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Television, the Internet, and identity 389COMMUNICATION AND CULTURAL IDENTITY: AN OLDDEBATEThompson (1995) examines the beginning of the globalization of communicationby focusing on three key developments of the late nineteeth and earlytwentieth centuries: the development of underwater cable systems by theEuropean imperial powers; the establishment of international news agenciesand their division of the world; and the formation of international organizationsconcerned with the allocation of the electromagnetic spectrum. I wouldadd a fourth development: the speed of information and communication technologiesand the birth of the Internet during the 1960s.In the 1970s, concern about cultural imperialism underpinned a growingperception across the Third World of imbalances in international news reportingand worldwide media flows. In 1977, UNESCO sponsored an internationalcommission for the study of communication problems known as the McBrideCommission after its chairman, the Irishman Sean McBride. The Commissionspent two years examining questions about the communication gap betweenthe developed and the developing worlds. Concern that most countries in thedeveloping world were merely passive receivers of news and fiction from thedeveloped world inspired calls for the creation of a “new more just and moreefficient world information and communication order” known as NWICO. Infact, the demand for a new international economic order and the quest for anew world information and communication order of the 1970s have beentransformed into a new global economic competitiveness. Since the McBrideReport, both the world and the communication flows have changed. In LatinAmerica, Brazil and Mexico have built strong audiovisual industries and havebecome successful exporters of media products (specially soap operas), butthey still import an average of more than 30 percent of their broadcasts fromthe United States. 1The 1993 North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between theUnited States, Canada, and Mexico worried Mexican identity scholars becauseof the cultural impact of a free trading zone. Moreover, controversy aboutwhether to include audiovisual products in the GATT Treaty indicates thatvariants of arguments about cultural imperialism have continued to be putforward. These arguments have been displaced by the notion of globalizationand a recognition that the concept of globalization suggests interconnectionand interdependency and that it is not exactly a synonym for imperialism.Neither does globalization mean universalism.It is interesting to observe that European intellectuals and politicians usedthe same discourse of dependency deployed and used by Latin American intellectualsin the 1970s during the concluding phase of the GATT negotiation in1993, trying to protect European audiovisual production from the United
390 Imma TubellaStates. During the concluding phase of the GATT negotiations, the EuropeanUnion insisted upon a cultural exception for audiovisual products, refusing toconsider them just as any other commercial product or to accept that globalizationmust mean Americanization.The problem is that these debates were based on the primacy of the sovereigntyof the state. A French minister wrote at this time that if he had torenounce being French or being European he would prefer to renounce beingEuropean. It has been a typical French problem: imposing a quota of Frenchproduction to protect French identity and, at the same time, rejecting suchcultural identities as Corsican, Catalan, or Basque. Another example is that,although the French state forbids the use of anglicisms in the mass media,people include them in their everyday language; for instance, the use of “Bye”is general.So far, in the field of media and culture, the dependency model hasconcluded that the communication interests of the United States conditionedcommunication systems and that the result has been destructive to culturalidentities. The cultural imperialism argument holds that imported media products(usually from the United States) contain ideas that will lead to the declineof traditional lifestyles and values: “By importing a product we are alsoimporting the cultural forms of that society” (Mattelart et al., 1984). Thecontention that imported cultural forms will weaken a country’s sense of itselfand erode national identity has not been unique to Latin America. France hasbeen a leader in promulgating this view. Mitterrand affirmed the right of everycountry to create its own images, saying that a society that abandons the meansof representing itself would soon be an enslaved society, though when he saidcountry, he meant state.Constructing identity is both a matter of disseminating symbolic representationsand forging cultural institutions and social networks. We catch themeaning of a collectivity through the images it casts, the symbols it uses, andthe fictions or narratives it evokes. It is about a system of collective imaginingsand symbolic representations. The United States has used the cinema, andaudiovisual production in general, to spread an image of itself both across theworld and within its own borders. The Japanese mass media have used theconcept of kokuminshugi or “civic national consciousness” to strengthen thesocial construction of the Japanese and the Japanese self-image. Nihonjinron,theories of Japaneseness, have been used by the mass media inside the countryto recover Japanese self-esteem. The first product for television in Japanwas: Watashi wa kai ni naritai (I will become an oyster), a model of behaviorfor the people of post-war Japan, and a bet on a positive future. Authors likeMuruyama (1963) use concepts such as “healthy civic national consciousness”(kenzen na kokuminshugi), which combines democracy with civic nationalism,to theorize behaviors broadcast by cinema and television.
- Page 360: PART VINetworked social movements a
- Page 363 and 364: 342 Jeffrey S. JurisFollowing Fredr
- Page 365 and 366: 344 Jeffrey S. Jurisactions and cou
- Page 367 and 368: 346 Jeffrey S. Juristime. 13 Some h
- Page 369 and 370: 348 Jeffrey S. JurisZapatistas were
- Page 371 and 372: 350 Jeffrey S. Juriscollectives aga
- Page 373 and 374: 352 Jeffrey S. JurisVisibly impassi
- Page 375 and 376: 354 Jeffrey S. Juriselements. Colin
- Page 377 and 378: 356 Jeffrey S. Jurisorganizations.
- Page 379 and 380: 358 Jeffrey S. JurisNOTES1. Moving
- Page 381 and 382: 360 Jeffrey S. JurisMRG,’ which w
- Page 383 and 384: 362 Jeffrey S. JurisPolanyi, Karl (
- Page 385 and 386: 364 Araba Sey and Manuel CastellsIn
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- Page 404: PART VIIThe culture of the network
- Page 407 and 408: 386 Imma Tubellacultural and sociol
- Page 409: 388 Imma Tubellaand through symboli
- Page 413 and 414: 392 Imma TubellaIn Galicia, autonom
- Page 415 and 416: 394 Imma Tubellarooms, including fi
- Page 417 and 418: 396 Imma Tubellaunderstand the choi
- Page 419 and 420: 398 Imma Tubellainteraction which i
- Page 421 and 422: 400 Imma TubellaFerguson, M. (1995)
- Page 423 and 424: 18. Globalization, identity, and te
- Page 425 and 426: 404 Anshu ChatterjeeIndian entrepre
- Page 427 and 428: 406 Anshu ChatterjeeThese enterpris
- Page 429 and 430: 408 Anshu Chatterjeerestricted area
- Page 431 and 432: 410 Anshu Chatterjeepenetration rat
- Page 433 and 434: 412 Anshu Chatterjeeproduced instit
- Page 435 and 436: 414 Anshu ChatterjeePunjabi TV face
- Page 437 and 438: 416 Anshu Chatterjeedecisions. The
- Page 439 and 440: 418 Anshu ChatterjeeNOTES1. For mor
- Page 441 and 442: 19. The hacker ethic as the culture
- Page 443 and 444: 422 Pekka Himanenthe informational
- Page 445 and 446: 424 Pekka Himanenone of the founder
- Page 447 and 448: 426 Pekka Himanena work culture in
- Page 449 and 450: 428 Pekka Himanenhype in which the
- Page 451 and 452: 430 Pekka HimanenWithout renewing t
- Page 453 and 454: Afterword: an historian’s view on
- Page 455 and 456: 434 Rosalind Williamsdoes it mean t
- Page 457 and 458: 436 Rosalind Williamsindustrial soc
- Page 459 and 460: 438 Rosalind Williamsgovernance str
390 Imma TubellaStates. During the concluding phase of the GATT negotiations, the EuropeanUnion insisted upon a cultural exception for audiovisual products, refusing toconsider them just as any other commercial product or to accept that globalizationmust mean Americanization.The problem is that these debates were based on the primacy of the sovereigntyof the state. A French minister wrote at this time that if he had torenounce being French or being European he would prefer to renounce beingEuropean. It has been a typical French problem: imposing a quota of Frenchproduction to protect French identity and, at the same time, rejecting suchcultural identities as Corsican, Catalan, or Basque. Another example is that,although the French state forbids the use of anglicisms in the mass media,people include them in their everyday langua<strong>ge</strong>; for instance, the use of “Bye”is <strong>ge</strong>neral.So far, in the field of media and culture, the dependency model hasconcluded that the communication interests of the United States conditionedcommunication systems and that the result has been destructive to culturalidentities. The cultural imperialism argument holds that imported media products(usually from the United States) contain ideas that will lead to the declineof traditional lifestyles and values: “By importing a product we are alsoimporting the cultural forms of that society” (Mattelart et al., 1984). Thecontention that imported cultural forms will weaken a country’s sense of itselfand erode national identity has not been unique to Latin America. France hasbeen a leader in promulgating this view. Mitterrand affirmed the right of everycountry to create its own ima<strong>ge</strong>s, saying that a society that abandons the meansof representing itself would soon be an enslaved society, though when he saidcountry, he meant state.Constructing identity is both a matter of disseminating symbolic representationsand forging cultural institutions and social networks. We catch themeaning of a collectivity through the ima<strong>ge</strong>s it casts, the symbols it uses, andthe fictions or narratives it evokes. It is about a system of collective imaginingsand symbolic representations. The United States has used the cinema, andaudiovisual production in <strong>ge</strong>neral, to spread an ima<strong>ge</strong> of itself both across theworld and within its own borders. The Japanese mass media have used theconcept of kokuminshugi or “civic national consciousness” to strengthen thesocial construction of the Japanese and the Japanese self-ima<strong>ge</strong>. Nihonjinron,theories of Japaneseness, have been used by the mass media inside the countryto recover Japanese self-esteem. The first product for television in Japanwas: Watashi wa kai ni naritai (I will become an oyster), a model of behaviorfor the people of post-war Japan, and a bet on a positive future. Authors likeMuruyama (1963) use concepts such as “healthy civic national consciousness”(kenzen na kokuminshugi), which combines democracy with civic nationalism,to theorize behaviors broadcast by cinema and television.