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Divisions within an organizational knowledge base are termed “balkanization,”which can be measured empirically using similarity and distance metricsfrom information theory and graph theory measures of social networks(Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Val Alstyne and Brynjolfsson, 1996a, b). Statedformally as a hypothesis:Hypothesis 6c: Information sharing reduces “balkanization,” increasingproductivity by promoting economies of scope and scale.In the firms studied, individual contact networks within offices are not atall “balkanized.” Over any period longer than several weeks, contacts aredense and average e-mail distance rapidly falls below two links to reach mostpeople. Information sharing is more concentrated within industry sectors andwithin geographically dispersed offices than across these groupings.Importantly, recruiters with more contacts inside the firm, as measured byunique e-mail correspondence, are observed in conjunction with higher outputin terms of revenues, completion rates, and multitasking.Utilizing the Knowledge BaseWhy information should influence productivity 159Organizational knowledge is a highly distributed resource. It can also bethought of as both a set of templates for action and a huge collection of facts.In this context, the productivity problem of allocating resources toward thehighest value combination of actors, assets, and actions becomes one in whichcomplexity overshadows uncertainty. Problem complexity increases so rapidlythat answers become difficult even to enumerate.Standards may increase productivity by reducing the range of complexity.They cut the costs of monitoring, deliberation, and search. They promoteeconomies of scale or scope in information processing and foster networkeffects. At the same time, standards reduce information processing requirementsby constraining potential interpretations. Short-run costs include thoseof recognizing, formulating, and handling exceptions or the hidden costs ofignorance. In the long run, deference to a standard can mask environmentalchanges.Once adopted, standards give rise to patterns of complementary investment.Economic implications include: path dependency, increasing returns,switching costs, and network externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Arthur,1989; David, 1990; Liebowitz and Margolis, 1990, 1994; Shapiro and Varian,1999; Shy, 2001) Following organizational adoption of a standard, economistsoften assume productivity will increase over time, although at a decreasingrate, which corresponds with empirical regularities seen in learning curves orlearning-by-doing (Arrow, 1962a; Epple et al., 1996) In the presence of learning-by-doingeffects, a central microeconomic question for productivity analysisinvolves timing the switch to a potentially more efficient standard
160 Marshall Van Alstyne and Nathaniel Bulkley(Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1996). These factors highlight a trade-off inherent inthe adoption of informational standards:Hypothesis 7a: Information routines and standards reduce complexity.They foster interoperability and sharing, but limit adaptation and flexibility.Optimal information standardization increases with decision stability.In executive recruiting, standardization examples include interview formsfor capturing candidate data, generation of new business leads, and routinizationof data-entry procedures by research staff. While the number of firms istoo small for statistically meaningful firm-level conclusions, the firm with themost standardized practices on all three dimensions also had the highest percapita revenues, implying that such practices do matter.While informational standards are applied to declarative information, standardizationcan also take place at the process interface. Modularity increasesthe number of independent processes, while standardizing interfaces betweenthem. Dividing tasks into independent modules partitions the search space ofpotential designs, which can reduce the costs of experimentation and speeddevelopment by allowing design processes to operate in parallel (Fine, 1998;Baldwin and Clark, 2000).Simon’s (1996) parable of two watchmakers, Tempus and Hora, providesan illustration. Each watchmaker builds watches of 1,000 parts. Hora dividesthe task into sub-assemblies based on powers of ten, while Tempus does not.Interruptions by customers cause the watchmakers to lose any partiallycompleted work – five steps on average in the case of a sub-assembly, but 500steps on average otherwise. At the end of the day, Hora has built more than anorder of magnitude more watches. The modular design proves significantlymore robust. Stated formally as a hypothesis:Hypothesis 7b: Modular designs can increase productivity by spreading therisk of process failure or enabling new combinations of processes that extendthe efficient frontier.In terms of executive recruiting, tasks are modularly distinct for partners,consultants, and recruiters. For example, researchers specialize in generatingcontacts, consultants typically perform the initial screening of candidates,while partners interact directly with clients and are responsible for generatingnew business. This allows individuals to specialize in certain tasks and isreflected in our survey as differences in how recruiters spend their time thatvary significantly more across job types than across firms. For example,researchers spend the most time in front of computers, while partners spendtwice as much time as consultants interacting face to face. Job specializationalso allows teams to constantly re-form across engagements, which alsoencourages information spillovers across teams.While informational standards and modularity both seek to limit the costsof transmitting information between processes, a more general trade-off often
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- Page 167 and 168: 146 Marshall Van Alstyne and Nathan
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- Page 197 and 198: 176 Chris BennerLABOR AND FLEXIBILI
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- Page 203 and 204: 182 Chris BennerTable 7.2Indicators
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- Page 207 and 208: 186 Chris Bennerof human resource a
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- Page 213 and 214: 192 Chris BennerFlexible labor mark
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- Page 217 and 218: 196 Chris BennerLave, Jean and Weng
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- Page 221 and 222: 200 Caitlin Zaloomthe bids and offe
- Page 223 and 224: 202 Caitlin Zaloomexchange, the bro
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Divisions within an organizational knowled<strong>ge</strong> base are termed “balkanization,”which can be measured empirically using similarity and distance metricsfrom information theory and graph theory measures of social networks(Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Val Alstyne and Brynjolfsson, 1996a, b). Statedformally as a hypothesis:Hypothesis 6c: Information sharing reduces “balkanization,” increasingproductivity by promoting economies of scope and scale.In the firms studied, individual contact networks within offices are not atall “balkanized.” Over any period lon<strong>ge</strong>r than several weeks, contacts aredense and avera<strong>ge</strong> e-mail distance rapidly falls below two links to reach mostpeople. Information sharing is more concentrated within industry sectors andwithin <strong>ge</strong>ographically dispersed offices than across these groupings.Importantly, recruiters with more contacts inside the firm, as measured byunique e-mail correspondence, are observed in conjunction with higher outputin terms of revenues, completion rates, and multitasking.Utilizing the Knowled<strong>ge</strong> BaseWhy information should influence productivity 159Organizational knowled<strong>ge</strong> is a highly distributed resource. It can also bethought of as both a set of templates for action and a hu<strong>ge</strong> collection of facts.In this context, the productivity problem of allocating resources toward thehighest value combination of actors, assets, and actions becomes one in whichcomplexity overshadows uncertainty. Problem complexity increases so rapidlythat answers become difficult even to enumerate.Standards may increase productivity by reducing the ran<strong>ge</strong> of complexity.They cut the costs of monitoring, deliberation, and search. They promoteeconomies of scale or scope in information processing and foster networkeffects. At the same time, standards reduce information processing requirementsby constraining potential interpretations. Short-run costs include thoseof recognizing, formulating, and handling exceptions or the hidden costs ofignorance. In the long run, deference to a standard can mask environmentalchan<strong>ge</strong>s.Once adopted, standards give rise to patterns of complementary investment.Economic implications include: path dependency, increasing returns,switching costs, and network externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Arthur,1989; David, 1990; Liebowitz and Margolis, 1990, 1994; Shapiro and Varian,1999; Shy, 2001) Following organizational adoption of a standard, economistsoften assume productivity will increase over time, although at a decreasingrate, which corresponds with empirical regularities seen in learning curves orlearning-by-doing (Arrow, 1962a; Epple et al., 1996) In the presence of learning-by-doin<strong>ge</strong>ffects, a central microeconomic question for productivity analysisinvolves timing the switch to a potentially more efficient standard