decreased to about 70 

km/h shortly after the introduction of the measure. Further speed measurements carried 

out after a 6-month period revealed that average speed on this road section has levelled 

off to 75 km/h due to the fact that drivers tend to follow regulations in a very strict manner 

right after their implementation, but less some time afterwards due to unintended 

behavioural adaptations (”kangaroo effect“). 

Drivers started acting in accordance with the speed limit as soon as technical installations 

were established, and reports about this new system of speed control appeared in the 

media. 

Figure 3: Effect of Section Control on average vehicle speed 

Source: Vienna Municipal Department 34 

In close cooperation with local police services and employees of the Institute for Driver 

Education and Vehicle Technology of the Austria Road Safety Board (KfV), the following 

distinction in average speed of passenger cars and HGV during daytime (5 am - 10 pm) 

and night time (10 pm - 5 am) was made. This breakdown is essential for calculating 

detailed traffic emissions and fuel consumption for different road users. 

7 KfV, 2004, page 50 

Page 30


Table 6: Average speed of passenger cars and lorries before and after implementation of Section Control 

Passenger cars HGV 

Before After Before After 

Daytime 85 km/h 75 km/h 70 km/h 55 km/h 

Night time 95 km/h 75 km/h 75 km/h 55 km/h 

Source: own estimates in cooperation with local police services 

3 Cost-Benefit Analysis 

3.1 Costs of the measure 

Investment costs for the Section Control in the Kaisermühlen Tunnel add up to € 

1,200,000 (2003 price). Construction work of gantries, cables and data lines to the Section 

Control server are included in this price. Annual costs of operation and maintenance are 

about € 60,000, covering a service contract of 4 service cycles per year plus additional 

repairs if the system starts malfunctioning. In order to avoid disruption of traffic flow, 

maintenance and repairs are done during night hours when traffic is usually very low. 

According to the Austrian highway operator (ASFINAG), the Section Control system has a 

10-year service life, beginning in 2003. After that period, software problems and missing 

spare parts for the hardware are expected to affect full operation of the system. Investment 

costs are incorporated in the form of an annual capital cost assuming a 4 percent interest 

rate in real terms (see Table 7). For the sake of comparability, all costs were converted to 

their 2002-price level. Total annual costs for operating the Section Control add up to € 

204,272 per year. 

Table 7: Total annual costs of Section Control in the Kaisermühlen Tunnel 

EURO 

(2003-price) 

Expense factors Costs Costs 

EURO 

(2002-price) 

Annual capital costs 

[n=10, 4% p.a.] 

Investment costs 1,200,000 1,178,782 145,333 

Annual maintenance costs 60,000 58,939 

Source: Vienna Municipal Department 34, own calculations 

3.2 Economic benefits due to reduced road traffic emissions 

Total annual 

costs 

204,272 

Road traffic is a major source of air pollution and emission of greenhouse gases in Austria. 

Although improvements in vehicle technology, the introduction of exhaust treatment 

systems (catalytic converters), and the development of higher quality fuels have to some 

extent significantly reduced emissions from vehicles, this effect has levelled off by a still 

ongoing increase in traffic performance. According to latest studies 8 , traffic volume in and 

around Vienna will rise by more than 90% by 2035 due to a steady increase in resident 

population, decentralization and daily distances covered. 

8 SAMMER et al, 2004, page 25 

Page 31


As stated in the previous chapter, a major effect of Section Control is harmonization of 

velocity, i.e. vehicle drivers maintain a constant speed, reducing “Stop-and-Go” traffic and 

congestion. The model 9 used for computing the resulting changes in road traffic emissions 

was created by the Austrian Umweltbundesamt, the governmental authority for protection 

and control of the environment, in close cooperation with associated institutes in Germany 

and Switzerland. The “Handbook of Emission Factors for Road Transport” provides 

emission factors in g/km for all current vehicle types (passenger cars, Light Duty Vehicles, 

Heavy Goods Vehicles and motorcycles), each divided into different categories for a 

variety of traffic situations. The following parameters have been used to define the model: 

• Type of emission: hot emissions, cold start emissions, evaporation 

• Vehicle type: passenger car - Heavy Goods Vehicle (HGV) 

• Estimated changes in composition of the vehicle fleet (2003-2013) 

• Air pollutants (CO, NOx, SO2, PM10, VOC) and carbon dioxide (CO2) 

• Type of road: urban motorway 

• Time of day: daytime/night time 

Table 8 gives values for both air pollutants and CO2 as the most important greenhouse 

gas emitted by road traffic. As can be seen from the annotations in the footnote, different 

literature sources were used to obtain monetary estimations for the most important air 

pollutants emitted during combustion. To arrive at 2002 prices, German Mark (DM) and 

Norwegian Krona (NOK) were first converted into Austrian Shillings (ATS) and then 

brought to a 2002 price level by using official inflation rates (see appendix). Values of 

traffic emissions were finally converted to € by multiplication with 0.07267. 

Table 8: Valuation of environmental impacts for use in cost-benefit analyses 

Air pollution Unit of valuation 

CO 

Value per unit 

DM (1995) 10 NOK (1995) 11 

€ (2002) 

Tons of NOx- 

12 1700 974.64 

Equivalent 

NOx kg of NOx 115 14.90 

SO2 kg of SO2 37 4.79 

Particle (PM10) kg of PM10 1800 233.27 

VOC kg of VOC 15 1.94 

CO2 Tons of CO2 220 28.51 

Source: own calculations 

For quite some years, considerable efforts have been made by the European Commission 

to reduce fuel consumption and, consequently, emissions of carbon dioxide. In 1992, the 

Auto-Oil I Program was introduced within the European Union to define emission ceilings 

9 

KELLER, HAUSBERGER, 2004 

10 

EWS, 1997, page 41 

11 

ELVIK, 1999, page 24 

12 

Conversion factor: 1 ton of CO = 0.003 tons of NOx-Equivalent (EWS, 1997, page 41) 

Page 32


(EURO classes) for passenger cars as well as Heavy Goods Vehicles, and to set quality 

standards for fuels for 2000 and beyond. 

One key measure in this respect was a voluntary agreement with car manufactures to 

reduce CO2 emissions from new passenger cars to 140 g/km by the year 2008/2009. For 

the Kaisermühlen Tunnel, this boost in vehicle technology, along with a lower average 

speed due to Section Control, results in more than 12,000 tons of saved CO2 emissions, 

having a discounted monetary value of more than € 280,000 (see Table 9). 

Table 9: Monetary value of saved emissions due to Section Control (accumulated 

value 2003-2013) 

Changes in road 

traffic emissions (t) 

Discounted value of traffic 

emissions in € (2002-price) 

CO - 14.9 -137 

NOx - 39.0 -431,639 

SO2 - 0.4 -1,552 

Particle (PM10) - 0.5 -87,029 

VOC + 7.3 +11,247 

CO2 - 12,879.6 -281,973 

Accumulated value -791.084 

Monetary value of saved emissions per year -79,108 

Source: Austrian Umweltbundesamt, own calculations 

Nitrogen oxide emissions are among the most harmful of all air pollutants. Thus, various 

nitrogen oxide catalytic converters have been developed which will help to reduce 

emissions of NOx significantly over the next 10 years. Expected changes can be seen in 

Table 9, which states above all a constant decrease in saved nitrogen oxide emissions 

because of improvements in vehicle technology. In the year 2003 nearly 6 tons of NOx 

were saved through Section Control. This value decreases to one ton of NOx in 2013. 

Calculated over the economic lifetime of the Section Control system, savings in NOx 

emissions amount to a value of more than € 430,000. 

Volatile organic compounds (VOC), in combination with nitrogen oxides, are responsible 

for ground level ozone and smog. VOC are primarily produced when fuels are incompletely 

combusted. Looking at the VOC traffic emissions in the period under observation, an 

increase of one ton in 2003 and slightly less in the following years has been calculated. 

This is due to the fact that most vehicle engines have their lowest VOC output between 80 

and 100 km/h. A decrease in average speed to 75 km/h (passenger cars) or 55 km/h 

(HGV) amounts to an increase of VOC emissions. 

Page 33

Changes in road traffic emissions [t] 

1 

0 

-1 

-2 

-3 

-4 

-5 

-6 


Figure 4: Changes in the emission of air pollutants due to Section Control 

2003 

2004 


3.3 Effect on accidents 

2005 

2006 

VOC CO NOx PM10 SO2 

2007 

2008 

Period under observation 

In its first year of operation, a positive impact of Section Control concerning accidents in 

the Kaisermühlen Tunnel was observed. Apart from the reduction in total numbers of 

casualty accidents, the severity of injury was also positively affected. In a four-year period 

prior to the start of the Section Control system (Ib-IVb), one fatality, one person severely 

and 10 slightly injured have been recorded on average every year. Since August 2003 no 

fatal or severely injured road user was observed in the Kaisermühlen Tunnel, while the 

number of slightly injured drivers decreased to a total of 7 in the after-period (see 

Table 10). 

Table 10: Injury accidents before and after the implementation of Section Control 

From To Period 

Injury 

accidents 

2009 

2010 

Fatalities 

2011 

2012 

Seriously 

injured 

2013 

Slightly 

injured 

12.08.1999 12.08.2000 IVb 7 1 0 10 

12.08.2000 12.08.2001 IIIb 7 0 1 9 

12.08.2001 12.08.2002 IIb 7 1 1 11 

12.08.2002 12.08.2003 Ib 7 0 0 9 

12.08.2003 12.08.2004 Ia 5 0 0 7 


Mean (IVb – Ib) 7.0 0.5 0.5 9.8 

Accidents are statistically rare events. Part of the nature of such events is that the precise 

time and place of their occurrence, as well as the precise nature of their impacts, are 

hardly predictable, i.e. in some periods the recorded number of accidents on given points 

of the road network are greater (or less) than the average values expected for those 

points. In Figure 5, the grey dots represent the recorded number of accidents and slightly 

Page 34


injured road users in the Kaisermühlen Tunnel (fatal and serious injuries were omitted due 

to small numbers). The white dots show the moving average of the annual counts. In the 

first year, this is the same as the number of accidents or slightly injured for that year. In the 

second year, it is the average of the first two years, in the third year, it is the average of the 

first three years, etc. 

It can be seen that the recorded number of slightly injured road users in a given year is not 

necessarily representative of the mean annual number. The annual recorded number of 

slightly injured, for example, varies between 9 and 11. Thus, if a safety inspection leads to 

choosing these points for treatment, a selection bias occurs and, in the measurements 

made after the treatment, an effect of diminution is registered (regression to the mean) 

independent of the treatment. The average value of the four years prior to the installation 

of Section Control (Ib-IVb) have been chosen as the base for a medium-long term trend. 

Figure 5: Recorded number of accidents and slightly injured in the Kaisermühlen Tunnel – 

mean of the annual numbers 

Number of accidents/slightly injured 

12 

10 

8 

6 

4 

2 

0 

10,0 


10 

Recorded number of accidents Annual mean accidents 

Recorded number of slightly injured Annual mean of slightly injured 

9,5 

9 

7 7 7 7 

7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 

IVb IIIb IIb Ib 

Before periods 

To properly quantify the safety effect of Section Control, a simple before/after comparison 

of accidents is not suitable. It is necessary to compare the situation with Section Control 

(“after”) with the anticipated situation that would have occurred without Section Control. 

The latter presents a calculated value of a previously observed (“before”) situation. 

Therefore, various types of risk indicators (fatality rate, rate of severely injured road users, 

etc.) and their means and standard deviations were computed (see Table 11). 

Traffic performance in the before period (Ib-IVb) increased in a linear manner, while in the 

after-period (Ia) a slight drop in vehicle-km was observed. This phenomenon is due to the 

fact that traffic capacity on this road section has apparently reached its limit. Without 

further investments in additional lanes or route information and management systems, a 

further increase in daily traffic is unlikely. Because numbers of fatal and serious injuries 

are too low to produce meaningful results, these two categories were combined for further 

calculations. Furthermore, some effects of serious injuries on the quality of life (e.g. 

lifelong paraplegia) deem it necessary to ascribe these victims the same weight as 

fatalities. 

11 

10,0 

9,8 

9 

Page 35


Table 11:Traffic performance and accident rates [per million vehicle-km] in the 

Kaisermühlen Tunnel 

Period 

Traffic 

performance 

[million vehiclekm] 

Accident rate 

Rate of fatal 

and serious 

injuries 

Rate of slight 

injuries 

IVb 67.6 0.10 0.015 0.15 

IIIb 70.3 0.10 0,014 0.13 

IIb 72.2 0.10 0,028 0.15 

Ib 74.8 0.09 0,000 0.12 

Ia 74.5 0.07 0,000 0.09 

Mean (IVb - Ib) 0.10 0.014 0.14 

Standard deviation (IVb - Ib) 0.004 0.011 0.015 


The corrected “before” value (number of accidents, fatalities or injured people without 

treatment) results from multiplying the average number of accidents (per million vehiclekm) 

in Table 11 with the traffic performance in the “after” period (Ia). The ratio of “after” and 

(corrected) “before” values constitutes the actual safety effect of the measure. 

Table 12: Corrected before and after values of accident severity due to Section Control 

Corrected before value After value Ratio 13 

Injury accidents 7 5 0.71 

Fatal and serious 

injuries 

1 0 0.00 

Slightly injured 10 7 0.70 


The analysis also controls for general trends in the number of accidents by using the total 

number of accidents on motorways in the “before” and “after” period as a comparison 

group (see Table 13). The mean number of comparison group accidents in the before 

period was 2,485, respectively, and 2,540 in the “after” period. Thus, the number of 

comparison group accidents is sufficiently large to be only minimally influenced by random 

fluctuations. The effect of Section Control on the number of accidents (or fatalities or 

injured road users) was estimated as follows: 

whereas 

Safety effect [%] = 1- [Xa/E(m)b] / [Ca/Cb] 

Xa = recorded number of accidents in the “after” period 

E(m)b = expected number of accidents (correct before value) in the “before” period 

Ca = number of comparison group accidents in the “after” period 

Cb = number of comparison group accidents in the “before” period 

13 Slightly different numbers due to round off errors in the computation of the ratio 

Page 36


Table 13: Injury accidents and severity of casualties on Austrian motorways in the before/after period 


Injury 

accidents 

Fatalities 

Seriously 

injured 

Slightly 

injured 

12.08.1999 12.08.2000 IVb 2,535 134 1,218 2,847 

12.08.2000 12.08.2001 IIIb 2,468 165 1,255 2,703 

12.08.2001 12.08.2002 IIb 2,402 121 1,173 2,663 

12.08.2002 12.08.2003 Ib 2,534 124 1,133 2,819 

12.08.2003 12.08.2004 Ia 2,440 108 1,165 2,642 

Mean (IVb – Ib) 2,485 136 1,195 2,758 

Source: Road Accident Database of the Austrian Road Safety Board (KfV) 

Statistical inference draws conclusions about a population based on sample data. It also 

provides a statement, expressed in the language of probability, of how much confidence 

we can place in the conclusions. The different values for the safety effect of Table 14 acts 

as estimators of the (unknown) population parameter. The purpose of a confidence interval 

is to estimate this parameter with an indication of how accurate the estimate is and how 

confident we are that the result is correct. Any confidence interval consists of two parts: an 

interval computed from the data and a confidence level. The confidence level states the 

probability that the method will give a correct answer. That is, if you use a 95% confidence 

interval, the probability that the true value is out of this interval is only 0.05. 

Table 14 and Table 15 show estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the safety effects 

of Section Control on accidents. Computing the Odds Ratio, note that if any value out of 4 

numbers involved in the evaluation is zero, a correction must be applied, i.e. 0.5 should be 

added to each number. 14 

Table 14: Safety effect of Section Control on accident severity 

Odds ratio Safety effect [%] 

Injury accidents 0.69 -30.5 

Fatal and serious injuries 0.34 -66.4 

Slightly injured 0.72 -28.4 


Table 15: Best estimate and confidence interval of the safety effect of Section Control on accidents 

14 FLEISS, 1981, page 64 

Percentage change in the number of accidents 

Accident severity Best estimate 95% confidence interval 

Injury accidents -31 (-35; -26) 

Fatal and serious 

injuries 

-66 (-82; +143) 

Slightly injured -28 (-39; -13) 


Page 37


Table 16 gives an economic valuation of savings in the number of accidents and severity 

of injury due to Section Control. The original values were obtained from a study on 

economic costs of accidents 15 . Figures were then converted into EURO (€) and brought to 

a 2002 price level by using official inflation rates (see appendix). As can be seen from the 

bottom line of the table, the safety effect of the Section Control system amounts to annual 

savings of more than 1 million €. 

Table 16: Valuation of savings in the number of accidents and 

severity of injury due to Section Control 

Category 

Amount of 

savings 

€ per unit 

(2002-price) 

Cumulated value 

Fatalities 1 949,897 949,897 

Seriously 

injured 

Slightly 

injured 

Property 

damage 

1 51,439 51,439 

3 4,359 13,077 

2 5,745 11,490 

Total 1,025,903 


3.4 Revenues due to speed violation 

In the period under observation (13.09.2003 - 27.08.2004), more than 29 million vehicles 

passed through the Kaisermühlen Tunnel and about 40,000 drivers were charged because 

of excessive speeding (see Table 17). That is, only 0.14% or every 700 th driver, does not 

follow speed regulations on this road section and drives too fast. The top speed of a 

vehicle heading north was 175 km/h and 154 km/h heading south. About 5% (2,161) of all 

fines issued were acquired by HGVs. Keeping in mind that more than 10% of daily traffic is 

due to HGVs, a possible explanation for this phenomenon can be found in the high 

proportion of foreign vehicles among lorries. Due to the fact that mutual recognition of 

financial penalties has only been established with Germany and Switzerland, most of the 

foreign speed violators cannot be prosecuted. 

Table 17: Speed violations and charges in the Kaisermühlen Tunnel 

Heading 

south (A23) 

Heading north 

(Stockerau) 

Vehicles passing 

Fines 

the Section 

Control Passenger cars HGV 

All 

vehicles 

13,450,345 19,162 951 20,113 

15,973,473 19,558 1,210 20,768 

Total 29,423,818 38,720 2,161 40,881 

Source: Federal Ministry of the Interior, own calculations 

15 BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR WISSENSCHAFT UND VERKEHR, 1997, page 136-141 

Page 38


At the Tampere European Council (15 and 16 October 1999), the Heads of State or 

Government of the EU-Member states and the President of the Commission agreed that 

mutual recognition of criminal and financial matters should be a cornerstone of judicial 

cooperation within the European Union. Thus, France, the United Kingdom and Sweden 

initiated the adoption of a Council Framework Decision that enables member states to 

execute criminal and financial offences against citizens of other member states. Although 

this proposal is far from reaching legal status due to objections from several countries, it 

can be expected to pass legislation within the next 3-5 years. Obtaining fines from foreign 

speed violators should then be possible and benefits will be maximized. 

According to Austrian law 16 80% of the fines from speed violations belong to the operator 

of the infrastructure, which (in case of the Section Control) is the Austrian highway 

operator (ASFINAG). The remaining 20% are used to cover the maintenance costs of the 

system settled by the Federal Ministry of the Interior. 

Table 18 gives fines for different levels of speeding. Drivers exceeding the speed limit by 

more than 50 km/h have their driving licences revoked. During the observation period, this 

happened in 46 cases. 

Table 18: Revenues due to excessive speeding in the Kaisermühlen Tunnel 

Fine Violators 

Revenues due to 

speed violation 

0 – 9 km/h € 21 16,176 339,696 

10 – 19 km/h € 42 22,048 926,016 

20 – 29 km/h € 56 2083 116,648 

30 – 39 km/h € 70 409 28,630 

40 – 50 km/h € 140 119 16,660 

Total 40,881 1,427,650 

Source: Federal Ministry of the Interior, own calculations 

3.5 Computation of the Cost-Benefit Ratio 

The Cost-Benefit Analysis is based on the principle of economic efficiency, i.e. to estimate 

if a measure is worth being implemented, the benefits and costs of the treatment are 

computed and brought into relationship. The benefit term includes all positive (monetary) 

effects of the measure. In the case of Section Control, benefits consist of reductions in 

accidents and road traffic emissions. Revenues from speed violators were omitted in the 

calculation of the Cost-Benefit Ratio because of the fact that in an economic point of view, 

it is irrelevant if the money belongs to consumers buying goods and therefore increasing 

their personal benefits or the highway operator that uses the fines for additional safety 

campaigns. The Cost-Benefit Ratio will be the same at both events. 

Different benefits are added to obtain a total benefit. The cost term on the other hand 

denotes implementation and maintenance costs. 

16 StVO, Article 100, Paragraph No.10 

Page 39


The Cost/Benefit-Ratio (CBR) is defined as: 

CBR = 

Combining the benefits and costs calculated in the previous chapters, a net present value 

of all benefits (without fines from speeders) of € 1,105,011 and costs of € 204,272 is 

obtained (see Table 19). Both values amount to a Cost/Benefit-Ratio of 5.4. According to 

analyses of safety measures in Work Package 1 of ROSEBUD 17 , measures with a CBR 

larger than 3 are ranked “excellent”. 

Table 19: Present value of benefits and costs in € (2002-price) due 

to Section Control 

4 Conclusions 

Present value of all benefits 

Present value of implementation costs 

Components of the CBA Benefits Costs 

Road traffic emissions 79,108 

Accident costs 1,025,903 

Installation and maintenance 

costs 

204,272 

Total 1,105,011 204,272 

Source: Austrian Umweltbundesamt, Federal Ministry of the 

Interior, Vienna Municipal Department 34, own calculations 

The results of the Cost-Benefit Analysis lead to the following conclusions: 

• Although accidents rates in the Kaisermühlen Tunnel were already well below 

average (0.12 injury accidents per million vehicle-km on Austrian motorways), a 

positive safety effect of Section Control was achieved. It can be estimated that the 

effect would be even more convincing if this safety measure had been implemented 

to road sections with accident rates above the average. In the weeks to come, 

another Section Control system will start operating on the motorway A2 near mount 

“Wechsel”. Previous studies showed that this road section has an accident rate 

three times above the average. Thus, an even better safety performance than the 

Section Control in the Kaisermühlen Tunnel can be expected. 

• This survey concentrates on injury accidents because data for material damage 

accidents could not be collected without enormous strains on budget and working 

hours. Thus, the Cost-Benefit Ratio computed underestimates the real effects to a 

certain extent. This should be kept in mind whenever Section Control systems are 

considered for further use in traffic safety programs. 

• Due to the fact that mutual recognition of financial penalties only exists with 

Germany and Switzerland, most of the foreign speed violators cannot be 

prosecuted. As soon as the Council Framework Decision on mutual recognition of 

17 Road Safety and Environmental Benefit-Cost and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for Use in Decision-making. 

ROSEBUD is a thematic network funded by the European Commission to support users of efficiency 

assessment tools at all levels of government. 

Page 40


criminal and financial matters has reached legal status, obtaining fines from foreign 

speed violators should be possible and benefits will be maximized. 

• With the instrument of Cost/Benefit Analysis, it is possible to incorporate various 

effects of this safety measure into the evaluation process, i.e. not only reductions in 

casualty accidents and severity of injuries, but also impacts on the environment, 

such as road traffic emissions. A major problem of road traffic, which has been 

neglected due to the special situation of the Kaisermühlen Tunnel, is traffic noise. 

Regional governments in Austria have already expressed their intention to use 

Section Control as a means to reduce traffic noise in residential areas. Such an 

application of Section Control will raise the Cost-Benefit Ratio even more. 

• The effects of Section Control are closely related to outside influences such as 

annual average daily traffic (AADT), accident rates, amount of HGVs, etc. That is, if 

you change the site you will probably get different results than the ones present in 

this case study. 


The results of Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) on Section Control were presented to officials 

of the Austrian highway operator (ASFINAG) to answer the question whether this method 

will be taken into consideration in the future. 

Regarding the use of Efficiency Assessment Tools (EAT) such as CBA in the decision 

making process, it was stated that at the time being, such instruments were too complex. 

Candidates for the introduction of further Section Control systems on the existing road 

network will initially be detected by comparing accident and fatality rates of road sections 

with the motorway average of this type of road. The decision whether or not Section 

Control is an appropriate instrument to reduce accident risk is then made after thorough 

analysis of cause and type of accidents on this specific section. 

Further concerns were expressed that the results and methodology of EAT are hard to 

communicate to the public. The more complex the decision making process, the more 

likely it would be that people mistrust those findings. Another aspect regarding the use of 

EAT is politically motivated. In the aftermath of catastrophic accidents, such as the fire in 

the Tauern Tunnel (1999), political pressure concerning a second tube became so high 

that even if a CBA had led to a negative Cost-Benefit Ratio, this measure would have been 

implemented nonetheless. 

Although it is unlikely that CBA will be used in decision making in the near future, officials 

of the ASFINAG considered Efficiency Assessment Tools an adequate instrument in those 

cases where decisions cannot be made solely based on accident statistics. 

Changes in ASFINAG policy could also lead to an increased demand of Efficiency 

Assessment Tools in the decision making process. As soon as environmental aspects, 

such as traffic emissions and traffic noise, are considered as important as improving traffic 

safety, instruments including those aspects are to become an essential part in decisionmaking. 

Till then the most influencing factors are accidents and fatality rates and the 

amount of daily traffic, respectively. 

Page 41

References 


[1] AUSTRIAN FEDERAL ECONOMIC CHAMBER (WKO), Inflation rates in Austria in 

the years 1996-2002, http://wko.at/statistik/prognose/inflation.pdf, Date of inquiry: 

29.09.2004 

[2] AUSTRIA ROAD SAFETY BOARD (KfV): “Road Traffic Accidents in Austria”, In: 

Verkehr in Österreich, Edition No. 36. Vienna, 2004 

[3] BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR VERKEHR, WISSENSCHAFT UND VERKEHR: 

“Österreichische Unfallkosten- und Verkehrssicherheitsrechnung Straße“, In: 

Forschungsarbeiten aus dem Verkehrswesen, Band 79. Wien, 1997 

[4] ELVIK, R.: “Cost-benefit analysis of safety measures for vulnerable and 

inexperienced road users”, Work package 5 of EU-Project PROMISING, TØI- 

Report 435, Institute of Transport Economics. Oslo, 1999 

[5] EUROPEAN UNION (EU): „Screening of efficiency assessment experiences“, 

Report “State of the Art”, Work package 1 of EU-Project ROSEBUD. July 2003 

[6] FLEISS, J.: „Statistical methods for rates and proportions“. New York, 1981 

[7] FORSCHUNGSGESELLSCHAFT FÜR STRASSEN- UND VERKEHRSWESEN, 

Arbeitsgruppe Verkehrsplanung: “Empfehlungen für Wirtschaftlichkeitsuntersuchungen 

an Straßen (EWS) - Entwurf, Aktualisierung der RAS-W 86. 1997 

[8] KELLER, M.; HAUSBERGER, S.; et al: „Handbuch der Emissionsfaktoren des 

Straßenverkehrs in Österreich“, Version 2.1 erstellt im Auftrag von Umweltbundesamt, 

Ministerium für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft 

sowie dem Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie. 

Vienna, 2004 

[9] OANDA.COM – The currency site, FXHistory: historical currency exchange rates, 

http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory, Date of inquiry: 26.07.2004 

[10] ROAD ACCIDENT DATABASE of the Austrian Road Safety Board (KfV), Date of 

inquiry: 18.10.2004 

[11] SAMMER, G.; ROIDER, O.; KLEMENTSCHITZ, R.: “Mobilitäts-Szenarien 2035 - 

Initiativen zur nachhaltigen Verkehrsentwicklung im Raum Wien”, Editor: Shell 

Austria GmbH. Vienna, 2004 

[12] STRASSENVERKEHRSORDNUNG (StVO) 1960, Article 100, Paragraph No. 10, 

Website of the Austrian Federal Chancellery: http://www.ris.bka.gv.at, Date of 

inquiry: 19.10.2004 

[13] VIENNA MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT 34 - Building and Facility Management, City 

Administration of Vienna 

Page 42

Appendix 


Table A1: Inflation rates in Austria in the years 1996-2002 

Year Inflation [%] 

1996 1.9 

1997 1.3 

1998 0.9 

1999 0.6 

2000 2.3 

2001 2.7 

2002 1.8 

Source: http://wko.at/statistik/prognose/inflation.pdf 

Table A2: Average currency exchange rates for different European countries 


Exchange rate 

(annual mean) 

DM ATS 1995 7.04001 

NOK ATS 1995 1.59133 

ATS EURO 2002 0.07267 

Source: http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory 

Page 43

CASE B2: Automatic Speed enforcement on the A13 motorway (NL) 

ROSEBUD 

WP4 - CASE B REPORT 

AUTOMATIC SPEED ENFORCEMENT ON 

THE A13 MOTORWAY (NL) 

BY CHRISTIAN STEFAN 

AUSTIAN ROAD SAFETY BOARD (KFV), AUSTRIA


AUTOMATIC SPEED ENFORCEMENT ON THE A13 MOTORWAY (NL) 

1 INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................47 



2.2 Objectives .............................................................................................................49 

2.3 Improving traffic safety ..........................................................................................49 

2.4 Harmonisation of traffic flow..................................................................................50 

2.5 Reduction of air pollution.......................................................................................50 

2.6 Reduction of traffic noise.......................................................................................51 


4 CONCLUSIONS....................................................................................................51 

Page 45

CASE OVERVIEW 

Measure 


Automatic Speed Enforcement (Section Control) on the A13 motorway in Overschie 

Problem 

Traffic accidents, noise and air pollution due to excessive speeding 

Target Accident Group 

All accidents on the A13 motorways 

Objectives 

Reducing accidents and harmonization of traffic flow (reduction of traffic emissions and 

traffic noise due to lower speed limit) 

Initiator 

National Police Service Agency KLPD 


National Police Service Agency KLPD, Ministry of Transport 

Costs 

No data available 

Benefits 

Benefits are reductions in accidents, greenhouse gas emissions and traffic noise 


Could not be calculated due to missing data 

Page 46

1 Introduction 


In the Netherlands, speed enforcement is the most important task of the motorway police. 

Since the implementation of general speed limits and the beginning of structural speed 

control in May 1988 (by the National Police Service Agency KLPD), motorists have been 

acting at a level of major violation. In December 1993, a pilot for Continuous Applied 

Speed Enforcement (CASE1) was started by the KLPD and the Ministry of Transport on 

the A2 between Utrecht and Amsterdam. Before the implementation of the pilot, the speed 

limit was violated by 35% of the motorists, increasing to almost 70% during the night. After 

CASE1 started operating, speed violations decreased to almost 3%. This result led to an 

institutionalization of Automatic Speed Enforcement in 1995, becoming a part of daily 

operational procedure. 


In May 2002, the Dutch authorities introduced a Section Control system on the motorway 

A13 aimed at maintaining the maximum speed limit at 80 km/h. One of the main purposes 

of this measure was to improve the air quality in Overschie, a municipality of Rotterdam. 

About 124,000 vehicles use this motorway everyday, which includes almost 10% of Heavy 

Goods Vehicles (HGV). As the A13 crosses through a densely populated area, noise and 

air pollution have become a major cause of distress for local residents. 

Another objective of the Section Control system was to reduce the number of accidents 

and severity of injury, respectively. The National Traffic Safety Policy of the Netherlands 

aims at reducing the number of fatalities by 50% and injuries by 40% (in comparison to 

1985) by the year 2010. 

Figure 6: Site overview of Section Control on the A13 motorway 

Source: MALENSTEIN, 2003, page 3 

Page 47


Table 20: Road characteristics of the A13 motorway 

A13 MOTORWAY 

Road classification Urban motorway 

Number of lanes per direction 3 

Width per lane 3.5 m 

Length 2 km 

Speed limit 80 km/h (all vehicles) 

Daily traffic 124.000 vehicles/24 hours 

Amount of Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGV) 10% 

Source: MALENSTEIN, 2003, page 10; TNO, 2003, page 5 

2.1 System description 

A Section Control system was set up over a 2 km stretch on the A13 in Overschie. A video 

system placed on gantries on both sides of the control zone captures and stores an image 

of each passing vehicle. These images are reduced to a limited amount of information, 

providing a digital fingerprint for every vehicle. The Section Control server continually 

searches for two matching fingerprints. If a match is found, the computer calculates the 

average speed and stores both images as one object on a permanent medium if this value 

is above a pre-set margin. A nearly invisible flashlight on the gantries allows the system to 

function during low light conditions without blinding the drivers. 

Recognition of the license plate is handled by a separate application. Checking the 

vehicles’ categories (passenger car, lorry, motorcycle, etc.) is done via a special license 

database in the Ministry of Transport. The length of each passing vehicle is measured by 

inductive loops. 

Before the Section Control was set in force, it had to be guaranteed that fines could not be 

appealed in court. Thus, a police patrol of the Traffic and Transport Division deliberately 

committed a speed offence, which was registered by the Section Control system. This 

offence was taken to a Dutch court as a test trial. During the process, technical details and 

the mode of operation of Section Control were explained and accepted as evidence by the 

judges. When the patrolman was convicted, he appealed and matters were taken to the 

next higher court. When he was convicted again, legislation was achieved. 

Page 48


Table 21: Statistics of the Section Control system on the A13 motorway 

A13 MOTORWAY 

Accuracy of measurement < 1% error 

Accuracy of vehicle identification 99.75% 

Accuracy of license plate recognition 84.8% 

Detection of speed up to 250 km/h certified (156 mph) 

Start of Section Control 11.05.2002 

Processing of violators 

Violations 

Source: MALENSTEIN, 2003, page 17 

Fully automated (15.6% of the violators have 

to be processed manually due to errors in 

license plate recognition) 

Before implementation of Section Control 

⇒ 6,000 violators/day (4.8% of daily traffic) 

After implementation of Section Control 

⇒ 700-800 violators/working day (0.6%) 

⇒ 1,000-1,100 violators/weekend (0.9%) 

Questionnaires among motorists showed a surprisingly high rate of acceptance of Section 

Control. 75% of the interviewees considered this system to be more reasonable than 

traditional speed enforcement (radar traps). Combined with sufficient information on the 

road, the methodology of Section Control was appreciated because of its structured 

approach. Motorists experienced that there was no escape and obediently followed speed 

regulations. The major effects of this measure were slowing of traffic and a better use of 

the infrastructure. 

2.2 Objectives 

The main task of Section Control is the measurement of average speed of motor vehicles 

for the purpose of speed control and traffic enforcement. This objective was triggered by 

the National Traffic Safety Policy to reduce the number of fatalities by 50% by the year 

2010. Due to harmonization of traffic flow, Section Control allows for a better use of the 

existing infrastructure and reductions in traffic emissions and traffic noise. 

Objectives 

• Improving road safety 

• Harmonisation of traffic flow 

• Reduction of air pollution 

• Reduction of traffic noise 

2.3 Improving traffic safety 

Accident data before and after the implementation of Section Control on the A13 was not 

available. According to Jan Malenstein from the Dutch National Police Agency (KLPD), the 

safety effect of continuous speed enforcement (implemented in the Netherlands in 1993) 

Page 49


accounts for -20% in injury accidents and -25% in the number of fatalities over a period of 

10 years. 

2.4 Harmonisation of traffic flow 

Based on loop detectors at the beginning and the end of the control zone, average speed 

and traffic flow before and after the implementation of Section Control was monitored. 

Analysis of the measurements showed a clear decrease in average speed and v85 after 

Section Control started operating - speed fluctuations became smaller and extreme peaks 

occurred less often. Speed measurements carried out after several months revealed a 

slight increase in average speed. Traffic behaviour was adapted due to continuous speed 

control, resulting in a harmonized traffic flow (reduction of “Stop-and-Go” traffic) and less 

congestion. Calculations showed a decrease of congestion during peak hours by 30%. 

2.5 Reduction of air pollution 

The assessment of air quality before and after the introduction of Section Control was 

based upon measurements and modelling. An hour-to-hour line-source model was applied 

to compute the contribution of traffic emissions on the A13 to air quality in Overschie. 

Continuous monitoring of NO, NO2 and PM10 was performed at three different locations: 

one 500m west of the A13 (“background location”) and the other two 50m and 200m east 

of the motorway. Measurements were carried out between April 2001 and April 2003, 

including periods of one year before and one year after the implementation of Section 

Control. Furthermore, NO2 concentrations were monitored with passive samplers at more 

than 30 locations in Overschie between April 2002 and April 2003. 

At a limited number of locations, black smoke and concentrations of elemental and organic 

carbon (ES and OC) were measured. Meteorological data and traffic data on the A13 were 

obtained from the Meteorological Services KNMI and the Netherlands Road Directorate 

(RWS). Data from road loops provided information on the number, category and speed of 

vehicles before and after the measure. In addition, TNO provided emission factors 

specifically derived for the A13 before and after the implementation of Section Control. 

The main findings and conclusions are as follows: 

Section Control has been effective in reducing fluctuations in traffic flow and speeding 

(especially during the night). Traffic moving at a constant, moderate speed emits less air 

pollutants compared to traffic with high speed fluctuations. Measurements carried out after 

Section Control started operating on the A13 showed that traffic flowed more efficiently 

through Overschie, although the number of vehicles has increased drastically in the past 

years. Compared to a motorway with the same amount of traffic, this measure is estimated 

to reduce NOx emissions by 15-25% and PM10 by 25-35%, respectively (see Table 22). 

Measurements of NO2 concentrations in Overschie with passive samplers indicate that at 

a distance of 250m from the A13, impacts of traffic emissions were no longer detectable. 

Model calculations were used to assess the effect of Section Control on air quality. NO2 - 

concentrations in a distance of 200m east of the motorway decreased by 25% and 34% for 

PM10, respectively. It has to be emphasized that these results are specific for Overschie. 

At other locations different ratios of passenger cars and HGV, or different traffic dynamics 

and congestion conditions, would influence the impacts of continuous speed control in a 

way that might be quite different from the situation in Overschie. Thus, it is recommended 

Page 50


to perform specific research for each location before implementing a Section Control 

system. 

Table 22: Changes in the emission of air pollutants on the A13 motorway due to Section Control 

Air pollutants 

Changes in 

emissions 

Traffic emissions NOx -15 – 25% 

Traffic emissions PM10 -25 – 35% 

Concentration of air pollutants 

at a distance of 200m 

Concentration of air pollutants 

at a distance of 200m 

Source: TNO, 2003, page 6 

NO2 

-25% 

PM10 -34% 

Regarding environmental aspects, continuous speed control is an important instrument to 

reduce traffic emissions as long as more source-orientated measures (e.g. less polluting 

vehicles, “clean” fuels, less road traffic) are not available. 

2.6 Reduction of traffic noise 

In addition to environmental and safety aspects, Section Control also reduced traffic noise 

by forcing drivers to follow the reduced speed limit of 80 km/h. Research on traffic noise 

before and after the measure was implemented and showed a significant reduction in the 

noise level by 5.6 dB(A). However, this result cannot be solely attributed to the reduction in 

maximum speed, but also to the changing of the top layer of the A13. Local authorities 

recommended new test trails along a 25m pathway on both carriageways to eliminate this 

influence. 


The Cost-Benefit Ratio (CBR) could not be calculated due to missing data (costs of the 

measure). Concerning the benefits of Section Control, most of the information (accident 

data, reduction of greenhouse gases, etc.) was available in aggregated form only. In order 

to compute monetary values for those benefits, original data would have to be used. 

4 Conclusions 

The Section Control on the A13 was highly successful in achieving the preset objectives. 

Speed violations have been reduced, average speed decreased and extreme speed 

violations have become an exception. Based on model calculations, the reduction of 

average speed also had a positive impact on traffic emissions and traffic noise. 75% of the 

motorists approve of Section Control because they experience less traffic congestion 

during peak hours. 

Page 51

References 


[1] MALENSTEIN; J.: Madrid ITS Japan Session Segment Control, Presentation 

documents of the Section Control System on the A13. Madrid, 2003 

[2] MALENSTEIN; J.: VERA2 – The issue of cross border enforcement in the 

Netherlands, Presentation for the European Commission on speed enforcement. 

2003 

[3] The Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO): “Onderzoek 

naar effecten van de 80 km/u- maatregel voor de A13 op de luchtkwalitweit in 

Overschie”, TNO Report 258. Apeldoorn, 2003 

Page 52

CASE C1: Daytime Running Lights in The Czech Republic 

ROSEBUD 

WP4 - CASE C REPORT 

DAYTIME RUNNING LIGHTS 

IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC 

BY PETR POKORNÝ 

TRANSPORT RESEARCH CENTRE, CDV, THE CZECH 

REPUBLIC


DAYTIME RUNNING LIGHTS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC 

1 PROBLEM TO SOLVE .........................................................................................56 

2 DESCRIPTION......................................................................................................57 

3 TARGET GROUP .................................................................................................57 




7 DECISION MAKING PROCESS AND BARRIERS ..............................................61 

8 CONCLUSION/DISCUSSION...............................................................................62 

Page 54

CASE OVERVIEW 

Measure 


Implementation of Daytime Running Lights (DRL) during the entire year 

Problem 

The high number of casualties in daytime multi-party accidents (target accident group) 

Target Group 

Drivers and owners of motor vehicles 

Targets 

Implementation of DRL, which will lead to the significant reduction of casualties in daytime 

multi-party accidents 

Initiator 

The first initiator will be the Transport Research Centre, which will provide the results of 

this CBA to the Ministry of Transport 

Decision Makers 

In case of potential implementation of the measure, the Ministry of Transport will elaborate 

and incorporate a relevant amendment into the Road Act; the Parliament will then have to 

authorise it. 

Costs 

All costs are calculated for a 12-year period, which is the lifetime of DRL automatic 

switches. All monetary values are converted to 2002 prices. The following costs were 

calculated: 

• the cost of automatic light switches 

• maintenance and repair costs of these switches 

• additional replacement costs of bulbs due to wear 

The total costs are € 70,410,000 for 12 years 

Benefits 

Positive benefit 

• reduction in casualties (48 fatalities are estimated to be prevented due to DRL 

annually) 

Negative benefits 

• extra fuel costs due to DRL 

• environmental effects 

The total benefits are calculated to be € 303,570,000 for 12 years 


1/4.3 

Page 55

1 Problem 


The Czech Republic has a high number of casualties caused by the road accidents 

(compared to most other EU countries). The implementation of DRL would contribute to 

the decrease of this number. The implementation of DRL will improve the visibility of motor 

vehicles in daytime, which will lead to a decrease in multi-party daytime accidents. It will 

also contribute to lower collision speeds in accidents involving DRL-equipped motor 

vehicles. The vehicles will be more visible; drivers will be able to react faster in the case of 

a potentially dangerous situation and can start to slow down earlier. This will also have a 

significant effect on the number of casualties. 

Figure 7: Comparison of total numbers of road accident fatalities in selected European 

countries from 1980 – 2003 

. 

Source: CDV 

Table 23: Numbers of casualties (until 30 days after accident), 2002 

Fatalities 1,431 

Severely injured* 5,492 

Slightly injured 29,013 

Source: Summary of accidents data, the Traffic Police Directorate of CZ, 2003 

*The definition of severely injured is a person who spends a minimum of 7 days in hospital 

due to a road accident. 

Page 56

2 Description 

2.1 Definition of DRL 


This measure is a legal obligation for all motor vehicles to drive with low beam headlights 

on or with special DRL lamps during the whole year [ETSC, 2003]. 

For this calculation the use of special DRL lamps is not considered. For the calculation it is 

assumed that an automatic light switch is installed in all new vehicles from January 2002 

onwards. This means that in all older vehicles, low beam headlights have to be switched 

on manually or the automatic light switch will be installed additionally. Mopeds and 

motorcycles are not considered in this calculation because DRL has already been 

obligatory for them. Another aspect to consider is the current use of DRL, which will have 

an effect on the calculation. 

The following calculation assumes the effect of DRL on target accident fatalities to be 

20%. The DRL effect on the number of casualties is higher than on the number of multiparty 

daytime accidents, which can be explained because of lower collision speeds [ETSC, 

2003]. 

The number of fatalities in the target accident group (multi-party daytime accidents) was 

estimated to be 30% of all fatalities. Because it was not possible to find the relevant 

number in Czech national statistics, the estimation was made based on Austrian statistics. 

2.2 Legal situation 

DRL has been obligatory for mopeds and motorcycles throughout the whole year since 

1.1.2001. For other motor vehicles, DRL is obligatory in winter (from the last Sunday in 

October to the last Sunday in March – for this study the winter time lasts 5 months). This 

obligation is stated in the National Road Act [§ 32, law 361/2000]. 

3 Target Group 

The target group is drivers and owners of motor vehicles. 


CBA was applied in the calculation because it enables on to evaluate the monetary 

valuation of the measure’s benefits and costs. CBA provided in 2003 by ETSC [“Cost 

Effective Transport Safety Measures”] was used as the basis, and was also an important 

source of information and assumptions. In order to make the costs and benefits 

comparable, the duration of effect was formulated. The duration of the measure is 

determined for 12 years – this is the entire lifetime of DRL automatic switches in cars. 

The effects of DRL are calculated for 7 months in a year. The fact, that a lot of road users 

use DRL on a voluntary basis is also considered. The estimation that 10% of drivers have 

already been using DRL was made. It is also assumed, that 90% of drivers will use DRL 

when it becomes obligatory. 

Page 57


For the sake of comparability of the evaluation results, the monetary values are converted 

to € at 2002 prices. To calculate the present value of benefits and costs, the accumulated 

discount factor of 5% is assumed. 

The safety effect of DRL is calculated for fatalities prevented; target accidents are multiparty 

daytime accidents. 

The impacts of DRL are as follows: 

• Safety effects – using DRL will lead to a 20% reduction in the number of fatalities of 

target accidents. The proportion of injuries and property damage is included in the cost 

of one fatality prevented. It is estimated that 30% of total fatalities occur in DRLrelevant 

accidents. 

• Environmental effects – using DRL will lead to extra fuel consumption. The additional 

contribution to air pollution due to DRL use for all vehicles is about 1% of the total cost 

of pollution arising as a result of fuel emissions in road transport [ETSC, 2003]. 

• Additional fuel costs due to DRL (price of fuel excluding tax and VAT) – for passenger 

cars this consumption is estimated to be 0.1 l/hour in traffic, while for trucks it is 0.12 

l/hour in traffic. 

Costs considered: 

• The price of automatic light switches in new cars is estimated at € 5. The price of 

retrofitting amounts to € 40 including installation costs per vehicle. It is estimated that 

10% of old vehicles will install the automatic light switch [own estimation]. 

• Maintenance and repair costs of automatic light switches during its lifetime are 

estimated at € 10 [own estimation]. 

• Additional replacement costs of bulbs related to ‘wear and tear’ of the bulbs during 

daytime – additional bulb costs are € 2 per car per year [own estimation]. 

It is assumed that the costs do not affect mobility. 

5 Assessment Quantification 

5.1 Safety effect 

Safety effects are calculated only for reduction of the number of fatalities. The reduction of 

injuries and property damage is included in the calculation of the cost of one fatality 

prevented. 

The cost of one fatality prevented was determined to be € 1,076,000. This amount was 

calculated based on “Socio-economy losses caused by accidents in CZ in 2002” 

[KOŇÁREK, 2002]. The cost of one fatality prevented includes medical costs, costs of lost 

productive capacity (lost output) and administrative costs. The proportional share of the 

costs of minor and serious injuries and property damage is also considered in the cost of 

one fatality. 

Page 58


It is estimated that 30% of the total fatalities occur in DRL-relevant accidents and that DRL 

will lead to a 20% reduction in the number of fatalities. The reduction of fatalities is 

calculated as follows: 

The number of fatalities * the average 90% use of DRL * the 30% of the DRL-relevant 

accidents * the 20% effect of DRL for fatalities [ETSC, 2003]. 

Table 24: Numbers of fatalities (until 30 days after accident), 2002 

Number of fatalities 

1.4.2002 – 30.10.2002 

899 

DRL-related fatalities 270 

Fatalities prevented by DRL 48 

Source: Summary of accidents, the Traffic Police Directorate, 2003 

In 12 years, the total cost of fatalities prevented (including proportional costs of injuries 

and property damage) is € 460,230,000. 

5.2 Cost of extra fuel 

Due to the large differences in fuel consumption it is not suitable to calculate average fuel 

consumption. As the extra DRL fuel consumption is independent of the standard fuel 

consumption of vehicles, the time that a vehicle participates in traffic was calculated. The 

extra fuel consumption by DRL is 0.1 l/h (0.1 litre of fuel during 1 hour of drive) for 

passenger cars and 0.12 l/h for trucks. The average distance driven in one hour is 

estimated at 50 km on all types of roads. The share of km driven during the daytime is 

55% of the total sum of vehicle km [ETSC, 2003]. 

Required data: 

• Number of vehicles and million vehicle-km 

The number of passenger cars was 3,650,000 in 2002 and number of trucks was 460,000 

in 2002 [Czech Ministry of Interior]. Number of vehicle-km is not known, so the estimation 

had to be done – on average, a passenger car drives 10,000 km a year and a truck 30,000 

km a year [ETSC, 2003]. 

Table 25: Numbers of cars and mill. Vehicle-km in 7 months, 2002 

Passenger cars 3,650,000 

Trucks 460,000 

Daytime mill. vehicle-km - cars 11,700 

Daytime mill. vehicle-km - trucks 4,430 

Source: The Czech Statistical Office, own estimation 

Average 2002 price of fuel excluding tax and VAT. 

Table 26: Price of fuel excluding tax and VAT, the year 2002 

Diesel € 0.315 

Petrol € 0.308 

Source: CDV 

Page 59


5.2.1 The calculation of extra fuel consumption due to DRL 

The correction due to the voluntary use of DRL is 20%. A correction is needed because 

10% of car users already use DRL on a voluntary basis and 90% will use DRL after the 

law is set. The correction value is 0.8. 

Passenger cars - 11,706 mill. Vehicle-km / 50 km * 0.8 * 0.1 l = 18,730,000 litres 

Trucks – 4,430 mill. Vehicle-km / 50 km * 0.8 * 0.12 l = 8,500,000 litres 

The fuel costs for cars and trucks are € 8,300,000 in 2002. 

In 12 years, the total cost is € 73,960,000. 

5.2.2 Environmental costs 

The cost of pollution arising as a result of DRL extra fuel emission is about 1% of total 

pollution costs caused by fuel emissions in road transport [ETSC, 2003]. In the Czech 

Republic, the average estimation price of external costs from road emissions for 2002 is 

calculated to be € 1,600,000,000 [CDV]. A cost of € 82,700,000 is calculated for the 12year 

period due to DRL use. 

5.3 Calculation of other costs 

5.3.1 Automatic light switch 

The price of an automatic light switch in new cars is estimated at € 5. The number of new 

cars sold in 2002 was 170,000. The price of retrofitting amounts to € 40, including 

installation costs per old vehicle. It is estimated that 10% of old vehicles will install the 

automatic light switch [ETSC, 2003, own estimation]. The total costs for 12 years are € 

23,700,000. 

5.3.2 Maintenance and repair costs of automatic light switches during its 

lifetime 

The costs are estimated at € 10 for one car equipped with a light switch [ETSC, 2003, own 

estimation]. 

The total cost for 12 years is € 17,100,000. 

5.3.3 Additional costs as a result of the wear of the bulbs during daytime use 

The replacement rate for bulbs increases by a factor of 1.4 for the Czech Republic. The 

additional bulb costs are € 2 [ETSC, 2003, own estimation]. The correction of 0.8 is 

needed. The total cost for 12 years is € 29,610,000. 

Page 60



Table 27: Costs and benefits – 12-year period 

Fatalities 

prevented 

460,230,000 € 

Extra fuel -73,960,000 € 

Emission costs -82,700,000 € 

Total benefits 303,570,000 € 

Light switches 23,700,000 € 

Maintenance 17,100,000 € 

Bulbs 29,610,000 € 

Total costs 70,410,000 € 

Cost / benefit 1/4.3 

7 Decision-Making Process and Barriers 

In case of potential implementation of DRL, the measure has to be part of the Road Act 

and must be ratified by the national parliament. This situation is the main barrier – some 

decisions of parliament members are not based on rational reasons (e.g. CBA), but on 

political or personal opinions. Especially in the case of DRL (and other road-related laws), 

some members of parliament assume themselves to be road experts just because they 

drive many kilometres per year. 

The role of CDV in this process is vital – CDV should introduce the results of this CBA 

(and other related CBAs) to the members of the Subcommittee on Road Safety and to 

disseminate the results between the experts. 

Based on a survey amongst decision makers (members of the parliament of the Czech 

Republic: Ms Soňa Paukrtova - Chairman of the Subcommittee on Road Safety of the 

Senate of the Czech Parliament, Mr Miroslav Fejfar - also member of this Subcommittee, 

Ms Ivana Večeřová - Secretary of the Economical Committee of the Senate), the following 

general conclusions could be drafted: 

• CBA could be one of the most important tools to force implementation of road safety 

legislative measures in relatively short amount of time. 

• CBA could play a key role in the decision-making process, especially at present when 

there is a lack of public finance sources in the Czech Republic. 

• To increase the usage and to widespread CBA amongst decision-makers, wider 

dissemination of information on CBA is vital. Research institutes should play a more 

active role in this process. 

Nevertheless, processes in the parliament are mostly political ones so one could also 

expect negative reactions, or not taking CBA into account due to the political reasons. 

Page 61

8 Conclusion/Discussion 


The calculation has shown that the use of DRL would significantly contribute to improving 

the road safety situation in both countries and that making DRL obligatory would bring 

significant benefits to the whole society. The difference in the CBA-results in Austria and in 

the Czech Republic is caused by the lack of some data for the Czech Republic, which 

therefore had to be estimated. 

The main barrier in Austria preventing the obligatory use of Daytime Running Lights 

consisted of objections by stakeholders (e.g. drivers’ unions) in technical and social 

aspects of this measure. Additional fuel consumption and the fear of elderly drivers getting 

stranded because of dead batteries have been major arguments in past discussions. 

Recent developments in vehicle technology (automatic switches for DRL) could dispel 

most of those objections. 

In the Czech Republic, the wider discussion regarding making DRL obligatory during whole 

year has not started yet. There is a common understanding that the current situation (DRL 

obligatory only in the winter season) is sufficient enough. The introduction of results of 

several international studies (including this one) to the relevant decision-makers seems to 

be the first step in the process of constant DRL implementation. Barriers in the 

implementation process are expected. These barriers could occur from political reasons 

and also from the technical point of view (like in Austria). Therefore, providing independent 

and current information regarding benefits of DRL is vital for a potential beginning of the 

implementation process. 

REFERENCES 

ETSC (2003): Cost Effective Transport Safety Measures 

The Czech Statistical Office: www.czso.cz 

The Czech Ministry of Interior: http://www.mvcr.cz/statistiky/crv.html 

KOŇÁREK (2002): Socio-economy losses caused by accidents in CZ 

The Traffic Police Directorate of CZ (2003): Summary of accidents data 

Page 62

CASE C2: daytime running lights in AUSTRIA 

ROSEBUD 

WP4 - CASE C REPORT 

DAYTIME RUNNING LIGHTS IN AUSTRIA 



REPUBLIC




2 DESCRIPTION......................................................................................................67 

3 TARGET GROUP .................................................................................................67 




7 DECISION MAKING PROCESS AND BARRIERS ..............................................71 

Page 64

CASE OVERVIEW 

Measure 


Implementation of Daytime Running Lights (DRL) during a whole year period 

Problem 

High number of casualties in daytime, multi-party accidents (target accident group) 

Target Group 

Drivers and owners of motor vehicles 

Target 

Implementation of DRL, leading to a significant reduction of casualties in daytime multiparty 

accidents 

Initiator 

Ministry of Transport, Austrian Road Safety Board (KfV) 


Ministry of Transport 

Costs 

All costs are calculated for a 12-year period, which is the usual lifetime of a DRL automatic 

switch. All monetary values have been converted to 2002 prices. The following costs were 

calculated: 

• the cost of automatic light switches 

• maintenance and repair costs of switches 

• additional replacement costs of burned out bulbs 

The total costs are € 195,300,000 for 12 years. 

Benefits 

“Positive” benefits 

• reduction of casualties (53 less fatalities per year are estimated due to DRL in Austria) 

“Negative” benefits 

• extra fuel costs due to DRL 

• environmental effects 

The total benefits are calculated to be € 695,000,000 for 12 years. 


1/3.6 

Page 65

1 Problem 


In Austria, the number of accidents (especially fatalities) looks more favourable than 

relevant data in the Czech Republic. However, any further decrease in these numbers is 

desirable. DRL is a measure that could contribute to a significant reduction of human 

fatalities in traffic accidents. Figure 8 shows different trends in Austria and the Czech 

republic from 1989 – 2002. 

Figure 8: Trends of development in the Czech Republic and Austria from 1989 – 2002 

140% 

120% 

100% 

80% 

60% 

40% 

20% 

0% 

-20% 

-40% 

-60% 

Road accident fatalities 

32% 

Source: CDV and KfV 

- 39% 

126% 

37% 

Passenger cars 

Czech Republic 

Population 

-1,5% 

The following Table 28 shows the number of casualties in the year 2002. 

Table 28: Numbers of casualties (fatalities until 30 days after accident) in 2002 

Source: KfV 

Definition of severely injured 

Fatalities 956 

Severely injured 14,628 

Slightly injured 42,056 

Whether an injury is severe or slight is determined by §84 of the Austrian criminal code 

[StGB]. A severe injury is one that causes a health problem or occupational disability 

longer than 24 days, or one that "causes personal difficulty". An injury or health problem 

that "causes personal difficulty" is one that affects an "important organ", if it results in a 

"health disadvantage", if the "healing process is uncertain", or if it leads to the fear of 

"additional effects”. 

5% 

Page 66

2 Description 

2.1 Definition of DRL 


This measure is a legal obligation for all motor vehicles to drive with low beam headlights 

or special DRL lamps during the whole year [ETSC, 2003]. In the following calculations, 

the use of special DRL lamps has not been considered. It is assumed that an automatic 

light switch is installed in all new vehicles from January 2002 onwards. This means that in 

all older vehicles, low beam headlights have to be switched on manually or the automatic 

light switch will be installed on them additionally. Mopeds and motorcycles are not 

considered in this calculation, because DRL is already obligatory for those vehicles. 

Another aspect needing consideration is the current use of DRL, which has an effect on 

the calculation. The following calculations assume the effect of DRL on the target accident 

fatalities to be 20%. The DRL effect on the number of casualties is higher than on the 

number of multiparty daytime accidents, which can be explained due to lower collision 

speeds [ETSC, 2003]. 

2.2 Legal situation 

Except for mopeds and motorcycles, DRL is not obligatory in Austria. Austrian law [§ 99 

KFG] states certain conditions for using driving lights: running lights have to be switched 

on at dusk, nightfall and during the night, in fog, or when the overall weather conditions 

deem it necessary. 


Drivers and owners of motor vehicles. 


CBA was applied in the calculation because it enables the monetary valuation of the 

measure’s benefits and costs. CBA provided in 2003 by ETSC [Cost Effective Transport 

Safety Measures] was considered as the main source for information and assumptions. 

In order to make costs and benefits comparable, a duration of the effect was needed. The 

duration of the measure is determined for 12 years – which is the lifetime of DRLautomatic 

switches in passenger cars. 

The fact that a lot of road users switch on DRL voluntarily has also been considered. In 

Austria, nationwide surveys from 1999 and 2003 showed that about one third (1999: 29%, 

2003: 37%) of all drivers have already been using DRL. Thus, a share of 35% is used in 

this calculation. It is also assumed, that 90% of drivers would use DRL when it is 

obligatory. 

For the sake of comparability of the evaluation results, the monetary values are converted 

to € at 2002 prices. To calculate the present value of benefits and cost, an accumulated 

discount factor of 5% is estimated. 

Page 67


The safety effect of DRL is calculated for the number of fatalities saved, target accidents 

are multiparty daytime accidents. The number of target accident group fatalities was 296 

(31% of all fatalities) in the year 2002 [KfV]. 

The impacts of DRL are as follows: 

• Safety effects – using DRL will lead to a reduction of 20% in the number of target 

accident fatalities. The proportion of injuries and property damage is included in the 

cost of one fatality saved. 

• Environmental effects – using DRL will lead to extra fuel consumption. For passenger 

cars this consumption is estimated to be 0.1 l/hour in traffic, while for trucks it is 0.12 

l/hour in traffic. The additional contribution to environmental pollution due to DRL use 

for all vehicles is about 1% of the total cost of pollution arising as a result of fuel 

emissions in road transport [ETSC, 2003]. 

• Additional fuel costs due to the DRL (price of fuel excluding tax and VAT). 

Considered costs: 

• The price of an automatic light switch in a new car is estimated at € 5. The price of 

retrofitting amounts to € 50, including installation costs per vehicle. It is estimated that 

15% of old vehicles will install the automatic light switch [ETSC, 2003]. 

• Maintenance and repair costs of automatic light switches during its lifetime are 

estimated to be € 15 for Austria [ETSC, 2003]. 

• Additional replacement costs of bulbs related to the “wear and tear” of bulbs during 

daytime – the additional bulb costs are € 6 per car and year [ETSC, 2003]. 

It is assumed that the costs do not affect mobility. 



The safety effects are calculated only in reduction of number of fatalities. The reduction of 

injuries and property damage is included in the calculation of the cost of one fatality saved. 

The cost of one fatality saved was determined to be € 2,200,000. The cost of one fatality 

saved includes medical costs, costs of lost productive capacity (lost output) and 

administrative costs. The proportional share of the costs of minor and serious injuries and 

property damage is also considered in the cost of fatality. DRL will lead to a 20% reduction 

in the number of fatalities in the target accident group. The reduction of fatalities is 

calculated as follows: The number of target accident group’s fatalities * the average 90% 

use of DRL * the 20% effect of DRL on fatalities [ETSC, 2003]. 

Page 68


Table 29: Numbers of fatalities (until 30 days after accident), the year 2002 

Number of fatalities 956 

DRL related fatalities 296 

Fatalities saved by DRL 53 

Source: KfV 

In 12 years, the total cost of fatalities saved (including proportional cost of injuries and 

property damage) is € 1,040,000,000. 

5.2 Cost of extra fuel 

Due to the large difference in fuel consumption it is not suitable to use an average fuel 

consumption in the following calculations. As the extra DRL fuel consumption is 

independent on the standard fuel consumption of vehicles, the time that a vehicle 

participates in traffic was calculated. The extra fuel consumption by DRL is 0.1 l/h (0.1 litre 

of fuel during one hour of driving) for passenger cars and 0.12 l/h for trucks. The average 

distance covered in a one-hour drive is estimated at 50 km on all types of roads. The 

share of km driving during the daytime is 55% from the total sum of vehicle-km [ETSC, 

2003]. 

Required data: 

• Number of vehicles and million vehicle-km 

The number of passenger cars was 4,000,000 in 2002 and number of trucks was 330,000 

in 2002. The total number of vehicle-km is known – 75 060 mill. vehicle km for passenger 

cars and 12.528 mill. vehicle km for trucks. 

Table 30: Numbers of cars and mill. vehicle km, the year 2002 

Passenger cars 4,000,000 

Trucks 330,000 

Daytime Mio. vehicle km - cars 41,283 

Daytime Mio. vehicle km - trucks 6,890 

Source: KfV 

• Average 2002 price of fuel excluding tax and VAT. 

Table 31: Price of fuel excluding tax and VAT, the year 2002 

Diesel € 0.316 

Petrol € 0.293 

Source: KfV 

The calculation of extra fuel consumption due to DRL 

A correction factor of 45% has been made for Austria. The correction is needed because 

35% of car users already use DRL on a voluntary basis and it is assumed that 90% of car 

users will use DRL after the obligation. The value for the correction is then 0.55. 

Passenger cars – 41.283 mill. vehicle km / 50 km * 0.55 * 0.1 l = 45,000,000 litres 

Trucks – 6.890 mill. vehicle km / 50 km * 0.55 * 0.12 l = 9,100,000 litres 

Page 69


The fuel costs for cars and trucks are € 16,100,000 in 2002. 

In 12 years, the total cost is € 145,000,000. 

5.3 Environmental effects 

The cost of pollution arising as a result of DRL extra fuel emission is about 1% of the total 

costs of pollution caused by fuel emission in road transport [ETSC, 2003]. The estimated 

costs of road emissions in 2002 are € 2,232,385,000 [KfV]. Due to DRL use, the cost of € 

200,000,000 is calculated for a 12-year period. 

5.4 Calculation of other costs 

5.4.1 Automatic light switch 

The price of an automatic light switch in new cars is estimated at € 5. The number of new 

cars was 280,000 in 2002. The price of retrofitting amounts to € 50, including installation 

costs per old vehicle [ETSC, 2003]. 


5.4.2 Maintenance and repair costs of automatic light switches during its 

lifetime 

The costs are estimated to be € 15 per light switch [ETSC, 2003]. 


5.4.3 Additional costs as a result of the wear of the bulbs during daytime use 

• The replacement rate for bulbs increases by a factor of 2 due to DRL. The additional 

bulb costs are € 6 per car per year [ETSC, 2003]. The correction of 0.55 is needed. 


Page 70




Fatalities saved 1,040,000,000 € 

Extra fuel -145,000,000 € 

Emission costs -200,000,000 € 

Total benefits 695,000,000 € 

Light switch 44,000,000 € 

Maintenance 47,000,000 € 

Bulbs 104,300,000 € 

Total costs 195,300,000 € 


7 Decision-making process and barriers 

In the mid 1990’s, the Austrian Road Safety Board [KfV] started its first awareness 

campaign for Daytime Running Lights (DRL) with information boards along streets with 

unusually high numbers of casualty accidents caused by passing. At that time, 

international studies in countries already using DRL indicated that about 30 fatalities could 

be saved in Austria every year due to such a safety measure. In 1996, the Federal Ministry 

of Transport launched a bill for a 2-year field test of DRL. During the following legislation 

process, several stakeholders voiced severe objections concerning additional fuel costs 

and stranded vehicles due to empty batteries. 

It was not till 2001 when the Austrian Road Safety Programme 2002-2010 was passed that 

DRL once again became a public agenda. In a comprehensive EU study based on the 

growing number of international studies, it was proven that DRL has a positive effect on 

reducing accidents. The introduction of daytime running lights in rural areas during winter 

was seen as a suitable way to overcome still existing concerns and objections. Besides 

the established safety effect of DRL, another aspect proved to be even more convincing. 

Most European countries have already established DRL, thus arguments finding a 

harmonized solution for the whole of Europe became more and more convincing. During a 

press conference in October 2004, the Austrian Minister of Transport, Hubert Gorbach, 

announced a new bill for DRL in the early months of 2005. Up to now, the main barrier in 

Austria preventing the obligatory use of daytime running lights consisted of objections from 

stakeholders (e.g. drivers’ unions) in technical and social aspects of the measure. 

Additional fuel consumption and the fear of elderly drivers getting stranded because of 

dead batteries have been major arguments in past discussions. Recent developments in 

vehicle technology (automatic switches for DRL) could dispel most of those objections. 

REFERENCES 

ETSC (2003): Cost Effective Transport Safety Measures 

Page 71

CASE E1: four-arm roundabouts in urban areas In the czech republic 

ROSEBUD 

WP4 – CASE E REPORT 

FOUR-ARM ROUNDABOUTS IN URBAN AREAS IN 

THE CZECH REPUBLIC 



REPUBLIC


FOUR-ARM ROUNDABOUTS IN URBAN AREAS 


2 DESCRIPTION......................................................................................................76 

3 TARGET GROUP .................................................................................................77 





8 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................81 

Page 73

CASE OVERVIEW 

Measure 


Implementation of four-arm roundabouts instead of four-arm intersections (without traffic 

lights) in urban areas (in cities with less than 100,000 inhabitants) 

Problem 

High number of accidents, high speeds 

Target Group 

All accidents at the treated sites 

Targets 

To reduce the number of accidents; traffic calming 

Initiator 

The initiator is mostly relevant local authorities, the owner of the infrastructure 


Members of city council, local authorities 

Costs 

Roundabout design costs and costs of implementation 

Benefits 

The only expected benefit is the reduction of accidents. Other impacts (on mobility and 

environment) were not calculated because of the lack of the available data. 


1/1.5 

Page 74

1 Problem 


In the Czech Republic, more than 70% of accidents take place in urban areas and about 

10% of them occur on four-arm intersections [Summary of Czech Accident Data, 2003]. 

One of the measures aimed at reducing the number of these accidents is to rebuild 

“dangerous” intersections into roundabouts. There are several reasons for implementation 

of roundabouts: their effects on improving road safety, on capacity, and on traffic calming. 

In some cases the roundabout can also be a significant architectural element of city 

design. The positive effects of properly designed and built roundabouts are well known 

from studies in many countries. 

In Czech traffic engineering, roundabouts are still quite a new element. In some cases 

there are still doubts on the use of roundabouts. Nevertheless, the number of roundabouts 

in the Czech infrastructure network is increasing (the quality of the design is problematic in 

some cases), but there are still a lot of barriers during the decision-making phase. 

There is not enough available data and studies evaluating the roundabouts in Czech 

infrastructure. One available source of information is the BESIDIDO project. It is a 

research project funded by the Ministry of Transport and elaborated by CDV and the 

Czech Technical University in Prague; its aim is to evaluate the affectivity of various 

infrastructure measures. 

number of accidents 

17600 

17400 

17200 

17000 

16800 

16600 

16400 

16200 

Figure 9: Number of road accidents on four-arm intersections in urban areas, 1999–2003 

Number of accidents on four-arms intersection in urban areas 

(1999 - 2003) 

16947 

17409 

Source: CDV; Summary of Czech Accident Data 2003 

16726 16726 16695 

Page 75


Figure 10: Numbers of road accidents casualties on four-arm intersections in urban areas, 1999–2003 

number of casualities 

3500 

3000 

2500 

2000 

1500 

1000 

500 

0 

2813 

Number of casualties (1999 - 2003) 

2698 

2840 

2898 

2938 

360 347 360 378 338 

49 50 43 47 51 

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 

Source: CDV; Summary of Czech Accident Data 2003 

2 Description 

2.1 General 

fatalities 

seriously injured 

slightly injured 

Description of the sample 

There are eight roundabouts in the evaluated sample. All of them are four-arm 

roundabouts that were constructed instead of four-arm intersections between the years 

1998–2002 in the urban areas of cities with population less than 100,000 inhabitants. 

Picture 1: Examples of roundabouts in the sample: Lázně Bohdaneč (left), Ždírec (right) 

Source: CDV (project Besidido, 2004) 

The brief description of the sample is in Table 33. 

Page 76


Table 33: Description of the sample 

Site Number/City Population “ Before” 

accident data 

Year of 

implementation 

“After” 

accident data 

Price (€) 

1.Česká Lípa 40,000 1995-1997 1998 1999-2000 unknown 

2.Chlumec nad Cidlinou 5,000 2000 2002 2003 unknown 

3.Chrudim 25,000 2000-2001 2002 2003 unknown 

4.Lázně Bohdaneč 3,500 2000-2002 2003 2004 350,000 

5.Litomyšl 10,000 1999 - 2000 2001 2002 unknown 

6.Most 70,000 1999 2000 2001-2003 200,000 

7.Tábor 37,000 1996-1997 1998 1999-2000 unknown 

8.Ždírec 3,000 2000-2001 2002 2003-2004 unknown 

Source: CDV (Project Besidido, 2004) 

All roundabouts in the sample are “typical“ four–arm roundabouts designed in accordance 

with Czech technical standards. The reason for their implementation was mostly the 

demand for more capacity and for improving the safety situation. 


The implementation of a roundabout has mostly a positive effect on the safety level of the 

treated site. This is based on the fact that the roundabout geometry reduces the number of 

collision points, decreases the speed of vehicles, and improves the safety of pedestrian 

crossing. The only negative phenomenon is a possible lower safety level for cyclists. 

Therefore, the target accident group was defined as “all accidents occurring on the treated 

sites”. 

The sample contains 8 sites, where the original four-arm intersections without traffic lights 

were rebuilt into the four-arm roundabouts. Based on accident data before the 

implementation of roundabouts, an “average” intersection accident is determined. This is 

an accident with 0.004 fatality, 0.04 severely injured, 0.19 slightly injured and with property 

damage valued at 27,000 CZK. The value of one average accident is calculated to be 

€ 7,500 (at 2002 prices) [based on the socio-economic evaluation of road accident; 

Koňárek, 2003]. 


The ideal method of assessment would be to provide the complete CBA (with calculation 

of roundabout effects on environment and mobility). The quality of available data does not 

allow for such a complete analysis, so only the safety effects are calculated in the 

analyses. 

The suitable method for such calculation is a method combining before/after comparison 

with a control group of sites (sites which are similar in most characteristics to the treatment 

sites, but left untreated). In this calculation, the total number of accidents on four-arm 

urban intersections in the whole country is used as a control group, so the general trends 

in accident number development are taking into account. 

The aim of the calculation is to find the number of accidents prevented by the 

implementation of roundabouts instead of four-arm intersections in the evaluated sample 

Page 77


of eight sites. The “before” and “after” accident data of treated sites and of all four-arm 

intersections in the Czech Republic were known. 

An evaluation of the treatment effect θi at each site by means of the odds-ratio with the 

comparison group is calculated. A correction due to changes in traffic volumes is not 

performed, so δ = 1. The formula is: 

a 

Estimated effect( 

θ ) = δ 

Ca 

X m 

Cb 

where h 

X 

Xa – the number of accidents observed at the treatment site in the “after” period, 

Xm – the number of accidents at the treatment site in the “before” period, 

Ca – the number of accidents in comparison group sites in the “after” period, 

Cb – the number of accidents in comparison group sites in the “before” period, 

Weighting the effects found for separate treatment sites is done by means of a standard 

method for weighting odds-ratios, where a statistical weight of separate result is defined by 

the sizes of data sets, which provided the following result: 

Weighted mean effect( 

WME) 

= exp( 

w 

i 

1 

= 

= 

VAR(log( 

θ )) 

where 

i 

1 

X 

i 

a 

1 

+ 

X 

i 

b 

1 

1 

+ 

C 

∑ 

i 

i 

a 

wi 

ln( θ i ) 

) 

w 

∑ 

i 

1 

+ 

C 

θi - estimate of effect for site i, 

wi - statistical weight of estimate for site i, 

X i a – the number of accidents observed at treatment site i, in the “after” period, 

X i b – the number of accidents at treatment site i, in the “before” period, 

C i a – the number of accidents in comparison group (for site i), in the “after” period, 

C i b – the number of accidents in comparison group (for site i), in the “before” period. 

The 95% confidence interval for the weighed effect is estimated as follows: 

⎛ ⎛ 

⎜ ⎜ 

⎜WME 

exp⎜ 

⎜ ⎜ 

⎜ ⎜ 

⎝ ⎝ 

z 

∑ 

i 

α 

2 

w 

i 

⎞ ⎛ 

⎟ ⎜ 

⎟, 

WME exp⎜ 

⎟ ⎜ 

⎟ ⎜ 

⎠ ⎝ 

z 

α 

1− 

2 

∑ 

i 

w 

i 

⎞⎞ 

⎟⎟ 

⎟⎟ 

⎟⎟ 

⎟⎟ 

⎠⎠ 

i 

i 

b 

The applicable value of the safety effect, i.e. the best estimate of accident reduction 

associated with the treatment (in percent), is calculated as (1-WME)*100. 

Page 78



The unit of implementation 

A four-arm roundabout was determined to be the typical unit of implementation. 

The typical cost of the unit of implementation 

The typical cost was estimated to be € 300,000 (at 2002 prices). The estimate was based 

on results found in the BESIDIDO project. The cost of maintenance was not calculated due 

to an assumption that the cost of maintenance is similar for four-arm intersections as it is 

for the four-arm roundabout. 

The duration of the effect 

The duration of the effect was estimated to be 20 years. 

The discount rate 

The discount rate was determined to be 5%. This is based on the recommended value of 

discount rate used in the Rosebud project. All prices are converted to Euro; the price level 

is as of the year 2002. 

Price of a typical four-arm intersection accident 

The price of a typical four-arm intersection accident was calculated to be € 7,500 (at 2002 

prices). The calculation is based on accident statistics of the intersections from the sample 

before the implementation of roundabouts. 


The aim was to find the number of accidents, which will be prevented by the 

implementation of roundabouts instead of four-arm intersections, in an evaluated sample 

of eight sites. 

Table 34: Data for calculations 

site site accidents comparison group estimated statistical weight 

number before after before after effect θi of estimate wi 

1 85 24 57810 34356 0,475 18,699 

2 5 5 17409 16695 1,04 2,5 

3 36 3 34135 16695 0,17 2,768 

4 13 5 50861 16600 1,178 3,61 

5 2 1 34356 16726 1,027 0,666 

6 10 4 16947 50147 0,135 1,428 

7 27 29 38810 34356 1,213 13,971 

8 19 1 34135 33295 0,054 0,949 

Estimated effect (WME) WME confidence 

interval 

Table 35: Safety effect of evaluated roundabouts 

Number of treatment 

sites in the sample 

Number of accidents at 

the treatment sites 

0.624 (0.465, 0.836) 8 197 

The average accident reduction associated with the treatment is calculated as (1-WME) x 

100 = (1- 0,0,624) x 100 = 37.6%. 

Page 79


Site 

number 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

Table 36: Accident reduction 

Average annual 

number of accidents 

28.3 

5 

18 

4.3 

1 

10 

13.5 

9.5 

Reduction of 

accidents 

10.64 

1.88 

6.77 

1.62 

0.37 

3.76 

5.08 

3.57 

The total sum of accidents prevented annually multiplied by the average accident costs 

(the total benefit) is 33.7 x 7,500 = € 253,000. The annual average sum of money saved 

for one treated site is € 31,625. 


The total cost of prevented accidents in a period of 20 years at one treated site is 

calculated to be € 444,000. Because the cost of one unit of implementation is estimated at 

€ 300,000, the cost/benefit ratio is 1/1.5. 



Accidents prevented € 444,000 

Cost of one unit € 300,000 


The cost-benefit calculation of the roundabout implementation in urban areas is not a 

common tool in decision-making processes in the Czech Republic (it has probably never 

been used). The decisions regarding implementation of roundabouts are usually made by 

the relevant local authority, which is the owner of the urban infrastructure. The criteria for 

decisions and implementations are mostly as follows: 

• Traffic engineering – capacity issues, traffic calming 

• Safety of all road users 

• Town planning 

It is generally agreed among the experts and decision-makers that roundabouts are a 

“safe” type of intersection. The fundamental arguments against their implementation are 

mostly based on the general feeling of decision-makers that the capacity of roundabouts is 

rather limited. The reason for it could be the fact that some of the already-implemented 

roundabouts have been causing traffic congestions, with obvious impacts on mobility and 

environment. Wrong roundabout design mostly causes these problems. 

Page 80


The CBA, which would compare the safety effects of roundabouts with their effects on 

environment and mobility, could thus be a very useful tool to improve the decision-making 

process. 

8 Conclusion 

Due to the limited sources of available data, it was not possible to calculate a complete 

CBA. A “mini-CBA” was thus calculated - only the safety effects of roundabouts were taken 

into account. The effects on environment and mobility were not taken into account. The 

result showed that the four-arm roundabouts in urban areas have a positive effect (-37.6%) 

on the reduction of all accidents. 

REFERENCES 

The Czech Statistical Office: www.czso.cz 

The Czech Ministry of Interior: http://www.mvcr.cz/statistiky/crv.html 

Koňárek (2002): Socio-economy losses caused by accidents in CZ 

The Traffic Police Directorate of CZ (2003): Summary of accidents data 

WP3 (2004): Improvements in efficiency assessment tools, ROSEBUD 

Page 81

CASE E2: Speed humps on local streets 

Technion - Israel Institute of Technology 

Transportation Research Institute 

ROSEBUD 

WP4 - CASE E REPORT 

SPEED HUMPS ON LOCAL STREETS 

BY VICTORIA GITELMAN AND SHALOM HAKKERT, 

TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE, TECHNION, 

ISRAEL



1 THE PROBLEM TO SOLVE.................................................................................85 

2 DESCRIPTION OF MEASURE.............................................................................85 

2.1 General .................................................................................................................85 

2.2 Current installation ................................................................................................87 

3 TARGET ACCIDENT GROUP..............................................................................88 

4 ASSESSMENT TOOLS ........................................................................................88 

4.1 Method for estimating safety effect .......................................................................88 

4.2 Safety effect of speed humps................................................................................90 

4.3 Accident costs.......................................................................................................91 


5.1 General .................................................................................................................92 

5.2 Values of costs and benefits .................................................................................92 

5.3 Cost-Benefit Ratio .................................................................................................93 


7 DISCUSSION........................................................................................................94 

Page 83

CASE OVERVIEW 

Measure 


Installation of speed humps on a section of urban street 

Problem 

High travel speeds along the road section and accident occurrences 

Target Group 

All injury accidents on the treated road 

Targets 

Reducing travel speeds and the number of injury accidents along the road 

Initiator 

Local authorities – for the measure’s application; Ministry of Transport – for the evaluation 

of safety effect 


Local authorities 

Costs 

Speed humps’ design and installation costs, paid by the local authority 

Benefits 

The benefits are expected from the savings in injury accidents along the treated road. The 

costs of time losses due to lower vehicle speeds are subtracted from the benefits. The 

residents of the area and the national economy will benefit from the measure’s application. 


May range from 1:4 to 1:2, depending on the type of speed humps installed. 

Page 84

1 Problem 


In Israel, similar to many other countries, more than 70% of injury accidents and about half 

of fatal accidents occur in built-up areas (Gitelman, Hakkert, 2003). Previous research 

indicates that, as to the location of road accidents in towns, there is a somewhat equal 

subdivision of those occurring on arterials, and in central city districts and residential 

areas. Following this, the number of injury accidents in the residential areas throughout the 

country amounts to some 5,000 per year, with 9,000 injuries involved. Due to the scattered 

pattern of accidents in residential areas, on the one hand, and the high proportion of 

vulnerable road users on the residential streets, on the other hand, traffic calming is known 

as the best safety solution for such areas. Safety effects of traffic calming measures stem 

mostly from reduced travelling speeds and also from a reduction in traffic volumes on 

residential streets. 

Traffic calming measures are engineering solutions that change the regular road layout. 

These measures can be subdivided into two groups: those creating a horizontal diversion 

from a regular road lane and those creating a vertical diversion from a regular road 

surface. The latter group includes speed humps. 

Speed humps may serve as one of the design elements when a traffic calming area ("30km 

zone") is established. In this case, speed humps are usually combined with other 

measures, e.g. road narrowings, chicanes, pedestrian refuges and roundabouts. 

Regarding the maintenance and improvement of existing roads, speed humps are 

frequently applied by the authorities when the street design does not satisfy safety 

demands, i.e. when actual vehicle speeds are higher than they should be for the given 

road type and surroundings, or when road accidents occurred on the street or in the area 

considered. Sometimes a demand for the installation of speed humps comes from the 

residents, who are worried about the high travel speeds or of near-accidents that were 

observed on the street. 

Speed humps are frequently chosen as a typical solution when there is a need to reduce 

travel speeds on a local street and to provide the street with a calmer and safer character. 

2 Description of measure 

2.1 General 

Speed humps are defined as raised areas over the road surface, which are installed over 

the whole road width or part of it, and present a physical measure for reducing travel 

speeds (Guidelines, 2002). The humps consist of a raised road pavement and can be 

made of asphalt, concrete or paving blocks. 

The main advantages of speed humps are in their self-enforcing nature and in creating a 

visual impression that the street is not designated for high speeds or for passing traffic 

(e.g. ITE, 1997). 

Over the last three decades, safety effects of speed humps were examined and proven in 

many countries. Those are associated with two basic reasons: typically, a reduction in 

travel speeds and, frequently, a reduction in traffic volume, following the humps' 

installation. The safety effect is usually observed provided that the installation parameters 

Page 85


and the density of the humps are proper, i.e. strict enough in order to dictate the desired 

travel speeds on the street. 

The speed humps' installation may have one of two purposes (Guidelines, 2002): 

a) reducing travel speeds along a road section; 

b) reducing travel speeds near a problematic point, e.g. a pedestrian crossing, 

a school, or another public place with a high concentration of pedestrians. 

The first case is considered as the typical one and demonstrating major advantages of the 

measure. 

Speed humps are known in the world since 1973, when the first systematic study aimed at 

developing speed humps was conducted in the UK (Watts, 1973). The first humps had a 

circular profile and, until today, it is the most widespread form of speed hump in many 

countries. Several years later, another form of speed humps - a trapezoidal profile, was 

independently developed in two countries: Australia and the USA. 

While a circular hump resembles a segment of a circle, a trapezoidal hump consists of 

three components: an incline ramp, a flat head and a decline ramp. 

Figure 11 illustrates typical parameters of circular and trapezoidal humps, which are called 

using their historical names: "Watts profile" for a circular hump (after the name of the 

researcher who developed the first humps), and "Seminole profile" for a trapezoidal hump 

(after the name of the county in Florida, USA, where the humps were developed). The 

circular and trapezoidal humps are the basic (regular) types of speed humps that are in 

use today around the world. 

Over the last decades, many variations of basic humps were developed in the UK, the 

Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and other countries (e.g. Gitelman et al, 2001). Among 

other types, speed cushions (narrow trapezoidal humps allowing for easy passing by 

buses and large vehicles), sinusoidal profile humps and combi-humps (a combination of 

speed cushion and regular humps) were introduced and tested in some European 

countries. 

In Israel, the updated edition of guidelines for design and installation of speed humps was 

published by the Ministry of Transport in 2002 (Guidelines, 2002). The types of speed 

humps that are recommended for the use in urban areas in Israel are: 

1. Circular humps, of 3.5-4 m in length, with a height of 8-10 cm for a street with 

a 30 kph speed limit and a height of 6-8 cm for a 50 kph speed limit; 

2. Trapezoidal humps, with a height of 8-10 cm for a 30 kph speed limit and a 

height of 6-8 cm for a 50 kph speed limit. The flat head of the humps should 

be of 2.5-3 m in length and the slope of the ramps not steeper than 1:10- 

1:15. 

1. Speed cushions, for the streets with a 50 kph speed limit. These should be 6- 

8 cm in height, 1.9-3.7 m in length, and 1.6-2.0 m in width. The slope of the 

incline/ decline ramps should be 1:8-1:10. 

Page 86


Figure 11: Basic profiles of speed humps in the historical perspective: circular (Watts) and trapezoidal 

(Seminole). 

2.2 Current installation 

Sources: Ewing (1999); Weber and Braaksma (2000). 

In the current study, we consider the installation of regular speed humps (i.e. circular or 

trapezoidal humps) on a typical urban street with a 50 kph speed limit. The road section for 

the treatment is about 500 m in length. To note, according to the Guidelines (2002), 500 m 

is the maximum recommended length of road section which can be treated by continuous 

speed humps only, whereas a longer road section needs a combination of speed humps 

with other traffic calming measures. 

For the street with the 50 kph speed limit the parameters of speed humps can be as 

follows: 

Circular hump – 8 cm in height, 3.7 m in length; 

Trapezoidal hump – 8 cm in height, the flat head of 2.5 m in length, slopes of 1:10, total 

length of 4.1 m. 

The purpose of the installation of speed humps on the road section is to provide that the 

level of actual speeds (85%) be below the speed limits (50 kph). Based on the known 

relationships between the density of speed humps and the actual travel speeds along the 

road (Guidelines, 2002), the recommended distances between the humps considered 

should be 100-130 m for circular humps and 90-110 m for trapezoidal humps. Therefore, 

over the road section considered, five speed humps should be installed. 

Page 87

3 Target Accident Group 


Considering the speed humps' installation, the safety effect usually refers to all injury 

accidents (e.g. Webster and Layfield, 1996). This is based on the assumption that 

reducing actual speeds creates a moderating effect on all accident types, i.e. singlevehicle 

accidents, multiple-vehicle collisions and pedestrian accidents. Therefore, 

estimating a safety effect of speed humps' installations on urban roads in Israel, the target 

accident group was defined as all injury accidents on the treated roads. 

A slightly different consideration is accepted when a single site is considered for a speed 

hump installation. For example, according to Guidelines (2002), a warrant for the 

installation of speed humps suggests to account for a weighted number of accidents, 

where a severe accident of any type has the weight of 5; a pedestrian accident – the 

weight of 1; other accidents – weights of 0.5. Such an approach was chosen in order to 

strengthen the consideration of the speed factor in accident occurrences. Examining the 

warrant, the accident numbers for the last 3-5 years are weighted and an average annual 

number is considered. 

On the urban street considered in this study, three injury accidents occurred over the three 

last years, of which one was a pedestrian accident and two were vehicle collisions; all 

accidents produced slight injuries. Using the warrant's approach, the weighted number of 

accidents on the street of treatment will be 1 * 1 + 2 * 0.5 = 2 injury accidents in 3 years, or 

0.67 accidents per year. 

4 Assessment tools 

4.1 Method for estimating safety effect 

The safety effect from the installation of speed humps on urban roads in Israel was 

estimated in a recent study, which was initiated by the Ministry of Transport and conducted 

by the T&M Company in association with the Technion (Hakkert et al, 2002). The study 

aimed at developing a uniform methodology for evaluating potential safety effects of 

projects on road infrastructure improvements and estimating safety effects of some 30 

types of safety treatments, which were introduced on Israeli roads through the 90s. 

For the estimation of safety effects of road infrastructure improvements, a method 

combining an after/before comparison with a control group with an empirical correction due 

to selection bias, was proposed. The outline of the method resembles that described in 

Elvik (1997), whereas in the Israeli study an extension accounting for changes in traffic 

volumes was developed. Besides, the reference group statistics that are necessary for 

correction of the selection bias were estimated by the method of sample moments and not 

on the basis of a regression model. 

The reference group included sites which are similar to the treatment sites in most 

engineering characteristics but left untreated (unchanged) during the “before” periods of all 

the sites in the treatment group. The demands for the control (comparison) group were as 

follows: it should be large (to strengthen the significance of the findings) and demonstrate 

some similarity with the treatment group from the engineering viewpoint. 

For a treatment type considered, evaluation of the safety effect included three steps: 

1) A correction of “before” accident numbers with the help of reference group statistics for 

each site in the treatment group (WP3, 2004 – see Appendix to Chapter 3). 

Page 88


2) An evaluation of the treatment effect at each site by means of the odds-ratio with the 

comparison group, where for the “before” period the corrected accident numbers (from the 

first step) are applied. Besides, a correction due to changes in the traffic volumes is 

performed. The formula has the form: 

X a 


θ ) = δ 

Ca 

X m 

C 

where 

δ = 

⎛Vc 

⎜ 

⎝Vc 

where 

b 

a 

⎞ 

⎟ 

⎠ 

β 

1 

c 

⎛Vt 

⎜ 

⎝Vt 

a 

b 

⎞ 

⎟ 

⎠ 

β 

t 

b 


Xm – the corrected number of accidents at the treatment site in the “before” period, 

Vta – traffic volume at the treatment site in the “after” period, 

Vtb – traffic volume at the treatment site in the “before” period, 



Vca - traffic volume in comparison group sites in the “after” period, 

Vcb - traffic volume in comparison group sites in the “before” period, 

βt – the parameter of safety performance function (a power of relation between traffic 

volume and the accident number), for treatment sites, 

βc – the parameter of safety performance function, for comparison-group sites. 

3) Weighting the effects found for separate treatment sites. This is done by means of a 

standard way known for weighting odds-ratios, where a statistical weight of separate result 

is defined by the sizes of data sets, which provided this result: 


WME) 

= exp( 

w 

i 

1 

= 

= 

VAR(log( 

θ )) 

where 

i 

1 

X 

i 

a 

1 

+ 

X 


i 

b 

1 

1 

+ 

C 

∑ 

i 

i 

a 

wi 

ln( θ i ) 

) 

w 

∑ 

i 

1 

+ 

C 






i 

i 

b 

Page 89



⎛ ⎛ 

⎜ ⎜ 

⎜WME 

exp⎜ 

⎜ ⎜ 

⎜ ⎜ 

⎝ ⎝ 

z 

∑ 

i 

α 

2 

w 

i 

⎞ ⎛ 

⎟ ⎜ 

⎟, 

WME exp⎜ 

⎟ ⎜ 

⎟ ⎜ 

⎠ ⎝ 

z 

α 

1− 

2 

∑ 

i 

w 

i 

⎞⎞ 

⎟⎟ 

⎟⎟ 

⎟⎟ 

⎟⎟ 

⎠⎠ 



In the cases of large samples of treatment sites (that diminishes a threat of selection bias 

and also limits the practical possibility of building a comparable reference group), only 

steps 2-3 were applied for the evaluation. 

4.2 Safety effect of speed humps 

In the study Hakkert et al. (2002), the data on the road infrastructure improvements were 

collected by means of written applications and meetings with the representatives of road 

and municipal authorities in different country areas. A special database on the issue was 

established. The data were sought mostly on projects performed in the mid 90s, to have a 

two-year “before” and two-year “after” period for observation. 

To represent a specific project in the database, three information elements were defined 

as crucial: site of treatment, type of treatment and the period of treatment. For the project 

to be involved in the evaluation, all three pieces of information had to be thoroughly 

verified. To provide a minimum but comprehensive presentation of a specific project in the 

database, a special reporting form was devised which enabled to classify the site and the 

treatment in accordance with the road layout, area specifics, etc. The data were obtained 

from the authorities and accomplished by information from detailed maps, field surveys 

and the publications of the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 

Within each treatment type for the analysis, a strict definition of the periods “before” and 

“after” the treatment was provided for each site; a relevant definition of both periods for the 

comparison-group sites was also attached. The next stage in data preparation was filtering 

the CBS accident files for the sites and periods required. For each treatment type, files 

with series of accident numbers were produced for every treatment and comparison group 

of sites and then processed using the method described in Section 4.1. 

For the treatment type "installation of speed humps on a local street", the data were 

collected on the majority of projects, which were performed by 3 municipalities: Tel-Aviv, 

Netanya and Haifa. Over the years 1994-1998, speed humps were installed on 94 streets 

of these towns. The time period for the consideration was 1991-1999, both for the 

treatment and comparison group roads. For the treatment roads, all injury accidents 

observed on these roads were considered, whereas for each treated street a two-year 

"before" period and a two-year “after” period were separately defined. All injury accidents 

observed on urban road sections throughout the country (excluding junctions and fitting 

"before" and "after" periods for each site of treatment) served as a comparison group. 

Table 38 details the number of sites (projects) involved in the evaluation, the number of 

accidents observed at the treatment sites in “before” and “after” periods, the mean value of 

the safety effect estimated and the confidence interval for this value. As can be seen from 

Table 1, a significant accident reduction was observed following the treatment. (A 

reduction is significant when the whole WME confidence interval is below one.) 

Page 90


Table 38: Safety effect of speed humps estimated for Israeli conditions 

Treatment type Estimated 

effect 

Speed humps on 

urban road sections 

Source: Hakkert et al, 2002 

WME 

Number of Number of 

confidence treatment sites accidents at the 

(WME) interval in the sample treatment sites 

0.603 (0.44, 0.828 ) 94 129 

The average safety effect of speed humps installed on urban roads in Israel was a 40% 

reduction in injury accidents. This result is comparable with the international value reported 

by Elvik et al (1997) – a 48% reduction in injury accidents. 

4.3 Accident costs 

In the current Israeli practice, the average accident cost is estimated as a sum of injury 

costs and damage costs of an average accident in the target accident group. The injury 

costs are a sum of injury values multiplied by the average number of injuries, with different 

severity levels, which were observed in the target accident group. The road accident injury 

values are usually taken as $ 500,000 per fatality, $ 50,000 per serious injury, $ 5,000 per 

minor injury; the damage value is stated as 15% of the injury costs (Guidelines, 2002). 

Table 39 illustrates the calculation of accident costs for an average injury accident 

observed on urban Israeli roads over the period 1996-2000. The injury costs of an average 

accident are NIS 77,490; with the addition of damage-costs, the value of average injury 

accident is NIS 89,114 (at 2000 prices). 

The above values of injury should be treated as conservative because a recent evaluation 

of losses from road accidents in Israel recommended a higher estimate of the fatality value 

of $ 930,000 (MATAT, 2004). The latter accounts for both lost output and human costs, i.e. 

applies the willingness-to-pay approach. 

Table 39: Estimating costs for an average injury accident on urban Israeli roads 

Value Fatality Serious injury Minor injury 

Average number of injuries per 

accident* 

0.01 0.11 1.59 

Injury-values, $ 500,000 50,000 5,000 

Total injury-costs of average 

accident** 

Damage costs NIS 11,624 

Total costs of an average accident 

(at 2000 prices) 

*over the period 1996-2000 **$ 1 = 4.2 NIS 

$ 18,450 or NIS 77,490 

NIS 89,114 

Page 91


5.1 General 


In this section, a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) of the installation of speed humps on a local 

street is performed. The CBA compares the measure's benefits with the measure's costs, 

where both values are brought to the same economic framework. 

The main benefit from the installation of speed humps stems from the accident reduction 

that is expected after the treatment. However, due to a reduction in vehicle speeds that will 

be attained on the treated road, a loss in travel time by the vehicles passing the road 

should be accounted for, too. The economic value of the time lost should be subtracted 

from the value of benefits. 

The costs of the measure are a direct result of the initial investment, which is required for 

the design and installation of speed humps along the street considered. No special 

maintenance expenses are required as this is supposed to be a part of regular road 

maintenance. 

Both the costs and benefits are considered for 5 years, with a 7% discount rate; the 

accumulated discount factor (D) is 4.10. 

5.2 Values of costs and benefits 

The cost of speed humps' installation should account for the expenses on: the hump's 

design and its approval process, a dismantling of the road surface, building the hump, road 

signing and marking. When more than one unit of speed humps is installed, the unit cost 

times the number of the installed units should be taken into account. 

Using the typical cost values of the regular speed humps, which are provided by the 

Guidelines (2002) and the Israeli study of the road infrastructure improvements – Hakkert 

et al (2002), the cost value of one unit may range from 3,000 to 6,000 NIS (NIS – New 

Israeli Shekel). Therefore, the costs of installation of speed humps on the street 

considered will be NIS 15,000-30,000 (at 2000 prices). 

The one-year value of benefits from the expected accident reduction is estimated as a 

product of the annual number of "before" accidents, the accident reduction factor (the 

safety effect) and the accident cost. This value is: 

0.67 accidents * 0.4 * 89114 NIS/ accident = 23,883 NIS (at 2000 prices). 

The one-year value of time losses due to the humps' installation is estimated as a product 

of the time lost by one vehicle, the average daily traffic volume, the time costs and the 

number of working days over the year. Comparing the time required for a vehicle to pass 

the street with a higher speed (before the humps' installation) with the time required to 

pass the same street with a lower speed (after the humps' installation), one can conclude 

that the average delay will be of 4 sec/vehicle. (To note, a similar value was provided by 

Atkins and Coleman (1997), who measured the values of time lost by one vehicle due to a 

regular hump and found that even for large vehicles it is 1 sec per hump, on average.) 

The daily traffic volume on the street of treatment is 8000 vehicles. The cost of a delay of 

an average vehicle on a local street can be estimated as 3.96 NIS/hour (as some 20% of 

typical costs of delay for the economy - see Guidelines, 2002). Over the year, there are 

Page 92


260 working days (52 weeks * 5 working days); only working days are considered for time 

costs, so weekends may be neglected. 

Therefore, the one-year value of time lost due to the humps' installation on the street 

considered is: 

4 sec/vehicle * 1/3600 hours * 8000 vehicles * 3.96 NIS/hour * 260 days = 9,152 NIS (at 

2000 prices). 

5.3 Cost-Benefit Ratio 

Table 40 illustrates the calculation of the cost-benefit ratio (CBR) of the speed humps' 

installation. The value of the measure's costs is 15,000-30,000 NIS (at 2000 prices) or 

3,600-7,200 Euro (at 2002 prices). 

The total value of benefits is calculated as the difference between the costs of accidents 

prevented and the costs of time losses, multiplied by the accumulated discount factor (D = 

4.10). The total value of benefits is 60,397 NIS (at 2000 prices) or 14,408 Euro (at 2002 

prices). Depending on the measure's costs, the CBR ranges from 1:4 to 1:2. 

For the local street considered, the installation of speed humps appears to be costeffective. 

Table 40: Calculation of the cost-benefit ratio 

Costs Benefits Costs of 

accidents 

prevented in 

one year, 

NIS 

Losses: Costs 

of vehicle 

delays in one 

year, NIS 

Costs of one speed hump, NIS 3,000-6,000 23,883 -9,152 

Costs of a series of 5 humps, 

NIS (2000) 

15,000- 

30,000 

Total benefits in one 

year, NIS 

Total benefits in 5 

years, NIS (2000) 

Total costs, Euro (2002)* 3,578-7,156 Total benefits, Euro 

(2002)* 

14,731 

60,397 

14,408 

Cost-benefit ratio From 1:4.0 

to 1:2.0 

*Change of price index over 2000-2002 is 1.0687. In 2002: 1 Euro = 4.48 NIS. 


The cost-benefit analysis of the installation of speed humps is not common in Israel as this 

treatment is considered by local authorities as a low-cost measure and therefore, generally 

does not require an economic justification. 

As a result of more than 20 years of practical experience with their application, the safety 

effect of speed humps is widely accepted by the professional community and the local 

authorities. Typical questions usually concern the humps’ installation parameters and the 

suitability of the measure to the road’s layout, and much less – the economic effect of the 

measure. 

Page 93


Besides, pressure to install speed humps sometimes comes from the residents of the area 

who are interested in calming the traffic and in preventing accidents that might occur. 

Being under public pressure, the authorities feel they do not need an economic evaluation 

to promote the measure’s application. On the contrary, the economic evaluation of the 

speed humps’ installation might sometimes be helpful to demonstrate the lack of efficiency 

of the measure considered, allowing to rank the sites to be treated and the measures to be 

applied. 

7 Discussion 

In this study, a CBA of a typical example of a speed humps’ installation on an urban street 

was considered. The measure was found to be beneficial, mostly due to the fact that injury 

accidents were observed on the road in the “before” period. 

The economic consideration accounted for the humps’ installation costs, the safety effect 

expected and the costs of time losses due to lower travel speeds. The environmental 

impact of the measure, e.g. changes in the level of pollution or noise over the street, was 

not considered, as it is not essential in such a kind of installation. For instance, as 

indicated by different studies (Gitelman et al, 2001), the positive and negative pollution 

effects of speed humps usually compensate each other, especially where the parameters 

and the density of their installation are proper (i.e. keeping a certain speed level over the 

whole road section). 

The safety effect of speed humps was significant under Israeli conditions, in line with the 

findings reported by studies in other countries. 

The current study accounted for the time losses due to speed humps, which does not 

present a common component in the economic evaluation of this measure. One should 

remember that under certain conditions (e.g. for a road with higher traffic volume) the 

measure not be beneficial. 

The CBA presented in this study can be characterized as follows: 

• the evaluation findings support the measure's implementation; 

• to estimate the safety effects, statistical models were fitted to the accident 

data, and the evaluation was in line with the criteria of correct safety 

evaluation (WP3, 2004); 

• the accident costs were fitted to the accident type considered, however, they 

should be treated as conservative as the injury costs did not account for the 

willingness-to-pay component; 

c) the evaluation of the safety effect was initiated by the Ministry of Transport. 

However, the CBA of the measure was not required by the decision-makers. 

Page 94

References 


Atkins C. and Coleman, M. (1997) The influence of traffic calming on emergency response 

times. ITE Journal, August, pp. 42-46. 

Gitelman V., Hakkert A.S. et al (2001). Speed humps in towns. A literature survey. Ami- 

Matom Company and the Technion, Haifa (in Hebrew). 

Gitelman V., Hakkert A.S. (2003). A wide-scale safety evaluation of traffic calming 

measures in residential areas. European Transport Conference, Strasbourg, France. 

Guidelines (2002). Design and performance of speed humps. Ami-Matom Company, 

Ministry of Transport (in Hebrew). 

Elvik, R. (1997). Effects on Accidents of Automatic Speed Enforcement in Norway. 

Transportation Research Record 1595, TRB, Washington, D. C., pp.14-19. 

Elvik, R., Borger-Mysen, A. and Vaa, T. (1997) Trafikksikkerhekshandbok (Traffic Safety 

Handbook). Institute of Transport Economics, Oslo, Norway. 

Ewing, R. (1999) Traffic Calming. State of the Practice. Federal Highway Administration, 

US Department of Transportation, and Institute of Transportation Engineers, 

Washington, DC. 

Hakkert, A.S., Gitelman, V., et al (2002) Development of Method, Guidelines and Tools for 

Evaluating Safety Effects of Road Infrastructure Improvements. Final report, T&M 

Company, Ministry of Transport (in Hebrew). 

ITE (1997). Guidelines for the Design and Application of Speed Humps. A recommended 

practice of the Institute of Transportation Engineers, Publication No. RP-023A, 

Washington, DC. 

MATAT (2004). Road Accidents in Israel: the scope, the characteristics and the estimate 

of losses to the National Economy. MATAT - Transportation Planning Center Ltd, 

Ministry of Transport. 

Weber, P.A. and Braaksma, J.P. (2000). Towards a North American Geometric Design 

Standard for Speed Humps. ITE Journal, January. 

Webster, D. and Layfield, R. (1996). Traffic calming – Road hump schemes using 75mm 

high humps. TRL Report 186, Transport Research Laboratory, Crowthorne, UK. 

WP3 (2004). Improvements in efficiency assessment tools. ROSEBUD. 

Page 95

CASE E3: TRAFFIC CALMING MEASURES 

National Technical University of Athens 

Department of Transportation Planning and Engineering 

ROSEBUD 

WP4 - CASE E REPORT 

TRAFFIC CALMING MEASURES 

IMPLEMENTATION OF LOW COST TRAFFIC 

ENGINEERING MEASURES AT MUNICIPALITY LEVEL 

BY GEORGE YANNIS AND PETROS EVGENIKOS 

NTUA / DTPE, GREECE

IMPLEMENTATION OF LOW COST TRAFFIC ENGINEERING MEASURES AT MUNICIPALITY LEVEL 


1 PROBLEM ............................................................................................................99 

2 DESCRIPTION......................................................................................................99 

2.1 Speed humps and woonerfs description ...............................................................99 

2.2 Description of areas where traffic calming measures were implemented............101 

3 TARGET GROUP ...............................................................................................102 

4 ASSESSMENT METHOD...................................................................................102 

4.1 General ...............................................................................................................102 

4.2 Estimation of safety effect ...................................................................................102 

5 ASSESSMENT QUANTIFICATION....................................................................105 

5.1 Traffic calming measures implementation cost ...................................................105 

5.2 Traffic calming measures benefits.......................................................................105 

5.2.1 Number of accidents prevented ..........................................................................105 

5.2.2 Accident cost.......................................................................................................107 

5.2.3 Estimation of cost for time lost ............................................................................108 

6 ASSESSMENT RESULTS..................................................................................109 

7 DECISION MAKING PROCESS.........................................................................110 

8 IMPLEMENTATION BARRIERS ........................................................................110 

9 CONCLUSION / DISCUSSION...........................................................................111 

Page 97


CASE OVERVIEW 

Measure 

Implementation of low cost road traffic engineering measures (speed humps and 

woonerfs) in one direction - one-lane roads in the Municipality of Neo Psychiko in the 

Greater Athens Area in Greece 

Problem to solve 

In Greece 72% of the total number of road accidents occur in urban areas and speed is 

the most significant factor leading to their continuous increase. Increased travel speeds 

along urban roads affect not only the road accident causation, but also the accident 

severity. 

Target Group 

Inhabitants of residential areas (pedestrians, children, two-wheelers, drivers, passengers) 

Targets 

a) Creation of calm driving areas 

b) Decrease in the number of road accidents and related casualties 

Initiator 

Municipality of Neo Psychiko, Ministry of Public Works 


Municipality of Neo Psychiko. 

Costs 

Implementation costs (design and installation/construction) for speed humps and woonerfs 

provided by municipal funds from the Municipality of Neo Psychiko. 

Benefits: 

Fatal and injury accidents prevented 

Cost/Benefit Ratio 

1:1.14 to 1:1.2 

Page 98


1 Problem 

In Greece, less than 1,600 persons killed and 19,000 persons injured are recorded in more 

than 16,000 road accidents annually (DTPE, 2004). More specifically, 76% of the total 

number of road accidents occurs in urban areas. Speed is the most significant factor 

leading to the high increase of road accidents. High speed is a major factor in road 

accidents, as it affects both their occurrence and their severity (KANELLAIDIS et al, 1995). 

The majority of Greek drivers exceed the speed limit in urban areas, and therefore road 

accidents in urban areas present a continuously increasing trend (KANELLAIDIS, et al, 

1999). 

There are a wide variety of methods and techniques used for reducing road accidents in 

urban areas, such as enforcement, intensive campaigns, specific traffic management 

techniques etc. However, Low Cost Traffic Engineering Measures (LCTEM) (or traffic 

calming measures) are deemed to be the most efficient measures towards tackling one of 

the most significant problems that communities face nowadays: urban road accidents. 

2 Description 

2.1 Speed humps and woonerfs description 

Speed humps are raised paved areas on the surface of road, extended across its width. 

They are constructed by different types of materials, as asphalt, concrete, bricks or plastic 

(caoutchouc) and are usually designed for travel speeds between 20 - 30 km/h [KAPICA 

C.J, 2001]. Their length is usually larger than the distance between the wheels of vehicle 

(usual length 3.6 m), their height oscillates between 7.5 - 10 cm and the recommended 

distance between successive humps varies from 60 to 100 m. (ZAIDEL et al, 1992). The 

main advantages and disadvantages deriving from the use of speed humps in the road 

network of an urban area are shown in the following Table 41. 

Table 41: Advantages and disadvantages of speed humps 

Advantages Disadvantages 

1. Decrease of the number of conflicts of 

vehicles at junctions 

2. Travel speed reduction 

3. Do not prohibit the movement of 

vehicles 

4. Provide aesthetics of environment for 

pedestrians and pedal cyclists 

5. Positive effects in multi-sectoral nodes 

6. Low construction costs 

1. Obstruct the movement of heavy 

vehicles 

2. Require additional traffic signing 

3. Create potential deviation of traffic in 

near roads 

4. Influence traffic islands 

5. Require maintenance 

Source: Jacksonville Florida City, 2000 

The implementation of speed humps in several developed countries resulted in 

considerable improvement of road safety at the local level. In Denmark, a reduction in road 

accidents and road casualties by 24% and 45% respectively was attributed to the 

introduction of such traffic calming measures (ENGEL, THOMSEN, 1992). Some types of 

speed humps that can be used at urban areas are presented in Figure 12. 

Page 99


Figure 12: Typical dimensions of basic types of speed humps 

Source: ZAIDEL et al, 1992 

Page 100


Woonerfs, another widely applied traffic calming 

measure, are roads with special characteristics, 

which allow safe walking. Vehicles, although 

allowed in, move with very low travel speeds (up to 

30 km/h) and the priority is yield to pedestrians. 

Such measures are constructed in one-way roads, 

as well as in roads of two directions, and the 

respective road widths are 3 m and 5 m. 

The above-mentioned road types impend the free 

flow of vehicles; consequently traffic volumes are 

significantly reduced. However, they do not cause 

feelings of annoyance to the drivers, as it happens 

with speed humps. The construction and 

maintenance costs are much higher. 

Figure 13 presents the ground plan of a road with 

mixed circulation of vehicles and pedestrians 

(woonerf). The possibility of parking is very limited, 

while the presence of trees is intense. In this way, 

the aesthetics of the local environment is upgraded 

and the green in the urban regions is increased. 

Finally, as indicated in Figure 13, vehicles are not 

allowed to move straight ahead, but are 

constrained to follow an “S” manoeuvre. 

Consequently their speed does not exceed the 

relevant speed limit that is in 

effect for such roads, i.e. 30 

km/h. 

Figure 13: Ground plan of a 

woonerf. 

Source: Magee, 1998 

Woonerfs are constructed in most developed counties together with speed humps (or 

bumps), roundabouts, traffic circles, raised intersections, median barriers or islands, curb 

extensions and chokers, chicanes or street closures. 

2.2 Description of areas where traffic calming measures were implemented 

In Athens, the capital of Greece, a limited number of traffic calming measures has been 

constructed. The Municipality of Neo Psychiko is the only area in the Greater Athens Area, 

which inaugurated an extensive road traffic calming programme at the beginning of 1990’s 

in an attempt to improve road safety in this area. A wide range of traffic calming measures 

was carefully implemented, according to technical specifications. These measures mainly 

included speed humps and woonerfs and were basically implemented between the years 

1991 and 1999. (Municipality of Neo Psychiko, 2001). 

Neo Psychiko is the area of investigation of the impact of Low Cost Traffic Engineering 

Measures on road safety in urban areas and the methodology used is the “before and after 

accidents analysis with large control group”. The control group chosen consists of the 

neighbouring Municipalities of Holargos and Agia Paraskevi in the Athens Greater Area. It 

is important to mention that in this research only streets with one direction and one lane 

are examined, as in this type of streets traffic calming measures were primarily 

implemented. 

Page 101



The inhabitants of the Municipality of Neo Psychiko mainly benefit from the implementation 

of the traffic calming measures in the area. Especially the vulnerable road users groups 

(pedestrians, children, two-wheelers, pedal cyclists) are considered as the target group, 

but the reduction of road accidents also concerns the drivers and passengers circulating in 

the area. 


4.1 General 

Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is the financial tool used for the economic appraisal of the 

installation of speed humps and woonerfs in the Municipality of Neo Psychiko. Generally, 

CBA provides a logical framework for evaluating alternative courses of action when a 

number of factors are highly conjectural in nature. Essentially, it takes into account all the 

factors that influence either the benefits or the cost of a project, even if monetary value can 

not be easily assigned [SMITH, 1998]. 

For the purpose of this research, the main benefit (safety effect) considered in the 

calculations is the number of prevented accidents in the area, after the implementation of 

traffic calming measures. Social and environmental effects for the residents of the area are 

not taken into account in this study, as it is difficult to be quantified and moreover, their 

benefits are not essential comparing to the accident reduction. However, the time lost (for 

the road users) due to the reduction of travel speed should be incorporated into the 

benefits calculation. 

4.2 Estimation of safety effect 

Although there is a wide variety of methodologies used for the examination of road safety 

in an area, for the estimation of the safety effect in the Municipality of Neo Psychiko, 

deriving from the implementation of speed humps and woonerfs in the area, the “before 

and after methodology with large control group” was considered. This is the methodology 

with the highest degree of accuracy, as the size of control group is quite large and 

moreover, when there is a sufficient number of years “before” and “after” the 

implementation of traffic calming measures (as it is in this case study), the phenomenon of 

the regression to the mean is eliminated, making the “before and after methodology with 

large control group” the most appropriate and reliable methodology for the estimation of 

the potential safety effect. 

The effects observed in the treated area and the control group area, are weighted by 

means of Odds-ratio of the total number of road accidents in “before” and “after” treatment 

period. This results to the estimated effect: 

Page 102


Estimated effect ( θ i ) = [Xa/Xm]/[Ca/Cb] 

where 

Xa - the number of road accidents observed at the treatment area in the “after“ period 

Xm - the number of road accidents observed at the treatment area in the “before“ period 

Ca - the number of road accidents observed at the control group area in the “after“ period 

Cb - the number of road accidents observed at the control group area in the “before“ period 

The statistical weight of the estimate is: 

1 

wi 

= 

1 1 1 1 

+ + + 

i i i i 

A B C D 

Where A, B, C, D are the four numbers of the odds-ratio calculation. 

The weighted mean effect is : 


WME) 

= exp( 

∑ wi 

i 

∑ 

i 

ln( θi 

) 

) 

w 

with 95% confidence interval for the weighed effect estimated as follows: 

⎛ ⎛ 

⎜ ⎜ 

⎜WME 

exp⎜ 

⎜ ⎜ 

⎜ ⎜ 

⎝ ⎝ 

z 

∑ 

i 

α 

2 

w 

i 

⎞ ⎛ 

⎟ ⎜ 

⎟, 

WME exp⎜ 

⎟ ⎜ 

⎟ ⎜ 

⎠ ⎝ 

z 

α 

1− 

2 

∑ 

i 

w 

i 

⎞⎞ 

⎟⎟ 

⎟⎟ 

⎟⎟ 

⎟⎟ 

⎠⎠ 

i 


associated with the treatment (in percents), is calculated as (1-WME)*100. 

The control group should include large areas with similar characteristics to the area 

considered, where traffic calming measures were not implemented. The Municipalities of 

Holargos and Agia Paraskevi in the Athens Greater Area present similar road network, 

population density, land use and traffic volumes characteristics with the Municipality of 

Neo Psychiko (area considered), as indicated in Table 42 and were therefore chosen as 

the large comparison group (Georgopoulou, 2002). 

Page 103


Table 42: Road network, land use and other characteristics for the area considered and the control 

group 

Characteristics 

Road network characteristics 

Municipality 

Neo Psychiko Agia Paraskevi Holargos 

Area’s extent 1,200,000 m 2 

7,000,000 m 2 

2,735,000 m 2 

Population 16,000 87,500 39,000 

Density 130 res/acre 125 res/acre 142 res/acre 

Number of blocks 174 514 250 

Average surface of each block 6.90 m 2 

13.62 m 2 

10.94 m 2 

Road network length 19,000 m 120,000 m 42,000 m 

Basic road network length 3,700 m 25,000 m 7,000 m 

Secondary road network length 15,300 m 95,000 m 35,000 m 

Road surface percentage 12.63% 13.79% 12.03% 

Number of streets 75 288 95 

Number of one direction streets 67 260 85 

Number of two directions streets 8 28 10 

One direction streets 

percentage 

89.33% 90.28% 89.47% 

Two directions streets 

percentage 

10.67% 9.72% 10.53% 

Number of secondary streets 

Land use and other characteristics 

8 15 11 

Over-regional business land use 16.21% 14% 12% 

Regional business land use 1.44% 1.02% 1.2% 

Land for cultural events etc. 3.8% 4% 3.3% 

Education + Sports 4.93% 4.2% 3.5% 

Residence 73.62% 76.78% 72% 

Monthly family average income 1350 € 1100 € 1100 € 

Number of trips (to the centre of 

49% with 

public 

transport 

45% with public 

transport 

55% with public 

transport 

Athens) 51% with 

private 

vehicles 

55% with private 

vehicles 

45% with private 

vehicles 

Average residents’ vehicle 

property (vehic/1000 resid.) 

300 – 350 350 – 400 350 – 400 

Page 104



5.1 Traffic calming measures implementation cost 

The total cost for the implementation of traffic calming measures in the Municipality of Neo 

Psychiko can be distinguished into implementation costs for speed humps and 

implementation costs for woonerfs. The cost of speed humps includes the designing and 

construction/installation costs, depending on the type of material used (asphalt or plastic) 

as well as the respective road markings. In the case of Neo Psychiko, 49 speed humps 

were installed in 21 one-lane, one-direction roads and the total cost was 117.390€ (1998 

prices). 

The implementation cost of woonerfs is considerably higher than the respective of speed 

humps, as it concerns larger areas and includes the design cost, cost for the configuration 

and pavement of the respective areas, cost for hydraulic works, electrical works and 

sewage pipelines installation. In the case of Neo Psychiko, a total area of 100,000 m 2 in 40 

local roads was transformed into woonerfs between 1991-1999. According to the data 

provided by the technical department of the Municipality of Neo Psychiko, 4,402,054 € (at 

1998 prices) was the total cost for the implementation of woonerfs, which is considered 

quite high. Generally, increased construction cost is a particularity of the Greek tendering 

system. The above-mentioned implementation costs are shown in Table 43. 

Table 43: Traffic calming measures implementation cost 

Traffic calming measures Amount Cost 

Speed humps 49 units € 111,518 

Woonerfs 100,000 m 2 

Total Implementation Cost € 3,192,956 

*1998 prices 

5.2 Traffic calming measures benefits 

€ 3,081,438 

In the framework of this research, the benefits examined exclusively concern safety 

benefits deriving from the reduction of all injury accidents in the examined area, as no 

significant social or environmental costs were expected from the implementation of speed 

humps and woonerfs in the Municipality of Neo Psychiko. The available results of previous 

research allowed for the direct calculation of the number of accidents prevented by the 

measures, as described in detail in the following sections. 

5.2.1 Number of accidents prevented 

After the resemblance of the area examined and the control group was proved, the “before 

and after” methodology was applied to examine the statistical significance of the reduction 

of road accidents in the area where traffic calming measures were implemented. 

The evaluation of the safety effect, which in this case study is the number of all injury 

accidents prevented, is based on the Test X 2 . The number of accidents occurring in the 

area examined is compared with the accidents occurring in the control group. More 

specifically, X and Ψ represent, respectively, the total number of accidents that occurred in 

the period before and after the implementation of the measures in the area considered. 

Page 105


Similarly, XE and ΨE represent, respectively, the total number of accidents that occurred in 

the control group area, where traffic calming measures were not implemented. 

The Test X 2 gives that: 

2 

2 (Ψ - ΧΑ) 

Χ = 

(Χ + Ψ)Α 

where 

Ψ 

Α = 

Χ 

Then, the estimated X 2 value is compared with the X 2 α value for a given probability 

standard α and for n = 1 freedom standard (n = k–1, where k = 2 are the observations, one 

before and one after the implementation of the measures), as they are given in relevant 

tables. 

When the estimated X 2 value is higher than the Χ 2 α (for a predetermined probability 

standard α), the reduction in the number of accidents is considered statistically significant 

and in all likelihood is attributed to the implementation of speed humps and woonerfs. The 

pre-determined probability standard (α) used in this research is 95%, which can be 

considered as conservative. 

The total number of accidents occurred in one direction: one-lane streets in the area of 

Neo Psychiko during the years 1985-1990 and during the years 1994-1999 are 36 and 33, 

respectively. Similarly, the total number of accidents recorded in the control group is 101 

and 149, respectively. According to the previous symbolism, X = 36, Ψ = 33, ΧΕ = 101 and 

ΨΕ = 149, as indicated in Table 44. 

Table 44: number of accidents “before” and “after” in one direction - one lane streets 

Time period Area examined 

(Neo Psychiko) 

Area 

Control group 

(Xolargos and Agia Paraskevi) 

Before (1985-1990) Χ = 36 ΧΕ = 101 

After (1994-1999) Ψ = 33 ΨΕ = 149 

Proportion -8.3% 47.5% 

Ε 

Ε 

After applying equation (1), it is estimated that: 

X 2 = 3.972 > 3.84 (X 2 value for 95% probability standard), so that a statistical significant 

reduction in the total number of accidents is noticed. 

A reduction of 8,3% in the total number of accidents was observed in the area considered, 

while an increase of 47,5% was recorded in the region of control group. In Table 5 the 

mean value of the estimated safety effect and the confidence interval for this value are 

presented. 

(1) 

(2) 

Page 106


Table 45: Safety effect of speed humps and woonerfs estimated for Neo Psychiko 

Treatment type Estimated effect (WME) WME confidence 

interval 

Speed humps and woonerfs in the 

Municipality of Neo Psychiko 

0.621 (0.363, 1.061 ) 

The average safety effect of speed humps and woonerfs implementation in Neo Psychiko 

is a 38% reduction in of the total number of road accidents, thus, 14 accidents were 

prevented by the presence of these traffic calming measures, as no other road safety 

measure occurred in the area at the same period. 

5.2.2 Accident cost 

The estimation of average accident costs was carried out on the basis of a recent study on 

accidents cost in Greece [LIAKOPOULOS, 2002]. This study concerned the estimation of 

the costs of various components of accident costs (material damage costs, generalized 

costs, human costs) for fatal accidents, injury accidents and material damage accidents, 

including: 

• Material damage costs 

• Police costs 

• Fire brigade costs 

• Insurance companies costs 

• Court costs 

• Lost production output 

• Pain and grief 

• Rehabilitation costs 

• Hospital treatment costs 

• First aid and transportation costs 

The various costs were calculated by means of an exhaustive data collection process 

addressed to various organizations (National Statistical Service of Greece, National Police, 

Fire Service of Greece, Emergency Medical Service of Greece, hospitals, courts, 

insurance companies etc.). Additional parameters were adopted on the basis of 

estimations from experts in each field, as well as the existing international literature. 

It should be noted, however, that the above study did not adequately account for the 

human cost component, as the pain and grief parameters (reported in the Courts) are not 

sufficiently representative of the human cost. On that purpose, a separate investigation for 

human costs in Greece was carried out in the framework of the present research. In 

particular, human costs was estimated according to the following formula: 

VoSL = (NAEIS) / (LSE) 

Where: 

VoSL: Value of Statistical Life 

NAEIS: National Annual Expenditure on Improving Safety 

LSE: Expected Lives Saved from this Expenditure Annually 

Page 107


In particular, the calculations included parameters such as the percentage of the family 

annual income that each person is willing to pay in his/her entire life in order to reduce the 

probability of accident involvement of himself/herself or of any family person by 50%, the 

average members per family in Greece, the proportion of families with an economically 

active member, the average family annual income in Greece, the national population, the 

life expectancy in Greece and the current and new accident risk. 

With regards to the percentage of the family annual income that each person is willing to 

pay in his/her entire life in order to reduce the probability of accident involvement by 50%, 

the results of a recent "willingness-to-pay" survey in Greece were used [AGGELOUSI, 

KANELLOPOULOU, 2002]. In this survey, drivers were asked to state the percentage of 

annual income they are willing to pay to reduce the probability of a fatal accident, an injury 

accident and a material damage accident involvement by 50%. 

Furthermore, they were also asked to rate various types of accidents and injuries, in order 

to identify their perception on injury severity. On the basis of the results, in the present 

research the value corresponding to injury accidents is considered to adequately represent 

serious injury accidents, whereas the value for material damage accidents is considered to 

adequately represent both minor injury and material damage accidents. 

On the basis of the above, the human cost of accidents in Greece was estimated as 

follows: 

VoSL = 612,140.72 €/person for fatal accidents 

VoSL = 467,703.02 €/person for serious injury accidents 

VoSL = 206,339.57 €/person for slight injury and material damage accidents 

It should also be underlined that the calculations concern prices for 1999. In order to 

calculate the average accident cost in Greece, the costs of fatal and injury accidents were 

weighted in relation to the average distribution of accident casualties per casualty severity 

in urban areas in Greece. 

In the following Table 46, parameters concerning accident costs in Greece are 

summarized on the basis of the previous research used and the additional calculations 

carried out. 

Table 46: Calculation of average accident cost in Greece (1999 prices) 

Cost of Accidents with: Killed Seriously Injured Slightly Injured 

Material Damage cost (€) 28,769.42 18,174.91 13,904.19 

Generalised cost (€) 442,466.54 23,906.66 6,960.30 

Human cost (€) 612,140.72 467,703.02 206,339.57 

Total cost (€) 1,083,376.68 509,784.59 227,204.06 

Proportion of casualties in urban areas 3.70% 9.11% 87.19% 

Average accident cost 284.666,63 € 

5.2.3 Estimation of cost for time lost 

The implementation of traffic calming measures in an area results to reduced travel 

speeds (a reduction of 8 km/h – 15 km/h is usually observed). The time lost (for the road 

users) due to this speed reduction could also be incorporated into the benefits calculation 

as a negative effect and its value is estimated according to the following equation: 

T = D * Q * V * P 

Page 108


Where 

T: the value of time lost due to delays resulting traffic calming measures implementation 

D: average delay per vehicle 

Q: average daily traffic volume in the area considered 

V: average value of time (hourly) per vehicle 

P: period 

The average delay per vehicle (time lost due to implementation of speed humps and 

woonerfs) when circulating in the area of Neo Psychiko is approximately 60 seconds. This 

estimation is based on field measurements, which took place in the area considered. The 

average daily traffic volume in the Municipality of Neo Psychiko was 8,680 vehicles. The 

hourly cost of the delay of an average vehicle is 4.5 €/hour (1999). This calculation takes 

into account the average value of time per person (hourly) for 1999, which is 3 €, as well 

as the average vehicle occupancy, which is 1.6 € [ATTIKO METRO, 1997]. Finally, the 

examined period is the number of working days over a year (260 days). 

Consequently, the value of time lost in the area considered due to traffic calming 

measures implementation is: 

T = 60 sec/vehicle * 8,680 vehicles/day * 4.5 €/hour * 260 days * 1/3,600 hours = 180,544 

€ (1999 prices). 


The cost-benefit ratio calculation follows the identification and quantification of the costs 

related to the implementation of traffic calming measures and their benefits, described in 

the previous sections. An accumulated discount factor was applied to the implementation 

cost calculation on the basis of an interest rate of 4% [National Statistical Service of 

Greece, 2003]. Two scenarios are developed, according to the calculation of the value of 

benefits. In the first scenario, the value of benefits derives only from the number of 

accidents prevented in the area (scenario 1) and in the second scenario the yearly value of 

time lost in the area due to traffic calming measures implementation is also considered 

(scenario 2). On that purpose two ratios are calculated: 


Scenario 1 

Safety benefits only 

Scenario 2 

Including time lost 

Present value of benefits 

Number of accidents prevented 14 14 

Average accident cost - 1999 (€) 284,666.63 284,666.63 

Accumulated discount factor 1.0 1.0 

Value of time lost - 1999 (€) - 180.544 

Total (€) 

Present value of costs 

3,985,332.82 3,804,788.82 

Implementation cost - 1998 (€) 3,192,956.71 3,192,956.71 

Accumulated discount factor 1.04 1.04 

Implementation cost - 1999 (€) 3,320,674.98 3,320,674.98 

Cost-benefit ratio 1.2:1 1.14:1 

Page 109


The yielded cost-benefit ratio indicated in the above Table 47 proves that the 

implementation of speed humps and woonerfs in a broad local area can be cost-effective. 


The results of this research were presented to Head Officers of the Technical Department 

of Neo Psychiko. As these decision-makers are mainly civil engineers, they are familiar 

with efficiency assessment in terms of cost-benefit analyses and they responded positively 

towards this work from the first stages, contributed with data and other available 

information and were very helpful in dealing with lack of data when necessary. 

Furthermore, decision-makers were very interested in the results. The cost-benefit ratios, 

although not very high, were received as a confirmation of the important role of the local 

authorities in road safety improvement of urban areas and a validation of their systematic 

efforts to contribute in the reduction of road accidents and casualties in their municipality. 

Even though the implementation cost of the traffic calming measures are considered 

relatively increased, they believe that the reduction in accidents and the respective lives 

that can be saved are worth every possible effort. Consequently, they intend to continue 

the implementation of similar road safety measures and they would like to communicate 

these results to the residents of Neo Psychik, to the press, as well as to other 

municipalities so they can also benefit. 

They also added that if the results were negative or even less encouraging, they would try 

to identify the more cost-effective cases among the results and focus their efforts 

accordingly, or consider alternative and more efficient road safety related activities. 

Decision-makers also expressed a high interest for more analyses and results, concerning 

implementation of other traffic calming measures, in more road types than one-lane - one 

direction, or the results concerning specific types of road users (e.g. pedestrians, twowheelers 

and elderly people). 

They also underlined that these results would have been even more useful if they were 

available at earlier stages of the implementation of the speed humps and woonerfs and 

they expressed their strong willingness to mutually co-operate with any responsible 

authorities in order to further improve the road safety of their area. 


As far as the implementation of traffic calming measures is concerned, the basic barrier 

refers to the reactions from all drivers using the streets where the speed humps and 

woonerfs were installed. The reduced travel speeds, as well as the negative impact of 

such measures on the suspension system of the vehicles and the relevant annoyance to 

the drivers, lead very often to complaints. Some of these road users are residents of the 

area and some others are just passing through. 

Moreover, the elaboration of guidelines and standards for the construction and 

maintenance of the road network in Greece (even at the local level) is a task for the 

Ministry of Public Works. In the case of traffic engineering measures, such guidelines and 

technical specifications do not exist and consequently their development by the technical 

department of Neo Psychiko and the relevant governmental authorities resulted in delays 

during the implementation phase. These parameters were the main difficulties 

encountered during the early implementation period. 

Page 110


Additionally, it should be emphasized that such a research should be complemented with 

other studies concerning other disadvantages stemming from the implementation of traffic 

calming measures. More specifically, it is very essential that the negative impact of these 

measures on the traffic flow of vehicles should be examined. Speed humps or woonerfs in 

urban streets result in reduced car speeds, which in turn, affect adversely the traffic flow of 

streets and causes the undesirable “immigration” of accidents to adjacent streets 

[FRANTZESKAKIS, GOLIAS, 1994]. 

Furthermore, the possible negative impacts of speed humps on the suspension system of 

cars should be considered while calculating the value of benefits. The extent of this 

damage is highly dependent on the size and geometrical characteristics of those devices, 

as well as the speed of passing cars through them, and it comprises one of the most 

controversial aspects related to the implementation of traffic calming measures in urban 

areas. 

The lack of appropriate data for cost-benefit evaluation purposes and the fact that neither 

local, nor governmental authorities have used any economic evaluation tools so far to 

demonstrate the correctness of decision-making, were overcome by means of interviews 

with transport engineers from the technical department of the Municipality of Neo 

Psychiko, who were also actively involved in both the decision-making process and the 

monitoring of the traffic calming measures influence on road accident reduction. 

Additionally, existing research in Greece was further used to yield the necessary 

parameters for the computation of cost/benefit ratios. 

9 Conclusion / Discussion 

There is a certain correlation between low cost traffic engineering measures in urban 

areas and the respective number of road accidents. International experience in many 

developed countries has shown that several of the traffic calming measures (speed 

humps, woonerfs, raised intersections, road narrowing, etc.) are deemed to be the most 

efficient measures towards tackling one of the most significant problems that communities 

face nowadays: urban road accidents. In Greece such measures were implemented only 

in few municipalities and in most cases the implementation was either incomplete or not 

well prepared. 

A first approach for reliable and comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of those 

measures in reducing accidents, speeds or casualties is attempted through this research, 

as no evaluation studies have been undertaken so far in Greece. 

The present research revealed very limited use of assessment methods in the overall 

decision-making process in Greece. Only a small number of cost-effectiveness studies on 

road safety measures in general were conducted systematically by independent 

institutions and organisations. These occasional research initiatives provide some insight 

on the existing activities, but scarcely lead to interesting conclusions and thus are not 

usually transferred to policy-makers. 

In this study, the cost-benefit analysis was applied to an urban area (a municipality) in 

order to evaluate the economic effectiveness of certain traffic calming measures (speed 

humps and woonerfs). The safety effect (reduction of number of road accidents in the 

area) deriving from the implementation of such measures was calculated and statistically 

evaluated by applying the “before and after” methodology with large control groups. 

Monetary value was assigned to this safety effect by calculating the average accident cost. 

Page 111


Special consideration was given to the estimation of human costs, which is an ambiguous 

component of the total accident cost for different casualty types. 

Data on the measures’ implementation costs were provided by the technical department of 

Neo Psychiko and the cost-benefit ratio was calculated for two different scenarios, 

according to the calculation of the benefits’ value. However, the incorporation of the time 

lost in the value of benefits (scenario 2) did not really affect the result, as according to 

scenario 1 the estimated ratio was 1:1.8, whereas in scenario 2 the ratio was calculated as 

1:1.7. In both cases the ratio shows that traffic calming measures’ implementation is costeffective. 

The fact that the cost-benefit ratio is not very high could be attributed to the high 

implementation cost of the traffic calming measures, a particularity of the project tendering 

system in the Greek construction sector. 

Finally, it was worth mentioning that the absence of national and co-ordinated road safety 

programmes aiming at accident reduction can be overcome by the successful 

implementation of several road safety actions at the local level, like the traffic calming 

measures in urban areas. Generally, close cooperation of governmental and regional or 

local authorities can be very effective in road accident improvement at the local level. 

The cost-benefit analysis indicates that traffic calming measures could be a useful tool in 

the hands of decision-makers when considering road accident reductions in urban areas, 

although the implementation cost is high in several cases and there are several complaints 

from the road users concerning the reduced travel speeds. However, it is society who has 

to choose between speed and safety. 

Page 112

REFERENCES 


AGGELOUSSI, K., KANELLOPOULOU, A., (2002): Estimation of the human cost of road 

accidents and drivers' sensitivity towards accident risk - A willingness-to-pay technique 

and a stated-preference technique, Diploma Thesis, NTUA, School of Civil Engineering, 

Department of Transportation Planning and Engineering, Athens. 

ATTIKO METRO SA. (1997): Land use characteristics and socio-economical parameters. 

(03). P.S: Land use characteristics and density of the Greater Area of Athens. 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PLANNING AND ENGINEERING, (2004): 

Accident risk investigation of categories of drivers with high accident involvement - 

second report, Ministry of Transportation and Communication. 

ENGEL U, THOMSEN L., (1992): Safety effects of speed reducing measures in Danish 

Residential Areas, Accident Analysis & Prevention. Vol. 24, No 1, pp. 17 -28. 

FRANTZESKAKIS G., GOLIAS G., (1994): Road Safety, Papasotiriou Publications. 

GEORGOPOULOU X., (2002): Investigation of Low Cost Engineering Measures’ Impact 

on road safety in urban areas, Diploma Thesis, NTUA, School of Civil Engineering, 

Department of Transportation Planning and Engineering, Athens. 

JACKSONVILLE FLORIDA CITY, (2002): Neighbourhood Traffic Calming Manual, Traffic 

Engineering Division. 

KANELLAIDIS G. et al., (1999): Attitude of Greek drivers towards road safety, 

Transportation Quarterly. 

KANELLAIDIS G, et al., (1995): A survey of drivers’ attitude towards speed limit violations. 

Journal of safety Research. 

KAPICA C., (2001): Pilot Study Report on Speed humps, Columbia Avenue Hartsdale, 

New York. (www.town.greenburgh.ny.us/Speedhump.pdf) 

LIAKOPOULOS D., (2002): Development of a model for the estimation of the economic 

benefits from accident reduction in Greece, Diploma Thesis, NTUA, School of Civil 

Engineering, Department of Transportation Planning and Engineering, Athens. 

MUNICIPALITY OF NEO PSYCHIKO, (2001): Regional Development Programme, 

Technical Division of the Municipality of Neo Psychiko. 

NATIONAL STATISTICAL SERVICE OF GREECE, (2003): "Greece in figures, Official 

Publication of the National Statistical Service of Greece, Athens (www.statistics.gr). 

SMITH N., (1998): Engineering Project Management, Blackwell Publication. 

ZAIDEL D. et al., (1992): The Use of road Humps for Moderating Speeds on Urban 

Streets, Accident Analysis & Prevention, Vol. 24, No 1, pp. 45 - 56. 

Page 113

CASE F1: Grade-separation at railroad crossings 

ROSEBUD 

WP4 - CASE F REPORT 

GRADE-SEPARATION AT RAILROAD CROSSINGS 

BY MARKO NOKKALA, 

VTT BUILDING AND TRANSPORT, FINLAND


1 PROBLEM TO SOLVE .......................................................................................117 

2 DESCRIPTION OF MEASURE...........................................................................118 

3 TARGET GROUP ...............................................................................................118 





8 ROLE OF BARRIERS ........................................................................................125 

9 DISCUSSION......................................................................................................125

CASE OVERVIEW 

GRADE-SEPERATION AT ROADRAIL CROSSINGS 

Measure: 

Grade-separation of at-grade rail-road crossings 

Problem to solve: 

Train-vehicle collisions at the crossing (and vehicle delays due to crossing's closures) 

Target Group: 

Train-vehicle accidents 

Targets: 

Diminishing accidents and traffic delays 

Initiator 

VR, the Finnish national Railway Authority (also linked to National Road Administration) 


Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications (on the level of targeting specific 

measures), Road Authorities, Railway Authorities 

Costs: 

Investments in grade-separation construction; by the Railway Authority 

Benefits: 

The benefits are accident savings and a reduction in traffic delays. Driving public will 

benefit. 

Cost/Benefit-Ratio: 

For a rural crossing the CBA ratio is 0.65; for the urban crossing the ratio is 0.25. 

Page 116

1 Problem to solve 


The large majority of rail-road crossings in Finland, like in any country, are level (at-grade) 

crossings. In general, at-grade rail-road crossings are associated with economic losses 

due to vehicle delays and train-vehicle collisions. In the Finnish context, level crossings 

have been considered the cost-effective measure to construct crossings, due to the fact 

that traffic volumes at points of crossings have been small. However, in the late 1990s the 

awareness of need to upgrade existing crossings, either through increased safety 

measures or construction of grade-separation crossing increased rapidly, following some 

severe accidents at the crossings. 

To illustrate the situation in numeric figures, over the past years, 1999-2003, Table 48 lists 

the statistics of deadly and severely injured accidents. As the statistics show, there has 

been an observable increase in deaths per 1 million passengers in 2000 and 2001. In 

2003 a total of 17 persons were killed in rail accidents, with the following breakdown: 

• Level crossings with warning signals: 2 

• Level crossings without warning signals:4 

• Other, non specified: 11 

Table 48: Accident statistics in Finnish rail, 1999-2003 

TYPE OF ACCIDENT 1999 2000 2OO1 2002 2003 

Death and seriously injured 

per 1 million passenger kms 

Accident cases per 1 million 

passenger kms 

Deaths per 1 million 

passengers 

Seriously injured per 1 million 

passengers 

0,72 1,00 1,03 0,57 0,71 

2,10 2,01 2,18 1,72 2,00 

0,02 0,04 0,04 

0,11 0,05 0,09 0,02 0,02 

There has been a significant research program of the VTT Building and Transport to study 

the needs to upgrade the out-of-date crossings facilities in Finland. It has been found that 

a significant part of locations with accident occurrences are at-grade crossings which are 

equipped with automatic safety gates (i.e. have the highest form of safety protection for atgrade 

crossings), but in some cases there have been no safety gates due to the low 

volume of crossings. Due to high train frequencies and significant road traffic volumes at 

some crossings, the economic losses because of vehicle delays might be high. Therefore, 

the question was to point out the sites where a grade-separation is warranted. 

The process of grade-separation is expensive. It is therefore essential to provide a 

systematic approach for decision-makers that will lead to a considered decision on the 

benefits and costs associated with grade-separation. 

However, a detailed investigation of a specific crossing is time-consuming and costly 

(Tustin et al. 1986; Taggart et al. 1987), and cannot be reasonably performed for a large 

number of sites. Thus, at the initial stage, screening tools are required that will assist in 

Page 117


choosing, from the whole set of locations (i.e. from the whole railway network), those 

warranting further consideration. 

There is a set of screening tools for crossings’ consideration for grade-separation 

developed by the study Gitelman, Hakkert (2001) in Israel. The tools consist of a safety 

model, a formula for estimating the economic loss due to vehicle delays at a crossing and 

a qualification criterion. The tools are based on economic principles, comparing the 

economic loss due to an at-grade crossing with the average cost of grade-separation. In 

this study we will combine the information of delays from the Israel model with other data 

and methods used in Finnish standard appraisal. 

In this report present a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of grade-separation of two 

representative rail-road crossings, from rural and urban settings in Finland. 


A grade-separation of a rail-road crossing means building a bridge or a tunnel instead of 

existing at-grade crossing. A grade-separation eliminates existing railway-road crossing 

and consequently, removes the problem of train-vehicle collisions at the site considered. 

Besides, the grade-separation considerably diminishes the amount of road traffic delays at 

the site which previously stemmed from the crossing’s closures due to trains’ movements. 

A grade-separation is usually considered for rail-road crossings which are already 

protected by automatic gates and where the frequency of accidents due to, for instance, 

exceptional circumstances, is high. 


The target accident group are train-vehicle collisions at level crossings. 

The project aimed at developing screening tools for selecting crossings with high potential 

for grade-separation, i.e. those crossings where the costs of vehicle delays and safety 

problems associated with the at-grade crossings are sufficiently high in order to justify 

building a grade-separation. Such tools are needed for decision-makers as they both 

stimulate an objective policy and a systematic approach to the issue, and define a priority 

for grade separation at crossings. 

The tools are applied to perform a CBA of a grade-separation of two typical types of 

crossings. 


4.1 Assessment tools developed 

The economic losses associated with the current situation, i.e. at-grade crossing, stem 

from two main factors: vehicle delays and safety problems. These losses represent the 

economic benefits which can be attained due to eliminating at-grade crossing. The CBA 

should compare these potential benefits with the costs of building a grade-separation. 

The assessment tools developed for estimating potential benefits from a grade-separation 

include (Gitelman, Hakkert, 2001): 

Page 118


1. An accident prediction model, which, along with accident costs, supplies a 

basis for evaluating losses due to safety problems at level crossings. 

2. A model for evaluating economic losses due to vehicle delays at any 

crossing, based on its parameters. 

3. A quantitative criterion for grade separation which combines the results of 

both models. 

The principles, designed for the Israel, also apply for the Finnish case, despite using 

different tools for evaluation and modelling in Finland. In Finland, the common tool for 

economic appraisal of transport projects is socio-economic profitability calculations, which 

are based on calculating the vehicle costs, time savings (or losses), accident changes, 

pollution and noise costs of the investment project. This method is applied in this study to 

ensure compatibility with other appraisals in Finland. 

4.1.1 Evaluating economic losses due to safety problems 

Safety concerns at level crossings frequently provide the main reason for grade-separation 

(Europe@ 1998; US GAO 1995). The evaluation of the safety factor needs two inputs: an 

estimate of the expected number of accidents per crossing and the cost of an average 

crossing accident. The expected number of accidents per crossing represents the annual 

number of accidents which will be saved due to grade-separation, whereas their costs 

demonstrate the economic value of safety benefits expected. In Finland rail statistics 

collect data on annual accidents and for each type of accident there is a specified value to 

be used in estimating the monetary loss resulting from the accident. 

In Finland both the Railway and Road authorities have systems to collect accident data 

with location-specified. This means that for each of the crossings it is possible to collect 

history data on accidents, traffic volumes and other relevant information. 

There is a model called TARVA in use in Finland to estimate the accidents data. TARVA 

can be used to calculate the probabilities of accidents on the specified location on the 

roads network. However, the calculation of accidents and their prevention in the selected 

crossings proved difficult as there were only minor accidents on the locations. 

The following Table 49 summarises the unit values used for various types of accidents. 

The unit values are confirmed by the Finnish Ministry of Transport and 

Telecommunications and the figures were last revised in 2000. Particularly the 

compensation for severe accidents has risen over time, reflecting changes in the method 

to shift towards willingness-to-pay method. 

Table 49. Unit values for accidents. (Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications 2003). 

Accident with severe injury damages, € 386,832.00 

Accident leading to death, € 2,430,316.00 

Average value of the accident, € 84,094.00 

4.1.2 Evaluating economic losses due to vehicle delays 

We utilise the evidence from Israel to supplement the Finnish evaluation method of 

transport project to estimate the vehicle delays. This is useful since there are no accurate 

Finnish values available for this type of delay (which is often considered too small an item 

Page 119


to be accurately measured). In Israel, a sample of 20 crossings was selected for detailed 

measurement. The crossings were selected from among the busier lines of the rail 

network. 

At each crossing, the parameters measured were as follows: vehicular traffic volumes; 

closure times and queue release times; and vehicle speeds. For traffic volumes, hourly 

distribution was attained, along with the traffic subdivision into three vehicle classes: cars, 

trucks and buses. Prior to the evaluation, the hours were divided into three time intervals, 

according to the traffic volumes observed: peak, low (night) and intermediate volumes. The 

closure times (of the automatic gates) were estimated for three types of trains: passenger 

trains, freight trains and operational trains. Vehicle speeds were measured at a “free” 

distance from the crossing and emmediately before the crossing. Besides, for each 

crossing, the number of train transitions per each hour was calculated based on the 

railway line operative time-table. 

The analysis revealed that the closure times depend on the train type, train speed and the 

vicinity of station, whereas for the times for queue release no clear dependence was seen 

between this parameter and the average traffic volume or closure time (Gitelman, Hakkert, 

2001). 

The annual cost of vehicular delays at a crossing was estimated from: 

D = 260⋅[ N ⋅ d1 

+ ( V − N) 

⋅ d2 

] 

(1) 

where 

D=annual cost of vehicular delays, euros (for 260 working days a year), 

V = vehicular daily traffic volume, vehicles, 

N = number of vehicles stopped at the crossing per day, 

d1 = average cost of a vehicle’s stopping at the crossing, euros, 

d2 = average cost of a vehicle’ slowing down at the crossing, euros. 

The economic losses sustained from traffic delays ensue from additional consumption of 

fuel and other vehicle expenses and from the time lost to vehicle occupants because of 

“velocity cycles” when passing the crossing. Estimating d1 and d2 in the above formula, the 

losses due to different vehicle and train types at a specific crossing were weighted, in 

accordance with the shares of these types in daily vehicle/ train traffic at this site. 

The detailed calculation of vehicle delay costs at a specific crossing consists of various 

and multiple data considerations. Hence, for a rapid screening of sites, an approximate 

formula was developed which allows estimation, based on the crossing’s parameters and 

without prolonged calculations. The model fitting was performed by means of the SAS 

multiple linear regression module, where the parameters and estimates of the sample 

crossings served as a database. The approximate formula recommended for application 

was (Gitelman, Hakkert, 2001): 

Y/3.79 = -0.656044 + 0.000108*V + 0.0023038*Trains + 0.094042*Slowdown (3) 

where 

Y/3.79 = annual economic loss due to vehicle delays at a crossing, million euros (where 

3.79 is the exchange rate of NIS/euro), 

V – daily traffic volume (vehicles), 

Trains – daily number of trains (trains), 

Slowdown – average vehicle speed reduction due to a crossing (km/h). 

Page 120


4.2 Considering cost of the measure 

Summing up the costs of vehicle delays and of safety problems provides a value of annual 

economic loss at the level crossing, i.e. the magnitude of economic benefits, which could 

be attained due to a grade-separation. This value should be compared with the 

construction costs. Urban grade separations tend to be larger projects and have higher 

costs than rural crossings, with a range of € 5.0 million to urban and € 2.9 million for rural 

crossings, at 2000 prices, would be a reasonable average for the construction of a grade 

separation at a Finnish crossing. 

Considering the net present value of the construction costs, with a 5 per cent discount rate 

used in the Finnish project appraisal and a 20-year project life 18 , supplies a value of 

benefits (or annual economic loss at a level crossing) that would justify a grade-separation. 

We note that the cost of the project is considerably higher in the rural context when 

calculated per crossing vehicle as opposed to urban crossings. 

In Finland the decision-making on grade-separation appears to be non-linked to the 

economic benefits of the upgrading, but rather on the comfort and safety of travel, 

expressed in non-monetary terms. This is evident from the fact that the costs tend to be 

reasonably high in the rural context, which is itself a factor hindering the developments but 

also leads to decision-making where crossings are built independent of their costs. 


5.1 General 

In this section we consider a CBA of grade-separation of two different types of crossings. 

To note, a cost-benefit and not cost-effectiveness analysis was chosen, due to following 

reasons: 

2. Standard project appraisal in Finland on transport sector is based on cost-benefit, 

not cost-effectiveness analysis. 

3. Monetary valuations of all benefits and costs should be applied (inter alia, to justify 

the implementation of the measure). 

The main data elements to be provided for the CBA performance are (WP3, 2004): 

• A definition of unit of implementation for the measure; 

• An estimate of the number of accidents are expected to prevent per unit 

implemented of the measure, through: identification of target accidents, estimate of 

the number of target accidents expected to occur per year, estimate of the safety 

effect of the measure on target accidents; 

• Accident costs; 

• Other monetary values depending on the effects considered; 

• An estimate of the costs of implementing the measure; 

• The economic frame for the evaluation (length of service life, interest rate). 

18 According to Finnish recommendations for economic evaluation of transport projects 

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In our case of grade separation of at-grade crossings, the above data elements will be as 

follows: 

• The unit of implementation is one at-grade crossing; 

• Target accidents are all train-vehicle accidents at the at-grade crossings. The 

number of target accidents expected to occur per year can be estimated using a 

prediction model, TARVA. The safety effect of the measure is 100% reduction in 

target accidents, as a grade-separation implies the elimination of all train-vehicle 

collisions. Thus, in this case, the number of accidents are expected to prevent 

following implementation of the treatment is equal to the number of target accidents 

which are expected to occur at the site, prior to implementation of the treatment. 

• Accident costs – see Section 4.1.1; 

• Other monetary values include costs of travel time and vehicle operating costs; they 

can be estimated using formulae from Section 4.1.2; 

• The average cost of implementing the measure – see Section 4.2; 

• The economic frame for the evaluation: 20-year project life, with 5% discount rate. 

The CBA is performed for two at -grade crossings: one in the rural context (Outinen) and 

one in the urban context (Hennala). 

5.2 CBA of a rural crossing 

Crossing at Outinen is a rural rail-road crossing, which is situated on the Kouvola- 

Pieksämäki railroad section. The area is sparsely populated and Outinen serves as a 

perfect example of a rural crossing in the Finnish context. The original setting of the 

crossing gates, as shown in the Figure 1. While the speed limit on the road was 80 km/h, 

this crossing was considered extremely dangerous as people did not slow down sufficiently 

to ensure they could stop before a train approached the crossing. 

Page 122

Figure 14: Outinen crossing prior to changes. 


The site has the following characteristics: 

Frequency of car traffic is low – 126 vehicles, with 95% private cars and 5% trucks. 

Number of trains – 13 passenger trains daily, an estimate of 7 freight trains, total of 20 

daily trains 

There have not been any accidents at the crossing during the period of 1990-2000, so we 

estimate that despite the dangerous location of the crossing there is no annual 

monetarised safety impact of the grade separation. 

The average free speeds measured on the road were 61-66 km/h, the average crossing 

speeds were 44-48 km/h. Thus, the average slowdown at the crossing is 17-18 km/h. 

Providing the socio-economic profitability calculus for the crossing yields us the CBA 

results. A comparison of the net present values of the benefits (from both safety and 

mobility improvements) with the average cost of building a grade-separation, provides the 

benefit-cost ratio of as follows: 0.65 from using the approximate formula. 

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5.3 CBA of an urban crossing 


Crossing at Hennala is an urban rail-road crossing, which is situated on the railroad 

between Riihimäki and Kouvola at Lahti, a city with population of around 100,000 

inhabitantis. 


Daily vehicle traffic – 4,328 vehicles, with 94% of private cars, 5% of trucks and 1% of 

buses; 

Number of trains per day – estimated at 70, with 53 passenger trains and 17 of freight 

trains. 

There average cost of the accident on the crossing is evaluated at 84094 euros, based on 

the fact that there were no severe accidents at the crossing during the period 1990-2000- 

The annual loss due to accidents, or the economic value of safety benefits due to 

implementation of the measure, is therefore equal to 8.410 euro at 2000 prices. 

The average free speeds measured on the road were 48-53 km/h, the average crossing 

speeds were 25-31 km/h. Thus, the average slowdown at the crossing is 36-40 km/h. 

Providing the socio-economic profitability calculus for the crossing yields us the CBA 

results. A comparison of the net present values of the benefits (from both safety and 

mobility improvements) with the average cost of building a grade-separation, provides the 

benefit-cost ratio of as follows: 0.25 from using the approximate formula. 


For the rural case, the CBA results yield a non-profitable CBA ratio of 0.65. This is in 

particular due to the savings in both average waiting times (which are abolished) and the 

increase in speed in the absence of level crossing as the accidents data did not support 

major savings from accident costs. 

The cost-benefit ratios for a grade-separation of the urban crossing was 0.25, which is not 

generally considered a profitable level for a project. However, given that there were no 

observed safety impacts to be added (which could be obtained from larger data of similar 

types of crossings to estimate the probability of severe accident and the associated 

monetary value) adding these elements to the case would most likely yield a higher 

benefit-cost ratio. 

The safety aspects play no role in economic analysis, due to the fact that there was only 

one minor accident at the urban crossing and none in the rural during the period 1990- 

2000. However, one should remember that safety problems of the at-grade crossings are 

usually the main reason for consideration of grade-separation. 

7 Decision Making Process 

The study has utilised data from Finnish Rail Administration, which has an on-going 

evaluation program of railroad system, including level crossings. It is hoped that the results 

from economic analysis of safety measures could be applied in the future decision-making. 

For these purposes, the more analytical Israel model could be applied and, if needed, 

calibrated to fit the Finnish situation. 

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The project's results – a list of crossings warranting a grade-separation, were adopted by 

the Planning Department of the Ministry of Transport, which is responsible for financing 

and planning of improvements of public road networks. 

The CBA provided a firm basis for the evalution's performance and for selecting crossings 

which have higher priorities for future investments. 

8 Role of barriers 

Considering the main groups of barriers to the use of EAT or to the implementation of 

evaluation results (WP2, 2004), one can conclude that none of them played a serious role 

in the project's performance. Authorities were very helpful in providing data and given that 

the analysis are ex post, in the sense that the projects were implemented without a CBA, 

the results are considered useful for future evaluations. 

9 Discussion 

A grade-separation of an at-grade crossing can be beneficial under certain conditions. The 

daily number of trains and daily road traffic volume are the main crossing parameters in 

this consideration as they influence both the accident frequencies and the extent of traffic 

delays, at the crossing. In some cases, conditions caused by weather or visibility 

consideration can create need to construct the level-crossing, even if the appears to be 

economically disadvantageous. 

In the study, the evaluation tools of standard road transport CBA were applied to gradeseparation. 

Examples of a CBA of two typical crossings were provided. The crossings 

warrant a grade-separation while both safety and mobility benefits are accounted for in the 

rural setting, in the urban setting more detailed review of statistically meaningful safety 

impacts should be considered. In the rural context, the speed and delay impact starts to 

dominate the calculation when there are sufficient speed gains from the construction of the 

grade-separation. This is something that should be made clear as it may imply careless 

driving in the first instance. 

The CBA presented in this study was satisfactory from many viewpoints, such as: 

1. the evaluation findings supported the measure's implementation, at least partially; 

2. the evaluation performed was in line with the criteria of correct evaluation (WP3, 

2004), as special data were collected for different evaluation tasks and statistical 

models were fitted to the data; 

3. the accident costs were fitted to the accident type considered; 

4. the evaluation study was initiated by the authorities and the results were accepted 

by the decision-makers. 

In general, in the case presented, the majority of technical and institutional barriers for the 

CBA's performance were overcome. It should be noted, though, that in general the railway 

crossings in Finland do not require black spot management, since the phenomena does 

not exist in Finland. Distribution of accidents is random and cannot be assigned to certain 

spots in the network. 

The evaluation results had a number of limitations, such as: 

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1. The implementation costs include mostly initial investments. Maintenance costs 

were not explicitly considered neither for at-grade nor for grade-separated 

crossings. 

2. The average value of implementation costs was applied for all sites considered. 

Providing specific values will need for detailed feasibility studies of specific 

locations. 

3. No confidence interval was provided for the safety effect value. As explained 

previously, the safety effect in this case is stable (i.e. eliminating all accidents), 

whereas the safety benefits from the measure depend on the number of accidents 

expected at the site, per year. The latter was predicted by a model. However, safety 

impacts played almost no role in the analysis. 

4. The contribution of safety factor to the benefits from the measure implementation 

was relatively low. This is the usual problem in calculating the socio-economic 

profitability of investment projects, where time savings dominate other impacts, 

including safety. These case studies suggest that the implementation of crossings is 

not related to safety assessment but other decision-making criteria. 

5. Environmental impact was not quantified by the CBA performed. 

Page 126

REFERENCES 


Ahonen, T., A. Seise and E. Ritari (2003). Tasoristeysten turvallisuus Porin ympäristön 

rataosilla. Research Report RTE3815/03. 48 pages. VTT, 

Espoo. 

Ahonen, T., A. Seise and E. Ritari (2004). Tasoristeysten turvallisuus Seinäjoki-Kaskinenrataosalla. 

Research Report RTE2208/04. 87 pages. VTT, 

Espoo. 

Ahonen, T., A. Seise and E. Ritari (2004). Tasoristeysten turvallisuus Seinäjoki-Oulurataosuudella. 

Research Report RTE742/04. 71 pages. VTT, 

Espoo. 

Ahonen, T., A. Seise and E. Ritari (2004). Tasoristeysten turvallisuus Pieksamäki- 

Joensuu-rataosuudella. Research Report RTE154/04. 68 

pages. VTT, Espoo. 

Gitelman V., Hakkert A.S. (2001) Updating procedures for the consideration of gradeseparation 

at road-rail crossings in Israel. Research Report 

No 285/2001, Transportation Research Institute, Haifa, Israel 

(in Hebrew). 

Hytönen, J., T. Ahonen and A. Seise (2004). Tasoristeysten turvallisuus Joensuu- 

Uimaharju-rataosuudella. . Research Report RTE2207/04. 47 

pages. VTT, Espoo. 

Hytönen, J., T. Ahonen and A. Seise (2004). Tasoristeysten turvallisuus Niirala-Säkäniemi 

rataosalla. . Research Report RTE776/04. 39 pages. VTT, 

Espoo. 

Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications (2003). Guidelines for project appraisal. 

Ratahallintokeskus (2004) Suomen rautatietilasto 2004. The Finnish Railway Statistics. 

WP3 (2004) Improvements in efficiency assessment tools. ROSEBUD. 

WP2 (2004) Barriers to the use of efficiency assessment tools in road safety policy. 

ROSEBUD. 

Page 127

CASE F2: Grade-separation at ROAD-RAIL crossings 



ROSEBUD 

WP4 - CASE F REPORT 

GRADE-SEPARATION AT ROAD-RAIL 

CROSSINGS 



ISRAEL



1 PROBLEM ..........................................................................................................131 


3 TARGET GROUP ...............................................................................................132 


4.1 Assessment tools developed...............................................................................132 

4.1.1 Evaluating economic losses due to safety problems...........................................132 

4.1.2 Evaluating economic losses due to vehicle delays..............................................134 

4.2 Considering the cost of the measure...................................................................135 


5.1 General ...............................................................................................................136 

5.2 CBA of a rural crossing .......................................................................................137 

5.3 CBA of an urban crossing ...................................................................................138 


7 DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.........................................................................139 


9 DISCUSSION......................................................................................................139 

Page 129

CASE OVERVIEW 


Measure 

Grade-separation of at-grade road-rail crossings 

Problem 

Train-vehicle collisions at the crossing (and vehicle delays due to crossing's closures) 

Target Group 

Train-vehicle accidents 

Targets 

Diminishing accidents and traffic delays 

Initiator 

Planning Department of the Ministry of Transport 


Planning Department of the Ministry of Transport, Road Authorities, Railway Authorities 

Costs 

Investments in grade-separation construction; paid by the Ministry of Transport 

Benefits 

The benefits are accident savings and a reduction in traffic delays. Driving public will 

benefit. 


For a rural crossing: from 1:1.9 to 1:2.8; for an urban crossing: from 1:1.0 to 1:1.4. 

Page 130

1 Problem 


The large majority of road-rail crossings in Israel, like in any country, are level (at-grade) 

crossings. In general, at-grade road-rail crossings are associated with economic losses 

due to vehicle delays and train-vehicle collisions. The problem becomes urgent when a 

rapid increase in train traffic occurs as happened with the Israeli railways since the mid 

90s. This necessitated a policy concerning the need and priorities for grade separation at 

such crossings. 

To illustrate the situation in numbers over the past years (1995-2000), a rapid increase in 

train frequencies occurred on most railway lines in Israel: the total number of passenger 

trains per day changed from 80 to more than 200, with an annual average increase of 21 

percent. This was accompanied by a jump in rail-highway crossing accidents in 1997- 

1999. Besides, a steady increase in road traffic over the years took place, as well as the 

doubling of railway lines along the main train corridors. All these developments stimulated 

the Ministry of Transport to re-examine the state of road-rail crossing safety. 

A preliminary analysis demonstrated that a significant part of locations with accident 

occurrences are at-grade crossings that are equipped with automatic safety gates (i.e. 

have the highest form of safety protection for at-grade crossings). Due to high train 

frequencies and significant road traffic volumes at some crossings, the economic losses 

because of vehicle delays might be high. Therefore, the question was to point out the sites 

where a grade-separation is warranted. 

The process of grade-separation is expensive. It is therefore essential to provide a 

systematic approach for decision-makers that will lead to a considered decision on the 

benefits and costs associated with grade-separation. 

However, a detailed investigation of a specific crossing is time-consuming and costly 

(Tustin et al. 1986; Taggart et al. 1987), and cannot be reasonably performed for a large 

number of sites. Thus, at the initial stage, screening tools are required that will assist in 

choosing from the whole set of locations (i.e. from the whole railway network) those 

warranting further consideration. Therefore, the Ministry of Transport initiated a study to 

develop such screening tools and provide for an exhaustive list of sites having a potential 

for grade separation throughout the whole railway network 

The screening tools for crossings’ consideration for grade-separation were developed by 

the study Gitelman, Hakkert (2001). The tools consist of a safety model, a formula for 

estimating the economic loss due to vehicle delays at a crossing, and a qualification 

criterion. The tools are based on economic principles, comparing the economic loss due to 

an at-grade crossing with the average cost of grade-separation. 

In this report we will briefly discuss the development of the screening tools and present a 

cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of grade-separation of two representative road-rail crossings. 


A grade-separation of a road-rail crossing means building a bridge or a tunnel instead of 

an existing at-grade crossing. A grade-separation eliminates existing railway-road 

crossings and consequently, removes the problem of train-vehicle collisions at the site 

considered. Besides, the grade-separation considerably diminishes the amount of road 

traffic delays at the site that previously stemmed from the crossing’s closures due to trains’ 

movements. 

Page 131


A grade-separation is usually considered for road-rail crossings that are already protected 

by automatic gates. 


The target accident group are train-vehicle collisions at level crossings. 

The project aimed at developing screening tools for selecting crossings with a high 

potential for grade-separation, i.e. those crossings where the costs of vehicle delays and 

safety problems associated with the at-grade crossings are sufficiently high in order to 

justify building a grade-separation. Such tools are needed for decision-makers, as they 

both stimulate an objective policy and a systematic approach to the issue, and define a 

priority for grade separation at crossings. 

The tools are applied to perform a CBA of a grade-separation of two typical crossings. 


4.1 Assessment tools developed 

• The economic losses associated with the current situation, i.e. at-grade crossing, stem 

from two main factors: vehicle delays and safety problems. These losses represent the 

economic benefits, which can be attained due to eliminating the at-grade crossing. The 

CBA should compare these potential benefits with the costs of building a gradeseparation. 

The assessment tools developed for estimating potential benefits from a grade-separation 

include (Gitelman, Hakkert, 2001): 

• An accident prediction model, which, along with accident costs, supplies a basis for 

evaluating losses due to safety problems at level crossings. 

• A model for evaluating economic losses due to vehicle delays at any crossing, based 

on its parameters. 

• A quantitative criterion for grade separation, which combines the results of both 

models. 

• Field measurements at twenty representative sites (out of more than 200), as well as 

accident data and the crossings’ inventory for five years (1995-1999), provided a basis 

for building the tools. 

4.1.1 Evaluating economic losses due to safety problems 

Safety concerns at level crossings frequently provide the main reason for grade-separation 

(Europe@ 1998; US GAO 1995). The evaluation of the safety factor needs two inputs: an 

estimate of the expected number of accidents per crossing and the cost of an average 

crossing accident. The expected number of accidents per crossing represents the annual 

Page 132


number of accidents that will be prevented due to grade-separation, whereas their costs 

demonstrate the economic value of safety benefits expected. Both inputs were developed 

based on the data on train-vehicle accidents, which occurred at all level Israeli crossings 

over the five years, 1995-1999. 

To estimate the number of accidents expected at a specific crossing based on the crossing 

characteristics, a multiple regression model was developed. The database for the models’ 

development comprised, in total, 80 accidents and 994 “crossing-years”; both populations 

were built as a unification of five-year statistics, with necessary updates of crossings’ 

characteristics for each year considered. 

The model was developed by means of the S+ and SAS statistical packages. The Poisson 

rather than the Negative Binomial distribution was found to fit the accident frequencies at 

the crossings. As known, when a Negative Binomial distribution is found to be most 

suitable, it is customary to apply the Empirical-Bayes method for predicting accident 

numbers (WP3, 2004). In our case, the expected number of accidents at a local crossing 

should be defined mainly by its type (i.e. estimated by means of the fitted regression 

model) without a need for further correction of the value using the Empirical-Bayes 

method. In other words, the expected number of accidents at a crossing is equal to the 

expected number of accidents at an average site of this type. 

The model recommended for application in Israeli conditions looks as follows: 

λ = exp(-5.904 + 1.183*PROTECT + 0.426*NVOL + 0.876*NTRAIN - 

0.6*NTRAIN*PROTECT) (1) 

where 

λ = the expected number of accidents at a local crossing, per year; 

PROTECT= protection level, with 1 for “gate” or “lights”, 0 for “signs only”; 

NVOL = category of traffic volume, a number between 1-5 (see values in Table 50); 

NTRAIN = category of the number of trains, a number between 1-7 (see values in Table 50). 

Table 50: Categories of crossing characteristics, for evaluating crossing safety 

Vehicle traffic volume Daily number of trains 

Category Value, thousand Category Value, trains per day 

number vehicles per day number 

1 ≤ 1.0 1 Irregular* 

2 1.0-5.0 2 ≤ 10 

3 5.0-10.0 3 10-30 

4 10.0-20.0 4 30-50 

5 ≥ 20.0 5 50-80 

6 80-110 

7 ≥ 110 

*does not appear in operative timetable 

The cost of an average crossing accident was estimated using actual accident 

consequences over the 5-year period. The list of accident consequences included the 

effects of human injury; damage to vehicle, train and crossing equipment; delays of road 

and train traffic; and the activities of authorities involved, i.e. police, trial, railway accident 

investigation team, etc – see Table 51. The cost of an average train-vehicle crossing 

accident was estimated to be about NIS 448,000 or € 118,000 (at 2000 prices). The 

accident injury and fatality costs were calculated on the basis of the gross loss of output 

Page 133


method. Had the ‘willingness-to-pay’ method been used, the accident costs would 

probably have doubled. 

Table 51: Calculation of Cost of Average Crossing Accident 

Ordinal Accident Consequence Frequency Unit Cost, Contribution to 

number 

per Accident NIS Total Cost, NIS 

1. Fatality 0.091 2,726,500 248,112 

2. Injury 0.334 205,000 68,470 

3. Damage to vehicle 0.979 47,487 46,490 

4. Damage to train 0.448 65,758 29,460 

5. Damage to crossing equipment 0.113 27,782 3,139 

6. Passenger train traffic delays 0.468 3,123 1,462 

7. Freight train traffic delays 0.379 491 186 

8. Railway maintenance work delay 0.091 240 22 

9. Road traffic delays 1 5,861 5,861 

10. Activities of authorities involved: 

police; trial; social insurance, etc and 

railway accident investigation team 

1 44,447 44,447 

Total accident cost NIS 447,649 

or € 118,020 

Note: NIS = New Israeli Shekel, € 1= 3.793 NIS. At 2000 prices. 

The composition of the accident cost with the expected accident number supplies the 

annual cost evaluation of safety problems at a crossing. 

4.1.2 Evaluating economic losses due to vehicle delays 

• A sample of 20 crossings was selected for detailed measurement. The crossings were 

selected from among the busier lines of the rail network. 

• At each crossing, the parameters measured were as follows: vehicular traffic volumes, 

closure times and queue release times, and vehicle speeds. For traffic volumes, hourly 

distribution was attained, along with the traffic subdivision into three vehicle classes: 

cars, trucks and buses. Prior to the evaluation, the hours were divided into three time 

intervals, according to the traffic volumes observed: peak, low (night) and intermediate 

volumes. The closure times (of the automatic gates) were estimated for three types of 

trains: passenger trains, freight trains and operational trains. Vehicle speeds were 

measured at a “free” distance from the crossing and immediately before the crossing. 

Besides, for each crossing the number of train transitions per each hour was calculated 

based on the railway line operative timetable. 

• The analysis revealed that the closure times depended on the train type, train speed 

and the vicinity of station, whereas for the times for queue release no clear 

dependence was seen between this parameter and the average traffic volume or 

closure time [GITELMAN, HAKKERT, 2001]. 

Page 134


The annual cost of vehicular delays at a crossing was estimated from: 

D = 260⋅[ N ⋅ d1 

+ ( V − N) 

⋅ d2 

] 

(2) 

where 

D = annual cost of vehicular delays, NIS (for 260 working days a year), 

V = vehicular daily traffic volume, vehicles, 

N = number of vehicles stopped at the crossing per day, 

d1 = average cost of a vehicle’s stopping at the crossing, NIS, 

d2 = average cost of a vehicle’ slowing down at the crossing, NIS. 

The economic losses sustained from traffic delays ensue from additional consumption of 

fuel and other vehicle expenses and from the time lost to vehicle occupants because of 

“velocity cycles” when passing the crossing. Estimating d1 and d2 in the above formula, the 

losses due to different vehicle and train types at a specific crossing were weighted, in 

accordance with the shares of these types in daily vehicle/ train traffic at this site. 

The detailed calculation of vehicle delay costs at a specific crossing consists of various 

and multiple data considerations. Hence, for a rapid screening of sites, an approximate 

formula was developed which allows estimation based on the crossing’s parameters and 

without prolonged calculations. The model fitting was performed by means of the SAS 

multiple linear regression module where the parameters and estimates of the sample 

crossings served as a database. The approximate formula recommended for application 

was [GITELMAN, HAKKERT, 2001]: 

Y = -0.656044 + 0.000108*V + 0.0023038*Trains + 0.094042*Slowdown (3) 

where 

Y = annual economic loss due to vehicle delays at a crossing, million NIS, 

V = daily traffic volume (vehicles), 

Trains = daily number of trains (trains), 

Slowdown = average vehicle speed reduction due to a crossing (km/h). 

4.2 Considering the cost of the measure 

Summing up the costs of vehicle delays and of safety problems provides a value of annual 

economic loss at the level crossing, i.e. the magnitude of economic benefits, which could 

be attained due to a grade-separation. This value should be compared with the 

construction costs. Consultation with local economic experts and authorities that 

supervised some recent grade separations suggested that a figure of NIS 10 million (€ 2.6 

million), at 2000 prices, would be a reasonable average for the construction of a grade 

separation at an Israeli crossing. 

Considering the net present value of the construction costs, with a 7 percent discount rate 

and a 15-year project life 19 supplies a value of benefits (or annual economic loss at a level 

crossing) that would justify a grade-separation. This is a loss of 1.1 million NIS at least (€ 

0.290 million; at 2000 prices), to provide a benefit-cost ratio higher than 1. 

19 According to Israeli recommendations for economic evaluation of transport projects 

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Applying the boundary value of 1.1 million NIS to the estimates of sample crossings, 13 

sites (out of 20) were chosen as meriting a grade-separation [GITELMAN, HAKKERT, 

2001]. Considering the parameters of two groups of crossings, i.e. those warranting and 

those not yet warranting a grade-separation, a criterion was developed for a preliminary 

crossing's qualification from the viewpoint of its potential for grade-separation. The 

criterion examines two crossing's parameters: daily vehicle traffic and number of trains per 

day, and compares them with the boundary values for urban or rural crossings (depending 

on the crossing's location). For example, for urban crossings, the consideration for a 

grade-separation is irrelevant for sites with less than 20 trains per day or when the daily 

vehicle traffic is less than 8,000 [GITELMAN, HAKKERT, 2001]. 


5.1 General 

In this section we consider a CBA of grade-separation of two typical crossings. To note, a 

cost-benefit and not cost-effectiveness analysis was chosen, due to following reasons: 

1. multiple policy objectives to be considered (both safety and mobility), 

2. monetary valuations of all benefits and costs should be applied (inter 

alia, to justify the implementation of the measure). 

The main data elements to be provided for the CBA performance are (WP3, 2004): 

• A definition of unit of implementation for the measure; 

• An estimate of the number of accidents expected to be prevented per unit implemented 

of the measure, through: identification of target accidents, estimate of the number of 

target accidents expected to occur per year, estimate of the safety effect of the 

measure on target accidents; 

• Accident costs; 

• Other monetary values depending on the effects considered; 

• An estimate of the costs of implementing the measure; 

• The economic frame for the evaluation (length of service life, interest rate). 

In our case of grade separation of at-grade crossings, the above data elements will be as 

follows: 

• The unit of implementation is one at-grade crossing; 

• Target accidents are all train-vehicle accidents at the at-grade crossings. The number 

of target accidents expected to occur per year can be estimated using a prediction 

model (formula 1 above). The safety effect of the measure is 100% reduction in target 

accidents, as a grade-separation implies the elimination of all train-vehicle collisions. 

Thus, in this case, the number of accidents expected to be prevented following 

implementation of the treatment is equal to the number of target accidents that are 

expected to occur at the site, prior to implementation of the treatment. 

Page 136

• Accident costs – see Section 4.1.1; 


• Other monetary values include costs of travel time and vehicle operating costs; they 

can be estimated using formulae from Section 4.1.2; 

• The average cost of implementing the measure – see Section 4.2; 

• The economic frame for the evaluation: 15-year project life, with 7% discount rate. The 

accumulated discount factor is 9.108. 

The CBA is performed for two at -grade crossings: No 19 and No 133. 

5.2 CBA of a rural crossing 

Crossing No. 19 is a rural road-rail crossing, which is situated on 45.106 km of Haifa-Tel- 

Aviv railway line and on a regional road No. 651; the crossing is protected by automatic 

gates. 


Daily vehicle traffic - 15,330 vehicles, with 93% of private cars, 5% of trucks and 2% of 

buses; 

Number of trains per day - 132, with 89% of passenger trains and 11% of freight trains. 

Using Formula 1, the expected number of accidents per year will be 0.338 (that is the 

number of accidents to be prevented due to the measure). The annual loss due to 

accidents, or the economic value of safety benefits due to implementation of the measure, 

is equal to 0.151 million NIS (€ 0.040 million), at 2000 prices. 

The average free speeds measured on the road were 66-68 kph, the average crossing 

speeds – 51-52 kph (for private cars, buses) and 44 kph (for trucks). Thus, the average 

slowdown at the crossing is 15-16 kph (for private cars, buses) and 22 kph (for trucks). 

The average cost of a slowdown at the crossing is estimated to be 0.49 NIS. 

The average length of the crossing closure is 0.37 min due to a passenger train, and 1.46 

min due to a freight train. The average cost of stopping due to the crossing's closure is 

2.23 NIS. 

Using Formula 2 for a detailed calculation, the annual costs of vehicle delays at the 

crossing will be 2.916 million NIS (€ 0.769 million), at 2000 prices. 

Another estimate of the annual costs of vehicle delays, based on the approximate Formula 

3 will be 1.925 million NIS (€ 0.508 million), at 2000 prices. 

Effects, safety, and mobility compose the benefits from the grade-separation of the 

crossing. A comparison of the net present values of the benefits with the average cost of 

building a grade-separation provides the cost-benefit ratios as follows: 

1:2.79 when the costs of delays come from a detailed calculation; 

1:1.89 when the costs of delays come from the approximate formula. 

Page 137

5.3 CBA of an urban crossing 


Crossing No. 133 is an urban railroad crossing, which is situated on 114.806 km of Remez 

Junction-Kiriam Gat railway line and on Jabotinsky Street in Beer Yakov; the crossing is 

protected by automatic gates. 


Daily vehicle traffic - 13,156 vehicles, with 91% of private cars, 7% of trucks and 2% of 

buses; 

Number of trains per day - 71, with 86% of passenger trains and 14% of freight trains. 

Using Formula 1, the expected number of accidents per year will be 0.195 (that is the 

number of accidents to be prevented due to the measure). The annual loss due to 

accidents, or the economic value of safety benefits due to implementation of the measure, 

is equal to 0.087 million NIS (€ 0.023 million), at 2000 prices. 

The average free speeds measured on the road were 43-49 kph, the average crossing 

speeds – 42-47 kph. Thus, the average slowdown at the crossing is 1-2 kph. The average 

cost of a slowdown at the crossing is 0.13 NIS. 

The average length of the crossing closure is 0.51 min due to a passenger train, and 0.77 

min due to a freight train. The average cost of a vehicle’s stopping due to the crossing's 

closure is 1.78 NIS. 

Using Formula 2 for a detailed calculation, the annual costs of vehicle delays at the 

crossing will be 1.023 million NIS (€ 0.270 million), at 2000 prices. 

Another estimate of the annual costs of vehicle delays, based on the approximate Formula 

3, will be 1.490 million NIS (€ 0.393 million), at 2000 prices. 

A comparison of the net present values of the benefits (from both safety and mobility 

improvements) with the average cost of building a grade-separation, provides the costbenefit 

ratios as follows: 

1:1.01 when the costs of delays come from a detailed calculation; 

1:1.44 when the costs of delays come from the approximate formula. 


The cost-benefit ratio for a grade-separation of crossing No. 19 ranges from 1:1.9 to 1:2.8; 

the cost-benefit ratio for a grade-separation of crossing No. 133 – from 1:1.0 to 1:1.4. In 

both cases, the treatment is warranted from the economic viewpoint. 

The safety factor had only a minor contribution to the economic benefits expected: 4.9%- 

7.3% for crossing No. 19, 5.5%-7.8% for crossing No. 133. However, one should 

remember that safety problems of the at-grade crossings are usually the main reason for 

consideration of grade-separation. 

Applying the evaluation tools developed for the examination of all existing Israeli crossings, 

in the year 2000, 30 sites out of 216 were found to warrant a grade-separation (Gitelman, 

Hakkert, 2001). 

Page 138



The study was initiated by the Planning Department of the Ministry of Transport in cooperation 

with the Israeli Railways. The study's steering committee included decisionmakers 

having senior positions in the Ministry of Transport and in the Railway Authority. 

The project's results – a list of crossings warranting a grade-separation were adopted by 

the Planning Department of the Ministry of Transport, which is responsible for financing 

and planning of improvements of public road networks. 

The CBA provided a firm basis for the evaluation’s performance and for selecting 

crossings that have higher priorities for future investments. 


• Considering the main groups of barriers to the use of EAT or to the implementation of 

evaluation results (WP2, 2004), one can conclude that none of them played a serious 

role in the project's performance. The transport authorities initiated the project and 

promoted the implementation of its results, therefore indicating that institutional or 

implementation barriers are actually irrelevant in this case. 

• The technical barriers, e.g. lack of knowledge of safety effect or of accident costs, 

existed at the beginning, but were solved later by means of relevant data collection and 

fitting statistical models for various evaluation needs. The assistance by railway 

executives was extremely important at the stage of collecting data on train-vehicle 

accidents and on railroad crossings' characteristics. 

9 Discussion 

A grade-separation of an at-grade crossing can be beneficial under certain conditions. The 

daily number of trains and daily road traffic volume are the main crossing parameters in 

this consideration as they influence both the accident frequencies and the extent of traffic 

delays at the crossing. 

In the study, the evaluation tools for preliminary CBA of a grade-separation were 

developed and applied for selecting crossings warranting implementation of the measure. 

Examples of a CBA of two typical crossings are provided. The crossings warrant a gradeseparation, 

while both safety and mobility benefits are accounted for. 

The CBA presented in this study was satisfactory from many viewpoints, such as: 

1. the evaluation findings supported the measure's implementation; 

2. the evaluation performed was in line with the criteria of correct evaluation 

(WP3, 2004); in particular, special data were collected for different evaluation 

tasks and statistical models were fitted to the data; 

3. the accident costs were fitted to the accident type considered; 

4. the evaluation study was initiated by the authorities and the results were 

accepted by the decision-makers. 

Page 139


In general, in the case presented, the majority of technical and institutional barriers for the 

CBA's performance were overcome. 

The evaluation results had a number of limitations, such as: 

1. The implementation costs include mostly initial investments. Maintenance 

costs were not explicitly considered either for at-grade or for grade-separated 

crossings. 

2. The average value of implementation costs was applied for all sites 

considered. Providing specific values will need detailed feasibility studies of 

specific locations. 

3. No confidence interval was provided for the safety effect value. As explained 

previously, the safety effect in this case is stable (i.e. eliminating all 

accidents), whereas the safety benefits from the measure depend on the 

number of accidents expected at the site per year. The latter was predicted 

by a model. 

4. The contribution of a safety factor to the benefits from the measure 

implementation was relatively low. This contribution might be doubled had 

the ‘willingness-to-pay’ method been used for estimating accident costs. 

5. Environmental impact was not quantified by the CBA performed. 

References 

Europe’s Approach to Rail Crossing Safety (1998): ITE Journal, Feb.,18. 

GITELMAN V., HAKKERT A.S. (2001): Updating procedures for the consideration of 

grade-separation at road-rail crossings in Israel. Research Report No 285/2001, 

Transportation Research Institute, Haifa, Israel (in Hebrew). 

Taggart, R.C., LAURIA, P. et al. (1987): Evaluating Grade-Separated Rail and Highway 

Crossing Alternatives. NCHRP Report 288, Transportation Research Board, 

Washington D.C. 

TUSTIN, B.H., RICHARDS, H., MCGEE, H. and PATTERSON, R. (1986): Railroad- 

Highway Grade Crossing Handbook. Report No. FHWA TS-86-215, Springfield VA. 

United States General Accounting Office (US GAO) (1995): Status of Efforts to Improve 

Railroad Crossing Safety. Report GAO-RCED-95-191, Washington, D.C. 

WP3 (2004): Improvements in efficiency assessment tools. ROSEBUD. 

WP2 (2004): Barriers to the use of efficiency assessment tools in road safety policy. 

ROSEBUD. 

Page 140

CASE G: MEASURE against collisions with trees 

ROSEBUD 

WP4 - CASE G REPORT 

MEASURES AGAINST COLLISIONS WITH TREES 

RN134 (LANDES) 

FRANCE 

BY PHILIPPE LEJEUNE, 

CETE SO, FRANCE


MEASURE AGAINST COLLISIONS WITH TREES 

1 CASE OVERVIEW..............................................................................................143 


3 DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURE...................................................................146 

4 TARGET ACCIDENT GROUP............................................................................146 


5.1 Choice of CBA.....................................................................................................147 

5.2 Assessment tool..................................................................................................147 

5.3 Road safety of the collisions against trees ..........................................................149 

5.4 Type of assessed impacts...................................................................................149 

5.5 Costs of the measure ..........................................................................................150 

5.6 Costs of accidents...............................................................................................150 





10 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................154 

Page 142

Case Overview 

Measure 


The measure aims to avoid the collisions with the trees along 26.5 km of the national road 

RN 134 over the "Département des Landes" in the Southwest of France. The measure 

consists of the implementation of 7800 meters of guardrails, 13 frontage accesses and 8 

lay-by. 

Problem 

Some stretches of the road RN 134 crossing through the forest have a high level of risk in 

terms of crashes and severity due to the row of trees along the road side. 

The problem was to propose and negotiate measures to reduce the number and the 

severity of the crashes by ensuring the protection of the row of trees by the means of 

guardrails when it was possible, or otherwise by means of tree felling. 

Target Group 

All the road users driving on two stretches of the national road RN 134, which had a high 

level of risk of collision with trees. 

Targets 

The safety measures applied along the tree-lined stretches of road had two main 

objectives: 1) Avoid the collisions of the vehicles against the trees, and 2) Reduce the 

accident severity of the remaining crashes. This second objective implies the use of 

normalized guardrails insuring the vehicles against violent impact, throwing the vehicles to 

the opposite carriageway. 

Initiator 

The initiator of this local safety road improvement is the local transport administration 

(DDE-CDES), but other actors at the French national, regional and local levels are also 

involved in decision-making and funding. 


Mid-level civil servants of the local transport administration (DDE-CDES) make the choices 

among the panel and define the time schedule of the "accepted" local road safety 

measures. These measures are mentioned in a ministerial decision signed by high-level 

civil servants of the Road Directorate of the Ministry of Transport at the national, regional, 

and local levels. 

Page 143

Costs 


The total cost for implementing the measure was around 1 million €, including 

management, studies, implementation and site supervision. All these costs have been paid 

by the Ministry of Transport through the financial management of the regional 

administration. 

Benefits 

The main benefit from implementing the measure consists of an important reduction of the 

number of accidents against trees, fatalities and crash severity. 


The Cost/Benefit ratio is 8.69. 

Page 144

1 Problem 


The RN 134, which crosses the forest of “Landes” along 64.5 km, has long, tree-lined 

stretches of road on which before the measure, 38.5% of the accidents occurred against 

trees. A detailed traffic safety study showed that 58% of the accidents occurred over two 

stretches of road, which is 26.5 km length. Finally, the survey shows that 82% of the 

accidents against trees on the RN 134 occurred alongside the 26.5 km of these two 

stretches of road. Furthermore, during the period before the treatment (1993-1997) the 

safety indicators (accidents, casualties and injuries) of the crashes against trees were 

increasing (see Figure 15). 

Figure 15: Indicators and trends of accidents against trees 

10 

8 

6 

4 

2 

0 

Indicators and trends of accidents against trees 

(stretches of road RN134 before treatments) 

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 

Accidents Killed Injured Seriously 

On the other hand during the same period (1993-1997) the safety indicators (accidents, 

casualties and injuries) of crashes against trees were decreasing alongside the roads of 

Landes (see Figure 16 below). 

Figure 16: Safety of crashes against trees in Landes 

120 

100 

80 

60 

40 

20 

0 

LANDES 

Safety of crashes against trees 

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 

Accidents Killed Injured Seriously 

Therefore the problem was to take measures to reduce the number and the severity of the 

crashes alongside these 26.5 km, which had the highest and increasing level of risk. For 

this purpose, the more suitable measures were the protection of tree rows by means of 

Page 145


guardrails, when possible, or otherwise tree felling should be examined. This second 

measure raised other difficulties due to ecological pressure groups that are against tree 

felling. Therefore, it has been decided to spend time and money to reach an agreement 

between the local authorities, decision-makers and ecological pressure groups to solve the 

problem jointly, i.e. traffic safety taking into account the ecological aspect. 


Taking into account this road safety problem specifics, i.e. traffic safety and ecology, the 

study carried out by the local administration of the Ministry of Transport (DDE-CDES) 

located precisely the stretches of road to be treated. Along all 26.5 km of these road 

stretches, the choice between guardrails and cutting trees down had to be done case by 

case according to the five following technical criteria: 

1. The distance between the trees and the carriageway, 

2. The number of trees (isolated trees to cut down), 

3. Lay-by where hard shoulders are missing, 

4. General state of health of trees, 

5. The frontage accesses to be remained. 

In each case the decision was taken according to these criteria, keeping in mind the 

ecological aspects; therefore, the following measures have been performed: 

• 7800 meters of guardrails have been implemented where the preserved trees put the 

road users’ lives at risk, 

• 8 lay-by (emergency stop facilities) have been implemented at regular intervals where 

the hard shoulders were missing due to the narrow land and guardrails implementation, 

• 13 frontage accesses remained. 

The different steps to perform this measure were: 

• Management of the road safety measure and report related to the ecological topic, 

• Implementation plans: topographical surveying, choices between guardrails and tree 

felling, frontage access treatments project report etc., 

• Installation of the safety measure guardrail implementation, tree felling, road 

equipments and frontage access treatment, 

• Site supervision. 

3 Target accident group 

The road safety stakes in terms of accidents, casualties and injuries of the crashes against 

trees are summarised on the following figures. The target accident group involved those in 

crashes against trees and the related severity on the 26.5 km stretches of the RN 134. 

Page 146

10 


Figure 17: Treated sections of crashes against trees 

The Figure 17 shows the impact of the measure on the safety indicators measured before 

and after the treatment of the row of trees along the roadside. 


4.1 Choice of CBA 

According to the theoretical principle of CBA as mentioned in the WP3 report, "CBA 

evaluates the economic benefits and costs of the objective….It aims to find if the proposed 

objective is economically efficient at all and how efficient it is". Taking into account the 

before-after data availability related to this traffic safety measure (accidents, traffic 

volumes, accident trends), CBA has been chosen for the assessment. 

4.2 Assessment tool 

The CBA ratio defined as: 

8 

6 

4 

2 

0 

Benefit-cost ratio = 

Treated sections Safety evolution 

of crashes against trees 


Present value of implementation 

costs 

All the following data have been collected during the periods before and after: 

1. Accidents 

2. Casualties 

3. Injuries (severe and slight) according to current French definitions 

4. Traffic volumes 

These data have been collected on the treated stretches of road and on reference areas 

before and after the measure implementation. The present value of all benefits has been 

works 

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 

Accidents Killed Injured Seriously Injured Slightly 

Page 147


calculated from the safety impacts listed above (accidents causalities, and injuries), taking 

into account the trends of each of these variables in order to assess the numbers of 

accidents, casualties and injuries prevented. 

By this way it has been possible to apply the fundamental principle of the methodology 

proposed by Ezra HAUER 20 "…to assess the effect of a treatment on the safety of some 

entity, one has to compare what would have been the safety of the entity in the after period 

had treatment not be applied, to what the safety of the treated entity in the after period 

was". 

This fundamental principle leads to assess "what would have been the safety (accidents, 

casualties and injuries) of the crashes against trees in the after period if the measure 

(guardrails or tree felling) had not been applied". 

In accordance with this principle, the impact of the measures have been calculated by 

comparing the counted "before safety values" to the assessed Ho safety values which are 

the "after period safety values" assessed under the Ho Hypothesis (i.e. if the measures 

had not been applied). 

The method 2 consists in calculating the theoretical "after accident numbers" as follows: 

Where: 

Theoretical After Accident Numbers = Po x (N after + N before) 

Po is the probability of accidents under Ho i.e. if the measures had not been applied 

N after and N before is the number of accidents counted on the treated section after and 

before the implementation of the measure. 

Due to the random properties of the number of accidents, Po is calculated as follows: 

where: 

Evol × Daf × Taf 

Po = 

( Evol × Daf × Taf ) + Dbf × Tbf 

• Evol: is the trend of the analysed traffic safety indicator calculated on a reference area 

(here the “Département des Landes”) 

• Daf and Dbf are the duration of the periods "after" and "before" the works concerning 

the implementation of the measure (assessment periods) 

• Taf and Tbf are traffic counted on the treated stretches of road "after" and "before" the 

works concerning the implementation of the measure (assessment periods) 

20 Ezra HAUER "Observational Before-After Studies in Road Safety" Pergamon 1997 

2 "Statistiques pour la Sécurité Routière" SETRA février 1999 

Page 148


4.3 Road safety of the collisions against trees 

The road safety indicators of the collisions against trees can be summarised as follows: 

Table 52: Safety results 

All 

crashes 

crashes 

against 

trees 

Treated strechtes 

of road 

Before After 

1993 1999 

to 

to 

1997 2003 

Accidents 50 10 4 370 3 311 0,76 

Killed 20 2 530 402 0,76 

seriously 

injured 

37 6 2 148 1 368 0,64 

slightly 

injured 

34 17 3 996 3 475 0,87 

Accidents 27 1 436 294 0,67 

Killed 11 0 129 85 0,66 

seriously 

injured 

18 2 253 152 0,60 

slightly 

injured 

9 0 261 194 0,74 

4.4 Type of assessed impacts 

Before 

1993 

to 

1997 

Landes 

After 

1999 

to 

2003 

As shown above in § 3, the measure had a significant impact on the traffic safety related to 

the crashes against trees. This impact was assessed in accordance with the "Before-After" 

assessment tool presented. Therefore according the above formulas, the prevented 

impacts have been calculated as follows: 

(Prevented Accidents) = (Before Accidents) - Ho (After Accidents) 

(Prevented casualties) = (Before casualties) - Ho (After casualties) 

(Prevented injuries) = (Before injuries) - Ho (After injuries) 

trends 

The cost-benefit ratio has been calculated by using the accidents and casualties’ monetary 

values currently applied for the French CBA assessments. 

These road safety results related to the collision with trees have been applied according to 

the assessment tool described above and lead to the figures shown in the following tables. 

Page 149

crashes 

against 

trees 

4.5 Costs of the measure 


Table 53: Measure – safety impacts 

The costs for implementing the measure against collisions with trees were divided up in 

the following way: 

• Management of the road safety measure and report related to the ecological topic, 

• Implementation plans: topographical surveying, choices between guardrails and tree 

felling, frontage access treatments project report etc., 

• Installation of the safety measure guardrail implementation, tree felling, road 

equipments and frontage access treatment, 

• Site supervision. 

The total implementation costs were 993K €, which was paid by the Ministry of Transport 

through the financial management of the regional administration. 

4.6 Costs of accidents 

In France the cost of road safety has been assessed by Mr. Le NET (ENPC Paris) in a 

study 3 carried out in 1991-1992 in which the different components of the price of human 

life have been calculated. This calculation applied the method called "Compensated 

Human Capital" using the following "marketed" and" non-marketed" costs. 

• Direct marketed costs, 

Accident 

probability P0 

under Ho 

Theoretical 

Number of 

accidents 

under Ho 

accident 

prevented 

benefits 

of the 

measure 

K€ 

Accidents 0,387 10,83 16,2 88,9 

Killed 0,381 4,19 6,8 6 806,1 

seriously 

injured 

slightly 

injured 

Treated strechtes of road 

0,360 7,19 10,8 1 620,8 

0,410 3,69 5,3 116,8 

Total 8632,6 

3 

"Prix de la vie humaine, application à l'évaluation du coût économique de l'insécurité routière" M. Le NET 

(ENPC) 1992 

Page 150

• Medical and social costs, 


• Property damage costs (vehicles public equipments and environmental damages, fuel 

consumption, towing, etc., 

• Overheads as costs of police, justice, insurance services, etc., 

• Indirect marketed costs, 

• Costs of the loss of future productive capacity of fatalities and injuries, or jailed people, 

• Costs of the loss of future potential production, 

• Non-marketed costs; these costs are based on insurance company jurisprudence: 

o Cost of a killed person (moral wrong, prétuim mortis) 

o Cost of an injured person (prétium doloris) 

In 1999, this method led to the following costs: 

1. Killed: 3950 KF (for which there are 88% of indirect marketed costs) 

2. Seriously injured: 407 KF 

3. Slightly injured: 86 KF 

4. Property damages: 22 KF 

These values have been updated in 2000 taking into account other country accident cost 

methodologies and including the correlation between the human life cost and GDP (Gross 

Domestic Product) per person. These updated costs (see the following §5) have been 

used for the present assessment. 


The quantitative analysis is a "case study" for which the data gathering and processing has 

been performed as follows: 

• This is a before/after study concerning the safety of the crashes with trees for which the 

data collected concerns all the accidents, casualties, injuries and the traffic volumes on 

the treated stretches of road and reference area, i.e. the road of the "Département des 

Landes". These figures have been cheeked and corrected, if necessary, at the local 

level according to police reports. The reference areas exclude the treated stretches of 

road. 

• Data sources are the official local accident statistic and traffic volumes that count ADT 

(Average Daily Traffic). The safety data concerns all the accidents involving at least 

one injured person, as defined below. Crashes against trees were identified. 

• Disaggregated data has been used; concerning the safety data, all details included in 

the accident database were available. 

Page 151


• The time periods of the analysis are 1993 to 1997 for the “before period” and 1999 to 

2003 for the “after period”. The period of construction (1998) has been cancelled from 

the data used. 

• Concerning safety data, killed and injured users have been defined according to 

current French definitions, i.e. six days for fatalities; hospitalised more than 6 days for 

seriously injured, and less than 6 days for the slightly injured. In each accident, the 

casualties, severe and slight injuries, and property damages were taking into account 

for the monetary valuations of the relevant measure impacts. 

• The source of monetary costs of accidents, casualties and injuries are those currently 

used in France 4 . For this assessment the costs for 2000 (safety and implementation) 

have been chosen as the reference year. This choice is due to the fact that the 

correlation between the safety costs and the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) has been 

used for the first time to make them comparable at the international level. These costs 

are: 

5. Killed 1 000 K€ 

6. Seriously injured 150 K€ 

7. Slightly injured 22 K€ 

8. Property damages 5.5 K€ 

The quantified safety results are summarised in the following table. 


Taking into account the safety parameters presented above, the "after" safety values have 

been calculated, and the impact of the measure has been assessed from the figures 

summarised in the Table 1 below. 

The total value of benefits is 8633 K€. 

The total value of implementation costs is 993 K€ 

Therefore according the above figures, the assessment tool (see § 4.2) and the French 

monetary valuation used, the cost-benefit ratio gives the following result: 


Present value of implementation 

costs 


= 8633K€ / 993K€ . = 8.69 

The initiative of this local safety road improvement involved different actors at the French 

national, regional and local levels in terms of decision-making and funding. 

4 

Sécurité Routière en France" Bilan 2003 ONISR (Observatoire National Interministériel de Sécurité 

Routière) Documentation Française 2004 

Page 152


The local safety measure described in this case report is part of a national French road 

safety program PRAS (Programme Régional d'Aménagements de Sécurité - Regional 

Road Safety program). 

This program is elaborated as follows: 

• Local road safety analyses are performed by the local transport administrations (DDE), 

which provide reports (Etude des Enjeux). These reports propose a set of breeding 

grounds of local road safety measures corresponding with the local road safety context. 

• All these reports are put together at the regional transport administration level (DRE), 

which performs a regional comprehensive road safety study. This comprehensive study 

is sent to the National Road Administration (Road Directorate), which in charge of the 

choices according to several criteria (political, financial, technical, etc). 

• The "accepted" local safety measures are mentioned in a ministerial decision signed by 

the three decision levels of the Transport Administration (national, regional and local 

DR, DRE, DDE), where applicable. 

• Funding is managed at the regional level (DRE). 

The local transport administration (DDE-CDES) makes the final choices among the 

"accepted" local road safety measures mentioned in the ministerial decision. 

The same local administration is in charge of the implementation work programs, time 

schedules, and so on, of these local road safety measures. 

These tasks have been undertaken, including dialogues with the local authorities and 

pressure groups, e.g. ecologists who are keeping a close watch on the measures leading 

to tree felling. For this purpose, an extra report has been written and provided to the local 

Commission of Sites (Commission des sites). This report presented a detailed study 

concerning the tree species of the ‘Landes’ forest and proposed compensating measures, 

which planned to replant trees in appropriate places. The Commission of Sites gave its 

approval. Otherwise, the implementation of this road safety measure would be impossible. 

Relevant decisions have been taken by the local transport administration and approved by 

the local authorities and pressure groups. 


No significant technical barriers or difficulties have been met by the local decision-maker 

(DDE-CDES) in charge of the implementation of the measure. Only some problems related 

to the frontage access and the underground telecommunication cable networks were 

raised and were solved. 

The significant barriers before starting the measure were related to long and complicated 

administrative and financial procedures. These procedures involved several steps from the 

national (Road Directorate DR) to the regional (DRE) and local DDE/CDES) levels. Also, 

the local decision-maker in charge of the implementation of the measure has been waiting 

for the credit line before starting any work on the program. 

Page 153


Concerning the assessment process, no barrier occurred. Local and national decisionmakers 

and data providers provided all the necessary information and figures to perform 

the CBA. 

9 Conclusion 

The implementation of this road safety measure dealing with collision against the trees and 

the related “ex-post” cost-benefit analysis can be summarized as follows: 

• Although the problem to solve was included in a global and national traffic safety 

program it has been clearly identified and delimited. For this purpose local surveys 

have been integrated into the national road safety framework policy, decision 

processes, technical approaches and financing. The final decisions concerning the 

implementation of the measure are made by the local decision-maker from the 

administration (DDE-CDES). 

• In spite of the difficult technical choices and decisions to be made, in particular those 

related to political and environmental aspects linked to this measure, an agreement has 

been reached by means of dialogues involving the different local authorities, 

administrations, road engineers and pressure groups, e.g. ecologists. 

• Finally, the measure has been quite well accepted and the assessment shows good 

efficiency in terms of accidents and severity with a 8.69 cost-benefit ratio. 

• Therefore it seems that such an “ex-post” cost-benefit analysis could be an efficient input 

for further cost-benefit analyses (CEAs) and should be considered as only one of 

the decision-making process criteria to be used by the decision-makers to choose 

among available measures related to collisions against trees and side obstacles. 

The question is what will be the weight of such a CBA in the final decision-making process 

toward the other criteria to be taken into account by the decision-makers. This point should 

be discussed during the workshop and the conference. 

References 

(1) Ezra HAUER "Observational Before-After Studies in Road Safety", Pergamon, 1997 

(2) Statistiques pour la Sécurité Routière" SETRA février 1999 

(3) " M. Le NET (ENPC) "Prix de la vie humaine, application à l'évaluation du coût 

économique de l'insécurité routière" Ministère des Transports, 1992 

(4) Sécurité Routière en France" Bilan 2003 ONISR (Observatoire National Interministériel 

de Sécurité Routière) Documentation Française, 2004 

Page 154

CASE H: introducing signal control at a rural junction 



ROSEBUD 

WP4 - CASE H REPORT 

INTRODUCING SIGNAL CONTROL 

AT A RURAL JUNCTION 



ISRAEL


INTRODUCING SIGNAL CONTROL AT A RURAL JUNCTION 

1 PROBLEM ..........................................................................................................158 


2.1 General ...............................................................................................................159 

2.2 Current installation ..............................................................................................159 


4 ASSESSMENT TOOLS ......................................................................................160 

4.1 Method for estimating safety effect .....................................................................160 

4.2 Safety effect of introducing traffic signal control..................................................162 

4.3 Accident costs.....................................................................................................163 

5 COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS...............................................................................164 

5.1 General ...............................................................................................................164 

5.2 Values of costs and benefits ...............................................................................164 

5.3 Cost-Benefit Ratio ...............................................................................................165 


7 DISCUSSION......................................................................................................166 

Page 156

CASE OVERVIEW 

Measure 


Introducing traffic signal control at a rural junction 

Problem 

Traffic delays and accident occurrences due to conflict vehicle movements at a junction 

with no signal 

Target Group 

All injury accidents at the treated junction 

Targets 

Reducing traffic delays and the number of injury accidents at the junction 

Initiator 

Road authority – for the measure’s application; Ministry of Transport – for the evaluation of 

safety effect 


Road authorities, Ministry of Transport 

Costs 

Traffic lights’ design and installation, and the junction's realignment costs; paid by the 

Road Authority and the Ministry of Transport 

Benefits 

Estimated benefits stem from the expected savings in injury accidents at the treated 

junction. Benefits from reduced traffic delays are expected but not estimated. The driving 

public will benefit. 


1:1.25, where the CBR accounts for safety effect only 

Page 157

1 Problem 


In Israel, some 10% of both injury accidents and fatalities occur at rural junctions (CBS, 

2003). When the accidents are observed at unsignalised intersections, the majority of 

accidents are usually right-angle, rear-end and pedestrian accidents. For unsignalised 

intersections, introducing traffic lights is frequently suggested as a safety treatment to 

reduce all accident types. 

International experience demonstrates (Elvik and Vaa, 2004) that the effect on accidents 

of traffic signal control at intersections was mostly positive, providing on average a 15% 

accident reduction at T-junctions and a 30% accident reduction at crossroads. 

At the same time, one should remember that the function of traffic lights is to provide time 

separation between conflicting traffic flows. Thus, the main purpose of introducing traffic 

lights at a junction is in improving traffic flows through the junction, i.e. in reducing delays, 

better use of the road’s capacity, providing successive traffic flows on arterial roads, etc. 

Eliminating conflicts between different traffic flows at the junction diminishes the probability 

of collisions and, therefore, may provide an additional benefit from traffic signal control – 

accident reduction. 

However, as it was proven by a number of studies when traffic lights are introduced at 

junctions with low traffic volumes, neither reductions in traffic delays nor safety benefits are 

usually observed. In some cases, deterioration in both conditions (i.e. an increase in traffic 

delays and accidents) was even reported. Therefore, the current Israeli guidelines on the 

design of traffic signal control recommend considering the introduction of traffic lights only 

for junctions with reasonably high traffic volumes (Ministry of Transport, 1981). 

The warrants for introducing traffic lights at a junction consider mostly the traffic volumes 

on the main and secondary roads, but enable also to account for additional conditions 

such as high accident numbers due to priority problems, lacking visibility, high approaching 

speed, or other geometric problems at the junction. The Israeli guidelines dictate a 

threshold of at least 10,000 private car units (or equivalent vehicle units) which enter the 

junction during the eight most heavily travelled hours, from both main and secondary 

roads, whereas the number of vehicles entering from the secondary road should be over 

1,500. If the traffic volumes at a junction satisfy this demand, the introduction of traffic 

signal control can be considered. Presence of additional conditions (high accident 

frequencies, geometric problems, etc) may facilitate the above demand by up to 30% 

(Ministry of Transport, 1981). 

Prior to the installation of traffic lights the guidelines recommend considering other 

improvements such as priority signs, better visibility distances, road marking 

improvements, rumble bars to warn on approaching a junction, physical separation 

between different flows, pedestrian islands, etc. Such improvements are known as lowcost 

safety measures and are usually applied to sites with low to medium traffic volumes, 

but evident safety problems. 

Traffic lights’ installation is considered for sites with relatively high traffic volumes, which 

are close to the warrant’s demand. Possible safety benefits may be estimated in 

association with this infrastructure improvement, however, they will usually be treated as 

an additional benefit and never present the main reason for the application of the measure. 

Page 158


2.1 General 


A road junction presents a natural point of potential conflict between different traffic 

streams. As traffic volumes increase, the probability of conflict increases too, and traffic 

delays worsen. Traffic signal control at intersection separates different traffic streams from 

each other and therefore improves the flow of traffic at the intersection and reduces 

accident occurrences. 

Traffic signal control is introduced using lights, which may be either time-controlled 

(phases change after a given time irrespective of the amount of traffic) or vehicle-actuated 

(the length of the phases is adapted to the amount of vehicles up to a given maximum 

phase length). 

The safety measure evaluated in the current study is the introduction of traffic signal 

control at a rural junction, which was previously controlled by priority signs, i.e. was an 

unsignalised intersection. The treatment is complex, including both the installation of traffic 

lights and the junction’s realignment. The latter typically includes arranging turning lanes, 

adding traffic islands, and improving signing and road marking at the site and in its vicinity. 

2.2 Current installation 

In the current study, we consider the installation of traffic signal control at a typical rural 

road junction, which is situated on a single-carriageway road. The junction is four-legged 

(a crossroad) with relatively high traffic volumes on the main road. The daily traffic 

volumes are: 9,000 vehicles entering the junction from the both directions of the main road 

and 2,000 vehicles – from the both directions of the secondary road. 

In total, nine injury accidents were observed at the junction over the three years prior to 

the traffic lights’ installation, whereby eight of them were associated with priority problems. 

The analysis of "before" traffic flows demonstrates that based on the traffic volumes only, 

the site would not satisfy the warrant for signal control’s installation. However, an 

additional consideration of accident records at the site enables to treat it as a boundary 

case warranting the measure. 

The purpose of the installation was, first of all, to improve the traffic flows and, possibly, to 

improve the site’s safety. 

The case is considered for the year 2002. 


Considering the introduction of traffic signal control, the safety effect usually refers to all 

injury accidents (e.g. Elvik and Vaa, 2004). The positive effect is usually expected on rightangle 

accidents, other collisions from conflicting crossing movements and pedestrian 

accidents, whereas for rear-end collisions an increase is sometimes observed. 

In a recent Israeli study that estimated, inter alia, a safety effect of traffic lights' installation 

at rural junctions in Israel, the target accident group was also defined as all injury 

accidents at the treated sites (Hakkert et al, 2002). 

Page 159


In the current study, the economic evaluation of safety improvement of a typical rural 

junction, the target accident group of all injury accidents is considered as well. At the 

junction considered three injury accidents on average were observed per year. 

To note, a slightly different consideration of accidents is accepted by the guidelines 

(Ministry of Transport, 1981), which, for the warrants’ examination, recommend accounting 

only for accidents associated with vehicle and pedestrian priority problems at the site. 

4 Assessment tools 

4.1 Method for estimating safety effect 

The safety effect from introducing traffic lights (signal control + realignment) at rural 

junctions in Israel was estimated in a recent study, which was initiated by the Ministry of 

Transport and conducted by the T&M Company in association with Technion (Hakkert et 

al, 2002). The study aimed at developing a uniform methodology for evaluating potential 

safety effects of projects on road infrastructure improvements and estimating safety effects 

of some 30 types of safety treatments, which were introduced on Israeli roads throughout 

the 90s. 

For the estimation of safety effects of road infrastructure improvements, a method 

combining an after/before comparison with a control group, and with an empirical 

correction due to selection bias, was proposed. The outline of the method resembles that 

described in Elvik (1997), whereas in the Israeli study, an extension accounting for 

changes in traffic volumes was developed. Besides, the reference group statistics, which 

are necessary for correction of the selection bias, were estimated by the method of sample 

moments and not on the basis of a regression model. 

The reference group included sites which are similar to the treatment sites in most 

engineering characteristics but were left untreated (unchanged) during the “before” periods 

of all the sites in the treatment group. The demands for the control (comparison) group 

were as follows: it should be large (to strengthen the significance of the findings), and 

demonstrate some similarity with the treatment group from the engineering viewpoint. 

For the treatment type considered, evaluation of the safety effect included three steps: 

1) A correction of “before” accident numbers, with the help of reference group statistics, for 

each site in the treatment group (WP3, 2004 – see Appendix to Chapter 3). 

2) An evaluation of the treatment effect at each site by means of the odds-ratio with the 

comparison group, where for the “before” period the corrected accident numbers (from the 

first step) are applied. Besides, a correction due to changes in traffic volumes is 

performed. The formula is: 

Page 160

X a 


θ ) = δ 

Ca 

X m 

C 

where 

δ = 

⎛Vc 

⎜ 

⎝Vc 

where 

b 

a 

⎞ 

⎟ 

⎠ 

β 

1 

c 

⎛Vt 

⎜ 

⎝Vt 

a 

b 

⎞ 

⎟ 

⎠ 

β 

t 


b 


Xm – the corrected number of accidents at the treatment site in the “before” period, 

Vta – traffic volume at the treatment site in the “after” period, 

Vtb – traffic volume at the treatment site in the “before” period, 



Vca - traffic volume in comparison group sites in the “after” period, 

Vcb - traffic volume in comparison group sites in the “before” period, 

βt – the parameter of the safety performance function (a power of relation between traffic 

volume and the accident number), for treatment sites, 

βc – the parameter of safety performance function, for comparison-group sites. 

3) Weighting the effects found for separate treatment sites. This is done by means of a 

standard method known for weighting odds-ratios, where a statistical weight of separate 

result is defined by the sizes of data sets, which provided this result: 


WME) 

= exp( 

w 

i 

1 

= 

= 

VAR(log( 

θ )) 

where 

i 

1 

X 

i 

a 

1 

+ 

X 


i 

b 

1 

1 

+ 

C 

∑ 

i 

i 

a 

wi 

ln( θ i ) 

) 

w 

∑ 

i 

1 

+ 

C 







i 

i 

b 

Page 161

⎛ ⎛ 

⎜ ⎜ 

⎜WME 

exp⎜ 

⎜ ⎜ 

⎜ ⎜ 

⎝ ⎝ 

z 

∑ 

i 

α 

2 

w 

i 

⎞ ⎛ 

⎟ ⎜ 

⎟, 

WME exp⎜ 

⎟ ⎜ 

⎟ ⎜ 

⎠ ⎝ 


z 

α 

1− 

2 

∑ 

i 

w 

i 

⎞⎞ 

⎟⎟ 

⎟⎟ 

⎟⎟ 

⎟⎟ 

⎠⎠ 



In the cases of large samples of treatment sites (that diminishes a threat of selection bias 

and also limits the practical possibility of building a comparable reference group), only 

steps 2-3 were applied for the evaluation. 

4.2 Safety effect of introducing traffic signal control 

In the study HAKKERT et al. (2002), the data on the road infrastructure improvements 

were collected by means of written applications and meetings with the representatives of 

road and municipal authorities in different country areas. A special database on the issue 

was established. The data were sought mostly for projects performed in the mid 90s, to 

have a two-year “before” and two-year “after” period for observation. 

To represent a specific project in the database, three information elements were defined 

as crucial: location of the treatment, type of treatment and the period of treatment. For the 

project to be involved in the evaluation, all three pieces of information had to be thoroughly 

verified. To provide a minimum but comprehensive presentation of a specific project in the 

database, a special reporting form was devised which enabled to classify the site and the 

treatment in accordance with the road layout, area specifics, etc. The data were obtained 

from the authorities and accomplished by information from detailed maps, field surveys 

and the publications of the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 

Within each treatment type for the analysis, a strict definition of the periods “before” and 

“after” the treatment was provided for each site; a relevant definition of both periods for the 

comparison-group sites was also attached. The next stage in data preparation was filtering 

the CBS accident files for the sites and periods required. For each treatment type, files 

with series of accident numbers were produced for every treatment and comparison group 

of sites and then processed using the method described in Section 4.1. 

For the treatment type "introduction of traffic signal control at a rural junction", data were 

collected on ten projects, which were performed in the north of the country, by the Haifa 

county of the Public Works Department 21 . The traffic lights were installed at the junctions 

over the years 1994-1998. 

The time period for consideration was 1990-1999, both for the treatment and comparison 

group sites. For the treatment group, all injury accidents observed at the junctions were 

considered, whereas for each treated site two-year "before" period and two-year “after” 

period were separately defined. All injury accidents observed at rural road junctions 

throughout the country (fitting "before" and "after" periods for each site of treatment) 

served as a comparison group. 

21 Public Works Department (PWD) is the National Road Authority that is responsible for the development 

and maintenance of the majority of rural roads in Israel. 

Page 162


Table 54 details the number of sites (projects) involved in the evaluation, the number of 

accidents observed at the treatment sites in “before” and “after” periods, the mean value of 

the safety effect estimated, and the confidence interval for this value. 

Accident reduction is significant when the whole WME confidence interval is below one. As 

can be seen from Table 54, a close to significant accident reduction was observed 

following the treatment: the right boundary of 95% confidence level is slightly over 1. The 

accident reduction effect of traffic signal control is significant with p=0.11. 

Table 54: Safety effect of introducing traffic signals estimated for Israeli conditions 

Treatment type Estimated 

effect 

Introducing signal control at 

rural junctions 

Source: Hakkert et al, 2002 

WME 

Number of Number of 

confidence treatment sites accidents at the 

(WME) interval in the sample treatment sites 

0.70 (0.453, 1.081) 10 86 

The average safety effect of introducing traffic signals at rural junctions in Israel was a 

30% reduction in injury accidents. This result is comparable with the international value 

reported by Elvik and Vaa (2004). Accounting for both the significance level and the 

comparability of finding with the international experience, the above result was classified 

as “admissible for application” and was recommended for use in evaluations of road 

infrastructure improvements for Israeli conditions (Hakkert et al, 2002). 

4.3 Accident costs 

In the current Israeli practice, the average accident cost can be estimated as a sum of 

injury costs and damage costs of an average accident in the target accident group. The 

injury costs are a sum of injury-values multiplied by the average number of injuries, with 

different severity levels, which were observed in the target accident group. The road 

accident injury values are usually taken as $ 500,000 per fatality, $ 50,000 per serious 

injury, $ 5,000 per minor injury; the damage value is stated as 15% of the injury costs. 

Table 55 illustrates the calculation of accident costs for an average injury accident, 

observed at rural Israeli junctions in 2002. The injury-costs of an average accident are NIS 

155,057; with the addition of damage-costs, the value of average injury accident is NIS 

178,315 (at 2002 prices). 

The above values of injury should be treated as conservative because the fatality-value is 

lower then that estimated accounting for the ‘willingness-to-pay’ approach (MATAT, 2004). 

Table 55: Estimating costs for an average injury accident at rural junctions in Israel 

Value Fatality Serious injury Slight injury 

Average number of injuries per accident* 0.0275 0.1227 2.571 

Injury-values, $ 500,000 50,000 5,000 

Total injury-costs of average accident** $ 32,740 or NIS 155,057 

Damage costs NIS 23,258 

Total costs of an average accident (at 2002 prices) NIS 178,315 

*in 2002 **$ 1 = 4.736 NIS (average, in 2002) 

Page 163


5.1 General 


In this section, a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) of the safety effect from introducing traffic 

signal control at a rural junction is performed. The CBA compares the measure's safety 

benefits with the measure's costs, where both values are brought to the same economic 

framework. 

As mentioned in Section 1, the main benefits from introducing signal control at a junction 

come from the improvements of traffic flows, i.e. reduced traffic delays, better use of roads' 

capacity, etc. Possible safety improvements (an accident reduction following the 

treatment) present an additional benefit and not the main reason for the application of the 

measure. 

In the current practice, a general CBA of introducing signal control at a junction is not 

obligatory when the warrant for the application of measure is satisfied. In other words, if 

the traffic volumes at the junction are reasonably high, the traffic lights' installation usually 

provides apparent economic benefits from the viewpoint of traffic flows. However, a 

demonstration of these time savings and their costs is not simple as it requires for multiple 

calculations depending on the traffic signal design parameters, characteristics of traffic 

flows, approaching speeds, etc. Therefore, in the current evaluation, only benefits 

associated with safety improvements due to the measure will be estimated and compared 

with the measure's costs. The evaluation results should be treated as conservative and 

demonstrating only a part of general benefits associated with the measure. 

The costs of the measure consist of the initial investment, which is required for the design 

and introducing signal control at the junction considered, and annual maintenance 

expenses for providing a proper functioning of the system. 

Both the costs and benefits are considered for 15 years, with a 7% discount rate 

(according to the values recommended by the Ministry of Transport – Nohal Prat, 1996); 

the accumulated discount factor will be 9.108. 

5.2 Values of costs and benefits 

Introducing traffic signal control at a junction includes both traffic lights' installation and a 

minor realignment of the junction. The value of the initial investment on the measure 

should account for the expenses on the traffic signal's design and approval, the junction's 

redesign and approval, the performance of road paving, building turning lanes, traffic 

islands and curbs, road signing and marking, and the installation of traffic lights. Typical 

costs of the measure were estimated by Hakkert et al. (2002) and they amounted to NIS 

750,000 (at 2000 prices). At 2002 prices 22 , the value of initial investment will be NIS 

801,525. 

The annual maintenance expenses present some 5% of the initial investment. Therefore, 

the total value of costs for the introduction of traffic signal control, over a 15-year period, 

will be: 

801,525 (1 + 0.05* 9.108) = 1,166,539 NIS (at 2002 prices). 

22 Change of price index over 2000-2002 is 1.0687. 

Page 164


The one-year value of benefits from the expected accident reduction is estimated as a 

product of the annual number of "before" accidents, the accident reduction factor (the 

safety effect) and the accident cost. This value is: 

3 accidents * 0.3 * 178,315 NIS/ accident= 160,483 NIS (at 2002 prices). 

The total value of safety benefits from the introduction of traffic signal control, over a 15year 

period, will be NIS 1,461,679 (at 2002 prices). 

5.3 Cost-Benefit Ratio 

Table 56 illustrates the calculation of the cost-benefit ratio (CBR) of the introduction of 

traffic signal control. The CBR estimated for the measure is 1:1.25. 

This means that based on safety benefits, only the application of the measure for the rural 

junction considered appears to be slightly cost-effective. Had the traffic flow benefits been 

added to the calculations, the CBR would be much higher. 


Costs Benefits Costs of accidents 

saved in one year, 

NIS 

Initial investment, NIS 801,525 

Maintenance costs, NIS 

(one-year) 

Total costs, over 15-year 

period, NIS (2002) 

40,076 

Total benefits in one 

year, NIS 

1,166,539 Total benefits in 15 

years, NIS (2002) 

Total costs, Euro (2002)* 260,388 Total benefits, Euro 

(2002)* 

*In 2002: 1 Euro = 4.48 NIS. 


160,483 

1,461,679 

326,268 

Cost-benefit ratio 1 : 1.25 

The cost-benefit analysis of the introduction of traffic signal control at a junction is not 

common in Israel. Usually, neither safety nor traffic flow benefits are estimated in 

economic terms. The only estimate that is usually performed is an examination of the site 

from the viewpoint of warrants for the installation of traffic lights. 

Both road and local authorities frequently request this measure when any safety problem 

is identified at the junction. The Ministry of Transport applies efforts to regulate these 

demands approving the introduction of signal control only for junctions where the measure 

is really warranted. 

The estimation of the safety effect from the introduction of signal control is not obligatory 

according to current guidelines. However, for boundary cases (i.e. when traffic volumes at 

the junction are slightly lower than the threshold values) such an estimation might provide 

additional arguments in favour of approving the measure. 

Page 165

7 Discussion 


In this study, a CBA of a typical example of introducing signal control at a rural junction 

was considered. The CBA included the safety effect only. A consideration of time savings 

due to new signal control would strengthen the benefits of the measure. However, such a 

consideration is complicated and site-specific and, thus, cannot easily be performed within 

the framework of a mini-CBA. Other possible effects of signalising an intersection are the 

effects on energy consumption and pollution effects. These were not considered in the 

present case study. 

Based on the evaluation of the safety effect only, the measure was found to be beneficial. 

This is because a certain amount of injury accidents was observed at the junction in the 

“before” period. However, it is worth mentioning that the economic value of safety benefits 

is only slightly higher than the costs. The above result alone would not provide a high rank 

of the site for the measure's application. 

Obviously, fewer injury accidents in the "before" period would lower the estimated value of 

benefits, making the results less relevant for the decision-making. 

The safety effect of introducing signal control, observed under Israeli conditions, was high 

and close to significant. It was in line with the findings reported by studies in other 

countries. 

The CBA presented in this study can be characterized as follows: 

• the CBA accounts for safety effect only; a consideration of time savings would 

strengthen the benefits of the measure; 


• to estimate the safety effects, a statistical model was fitted to the accident data from a 

group of similar sites; the evaluation was in line with the criteria of correct safety 

evaluation (WP3, 2004); 

• the accident costs were fitted to the accident type considered, however, they should be 

treated as conservative as the injury costs do not account for the ‘willingness-to-pay’ 

component; 

• the evaluation of the safety effect was initiated by the Ministry of Transport. However, 

the decision-makers usually do not require a CBA of the measure. 

Page 166

References 


CBS (2003). Road accidents with casualties 2002. Part A: General Summaries. Central 

Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem. 



Elvik, R. and Vaa, T. (2004) The Handbook of Road Safety Measures. Elsevier. 

Hakkert, A.S., Gitelman, V., et al (2002) Development of Method, Guidelines and Tools for 

Evaluating Safety Effects of Road Infrastructure Improvements. Final report, T&M 

Company, Ministry of Transport (in Hebrew). 

MATAT (2004). Road Accidents in Israel: the scope, the characteristics and the estimate 

of losses to the National Economy. MATAT - Transportation Planning Center Ltd, 


Ministry of Transport (1981). Guidelines on design of traffic control signals. The National 

Transport supervisor, Ministry of Transport (in Hebrew). 

Nohal Prat (1996). A guideline for economic evaluation of transport projects. 2.0 edition. 


WP3 (2004). Improvements in efficiency assessment tools. ROSEBUD. 

Page 167

CASE I1: intensification of police enforcement (speed and alcohol) 

National Technical University of Athens 

Department of Transportation Planning and Engineering 

ROSEBUD 

WP4 - CASE I REPORT 

INTENSIFICATION OF POLICE ENFORCEMENT 

(SPEED AND ALCOHOL) 

BY GEORGE YANNIS AND ELEONORA PAPADIMITRIOU 

NTUA / DTPE, GREECE


INTENSIFICATION OF POLICE ENFORCEMENT (SPEED AND ALCOHOL) 


2 DESCRIPTION....................................................................................................171 

3 TARGET GROUP ...............................................................................................171 







Page 169

CASE OVERVIEW 

Measure 


Intensification of Speed and Alcohol Enforcement in Greece 

Problem 

Road accidents and related casualties presented an increasing trend during the past 

decade in Greece, mainly due to insufficient maintenance of the road network, 

inappropriate behaviour of the road users and lack of efficient and systematic 

enforcement. Since 1998, an important effort was devoted to the improvement of this 

situation in Greece, focusing on an intensification of enforcement aimed at improving 

driver behaviour. 

Target Group 

Drivers, mainly on the interurban road network 

Targets 

a) Increase in the number of police controls for speeding and drinking-and-driving 

b) Decrease in the number of road accidents and related casualties 

Initiator 

National Police 


National Police 

Costs 

Police Labour Costs, Police Vehicle Costs, Police Equipment Costs 

Benefits 

Fatal and injury accidents prevented 


1:6.6 to 1:9.7 

Page 170

1 Problem 


Road accidents and related casualties increased during the past decade in Greece, mainly 

due to insufficient maintenance of the road network, inappropriate behaviour of the road 

users and lack of efficient and systematic enforcement [NTUA/DTPE, 2003]. Since 1998, 

an important effort was devoted to the improvement of this situation in Greece, focusing on 

an intensification of enforcement aimed at improving driver behaviour. 

2 Description 

In 1998, the Greek Traffic Police started the intensification of road safety enforcement, 

having set as the target the gradual increase of road controls for the two most important 

infringements: speeding and drinking & driving. Since then, all controls and related 

infringements recorded are systematically monitored and the related enforcement and 

casualty results at the local and national level are regularly published, as shown in the 

following table with basic road safety related trends in Greece. Seat belt and helmet use 

were two additional offences, which the police started to enforce more systematically in 

2002. 

Table 57: Basic road safety and enforcement trends in Greece (1998-2002) 

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 5-year change 

Injury road accidents 24,819 24,231 23,127 19,710 16,852 -32% 

Fatalities 2,182 2,116 2,088 1,895 1,654 -24% 

Vehicle fleet (x1000) 4,323 4,690 5,061 5,390 5,741 33% 

Speed infringements 92,122 97,947 175,075 316,451 418,421 354% 

Drinking & driving infringements 13,996 17,665 30,507 49,464 48,947 250% 

Drinking & driving controls 202,161 246,611 365,388 710,998 1,034,502 412% 


The target group of the measure included the entire population of Greek drivers. Although 

the intensification of enforcement was more significant on the interurban road network, it is 

considered that the entire number of accidents was affected. In particular, the enforcement 

was nationwide and concerned all types of traffic violations. Moreover, previous research 

allows for the quantification of the particular effect of speed and alcohol enforcement in 

particular regions of Greece, as described in the following sections. 


The present research concerns a cost-benefit evaluation of police enforcement for 

speeding and drinking & driving in Greece for the period 1998-2002. The evaluation was 

based on detailed police controls and infringements data, available by the police for the 

examined period. Additional information was collected by means of interviews with police 

officers in order to estimate the implementation costs of the measures. As far as safety 

benefits are concerned, the results of three recent studies were used; one study 

concerned the calculation of accident economic costs in Greece, one study on the 

Page 171


‘willingness-to-pay’ for accident risk reduction in Greece, and one study concerned the 

quantification of the safety effect of enforcement and other safety related parameters in 

Greece. 

It should be noted that enforcement costs include police labour, vehicle and equipment 

costs, whereas enforcement benefits exclusively refer to safety effects. 


5.1 Enforcement Costs 

Enforcement costs include police labour costs, police vehicle costs and police speed and 

alcohol enforcement equipment costs (speed cameras, alcoholmeters etc.). As the 

intensification of enforcement in the examined period was not foreseen as part of a 

specific project with a specific budget and resource allocation, there was very little 

information available on police-related costs. The additional necessary information for CBA 

calculations was obtained by means of exhaustive interviews with Head Officers of the 

police. In particular, on the basis of the available detailed information on yearly numbers of 

speed and alcohol infringements, the interviews tried to yield the related labour and capital 

parameters through the adoption of typical conversion measures. 

5.1.1 Police Labour Costs 

Table 58: Police Labour Costs for Speed Enforcement in Greece (1998-2002)* 

1999 2000 2001 2002 

Number of infringements 97,947 175,075 316,451 418,421 

Number of shifts 

Shifts Labour 

typical days 73,460 131,306 237,338 313,816 

special days 24,487 43,769 79,113 104,605 

typical days 4,897 8,754 15,823 20,921 

special days 1,224 2,188 3,956 5,230 

Persons 3 3 3 3 

Person-hours 8 8 8 8 

Hourly rate (€) 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 

Shifts Costs (€) 1,101,904 1,969,594 3,560,074 4,707,236 

Number of prosecutions 2,938 5,252 9,494 12,553 

Prosecution Police Labour 



Hourly rate (€) 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 

Prosecution Costs (€) 308,533 551,486 996,821 1,318,026 

Total Labour Costs (€) 1,410,437 2,521,080 4,556,894 6,025,262 

*prices of 2002 

Page 172


The total yearly labour cost of speed enforcement is summarized in the table above. The 

calculations for speed enforcement are based on the following assumptions, as reported 

by Head Police Officers interviewed, based on experience: 

• 75% of speed infringements are recorded on typical days 

• 25% of speed infringements are recorded on special days (weekends, 

holidays, special events) 

• An average of 15 speed infringements per shift are recorded on typical days 

• An average of 20 speed infringements per shift are recorded on special days 

• 3% of speed infringements recorded result to driver's prosecution, both on 

typical and special days 

As far as alcohol enforcement labour is concerned, the calculations are presented in the 

following table. 

Table 59: Police Labour Costs for Alcohol Enforcement in Greece (1998-2002)* 

1999 2000 2001 2002 

Number of infringements 17,665 30,507 49,464 48,947 

Number of shifts 

Shifts Labour 

typical days 13,249 22,880 37,098 36,710 

special days 4,416 7,627 12,366 12,237 

typical days 13,249 22,880 37,098 36,710 

special days 2,208 3,813 6,183 6,118 



Hourly rate (€) 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 

Shifts Costs (€) 2,782,238 4,804,853 7,790,580 7,709,153 


Prosecutions Labour 



Hourly rate (€) 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 

Prosecutions Costs (€) 185,483 320,324 519,372 513,944 

Total Labour Costs (€) 2,967,720 5,125,176 8,309,952 8,223,096 


The respective assumptions for alcohol enforcement are the following: 

• 75% of alcohol infringements are recorded on typical days 

• 25% of alcohol infringements are recorded on special days 

• An average of 1 alcohol infringements per shift is recorded on typical days 

• An average of 2 alcohol infringements per shift are recorded on special days 

• 10% of alcohol infringements recorded result to driver's prosecution, both on 

typical and special days 

Page 173


Based on the information above, the yearly numbers of police control shifts on speed and 

alcohol enforcement and prosecutions for speeding and drinking & driving were calculated. 

Additionally, a detailed labour breakdown for control shifts and prosecutions obtained 

though interviews (number of persons and person-hours of a typical control 

shift/prosecution, typical policeman hourly rate) was used to calculate the total yearly 

labour costs for alcohol enforcement. It should be noted that the police person-hour rate 

(€) refers to year 2002. In particular: 

• 3 policemen are involved in one control shift for 8 hours each 

• 1 policeman is involved in an prosecution for a total of 14 hours 

• The hourly rate of a policeman is 7.5 € 

5.1.2 Police Vehicle Costs 

The calculation of vehicle costs is based on the number of police control shifts and 

prosecutions, which was calculated as described above on the basis of the interviews. 

Additional information on the use of police vehicles collected during the interviews was 

also exploited. The results are summarized in the following tables. 

Table 60: Police Vehicle Costs for Speed Enforcement in Greece (1998-2002)* 

1999 2000 2001 2002 

Number of shifts 6,122 10,942 19,778 26,151 


Shifts Vehicle costs 

Number of vehicles 1 1 1 1 

Average distance 20 20 20 20 

Unit Cost per Km (€) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 

Prosecutions Vehicle Costs 

Vehicle Cost (€) 12,243 21,884 39,556 52,303 




Vehicle Cost (€) 1,469 2,626 4,747 6,276 

Total Vehicle Costs (€) 13,713 24,511 44,303 58,579 


As far as speed enforcement is concerned, the following assumptions were included: 

• 1 police vehicle is used in each shift 

• 1 police vehicle is used for each driver's prosecution 

• The average total distance travelled for each shift is 20 km 

• The average total distance travelled for each prosecution is 5 km 

Page 174


Table 61: Police Vehicle Costs for Alcohol Enforcement in Greece (1998-2002)* 

1999 2000 2001 2002 

Number of shifts 15,457 26,694 43,281 42,829 


Shifts Vehicle costs 




Prosecutions Vehicle Costs 

Vehicle Cost (€) 7,728 13,347 21,641 21,414 




Vehicle Cost (€) 1,469 2,626 4,747 6,276 

Total Vehicle Costs (€) 9,198 15,973 26,387 27,691 


As far as alcohol enforcement is concerned, the following assumptions were included: 

• 1 police vehicle is used in each shift 

• 1 police vehicle is used for each driver's prosecution 

• The average total distance travelled for each shift is 5 km 

• The average total distance travelled for each prosecution is 5 km 

Additionally, the average police vehicle cost per kilometre was considered equal to 0.10 

€/km (referring to year 2002) according to a recent study on accident costs in Greece 

[LIAKOPOULOS, 2002]. 

5.1.3 Police Equipment Costs 

The number of available devices used for speed and alcohol enforcement for the year 

2002 was obtained from the Technical Services of the Police. However, no information on 

the respective numbers for the year 1998 was available. According to the information 

collected during the interviews, a reasonable assumption would be to consider that the 

enforcement equipment was doubled in the examined period. 

Table 62: Police Equipment Costs for Speed and Alcohol 

Enforcement in Greece (1998-2002)* 

1998 2002 

Number of portable speed guns 231 462 

Unit cost (€) 600.00 

Number of in-car radars 31 62 

Unit cost (€) 500.00 

Number of speed guns on tripod 20 39 

Unit cost (€) 300.00 

Number of alcoholmeters 467 934 

Unit cost (€) 10.00 

Total Equipment Costs (€) 164,620 

Page 175



5.2 Enforcement Benefits 

In the framework of this study, the benefits examined exclusively concern safety benefits, 

as no significant social or environmental costs were expected from the intensification of 

speed and alcohol enforcement. The available results of previous research allowed for the 

direct calculation of the number of accidents prevented by the measures, as described in 

detail in the following sections. 

5.2.1 Number of accidents prevented 

For the estimation of the number of accidents prevented from the intensification of speed 

and alcohol enforcement, the results of a recent research study were used [AGAPAKIS, 

MYGIAKI, 2003]. This research concerned a macroscopic investigation of the effect of 

enforcement on road safety improvement in Greece aimed in particular at determining the 

separate effect of different types of enforcement (speeding, drinking and driving, violating 

signals, failing to yield etc.), as well as the effect of other safety related parameters 

(vehicles fleet, vehicle ownership, population) on the significant overall improvement of 

road safety in Greece during the last few years. 

This study included two distinct parts; the first part concerned a cluster analysis aimed at 

identifying groups with similar characteristics within the 52 departments of Greece. In 

particular, road network, population density, vehicle ownership, traffic infringements and 

accidents characteristics were used for the separation of Greece in four groups of 

departments, as follows: 

Figure 18: Clustering of the departments of Greece in groups of similar accident and infringement rates 

Group I 

Group II 

Group III 

Group IV 

• Group I included the Athens and Thessaloniki large urban regions, which present 

high accident and infringement rates 

• Group II included 5 large departments with relatively high population density and 

accident and infringement frequencies 

Page 176


• Group III included 22 departments with relatively medium population density, high 

accident frequencies and medium infringement frequencies 

• Group IV included 22 smaller departments with relatively low population density, 

accident and infringement frequencies 

The second part of the study concerned the development of Poisson regression models for 

the quantification of the separate effect of various types of enforcement, as well as other 

parameters on the total number of accidents in each group of departments. In each case, 

the marginal effects of the various significant parameters were also calculated. 

Additionally, the modelling process was developed for two different assumptions 

concerning the effect of enforcement, resulting in two categories of models: 

• Models with no time-halo in the effect of enforcement 

• Models with a time-halo in the effect of enforcement 

The above classification rises from the international experience, according to which there 

may be a delay of several weeks before a significant effect of enforcement is observed 

(Holland, Corner, 1996, Vaa, 1997). This "time halo effect" was examined in the framework 

of the analysis of intensification of enforcement in Greece. 

It is interesting to note that, among the various types of enforcement examined in this 

study, the enforcement of speeding and drinking & driving was found to have a significant 

effect on the total number of accidents only in Groups II and IV, whereas in the other 

groups, other types of enforcement were found significant, such as traffic signals 

violations, failing to yield etc. The quantified effects are presented in detail below. 

5.2.2 Consideration with no time-halo in the effects of enforcement 

The first group of models is based on the assumption that there is no time-halo (delay) in 

the effect of enforcement on the total number of road accidents. In this scenario, the 

number of police controls and infringements of a certain period is considered to directly 

affect the number of accidents of this period. 

As mentioned above, the effect of speed and alcohol enforcement was significant in 

Groups of departments II and IV. In particular, it was found that an increase of 1000 speed 

infringements prevents approximately one accident in Group II departments and two 

accidents in Group IV departments. Additionally, it was found that an increase of 1000 

alcohol controls prevents approximately two accidents in Group II departments and 1 

accident in Group IV departments. 

In the framework of the present research, the above results were combined with the 

related enforcement trends data for 1998-2002, which is available in detail from the 

National Police, in order to calculate the total number of accidents prevented from the 

intensification of enforcement in the examined period. The results are presented in detail in 

the following Table 63. According to the results of the consideration without delay in the 

effects of enforcement, a total number of 772 accidents were prevented in the examined 

period in Greece. This consideration will be adopted as the "conservative scenario" of the 

present cost-benefit evaluation, corresponding to a minimum effect of enforcement. 

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Table 63: Marginal effects of enforcement and number of accidents prevented (1999-2002), no time-halo-effect 

Department Group I II III IV 

Marginal effects 

Speed infringements -1.239 -1.542 

Alcohol controls -1.929 -1.373 

Speed infringements 

Alcohol controls 

Accidents prevented 

1998 23,867 9,579 42,028 14,648 

1999 32,480 16,091 49,169 19,899 

2000 37,324 31,533 74,323 30,112 

2001 68,397 64,966 128,924 54,164 

2002 105,025 82,531 161,297 69,568 

1998 100,955 13,584 62,655 24,967 

1999 104,540 19,485 87,415 35,171 

2000 128,287 54,498 121,775 60,828 

2001 211,273 151,943 235,716 112,066 

2002 290,052 213,138 351,888 179,552 

1999 0 19 0 22 

2000 0 87 0 51 

2001 0 229 0 107 

2002 0 140 0 116 

TOTAL 772 

5.2.3 Consideration of a two-month time-halo in the effect of enforcement 

The second group of models was based on the assumption that there is a two-month timehalo 

(delay) in the effect of enforcement on the total number of road accidents. More 

specifically, in these models, the number of controls and infringements of one month were 

combined with the accidents of the next third month. 

As mentioned above, the effect of speed and alcohol enforcement was significant in 

Groups of departments II and IV. In particular, it was found that an increase of 1000 speed 

infringements prevents approximately one accident in Group II departments and two 

accidents in Group IV departments. Additionally, it was found that an increase of 1000 

alcohol controls prevents approximately two accidents in Group II departments and one 

accident in Group IV departments. 

Accordingly, the results were combined with the related enforcement trends data for 1998- 

2002 in order to calculate the total number of accidents prevented from the intensification 

of enforcement in the examined period. The results are presented in detail in the following 

Table 64. 

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Table 64: Marginal effects of enforcement and number of accidents prevented (1999-2002) - Two-months 

time-halo-effect 

Department Group 

Marginal effects 

I II III IV 

Speed infringements -2.224 -2.053 

Alcohol controls 

Accidents prevented 

-2.265 -2.684 

1999 0 28 0 38 

2000 0 114 0 90 

2001 0 295 0 187 

2002 0 178 0 213 

TOTAL 1,142 

The results of the consideration with two-month time-halo in the effects of enforcement 

indicate a total number of 1,142 accidents prevented in the examined period in Greece. 

This consideration will be adopted as the "best scenario" of the present cost-benefit 

evaluation, corresponding to a maximum effect of enforcement. 

5.2.4 Accident costs 

The estimation of average accident costs was carried out on the basis of a recent study on 

accident costs in Greece (LIAKOPOULOS, 2002). This study concerned the estimation of 

the costs of various components of accidents (material damage costs, generalized costs, 

human costs) for fatal accidents, injury accidents and material damage accidents, 

including: 

• Material damage costs 

• Police costs 

• Fire brigade costs 

• Insurance companies costs 

• Court costs 

• Lost production output 

• Pain and grief 

• Rehabilitation costs 

• Hospital treatment costs 

• First aid and transportation costs 

The various costs were calculated by means of an exhaustive data collection process 

addressed to various organizations (e.g. National Statistical Service of Greece, National 

Police, Fire Service of Greece, Emergency Medical Service of Greece, hospitals, courts, 

insurance companies). Additional parameters were adopted on the basis of estimations 

from experts in each field, as well as the existing international literature. 

It should be noted, however, that the above study did not adequately account for the 

human cost component, as the pain and grief parameters as reported in the courts are not 

sufficiently representative of the human cost. For that purpose, a separate investigation for 

human cost in Greece was carried out in the framework of present research. In particular, 

human cost was estimated according to the following formula: 

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VoSL = (NAEIS) / (LSE) 

Where: 

VoSL: Value of Statistical Life 

NAEIS: National Annual Expenditure on Improving Safety 

LSE: Expected Lives Saved from this Expenditure Annually 

In particular, the calculations included parameters such as the percentage of family annual 

income that each person is willing to pay in his/her entire life in order to reduce the 

probability of accident involvement of himself/herself or of any family person by 50%, the 

average members per family in Greece, the proportion of families with an economically 

active member, the average family annual income in Greece, the national population, the 

life expectancy in Greece and the current and new accident risk. 

In regards the percentage of family annual income that each person is willing to pay in 

his/her entire life in order to reduce the probability of accident involvement by 50%, the 

results of a recent "willingness-to-pay" survey were used [AGGELOUSI, 

KANNELOPOULOU, 2002]. In this survey, respondents were asked the percentage of 

annual income they were willing to pay to reduce the probability of fatal accident, injury 

accident and material damage accident involvement by 50%. 

It should be noted that in the willingness-to-pay survey, respondents were also asked to 

rate various types of accidents and injuries in order to identify their perception on injury 

severity. On the basis of the results in the present research, the value corresponding to 

injury accidents is considered to adequately represent serious injury accidents, whereas 

the value for material damage accidents is considered to adequately represent both slight 

injury and material damage accidents. 

On the basis of the above, the human cost of accidents in Greece was estimated as: 

VoSL = 612,140.72 €/person for fatal accidents 

VoSL = 467,703.02 €/person for serious injury accidents 

VoSL = 206,339.57 €/person for minor injury and material damage accidents 

It should also be underlined that the calculations concern prices of 1999. In order to 

calculate the average accident cost in Greece, the costs of fatal and injury accidents were 

weighted in relation to the average distribution of accident casualties per casualty severity 

in Greece. 

In the following Table 65, the parameters concerning accident costs in Greece are 

summarized on the basis of the previous research used and the additional calculations 

carried out: 

Table 65: Calculation of average accident cost in Greece (1999) 

Cost of Accidents with Fatalities Seriously Injured Slightly Injured 

Material Damage cost 28,769.42 18,174.91 13,904.19 

Generalised cost 442,466.54 23,906.66 6,960.30 

Human cost 612,140.72 467,703.02 206,339.57 

Total cost 1,083,376.68 509,784.59 227,204.06 

Proportion of casualties 5.81% 11.60% 82.59% 

Average accident cost 309,723.25 

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On the basis of the detailed approach described in the previous sections, the cost-benefit 

ratio was calculated for the "conservative" scenario and the "best" scenario. An 

accumulated discount factor was applied to the benefits calculation on the basis of an 

interest rate of 4% (National Statistical Service of Greece, 2003). 

Table 66: Calculation of the cost/benefit ratio for the "conservative" scenario (1999-2002) 

Present value of benefits 1999 2000 2001 2002 

Number of accidents prevented 42 138 337 256 

Average accident cost (€) 309,723.25 309,723.25 309,723.25 309,723.25 

Accumulated discount factor 1.000 1.040 1.082 1.125 


Total (€) 12,871,643.25 44,338,168.72 112,837,881.79 89,265,963.13 

Cost of Speed Enforcement (€) 1,424,149.38 2,545,590.50 4,601,197.54 6,243,791.34 

Cost of Alcohol Enforcement (€) 2,976,917.64 5,141,148.94 8,336,339.27 8,255,456.63 

Benefit/Cost Ratio 6.6:1 

As shown in the above Table 66, the "conservative" scenario yielded a very high benefitcost 

ratio equal to (6.6:1). In particular, the total value of benefits for this scenario were 

calculated equal to 274,696,321.34 €, whereas the enforcement implementation costs 

totalled 39,524,591.23 €, all values referring to year 2002. 

Table 67: Calculation of the cost/benefit ratio for the "best" scenario (1999-2002) 

Present value of benefits 1999 2000 2001 2002 

Number of accidents prevented 66 203 482 390 

Average accident cost (€) 309,723.25 309,723.25 309,723.25 309,723.25 

Accumulated discount factor 1.000 1.040 1.082 1.125 


Total 20,446,780.45 65,542,783.83 161,458,163.95 136,023,786.23 

Cost of Speed Enforcement (€) 1,424,149.38 2,545,590.50 4,601,197.54 6,243,791.34 

Cost of Alcohol Enforcement (€) 2,976,917.64 5,141,148.94 8,336,339.27 8,255,456.63 

Benefit/Cost Ratio 9.7:1 

Accordingly, as shown in the above Table 67, the "best" scenario yielded an even higher 

benefit-cost ratio equal to (9.7:1). In particular, the total 1999-2002 value of benefits for 

this scenario were found equal to 406,219,308.40 €, whereas the 1999-2002 enforcement 

implementation cost totalled 39,524,591.23 €, all values referring to year 2002. In both 

scenarios, the nationwide intensification of speed and alcohol enforcement in Greece was 

found to be highly cost-effective. 


The results of this research were presented to Head Officers of the police at the Ministry of 

Public Order. Although these decision-makers were not familiar with efficiency assessment 

Page 181


in terms of cost-benefit analyses, they responded positively towards this work from the first 

stages, contributed with data and other available information, and were very helpful in 

dealing with lack of data when necessary. 

Furthermore, decision-makers were very interested in the results. The high benefit-cost 

ratios were received as a confirmation of the important role of the police in road safety and 

a validation of the systematic efforts of the police to contribute in the reduction of road 

accidents and casualties. Consequently, they intend to communicate these results to their 

superiors, to the press, as well as the Head Police Officers of the various regional police 

departments. 

They were also asked on their possible response if the results were negative or less 

encouraging. They replied that they would try to identify the more cost-effective cases 

among the results and focus their efforts accordingly. 

Decision-makers also expressed a high interest for more analyses and results concerning 

other types of police enforcement and other road safety related activities of the police. 

They also underlined that these results would have been even more useful if they were 

available at earlier stages of the intensification of enforcement. 


• As far as the implementation of the measures is concerned, the basic barrier 

concerned the inefficiency of the process for the payment of the infringement ticket, as 

several different authorities are involved in the process (police, municipalities, tax 

computer centre, etc.). Other related barriers concerned the lack of appropriate 

number of policemen and the reactions from the drivers and the policemen against the 

systematic controls (using several different pretexts). These parameters were the main 

difficulties encountered during the early implementation period. 

• As far as the present evaluation is concerned, the main difficulty concerned the lack of 

detailed and accurate data on the specific resources allocated in the intensification of 

enforcement. As in most countries (ESCAPE, 2003), no standards to measure police 

intensity existed in Greece and no system of performance indicators for enforcement 

activity was developed. Additionally, neither police headquarters nor road safety 

authorities use such performance indicators. Consequently, the systematic recording of 

the number of police controls and related infringements achieved during the 1998-2002 

period in Greece contributed important progress in the monitoring of the enforcement 

activity as well as the road safety level in Greece. 

• Additionally, no systematic and official cost data are available in Greece. In particular, 

police costs are not systematically recorded in relation to specific actions, as labour 

and capital allocation is optimised according to the specific needs of each 

circumstance. As far as accident costs are concerned, no social values of reference 

are officially published, and the estimated values are based on survey results. 

• In the present evaluation, the lack of appropriate data for cost-benefit evaluation 

purposes was overcome by means of exhaustive interviews with experienced Head 

Officers of the police who had also been actively involved in both the decision-making 

Page 182


process and the monitoring of police effort. Additionally, existing research in Greece 

was further used to yield the necessary parameters for the computation of cost-benefit 

ratios. 


There is certainly a correlation between systematic road safety enforcement and the 

number of road accidents. This road safety enforcement intensification is one of the two 

basic reasons (the other one is congestion) that may explain the important decrease 

observed in the number of road accidents, persons killed and injured during the last five 

years in Greece. 

Previous research on enforcement assessment has indicated that only a significant 

increase in enforcement level may affect the number of accidents [BJØRNSKAU, ELVIK, 

2003]. Additionally, very little validation of enforcement effect at the national level has been 

available in international literature. In particular, most evaluation attempts concern a 

temporary increase in local resources or concentrated enforcement efforts in a selected 

area [ESCAPE, 2003]. However, as far as Greece is concerned, the measures were 

implemented at the national level, and a systematic intensification of enforcement covering 

all types of violations was achieved. 

The present research has revealed a limited exploitation of assessment methods in the 

decision-making process in Greece. This phenomenon is not specifically related to the 

processes and administrations related to the particular research on enforcement, as CBA 

and CEA evaluations are not commonly used in general in Greece. 

As far as the particular case is concerned, the lack of systematic and appropriate cost data 

complicated the assessment process. The co-operation of the decision-makers who 

provided useful data based on their experience was very important in dealing with this 

problem. However, it is obvious that a lot of additional effort is required in order to achieve 

a systematic recording of police labour and capital costs, in a similar way that the related 

controls and infringements were monitored since the intensification of police enforcement 

in Greece. 

However, the important benefit obtained from the intensification of speed and alcohol 

enforcement in terms of number of accidents and casualties prevented could motivate 

decision-makers towards further improvement of the implementation and monitoring of the 

measures. Additionally, it is obvious that decision-makers respond very positively to results 

of CBA and CEA evaluations when these are available, as their efforts and policies are 

confirmed. Nevertheless, such efficiency assessment is rarely initiated, especially at the 

national level. 

Page 183

REFERENCES 


AGAPAKIS, J., MYGIAKI, E., (2003): "Macroscopic investigation of the effect of 

enforcement on the improvement of road safety on Greece", Diploma Thesis, NTUA, 

School of Civil Engineering, Department of Transportation Planning and Engineering, 

Athens. 

BJØRNSKAU, T., ELVIK, R., (1992): "Can road traffic law enforcement permanently 

reduce the number of accidents?", Accident Analysis & Prevention, Volume 24, Issue 5, 

Pages 507-520. 

ESCAPE CONSORTIUM (2003): "Traffic enforcement in Europe: Effects, measures, 

needs and future", The “Escape” Project Final report, Contract Nº: RO-98-RS.3047, 4 th 

RTD Framework Programme. 

HOLLAND, C.A., CONNER, M.T., (1996): "Exceeding the speed limit: An evaluation of the 

effectiveness of a police intervention", Accident Analysis & Prevention, Volume 28, 

Issue 5, Pages 587-597. 

KANELLOPOULOU, A., AGGELOUSSI, K., (2002): "Estimation of the human cost of road 

accidents and drivers' sensitivity towards accident risk - A willingness-to-pay technique 

and a stated-preference technique", Diploma Thesis, NTUA, School of Civil 


LIAKOPOULOS, D. (2002): "Development of a model for the estimation of the economic 

benefits from accident reduction in Greece", Diploma Thesis, NTUA, School of Civil 


NATIONAL STATISTICAL SERVICE OF GREECE, (2003): "Greece in figures", Official 

Publication of the National Statistical Service of Greece, Athens (www.statistics.gr). 

National Technical University of Athens, Dept. of Transportation Planning and Engineering, 

(2003): "A strategic plan for the improvement of road safety in Greece 1998-2002", 

Ministry of Economy and Finance. 

TSAMBOULAS, D., (2004): "Evaluation of transport infrastructure projects", NTUA, School 

of Civil Engineering, Department of Transportation Planning and Engineering, Athens. 

VAA, T., (1997): "Increased police enforcement: Effects on speed", Accident Analysis & 

Prevention, Volume 29, Issue 3, Pages 373-385. 

YANNIS, G., KANELLOPOULOU, A., AGGELOUSSI, K., TSAMBOULAS, D., (2003): 

"Modelling driver choices towards accident risk reduction", Article In Press, Safety 

Science. 

Page 184

CASE I2: Concentrated General enforcement on interurban roads in israel 



ROSEBUD 

WP4 - CASE I REPORT 

CONCENTRATED GENERAL ENFORCEMENT ON 

INTERURBAN ROADS IN ISRAEL 



ISRAEL



1 PROBLEM ..........................................................................................................188 


2.1 The enforcement project .....................................................................................189 

2.2 The follow-up study .............................................................................................190 



4.1 Monitoring of police activity .................................................................................191 

4.2 Accident analysis ................................................................................................193 

5 COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS...............................................................................195 

5.1 General ...............................................................................................................195 

5.2 Costs...................................................................................................................196 

5.3 Benefits ...............................................................................................................197 

5.4 Computation of the Cost-Benefit Ratio................................................................199 



8 DISCUSSION......................................................................................................200 

Page 186

CASE OVERVIEW 

Measure 


A police project of concentrated general enforcement on interurban roads 

Problem 

Reducing the high numbers of severe accidents on main rural roads 

Target Group 

Accidents of all types, with fatalities or serious injuries 

Targets 

Improving drivers' behaviour and diminishing severe accidents on main rural roads 

Initiator 

National Road Safety Authority and the Police Traffic Department 


National Road Safety Authority and the Police Command 

Costs 

Additional personnel costs, additional vehicle fleet expenses and the costs of a publicity 

campaign that accompanied the police project; paid by the National Road Safety Authority 

and the Ministry of Interior Security 

Benefits 

The benefits stemmed from prevention of severe accidents, which were attained during the 

project's performance. The driving public and the national economy will benefit. 


Ranges from 1:3.5 for a "conservative estimate" of the accidents prevented to 1:5 for the 

"best estimate". 

Page 187

1 Problem 


Traffic law enforcement is believed to be a factor that contributes significantly to normative 

road user behaviour and road safety. Traffic rules are usually enforced by traffic police 

forces whose activity and success are generally limited by the resources that can be 

applied and by established priorities. Numerous long and short-term enforcement projects 

frequently accompanied by research studies have been performed throughout the world 

over the last forty years, aimed at increasing the effects of police activity on driver 

behaviour and road safety and, concurrently, to improve the enforcement methods in use. 

Examples of literature surveys that summarize the findings of this research are Fitzpatrick 

(1992); Bjornskau and Elvik (1992); Zaal (1994); Oei (1998); and OECD (1999). A number 

of large-scale European studies on the subject funded by the European Commission have 

also been conducted over the past ten years, including GADGET, ESCAPE and VERA. 

Over the last two decades, traffic rules' enforcement became a significant share of activity 

of the Israeli police. The National Traffic Police (NTP) in Israel was established in 1991 as 

an operational branch of the national police, when all existing interurban traffic units came 

under its direct command. At the beginning of 1997 the NTP’s responsibility covered over 

3100 kilometres of interurban roads, where the traffic police forces counted more than 400 

patrol officers, about 150 patrol vehicles and about 70 units of mobile enforcement tools 

(speed guns and photo radar cameras). 

The NTP has always been looking for more effective forms for deployment of its forces. 

The approach usually applied in Israel for deployment of patrol cars on road sections can 

be termed “correlative”, whereby the number of accidents that occurred on a certain road 

and the traffic volumes determine the road’s priority for police enforcement. (A detailed 

description of the method is given in Hakkert et al, 1991). This approach is common for the 

annual and other typical plans of activity of the traffic police. Besides, as the NTP bears 

the responsibility for the whole network of interurban roads, during the 90s two nationwide 

enforcement experiments took place. The first of these enforcement projects was 

performed following the NTP foundation in 1991, and lasted for 21 months (Zaidel et al, 

1994). 

At the beginning of 1997, the NTP, with the support of the National Road Safety Authority, 

undertook a redeployment of its forces and started the second nationwide enforcement 

project. This was called the 700-project as its basic idea was to concentrate the major part 

of the NTP forces on about 700 kilometres (some 20%) of interurban roads which in 1996 

contained the majority of all interurban accidents and about half of all severe rural accident 

locations. The project began in April 1997 and lasted for one year. The new deployment 

was aimed at increasing the enforcement activity on the roads under focus, to properly 

combine the traffic and safety issues in everyday police operations, and to lead the traffic 

police to a more effective use of its resources. 

In contrast to most reported projects in this field, which usually tend to be localized and/or 

focus on specific target behaviours and populations, the 700-project was planned on a 

wide geographical scale with the intention to improve the general functioning of the NTP 

forces and to determine the resource allocation and field activity modes, providing maximal 

influence on drivers’ behaviour and road safety. From reviews on the subject (e.g. 

Bjornskau and Elvik, 1992) it follows that changes in drivers’ behaviour and a decrease in 

accident frequency can be expected when the enforcement intensity has been increased 

by at least a factor of three. Due to its size, the 700-project could not satisfy this demand. 

However, accounting for a general deterrence effect of such wide-scale enforcement, one 

might expect changes in drivers' behaviour and in the end, in the accidents. 

Page 188


Besides, the potential to influence driver behaviour and accident occurrences might 

increase when conventional enforcement is fortified by non-trivial enforcement tactics such 

as a random scheduled deployment or the use of the field experience of the police officers 

when the activity types are selected. 


2.1 The enforcement project 

The "700-project" was the second large-scale experiment of the National Traffic Police. 

The project began in April 1997 and lasted for one year. The project involved ten out of 

thirteen regional police subdivisions that comprised more than 90% of the NTP staff. 

Within the project, the NTP declared a redeployment of its forces, concentrating the major 

part of its resources on about 700 km of interurban roads. These were the most heavily 

travelled roads throughout the country which, in 1996, contained some 60% of all 

interurban accidents and about half of the severe accident locations (severe accidents are 

those with serious casualties or fatalities). The declared purpose of the project was to 

achieve a reduction in severe accidents on the roads in focus. 

The “700 project” roads included fifteen road sections (Table 67) with a traffic volume of 

17-80 thousand vehicles per day. Four of the roads, i.e. roads No 65, 70, “4-center” and 

“40-south” were declared as the highest priority roads, intended for maximum enforcement 

"coverage". The police planned three-shift patrols everyday on the highest priority roads, 

two working day shifts on other project's roads, and 2-3 shifts per week for the rest (of the 

rural network). The enforcement was announced to emphasize severe violations 

(speeding, not keeping to the right, non-compliance with traffic signs and other moving 

violations), however in practice it was not limited to severe violations only. 

Being inspired by the Australian experience of enforcement programs combined with 

publicity campaigns (Cameron et al, 1996), the Israeli Road Safety Authority initiated a 

publicity campaign, which was launched simultaneously with the beginning of the 700project. 

This was the first experiment in NTP history where publicity accompanied the 

police operation in a controlled manner. The campaign consisted of TV and radio 

advertisements, press announcements, outdoor advertising and special yellow sign posts 

indicating intensive enforcement that were erected on the shoulders of the project roads. 

Two purposes were determined for the campaign: a) to inform the public about the police 

enforcement project, its territory and major violations enforced; and b) to strengthen the 

public feeling that the risk of apprehension had grown for those who violated traffic rules 

on the project roads. 

The publicity campaign in the media lasted four months, from April to July 1997. The static 

outdoor advertising and signposts were left in the field till the end of the police project. 

Page 189


Region Road No Section: from km 

to km 

Table 68: 700-project road sections 

Length, km AADT, 1000 vehicles Road Type* 

North 65 0-60 60 30.2 D 

70 10-52.9 42.9 25.1 D 

2 55-100 45 39.7 D 

4 157-200 43 18.8 S 

85 1-31 30 21.4 D+S** 

79 0-27 27 17.3 S 

77 49-75.7 26.7 18.0 S 

75 20-49 29 19.4 D 

Centre 2 28-55 27 79.5 D 

4 85-157 72 62.3 D+F** 

40 248-301 53 35.3 D 

44 10-35 25 29.1 D 

1 4-56 52 47.7 F 

South 4 51-85 34 27.2 D 

40 189-248 59 30.9 D 

*F – Freeway; D - Dual-carriageway; S - Single-carriageway 

**Includes sections of both types 

2.2 The follow-up study 

An assessment study was conducted for the purpose of the follow-up of the actual project 

performance and of the project’s influence on drivers’ behaviour and on road safety. This 

was performed by Technion – the Transportation Research Institute in co-operation with 

the Technion Statistics Laboratory. The assessment project began in March 1997 and 

accompanied the police activity for the whole year [HAKKERT et al, 1998]. 

The underlying rationale of the evaluation study was based on the assumption of a chain 

of relations between police activities and road safety [e.g. OECD, 1999; HAKKERT et al., 

2001]. It is hypothesized that the new deployment of police forces will lead to increased 

enforcement on the project roads; the latter implies a growth in the actual risk of being 

detected for traffic rules’ violations which, together with the accompanying publicity, raises 

the subjective probability of apprehension perceived by the drivers. The subjective 

probability of apprehension, together with the expected punishment for violators that is 

meted out by the judicial process, constitutes the deterrence effect. Ultimately, the 

deterrence and the detection in combination with proper education and training may cause 

positive changes in driving norms and actual traffic behaviour in a manner that would 

manifest itself in a reduction in accidents and their severity. 

In order to identify changes in the components of the aforementioned relationship, the 

evaluation study was designed to monitor police activity on the project roads, estimate 

changes in road users’ apprehension and behaviour, and assess changes in traffic 

accidents that might be attributable to the project performance. Thus, the follow-up study 

of the 700-project consisted of three main parts: 

Page 190


1. monitoring of everyday police operations on the project roads (shift deployments, 

activity types, citation types and locations, etc.); 

2. periodic evaluation of the project’s influence on driver behaviour (through field 

observations, driver questionnaires and speed measurements); 

3. the evaluation of changes in accident numbers and severity within the project area. 

As the present report focuses on the economic evaluation of the enforcement project, only 

data on the police activity during the project and changes observed in accident numbers 

will be further discussed. A description of changes in drivers' behaviour and attitudes 

which were observed during the project's performance and served as intermediate 

indicators of the project's effects can be found in Hakkert et al (2001). 


The target accident group of the enforcement project included all severe accidents, i.e. 

accidents of all types, with fatalities or serious injuries. All accident types were considered 

as the enforcement was of a general nature, aimed at improving drivers' obedience to 

most traffic rules. The results pertaining to severe accident counts are considered as the 

most appropriate to the project's objective. 

The accident changes were considered on the project's roads (see Table 1). The detailed 

consideration of the police patrol data (during the project's performance) revealed that 

shortly after the project's beginning, the actual project territory was reduced in comparison 

with the original plan, and comprised in fact about 600 kilometres of roads. Table 1 

provides the actual lengths of the project road sections, whereas the changes concerned 

roads No. 70, 77, 75 and “4-north” (these are not the highest priority roads). The accident 

analysis and the analysis of police activity on road sections addressed these actual 

lengths of the project roads. 

4 Assessment results 

4.1 Monitoring of police activity 

A special information system was established to monitor the enforcement activity during 

the project. This included the data of policemen’s shift activity reports of all the NTP 

subdivisions involved in the project – a monthly input of some 4,500 records. The 

policeman’s activity report provides details on patrol car locations, activity types and 

citation categories produced during the shift. Using these data, three groups of summary 

indices were estimated: (a) inputs - the number of police officers, patrol vehicles and 

devices per site in a definite time interval (day, week, month); (b) outputs - the level of 

actual police presence and the citations given; and (c) the efficiency indices, e.g. the 

performance-against-plan ratios and utilization of resources. The summary indices 

illustrated the police activity in the form of daily and average monthly figures, with respect 

to road sections, police regions and the entire project area. 

The intensity of the police enforcement over the 700-project is characterized by the 

following facts: 

Page 191


• the number of patrol units within the project area during a regular weekday shift was 

about 60; during a similar weekend shift – more than 30; during a night shift – 9.5 and 

12, accordingly; 

• the average monthly amount of the patrol units in all the shifts was some 4,000 in the 

whole interurban area, of which some 2,700 in the project-area (70%) – Figure 19; 

• on average, every road section of the 700-project was patrolled about 1,760 hours 

monthly with a “production rate” of 0.83 citation per shift hour, or 1.2 citations per actual 

enforcement hour; 

• the average monthly amount of citations in the project area was more than 24,000 

(some 82% of the total), with 1460 citations per project road, on average; 

• the productivity of a patrol unit in the project area was on average 9 citations per shift, 

and 7.7 in the whole territory under the NTP responsibility. (The figure does not include 

automatic citations, produced by F6 – photo radar camera, and Marom – an infra-red 

speed and gap-following camera). 

Figure 19:Monthly number of patrol units in the course of the project (estimated amount of vehicle-shifts in 

three daily shifts) 

Vehicle-shift 

5000 

4500 

4000 

3500 

3000 

2500 

2000 

1500 

1000 

500 

0 

4/97 

5/97 

6/97 

7/97 

8/97 

9/97 

10/97 

11/97 

12/97 

1/98 

All roads under the NTP 

responsibility 

the project area 

2/98 

3/98 

month 

As became evident from the evaluation of most input/output indices [HAKKERT et al, 

1998], project intensity did not stay constant over the whole year. There was an initial 

period of increasing activity; a fall in September; some priority changes in October and a 

return to routine in November, however, with a lower intensity in comparison with the initial 

project period. There were also other factors pointing to two periods in the project’s 

performance: the intensive publicity accompanied the project only in the first four months; 

and in September, the central NTP subdivisions were restructured administratively. Finally, 

Page 192


a detailed consideration of police deployment (the force split between the project road 

sections) determined two periods: I - from April to August, II - starting from September 

1997 till the project’s completion. This was the first finding taken into consideration in the 

following accident analysis. 

The second important point that influenced the accident analysis was the fact that not all 

road sections were characterized by the same enforcement intensity during the project. 

Based on three criteria: 

1. the number of patrol units per road-km per month (with a threshold of 4); 

2. the rate of NTP forces allocated to the road section (5% was accepted as a 

threshold); 

3. the amount of net enforcement hours on the section as opposed to the average 

value (above average was taken as considerable). 

Seven road sections, out of fifteen, were chosen as having higher police presence during 

the project. 

4.2 Accident analysis 

To assess the NTP project’s influence on safety, the trends in road accidents during the 

project year were analysed. An evaluation method, which combines both the odds-ratio 

and a longitudinal (time-series) analysis, was developed. Using this method, the 

longitudinal models were fitted to the monthly accident counts in the “before” and the 

“after” periods, for both the treatment and the comparison-group roads, followed by a 

comparison of the changes. Unlike the classical methods in which the odds-ratio considers 

the average behaviour “before” and “after”, this method produces odds-ratios for each time 

point (month) of the “after” period. 

For the accident analysis, all the roads under the NTP supervision were divided into eight 

groups, according to following three characteristics: 

4. Belonging to the 700–project (yes/no); 

5. Police activity level within the project area (high/low presence); 

6. Geographical zone (north, centre, south). 

The third characteristic was added as the geographical regions differ in their traffic 

patterns and, consequently, in the police activity modes. (Not nine, but eight groups were 

considered, as in the south there were only two road groups: “non-project roads” and 

“project roads with higher police presence”.) The roads, which did not belong to the 

project, served as comparison groups in the corresponding geographical area. 

The data file for the analysis consisted of the accident records from January 1995 till 

March 1998. The observed monthly counts of severe accidents, both for the project and 

comparison group roads, are given in the Appendix. 

Models for the “before” and “after” periods, were fitted for each road category. A 

generalized linear model was fitted to the monthly accident counts using the GENMOD 

procedure of SAS, assuming a Poisson distribution and allowing for over-dispersion. Each 

model includes a trend and seasonal component. More details can be found in [HAKKERT 

et al, 2001]. 

Based on the fitted model for the "before" period for each month of the project period, the 

expected number of accidents, had there been no intervention, were predicted. Then, a 

model based on the actual data for the "after" period was also fitted. The monthly odds is 

Page 193


the ratio of the predicted number of accidents according to the model based on the "after" 

period and the forecast according to the model based on the "before" period. These 

monthly odds were evaluated for all the roads (comparison and treatment groups). 

The next stage of evaluation - the odds ratio - is required to account for possible changes 

that were not necessarily caused by the intervention (project). Thus, for each month the 

odds of the treatment group were divided by the corresponding odds of the comparison 

group to obtain a monthly odds-ratio. This odds ratio was expected to be significantly less 

than 1, had the project been effective. The "gain" (or loss in accident number due to the 

treatment) was expressed as the difference between the product of the odds-ratio times 

the actual count. 

Table 69 provides the evaluation results. It was seen that since the project started, an 

increase in accident numbers was observed in most road groups. However, the 

comparison of the “during the project” accident counts with the “before” period (Table 69, 

“after/before ratio”) revealed that none of the changes appeared to be significant. A further 

comparison of the changes observed for the project roads with those occurred in the 

proper comparison groups, demonstrated that (Table 69, “Odds-ratio”): 

• A statistically significant reduction of severe accidents, as opposed to the comparison 

group, was found on the highly enforced road sections in the centre of the country 

(mainly during the second project period); 

• No other statistically significant results were obtained. However, as can be seen in 

Table 69, in most cases the mean value of the odds ratio is much less than one and 

the average gain (the number of accidents prevented due to the project) is positive. 

The summary changes in severe accidents over the project's period, in terms of the odds 

ratio and the "gains" estimated, are highlighted in Table 69. 

The supplementary analyses performed for all injury accidents and for the numbers of 

severe casualties (serious injuries and fatalities together) provided similar results 

[HAKKERT et al, 1998]. To note, separate consideration of fatalities did not bring a 

significant contribution to the findings, as, due to scarce statistics, the confidence intervals 

for the odds-ratio values were very wide. None of the project road groups demonstrated a 

statistically significant change of all injury accidents [HAKKERT et al, 1998]. 

In general, it was concluded that a general deterioration in safety on the interurban roads 

occurred during the project year. The phenomenon was less tangible on the project roads, 

and this result ought to be, due to the concentrated police enforcement applied in this area 

[HAKKERT et al, 1998]. 

Page 194


Table 69: Odds ratios and estimated "gains" for severe accidents on the project roads 

Evaluation 

period (1) 

After/before 

ratio (odds) for 

the project 

roads 

After/before 

ratio (odds) for 

comparisongroup 

roads 

Road Group: North, Higher Police Presence 

I 1.75 

1.29 

(0.93;3.27) (0.90;1.86) 

II 1.37 

1.41 

(0.75;2.50) (0.99;2.00) 

Whole 1.50 

1.37 

Year (0.88;2.54) (1.00;1.86) 

Road Group: Centre, Higher Police Presence 

I 0.95 

1.42 

(0.70;1.29) (0.94;2.15) 

II 0.76 

1.32 

(0.57;1.02) (0.89;1.96) 

Whole 0.82 

1.36 

Year (0.64;1.06) (0.96;1.92) 

Road Group: South, Higher Police Presence 

I 0.85 

1.06 

(0.47;1.53) (0.69;1.64) 

II 0.95 

1.23 

(0.54;1.70) (0.80;1.89) 

Whole 0.91 

1.17 

Year (0.55;1.51) (0.80;1.70) 

Road Group: North, Lower Police Presence 

I 0.97 

1.29 

(0.63;1.48) (0.90;1.86) 

II 1.25 

1.41 

(0.86;1.81) (0.99;2.00) 

Whole 1.14 

1.37 

Year (0.82;1.59) (1.00;1.86) 

Road Group: Centre, Lower Police Presence 

I 0.79 

1.42 

(0.31;2.00) (0.94;2.15) 

II 0.65 

1.32 

(0.27;1.60) (0.89;1.96) 

Whole 0.70 

1.36 

Year (0.32;1.55) (0.96;1.92) 

Odds ratio Estimated 

“Gain” (2) 

1.35 

(0.66; 2.79) 

0.97 

(0.49; 1.95) 

1.10 

(0.60; 2.02) 

0.67 

(0.40; 1.12) 

0.57 

(0.35; 0.93) 

0.61 

(0.39; 0.93) 

0.80 

(0.38; 1.66) 

0.77 

(0.38; 1.59) 

0.78 

(0.42; 1.46) 

0.75 

(0.43; 1.31) 

0.89 

(0.53; 1.47) 

0.83 

(0.53; 1.31) 

0.56 

(0.20; 1.54) 

0.49 

(0.19; 1.31) 

0.52 

(0.22; 1.22) 

-7.74 

(-19.09; 15.67) 

1.02 

(-18.18; 39.48) 

-5.92 

(-33.88; 45.61) 

28.58 

(-6.07; 86.64) 

58.02 

(5.52; 143.62) 

88.06 

(9.85; 208.44) 

4.18 

(-6.53; 26.50) 

6.48 

(-8.24; 36.67) 

10.74 

(-12.24; 53.72) 

14.16 

(-9.91; 56.26) 

11.58 

(-29.21; 79.39) 

26.51 

(-31.67; 118.13) 

10.56 

(-4.66; 52.51) 

19.58 

(-4.57; 83.76) 

30.38 

(-5.94; 116.43) 

Observed 

Accident 

Count (3) 

(1) 

The project periods: I (first) April-August 1997; II (second) September 1997-March 1998. 

(2) 

“Gain” corresponds to loss in the accident number due to the project. 

(3) 

The observed accident counts for the "before" and "after" periods, for the treatment and the comparison 

group roads are given in the Appendix. 


5.1 General 

In this section, a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) of the enforcement project is performed. The 

CBA compares the measure's benefits with the measure's costs, where both values are 

brought to the same economic framework. Due to the fact that a certain level of 

enforcement activity was available on the roads prior to the project’s beginning and, 

therefore, somehow contributed to the safety of the rural road network, the CBA will focus 

on the changes associated with the project’s performance. In other words, the CBA will 

29 

36 

65 

58 

76 

134 

16 

22 

38 

41 

90 

131 

13 

19 

32 

Page 195


compare the additional costs that were invested in the enforcement project's performance 

with the safety benefits observed. 

As the time halo-effect of the enforcement project is usually limited, both the costs and the 

benefits are considered for the project's period only (one year). No conversion to the 

present economic values is necessary. 

5.2 Costs 

The additional costs, which were required for the police project's performance, are as 

follows: 

1. personnel costs, including overhead; 

2. vehicle fleet expenses; 

3. publicity costs. 

The additional personnel costs were associated with an increase in the police staff, which 

was needed for the project's performance. A comparison of the numbers of monthly 

vehicle-shifts during the project with similar data for the "before" period demonstrated that 

the project's figures were 1.4-1.6 times higher [HAKKERT et al, 1998]; we shall apply an 

average increase of 1.5 times. 

Based on the average figure of 1760 hours of patrolling per road per month (see Section 

4.1) for the 15 project's roads, the total person-hours during the project month will be 

26,400. Applying the norm of 180 person-hours per month, 147 policemen appear to be 

involved in the project's performance, of whom 49 compose the addition (providing a 

higher than usual police presence on the project's roads). 

The personnel costs of one policeman are estimated at 150,000 NIS per year 23 . A 100% 

overhead should be added to this figure, accounting for the command, logistics, support 

staff, equipment’s maintenance, citations' processing, etc. Thus, the additional personnel 

costs for the project's performance were: 

49 policemen * 150,000 * 2 = 14.7 million NIS (at 1997 prices) 

The vehicle fleet was extended by 10 cars and 3 motorcycles for the project's 

performance. The cost of a new car is $ 20,000 and a new motorcycle costs $10,000 (as 

each vehicle stays in use for 5 years, on average, 20% of the initial investment belong to 

the project’s costs). The annual maintenance expenses of the traffic police in 2003 were 

93,000 NIS per a car and 15,000 NIS per a motorcycle. (All the estimates were provided 

by the Traffic Department of the Police.) Thus, using the average rate $1 = 3.45 NIS (in 

1997) and accounting for the change of price index over the years 1997-2002 (by 1.1986), 

the additional expenses on the vehicle fleet can be estimated as: 

10 cars * [0.2 * 20,000 $ * 3.45 + 77,590] = 913,900 NIS on cars, and 

3 motorcycles * [0.2 * 10,000 $ * 3.45 + 12,515] = 58,245 NIS on motorcycles 

(both figures are at 1997 prices). 

The costs of publicity that accompanied the project were 5.0-7.0 million NIS 24 (at 1997 

prices). 

23 Provided by the Police Traffic Department 

24 Provided by the National Road Safety Authority 

Page 196


Besides, the additional costs of administration were considered to account for the 

processing of extra citations that were produced during the project. As HAKKERT et al. 

(1998) found, the productivity of the patrol units increased during the 700-project in 

comparison with the previous years. The increase in the number of citations would mean 

extra work for the prosecution of offenders by the police and, in some cases, by courts. 

However, as known, the fines paid for traffic law violations produce revenues to the 

treasury. As believed, both figures (of the additional costs and the benefits) are somewhat 

similar and compensate each other’s effects. The exact figures are unknown and cannot 

be easily tracked. Therefore, neither costs nor benefits stemming from the extra citations 

were accounted for in our case. 

5.3 Benefits 

The project's benefits came from the accidents prevented due to concentrated police 

enforcement. The value of benefits is estimated as the product of the number of accidents 

saved and the average accident cost. In the current evaluation the severe injury accidents 

are considered, as both corresponding to the project's purpose and providing more 

significant results (see Section 4.2). 

The number of accidents saved due to the project can be estimated in two ways: 

1. Summarizing the values of "gains" estimated by the fitted models (see Table 

69). The values are summed up through the project area, i.e. over the five 

groups of the project's roads (see Table 69). This case will be called "the 

best estimate". 

2. Applying the values of odds-ratio, i.e. the safety effects estimated (see Table 

69), the number of accidents prevented is assessed by multiplying the value 

of the safety effect by the number of accidents observed on project roads 

during the year "before". The total number of accidents prevented presents a 

sum of the values from the five groups of the project roads. In this case, a 

“conservative estimate” of benefits is provided (as less accounting for the 

general increasing trend, which was observed in the accidents on the whole 

network of interurban roads during the project year). 

The details of both estimates are given in Table 70. The "best estimate" states that 150 

severe accidents were prevented due to the project's performance. The “conservative 

estimate” will be 108 severe accidents prevented. 

Page 197


Table 70: Estimating the number of severe accidents prevented due to the project's performance 

Project's road group North, 

higher 

police 

presence 

Estimated "gain" ("best 

estimate") 

Centre, 

higher 

police 

presence 

South, 

higher 

police 

presence 

North, 

lower police 

presence 

Centre, 

lower police 

presence 

Total 

-5.92 88.06 10.74 26.51 30.38 149.77 

Estimated safety effect* +10% -39% -22% -17% -48% N/a 

Observed "before" 

accident counts** 

Number of "saved" 

accidents 

(“conservative 

estimate”) 

62 157 48 140 38 445 

-6.2 61.23 10.56 23.8 18.24 107.63 

*Percentage of accident reduction attributed to the measure 

** Over the period April 1996-March 1997 

In the current Israeli practice, the average accident cost is estimated as a sum of injury 

costs and damage costs of an average accident in the target accidents’ group. The injury 

costs are a sum of injury-values multiplied by the average number of injuries with different 

severity levels, which were observed in the target accidents’ group. The road accident 

injury values are usually taken as $ 500,000 per fatality, $ 50,000 per serious injury, and $ 

5,000 per slight injury [HAKKERT and GITELMAN, 1999]. The damage value is stated as 

10% of the injury costs. 

The above values of injury should be treated as conservative because a recent evaluation 

of losses from road accidents in Israel recommended a higher estimate of the fatalityvalue, 

of $ 930,000 [MATAT, 2004]. The latter accounts for both lost output and human 

costs, i.e. accounts for the ‘willingness-to-pay’ approach. 

Table 71 illustrates the calculation of injury costs for an average severe accident 

observed on rural roads over the year 1997. The injury costs of an average severe 

accident are NIS 663,815; with the addition of damage-costs, the value of average severe 

accident is NIS 730,196 (at 1997 prices). 

Table 71: Estimating injury costs for an average severe accident on rural roads in 1997 

Value Fatality Serious injury Slight injury 

Total number of injuries in severe 

accidents 

288 1285 1494 

The number of severe accidents 1122 1122 1122 

Average number of injuries per 

accident 

0.257 1.145 1.332 

Injury values, $ 500,000 50,000 5,000 

Total injury costs of average 

severe accident (at 1997 prices)* 

*$ 1 = 3.45 NIS 

$ 192,410 or NIS 663,815 

Page 198


5.4 Computation of the Cost-Benefit Ratio 

Table 72 illustrates the calculation of the cost-benefit ratio (CBR) of the enforcement 

project. The total value of the project's costs was of 21-23 million NIS (at 1997 prices), or 

about 6 million Euros (at 2002 prices). The total value of the project's benefits was of 79- 

109 million NIS (at 1997 prices), or of 21-29 million Euros (at 2002 prices). Consequently, 

the value of CBR was better than 1:3.5 for the "conservative estimate" of the accidents 

prevented and about 1:5 for the "best estimate". 

For the range of cost and benefit assumptions considered, the enforcement project 

appears to be cost-effective. 

Table 72: Costs and benefits of the enforcement project considered 

Costs Benefits "Best 

estimate" 

Personnel, with overhead, 

million NIS 

14.7 Number of severe 

accidents saved 

Vehicle fleet, million NIS 0.914 + 0.058 Average accident 

cost, NIS 

Publicity, million NIS From 5.0 to 7.0 

Total, million NIS (1997) From 20.672 to 

22.672 

Total, million Euro (2002)* From 5.53 to 

6.07 

Total, million NIS 

(1997) 

Total, million Euro 

(2002)* 

Cost-benefit ratio From 1 : 5.3 

to 1 : 4.8 

*Change of price index over 1997-2002 is 1.1986. In 2002: 1 Euro = 4.48 NIS. 


"Conservative 

estimate" 

150 108 

730,196 730,196 

109.53 78.86 

29.3 21.1 

From 1 : 3.8 

to 1 : 3.5 

The follow-up study of the enforcement project was initiated by the National Road Safety 

Authority. The study's steering committee included representatives from the Ministry of 

Interior Security, National Road Safety Authority and the Police Traffic Department. The 

evaluation results were reported to the Head and other high level decision-makers of the 

Road Safety Authority and to the Traffic Police Command. 

The follow-up consideration of the enforcement project concerned mostly the changes in 

actual driver behaviour, drivers' attitudes and accident numbers. As the majority of 

accident changes observed on the project's roads were statistically not significant, the 

project's results were stated as "moderate" [HAKKERT et al, 2001]. Such a "conservative" 

estimate was given to the project also accounting for a decrease in the project's intensity 

during the second half of the project's year, changes in the force deployment over the 

project's year, and lack of a strict policy in the enforcement modes applied by the different 

police units. One of the main reasons for the limited success was seen in the gap between 

the project target and everyday enforcement activity. The recommendations were given to 

develop more focused enforcement operations, i.e. shorter in time, more concentrated in 

area/enforcement subject, and more flexible in performance by the police units [HAKKERT 

et al, 1998]. To note, in the coming years, 1998-1999, a series of short-term enforcement 

experiments was performed by the Israeli Traffic Police. 

Page 199


The cost-benefit analysis presented in this report actually rehabilitates the 700-project 

demonstrating that in spite of the doubts as to the significance and consistency of the 

results attained, the project was definitely beneficial from the economic viewpoint. 

It is believed that a repeat discussion on the project's results with the decision-makers, and 

especially with the Police Command, will stimulate the performance of other projects of 

intensive police enforcement. 


None of the known barriers to the use of the efficiency assessment tools [WP2, 2004] 

played a serious role in the CBA of the enforcement project considered. Both the Traffic 

Department of the Police and the National Road Safety Authority assisted in collecting the 

data to perform the economic evaluation. The police enforcement project was initiated by 

the Israeli authorities based on the international experience that proved the effectiveness 

of such a measure for improving drivers' behaviour and road safety. Therefore, neither 

institutional nor implementation barriers to the EAT application seem to be relevant in this 

case. 

The technical barriers, e.g. lack of knowledge of safety effect, were overcome by means of 

relevant data collection and fitting statistical models for various evaluation needs. 

8 Discussion 

The concentrated general police enforcement project took place for a whole year on the 

most heavily travelled interurban roads in Israel. The project aimed at a reduction in 

severe accidents on the roads in focus and, concurrently, at an improvement in the Traffic 

Police working modes. The project did not attain its full purpose, as a significant reduction 

of severe accidents was found only on one of the five project road groups. However, in 

four of the five project road groups the mean value of the odds ratio was much less than 

one, indicating a positive average safety effect. 

The economic evaluation based on the average values of safety effects demonstrated that 

the enforcement project was beneficial. An important finding of this study is that had the 

cost-benefit analysis been performed immediately after the police project completion, the 

conclusions of the evaluation study would have been more optimistic than those given in 

the report by Hakkert et al. (1998). 

The CBA compared the additional costs, which were required for the police project 

performance with the safety benefits (severe accident savings) attained. The CBA 

presented in this study can be characterized as follows: 


• to estimate the safety effects statistical models were fitted to the accident 

data and the evaluation was in line with the criteria of correct safety 

evaluation [WP3, 2004]; 

• the accident costs were fitted to the accident type considered, however, they 

should be treated as conservative as the injury costs did not account for the 

‘willingness-to-pay’ component; 

• the measure does not have a long-term effect, therefore both costs and 

benefits were considered for the year of implementation only; 

Page 200


• the evaluation study was initiated by the authorities and the results were 

accepted by the decision-makers; 

• the barriers for the CBA's performance did not play an essential role in the 

case presented. 

The limitations of the CBA performed are as follows: 

• the calculation of benefits was based on mean values of safety effects, 

whereas part of them were not stated as statistically significant; 

• the economic analysis considered the benefits stemming from the 

project's safety effect only. Neither environmental impact nor mobility effect 

was quantified, as the influence of the enforcement project appears to be 

insignificant in this sense. 

Page 201

References 


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reduce the number of accidents? Accident Analysis & Prevention 24, 507-520. 

CAMERON, M., NEWSTEAD, S. and GANTZER, S. (1996) Effects of enforcement and 

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Conference on Traffic Safety on Two Continents, Prague, Czech Republic; VTI 

konferens 4A, part 4, pp. 244-253. 

FITZPATRICK, K (1992): A Review of Automated Enforcement. Compendium of 

Technical Papers, Institute of Transportation Engineers, pp.184-188. 

HAKKERT, A. S., YELINEK, A. and EFRAT, E. (1991): Police surveillance methods and 

police resource allocation models. In Enforcement and Rewarding: Strategies and 

Effects, eds M. J. Koornstra and J. Christensen, pp. 98-101. SWOV, Leidschendam, the 

Netherlands. 

HAKKERT, A.S., GITELMAN V., COHEN, A., DOVEH, E., UMANSKY, T., SHINAR, D. 

(1998): A Follow-up Study of a New Deployment of the National Traffic Police in 1997 - 

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Institute, Technion, Israel (in Hebrew). 

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evaluation of effects on driver behaviour and accidents of concentrated general 

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MATAT (2004): Road Accidents in Israel: the scope, the characteristics and the estimate 

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Page 202


Appendix: The observed counts of severe accidents for the road groups considered 

Non-project road groups Project road groups 

Year Month North Centre South North, 

lower 

police 

presence 

Centre, 

lower 

police 

presence 

North, 

higher 

police 

presence 

Centre, 

higher 

police 

presence 

95 1 33 19 11 17 4 6 11 5 

2 18 9 15 12 5 11 9 3 

3 22 9 13 15 5 9 12 4 

4 25 7 14 13 3 8 11 4 

5 23 12 22 12 5 8 10 3 

6 32 9 15 20 3 8 13 7 

7 26 11 22 16 3 12 13 9 

8 31 8 12 16 2 1 11 5 

9 25 13 10 13 0 3 8 3 

10 25 12 19 9 5 5 8 4 

11 25 11 17 7 2 5 13 4 

12 30 14 13 16 3 3 15 5 

96 1 28 10 14 10 4 8 13 7 

2 29 9 16 9 4 9 7 2 

3 20 12 9 15 1 4 11 7 

4 18 4 17 15 2 7 9 3 

5 22 17 15 11 0 4 14 5 

6 27 8 21 11 4 6 10 9 

7 27 12 14 8 5 4 13 4 

8 29 7 21 7 6 4 16 3 

9 11 11 7 15 5 5 13 5 

10 22 12 10 13 4 6 16 4 

11 23 6 13 10 7 7 12 3 

12 21 9 4 14 0 6 16 4 

97 1 18 8 11 12 2 6 9 2 

2 15 5 19 14 3 4 17 1 

3 19 6 10 10 0 3 12 5 

4 22 9 12 11 1 3 9 2 

5 21 14 14 11 2 2 18 4 

6 30 8 19 6 6 9 10 3 

7 34 13 18 10 4 9 12 5 

8 26 7 17 14 1 9 18 4 

9 27 6 19 10 3 4 13 3 

10 11 5 15 7 0 3 9 4 

11 24 7 13 18 1 1 10 3 

12 36 10 10 13 5 9 14 4 

98 1 29 9 16 14 3 7 11 4 

2 17 18 16 12 1 7 11 2 

3 23 13 7 16 6 5 8 2 

South, 

higher 

police 

presence 

Page 203

CASE J1: 2 + 1 roads in Finland 

ROSEBUD 

WP4 – CASE J REPORT 

2 + 1 ROADS IN FINLAND 




2 +1 ROADS IN FINLAND 

1. PROBLEM TO SOLVE .......................................................................................207 

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURE...................................................................207 

3. TARGET GROUP ...............................................................................................208 

4. ASSESSMENT METHOD...................................................................................209 

5. METHOD OF ANALYSIS....................................................................................209 

6. ASSESSMENT QUANTIFICATION....................................................................210 

7. ROLE OF BARRIERS ........................................................................................211 

8. DISCUSSION......................................................................................................211 

Page 205

CASE OVERVIEW 

Measure 


The measure is to construct 2+1 roads with pavement in the middle of a narrow highway. 

Problem 

Head-on collisions have been frequent in traffic in Finland and Sweden, with the number of 

fatalities resulting from the accidents increasing as a proportion of total road accidents. 

Target Group 

All the road users driving on Finnish roads and highways where new 2+1 construction 

takes place. 

Targets 

The safety measures applied in the middle of the road have two main objectives: To avoid 

the head-on collisions of the vehicles off their lane and to reduce the accident severity of 

the remaining crashes. 

Initiator 

In Finland, the national road authorities have been responsible of road construction to 

produce the required alterations and investments for 2+1 roads. The discussion on the 

safety impact of the measure has been centred on by a few key experts, otherwise the 

measure is not widely promoted. 


Decision-makers are usually located in the headquarters of the national road authorities, 

but if 2+1 roads are part of major national level investments, then the participation of 

national level (i.e. Ministry) decision-makers is required. 

Costs 

For Finland, the total costs of the 2+1 road construction have so far been 417 million 

Euros, which has resulted in over 500 kilometres of 2+1 road constructions, mostly as 

short overtaking sections rather than a full road length. 

Benefits 


number of head-on collisions at a cost lower than that of highway construction. These 

benefit mainly national level decision-makers, insurance companies and those road users 

who still experience a traffic accident, but with less damage than in the absence of the 2+1 

road. 


The Cost-Benefit Ratio is 1.25. 

Page 206

1 Problem 


Both Finland and Sweden have committed to a version of zero-tolerance for traffic 

accidents with fatalities. Whilst it has been realised that the random variable in causing the 

accidents cannot be controlled, several studies have addressed the efficiency of various 

measures in preventing accidents (see, for instance, Peltola and Wuolijoki (2003) and 

Kärki et al. (2001) for reviews of such typologies). However, these studies do not list the 

construction of 2+1 roads into road safety measures list, which has only been a recent 

addition (see Annex for latest available cost-effectiveness information on road safety 

measures in Finland). 

Head-on collisions have been one of the major causes of fatal accidents on roads in 

Nordic countries. In 1998 the Swedish National Road Administration, Vägverket, started a 

development project on 13-meter wide roads. The rationale for the program was that the 

construction of a wider road would be a cost-effective way of increasing road safety on 

highways, compared to alternative measures resulting in the same net effect in prevention 

of crashes and fatalities. 

Finland has been slow to use the 2+1 road as a solution to prevent the accidents. The 

National Road Administration in Finland has studied the Swedish case with close interest, 

but the frequency of adopting the measure has not been transferred to Finnish context. In 

Sweden, however, there have been frequent campaigns to show the cost-efficiency of this 

measure [NTF 2003]. It has been estimated that one kilometre of 2+1 road costs onetwentieth 

of the cost of one kilometre of motorway, which has been translated into an 

argument that building a motorway is not in fact an efficient way to increase road safety 

compared to the 2+1 road solution. 

Head-on collisions have been a severe problem as a percentage of total fatalities in 

Finland; between 1996-2000 an average of 80-85 percent of fatal accidents on two-lane 

highways were due to head-on crashes. For Sweden, figures for 1993-2000 show that 140 

people were killed in head-on collisions, while the number of severely injured was 450 for 

the same period. 

For this case study a comparative study of Finnish and Swedish experiences were chosen 

to study the decisions made in choosing the 2+1 road as means to prevent accidents. 

Particularly in Finland, the decision-making on road construction does not take into 

consideration a pure road safety aspect; the decisions are always based on the socioeconomic 

profitability of the project, where traffic safety is only one of the dimensions. This 

is explained in greater detail in the section dealing with the assessment method. 


2+1 road construction is a measure where an existing road is updated to have a middle 

lane changing direction every 1-2.5 kilometres. Of course, alternatively the construction 

method can be applied to new road sections as well, but since the upgrading is a low-cost 

measure compared to, for instance, construction of a new motorway, the standard 

application is to existing road sections. 

In principle, the 2+1 road construction takes place on 13-meter-wide roads, and it is 

considered as means of upgrading other solutions, mainly wide shoulders or wide lanes. 

Figure 20 illustrates the principle difference between these three approaches. Between the 

three different approaches, the distinctive advantage of the 2+1 solution is that it prevents 

head-on collisions, whereas wide shoulders and wide lanes allow for greater driving 

Page 207


margins and can prevent crashes out of the roads with more margins. As noted, the most 

effective crash reduction will result from the reduction in head-on collisions. 

Figure 20: Construction possibilities for 13-meter wide road: Wide shoulders, wide lanes and 2+1 design 

Source: Larsson et al. 

The road construction must also pay great deal of attention to switching the overtaking 

lane from one side to another. The principles of this are shown in Figure 21. There are 

signals both on the road and on the side to indicate the width of the overtaking lane to the 

other side. 

Figure 21: Designing the lane transition zone 

Source: Larsson et al. 

We will limit the analysis in this case study to the case where the 2+1 road is constructed 

with fixed median cable, which is also the most common way of constructing the 2+1 

roads. The more recent promotion of 2+2 road is obviously even more effective way of 

increasing road safety in Nordic roads, but there is limited data from both countries in 

terms of the impacts of these roads. 


The construction of new roads using the 2+1 design is likely to benefit all road users, with 

the reduction of head-on collisions. For those road users who cause the possibility of an 

Page 208


accident, for instance by sleeping behind the wheel, the immediate benefit is the reduction 

to zero in the probability to have a serious head-on collision. The measure is considered 

effective in fully preventing the head-on collision. For the drivers who are in danger of 

facing a possible head-on collision, the benefit is derived from the fact that the probability 

again is diminished by the existence of a middle road cable. 


Sweden has been ahead of Finland in designing and implementing the 2+1 road 

construction. There is a relatively well-documented, existing database on the constructed 

sections of the 2+1 roads produced by VTI, the Swedish National Institute for Transport 

Research. In Finland, the choice of methods for upgrading roads, particularly from the 

safety point of view, has been unsatisfactory, focusing on speed improvements over lowcost 

safety measures. 

Finnish aggregate data on accidents shows that the cost-effectiveness of the 2+1 road is 

of average in terms of cost for accident prevention [NOKKALA and PELTOLA 2004]. So 

far, 575 kilometres of road with the 2+1 structure has been built at the cost of 417.6 million 

euros. The associated reduction in fatal accidents is estimated to be around 29 accidents 

annually, and in accidents resulting in death an average of 5.5 accidents are prevented 

annually. In discussions with the representatives of National Road Administration, a case 

study for the CBA was selected to represent a typical project focusing on the 2+1 road 

construction. 

For Finland, the TARVA program can be used for assessing the accidents on road 

networks. TARVA contains detailed information on the road network based on road 

addresses and information on investment projects (broken down by components) and 

accidents data assigned to road address. This model can be used to analyse the reduction 

in accidents for each given section of the road network. 

5 Method of analysis 

Finland uses a specific procedure for evaluating the transport projects: socio-economic 

profitability analysis. This is a method that combines both quantitative and qualitative 

techniques, but is very much based on CBA. The following components of the calculation 

need to be produced, and the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications has 

published a set of official values to be used: 

• Accident costs 

• Time savings 

• Vehicle costs 

• Emissions 

• Noise 

• Maintenance costs 

• Investments 

The standard methodology can be applied to the case of 2+1 road, but a word of caution is 

needed. The method tends to heavily stress the role of time saving component, often 

overlooking other dimensions of analyses. Relying on cost-effectiveness methods could be 

more appropriate, but it is against the evaluation principles. Therefore, we apply the 

Page 209


standard methodology keeping in mind the constraints. Table 73 below shows the unit 

values used in analyses. 

Table 73: Unit values for various components on the socio-economic profitability analysis 

COMPONENT UNIT PRICE 

VEHICLE COST LIGHT/HEAVY 

VEHICLES PER KILOMETRE 

(+VAT), CENTS 

24.7/84.8 

Time savings light/heavy vehicles per 

km, cents 

10.6/26.7 

Severe accident € 386,832 

Accident, death € 2,430,316 

Accident, average € 

Emission costs per ton, average 

84,094 

*SO2 

8,322 

*NOX 

734 

*PM2,5 

103,537 

*CO 

16 

Noise (annualised cost per inhabitant) 

€ 

959 

Source: Finnish Ministry for Transport and Telecommunications 

Figures in Table 73 are officially used in all Finnish transport project appraisals and their 

unit values are confirmed by the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications. 

6 Assessment quantification 

The calculations have been complicated by the fact that the construction of road sections 

in Finland is taking place on the terms of developing the road as a whole, as opposed to 

constructing a separate measure, such as the pavement alone. In fact, in many cases the 

centre of the road pavement is part of an upgrading of existing road, where traffic volumes 

have increased to degrade the existing road. On the other hand, as explained in the 

previous section, the use of the socio-economic profitability calculus allows one to take 

into consideration the full impact of the investment, including the changes in speed. 

For the calculation we have applied the socio-economic profitability analyses, with a 5 

percent discount rate and maintenance period of 20 years. The technical durability of the 

2+1 road is most likely less than 20 years, as new methods to construct motorways with 

lower costs create pressures to upgrade the roads eventually. 

The Finnish case is from Highway Nr. 4 (VT 4), from the section between Lahti and 

Heinola. This particular section of the road is considered one of the rare congested 

highways outside the Helsinki metropolitan area. The road was constructed into 2+1 

format in 1993 and the section is 26 kilometres long (Hiltunen 2004). However, the road is 

constructed without the median cable, as the solution is from 1993 when the construction 

was not fashionable. In the Finnish context the road has a large traffic flow, 12,000 

vehicles per day (Tuovinen et al. 2004). Data on traffic volumes and driving times was 

available from both the pre-investment period and the period during which the road has 

been operational. 

Accident risk on the Lahti-Heinola road was estimated for the period 1998-2002 as 1.4 

deaths per 100 million driven kilometres and 5.5 million severe accidents per 100 million 

Page 210


driven kilometres. These figures were extrapolated to the period of 1993-1998 and 

contrasted with data from 1988-1993 to estimate the change in accidents. 

The safety impact of the measure is considered to be 100% elimination of head-on 

collisions and the fatalities resulting from these accidents if a median cable is inserted. The 

median cable is able to fully prevent the accidents with vehicles from other lanes, but can 

only partially reduce other damages from accidents where vehicles collide with the cable. 

In monetary terms, however, the size of an average accident is reduced significantly. 

However, in Finland there exists only one section of the road that has 2+1 construction 

with a median cable. We were forced to use an example without the median cable, which 

results in lower accident prevention rate. 

The total cost of the project was estimated at 11.5 million Euros, which consisted of both 

upgrading the road and the necessary expansion of the road width. 

Using the data available, the socio-economic profitability analysis was carried out. The 

resulting benefit-cost ratio was 1.25. The project was considered acceptable by pure 

financial terms, even if the benefit-cost ratio was modest. The calculations have not been 

subject to significant sensitivity analysis, but it can be noted that the main factor that may 

change the calculus significantly is the change in driving speed, but this in fact is well 

documented and should not be subject to too much variability. 


Barriers to constructing this type of road exist, and in decision-making this appears at all 

hierarchy levels. Planners avoid the 2+1 solution in the first place because they know that 

it will face resistance at high levels of decision-making. This is why there has been only 

one example of the measure so far. New, smaller examples of simply constructing 

overtaking lanes have adopted the principle of always having the median cable, which is a 

clear indicator of the observed effect of the cable in preventing collision accidents. 

Unlike in Sweden, Finnish decision-making seems to take the alternative, but more costly, 

route of upgrading roads to broader motorways instead of 2+1 roads. This is perhaps in 

the long-term interest of the government, but it overlooks the important cost factor. 

Data availability for conducting the case study was good and authorities were helpful in 

compiling required data. This suggests that the real problem of adopting the method lies 

outside the authorities and is within the decision-making system. 

8 Discussion 

The findings show that the results are promising in terms of the expected reduction in 

head-on-collisions. The value for the Finnish case in the CBA is unexpectedly low, perhaps 

an indication of the relatively little impact of the safety in the socio-economic profitability 

analysis. In the case of major investment programs, effects other than safety tend to 

dominate the analyses and the isolation of the safety impact alone become meaningless, 

as the project would not have been implemented by constructing the safety measure 

alone. This is because the construction of 2+1 road requires updating the existing road 

and possibly carrying out a number of supporting measures to be able to install the median 

cable. 

The section between Lahti and Heinola is already in an upgrading process. The 2+1 road 

will be replaced by a motorway later in 2005. Therefore, obtaining long-term series data on 

Page 211


the safety effect of the 2+1 road will not be possible. This also makes it difficult to interpret 

the CBA results, where the estimated maintenance time was 20 years, but it now appears 

to remain around 12 years. 

REFERENCES 

HILTUNEN, L. (2004): Uusien tietyyppien liikenneturvallisuus. Seminar paper at Helsinki 

Technical University. 

KÄRKI, O., H. PELTOLA JA A. WUOLIJOKI (2001): Tienpidon toimien 

turvallisuusvaikutukset. Tie- ja liikenneolojen hallintajärjestelmän (TILSU) sisältämien 

toimien arviointi. Tiehallinnon sisäisiä julkaisuja 47/2001. Helsinki. 

LARSSON, M., T. BERGH JA A. CARLSSON (2003): Swedish Vision Zero Experience. 

MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2003): Guidelines for 

project appraisal. In Finnish, with English abstract. 

NOKKALA, M. JA H. PELTOLA (2004): Tienpidon uus- ja laajennusinvestointien 

kustannustehokkuus liikenneturvallisuuden näkökulmasta (LIIKUTUS). Publication in 

LINTU-program, the Finnish program for traffic safety. 

SUMMALA, H. (2003): Kohtaamisonnettomuudet: Pääteiden suurin turvallisuusongelma. 

In Tiennäyttäjä 6/2003. 

TARVA (2003). TARVA 4.4 Käyttöohje. Liite 2: Keskimääräiset onnettomuusasteet ja Karvot. 

Tuovinen, P., T. Luttinen, Å. Enberg (2004): Traffic Flow Characteristics on main road 4 

between Lahti and Heinola in Finland. In Finnish, with English abstract. 

Page 212


Annex - Measures to improve traffic safety in Finland 

Toimenp KVL Hinta Hvjonn. Kuolem. Hinta M€/vaikutus- 1.vuod 

matka aj/vrk yht. vähen. vähen. aikana säästetty tuotto 

Nro Toimenpide km 1000 € vuosit. vuosit. hvjo kuoll % inv. 

921 Kameravalvonta (50%) 597 7461 1889 12,51 2,864 0,01 0,0 502,1 

684 Nopeusrajoitus 100 -> 80 km/h 29 2159 13 0,31 0,083 0,00 0,0 1979,6 




502 Jäykät pylväät myötääviksi 10 15914 70 0,23 0,055 0,02 0,1 256,9 

383 Liikennetieto-ohjaus, valmiit valot 50 5223 162 0,28 0,065 0,04 0,2 131,1 

924 Ajosuuntien erottaminen rakent. 297 9013 26653 9,71 2,965 0,14 0,4 33,0 

639 Kaiteiden kunnostus 3 7441 59 0,01 0,006 0,21 0,5 27,2 

361 Uusi tievalaistus jäykin pylväin 4 12573 224 0,17 0,022 0,09 0,7 43,1 

362 Uusi tievalaistus myötäävin pylväin 615 5271 33259 13,98 2,933 0,16 0,8 30,3 

601 Koroke päätien suojatielle 0 5479 15 0,01 0,001 0,08 0,8 31,8 

631 Kaiteiden rakentaminen 121 6183 6137 2,04 0,359 0,15 0,9 21,8 

503 Kallioleikkausten leventäminen 15 5951 782 0,11 0,044 0,35 0,9 15,4 

521 Muuttuva nopeusrajoitus 620 16011 24291 10,16 1,563 0,16 1,0 25,6 

132 Kevytliikenteen ylikulku 0 5479 57 0,02 0,003 0,15 1,0 20,7 

504 Esteiden poistaminen 84 12139 5162 1,89 0,212 0,14 1,2 19,5 

638 Liittymämerkintöjen tehostaminen 0 2055 6 0,01 0,001 0,17 1,2 69,0 

905 Kapea 4-kaistatie 557 8500 336214 63,46 13,252 0,26 1,3 13,6 

342 Linja-autopysäkki maaseudulla 2 3303 62 0,02 0,002 0,17 1,6 15,4 

913 Yksityistiejärj. 1185 5368 74331 16,66 2,199 0,22 1,7 12,8 

501 Luiskien loiventaminen 214 4912 16677 1,28 0,481 0,65 1,7 8,0 

289 Väistötilan rakentaminen 83 3812 9092 1,90 0,265 0,24 1,7 12,2 

912 Kevytliikenne rinnakkaisväyl. 159 5780 6553 0,67 0,156 0,49 2,1 7,8 

658 Taajaman saneeraus 11 4718 2329 0,66 0,054 0,18 2,2 13,4 

922 Mol -> MO 72 12477 163602 4,18 3,329 1,96 2,5 4,7 

602 Suojatien valo-ohjaus 0 5479 43 0,02 0,001 0,18 2,9 16,2 

261 Lisäkaistan rakentaminen 50 25043 5524 1,74 0,090 0,16 3,1 13,1 

634 Reunapaalut, 100 km/h 109 903 368 0,16 0,024 0,45 3,1 26,6 

381 Uusi valo-ohjaus, 4-haaraliittymä 4 13387 3798 0,70 0,074 0,36 3,4 9,5 

902 Ohituskaistatie+kaide 575 5230 417642 28,95 5,595 0,72 3,7 4,8 

288 Kiertoliittymän rakentaminen 9 6531 15521 1,61 0,198 0,48 3,9 5,7 

914 Riista-aita, mol 449 7680 14219 2,53 0,166 0,28 4,3 7,9 

301 Kiihdytyskaista eritasoliittymään 10 13980 4575 0,32 0,052 0,71 4,4 4,4 

282 Liittymän porrastaminen 87 4774 94172 5,88 1,022 0,80 4,6 4,1 

281 Keskisaarekkeen rakentaminen 2 5365 419 0,04 0,004 0,50 5,2 5,0 

911 Kevyen liikenteen väylän rak. 544 5161 82065 3,54 0,777 1,16 5,3 3,2 

285 Nelihaaraliittymän kanavoinnin täydent. 2 5753 847 0,07 0,007 0,65 6,0 4,0 

173 Kapean tien leventäminen, maaseutu 1926 2278 284883 15,53 2,177 0,92 6,5 3,2 

290 Sivuteiden saarekkeen rakentaminen 4 3484 545 0,05 0,004 0,58 6,8 4,1 

283 Liittymän siirto parempaan paikkaan 15 5288 6937 0,39 0,049 0,88 7,1 3,2 

133 Henkilöauto & kevytliikenne alikulku 33 6404 69925 2,87 0,468 1,22 7,5 2,6 

482 Riista-aita muilla teillä 261 5311 6008 1,05 0,036 0,29 8,3 6,7 

382 Uusi valo-ohjaus, 3-haaraliittymä 4 7671 3232 0,21 0,025 1,05 8,6 3,5 

172 Suuntauksen parantaminen, maaseutu 618 4325 299068 15,07 1,709 0,99 8,7 2,7 

284 Nelihaaraliittymän täyskanavointi 26 4988 26771 1,07 0,140 1,25 9,6 2,3 

131 Kevytliikenteen alikulku 72 5588 73054 1,59 0,287 2,30 12,7 1,4 

302 Eritasoliittymän täydentäminen 31 17653 46299 3,64 0,168 0,64 13,8 3,2 

102 Kevytliikenteen väylän parantaminen 2 3005 298 0,01 0,001 1,35 14,9 1,8 

632 Näkemäraivaus 104 3462 467 0,16 0,009 1,00 17,3 14,3 

915 Eritasoliittymän rakent. 80 8387 983502 20,62 2,385 2,39 20,6 1,1 

286 Kolmihaaraliittymän kanavointi 67 4820 73795 1,00 0,139 3,70 26,5 0,8 

287 Liittymän kevyt parantaminen 20 5747 2945 0,35 0,030 2,77 32,7 5,8 

923 Yksittäisen ohituskaistan rakent. 138 4219 42294 0,15 0,000 14,58 - 0,1 

901 Ohituskaistatie 4 5479 2131 0,12 -0,011 0,86 - 0,8 

690 Nopeusrajoitus Kesä 80->100 km/h 5 5619 4 -0,10 -0,032 - - -2359,4 

681 Nopeusrajoitus 70 -> 80 km/h 4 7581 1 -0,34 -0,106 - - -31224,0 


903 Leveäkaistatie 65 6324 42866 2,24 -0,153 0,96 - 1,0 


YHTEENSÄ 10240 6091 3297108 246,75 45,133 0,68 3,7 5,0 

Source: Nokkala and Peltola, 2004 

Page 213

CASE J2: 2 + 1 roads in Sweden 

ROSEBUD 

WP4 – CASE J REPORT 

2 + 1 ROADS IN SWEDEN 




2 +1 ROADS IN SWEDEN 


2 DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURE...................................................................217 

3 TARGET GROUP ...............................................................................................219 


5 METHOD OF ANALYSIS....................................................................................219 




9 DISCUSSION......................................................................................................221 

Page 215

CASE OVERVIEW 

Measure 


The measure is to construct 2+1 roads with pavement in the middle of a narrow highway. 

Problem 

Head-on collisions have been frequent in traffic in Sweden, with the number of fatalities 

resulting from the accidents increasing as a proportion of total road accidents. 

Target Group 

All the road users driving Swedish roads and highways, also the drivers who drive the 

opposite direction (due to the safety effect). 

Targets 

The safety measures applied in the middle of the road have two main objectives: to avoid 

the head-on collisions of the vehicles off their lane and to reduce the accident severity of 

the remaining crashes. 

Initiator 

In Sweden, the national road authorities have been responsible of road construction to 

produce the required alterations and investments for 2+1 roads. There has been active 

public discussion on the safety impact of the 2+1 construction, particularly when it has 

been contrasted with construction of motorways, which are 20 times more expensive per 

kilometre as opposed to 2+1 road construction. 


Decision-makers are usually located in the headquarters of the national road authorities, 

but if 2+1 roads are part of major national level investments, then the participation of 

national level (i.e. Ministry) decision-makers is required. 

Costs 

The average cost per kilometre of 2+1 road in Sweden is 125,000 Euros. 

Benefits 


number of head-on collisions at a cost lower than that of highway construction. This 

benefits mainly national level decision-makers, insurance companies and those road users 

who still experience a traffic accident but with less damage than in the absence of the 2+1 

road. On the average, every 40 kilometres of 2+1 road construction reduce the probability 

of fatal accident by one death person. 

Cost/Benefit-Ratio: 

The Cost-Benefit Ratio is 2.26 in the Swedish case. 

Page 216

1 Problem 


Both Finland and Sweden have committed to a version of zero-tolerance for traffic 

accidents with fatalities. Whilst it has been realised that the random variable in causing the 

accidents cannot be controlled for, several studies have addressed the efficiency of 

various measures in preventing accidents (see, for instance, Peltola and Wuolijoki (2003) 

and Kärki et al. (2001) for reviews of such typologies in Finland). However, these studies 

do not list the construction of 2+1 roads into the road safety measures list, which has only 

been a recent addition. 

Head-on collisions have been one of the major causes of fatal accidents on roads in 

Nordic countries. In 1998 the Swedish National Road Administration, Vägverket, started a 

development project on 13-meter wide roads. The rationale for the program was that the 

construction of a wider road would be a cost-effective way of increasing road safety on 

highways, compared to alternative measures resulting in the same net effect in prevention 

of crashes and fatalities. 

Finland has been slow to use the 2+1 road as a solution to prevent the accidents. The 

National Road Administration in Finland has studied the Swedish case with close interest, 

but the frequency of adopting the measure has not been transferred to Finnish context. In 

Sweden, however, there have been frequent campaigns to show the cost-efficiency of this 

measure [NTF 2003]. It has been estimated that one kilometre of 2+1 road costs onetwentieth 

of the cost of one kilometre of motorway, which has been translated into 

argument that building a motorway is not in fact an efficient way to increase road safety, 

compared to the 2+1 road solution. 

Head-on collisions have been a severe problem as a percentage of total fatalities in 

Finland, between 1996-2000 an average of 80-85 percent of fatal accidents on two-lane 

highways were due to head-on crashes. For Sweden, figures for 1993-2000 show that 140 

people were killed in head-on collisions, while the number of severely injured was 450 for 

the same period. 

For this case study a comparative study of Finnish and Swedish experience was chosen to 

study the decisions made in choosing the 2+1 road as means to prevent accidents. 

Particularly in Finland the decision-making on road construction does not take into 

consideration a pure road safety aspect; the decisions are always based on socioeconomic 

profitability of the project where traffic safety is only one of the dimensions. 


In principle, the 2+1 road construction takes place on 13-meter wide roads, and it is 

considered as means of upgrading other solutions, mainly wide shoulders or wide lanes. 

Picture 2 illustrates the practical application of 2+1 road construction in Sweden. 

Page 217

Source: Larsson et al, 2003 


Picture 2: An example of 2+1 road with a median cable 

As shown in the Picture 2, the most common way to construct the 2+1 road is to set the 

fixed steel median cable on the road, which then shifts to the other side when the 

overtaking lane is switched to the other direction. The main problem with the solution is the 

inability of the road to adjust to changes in traffic flows, for instance during the congestion 

period as the solution is fixed and cannot be adjusted. 

Figure 22 shows the other possibilities to utilise the 13-meter width of the road. Wide 

shoulders mean that the standard lanes are left somewhat narrower, but shoulders have 

been extended so that driving off the road becomes more difficult. In the case of wide 

lanes, small errors in steering do not lead to driving off the road, but the shoulders are 

narrower. In the case of the 2+1 road, shoulders are narrow and the lane width is similar to 

that of wide shoulder lanes. The overtaking lane in the middle is slightly narrower than the 

standard lanes. As can be seen, the 2+1 road most effectively reduces head-on collisions, 

compared to the other two solutions. It is also the most effective solution to deal with 

congestion, as it allows for overtaking more easily than the other two construction 

possibilities. 

Figure 22: Construction possibilities for 13-meter wide road: Wide shoulders, wide lanes and 2+1 design 

Source: Larsson et al, 2003 

We will limit the analysis in this case study to the case where the 2+1 road is constructed 

with a fixed median cable, which is also the most common way of constructing the 2+1 

roads. The more recent promotion of 2+2 road is obviously even more effective way of 

Page 218


increasing road safety in Nordic roads, but there is limited data from both countries in 

terms of the impacts of these roads. 


The construction of new roads using the 2+1 design is likely to benefit all road users with 

the reduction of head-on collisions. For those road users who cause the possibility of 

accident, for instance by sleeping behind the wheel, the immediate benefit is the reduction 

in the probability to have a serious head-on collision. For drivers who are in danger of 

facing a possible head-on collision, the benefit is derived from the fact that the probability 

again is diminished by the existence of a middle road cable. 


Sweden has been ahead of Finland in designing and implementing the 2+1 road 

construction. There is a relatively well-documented, existing database on the constructed 

sections of the 2+1 roads, produced by VTI, the Swedish National Institute for Transport 

Research. In fact, VTI has been responsible for annual follow-up studies on the 2+1 roads 

(or, in more general terms, the head-on collision free roads). 

The unit cost for one kilometre of 2+1 road in Sweden was estimated at € 125,000, but 

since actual costs of the investment were available, the real figures were used instead. 

TYPE OF 

ACCIDENT 

Table 74: Accident costs, official values [SEK] 

MATERIAL COSTS RISK VALUE TOTAL 

DEATH 1,242,000 16,269,000 17,511,000 

SEVERE INJURY 621,000 2,503,000 3,124,000 

SLIGHT INJURY 62,000 113,000 175,000 

PROPERTY 

DAMAGE 

5 Method of analysis 

13,000 13,000 

The calculations have been complicated by the fact that the construction of road sections 

in Sweden takes place on the terms of developing the road as a whole, as opposed to 

constructing a separate measure, such as the pavement alone. In fact, in many cases the 

centre of the road pavement is part of an upgrading of existing road, where traffic volumes 

have increased to degrade the existing road. We do not want to separate the safety effect 

in the analyses (for instance, in the form of cost-effectiveness analyses of various safety 

measures, as this is not the procedure applied in the national project appraisal. 

The Swedish case is from RV 44, Trollhättan-Håsten, totalling 10.6 km. The road was 

opened as a typical 13-meter, 2-lane road in 1990. Daily traffic volume between 1991-99 

was calculated to be 6450 vehicles. In 2000 the upgrading of the road began with 

installation of the mid-road cable and the new road consisted of 6 sections of 2+1 road, 

Page 219


stretching from 910 meters to 1880 meters. Total cost of the operation was 44.6 million 

Swedish Kronor (5 million €). On this road section the average cost per kilometre was 

higher than the average estimate of 125,000 Euros (nearly 500,000 € per kilometre). 

Accident statistics for the road show that during the 2+1 solution there were eight reported 

accidents for the period of first 18 months of the operation of the new road, with two 

person accidents (slight injuries). These accidents were used to correct the accidents data 

that would consider the reduction of deadly accidents. 

As in the Finnish case, similarly we need to calculate: 

• Accident costs 

• Time savings 

• Vehicle costs 

• Emissions 

• Noise 

• Maintenance costs 

• Investments 

For several of the variables averages were used based on the traffic volumes. This is 

because the real data had not been collected for the purposes of the socio-economic 

profitability, or if such data existed, it was not available for this case study. The next 

section presents the results of the calculations. 


Assessment was carried out using the socio-economic profitability analysis, which is the 

standard method of road investment project assessment in Sweden. Carrying out the 

calculations for the project (with a standard duration of 20 years and a 4 percent discount 

rate) gives us the CBA results in the form of socio-economic profitability with all the 

mentioned elements of the analysis. 

For the case of RV 44, Trollhättan-Håsten, the calculations yield a benefit-cost ratio of 

2.26. The ratio is good, making the project profitable. The main sources of benefits were 

derived from safety impact (reductions in estimated deaths) and time savings due to the 

overtaking lane. 


In 1998 the Director General of the Swedish National Road Authority decided on a fullscale 

programme to improve traffic safety on six existing 13-meter roads using low-cost 

measures, where the main alternative identified was the 2+1 road with the separating 

median cable. The estimate was to have a potential to reduce 50 percent of all severe link 

accidents. It has been thereafter indicated that all old 13-meter roads should be replaced 

with the 2+1 roads. In the Swedish system, the road administration (Vägverket) produces 

and executes the investment plans. The final decision-making authority is in the hands of 

the parliament, which confirms the annual budget for road construction. 

The parliament, which is committed to the Swedish zero vision (on traffic deaths) has 

clearly followed the principle in promoting the 2+1 road and other non-collision 

construction methods for new roads. The political atmosphere is therefore clearly 

favourable to implement safety-improving measures. 

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Barriers in Sweden tend to be similar to those reported in the Finnish case, but more 

appearing as a result of financial constraints than simply those of political nature. It 

appears that several interest groups have been active in promoting the 2+1 road as one of 

the major tools in reducing traffic accidents in Sweden. Perhaps in Sweden the relatively 

low cost of this measure can be better understood as an alternative to motorways in the 

areas where the traffic volumes do not suggest that a motorway is required to remove 

capacity bottlenecks. 

As in the Finnish case, data was relatively easily available and the quality was satisfactory. 

Earlier studies of VTI had focused on more traffic flows than economic assessment, so 

there was need to supplement the basic data with data on investment costs. These 

additional data requirements did not complicate the analyses. 

9 Discussion 

In Sweden, the benefits of constructing the 2+1 road have been clearly documented well in 

advance. The public opinion has been in favour of the solution, as it is considered an 

effective means of preventing head-on collisions and is cost-effective compared to 

motorway construction. 

More than in Finland, in Sweden the 2+1 road construction is understood as a safety 

measure, but this is not the principal criteria for constructing the road. Like in Finland, also 

in Sweden the socio-economic profitability approach dominates cost-effectiveness 

approach. 

Perhaps the biggest challenge for shifting towards consideration of specific measures and 

their appraisal is to acknowledge that decision-making can take place on the basis of, for 

instance, the cost-effectiveness of the measure. The realization that not all the projects 

can be comparable, if they are based on a single target (e.g., safety) compared to multiple 

targets, which could include mobility, time savings and safety. 

REFERENCES 

CARLSSON, ARNE et al. (2003): Uppföljning av mötesfria vägar. Halvårsrapport 2002:1. 

VTI notat 9-2003. 

CARLSSON, ARNE and ULF BRÜDE (2003): Utvärdering av mötesfri väg. Halvårsrapport 

2002:2. VTI notat 45-2003. 

LARSSON, M., T. BERGH JA A. CARLSSON (2003): Swedish Vision Zero Experience. 

NTF (2003): Motorvägar dödar fler än de räddar. NTF Tidning. 

Page 221

CASE K: compulsory bicycle helmet wearing 

ROSEBUD 

WP4 - CASE K REPORT 

COMPULSORY BICYCLE HELMET WEARING 

BY MARTIN WINKELBAUER, 

AUSTRIAN ROAD SAFETY BOARD, KFV, AUSTRIA


COMPULSORY HELMET WEARING FOR CYCLISTS 

1 EFFICIENCY ASSESSMENT FOR GERMANY .................................................225 

1.1 Problem to solve .................................................................................................225 

1.2 Description ..........................................................................................................225 

1.3 Target Group.......................................................................................................225 

1.4 Assessment method............................................................................................225 

1.5 Choice of Efficiency Assessment method ...........................................................225 

1.6 Assessment tool and calculation method ............................................................226 

1.6.1 Types of assessed impacts: safety, environment, mobility, travel time ...............226 

1.6.2 Considered cost of the measure .........................................................................226 

1.7 Assessment Quantification..................................................................................227 

1.7.1 Target group........................................................................................................227 

1.7.2 Current helmet wearing rates..............................................................................227 

1.7.3 Accident statistics................................................................................................227 

1.7.4 Helmet prices ......................................................................................................228 

1.7.5 Accident reduction potential ................................................................................228 

1.7.6 Crash costs .........................................................................................................229 

1.7.7 Unit of Implementation ........................................................................................229 

1.7.8 Price basis, interest rates and duration of the measure ......................................229 

1.8 Assessment Results............................................................................................229 

1.8.1 Calculation procedure .........................................................................................229 

1.8.2 Cost-benefit ratio by expected values .................................................................230 

1.8.3 Marginal cost-effective helmet wearing rates ......................................................230 

1.9 Decision Making Process....................................................................................231 

2 EFFICIENCY ASSESSMENT FOR AUSTRIA....................................................231 

2.1 Problem to solve .................................................................................................231 

2.2 Description ..........................................................................................................232 

2.3 Target Group.......................................................................................................232 

2.4 Assessment method............................................................................................232 

2.4.1 Assessment tool and calculation method ............................................................232 

2.4.2 Types of assessed impacts: safety, environment, mobility, travel time ...............232 

2.4.3 Considered cost of the measure .........................................................................233 

2.5 Assessment Quantification..................................................................................233 

2.5.1 Target group........................................................................................................233 

2.5.2 Current helmet wearing rates..............................................................................234 

2.5.3 Accident statistics................................................................................................234 

2.5.4 Helmet prices ......................................................................................................235 

2.5.5 Accident reduction potential ................................................................................235 

2.6 Assessment Results............................................................................................236 




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CASE OVERVIEW 

Measure 

Compulsory bicycle helmet wearing 


Problem 

Among all severe injuries sustained by bicycle riders, head injuries are the most common. 

At the same time, average helmet wearing rates are very low. The protective potential of a 

bicycle helmet is considered to be very high. 

Target Group 

All bicycle riders (precisely those currently not wearing a helmet) 

Targets 

Reduction of head injuries among bicycle riders 

Initiator 

Research institutes 


The decision has to be made by the national parliaments and has to be prepared following 

the usual procedures for such legislation. 

Costs 

Helmet costs 

Benefits 

Reduction of head injuries and all related costs 


efficiency of compulsory helmet 

cost/benefit ratio 

wearing 

Germany 

Austria 

road accidents only all accidents 

helmet price 

€ 20 4.45 2.28 4.10 

€ 40 2.23 1.14 2.05 

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1 Efficiency Assessment for Germany 

1.1 Problem 

62% of the German population use a bicycle at least occasionally [Mobilität in Deutschland 

2002 – Fahrradverkehr]. Annually, about 600 (in 2003: 639) Germans are killed as 

bicyclists in road traffic, about 15,000 (in 2003: 15,591) are severely injured and 65,000 

slightly injured. A little less than 50% of the bicyclists injured in road traffic suffer head 

injuries. 65% of the head injuries occur in regions of the head that are covered by a helmet 

and therefore are potentially protected by helmet wearing. In total, about 20% of the fatal 

and severe injuries may be avoided by helmet wearing and the number of slight injuries 

will rise by 1% if all bicyclists would wear helmets [OTTE, 2001]. 

Although the safety potential of wearing a cycle helmet is high and well documented, 

helmet wearing rates are still very low. A considerable share of children wear helmets 

(about 60%); the average helmet wearing rate in Germany is almost constant over the 

recent years, currently about 6% [SIEGENER, 2004]. Bicycle helmet wearing campaigns 

have been carried out successfully, but the total wearing rate could not be raised to a 

desirable level. 

1.2 Description 

To make bicycle helmet wearing compulsory for all bicyclists. Used helmets shall be 

approved by using one of the existing standards for cycle helmets (e.g. EN 1078). 

1.3 Target Group 

The target group is those bicyclists currently not wearing a helmet, which is a huge 

majority of bicyclists in Germany. 

1.4 Assessment method 

1.5 Choice of Efficiency Assessment method 

It was decided to perform a cost-benefit analysis for the following reasons: 

• It was an explicit demand of the partners in Germany (bast) to choose CBA. 

• The potential of injury reduction is well documented, but it did not support the decisionmaking 

process in a satisfying manner. The question of cost benefit in relation to the 

public economy level was raised during this process. 

• Most of the fatalities and severe injuries are considered to remain as slight injuries after 

introducing the measure, while the effect of helmet wearing on slight injuries is small. 

This leads to differing impacts of the measure on different levels of injury severity, 

which cannot be considered in a CEA. 

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There was no question of comparing helmet wearing with other safety measures, in 

particular measures dedicated to bicyclists (for which a CEA would have been useful). 

As indicated, the effectiveness of helmet wearing is not in doubt at all, a costeffectiveness 

ratio would not have given any severe input to the decision-making 

process. 

1.6 Assessment tool and calculation method 

A self-made calculation method was chosen using a spreadsheet program. The main 

inputs were accident and population data and helmet wearing rates. Both were available in 

age groups and for several years. Partly, the data was aggregated to age groups with 

different thresholds. There were big differences between age groups. It seemed easy to 

calculate the data without using formal assessment methods. 

1.6.1 Types of assessed impacts: safety, environment, mobility, travel time 

Safety 

Concerning safety, three effects may be considered: 

1. Reduced likeliness of head injury 

2. Increased risk by risk compensation 

3. Reduced risk by reduced exposure 

It was decided not to consider risk compensation and changes of exposure for the 

following reasons: 

• Emotionally based effects like risk compensation and change of mobility behaviour are 

very much based on the culture in the target country. There was no evidence that these 

effects should occur in Germany. 

• It was presumed, that those who object to wearing a helmet would not change their 

mode of mobility, but continue cycling without a helmet. This is why a "break even 

helmet wearing rate" was calculated afterwards. 

• It was also presumed, that there may be a group of bicyclists who take higher risks if 

wearing a helmet. But a majority of these may be found among the bicyclists already 

wearing a helmet. Those cyclists who wear helmets due to legal obligation were not 

assumed to change their risk behaviour significantly. 


As indicated above, a significant change of modal split was not expected to occur. If this is 

the case, there will be no significant impact on environment, mobility and travel time. 

1.6.2 Considered cost of the measure 

The costs of the measure simply consist of the costs for supplying bicycle riders with 

helmets. The cost of the legal process (making the law) will not be considered. Due to the 

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decision not to consider effects of a modal shift, no costs of environmental effects, mobility 

or travel time will be considered. 

The time use for the handling of the helmet was considered to have a very low impact on 

total travel time and was therefore disregarded. 

1.7 Assessment Quantification 

1.7.1 Target group 

The definition and calculation of the target group was primarily based on the total 

population. "Mobilität in Deutschland 2002 -Fahrradverkehr" presents data on the 

frequency of bicycle use; 38% of the Germans never use a bike and were discounted. 

Cyclists already wearing a helmet had to be excluded from the calculation. There are no 

impacts from this group either on accidents (the accident statistics and their development 

already represented the impact of them wearing a helmet) or on costs (the money for their 

helmets was already spent and a helmet law will have no impact on replacement costs of 

these helmets). 

1.7.2 Current helmet wearing rates 

Helmet wearing rates 

Table 75: Helmet wearing rates in Germany 

age groups 

Germany - 5 6 - 10 11 - 17 - 22 - 31 - 41 - > 60 total 

16 21 30 40 60 

year of 1997 59% 37% 12% 3% 3% 3% 2% 1% 6% 

assessment 1999 85% 47% 11% 2% 3% 3% 2% 1% 5% 

2001 58% 37% 8% 2% 3% 3% 3% 1% 5% 

2002 32% 33% 9% 2% 3% 4% 3% 2% 5% 

2003 60% 38% 10% 2% 2% 5% 5% 2% 6% 

The study on helmet wearing rates by Siegener (2004) is based on a sample of 6800 to 

8300 observations in each of the years. The sample of children is very small (32-80 

observations) and therefore not very reliable. But the figures were compared to a study 

from Austria with a larger sample and found plausible. 

1.7.3 Accident statistics 

The German accident data contains road accidents taken from the official accident 

database including the years from 1991 to 2003 (disaggregated data from the German indepth-analysis-system 

GIDAS combined with aggregated). This database contains all 

injuries where any of the parties involved sustained personal injury. It also contains the 

numbers of all bicyclists, killed, severely injured or slightly injured in road accidents. It does 

not contain the numbers of bicyclists killed or injured apart from road traffic. Further, this 

database does not contain accidents that were not noticed by the police, i.e., all those 

cases where a bicyclist falls off the bicycle for any reason in a single party accident and 

Page 227


goes away injured without calling the police are not contained. The population used was 

taken from the official population statistics. 

For Germany, there was good information on vehicle numbers available. This study by the 

Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin, does not contain bicycles 

qualified as children's toys. This data later on was not used for calculation, but kept in this 

report for information purposes. 

Unfortunately, the age classification in the different data sources differs from each other. 

Punctually, age classes had to be summarised together or divided based on the population 

data. The whole table of German data can be found in annex K1. 

1.7.4 Helmet prices 

The prices of bicycle helmets differ very much. The cheapest offers are available for 

children's helmets in super-markets, which are about € 7. The most expensive helmets are 

about € 95. Elvik (2004) indicates helmet prices for children are about € 35 to € 50, an 

adult helmet between € 50 and € 62. He estimates the lifetime of a children's helmet about 

3 years, a young adult helmet about 6 years and an adult helmet about 10 years. In the 

USA and Australia the average helmet price is about € 25 to € 30. 

A short investigation in Austria (currently no data available either in Austria or in Germany) 

had poor results, as most of the companies only gave little information on the prices of 

helmets, and what would have been necessary to weight this data, not any information on 

their sales or market share. The only really useful information came from a big sport 

supplier, telling us that the average price of a cycle helmet is slightly below € 40. 

What had to be taken into consideration was the number of helmets sold, if helmet wearing 

is compulsory. For example, rescue jackets (warning jackets) were available in Austria for 

about € 15. Immediately after introducing a law that rescue jackets will be compulsory, 

even before this law was put into force, the prices fell to € 4. It is supposed that a similar 

effect will take place if cycle helmet wearing should become compulsory. Further, we can 

suppose that people buying a helmet voluntary for their own safety have different patterns 

of decisions in their helmet purchase than those buying a helmet due to a legal obligation. 

Determination of a suitable price for helmets is a key issue in this CBA since helmet costs 

are the only cost factor. To consider the uncertainty of future helmet prices, it was decided 

to calculate two alternatives: A conservative one with a helmet price of € 40 (i.e. helmets at 

current price level) and a progressive one with € 20 as the average price for a helmet. 

1.7.5 Accident reduction potential 

There were various studies on the injury reduction potential of bicycle helmets. As it was 

most commonly accepted in Germany, a study by OTTE (2001) was chosen as reference 

for this assessment. OTTE investigated in-depth 3534 accidents with bicyclists involved in 

Germany between 1985 and 1999. This very elaborate study considers injuries of different 

regions of the body and different regions of the head. Actual injury severity of real life 

crashes is compared to virtual injury severity, i.e. injuries which would have occurred if a 

helmet had worn. OTTE concludes that the total number of fatally and seriously injured 

bicycle riders would decline by 20% if all cyclists would wear helmets. The number of slight 

injuries would increase by 1%, since the number of slight head injuries protected by a 

helmet is lower than the number of fatal and severe injuries changed to slight ones. 

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1.7.6 Crash costs 


The accident costs (fatalities, severe and slight injuries) are taken from the ROSESUD 

WP3 report for Germany, which is the official German accident cost estimation. 

1.7.7 Unit of Implementation 

Compulsory cycle helmet wearing is a measure that applies to all cyclists in the whole 

country. The crash reduction potential is estimated for a whole country. The decision has 

to be made for the whole country. Finally it is presumed that the results of an assessment 

would be most useful if they estimate the total effect in reference to the group that is 

affected by the measure, which is a whole country again. So it was decided to consider the 

whole country as the unit of implementation. 

1.7.8 Price basis, interest rates and duration of the measure 

For all values presented in the previous ROSEBUD deliverables, it was decided for 

comparability reasons to convert all monetary values to 2002 prices. It was then agreed to 

choose the same procedure also for WP4 cases. 

The interest rate was chosen based on ROSEBUD WP3 recommendations. 

The life span of a cycle helmet was considered between 3 and 10 years. This 

recommends assessing a period of at least 10 years. ROSEBUD WP3 recommends 

assessing a period of 20 to 30 years, for non-infrastructure measures the period may be 

shorter. Based on that, it was decided to assess a period of 13 years, being somewhere in 

between 10 and 20 years. 

1.8 Assessment Results 

1.8.1 Calculation procedure 

• Based on the reported accident data (1991 to 2002), forecasts for 2003 to 2015 were 

calculated and reviewed for plausibility. 

• The same was done for helmet wearing rates based on the data from 1997 to 2003. 

Wearing rates for 1998 were missing (not investigated) and were interpolated. 

• The target accidents affected by a helmet wearing obligation was calculated as the 

product of the share of cyclists currently not wearing a helmet and the number of 

injuries in the different levels and age groups. 

• A further calculation was done as if the helmet law would have been introduced on 

January 1 st 2003. 

• The crash severity reduction figures were applied to the target accidents in the different 

age groups and injury severity classes. 

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• Future costs and benefits were labelled to 2002 prices using a discount factor of 5% 

annually. 

• The costs were calculated assuming that 38% of the Germans never use a bike and 

the rest will be fully equipped with helmets. 

• Afterwards, two approaches were chosen. 

1.8.2 Cost-benefit ratio by expected values 

Considering the predictions for accidents, helmet wearing rates, population and accident 

reduction potential, the costs and benefits were calculated for two values of the expected 

helmet price. Within the period from 2003 to 2015 the cumulated costs and benefits based 

on 2002 prices will be: 

Table 76: Costs and benefits 2003 -2015, Germany 

Helmet price 

(€) 

benefits 

(€) 

total supply costs 

(€) 

cost/benefit-ratio 

20,- 5,077,319,223 1,140,167,632 4.45 

40,- 5,077,319,223 2,280,335,263 2.23 

1.8.3 Marginal cost-effective helmet wearing rates 

For this presentation of the result it was supposed that 100% of the Germans at least 

occasionally riding a bike buy a helmet. Again, supposing two different prices of the 

average helmet, the minimum helmet wearing rate which would achieve a cost-benefit 

ratio of one was calculated, i.e. enforcement measures would have to achieve at least a 

"break-even helmet wearing rate" of 26.6% (47.9%) to make bicycle helmets effective 

supposing a worst case scenario for the costs. 

Table 77: marginal average helmet wearing rates 2003- 2015, Germany 

Helmet price 

(€) 

benefits 

(€) 

total supply costs 

(€) 

break-even 

helmet wearing rate 

20,- 1,140,464,390 1,140,167,632 26.6% 

40,- 2,282,903,190 2,280,335,263 47.9% 

There is one problem in this type of calculation, as there is no information available on 

enforcement costs either on costs of one unit of enforcement (e.g. one hour of road-side 

enforcement) or on the number of those units necessary to achieve the demanded helmet 

wearing rate. Further it is not known whether these enforcement measures would be selffinancing 

by fines. Even if enforcement measures would be cost neutral for the authorities, 

they might not be for the target group. 

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1.9 Decision-Making Process 


• Currently there is no governmental initiative for making helmet wearing compulsory in 

Germany. But there is an explicit backup and encouragement for voluntary helmet 

wearing. 

• Basically the government strongly aims at improving road safety and reducing accident 

costs. Compulsory helmet wearing fits into this target but is currently not at a status of 

official discussion. 

• The bicycle-rider lobby wants to avoid any interference in bicycling, referring to aspects 

like "comfort", "freedom" and "responsibility". These groups argue that a large share of 

cyclists would stop cycling if a helmet would have to be worn. 

• A decision about an obligation to wear a helmet would have to be made by the national 

parliament, and the German Diet "Deutscher Bundestag". 

• It was supposed by a member of the ROSEBUD URG to select compulsory bicycle 

helmet wearing as one of the ROSEBUD WP4 cases. 

• But due to the fact that currently there was no occasion to raise a political or public 

discussion about compulsory helmet wearing, the results had only been presented to 

decision-makers from inside the experts' organisation. These experts agreed to the 

findings, but they did not think that EA results would bring useful input to the process of 

political and public decision making. The case was too far away from being discussed 

on a rational basis, that monetary arguments at national level, which are hardly 

understandable for the public, could support the implementation of this measure. 

• So far, it cannot be foreseen when a public and political discussion on bicycle helmet 

wearing will be continued. 

2 Efficiency Assessment for Austria 

2.1 Problem to solve 

62% of the Austrian population uses a bicycle at least occasionally [BÄSSLER, 2001]. 

Annually, about 60 (in 2003: 56) Austrians are killed as bicyclists in road traffic, about 

1,800 (in 2003: 1,838) are severely injured and 4,000 slightly injured. A little less than 50% 

of the bicyclists injured in road traffic suffer head injuries. 

The Austrian Federal Ministry of Transportation, Innovation and Technology has set up a 

Road Safety Program from 2002 to 2010 which includes a 50% reduction target for 

fatalities. Although this program does not specifically mention cycle helmet wearing as a 

measure targeting bicycle accidents, cycle helmet could achieve a serious contribution 

towards road safety targets. Besides, there might be an additional contribution in reducing 

injury severity after leisure time and sport accidents. 

Although the safety potential of cycle helmet is high and well documented, the helmet 

wearing rates are currently very low. A considerable amount of children wear helmets 

Page 231


(about 60%), the average helmet wearing rate in Germany is almost constant over the 

recent years, currently about 11% [FURIAN, GRUBER, 2002]. 

Bicycle helmet wearing campaigns have been carried out successfully, particularly 

targeting school children, but the total wearing rates could not be raised to a desirable 

level neither among children nor among adults. 

2.2 Description 

Making bicycle helmet wearing compulsory for all bicyclists. Used helmets shall be 

approved by using one of the existing standards for cycle helmets (e.g. EN 1078). 

2.3 Target Group 

Those bicyclists currently not wearing a helmet, which is a huge majority of bicyclists in 

Austria. 

2.4 Assessment method 

It was decided to perform a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) for the following reasons: 

• The studies for Germany and Austria were done at the same time, for reason of 

comparability it was useful to select the same method. 

• Most of the fatalities and severe injuries are considered to remain as slight injuries after 

introducing the measure, while the effect of helmet wearing on slight injuries is small. 

This leads to differing impact on different levels of injury severity, which cannot be 

considered in a CEA. 

There was no question of comparing helmet wearing with other safety measures, in 

particular measures dedicated to bicyclists (for which a CEA would have been useful). 

As indicated, the effectiveness of helmet wearing is not in doubt at all; a costeffectiveness 

ratio would not have given any severe input to the decision-making 

process. 

2.4.1 Assessment tool and calculation method 

A self-made calculation method was chosen using a spreadsheet program. The main 

inputs were accident and population data and helmet wearing rates. Both were available in 

age groups and for several years. Partly, the data was aggregated to age groups with 

different thresholds. There were considerable differences between age groups. It seemed 

easy to calculate the data without using formal assessment methods. 

2.4.2 Types of assessed impacts: safety, environment, mobility, travel time 

Safety 

Concerning safety, three effects may be considered: 

Page 232

• Reduced likeliness of head injury 

• Increased risk by risk compensation 

• Reduced risk by reduced exposure 


It was decided not to consider risk compensation and changes of exposure for the 

following reasons: 

• Emotionally based effects like risk compensation and change of mobility behaviour are 

very much based on the culture in the target country. There was no evidence that these 

effects should occur in Austria. 

• It was presumed that those who object wearing a helmet would not change their mode 

of mobility, but continue cycling without a helmet. 

• It was also presumed that there may be a group of bicyclists who take higher risks if 

wearing a helmet. But a majority of these may be found among the bicyclists already 

wearing a helmet. Those cyclists who wear helmets due to legal obligation were not 

assumed to change their risk behaviour significantly. 


As indicated above, a significant change of modal split was not expected to occur. If that is 

the case, there will be no significant impact on environment, mobility and travel time. 

2.4.3 Considered cost of the measure 

The costs of the measure simply consisted of the costs for supplying bicycle riders with 

helmets. The costs of the legal process (making the law) were not considered. Due to the 

decision not to consider effects of a modal shift, no costs of environmental effects, mobility 

or travel time had to be considered. The time use for the handling of the helmet was 

considered to have a very low impact on total travel time and was therefore disregarded. 

2.5 Assessment Quantification 

2.5.1 Target group 

The definition and calculation of the target group was primarily based on the total 

population. Baessler (2001) showed numbers of inhabitants at least occasionally 

performing various sports; 4.1 million Austrians aged over 15 engage in cycling. 

Extrapolating this value to persons under 15 considering the share of the total population 

gave almost exactly the same figures as in Germany. 

Persons already wearing a helmet had to be excluded from the calculation. There will be 

no impacts from this group either on accidents (the accident statistics and their 

development already represented the impact of them wearing a helmet) or on costs (the 

money for their helmets is already spent and a helmet law will have no impact on 

replacement costs of these helmets). 

Page 233

2.5.2 Current helmet wearing rates 


Table 78: helmet wearing rates in Austria 

helmet wearing rates 

year of assessment 

Austria 1992 1994 1996 1998 2001 

total 2.7% 5.7% 8.6% 11.4% 10.7% 

by age children 5.6% 19.3% 28.2% 42.9% 43.3% 

juvenile 1.7% 5.2% 7.0% 12.5% 8.2% 

adult 2.5% 4.4% 7.0% 8.1% 8.9% 

by mode of sports 6.0% 16.0% 18.0% 22.0% 30.0% 

bicycle use leisure time 1.0% 3.0% 4.0% 9.0% 7.0% 

traffic 3.0% 3.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 

by type of children 6.0% 25.0% 36.0% 59.0% 63.0% 

bicycle adult bike 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 

mountain bike 3.0% 7.0% 11.0% 12.0% 12.0% 

street race 

bike 

13.0% 17.0% 20.0% 44.0% 62.0% 

These results of a study by Furian and Gruber (2001, 2002 and 2003) are based on about 

20,000 observations in each of the years, which should provide very reliable information. 

But the observations were made on bicyclists passing by without asking them for their age. 

So the age distribution between children, juveniles and adults is only based on the 

estimation of the observers. A study on helmet wearing rates in 2004 is currently being 

carried out, but results were not available. 

Generally speaking, the helmet wearing rates changed extremely over the years, which 

makes forecasts quite difficult. 

2.5.3 Accident statistics 

Bicycle accidents are divided into two groups: 

• Road traffic accidents, i.e. accidents occurring on public roads taken from the official 

road traffic accident database. 

• The EHLASS database provides accident data based on about 12,000 interviews 

annually. These interviews are carried out in hospitals with interviewees who have 

sustained leisure time accidents. The accident statistics of the "Institut Sicher Leben" 

summarises sport and leisure time accidents. It may be presumed that these accidents 

are separate from traffic accidents, but no data on fatalities is included and the accident 

severity is reported in other patterns than the traffic accidents. This database contains 

data on injuries of different regions of the body, including head injuries. 

The evaluation has to deal with shortcomings in both of these sources: 

• It is supposed that there are a considerable number of unreported cases not contained 

in the official traffic accident database, e.g. single party accidents of cyclists. Due to a 

Page 234


legal obligation all road accidents where any of the persons involved sustains any injury 

have to be reported by the police. But particularly cycle accidents are not likely to be 

reported if no other party is involved. However, it is likely that most accidents remaining 

unreported this way are of minor severity and therefore will not alter the result of a CBA 

significantly. 

• Injuries not treated in hospitals, but by general practitioners in their private practices, 

are not covered in either database. The same for injuries that are not at all treated by 

doctors, however, these injuries may be frequent but are assumed severe enough to 

have a significant impact on public economy. 

• Fatal leisure time accidents are not reported. 

• Since the EHLASS data is investigated by interviews, it likely but not secure that no 

accidents are double-counted in both databases. 

• In the EHLASS database the accident severity is reported in other patterns than the 

traffic accidents. 

Unfortunately the age classification thresholds in the different data sources differ from 

each other. Punctually and age classes had to be summarised together or divided based 

on the population data. 

This data was used to calculate two different scenarios, one for road traffic on and one for 

all accidents. A comparison of both databases shows that on an average road traffic 

accidents are much more severe than sport and leisure time accidents. This difference 

was considered in the calculation. Sport and leisure time accident data was only available 

for 2001 to 2003; the numbers differ significantly. There are only three age groups. 

2.5.4 Helmet prices 

For the Austrian study the same approach was used as for Germany. 

2.5.5 Accident reduction potential 

There are various studies on the injury reduction potential of bicycle helmets. As it is most 

commonly accepted in Germany, a study by OTTE (2001) was chosen as reference for 

this calculation. OTTE investigated in-depth 3,534 accidents with bicyclists involved in 

Germany between 1985 and 1999. This very elaborate study considers injuries of different 

regions of the body as a whole and for different regions of the head. Actual injury severity 

of real life crashes is compared to virtual injury severity (i.e. injuries which would have 

occurred if a helmet would have been worn). It comes to the final conclusion that the total 

number of fatally and seriously injured bicycle riders would decline by 20% if all cyclists 

would wear helmets. The number of slight injuries would increase by 1% since the number 

of slight head injuries protected by a helmet is lower than the number of fatal and severe 

injuries changed to slight ones. 

Page 235

2.6 Assessment Results 


• Based on accident data of 1992 to 2003, forecasts for 2004 to 2015 were calculated. 

• The further calculation was done as if the helmet law would have been introduced on 

January 1st 2003. 

• The data on helmet wearing rates available does not allow one to extrapolate wearing 

rates for the future; there was a rapid increase in the 90s, whereas the wearing rates 

declined slightly recently. Therefore the helmet wearing rates of 2001 were taken as 

the basis to define the target group by excluding the share of cyclists currently wearing 

a helmet. 

• The target accidents affected by a helmet wearing obligation were calculated as the 

product of the share of those not wearing a helmet and the number of injuries in the 

different levels and age groups. 

• The crash severity reduction figures were applied to the target accidents in the different 

age groups and injury severity classes. 

• The costs were calculated assuming that 62% of the Austrians, i.e. all those at least 

occasionally using a bike, buy a helmet. The information about the life span of helmets 

was taken from Rune Elvik's Handbook of Road Safety Measures. Regular reinvestment 

for helmets was considered from this source. For discounting those already 

wearing a helmet the same figures were used as described above for accidents. 

• Future costs and benefits were labelled at 2002 prices using a discount factor of 5% 

annually, and then finally added up. 

• To integrate sport and leisure time accidents, the two databases had to be compared. 

Sport and leisure time accident numbers are only available for the years 2001 to 2003, 

and besides, the numbers vary significantly through the years. It was supposed that the 

impact of helmet wearing on sport and leisure time accidents and road accidents is the 

same. An accident ratio was calculated based on 2001 to 2003 values for the three age 

groups. This ratio consists of two factors. One considers the ratio of the total numbers 

of accidents; the other considers the share of head injuries being different for road and 

other accidents. 

only road 

accidents 

all accidents 

Table 79: costs and benefits 2003 - 2015, Austria 

helmet cost (€) benefits (€) total supply costs 

(€) 

cost/benefit ratio 

20 230,918,822 101,081,159 2.28 

40 230,918,822 202,162,319 1.14 

20 414,093,300 101,081,159 4.10 

40 414,093,300 202,162,319 2.05 

Page 236



If helmet wearing for cyclists would be made compulsory, this would have to be a decision 

by the national parliament. Depending on what this obligation should cover, road traffic 

legislation would not only be necessary. Deriving from this fact, it would also be necessary 

to consult more than one ministry. 

After making an arrangement between the concerned ministries, a draft of the law would 

have to be sent out to be commented on by a lot of stakeholders. Usually this phase gives 

rise to the public discussion. As we have learned from informal consultations with other 

stakeholders during this operation, it may be expected that most of the interest groups 

would oppose to an obligation. 

The "Institut Sicher Leben" is a research institute dealing with sport and leisure time 

safety. This study was presented to the head of the institute and three experienced 

researchers working for the institute. The presentation of the study was started with 

presenting the "short training course" on efficiency assessment although some of the 

audience already had experience in this field. The "short training course" and the study 

itself were understood by the audience. The results were accepted. Nevertheless, the 

head of the institute decided not to bring the study forward to the relevant members of the 

Austrian administration. Well informed about the current positions of the stakeholders, he 

judged that it would do no good to the case itself if the discussion would be raised under 

the current circumstances. 

It was considered to present the efficiency assessment results to relevant decision-makers 

without joining this with a recommendation to implement the measure, or even pointing out 

that the institute does not recommend mandatory helmet wearing. But all these options 

were rejected as it seemed impossible to leave the discussion, only to leave it at a strictly 

theoretical level. 

But, as a positive result of this presentation, it was decided to prepare another CBA only 

considering children. The protection of children would not be the subject of a great deal of 

controversy as cycle helmet for all cyclists would be, safety measures for children cannot 

be easily objected, at least not as easy as measures targeting the whole population. 


None of the fundamental barriers played a significant role within this study. 

The institutional barriers were finally those avoiding this study to be used as it was meant 

to be. It might have been a matter of wrong timing, but definitely was not the wrong timing 

of using EA results to influence decision-making. Since there was no decision-making 

process running, the results would have to be used to start a process. And finally, it was 

supposed that these EA results were not a good starting point for a political discussion. 

Within the calculation procedure several difficulties occurred, but the results of the 

previous work packages of ROSEBUD were found to be very helpful to overcome these 

problems. The valuation of fatalities and injuries used for this study significantly differs 

from, e.g. the values used in Germany. New values for Austria will be available by the end 

of 2005. 

Three main problems were identified in the range of technical barriers: 

Page 237


• Accident data: Road traffic and off-road accident data were difficult to compare and to 

aggregate. Unreported accidents were presumed to exist in a considerable number, but 

having no considerable impact on the total accident costs. 

• The basis for the estimate of helmet prices was rather weak. 

Finally, there is no evidence of people stopping cycling when forced to wear a helmet. 

Although there are some results from another country tackling this problem, it seems to 

be highly depending on culture and attitudes of cyclists whether there is any change in 

mobility behaviour. If these effects should occur, there would be impacts of various 

kinds that would have to be considered in a CBA additionally (environmental effects 

and travelling time considering changed modal split as well as public health effects). 


When this study was carried out, there was strong interest by research institutes in EA of 

compulsory helmet wearing, but there was no discussion going on either among scientists 

and the administration or in the public. EA was found not to be an appropriate means of 

raising this discussion. It was supposed that the argument of cost efficiency would not be 

heard by the public, particularly not in a case where emotional arguments are the main 

basis of these discussions. 

It was found that it is not possible to discuss rational arguments (like the results of a EA 

study) with the relevant stakeholders on a broad basis without starting a public discussion 

on the topic at the same time. 

The limitations of the CBA carried out were identified as follows: 

• The accident data used may be influenced by a large number of unreported cases. 

• Accident data from road traffic accidents and another database containing leisure time 

accidents were difficult to compare and aggregate to a common basis for calculation. 

• Helmet prices were difficult to estimate due to a lack of knowledge on current prices 

and strong uncertainty of the impact of the enormous increase of sales after introducing 

an obligation. 

• The valuations for fatalities and injuries for Austria are based on relatively old data. 

• Although there is no evidence for these effects to exist, a change of the modal split 

would significantly alter the results of this CBA. Time consumption, environmental 

impacts and public health effects would have to be considered in addition. 

The following task in this CBA were particularly easy to achieve: 

• It was easy to gain access to accident data and other data sources, such as population 

data and empirical data on attitudes, mobility behaviour and helmet wearing rates. 

• There was suitable and elaborate information on the safety effects. 

• The calculation itself was supported by the framework described in WP3 report. 

Page 238


An obligation for cyclists to wear a helmet was found beneficial in any case. A cost-benefit 

ratio was found between 1.14 and 4.45 depending on what accident types are included, 

the monetary values for fatalities and injuries and on the estimate for helmet prices. 

REFERENCES 

BÄSSLER, R. (2001): Quantifizierung des Unfallrisikos beim Sporttreiben. Austrian Life 

Style 2000. Fessel-GfK. Studie im Auftrag des Institutes "Sicher Leben". Austria. 

HALBWACHS C. et. Al. (2000): Sport und Gesundheit. Bundesministerium für soziale 

Sicherheit und Generationen. Wien. Austria. 

FURIAN G., Gruber M. (1999): Die Österreichische Radhelminitiative 1992 - 1998. Institut 

Sicher Leben. Wien. Austria. 

KOLB W., BAUER R. (1999): Unfallfolgekosten in Österreich. Institut Sicher Leben. Wien. 

Austria. 

STEINER M., BAUER R. (2002): Unfallstatistik 2001. Verletzte nach Heim-, Freizeit. und 

Sportunfällen in Österreich. Institut Sicher Leben. Wien. Austria. 

Steiner M., Bauer R. (2003): Unfallstatistik 2002. Verletzte nach Heim-, Freizeit. und 

Sportunfällen in Österreich. Institut Sicher Leben. Wien. Austria. 

BAUER R., KÖRMER, C., STEINER M. (2002). EHLASS Austria Jahresbericht 2001. 

Institut Sicher Leben. Wien. Austria. 

BAUER R. et al (2003):EHLASS Austria Jahresbericht 2002. Institut Sicher Leben. Wien. 

Austria. 

FURIAN G., Gruber M. (2002):Einstellungen zum Helmtragen, Verwendung von 

Radhelmen und Em,pfehlungen für die Zukunft. Institut Sicher Leben. Wien. Austria. 

OTTE, D. (2001): Schutzwirkung von Radhelmen. Verkehrsunfallforschung Medizinische 

Hochschule Hannover. Im Auftrage der Bundesanstalt für Straßenwesen. Bergisch 

Gladbach. Germany. 

N.N. (2004):Mobilität in Deutschland 2002 - Fahrradverkehr. Bundesministerium für 

Verkehr-, Bau- und Wohnungswesen. Bonn. Germany. 

SIEGENER W., RÖDELSTAB Th. (2004): Sicherung durch Gurte, Helme und andere 

Schutzsysteme. IVT Ingenieurbüro für Verkehrstechnik GmbH Karlsruhe. Bundesanstalt 

für Straßenwesen. Bergisch Gladbach. Germany. 

ELVIK, R., BORGER-MYSEN, A. and VAA, T. (1997): Trafikksikkerhekshandbok (Traffic 

Safety Handbook). Institute of Transport Economics. Oslo. Norway. 

ROSEBUD WP3 Report (2004): Improvements in efficiency assessment tools. 

ROSEBUD WP2 Report (2004): Barriers to the use of efficiency assessment tools in road 

safety policy. 

Page 239


Accident, population and vehicle data, Germany, 

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 

injury accidents 

all 395462 385384 392754 388003 373082 380835 377257 395689 382949 375345 362054 

with bicycle involved 78695 72487 74955 72949 66667 73341 68879 76133 73927 72110 71219 

bicycle riders and total 925 906 821 825 751 594 679 637 662 659 635 583 616 

passengers, fatalities 0-5 12 12 10 6 12 6 7 7 2 4 4 4 

6-10 37 28 33 33 24 27 20 18 25 10 12 10 

10-15 59 58 74 66 54 45 39 48 53 41 37 28 

15-21 62 68 43 59 57 40 36 33 35 40 39 36 

21-65 437 430 377 371 326 277 316 293 289 298 278 270 

>65 316 308 284 290 277 198 261 237 257 265 265 235 

bicycle riders and total 17698 18928 17468 18041 17552 15747 17112 15624 16740 15586 14741 14025 

passengers, severe 

injuries 

0-5 

6-10 

315 

1393 

383 

1268 

310 

1198 

287 

1181 

273 

1241 

239 

1175 

253 

1088 

177 

873 

190 

942 

144 

717 

130 

532 

126 

490 

10-15 2510 2704 2609 2657 2564 2290 2565 2134 2340 2014 1828 1606 

15-21 2199 2401 2183 2263 2178 1823 1955 1773 1836 1601 1509 1481 

21-65 8705 9586 8782 9061 8738 7748 8747 8188 8718 8325 8086 7618 

>65 2550 2552 2358 2561 2529 2440 2484 2462 2692 2775 2646 2698 

bicycle riders and total 52307 58552 53764 55507 54049 49647 54876 52053 58294 57152 56338 56138 

passengers, slight 

injuries 

0-5 

6-10 

973 

3553 

1075 

3582 

958 

3494 

910 

3427 

922 

3715 

742 

3431 

805 

3755 

634 

3068 

744 

3367 

652 

2838 

591 

2309 

615 

2258 

10-15 8443 9378 9141 9207 8867 8323 9072 8414 9994 9152 8435 8420 

15-21 7893 8814 7800 8061 7786 7044 7615 7505 7798 7464 7381 7296 

21-65 27493 31394 28321 29689 28393 26003 28918 28015 31114 31315 31683 31420 

>65 3719 3982 3770 3907 4051 3814 4351 4165 4953 5438 5681 5922 

German population total 79984 80594 81179 81422 81661 81896 82052 82029 82087 82188 82339 82440 

(x1000) 

0-5 5357 5366 5319 5197 5051 4919 4832 4781 4743 4724 4706 4695 

6-10 4211 4290 4377 4456 4517 4560 4569 4540 4506 4462 4396 4358 

10-15 3445 3510 3582 3645 3695 3731 3738 3714 3687 3650 3596 3566 

15-21 5363 5190 5103 5096 5177 5299 5411 5474 5521 5561 5590 5604 

21-65 49640 50139 50526 50581 50586 50596 50587 50506 50421 50381 50177 50152 

>65 11969 12100 12272 12448 12634 12791 12916 13014 13207 13510 13874 14066 

Bicycles existing (million) 64,2 67,3 70 72,3 73,5 73,9 74 74 74,1 74,5 74,6 

Page 240

SHORT TRAINING COURSE ON EFFICIENCY ASSESSMENT 

SHORT TRAINING COURSE ON EFFICIENCY 

ASSESSMENT 

by Shalom Hakkert 

Efficiency assessment studies should be evaluated using standardized techniques. As 

highlighted at several points of this report, efficiency assessment is a sophisticated method 

and need some basic information to understand the methodology. This understanding is 

supposed as a basis for the recipients to believe in the results of such studies. 

The "short training course on efficiency 

assessment" provides a concise description of 

the main steps and data components, which are 

needed to perform a Cost-Benefit Analysis 

(CBA)/ Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) of a 

road safety measure 25 . The description includes: 

basic formulae, safety effects, implementation 

units, target accidents, accident costs and 

implementation costs. The evaluation of WP4 

case-studies was performed in line with these 

evaluation techniques. 

Certainly, the background and interest of the 

recipients of efficiency assessment studies is very diverse. The "short training course" 

aims at making a compromise for all level of decision making and the full range of interests 

and background. 

The introduction gives an overview on the motives to carry out EA studies, to use the 

results and the methods. 

25 This is a concise compilation of Chapters 2, 3 of the WP3’s report. More details can be found in the report. 

Page 241

a. Basic formulae 


The cost-effectiveness of a road safety measure 

is defined as the number of accidents prevented 

per unit cost of implementing the measure: 

Cost-effectiveness = Number of accidents 

prevented by a given measure/ Unit costs of 

implementation of measure 

For this calculation, the following information 

items are needed: 

• A definition of suitable units of 

implementation for the measure, 

• An estimate of the effectiveness of the safety measure in terms of the number of 

accidents it can be expected to prevent per unit implemented of the measure, 

• An estimate of the costs of implementing one unit of the measure. 

The accidents that are affected by a safety 

measure are referred to as target accidents. In 

order to estimate the number of accidents it can 

be expected to prevent (or prevented) per unit 

implemented of a safety measure, it is 

necessary to: 

• Identify target accidents, 

• Estimate the number of target accidents 

expected to occur per year for a typical 

unit of implementation, 

• Estimate the safety effect of the measure 

on target accidents. 

The numerator of the cost-effectiveness ratio is 

estimated as follows: 

Number of accidents prevented (or expected to 

be prevented) by a measure = The number of 

accidents expected to occur per year X The 

safety effect of the measure 

Page 242


The benefit cost ratio is defined as: 

Benefit-cost ratio = Present value of all benefits/ 

Present value of implementation costs 

When a CBA is applied, then, besides the above 

CEA’s components, the monetary values of the 

measure’s benefits are also required. The 

monetary values imply, first of all, accident costs 

and, depending on the range of other effects 

considered, may also include costs of travel 

time, vehicle operating costs, costs of air 

pollution, costs of traffic noise, etc. 

In order to make the costs and benefits 

comparable, a conversion of the values to a 

certain time reference is required. Such an 

action needs a definition of the economic frame, 

i.e. the duration of effect (length of service life of 

the project) and the interest rate, which are 

those commonly used for the performance of 

economic evaluations in the country. 

In a basic case, where the benefits come from 

the accidents saved only (and no influences on 

travel expenses and the environment are 

expected), the numerator of the benefit-cost 

ratio will be estimated as: 

Present value of benefits = Number of accidents 

prevented by the measure X Average accident 

cost X The accumulated discount factor, 

where the accumulated discount factor depends 

on the interest rate and the length of life of the 

measure. 

b. Safety effects 

The most common form of a safety effect is the 

percentage of accident reduction following the 

treatment. The main source of evidence on 

safety effects is from observational before-after 

studies. Other (theoretical) methods for 

quantifying safety effects are also possible. 

One should remember that the safety effect of a 

measure is stated as available if the estimates 

of both the average value and the confidence 

interval of the effect are known. One should also 

ascertain that both the type of measure and the 

type of sites (units) for which the estimates are 

available, correspond to those for which the 

CBA/CEA is performed. 

Page 243


For WP4’s evaluations, it was desirable to apply the local values of safety effects, i.e. 

those attained by the evaluation studies performed in the country. When the local values 

do not exist, the summaries of international experience can be used 26 . 

If the value of a safety effect is supposed to be provided by a current study (for which the 

CBA is performed), the estimation of safety effect should satisfy the criteria of correct 

safety evaluation. This implies that the evaluation should account for the selection bias 

and for the uncontrolled environment (e.g. changes in traffic volumes, general accident 

trends). 

c. Implementation units 

In the case of infrastructure measures, the 

appropriate unit will often be one junction or one 

kilometre of road. In the case of area-wide or 

more general measures, a suitable unit may be 

a typical area or a certain category of roads. In 

the case of vehicle safety measures, one vehicle 

will often be a suitable unit of implementation, 

or, in the case of legislation introducing a certain 

safety measure on vehicles, the percentage of 

vehicles equipped with this safety feature or 

complying with the requirement. For police 

enforcement, it may be a kilometre of road with 

a certain level of enforcement activity (e.g. the number of man-hours per kilometre of road 

per year); in the case of public information campaigns - the group of road users, which is 

supposed to be influenced by the campaign. 

d. Target accidents 

The accidents affected by a safety measure present a target accident group. Depending 

on the type of safety measure it can also be a target injury group, target driver population, 

etc. 

Target accidents depend on the nature of the safety measure considered. There are no 

strict rules for this case. For general measures like black-spot treatment, traffic calming, 

speed limits, etc. the target accident group usually includes all injury accidents. 

26 Such as: Elvik R. and Vaa T (2004) The handbook of road safety measures. Elsevier. 

Page 244


One should remember that if we apply a specific and not general accident group, proper 

corrections should be performed for the accident costs, as well. 

e. Accident costs 

As known, a detailed survey of practice in 

estimating road accident costs in the EU and 

other countries was made by an international 

group of experts as part of the COST-research 

programme 27 . Five major cost items of accident 

costs were identified as follows: 

(1) Medical costs 

(2) Costs of lost productive capacity (lost output) 

(3) Valuation of lost quality of life (loss of welfare due to accidents) 

(4) Costs of property damage 

(5) Administrative costs 

27 Alfaro, J-L.; Chapuis, M.; Fabre, F. (Eds): COST 313. Socioeconomic cost of road accidents. Report EUR 

15464 EN. Brussels, Commission of the European Communities, 1994. 

Page 245


The relative shares of these five elements differ 

between fatalities and the various degrees of 

injuries, and also differ among countries. 

We assume that each country has its official 

valuations of accident injuries and damage. 

Otherwise, the comparative figures from the 

recent studies can be of help 28 . All the values 

are applicable for the WP4’s evaluations but, in 

every case, there should be a clear indication 

which components of the above accident costs 

are included. 

For the sake of comparability of the evaluation 

results, the monetary values will be converted to € at 2002-prices. 

The literature discusses mostly the valuations of fatalities and injuries whereas a CBA 

usually needs average accident costs. In a simple case, the average accident cost can be 

estimated as the sum of injury costs multiplied by the average number of injuries with 

different severity levels, which were observed in the target accidents’ group; the damage 

value per accident should be stated and added to the injury costs. 

f. Implementation costs 

The implementation costs should be determined 

for each safety measure considered. The 

implementation costs are the social costs of all 

means of production (labour and capital) that 

are employed to implement the measure. 

The implementation costs are generally 

estimated on an individual basis for each 

investment project. As no strict rules are 

available on the issue, performing a WP4’s 

evaluation, all the components of the 

implementation costs should be explained. 

Typical costs of engineering measures, which are recommended for the CBA evaluations 

in the country, are desirable. 

28 see Chapter 2 of WP3’s Handbook 

Page 246


The implementation costs should be converted to their present values, which include both 

investment costs and the annual costs of operation and maintenance. Similar to the case 

of accidents costs, for the sake of comparability of the evaluation results, the monetary 

values will be converted to € at 2002-prices. 

g. Treatment of uncertainty 

In most cases, all effects, particularly the safety 

effects cannot be determined exactly. It is 

necessary to consider the level of uncertainty 

within the calculation, give exact figures and 

explain the variation of the results at their mean 

and at the borders of a (in most cases 95%) 

confidence interval. If uncertainties cannot be 

calculated or estimated, they have to mentioned 

at least and figures of the possible outcomes 

have to be described. 

h. Examples 

For a better understanding it is strongly recommended to use examples of well elaborated 

efficiency studies. It is also recommended, when using the short training course, to use 

other examples. Certainly, the examples used have to taken from well elaborated 

(according to the standards mentioned above, state-of-the-art EA) EA studies and be 

presented in a similar way as shown below for one of the ROSEBUD WP4 cases. 

Page 247


Page 248

CONCLUSIONS 

ROSEBUD WP4 - CONCLUSIONS 

by Victoria Gitelman and Shalom Hakkert 

Overview and Summary tables by George Yannis and Eleonora Papadimitriou 

WP4 descriptions by Martin Winkelbauer 

1 Summaries of WP4 activities 

The procedure adopted within ROSEBUD - WP4 was designed to gain experience from 

various countries in performing efficiency assessment (EA) studies of road safety related 

measures along the lines developed in earlier Work-packages. Particularly, the intentions 

were: 

• To test the availability of data and values for the performance of EA studies such as 

exposure data, accident data, etc; values of safety effects, accidents costs, 

implementation costs, environmental and other impacts. 

• To test the EA methods towards their applicability for road safety measures. 

• To perform EA studies of a considerable number of cases of safety-related 

measures ("case studies") which may serve as evaluation examples for similar 

cases, e.g. for the same or comparable road safety measures in other countries. 

• To examine the usability of procedures, methods and recommendations developed 

by the previous work-packages of ROSEBUD. 

• To gather problems which have not been targeted so far within the ROSEBUD 

framework and to develop solutions and recommendations. 

• To present the results of the case studies to decision makers, to document their 

feedbacks and to develop recommendations for such presentations and the 

assessment process and documentation as a whole. 

To cover all these goals, the following steps were undertaken: 

• Road safety measures were selected for assessment within WP4 (10 cases). 

• Among these measures, two cases were selected for detailed discussion with 

decision-makers. One of the cases was presented to a group of decision makers in 

a one-day workshop. The other case study was sent to a decision maker in a 

printed version. In both cases, the feedback of the decision makers was recorded 

and afterwards discussed within the workgroup. 

• In a one day conference (3 rd ROSEBUD Conference, Vienna, March 18 th , 2005), 

both cases were presented to a broader audience with a majority of the participants 

being members of the User Representation Group of ROSEBUD. 

Page 249

1.1 The WP4 – workshop 


On the 16 th of December 2004, a workshop in Bordeaux hosted by CETE SO was 

conducted and dedicated to 

• receiving feedback on the "Short Training Course" for decision makers; 

• present case G "Measures Against Collision with Trees" to decision makers in order 

to get feedback on both the results of the study and the applicability of the efficiency 

assessment. 

• test if this approach can be applied to a larger audience, e.g. at the 3 rd ROSEBUD 

Conference. 

The agenda of the Bordeaux-workshop was as follows: 

• Introduction of the decision makers and their role within decision making. 

• Description of ROSEBUD. 

• "Short Training Course" on efficiency assessment. 

• Presentation of the results of efficiency assessment (CBA) on measures against 

collisions with trees. 

• A broad discussion of the results focused on the usability of these results within the 

decision making process and the "Short Training Course". This was supported by a 

set of specific questions, which was developed specifically. 

The feedback from decision makers was recorded and discussed within the WP4 working 

group in a meeting on the next day. A procedure for the conference was developed and an 

agenda was drafted. 

Furthermore, the current status of all case studies was presented and discussed among 

the working group. 

1.2 The 3 rd ROSEBUD Conference 

In accordance with the results of the WP4 – workshop in Bordeaux, the agenda for the 3 rd 

ROSEBUD conference was prepared (excluding formal parts): 

• Intentions and Current Status of WP4 

• A keynote lecture which addresses the need for integrating EA in the decision 

making process and encourage a fruitful discussion afterwards. 

• A "Short Training Course" on efficiency assessment. 

• Overview of all WP4 cases 

In two parallel sessions: 

• Results of the two case studies were presented and discussed 

• Presentation of the decision makers' impressions on those studies with specific 

respect to their feasibility within the decision making process. 

• A discussion of the case study results focusing on the usability of the results within 

the decision making process. 

In a plenary session: 

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• A plenary discussion including the two case studies and general issues of EA and 

decision making. Chairmen of the discussion were two decision makers and two 

experts. This was also supported by a set of specific questions, which was based 

on the questions used in the workshop and improved with respect of the feedback 

gathered there. 

• Preview on ROSEBUD - WP5 and the final results and products of ROSEBUD. 

2 Discussion and Conclusions 

2.1 An overview of the case-studies 

Within the framework of ROSEBUD WP4, the efficiency of various road safety measures 

was assessed through case-studies conducted in different countries. The selected 

measures covered different road safety related categories, decision-making levels and 

target accident groups. The evaluations were in line with standard evaluation techniques, 

with additional adaptations if necessary. 

Table 1 summarizes the results of the EA analyses and the characteristics of evaluation 

methods applied. In total, within the WP4, 18 case-studies were carried out, which covered 

10 groups of safety-related measures. Out of the 18 case-studies: 

- 3 cases concerned vehicle-related measures (fitting motorcycles with ABS; compulsory 

DRL for the whole year); 

- 9 cases concerned infrastructure-related measures (traffic calming measures in urban 

areas; grade separation of at-grade rail-road crossings; installation of roadside guardrails; 

introducing signal control at a rural junction; constructing 2+1 road sections) and 

- the remaining 6 cases concerned user-related measures (automatic speed enforcement; 

large-scale projects of intensive police enforcement; compulsory helmet wearing for 

cyclists). 

It can be seen that: 

• Enforcement-related measures appear to be more cost-effective than other measures, 

obviously due to lower implementation costs. The efficiency of other user-related 

measures and of vehicle-related measures is also relatively high due to the same 

reason (low implementation costs per unit of implementation). On the other hand, the 

efficiency of infrastructure-related measures varies widely, depending both on the 

construction costs and safety effects of the measures. 

• National-level measures are generally more cost-effective than local-level measures. 

However, this finding mostly stems from the fact that the majority of local-level 

measures are road infrastructure improvements. 

• No significant differences can be found in the efficiency of similar measures applied in 

different countries. 

• The target accident group/ target population usually includes all road accidents/ all 

drivers, with some obvious exceptions such as case A ("fitting motorcycles with ABS") 

for which "motorcycle riders" are the natural target population; case G ("implementation 

of roadside guardrails") which is dedicated to the prevention of roadside collisions with 

trees; case J ("2+1 roads") which struggles with head-on collisions; and case K which 

concerns bicycle riders only. 

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• Typically, the accident costs come from official national data; in a few cases (mostly, 

Israeli and Greek case-studies on infrastructure-related measures and intensive police 

enforcement) some adaptations of the official injury costs were made to provide a 

valuation of an average accident. 

• The availability of implementation costs was problematic in many cases. 

Nevertheless, in the majority of cases the estimates of implementation costs were 

based on the official data provided by relevant authorities. In the cases where the 

evaluation was performed prior to the measure's implementation (e.g. ABS for 

motorcycles, DRL, compulsory helmets for cyclists) some practical assumptions or the 

valuations of similar measures applied in other countries (i.e. the "literature" source) 

were accounted for in the costs. 

• For the calculation of safety effects, before-after considerations with control-groups 

were the most common. In other cases, estimates from the literature or from previous 

research were applied. Only a few cases applied a number of simple assumptions, 

estimating the safety effect of the measure. 

• Additional (other than safety) effects were estimated in half of the cases. In some other 

cases a need to account for the additional effects was mentioned but not realized due 

to lacking data/ models which could isolate the effects (i.e. changes in air pollution, 

noise level, travel time or fuel consumption) associated with the measure. 

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Nr. 

Case Study 

Vehicle-related 

Category of 

measures 

Infrastructure-related 

User-related - Enforcement 

User-related - others 

Level of 

implemen 

tation 

National 

Regional 

Local 

Country of measure 


Table 80: Summary characteristics of the case-studies 

Case-responsibility 

Description of measure 

All accidents 

Target 

group 

All drivers 

Accident/ driver sub-group 

PAGE 253 

Implemen 

tation 

costs 

Official data 

Literature 

Estimates 

Official data 

Accident 

costs 

Literature 

Estimates 

Before-after comparison 

Source of 

safety effect 

value Other effects CBA results 

Fitting motorcycles with ABS and reducing ABS 

1.1-1.4 

A 1 ABS-Motorcycle √ √ AT AT taxes √ √ √ √ √ √ 

9.4-11.7 

B 1 Section Control √ √ AT AT 

Automatic speed enforcement in a tunnel 

(motorway) √ √ √ √ + 

5.4 

2 Section Control √ √ NL AT Automatic Speed Enforcement on a motorway √ n/a √ √ + + n/a 

C 1 Daytime running lights √ √ CZ CZ DRL for the whole year √ √ √ √ √ - - 4.3 

2 Daytime running lights √ √ AT CZ DRL for the whole year √ √ √ √ - - 3.6 

E 1 Traffic calming (urban areas) √ √ IL IL Speed humps (1 road) √ √ √ √ √ - 2.0-4.0 

2 Traffic calming (urban areas) √ √ GR GR Speed humps, woonerfs (area) √ √ √ √ √ - 1.14-1.2 

3 Traffic calming (urban areas) √ √ CZ CZ Roundabouts instead of four-arm intersections √ √ √ √ 1.5 

1.4 (urban) 

F 1 Rail-road crossings √ √ IL IL Grade separation of at-grade rail-road crossing √ √ √ √ √ √ + + 2.8 (rural) 

0.94 (urban) 

2 Rail-road crossings 

Measures against collisions 

√ √ FI FI Grade separation of at-grade rail-road crossing √ √ √ √ + + 2.5 (rural) 

G 1 with trees (guardrails) 

Road improvement mix (rural 

√ √ FR FR Implementation of roadside guardrails √ √ √ √ 8.7 

H 1 areas) √ √ IL IL Introducing traffic signal control at a rural junction 

5-year project (interurban roads), with emphasis on 

√ √ √ √ √ √ 1.25 

I 1 Intensive police enforcement √ √ GR GR speed and alcohol √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 6.6-9.7 

2 Intensive police enforcement √ √ IL IL 1 year project (interurban roads) √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 3.5-5.0 

Constructing a 2+1 road section (without median 

√ 

J 1 2+1 roads √ √ FI FI cable) 

Constructing a 2+1 road section (with a median 

√ √ √ 

1.25 

2 2+1 roads 


√ √ SW FI cable) √ √ √ √ + 2.26 

K 1 for cyclists 


√ √ AT AT Compulsory bicycle helmet wearing √ √ √ √ 1.14-2.28 

2 for cyclists √ √ DE AT Compulsory bicycle helmet wearing √ √ √ √ 2.23-4.45 

Regression model 

Literature 

Assumptions 

Air pollution 

Noise 

Time savings 

Fuel consumption 

Benefits to 

costs ratio


2.2 The evaluation techniques applied 

All the case-studies followed the standardised procedure of cost-benefit analysis (CBA). 

None of the studies selected the cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) due to obvious 

limitations of the CEA when a single measure is evaluated and, especially, when the 

evaluation should also account for other (other than safety) effects. Besides, the 

discussions on the EA results with decision-makers seem easier when the results are 

presented in usual money-terms. 

None of the studies considered project alternatives; by default, each study compared 

"implementation of the measure" with a "do nothing" alternative. All other steps of the CBA 

evaluation procedure, i.e. a consideration of safety effects and side effects (on mobility 

and environment), monetising all effects, estimating implementation costs, calculation of 

present values of costs and benefits, and of efficiency measure (cost-benefit ratio - CBR) – 

were applied by the majority of the studies. The exceptions were basically due to lacking 

data. 

Estimating safety effects of the measures, the emphasis was put on the application of a 

correct safety evaluation. In the "ex-ante" evaluations the best available values of safety 

effects (which are based on a summary of previous experience/ research) were typically 

applied. In the "ex-post" evaluations, the safety effect value was typically estimated by 

means of the odds-ratio with a comparison group. A weighted value of the effect, based on 

the safety experience of a group of treated sites, was applied, when possible. In these 

cases, confidence intervals for the estimated safety effects were also provided. 

For the economic evaluation, typical scenarios adopted were "conservative" or "best 

estimate", although these were based on different approaches in each case. In some 

cases, different scenarios were dictated by several values of safety effects; in others – by 

a consideration of safety effects only versus a combination of safety effects with other 

side-effects. In any case, consideration of a number of scenarios appears to be useful for 

testing sensitivity of the results and, therefore, should be recommended for the usual 

evaluation practice. 

Summarizing the performance of the evaluation studies, several points can be mentioned 

indicating common technical problems which might occur during the CBA evaluations. 

They are: 

- a correct application of the odds-ratio technique, e.g. in the case of zero-values of some 

of the numbers; 

- ways for checking the statistical significance of the evaluation results; 

- the selection of side-effects to be considered along with safety effects; 

- a correct distinction between the implementation costs and negative side-effects of the 

measure (e.g. increased fuel consumption or travel time). 

For a more correct and uniform performance of CBA for safety-related measures it would 

be useful to elaborate a categorization of cases, indicating the types of impacts (e.g. 

safety, mobility, noise, air pollution) to be considered in the evaluation of each category of 

measures. 

For example, in the cases of infrastructure or enforcement measures, which have an 

implication on travel speeds, a consideration of changes in travel time would be useful. 

Another question concerns the inclusion of fines in the economic evaluation of 

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enforcement measures. A possible recommendation may be as follows: to fully include the 

investments made for enforcement measures in the costs is a necessary condition for 

consideration of fines as benefits. 

When a number of impacts are combined in the evaluation of a measure, a distinction 

should be made between the implementation costs and negative benefits of the measure. 

According to the recommended procedure (WP3, 2004), the implementation costs are the 

social costs of all means of production (labour and capital) that are employed to implement 

the measure, whereas the benefits include all effects which stem from the measure's 

application. Some benefits may be negative, e.g. increased travel time; in this case, their 

values are subtracted from the total benefits. 

Aiming at a better methodological basis of the evaluation studies as well as at a 

comparability of the results, it would be useful to address the above and other issues in 

the extended version of guidelines for the performance of the EA studies. 

In general, safety effects estimated should satisfy the criteria of a correct safety evaluation, 

i.e. to account for general accident trends, selection bias and possible confounding factors 

(e.g. changes in traffic volumes in "after" as opposed to "before" periods). The effect on 

accident numbers needs to be based on a comparison of the null hypotheses (accidents 

which would occur had no measure been taken) with actual accident numbers observed 

after applying the measure. A comprehensive theory of the topic is presented in Hauer 

(1997). The applicable techniques can be found in many publications (e.g. Elvik, 1997; 

Elvik, 1999). It is believed that a distribution of a brief guide on standardized techniques for 

the evaluation of safety effects would be helpful for safety practitioners, in general, and 

particularly, for the improvement of quality of the EA studies. 

2.3 The EA components: data and values 

Generally, accident data were easily accessible to the authors of the EA studies. The 

valuations of road accident injury costs are usually provided by recently published 

evaluation studies. However, it was more difficult to attain costs of road safety measures. 

In the cases of infrastructure improvements and enforcement projects, the investments are 

paid from public budgets, therefore it frequently appears difficult to determine total values 

of these costs. Consultations with the responsible decision-makers and/ or analysis of 

valuations from similar studies may serve as the sources of values in this case. 

Establishing databases with typical implementation costs of safety improvements seems to 

be a practical solution for the systematic use of these values for EA studies. 

While the "ex-post" studies typically estimate the actual safety effect which can be 

associated with the application of safety measures, the "ex-ante" studies apply the 

available values, which should be based on previous research. To stimulate the application 

of more uniform and well-based values of safety effects, it would be useful to establish a 

database with typical values of the effects, based on international experience. Such a 

database might be open to a European network of experts and provide for general values 

of safety effects on initial steps of CBA/CEA as well as assist in judging the local effects 

observed. 

Lack of models for evaluating side-effects associated with the safety measure (i.e. 

changes in air pollution, noise level, travel time or fuel consumption) and, sometimes, lack 

of local valuations of theses effects, deter the consideration of theses effects by the EA 

studies. The problem may be tackled by a systematic accumulation of recommended 

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values and solutions (depending on safety measures considered) within the guidelines for 

the EA performance. 

2.4 Role of barriers 

The fundamental (or absolute) barriers to the application of the EA to road safety 

measures were left beyond the scope of the current consideration. None of the decisionmakers 

involved rejected the principles of efficiency assessment. Concerning the local 

level of decision-making some experts doubted the practical influence of the evaluation 

results, however, not because of a principle non-acceptance of the approach but mostly 

due to the awareness of other factors (political, emotional) which usually influence such 

decisions. 

On the other hand, the relative barriers (of institutional or technical nature) did influence 

the cases' performance. The technical barriers such as typical problems with the 

evaluation techniques or lacking data (as mentioned above) were generally overcome by 

the evaluation studies. In some cases, thoroughly based statistical models were developed 

to ascertain the lacking values of the effects. In general, the majority of technical barriers, 

which might appear during the performance of an EA study, seem treatable. 

A lack of obligatory procedure for the performance of cost-benefit evaluations of safety 

effects is known as a major institutional barrier for the application of the EA of safety 

measures. However, in many cases (mostly, "ex-post" evaluations of enforcement and 

infrastructure measures) the CBA results emphasized the accident reduction effects and 

the economic savings associated with the measures' application. As a result, the decisionmakers 

were interested in the distribution of the EA results and in further performance of 

the analyses. 

As to the barriers for implementation of safety measures, which were evaluated by the 

studies and found effective in the majority of cases, different forms of these barriers were 

identified by the studies. The wide application of the measure is frequently limited due to 

economic reasons (lack of finance, high costs, etc). Sometimes, safety reasons may 

conflict with other considerations (e.g. environmental issues like in case G – “measures 

against collisions with trees”). In other cases (e.g. helmets for bicycles, DRL, automatic 

speed enforcement) lack of publicity support or lack of acceptance by the general public 

deters the decision-makers from the measure’s promotion. However, in several cases (e.g. 

DRL for the Czech Republic, grade-separation of rail-road crossings in Israel, traffic 

calming in urban areas in Greece) the CBA results highlighted the expected/ attained 

benefits of the measures and, in this way, contributed to the acceptance of the measure by 

the decision-makers. 

2.5 The usefulness of efficiency assessment for decision-making 

Frequently, consideration of EA is part of the preparation of regional or local road safety 

plans. At the initial stage of evaluation, safety effects are usually unknown. To influence 

any decision making process, EA studies have to be prepared ex-ante using impact data 

from similar other measures taken from somewhere else. This stresses the need for 

availability and accessibility of evaluation studies on road safety measures as well as 

dissemination of EA results on an international basis. Authors of efficiency studies should 

be encouraged to use results from similar cases for this purpose. 

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In some cases, safety studies of road infrastructure measures are required to justify a 

choice among different solutions to the same problem. EA can be very useful for decision 

making in such cases, including the taking into account of other, non-safety, effects and 

costs. 

At the local level, the application of a safety measure is in many cases not just an 

economic question but also a matter of subjective judgement. This problem can occur 

where the program of "good measures" is developed at the national level but executed at 

regional or local level. Benefits estimated at the national level are frequently not visible at 

the local level, where costs and local political interests dominate the decision makers' 

perspective. During the preparation of EA studies within such an environment, the financial 

benefits need to be explained considering the level of future decision making in the best 

possible manner. 

As stated by one local decision-maker on the local level, not the millions of Euro expected 

to be saved, influence the decision but the fact that somebody familiar to the decision 

maker was killed in an accident. This highlights the conflict between traditional arguments 

used in decision making and EA as an instrument to be promoted. 

As mentioned above, decisions at the local level involve a mix of global and local interests. 

In presenting the study results it is important to fit the arguments to the level of decisionmakers. 

This comment refers to the specific situation of national road safety programs 

applied at regional or local level. To preserve the intentions of the national safety 

programs, the arguments need to include a presentation which is useful for the promotion 

of the original intentions at the regional or local level. 

The difference in usefulness of CBA versus CEA will also very much depend on the formal 

process of funding. As far as the French model, which was discussed at the workshop in 

Bordeaux, was concerned, the question of selecting guard-rail installation versus tree 

felling could be based on CEA, but again, emotional arguments were dominating the 

negotiations in the detailed planning process. 

Local decision makers in charge of road safety decisions seem to think that issues other 

than casualties (i.e. mobility costs, time use, environmental costs) will hardly be of use in 

local decision-making. 

In general, the feelings resulting from the discussions with local safety decision makers is 

that EA should be more directed to road safety and economic experts than to local 

decision makers. 

In the countries where the safety budget is centralized (i.e. the majority of local safety 

projects are financed by the government), the requirement of a CBA of safety measures 

may be distributed by stating it as a necessary condition for the application of projects 

coming from the central budget. 

CEA can be more applicable at the local level as no comparison with conflicting targets is 

usually performed and needed. The method of CBA at lower levels of decision making 

appears to be quite abstract. Specifically, in discussion with e.g. local peer groups, 

benefits at the national or even global level are weighted low or even disregarded, since 

impacts are not visible at the local level. The WP4 workshop showed the importance of 

decision markers' understanding of the principles of EA. The "short training course" was 

helpful on this issue. 

Some decision-makers voiced the opinion that when politicians make decisions they do not 

want to have too much input for these decisions. Elaborate EA studies narrow their range 

of decisions. Therefore EA seems to be "actively disregarded" or even objected to in 

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general. Rather cynically another opinion stated that EA is welcome as long as the results 

support the intentions of decision makers. 

2.6 The form of presentation of case study results 

On the basis of discussions with the decision-makers it was found to be useful to 

elaborate the presentation forms – the summary forms with the EA results, for different 

levels of decision makers. 

For laymen and non-professionals, the presentation of case results should be rather short. 

Figures on fatalities usually have a strong effect on decision makers. It is recommended to 

present local decision-makers with just one sheet (one page-presentation) of data, which 

should include a comparison of before and after accidents. The whole case report is 

needed when dealing with topics of national concern. 

At a higher level of decision-making the information presented needs to be more detailed. 

More detailed information improves the quality of the background material and improves 

the quality of decision-making. 

Presenting (marketing) the results, it is important to make a distinction between 

"technicians" (the professional level) and others. The language should be adapted to the 

targeted population. The educational background and function of the recipient need to be 

considered. For the professional level of decision makers it is important to explain the 

framework of components, which should be performed depending on categories of safety 

measures evaluated. 

From the various contacts with experts and decision makers in WP4, different suggestions 

were made concerning the amount of information that should be presented as a result of 

an EA study. It was felt that only in a small share of the cases, presenting all results of a 

study will be the optimum. Some voices recommended preparing a one-page information 

sheet. Frequently, the working group members received suggestions, only to present a 

rating of road safety measures (comparable to "star-ratings" e.g. used for safety of new 

cars), which would be very striking, particularly in discussions at local level and with the 

public. 

In summary: each recipient needs to be treated with an individual presentation of the 

results and individual background information adapted to the recipient. Although it was 

frequently stated, that the higher the level of decision making, the stronger the need for 

comprehensive information, the other issues mentioned above also have to be considered 

in each unique case. 

An important question is how to present the results to the public. In general, it can not be 

supposed that the public understands all the methods and processes of EA. Therefore, 

results need to be simplified to forward an understandable message to the public. While 

economic valuation of injuries and (particularly) fatalities may be accepted among experts, 

the average citizen is likely to oppose a monetary valuation of life. The presentation of EA 

results to the public needs to be carried out very carefully to avoid public resistance 

against the basic principles of EA. 

2.7 Distribution of knowledge 

The WP4 workshop again showed the importance of decision markers' understanding of 

the principles of EA. Training is also needed for those carrying out EA studies. There is a 

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need for international standards (guidelines) for preparing such studies. Both shall improve 

the quality of EA studies. 

Within the frame of the ROSEBUD Thematic Network such guidelines will be prepared. 

Deriving from WP4 experience, experts should be encouraged to publish their evaluation 

results on effects of road safety measures and results of EA studies. Reports should be 

inserted in international library databases (e.g. the ITRD) to become internationally 

available. To enable information exchange in day-to-day-business an internet forum for EA 

related issue could be installed. 

Possible ways for the dissemination of ROSEBUD results and messages in a country may 

be in the form of a workshop for national decision-makers, which includes: (a) a training 

course on principles of the EA of road safety measures; (b) the results of evaluation 

studies performed for local conditions. 

One of the most important findings within the practical testing done in WP4 is that the 

presentation of EA results has to be set up in close relation with the recipients. The level of 

decision making (international, national, regional or local), function (experts, researchers, 

government employees, politicians, etc.), educational background (lawyers, engineers, 

economists, etc.) and even individual characteristics of the recipient need to be 

considered. Particularly, it is recommended to take in account their personal experience 

and knowledge in the field of EA. The need for preparing the presentation of EA studies is 

very diverse, ranging from full training on EAT to no information at all. 

2.8 Recommendations 

Recommendations addressing the “best practice” guidelines and the evaluation framework 

in general: 

• Further development of the EA procedures and methods is required. 

• Particularly, for a more correct and uniform performance of CBA for safety-related 

measures it would be useful to elaborate a categorization of cases, indicating the 

types of impacts (e.g. safety, mobility, noise, air pollution) to be considered in the 

evaluation of each category of measures. 

• Safety effects estimated should satisfy the criteria of correct safety evaluation. A 

distribution of a brief guide on standardized techniques for the evaluation of safety 

effects would be helpful for safety practitioners, in general, and particularly, for the 

improvement of quality of the EA studies. 

• The implementation costs of safety measures are usually lacking. Establishing 

databases with typical implementation costs of safety improvements would be of 

help for the systematic use of these values in the EA studies. 

• A database with typical values of safety effects, based on international experience 

would be useful for correct and systematic performance of the "ex-ante" studies. 

• Consideration of a number of scenarios is useful for testing sensitivity of the results 

and should become common for the usual evaluation practice. 

• Definition and main components of a mini-CBA as well as its applicability for 

different levels of decision-making should be clarified. 

• It is important to clarify the definitions of projects for which the EA of safety impact 

should be performed. It is suggested that the EA of safety impacts should be 

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applied mostly for two types of projects: (a) the improvements which were financed 

by safety-dedicated budgets and (b) the projects aimed at improving safety. 

Recommendations addressing the distribution of EA procedures/ evaluation results: 

• It would be useful to elaborate the presentation forms – the summary forms with the 

EA results, for different levels of decision-makers. 

• Presenting the results, it is important to make a distinction between "technicians" 

(the professional level) and others. The language and the details should be adapted 

to the targeted population. 

• CBA seems to be more suitable for national- and regional-level decision-making 

where the safety budgets are planned. CEA seems more suitable for local level, 

especially when several safety solutions are compared while tackling a specific 

safety problem. 

• In the countries where the safety budget is centralized, an EA of safety measures 

may be distributed by stating it as a necessary condition for the application to 

central budget. 

• Training of decision-markers is important to strengthen their understanding of the 

principles of EA. Training is also needed for those carrying out EA studies. 

References 



Elvik, R. (1999) Cost-benefit analysis of safety measures for vulnerable and 

inexperienced road users, Work package 5 of EU-Project PROMISING, TØI-Report 

435, Institute of Transport Economics, Oslo. 

Hauer, E. (1997). Observational Before-After Studies in Road Safety. Pergamon. 

WP3 (2004) Improvements in efficiency assessment tools. ROSEBUD. 

PAGE 260

ANNEXES 

ANNEXES 

Annex 1:Set of Questions used at the WP4 Workshop 

• Short statement of the decision-makers: What are your opinions on the case? 

• Our comments (of the team)? 

• "Interesting questions" - opinions. 

• What questions do you expect, if you take the results of this CBA to another forum? 

• What do you expect when these results are published by mass media? 

• What do you expect from a public discussion in general? 

• Is there any information missing for the further decision-making process? 

• Which will be the most critical points in further discussion - among decision-makers, 

among experts and in the public. 

Annex 2: Set of Questions used for the panel discussion during the 3 rd ROSEBUD 

Conference 

General Topic: 

• How useful is EA for decision-making? 

Concerning the method: 

• Can we exchange value of life for time savings? 

Concerning dissemination to different audiences: 

• Would you use EA and the results based on EA in your own communication with third 

parties? 

• How will the public accept EA? 

• Is EA understood as an objective instrument? 

• Which will be the most critical points in further discussion of EA results? 

Concerning the usability in practical decision making: 

• What is needed to make EA practically useful? 

• How will EA influence the decision-making process? 

• Can decision-makers be convinced by EA? 

• Will the use of EA tools improve road safety efforts? 

PAGE 261

Thematic Network

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