petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to grant ... - Election Law Blog
petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to grant ... - Election Law Blog petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to grant ... - Election Law Blog
33vote of those residing in the disfavored areashad not been effectively diluted. It would appearextraordinary to suggest that a State couldbe constitutionally permitted to enact a lawproviding that certain of the State’s voters couldvote two, five, or 10 times for their legislativerepresentatives, while voters living elsewherecould vote only once. And it is inconceivable thata state law to the effect that, in counting votesfor legislators, the votes of citizens in one partof the State would be multiplied by two, five, or10, while the votes of persons in another areawould be counted only at face value, could beconstitutionally sustainable.Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562; Morris, 489 U.S. at 698 (“[A]citizen is … shortchanged if … he may vote for onerepresentative and the voters in another district half thesize also elect one representative.”).Yet this is precisely what the Plan imposes. As notedabove, the Court indicated in Mahan that a 16.4% deviationapproached the constitutional limit, even assuming thatthe State might have a compelling interest in drawingdistricts with such wide deviations. But this case exceedsthe deviations found barely tolerable in Mahan by an orderof magnitude. If the one-person, one-vote principle hasany value, such deviations are clearly unconstitutional.In any event, even if the Plan is not per seunconstitutional, there can be no compelling stateinterest in making the votes of certain citizens worthhalf the votes of others. The only two policy goals thatthis Court has identified as possibly justifying deviations
34slightly larger than 9.9%—preservation of the integrity ofpolitical subdivisions and maintenance of compactness andcontiguity—are clearly not driving the gross disparitiespresent in this case. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182,185 (1971); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967);Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578-79. Instead, the disparities hereare the result of the City’s interpretation of its Charter’srequirement that “districts [be drawn] as nearly equalin population as possible,” Irving City Charter, art IV,§ 3(d)—irrespective of whether this measure preservesthe one-person, one-vote rights of the people who willactually be voting in the elections—and the Fifth Circuit’sChen decision, which allows such a result to occur.This Court has not hesitated to strike downapportionment plans that violate the one-person, one-voteprinciple. Supra at 5-6. Nor should it here. Reynolds andits progeny require population equalization in order tosecure the equal-protection rights of the voter. And giventhe City’s demographics of large, concentrated groupsof non-citizens, id at 9-10, CVAP is the proper metricfor making that determination. Under that standard,there can be no question that the City’s Plan is per seunconstitutional.
- Page 3 and 4: iiPARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGAND RULE
- Page 5: ivTable of ContentsPageREASONS FOR
- Page 11: xCited AuthoritiesStatutes and Othe
- Page 14 and 15: 1PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARIP
- Page 16 and 17: 3The Court should grant the petitio
- Page 18 and 19: 5has “an obligation to explain to
- Page 20 and 21: 7because the City has substantially
- Page 22 and 23: 9City of IrvingPopulation, Voting A
- Page 24 and 25: 11The district court granted summar
- Page 26 and 27: 13I. This Petition Presents An Impo
- Page 28 and 29: 15First, the issue has increasingly
- Page 30 and 31: 17wards had far more eligible voter
- Page 32 and 33: 19or practice, they cannot claim to
- Page 34 and 35: 21This case—in which the choice b
- Page 36 and 37: 23two, five, or ten, or one-half.
- Page 38 and 39: 25In Chen, the Fifth Circuit reache
- Page 40: 27Importantly, then, the Fourteenth
- Page 43 and 44: 30Tennessee voters’ dilution chal
- Page 45: 32Under the Plan, as noted above, D
- Page 49 and 50: 1aAppendix AAPPENDIX
- Page 51 and 52: 2aAppendix APER CURIAM: *This case
- Page 53 and 54: 4aAPPENDIX B — Appendix MEMORANDU
- Page 55 and 56: 6aAppendix Bpopulation numbers are
- Page 57 and 58: 8aAppendix Bwhich total population
- Page 59 and 60: 10aAppendix Bthe court does acknowl
- Page 61 and 62: 12aAppendix CON PETITION FOR REHEAR
- Page 63 and 64: 14aAppendix DIrving’s at-large el
- Page 65 and 66: 16aAppendix Dother things, the at-l
- Page 67 and 68: 18aAppendix DThornburg v. Gingles,
- Page 69 and 70: 20aAppendix Dfailed to establish a
- Page 71 and 72: 22aAppendix Dcomplying with the Gin
- Page 73 and 74: 24aAppendix Done-hundred percent co
- Page 75 and 76: 26aAppendix Dhis opinion that would
- Page 77 and 78: 28aAppendix Dto estimate the 2008 H
- Page 79 and 80: 30aAppendix Dvotes of Hispanics hav
- Page 81 and 82: 32aAppendix Daverage household size
- Page 83 and 84: 34aAppendix DDr. Rives attempts to
- Page 85 and 86: 36aAppendix Dwith sampling error ac
- Page 87 and 88: 38aAppendix DIn his expert report,
- Page 89 and 90: 40aAppendix DAs Dr. Rives pointed o
- Page 91 and 92: 42aAppendix DC. Gingles II & III-Ra
- Page 93 and 94: 44aAppendix Dthis methodology canno
- Page 95 and 96: 46aAppendix Dthat the confidence th
34slightly larger than 9.9%—preservation of <strong>the</strong> integrity ofpolitical subdivisions and maintenance of compactness andcontiguity—are clearly not driving <strong>the</strong> gross disparitiespresent in this case. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182,185 (1971); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967);Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578-79. Instead, <strong>the</strong> disparities hereare <strong>the</strong> result of <strong>the</strong> City’s interpretation of its Charter’srequirement that “districts [be drawn] as nearly equalin population as possible,” Irving City Charter, art IV,§ 3(d)—irrespective of whe<strong>the</strong>r this measure preserves<strong>the</strong> one-person, one-vote rights of <strong>the</strong> people who willactually be voting in <strong>the</strong> elections—and <strong>the</strong> Fifth Circuit’sChen decision, which allows such a result <strong>to</strong> occur.This <strong>Court</strong> has not hesitated <strong>to</strong> strike downapportionment plans that violate <strong>the</strong> one-person, one-voteprinciple. Supra at 5-6. Nor should it here. Reynolds andits progeny require population equalization in order <strong>to</strong>secure <strong>the</strong> equal-protection rights of <strong>the</strong> voter. And given<strong>the</strong> City’s demographics of large, concentrated groupsof non-citizens, id at 9-10, CVAP is <strong>the</strong> proper metricfor making that determination. Under that standard,<strong>the</strong>re can be no question that <strong>the</strong> City’s Plan is per seunconstitutional.