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Informationalism and the network society 17underlying structural crisis in Western capitalism was the necessity to adapt toa knowledge-based economy, it seemed logical that a strategy of deepeningand reforming the welfare state, to provide the human capital necessary forthis economy, in terms of education, health, and modernization of the publicsector, would have been a better bet in the long term.Yet, the urgency of restoring profitability to business, and the outcome ofthe political process, led to the victory of Reaganomics, in Europe toThatcherism, and in developing countries to the model elaborated by theChicago boys, disciples of Milton Friedman, which was imposed by dictatorshipsand the IMF’s budgetary discipline. In other words, the crisis of industrialismwas also the crisis of the specific model of capitalist accumulation ofthe mature stage of industrialism, and it was this latter crisis that wasaddressed as a priority according to the interests and values of the politicalactors that seized power in the main economies. The political muscle of the USin the global economy, and ideological hegemony, linked to the bankruptcy ofstatism and to the short-sighted pragmatism of social democracy, did the rest.This is to say that the institutional conditions for globalization and businessflexibility were concomitant with a weakening of the power of labor and aretrenchment of the welfare state. However, they were not the necessaryoutcome of the crisis of industrialism and of Keynesian capitalism, but one ofthe options to restructure the system. It just happened to be the winning option.Its victory, on a global scale, created the conditions for the structural transformationsthat induced not only a new model of capitalism, but also contributedto the emergency of a new social structure.The shape of this transformation was also influenced by the collapse ofstatism, as a result of the failure of the restructuring policies that had tried toaddress its economic and technological crisis. Indeed, precisely in the 1970s,the Soviet economy reached the point of quasi-stagnation, reversing decadesof fast economic growth, and its technological development lost pace in relationto the West, particularly in the critical area of information and communicationtechnologies. Our study on the matter (Castells and Kiselyova, 2003)has documented the direct relationship between the features of Soviet statism,based on the control of information and of the capture of technology in themilitary complex, and the economic and technological crisis of the SovietUnion. Both crises decisively undermined Soviet military power, andprompted the need for reform, opening the way to Gorbachev’s perestroika.The depth of the crisis was such that Gorbachev had to go outside the channelsof the party to call for support for his perestroika from civil society. Theensuing process spiraled out of control and led to the unexpected demise of theSoviet empire, in one of the most extraordinary courses of events in history.Without the backbone provided by the Soviet Union, most statist countriesin the Third World gravitated toward Western influence and accepted the
18 Manuel Castellsformal and informal leadership of the IMF and its liberal economic policies,opening the way for the rapid spread of capitalist globalization. ChineseCommunists undertook their own reform in the hope of keeping state powerwhile joining global capitalism. The experiment is still underway, but, whateverits outcome, it has sharply departed from the logic of statism, and hassubstantially expanded the space of global capitalism. In the early twenty-firstcentury, while global capitalism is far from being a stable system, it hasbecome the only game on the planet, albeit increasingly challenged by activistminorities, and burdened with the marginalization of the majority ofhumankind.There was a second social trend, quite independent from the crises of industrialism,Keynesian capitalism, and Soviet statism: the alternative projects andvalues emerging from the cultural social movements of the 1960s and 1970s.These movements (whose first symbolic manifestations can be traced back tothe free speech movement in Berkeley in 1964 and to the May movement inParis in 1968) were, fundamentally, freedom-oriented. They were the affirmationof a culture of personal freedom and social autonomy, both vis-à-vis capitalismand statism, challenging the conservative establishment as well as thetraditional left. They were profoundly political in their implications, but theywere not oriented toward the state or preoccupied with the seizing of statepower. They did have various formats and ideologies, in interaction with thesocieties in which they took place: they connected with the civil rights movementin the United States; they called upon the working class and reignited theold tradition of the street barricade in France; they became “imagined proletarians”in Italy (mainly under the mantra of a Maoist ideology that wouldhave prompted Mao to shoot them); they opposed dictatorships in Spain,Portugal, Greece, and throughout Latin America; and they combined with thecritique of the industrial work ethic and with the conservatism of society inGermany, The Netherlands, and Japan.In all cases they opposed war, at the time symbolized by the Vietnam War,but their influence was mainly felt in the assertion of the principle of theautonomy of the individual, in direct challenge to the cultural foundations ofsocieties, starting with the family, the church, the state, and the corporateworld. They, of course, failed politically because accessing government wasnever their goal. Most of their young militants became corporate managers,respected politicians, publishers, academics, new philosophers, consultants,and web designers. Yet, their ideas permeated the entire society of the developed,capitalist world, and reached to the cultural elites of most of the world.Perhaps the most significant outcome of the 1960s’ movements was theirproductive dissolution into the forms of the more articulate movements thatemerged from their demise in the 1970s. Such was the case of feminism. Ofcourse, women’s struggles have a long history, way before the Commune of
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18 Manuel Castellsformal and informal leadership of the IMF and its liberal economic policies,opening the way for the rapid spread of capitalist globalization. ChineseCommunists undertook their own reform in the hope of keeping state powerwhile joining global capitalism. The experiment is still underway, but, whateverits outcome, it has sharply departed from the logic of statism, and hassubstantially expanded the space of global capitalism. In the early twenty-firstcentury, while global capitalism is far from being a stable system, it hasbecome the only game on the planet, albeit increasingly challen<strong>ge</strong>d by activistminorities, and burdened with the marginalization of the majority ofhumankind.There was a second social trend, quite independent from the crises of industrialism,Keynesian capitalism, and Soviet statism: the alternative projects andvalues emerging from the cultural social movements of the 1960s and 1970s.These movements (whose first symbolic manifestations can be traced back tothe free speech movement in Berkeley in 1964 and to the May movement inParis in 1968) were, fundamentally, freedom-oriented. They were the affirmationof a culture of personal freedom and social autonomy, both vis-à-vis capitalismand statism, challenging the conservative establishment as well as thetraditional left. They were profoundly political in their implications, but theywere not oriented toward the state or preoccupied with the seizing of statepower. They did have various formats and ideologies, in interaction with thesocieties in which they took place: they connected with the civil rights movementin the United States; they called upon the working class and reignited theold tradition of the street barricade in France; they became “imagined proletarians”in Italy (mainly under the mantra of a Maoist ideology that wouldhave prompted Mao to shoot them); they opposed dictatorships in Spain,Portugal, Greece, and throughout Latin America; and they combined with thecritique of the industrial work ethic and with the conservatism of society inGermany, The Netherlands, and Japan.In all cases they opposed war, at the time symbolized by the Vietnam War,but their influence was mainly felt in the assertion of the principle of theautonomy of the individual, in direct challen<strong>ge</strong> to the cultural foundations ofsocieties, starting with the family, the church, the state, and the corporateworld. They, of course, failed politically because accessing government wasnever their goal. Most of their young militants became corporate mana<strong>ge</strong>rs,respected politicians, publishers, academics, new philosophers, consultants,and web designers. Yet, their ideas permeated the entire society of the developed,capitalist world, and reached to the cultural elites of most of the world.Perhaps the most significant outcome of the 1960s’ movements was theirproductive dissolution into the forms of the more articulate movements thatemer<strong>ge</strong>d from their demise in the 1970s. Such was the case of feminism. Ofcourse, women’s struggles have a long history, way before the Commune of