petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to grant ... - Election Law Blog
petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to grant ... - Election Law Blog petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to grant ... - Election Law Blog
31representatives. It was recognition of that fundamentaltenet that motivated judicial involvement in the first placein what had been called the ‘political thicket’ of legislativeapportionment.”) (citations omitted)).This Court long ago determined in Baker andReynolds that the Fourteenth Amendment includes aone-person, one-vote principle requiring States to equalizethe electoral power of each vote, and the judiciary nowhas an obligation to enforce that rule. Those seminaldecisions were subject to substantial challenge at the time.Baker, 369 U.S. at 267-330 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 589-625 (Harlan, J., dissenting).If the Court is inclined to overrule them, it should doso forthrightly, not by converting subsidiary issues intounreviewable political questions. Chen, 121 S. Ct. at 2021(Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari);Garza, 918 F.2d at 784 (Kozinski, J.). But “as long as [theCourt] sustain[s] the one-person, one-vote principle, [ithas] an obligation to explain to States and localities whatit actually means.” Chen, 121 S. Ct. at 2021 (Thomas, J.,dissenting in the denial of certiorari).B. The City’s Plan Per Se Violates The One-Person, One-Vote Principle.The resolution of the question presented is decisivein this case. If the City is required to equalize the voterpopulation, the Plan is patently unconstitutional. AsCVAP statistics demonstrate, the Plan apportions citycouncil members across voting districts in an obviouslyunequal way, as the votes of electors in District 1 carryalmost twice the weight of those in other districts. No mapwith such a massive disparity can withstand any level ofconstitutional scrutiny.
32Under the Plan, as noted above, District 1 has thelowest CVAP with only 11,231 citizens of voting age, whileDistrict 3 has a CVAP of 20,617. Supra at 9-10. Thereare, therefore, 1.83 citizens of voting age in District 3 forevery citizen of voting age in District 1. District 3 contains14.13% more citizens of voting age than the ideal district.As a result, there is a 51.96% CVAP deviation between thelargest and smallest districts under the Plan.These CVAP deviations are clearly unconstitutional.A population deviation between the largest and smallestdistricts (as a percentage of the ideal district) of 10% ormore is prima facie evidence of a one-person, one-voteviolation that triggers the State’s obligation to set fortha compelling justification for the deviation. Brown, 462at 852; see, e.g., Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 750-51 (concludingthat a 7.83% deviation was permissible); White, 412 U.S.at 763 (1973) (permitting a maximum deviation of 9.9%).But, importantly, if the population discrepancy is largeenough, the plan is per se unconstitutional. Mahan, 410U.S. at 329 (concluding that a 16.4% discrepancy “maywell approach tolerable limits” the Court was willing toaccept irrespective of the State’s justification).There can be no doubt that the Plan’s deviation of51.96%, in which the votes of electors in one district carryalmost twice the weight of voters in another district is perse unconstitutional:[I]f a State should provide that the votes ofcitizens in one part of the State should be giventwo times, or five times, or 10 times the weightof votes of citizens in another part of the State,it could hardly be contended that the right to
- Page 3 and 4: iiPARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGAND RULE
- Page 5: ivTable of ContentsPageREASONS FOR
- Page 11: xCited AuthoritiesStatutes and Othe
- Page 14 and 15: 1PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARIP
- Page 16 and 17: 3The Court should grant the petitio
- Page 18 and 19: 5has “an obligation to explain to
- Page 20 and 21: 7because the City has substantially
- Page 22 and 23: 9City of IrvingPopulation, Voting A
- Page 24 and 25: 11The district court granted summar
- Page 26 and 27: 13I. This Petition Presents An Impo
- Page 28 and 29: 15First, the issue has increasingly
- Page 30 and 31: 17wards had far more eligible voter
- Page 32 and 33: 19or practice, they cannot claim to
- Page 34 and 35: 21This case—in which the choice b
- Page 36 and 37: 23two, five, or ten, or one-half.
- Page 38 and 39: 25In Chen, the Fifth Circuit reache
- Page 40: 27Importantly, then, the Fourteenth
- Page 43: 30Tennessee voters’ dilution chal
- Page 47 and 48: 34slightly larger than 9.9%—prese
- Page 49 and 50: 1aAppendix AAPPENDIX
- Page 51 and 52: 2aAppendix APER CURIAM: *This case
- Page 53 and 54: 4aAPPENDIX B — Appendix MEMORANDU
- Page 55 and 56: 6aAppendix Bpopulation numbers are
- Page 57 and 58: 8aAppendix Bwhich total population
- Page 59 and 60: 10aAppendix Bthe court does acknowl
- Page 61 and 62: 12aAppendix CON PETITION FOR REHEAR
- Page 63 and 64: 14aAppendix DIrving’s at-large el
- Page 65 and 66: 16aAppendix Dother things, the at-l
- Page 67 and 68: 18aAppendix DThornburg v. Gingles,
- Page 69 and 70: 20aAppendix Dfailed to establish a
- Page 71 and 72: 22aAppendix Dcomplying with the Gin
- Page 73 and 74: 24aAppendix Done-hundred percent co
- Page 75 and 76: 26aAppendix Dhis opinion that would
- Page 77 and 78: 28aAppendix Dto estimate the 2008 H
- Page 79 and 80: 30aAppendix Dvotes of Hispanics hav
- Page 81 and 82: 32aAppendix Daverage household size
- Page 83 and 84: 34aAppendix DDr. Rives attempts to
- Page 85 and 86: 36aAppendix Dwith sampling error ac
- Page 87 and 88: 38aAppendix DIn his expert report,
- Page 89 and 90: 40aAppendix DAs Dr. Rives pointed o
- Page 91 and 92: 42aAppendix DC. Gingles II & III-Ra
- Page 93 and 94: 44aAppendix Dthis methodology canno
32Under <strong>the</strong> Plan, as noted above, District 1 has <strong>the</strong>lowest CVAP with only 11,231 citizens of voting age, whileDistrict 3 has a CVAP of 20,617. Supra at 9-10. Thereare, <strong>the</strong>refore, 1.83 citizens of voting age in District 3 forevery citizen of voting age in District 1. District 3 contains14.13% more citizens of voting age than <strong>the</strong> ideal district.As a result, <strong>the</strong>re is a 51.96% CVAP deviation between <strong>the</strong>largest and smallest districts under <strong>the</strong> Plan.These CVAP deviations are clearly unconstitutional.A population deviation between <strong>the</strong> largest and smallestdistricts (as a percentage of <strong>the</strong> ideal district) of 10% ormore is prima facie evidence of a one-person, one-voteviolation that triggers <strong>the</strong> State’s obligation <strong>to</strong> set fortha compelling justification for <strong>the</strong> deviation. Brown, 462at 852; see, e.g., Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 750-51 (concludingthat a 7.83% deviation was permissible); White, 412 U.S.at 763 (1973) (permitting a maximum deviation of 9.9%).But, importantly, if <strong>the</strong> population discrepancy is largeenough, <strong>the</strong> plan is per se unconstitutional. Mahan, 410U.S. at 329 (concluding that a 16.4% discrepancy “maywell approach <strong>to</strong>lerable limits” <strong>the</strong> <strong>Court</strong> was willing <strong>to</strong>accept irrespective of <strong>the</strong> State’s justification).There can be no doubt that <strong>the</strong> Plan’s deviation of51.96%, in which <strong>the</strong> votes of elec<strong>to</strong>rs in one district carryalmost twice <strong>the</strong> weight of voters in ano<strong>the</strong>r district is perse unconstitutional:[I]f a State should provide that <strong>the</strong> votes ofcitizens in one part of <strong>the</strong> State should be giventwo times, or five times, or 10 times <strong>the</strong> weigh<strong>to</strong>f votes of citizens in ano<strong>the</strong>r part of <strong>the</strong> State,it could hardly be contended that <strong>the</strong> right <strong>to</strong>
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