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The Internet in China 111“network security.” It specified in broad terms the types of “harmful information”and “harmful activities,” such as hacking and spreading computerviruses. In 1999, the State Encryption Management Commission, in cooperationwith the SSB, promulgated the “Administration of CommercialEncryption Regulations” which required all network encryption products andequipment to be approved because they are regarded as state secret.In 2000 alone, six major regulations regarding state secrets, online businessoperation, information and news services, and Internet security were issued(Cheung, 2003: 79–82). The new rules primarily targeted Internet contentproviders (ICPs). They required, among other measures, online news disseminatorsto get special licenses, prohibited foreign companies from being largeshareholders of Chinese ICPs, and required bulletin board (BBS) and chatroomsystem operators to record user information (including content postedonline, account name, duration online, Internet provider address, accessingphone number) for at least 60 days to facilitate police work. Regulations at thenational level were reiterated, sometimes in stricter terms, in the managementpolicies of regional networks and commercial websites (Qiu, 1999: 12),reflecting a “business culture of self-censorship” (Cheung, 2003: 85).Administrative measures are used to ensure that the system of regulationhas teeth (Cheung, 2003). The MPS and the SSB have set aside special taskforces at national, provincial, and municipal levels, including full-time cyberpoliceand “state information security liaison personnel (guojia xinxi anquanlianluoyuan).” Many of these cyber-cops are college students who are subsidizedfor computer and Internet access by working part-time for law enforcement.26 There are also numerous system operators, webmasters, and BBSboardmasters who are required to share the labor. If they do not cooperate,penalties include temporary or permanent closure of their forums (Qiu, 1999).On the technical front, China is known for its notorious “Great Firewall”which blocks access to harmful information, broadly defined, perhaps as manyas 10 percent of the websites on the World Wide Web (Zittrain and Edelman,2002). The state agencies also apply advanced intranet and tracking technologies,as well as content-filtering software, in the so-called “Golden ShieldProject” (Walton, 2001). Since 1998, dozens of cyber-intruders have beentracked down and imprisoned on charges of disclosing state secrets, incitingsubversion, Internet hacking, propagating Falun Gong, and, more recently,spreading rumors during the SARS epidemic. These men and women aremostly in their late teens to early 40s, and include private IT entrepreneurs,schoolteachers, college students, and unemployed urbanites. From September2002, the blocking mechanisms became more sophisticated and aggressive.They specifically target certain online content (for example, an article atnytimes.com about Chinese corruption scandals, but not other sections of theelectronic newspaper). Those who attempt to access outlawed information via

112 Jack Linchuan Qiuthe Internet may find their browser application or even the entire terminaldisturbed (Zittrain and Edelman, 2002).From an economic perspective, the censorship regime entails higher coststhan justifiable for national development. Slower network speed and efficiencyand the image of a fettered Internet structure may discourage foreigninvestment. Insiders would see the picture differently. The control effortscreate jobs, generate profits, and bring opportunities for international collaborationfor China’s network censors. Surveillance and repressive control are afast-growing global industry, particularly after 9/11. In China, domestic andforeign IT firms seek state contracts to provide security technologies such as“personal identification systems” for e-government projects. 27 Internet contentproviders (ICPs) with government background welcome more stringentcensorship measures that apply to private start-ups with little official guanxi.Since 2000, private ICPs have become increasingly conservative due to newcontent regulations, frequently providing nothing more than clips from officiallysanctioned sources. Meanwhile, ironically, netizen-based politicaldebates (of corruption, WTO, international affairs and so on) migrate to onlineforums such as Qiangguo Luntan (www.qglt.com) hosted by the website ofPeople’s Daily.Another aspect of censorship has to do with China’s Internet cafés, a mainpoint of access for children, migrant workers, and low-income Internetusers. 28 Unlike large ISPs and ICPs, most cybercafés are small, private businesses,many run by laid-off or under-employed workers of state-owned enterprises.29 In April 2001, the Measures for the Administration of Business Sitesof Internet Access Services was promulgated by the MPS, the MII, theMinistry of Culture, the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, andthe State Birth Planning Commission in response to Internet trespassing fromthe cafés and increasing parental complaints about the negative impact ofcybercafés on schoolchildren. The measure formally prohibited Internet cafésfrom allowing patrons to access harmful information, required the speciallicensing of net-cafés, and prevented unaccompanied minors under the age offourteen from entering. However, the regulation was poorly enforced until thefatal Beijing café fire of June 2002 (Murray, 2003). Even after the fire, therehas been great geographical and temporal variation in the implementation ofthe Internet café regulations. Although officers in some municipalities confiscatedequipment or collected heavy fines from the cafés during a crackdowncampaign, others in neighboring towns were less predatory or turned a blindeye because the market demand for cybercafés was so huge.As difficult as it is to control cybercafés, it is even more difficult to monitorindividual users. It is most difficult to enforce the articles pertaining to userregistration. There is no systematic way to ensure that each of China’s 59 millionInternet users is registered or that the registration information is verified.

The Internet in China 111“network security.” It specified in broad terms the types of “harmful information”and “harmful activities,” such as hacking and spreading computerviruses. In 1999, the State Encryption Mana<strong>ge</strong>ment Commission, in cooperationwith the SSB, promulgated the “Administration of CommercialEncryption Regulations” which required all network encryption products andequipment to be approved because they are regarded as state secret.In 2000 alone, six major regulations regarding state secrets, online businessoperation, information and news services, and Internet security were issued(Cheung, 2003: 79–82). The new rules primarily tar<strong>ge</strong>ted Internet contentproviders (ICPs). They required, among other measures, online news disseminatorsto <strong>ge</strong>t special licenses, prohibited foreign companies from being lar<strong>ge</strong>shareholders of Chinese ICPs, and required bulletin board (BBS) and chatroomsystem operators to record user information (including content postedonline, account name, duration online, Internet provider address, accessingphone number) for at least 60 days to facilitate police work. Regulations at thenational level were reiterated, sometimes in stricter terms, in the mana<strong>ge</strong>mentpolicies of regional networks and commercial websites (Qiu, 1999: 12),reflecting a “business culture of self-censorship” (Cheung, 2003: 85).Administrative measures are used to ensure that the system of regulationhas teeth (Cheung, 2003). The MPS and the SSB have set aside special taskforces at national, provincial, and municipal levels, including full-time cyberpoliceand “state information security liaison personnel (guojia xinxi anquanlianluoyuan).” Many of these cyber-cops are colle<strong>ge</strong> students who are subsidizedfor computer and Internet access by working part-time for law enforcement.26 There are also numerous system operators, webmasters, and BBSboardmasters who are required to share the labor. If they do not cooperate,penalties include temporary or permanent closure of their forums (Qiu, 1999).On the technical front, China is known for its notorious “Great Firewall”which blocks access to harmful information, broadly defined, perhaps as manyas 10 percent of the websites on the World Wide Web (Zittrain and Edelman,2002). The state a<strong>ge</strong>ncies also apply advanced intranet and tracking technologies,as well as content-filtering software, in the so-called “Golden ShieldProject” (Walton, 2001). Since 1998, dozens of cyber-intruders have beentracked down and imprisoned on char<strong>ge</strong>s of disclosing state secrets, incitingsubversion, Internet hacking, propagating Falun Gong, and, more recently,spreading rumors during the SARS epidemic. These men and women aremostly in their late teens to early 40s, and include private IT entrepreneurs,schoolteachers, colle<strong>ge</strong> students, and unemployed urbanites. From September2002, the blocking mechanisms became more sophisticated and aggressive.They specifically tar<strong>ge</strong>t certain online content (for example, an article atnytimes.com about Chinese corruption scandals, but not other sections of theelectronic newspaper). Those who attempt to access outlawed information via

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