Untitled - socium.ge
Untitled - socium.ge Untitled - socium.ge
Afterword 435any historian wants to contribute to clarifying such a central problem. The driveto be relevant is especially strong in a self-proclaimed “technological age.”When the past, present, and future of technology is the subject of so much popularand semi-popular speculation, the “so what” question keeps poking historiansof technology in the ribs, so to speak. We feel that we should have somethingspecial to say to our own times, and complain when we are not listened to. 1In wanting to demonstrate generalizability and relevance, however, weconfront an inner conflict. On the one hand, we feel a sense of civic responsibilityto remind our readers that history matters, that the present world isrooted in past worlds, and that past experience offers some useful analogiesand lessons for the present. Since the eruption of whole new species of technologies– computers, networks, the web, biotechnology – is well within thehistorical lifespan of most readers, for historians it is an almost automaticprofessional reflex to write that there is a longer story here, that these thingsdid not appear just yesterday, that purposes of the past have shaped the present.On the other hand, we feel a sense of scholarly responsibility to remind ourreaders that “the past is a foreign country,” that the world today is very differentfrom that of the past, and that analogies and lessons are always highlylimited. The past is present and it is also past.These conflicting responses and responsibilities are what make history suchan interesting profession. History itself is a trading zone between past andpresent. History establishes communication between storytellers and actors,between what happened and what is remembered, between the dead and theliving. The subject matter of history is by definition weighted toward those whohave come before us, their deeds and actions and agendas. By writing history,the living try to push off some of the dead weight of the past, giving themselvesa little breathing room, protesting that they are not doomed to carry on with thepast because it was so very different. If tyranny breeds resistance (Castells’s firstlaw), the tyranny of the dead is no exception (Harrison, 2003).On the other hand, if resistance to the past is too extreme, it leads to thefallacy of “presentism,” in which the reality of the past (not to mention that ofdeath) is denied. Presentism can take several forms. In today’s most commonplaceversion, the past is simply ignored: the present is taken as it appears, as aself-contained reality, as if there were no past realities that have shaped it.Another version connects past with present, but in the manner of what in thehistorical trade is called “Whig history”: constructing the record of the past as atrack to the present, a narrative of events leading to the triumph of whatever isdeemed most commendable today. So, for example, among the Whig politiciansof nineteenth-century England, history was a record of the gradual emergence ofdemocratic, liberal politics, as defined by the then-current principles of the Whigparty. In current versions, technology stands in for the Whig party. The “informationsociety” is the apogee of the continuum from nomadic to agricultural to
436 Rosalind Williamsindustrial societies, so that human history is then the record of “the long marchof progress under the guidance of reason” (p. 42). Similarly, the “networksociety” is hailed as the climax of inevitable technological progress towardmore ubiquitous, more rapid, more portable, more miniaturized, more powerfulcommunication.Another version of presentism, already alluded to, involves taking the categoriesand concerns of the present, shaking (or stirring) them with history, andadding the dimension of time to inquire into their origins. This is an obvioustemptation in dealing with the concept of “network society.” As Castells hascautioned, this concept, as he uses it, cannot be freely floated through thewaves of history to far and distant shores. It relates to a specific technologicalparadigm, based on microelectronics; a specific type of technological system,that of linked computers; a specific form of globalization, acting in real time;and other very specific types of information, employment, and other socialbehaviors. So it is quite possible and helpful to look back, as Castells does, onthe emergence of contemporary network society in the unanticipated confluenceof three originally independent processes: “the crisis of industrialism, therise of freedom-oriented social movements, and the revolution in informationand communication technologies” (p. 22). But once one moves further back intime, very quickly the gap between the concept of a network society and thespecifics of networks in that historical situation grows ever wider.One can readily see this gap, for example, in the standard work on electricalnetworks in the early twentieth century – Thomas P. Hughes’s classicNetworks of Power (1983) – where both the specific content of the networksystem and the context in which it operated are markedly different from thatof contemporary computer systems. If one looks back even further – at theRoman Empire, for example – to ask how it might be analyzed as a “networksociety,” the mismatch becomes even more striking. If the network iscomposed of roads and aqueducts, and the labor force is based on slavery, andthe social goals are focused on the maintenance and extension of imperialpower, this is an entirely different “network society” from the one based on thedevelopment of computer networks in a job-holding, market-oriented economy.Concepts, too, have a history, and when one from the present is anachronisticallyimposed on the particularities of the past, the effort to generalize canquickly become absurd.That is why historians of technology have to be particularly careful. Wehave been outspoken in rejecting the types of presentism that would deny thevery reality of the past or read the historical record as the grand narrative oftechnological progress. However, in our very self-definition, we are indulgingin presentism of the last sort, by applying the concept of “technology” to thepast, especially the distant past. In this respect, the history of technology is onegrand exercise in anachronism.
- Page 407 and 408: 386 Imma Tubellacultural and sociol
- Page 409 and 410: 388 Imma Tubellaand through symboli
- Page 411 and 412: 390 Imma TubellaStates. During the
- Page 413 and 414: 392 Imma TubellaIn Galicia, autonom
- Page 415 and 416: 394 Imma Tubellarooms, including fi
- Page 417 and 418: 396 Imma Tubellaunderstand the choi
- Page 419 and 420: 398 Imma Tubellainteraction which i
- Page 421 and 422: 400 Imma TubellaFerguson, M. (1995)
- Page 423 and 424: 18. Globalization, identity, and te
- Page 425 and 426: 404 Anshu ChatterjeeIndian entrepre
- Page 427 and 428: 406 Anshu ChatterjeeThese enterpris
- Page 429 and 430: 408 Anshu Chatterjeerestricted area
- Page 431 and 432: 410 Anshu Chatterjeepenetration rat
- Page 433 and 434: 412 Anshu Chatterjeeproduced instit
- Page 435 and 436: 414 Anshu ChatterjeePunjabi TV face
- Page 437 and 438: 416 Anshu Chatterjeedecisions. The
- Page 439 and 440: 418 Anshu ChatterjeeNOTES1. For mor
- Page 441 and 442: 19. The hacker ethic as the culture
- Page 443 and 444: 422 Pekka Himanenthe informational
- Page 445 and 446: 424 Pekka Himanenone of the founder
- Page 447 and 448: 426 Pekka Himanena work culture in
- Page 449 and 450: 428 Pekka Himanenhype in which the
- Page 451 and 452: 430 Pekka HimanenWithout renewing t
- Page 453 and 454: Afterword: an historian’s view on
- Page 455: 434 Rosalind Williamsdoes it mean t
- Page 459 and 460: 438 Rosalind Williamsgovernance str
- Page 461 and 462: 440 Rosalind Williamsspeech deliver
- Page 463 and 464: 442 Rosalind Williamsincarnates as
- Page 465 and 466: 444 Rosalind Williamsexponentially
- Page 467 and 468: 446 Rosalind Williamsmultiplicity o
- Page 469 and 470: 448 Rosalind WilliamsArendt, Hannah
- Page 471 and 472: 450 IndexCalifornia, University of:
- Page 473 and 474: 452 IndexDetroit Area Study 249, 25
- Page 475 and 476: 454 IndexGore, Al 99Gould, Stephen
- Page 477 and 478: 456 Indexencryption 71, 76gender ga
- Page 479 and 480: 458 IndexMTV 403, 415MTV India 406M
- Page 481 and 482: 460 IndexRambler 95Raymond, Eric 35
- Page 483 and 484: 462 Indexstatism 15, 17-18, 22, 84,
- Page 485: 464 IndexYahoo! 55, 59, 61Yang, Jer
Afterword 435any historian wants to contribute to clarifying such a central problem. The driveto be relevant is especially strong in a self-proclaimed “technological a<strong>ge</strong>.”When the past, present, and future of technology is the subject of so much popularand semi-popular speculation, the “so what” question keeps poking historiansof technology in the ribs, so to speak. We feel that we should have somethingspecial to say to our own times, and complain when we are not listened to. 1In wanting to demonstrate <strong>ge</strong>neralizability and relevance, however, weconfront an inner conflict. On the one hand, we feel a sense of civic responsibilityto remind our readers that history matters, that the present world isrooted in past worlds, and that past experience offers some useful analogiesand lessons for the present. Since the eruption of whole new species of technologies– computers, networks, the web, biotechnology – is well within thehistorical lifespan of most readers, for historians it is an almost automaticprofessional reflex to write that there is a lon<strong>ge</strong>r story here, that these thingsdid not appear just yesterday, that purposes of the past have shaped the present.On the other hand, we feel a sense of scholarly responsibility to remind ourreaders that “the past is a foreign country,” that the world today is very differentfrom that of the past, and that analogies and lessons are always highlylimited. The past is present and it is also past.These conflicting responses and responsibilities are what make history suchan interesting profession. History itself is a trading zone between past andpresent. History establishes communication between storytellers and actors,between what happened and what is remembered, between the dead and theliving. The subject matter of history is by definition weighted toward those whohave come before us, their deeds and actions and a<strong>ge</strong>ndas. By writing history,the living try to push off some of the dead weight of the past, giving themselvesa little breathing room, protesting that they are not doomed to carry on with thepast because it was so very different. If tyranny breeds resistance (Castells’s firstlaw), the tyranny of the dead is no exception (Harrison, 2003).On the other hand, if resistance to the past is too extreme, it leads to thefallacy of “presentism,” in which the reality of the past (not to mention that ofdeath) is denied. Presentism can take several forms. In today’s most commonplaceversion, the past is simply ignored: the present is taken as it appears, as aself-contained reality, as if there were no past realities that have shaped it.Another version connects past with present, but in the manner of what in thehistorical trade is called “Whig history”: constructing the record of the past as atrack to the present, a narrative of events leading to the triumph of whatever isdeemed most commendable today. So, for example, among the Whig politiciansof nineteenth-century England, history was a record of the gradual emer<strong>ge</strong>nce ofdemocratic, liberal politics, as defined by the then-current principles of the Whigparty. In current versions, technology stands in for the Whig party. The “informationsociety” is the apo<strong>ge</strong>e of the continuum from nomadic to agricultural to