Untitled - socium.ge

Untitled - socium.ge Untitled - socium.ge

10.07.2015 Views

Why information should influence productivity 155On the other hand, decentralization favors data gathering and adaptation.The argument follows from contract theory economics: owning an asset boostsincentives for maintaining and improving that asset. Conversely, not owning itdiscourages investing in that asset by reducing expectations of future gainssince these must be negotiated with the owner (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hartand Moore, 1990). With pay-off uncertainty, then “to the owner go the spoils.”Decentralized control is favored if disparate parties have indispensable informationsince they will be better positioned to use and maintain that information.Applied to information management, contract theory offers the followingresults: (1) information systems that are independent of other parts of the organizationshould have decentralized control; (2) systems with complementaryinformation should be combined under centralized control; (3) more indispensableagents should exercise greater control; (4) no distribution of controlwill induce optimal investment in situations involving both complementaryinformation sources and more than one indispensable agent; (5) providinglocal copies may mitigate this problem at the risk of reintroducing fragmentation(Brynjolfsson, 1994; Van Alstyne et al., 1995). In case of conflictingdesign principles, a reasonable heuristic is to consider the investment motivesof the party contributing both the greatest marginal and the greatest total value.Hypothesis 3: Centralized decisions promote decision consistency, globalperspective, and avoid wasteful duplication. Decentralized decisions promotedata gathering, distributed incentives, and adaptation. Productivity increasesto the extent that distributing control optimally balances these factors in lightof complementarity and indispensability.In a recruiting context, project teams consist of a mix of one to four partners,consultants, associates, and research staff with two as the team mode. Asa rule, the party with final decision authority is the one who landed the business.This is usually the senior party but most importantly it is the one with theclient relationship. Thus, ultimate authority is concentrated in the hands of theparty with the client relationship, which can supersede seniority. Fact findingin teams, however, is decentralized.Further, two firms decentralized the task of database entry for interviewdata to the recruiter who conducted it, while the third centralized this functionin research staff. The former practice led to inconsistent data entry based onmore individualistic behavior but increased perceptions of control. The latterpractice frees more time and allows recruiters to contact more people per day.These provide competing benefits as both database control and higher contactsper day correlate with revenues.While allocations of information access and decision rights suggest apolicy framework, they do not specifically address the question of how organizationsmotivate self-interested individuals to proactively share information.

156 Marshall Van Alstyne and Nathaniel BulkleyAnother economic principle – aligning incentives with outcomes encouragesproper behavior – suggests that when organizational information sharing isdesired, absolute incentives may have an advantage over relative incentives.The intuition follows from a classroom grading example: under an absoluteincentive scheme, every student who scores 90 percent or higher gets an “A.”One successful student does not displace another but group study can lowerindividual effort. Under a relative scheme, the top 10 percent of the studentsget an “A” regardless of the actual score. Students are ranked relative to oneanother and may work hard to beat out other students. Assuming self-interestedbehavior, the former policy promotes sharing, while the later discouragesit. An axiomatic model of this phenomenon is developed in Van Alstyne andBrynjolfsson (1995), while the motivation follows from Orlikowski’s (1992)case study of groupware use in a competitive up-or-out consulting firm.Orlikowski found that junior consultants refused to share information for fearof losing strategic advantage, while senior consultants, who were rewardedbased on the absolute performance of the firm, willingly shared information.The optimal incentive policy is hypothesized to depend on the degree of taskinterdependence, which correlates with increased information sharing.Hypothesis 4: Absolute incentives encourage information sharing, whichpromotes group productivity; relative incentives discourage information sharing,but promote individual productivity. The optimal incentive policy in termsof productivity becomes increasingly absolute with increasing task interdependence.Evidence from recruiter surveys correlates well with incentive theorypredictions. Employees of the firm reporting the greatest weight on individualperformance reported sharing the least information. Those of the firm reportingthe greatest weight on team performance reported moderate informationsharing. Those reporting the greatest weight on whole company performancereported the most sharing. No firm in the study employs more than 150recruiters so these positive benefits may be contingent on firm size.Having information, firms and individuals must decide what to do with it.Hirshleifer (1971) emphasizes that one valuable technique is to use “informationpush” to arbitrage supply of and demand for a resource. By predicting orcausing future changes and controlling a key resource, one can disseminatenews widely in order to profit from the shift. Such news resolves uncertaintyover market opportunities and benefits those who acted early to control undervaluedassets. This represents a classic example of reduced inefficiency as infigure 6.2a and leads to:Hypothesis 5: Information push benefits individuals and organizations thatcontrol undervalued assets (owners of overvalued assets incur losses).Efficiency increases when resource allocations rebalance to account for problemsand opportunities.

Why information should influence productivity 155On the other hand, decentralization favors data gathering and adaptation.The argument follows from contract theory economics: owning an asset boostsincentives for maintaining and improving that asset. Conversely, not owning itdiscoura<strong>ge</strong>s investing in that asset by reducing expectations of future gainssince these must be negotiated with the owner (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hartand Moore, 1990). With pay-off uncertainty, then “to the owner go the spoils.”Decentralized control is favored if disparate parties have indispensable informationsince they will be better positioned to use and maintain that information.Applied to information mana<strong>ge</strong>ment, contract theory offers the followingresults: (1) information systems that are independent of other parts of the organizationshould have decentralized control; (2) systems with complementaryinformation should be combined under centralized control; (3) more indispensablea<strong>ge</strong>nts should exercise greater control; (4) no distribution of controlwill induce optimal investment in situations involving both complementaryinformation sources and more than one indispensable a<strong>ge</strong>nt; (5) providinglocal copies may mitigate this problem at the risk of reintroducing fragmentation(Brynjolfsson, 1994; Van Alstyne et al., 1995). In case of conflictingdesign principles, a reasonable heuristic is to consider the investment motivesof the party contributing both the greatest marginal and the greatest total value.Hypothesis 3: Centralized decisions promote decision consistency, globalperspective, and avoid wasteful duplication. Decentralized decisions promotedata gathering, distributed incentives, and adaptation. Productivity increasesto the extent that distributing control optimally balances these factors in lightof complementarity and indispensability.In a recruiting context, project teams consist of a mix of one to four partners,consultants, associates, and research staff with two as the team mode. Asa rule, the party with final decision authority is the one who landed the business.This is usually the senior party but most importantly it is the one with theclient relationship. Thus, ultimate authority is concentrated in the hands of theparty with the client relationship, which can supersede seniority. Fact findingin teams, however, is decentralized.Further, two firms decentralized the task of database entry for interviewdata to the recruiter who conducted it, while the third centralized this functionin research staff. The former practice led to inconsistent data entry based onmore individualistic behavior but increased perceptions of control. The latterpractice frees more time and allows recruiters to contact more people per day.These provide competing benefits as both database control and higher contactsper day correlate with revenues.While allocations of information access and decision rights sug<strong>ge</strong>st apolicy framework, they do not specifically address the question of how organizationsmotivate self-interested individuals to proactively share information.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!