petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to grant ... - Election Law Blog
petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to grant ... - Election Law Blog petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to grant ... - Election Law Blog
5has “an obligation to explain to States and localities whatit actually means.” Chen, 121 S. Ct. at 2021 (Thomas, J.,dissenting from the denial of certiorari).In filing an amicus brief and seeking argument timein the court of appeals, the United States argued thatthis case raises “important questions regarding theappropriate population standard a locality should usewhen drawing its election districts in compliance withthe Equal Protection Clause principles established inReynolds v. Sims.” Amicus Curiae Brief of the UnitedStates at 3 (May 23, 2011). The United States was correct.The Court should grant the Petition.STATEMENT OF THE CASEA. The One-Person, One-Vote Principle of theFourteenth Amendment.This Court has long held that the Equal ProtectionClause includes a one-person, one-vote principle underwhich “all who participate in [an] election are to havean equal vote—whatever their race, whatever their sex,whatever their occupation, w hatever their income, andwherever their home may be in that geographical unit.”Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 557-58 (citations and quotationsomitted); see also Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro.Kansas City, Mo., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970) (explaining thatthe Equal Protection Clause “requires that each qualifiedvoter must be given an equal opportunity to participatein that election”). Put simply, the one-person, one-voteprinciple guarantees an equal vote to all electors. SeeReynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
6Thus, “w hen members of an elected body are chosenfrom separate districts, each district must be establishedon a basis that will insure, as far as is practicable, thatequal numbers of voters can vote for proportionally equalnumbers of officials.” Hadley, 397 U.S. at 56; Reynolds,377 U.S. at 568. Although the Equal Protection Clausedoes not require that the population of each district beabsolutely equal, Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842(1983), it does forbid “substantial variation” from thisconstitutional norm, Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S.474, 485 (1968). A population deviation between the largestand smallest districts of 10% or more is prima facieevidence of a one-person, one-vote violation triggering thegovernment’s duty to set forth a compelling justification forthe deviation. Brown, 462 U.S. at 852; White v. Regester,412 U.S. 755, 763 (1973); Mahan, 410 U.S. at 329. And apopulation deviation large enough can be deemed per seunconstitutional. Id. at 329.B. Section 2 Litigation Over The Electoral SystemOf Irving, TexasIn 2007, Manuel A. Benavidez, a Hispanic citizen andresident sued the City, its mayor, and city council memberschallenging the City’s electoral system as invalid underSection 2 of the VRA. See App. 13a-14a. The challengedelectoral system provided that voters would choose theeight city council members and mayor through at-largeelections. 1 In his complaint, Benavidez alleged that1. Under the at-large system, “[e]very City Council candidate[ran] for a particular numbered position, designated as Places 1 to8. Irving [was] divided into five districts, and candidates for Places1 to 5 [needed to] reside in their respective district. Candidates formayor and for Places 6 to 8 [needed to] reside in Irving, but they[were] not required to reside in any particular district.” App. 15a.
- Page 3 and 4: iiPARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGAND RULE
- Page 5: ivTable of ContentsPageREASONS FOR
- Page 11: xCited AuthoritiesStatutes and Othe
- Page 14 and 15: 1PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARIP
- Page 16 and 17: 3The Court should grant the petitio
- Page 20 and 21: 7because the City has substantially
- Page 22 and 23: 9City of IrvingPopulation, Voting A
- Page 24 and 25: 11The district court granted summar
- Page 26 and 27: 13I. This Petition Presents An Impo
- Page 28 and 29: 15First, the issue has increasingly
- Page 30 and 31: 17wards had far more eligible voter
- Page 32 and 33: 19or practice, they cannot claim to
- Page 34 and 35: 21This case—in which the choice b
- Page 36 and 37: 23two, five, or ten, or one-half.
- Page 38 and 39: 25In Chen, the Fifth Circuit reache
- Page 40: 27Importantly, then, the Fourteenth
- Page 43 and 44: 30Tennessee voters’ dilution chal
- Page 45 and 46: 32Under the Plan, as noted above, D
- Page 47 and 48: 34slightly larger than 9.9%—prese
- Page 49 and 50: 1aAppendix AAPPENDIX
- Page 51 and 52: 2aAppendix APER CURIAM: *This case
- Page 53 and 54: 4aAPPENDIX B — Appendix MEMORANDU
- Page 55 and 56: 6aAppendix Bpopulation numbers are
- Page 57 and 58: 8aAppendix Bwhich total population
- Page 59 and 60: 10aAppendix Bthe court does acknowl
- Page 61 and 62: 12aAppendix CON PETITION FOR REHEAR
- Page 63 and 64: 14aAppendix DIrving’s at-large el
- Page 65 and 66: 16aAppendix Dother things, the at-l
- Page 67 and 68: 18aAppendix DThornburg v. Gingles,
5has “an obligation <strong>to</strong> explain <strong>to</strong> States and localities whatit actually means.” Chen, 121 S. Ct. at 2021 (Thomas, J.,dissenting from <strong>the</strong> denial of certiorari).In filing an amicus brief and seeking argument timein <strong>the</strong> court of appeals, <strong>the</strong> United States argued thatthis case raises “important questions regarding <strong>the</strong>appropriate population standard a locality should usewhen drawing its election districts in compliance with<strong>the</strong> Equal Protection Clause principles established inReynolds v. Sims.” Amicus Curiae Brief of <strong>the</strong> UnitedStates at 3 (May 23, 2011). The United States was correct.The <strong>Court</strong> should <strong>grant</strong> <strong>the</strong> Petition.STATEMENT OF THE CASEA. The One-Person, One-Vote Principle of <strong>the</strong>Fourteenth Amendment.This <strong>Court</strong> has long held that <strong>the</strong> Equal ProtectionClause includes a one-person, one-vote principle underwhich “all who participate in [an] election are <strong>to</strong> havean equal vote—whatever <strong>the</strong>ir race, whatever <strong>the</strong>ir sex,whatever <strong>the</strong>ir occupation, w hatever <strong>the</strong>ir income, andwherever <strong>the</strong>ir home may be in that geographical unit.”Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 557-58 (citations and quotationsomitted); see also Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro.Kansas City, Mo., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970) (explaining that<strong>the</strong> Equal Protection Clause “requires that each qualifiedvoter must be given an equal opportunity <strong>to</strong> participatein that election”). Put simply, <strong>the</strong> one-person, one-voteprinciple guarantees an equal vote <strong>to</strong> all elec<strong>to</strong>rs. SeeReynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
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