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Community mediation in multicultural India 403and caused the national media to decentralize along community lines, shiftingfrom a long-standing national policy of control. Ironically, the decentralizationoccurred at a time when nationalism occupied crucial space in the media dueto the mobilization strategies of the Hindu nationalist party. Media enterprises,including external players, responded to this in various forms, illustrating acontinued association between media activities and the domestic setting.The television sector in India is studied utilizing an institutional analysisthat places the media within the context of the social and political frameworkof democracy and its institutions. 1 As an embedded institution, the mediareflect the dominant norms and trends in society. The media may also play animportant role in providing space for communicative action among communitymembers. According to Jürgen Habermas (1996: 360–3), the publicsphere provided by the media serves as a link between institutions seeking toaddress social and political issues. Although Habermas does not address representationalinequalities in the public sphere, an historical consideration ofcommunities, their popular movements, and the political institutions thatimpress upon production and distribution may help delineate the asymmetry inrepresentation. Furthermore, the recent use by transnational media of selecteddomestic symbols and themes in framing programs also underscores the needto study institutions that emphasize selected symbols.A discussion of dominance requires us to approach these new televisionnetworks from the reception aspect as well. The processes of communication,as several scholars illustrate, do not flow in one direction. John Thompson(1999) argues that there is a structured break between production and reception,which allows spectators to determine messages in their own context.Although the relationship is not equal, the audience brings specific preferencesto the viewing setting (see Hall, 1980; Morley, 1980). An examination of thepolitical relationships at the reception setting delineates these preferences.LIBERALIZING INDIAN TELEVISIONIn 1991, restructuring processes initiated by the Indian state deregulated thestate-dominated television sector. The entry of the foreign media into theregion instituted a transformative decade. CNN and Star TV, initially ownedby Hutchinson-Wampoa of Hong Kong, and later by Rupert Murdoch’s NewsCorporation, began their transmission immediately after the announcement ofexpected reform. In 1992, Star TV included BBC and MTV segments whichtargeted English speakers in the Asian sub-continent. In 1995, SonyEntertainment entered the region using Hindi-only programs. During thisphase of transnational expansion, the Indian government made no seriousattempt to re-regulate this media space.
404 Anshu ChatterjeeIndian entrepreneurs located across the nation also received a tremendousboost in the reform-oriented environment, gaining access to external sourcesthat enabled them to broadcast into their own communities. Previous restrictionssurrounding the television industry had barred local entrepreneurs fromthe television sector. The lowered cost of access to new technologies at theglobal level, combined with regional expertise and associations, providedthese enterprises with an unexpected advantage. Within a decade of the deregulatorymoves, the Indian television sector consisted of 40–50 new playersaffiliated with a diversity of channels directed at community audiences. In1990, 27 million households in the country had television. By comparison, in2001, over 60 million households, comprising more than 31 percent of thecountry’s one billion residents, contained televisions sets. 2In comparison to other developing nations, the expansion of commercialtelevision in India occurred among the nation’s multiple cultural communities,challenging the larger players seeking a national audience. Historically, thestate-owned Doordarshan controlled this space, transmitting mainly Hindi andEnglish programs despite the nation’s language diversity. Although,Doordarshan’s reach extended across the nation by 1990, no clear receptionfigures exist. However, only 42 percent of Indians are Hindi speakers. Over106 language communities reside in India, of which twenty retain the officialstatus of a national language. Reception among these communities remainedlimited.From Doordarshan’s inception in 1959, the state had utilized television topromote selected developmental, social, and political objectives. In 1983,Rajiv Gandhi’s reform-oriented administration extended Doordarshan’s entertainmentsegment to include programs with a possible national appeal. Newcultural programs, such as Hindu mythology programs, gained an immediateviewership. Some scholars detect a link between the appearance of Hindumythology programs and Rajiv Gandhi’s attempts at mobilizing the Hinduvote (Rajagopal, 2001; see also Mitra, 1993). They argue that the increasingpopularity of the Hindu Nationalists, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in thenorthern and western parts of the nation caused Rajiv Gandhi to introduce religiousprograms into state television which had previously followed a secularpolicy.However, the proliferation of religious programs in the 1980s may be betterunderstood in the light of the state’s new commercial agenda. India consists of83 percent Hindus. Under Rajiv Gandhi, the objectives of the national mediadeveloped under the Nehruvian state confronted the new commercial objectivesthat responded to popular preferences. In addition, no apparent links existbetween audience programming preferences and their political choices. RajivGandhi lost the following 1989 elections and, although the Hindu mythologyprograms continued to be popular across the country, the BJP’s vote base
- Page 373 and 374: 352 Jeffrey S. JurisVisibly impassi
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- Page 404: PART VIIThe culture of the network
- Page 407 and 408: 386 Imma Tubellacultural and sociol
- Page 409 and 410: 388 Imma Tubellaand through symboli
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- Page 417 and 418: 396 Imma Tubellaunderstand the choi
- Page 419 and 420: 398 Imma Tubellainteraction which i
- Page 421 and 422: 400 Imma TubellaFerguson, M. (1995)
- Page 423: 18. Globalization, identity, and te
- Page 427 and 428: 406 Anshu ChatterjeeThese enterpris
- Page 429 and 430: 408 Anshu Chatterjeerestricted area
- Page 431 and 432: 410 Anshu Chatterjeepenetration rat
- Page 433 and 434: 412 Anshu Chatterjeeproduced instit
- Page 435 and 436: 414 Anshu ChatterjeePunjabi TV face
- Page 437 and 438: 416 Anshu Chatterjeedecisions. The
- Page 439 and 440: 418 Anshu ChatterjeeNOTES1. For mor
- Page 441 and 442: 19. The hacker ethic as the culture
- Page 443 and 444: 422 Pekka Himanenthe informational
- Page 445 and 446: 424 Pekka Himanenone of the founder
- Page 447 and 448: 426 Pekka Himanena work culture in
- Page 449 and 450: 428 Pekka Himanenhype in which the
- Page 451 and 452: 430 Pekka HimanenWithout renewing t
- Page 453 and 454: Afterword: an historian’s view on
- Page 455 and 456: 434 Rosalind Williamsdoes it mean t
- Page 457 and 458: 436 Rosalind Williamsindustrial soc
- Page 459 and 460: 438 Rosalind Williamsgovernance str
- Page 461 and 462: 440 Rosalind Williamsspeech deliver
- Page 463 and 464: 442 Rosalind Williamsincarnates as
- Page 465 and 466: 444 Rosalind Williamsexponentially
- Page 467 and 468: 446 Rosalind Williamsmultiplicity o
- Page 469 and 470: 448 Rosalind WilliamsArendt, Hannah
- Page 471 and 472: 450 IndexCalifornia, University of:
- Page 473 and 474: 452 IndexDetroit Area Study 249, 25
Community mediation in multicultural India 403and caused the national media to decentralize along community lines, shiftingfrom a long-standing national policy of control. Ironically, the decentralizationoccurred at a time when nationalism occupied crucial space in the media dueto the mobilization strategies of the Hindu nationalist party. Media enterprises,including external players, responded to this in various forms, illustrating acontinued association between media activities and the domestic setting.The television sector in India is studied utilizing an institutional analysisthat places the media within the context of the social and political frameworkof democracy and its institutions. 1 As an embedded institution, the mediareflect the dominant norms and trends in society. The media may also play animportant role in providing space for communicative action among communitymembers. According to Jür<strong>ge</strong>n Habermas (1996: 360–3), the publicsphere provided by the media serves as a link between institutions seeking toaddress social and political issues. Although Habermas does not address representationalinequalities in the public sphere, an historical consideration ofcommunities, their popular movements, and the political institutions thatimpress upon production and distribution may help delineate the asymmetry inrepresentation. Furthermore, the recent use by transnational media of selecteddomestic symbols and themes in framing programs also underscores the needto study institutions that emphasize selected symbols.A discussion of dominance requires us to approach these new televisionnetworks from the reception aspect as well. The processes of communication,as several scholars illustrate, do not flow in one direction. John Thompson(1999) argues that there is a structured break between production and reception,which allows spectators to determine messa<strong>ge</strong>s in their own context.Although the relationship is not equal, the audience brings specific preferencesto the viewing setting (see Hall, 1980; Morley, 1980). An examination of thepolitical relationships at the reception setting delineates these preferences.LIBERALIZING INDIAN TELEVISIONIn 1991, restructuring processes initiated by the Indian state deregulated thestate-dominated television sector. The entry of the foreign media into theregion instituted a transformative decade. CNN and Star TV, initially ownedby Hutchinson-Wampoa of Hong Kong, and later by Rupert Murdoch’s NewsCorporation, began their transmission immediately after the announcement ofexpected reform. In 1992, Star TV included BBC and MTV segments whichtar<strong>ge</strong>ted English speakers in the Asian sub-continent. In 1995, SonyEntertainment entered the region using Hindi-only programs. During thisphase of transnational expansion, the Indian government made no seriousattempt to re-regulate this media space.