petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to grant ... - Election Law Blog

petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to grant ... - Election Law Blog petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to grant ... - Election Law Blog

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10.07.2015 Views

13I. This Petition Presents An Important Question ThatHas Divided The Circuits And That This CourtShould Settle.A. Whether States And Local Districts MustBe Drawn Based On Voter Population Is ANationally Important Question.The United States has acknowledged that this caseraises “important questions regarding the appropriatepopulation standard a locality should use when drawingits election districts in compliance with the EqualProtection Clause principles established in Reynolds v.Sims.” Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States at 3(May 23, 2011). 4 And for good reason. The right to vote isfundamental. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).“Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the rightto vote is undermined.” Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,17 (1964). A citizen thus “has a constitutionally protectedright to participate in elections on an equal basis withother citizens in the jurisdiction.” Dunn v. Blumstein,405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,380 (1963) (“The idea that every voter is equal to everyother voter in his State, when he casts his ballot in favorof one of several competing candidates, underlies manyof our decisions.”).Under controlling precedent, this equal-protectionright guarantees more than ballot access. It also includesa one-person, one-vote principle that ensures that the vote4. The United States participates as an amicus in the courtsof appeals only at the authorization of the Solicitor General,28 C.F.R. § 0.20(c), and only in cases of great national importance.

14of any one voter once cast is accorded equal weight relativeto every other voter. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 557-58. “Withrespect to the allocation of legislative representation, allvoters, as citizens of a State, stand in the same relationregardless of where they live.” Id. at 565. “Simplystated, an individual’s right to vote for state legislatorsis unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in asubstantial fashion diluted when compared with votes ofcitizens living [in] other parts of the State.” Id. at 568. Inshort, “the weight of a citizen’s vote cannot be made todepend on where he lives.” Id. at 567.But the Court has not yet decided “what measure ofpopulation should be used for determining whether thepopulation is equally distributed among the districts.”Chen, 121 S. Ct. at 2021 (Thomas, J., dissenting fromdenial of certiorari). By not deciding the issue, the Courthas “left a critical variable in the requirement undefined.”Id. Indeed, “[t]he one-person, one-vote principle may, inthe end, be of little consequence if [the Court] decide[s]that each jurisdiction can choose its own measure ofpopulation. But as long as [the Court] sustain[s] theone-person, one-vote principle, [it has] an obligation toexplain to States and localities what it actually means.”Id. For several reasons, the question is too important toremain undecided any longer. See Robert W. Bennett,Should Parents Be Given Extra Votes On Account ofTheir Children?, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503, 516 (2000) (“Canit really be that equally populated districts are importantin constitutional terms, but that the inclusion or exclusionfrom the count of population groups that may approach,or conceivably even exceed, half the total in some districtsis of no constitutional moment?”).

14of any one voter once cast is accorded equal weight relative<strong>to</strong> every o<strong>the</strong>r voter. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 557-58. “Withrespect <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> allocation of legislative representation, allvoters, as citizens of a State, stand in <strong>the</strong> same relationregardless of where <strong>the</strong>y live.” Id. at 565. “Simplystated, an individual’s right <strong>to</strong> vote for state legisla<strong>to</strong>rsis unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in asubstantial fashion diluted when compared with votes ofcitizens living [in] o<strong>the</strong>r parts of <strong>the</strong> State.” Id. at 568. Inshort, “<strong>the</strong> weight of a citizen’s vote cannot be made <strong>to</strong>depend on where he lives.” Id. at 567.But <strong>the</strong> <strong>Court</strong> has not yet decided “what measure ofpopulation should be used for determining whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>population is equally distributed among <strong>the</strong> districts.”Chen, 121 S. Ct. at 2021 (Thomas, J., dissenting fromdenial of certiorari). By not deciding <strong>the</strong> issue, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Court</strong>has “left a critical variable in <strong>the</strong> requirement undefined.”Id. Indeed, “[t]he one-person, one-vote principle may, in<strong>the</strong> end, be of little consequence if [<strong>the</strong> <strong>Court</strong>] decide[s]that each jurisdiction can choose its own measure ofpopulation. But as long as [<strong>the</strong> <strong>Court</strong>] sustain[s] <strong>the</strong>one-person, one-vote principle, [it has] an obligation <strong>to</strong>explain <strong>to</strong> States and localities what it actually means.”Id. For several reasons, <strong>the</strong> question is <strong>to</strong>o important <strong>to</strong>remain undecided any longer. See Robert W. Bennett,Should Parents Be Given Extra Votes On Account ofTheir Children?, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503, 516 (2000) (“Canit really be that equally populated districts are importantin constitutional terms, but that <strong>the</strong> inclusion or exclusionfrom <strong>the</strong> count of population groups that may approach,or conceivably even exceed, half <strong>the</strong> <strong>to</strong>tal in some districtsis of no constitutional moment?”).

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