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Reflexive Internet? The British experience 133locations. Globalization is about the death of distance, and new technologiesare claimed to be “space defying, boundary crossing and ubiquitously linking.”Against this, our research found that the realization of the ideal of a“virtual organization” was actually set aside in favor of more trusted businesssolutions to the organizational problems of coordination. Workers’ efforts aredirected primarily at “making the new technology at home” within existingwork practices. In so doing, it is local relevance that is crucial rather thanglobal dimensions (Hughes et al., 2002). Relatedly, our research showed thatthe use of ICTs can reiterate spatial divisions and distinctiveness, rather thanhelping to ameliorate them (Agar et al., 2002). To a large extent this rule is aconsequence of the preceding four rules.REFLECTIONS ON THE VIRTUAL SOCIETY? PROGRAMIt was clear from the outset that the program should be built around strongnetworking both internally and externally, within academia and beyond,involving both researchers and “users.” The program aimed to take full advantageof the new technologies so as to provide accessible and rapid electroniccommunication between and beyond the academic research communities. Atits inception, intensive use of web technologies was a rarity. In 1997, I wastold that the program should be seen as something of a flagship for the ESRC’suse of new technologies.The challenge of networking with non-academics, and using electronictechnologies to do so, has three main consequences. First, it means that themajority of the repository of information about the program is available on theprogram website (www.virtualsociety.org.uk). The website provides a muchfuller account of the activities and achievements of the Virtual Society?program than can the flat, textual structure of this chapter. Second, it meansthat the distinction between “internal networking arrangements” and “externalcommunication with users,” a key distinction in research council bureaucracyof the 1980s and 1990s, becomes blurred. Indeed, one clear lesson from theVirtual Society? program is the importance of rethinking some of the key categoriesand distinctions currently enshrined in processes of research organizationand management. Third, this in turn provides a more general reminder thatprevailing assumptions about the relations between “researchers” and “users”require re-evaluation.By exploring some of the potential of enhanced networking and linkage,the Virtual Society? program was able to contribute to current debates aboutthe prospects for a more “interactive” social science (Gibbons et al., 1994;Caswill and Shove, 2000; Gibbons, 2000; Woolgar, 2000). The work of directingthis huge research effort was no longer just about intellectual leadership, it
134 Steve Woolgaralso involved strategic networking, a concerted effort to persuade “unsuspectingcaptains of industry” of the virtues of academic social science research.The researchers themselves had not only to carry out first-class scholarship,but also to exhibit good citizenship in willingly supporting the experiment ofcommunicating with “users.” Many outside the program had to be willing (orbe persuaded) to adopt this “unicorn role.” 3 Both constituencies were importantin helping to shape and define the research agenda.A notable feature of “dealings with users” was the marked change in thegeneral context and environment in which the program operated over its lifetime.In summary terms, we moved from a general perception that the consequencesof technologies were simply a matter for technologists; throughbreathless expectations about a world radically transformed by technology andthe dawn of a virtual age; to the “busted flush” of sober realization in the wakeof the dot-com crash. Throughout this whole period, it fell to the program totry to provide both a balanced consistency of perspective and a deeper understandingof what lies beneath these superficial judgments. Not only did theprogram manage relations with a bewildering variety of users – for in the finalanalysis there are few areas of social life potentially unaffected by concernsabout new technology – it also engaged with users whose views were changing.As many of the program’s publications point out, the central core of itsresearch findings are “counter-intuitive.” But this simple statement conceals acomplexity in changes of ideas about the new technologies: we also had toconsider for whom (which constituencies) the results were counter-intuitive.The current state of our understanding of the new electronic technologiesrequires our attention to the form of the debate around claimed technologicalimpacts. In particular, it is not enough, it certainly misses the point, and,perhaps, is even wrong-headed to attempt a straightforward evaluation of theseclaims. In simple terms, to set out to assess whether or not a virtual society ispossible is already to accept the terms of reference of the debate. As Cooper etal. (2002) put it, we need some mutual contamination of the categories thatmake up the real–virtual opposition, and should proceed by neither endorsingnor debunking the concept of virtual society. Nettleton et al. (2002) similarlyindicate that alignment with either extreme is inappropriate; they quoteWellman and Gulia’s (1999: 167) observation that “statements of enthusiasmor criticism leave little room for moderate, mixed situations that may be thereality.” 4The challenge is to find a way of interrogating the terms of the debate withoutdisengaging from them altogether. This is an important aim both academicallyand strategically. The terms of the debate are themselves motivated; bywhich I mean that they are deeply imbued with relations, meanings, impliedconnections, and performed communities of associations. These claimsthereby involve, give rise to, and sustain a form of social ordering. So, to
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- Page 203 and 204: 182 Chris BennerTable 7.2Indicators
134 Steve Woolgaralso involved strategic networking, a concerted effort to persuade “unsuspectingcaptains of industry” of the virtues of academic social science research.The researchers themselves had not only to carry out first-class scholarship,but also to exhibit good citizenship in willingly supporting the experiment ofcommunicating with “users.” Many outside the program had to be willing (orbe persuaded) to adopt this “unicorn role.” 3 Both constituencies were importantin helping to shape and define the research a<strong>ge</strong>nda.A notable feature of “dealings with users” was the marked chan<strong>ge</strong> in the<strong>ge</strong>neral context and environment in which the program operated over its lifetime.In summary terms, we moved from a <strong>ge</strong>neral perception that the consequencesof technologies were simply a matter for technologists; throughbreathless expectations about a world radically transformed by technology andthe dawn of a virtual a<strong>ge</strong>; to the “busted flush” of sober realization in the wakeof the dot-com crash. Throughout this whole period, it fell to the program totry to provide both a balanced consistency of perspective and a deeper understandingof what lies beneath these superficial judgments. Not only did theprogram mana<strong>ge</strong> relations with a bewildering variety of users – for in the finalanalysis there are few areas of social life potentially unaffected by concernsabout new technology – it also enga<strong>ge</strong>d with users whose views were changing.As many of the program’s publications point out, the central core of itsresearch findings are “counter-intuitive.” But this simple statement conceals acomplexity in chan<strong>ge</strong>s of ideas about the new technologies: we also had toconsider for whom (which constituencies) the results were counter-intuitive.The current state of our understanding of the new electronic technologiesrequires our attention to the form of the debate around claimed technologicalimpacts. In particular, it is not enough, it certainly misses the point, and,perhaps, is even wrong-headed to attempt a straightforward evaluation of theseclaims. In simple terms, to set out to assess whether or not a virtual society ispossible is already to accept the terms of reference of the debate. As Cooper etal. (2002) put it, we need some mutual contamination of the categories thatmake up the real–virtual opposition, and should proceed by neither endorsingnor debunking the concept of virtual society. Nettleton et al. (2002) similarlyindicate that alignment with either extreme is inappropriate; they quoteWellman and Gulia’s (1999: 167) observation that “statements of enthusiasmor criticism leave little room for moderate, mixed situations that may be thereality.” 4The challen<strong>ge</strong> is to find a way of interrogating the terms of the debate withoutdisengaging from them alto<strong>ge</strong>ther. This is an important aim both academicallyand strategically. The terms of the debate are themselves motivated; bywhich I mean that they are deeply imbued with relations, meanings, impliedconnections, and performed communities of associations. These claimsthereby involve, give rise to, and sustain a form of social ordering. So, to