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The Internet and the political process 367balloting, and opinion polling, have not erased concerns about the limits ofdirect democracy (Wolfensberger, 2002; The Economist, 2003). Taking advantageof the benefits of Internet technology is particularly problematic forparliamentary bodies. As Wolfensberger (2002: 91) notes, “just because theinformation super-highway and deliberation are both two-way streets does notmean that they are perfectly integrated and compatible systems. In reality, theyoperate at radically different speeds.” Politicians recognize the usefulness ofthe Internet, but fear that depending on a public ill equipped to deliberate andmake decisions on complex issues will consume too much time and eroderepresentative democracy.Experiences such as frequent hacking of candidates’ sites, inaccurate onlinepolls, and low-quality or extreme discussions in chat rooms have turned bothpoliticians and the public away from political websites (Coleman and Hall,2001; Thompson, 2002). Distrust of the Internet is not helped by past flopssuch as Steve Forbes’s elaborate online presidential candidacy in 2000, whichdid nothing to prevent his dismal performance as a candidate. Adoption of newinformation and communication technology by the UK central governmenthas also been less efficient and influential than anticipated (Chadwick andMay, 2003).The above reasons explain why politicians are skeptical about using theInternet for serious political communication. But the successful use of themedium by politicians such as Jesse Ventura, as well as the incorporation ofInternet components into most political operations and programs, suggests thatthere are other, deep-rooted reasons for the current patterns of limited use.Some observers have pointed to the fact that politicians are unfamiliar with thetechnology (Coleman, 1999; Johnson, 2003). However, this argument has lessstrength after almost a decade of Internet use in politics and the availability ofa pool of trained Internet professionals.Rather, the problem may be the inability to understand what Internet politicsreally is and how it works. There is a great deal of uncertainty aboutwhich models of political communication are most effective on the web. Thecommunication model chosen is influenced by perceptions of the role of theInternet in politics. The predominance of a given communication model canbe partially explained by the perception of Internet politics as dealing mainlywith acquiring information to make decisions during campaigns and elections(Agre, 2002; Anderson, 2003). Hence, online political campaigns focusmore on the provision of the candidate’s position on issues and less on othertypes of participation, such as organizing demonstrations, contacting officials,and building relationships around individuals and organizations(Anderson, 2003). This is in line with the dominant political paradigm(managerial model of state/citizen interaction), which prioritizes efficiencyof internal organizational activities and linear provision of information to
368 Araba Sey and Manuel Castellscitizens, in contrast to models that prioritize consultation or participation(Chadwick and May, 2003). Thus, although Coleman (2001) identifies threepossible e-campaigning models in UK politics, he concludes that, while thecampaigns concentrated on the “e-marketing” model, and Internet usersfocused on the “voter empowerment” model, the “e-democracy” model,based on interactive participation, was conspicuously absent.It is not unusual for old models of political communication to linger whilepoliticians get used to, and find effective ways to work with, emerging methods(Kamarck, 2002; Katz and Rice, 2002). However, the primary reason forthe continued dominance of traditional communication models is not thegradual easing in of a new model, but the reluctance on the part of politiciansto lose control over the political process. “Control of the message in acampaign is as much an obsession as is money and candidates fear this lossof control,” which is likely to happen in an open Internet campaign(Kamarck, 2002: 98). Not only can Internet users exchange information thatmay not be “on-message,” but both supporters and opponents also have thecapacity (thanks to hypertext and other Internet capabilities) to produce newmessages using campaign information without approval from the officialcampaign, what Foot and Schneider (2003) call “unilateral coproduction.”Furthermore, politicians anticipate “burdensome exchange among candidates,campaign staffs, and citizens, which would entail . . . losing the abilityto remain ambiguous in policy positions” (Stromer-Galley, 2000: 112).Consequently, political institutions consciously develop only those aspectsof Internet campaigning that are less subject to manipulation and input fromusers and more in tune with how they believe politics should be conducted.In sum, if the added value of the Internet is its interactivity and its potentialfor autonomous communication, a political system predicated on thecontrol of messages and the gatekeeping of access to institutions of representationand governance is unlikely to use the medium to its fullest potential.On the other hand, the more a political process is based on the buildingof citizens’ autonomy, the more the Internet may play a role as an enhancingmedium of political mobilization and influence. Let us explore this hypothesis.THE INTERNET AS A MEDIUM OF POLITICALAUTONOMYWhile politicians seek to retain control over the political process, somesegments of the electorate seek to attain greater autonomy in politicalengagement. The Internet potentially offers two levels of autonomy to theonline electorate. First, users can access more campaign information without
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- Page 421 and 422: 400 Imma TubellaFerguson, M. (1995)
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The Internet and the political process 367balloting, and opinion polling, have not erased concerns about the limits ofdirect democracy (Wolfensber<strong>ge</strong>r, 2002; The Economist, 2003). Taking advanta<strong>ge</strong>of the benefits of Internet technology is particularly problematic forparliamentary bodies. As Wolfensber<strong>ge</strong>r (2002: 91) notes, “just because theinformation super-highway and deliberation are both two-way streets does notmean that they are perfectly integrated and compatible systems. In reality, theyoperate at radically different speeds.” Politicians recognize the usefulness ofthe Internet, but fear that depending on a public ill equipped to deliberate andmake decisions on complex issues will consume too much time and eroderepresentative democracy.Experiences such as frequent hacking of candidates’ sites, inaccurate onlinepolls, and low-quality or extreme discussions in chat rooms have turned bothpoliticians and the public away from political websites (Coleman and Hall,2001; Thompson, 2002). Distrust of the Internet is not helped by past flopssuch as Steve Forbes’s elaborate online presidential candidacy in 2000, whichdid nothing to prevent his dismal performance as a candidate. Adoption of newinformation and communication technology by the UK central governmenthas also been less efficient and influential than anticipated (Chadwick andMay, 2003).The above reasons explain why politicians are skeptical about using theInternet for serious political communication. But the successful use of themedium by politicians such as Jesse Ventura, as well as the incorporation ofInternet components into most political operations and programs, sug<strong>ge</strong>sts thatthere are other, deep-rooted reasons for the current patterns of limited use.Some observers have pointed to the fact that politicians are unfamiliar with thetechnology (Coleman, 1999; Johnson, 2003). However, this argument has lessstrength after almost a decade of Internet use in politics and the availability ofa pool of trained Internet professionals.Rather, the problem may be the inability to understand what Internet politicsreally is and how it works. There is a great deal of uncertainty aboutwhich models of political communication are most effective on the web. Thecommunication model chosen is influenced by perceptions of the role of theInternet in politics. The predominance of a given communication model canbe partially explained by the perception of Internet politics as dealing mainlywith acquiring information to make decisions during campaigns and elections(Agre, 2002; Anderson, 2003). Hence, online political campaigns focusmore on the provision of the candidate’s position on issues and less on othertypes of participation, such as organizing demonstrations, contacting officials,and building relationships around individuals and organizations(Anderson, 2003). This is in line with the dominant political paradigm(mana<strong>ge</strong>rial model of state/citizen interaction), which prioritizes efficiencyof internal organizational activities and linear provision of information to