Untitled - socium.ge
Untitled - socium.ge Untitled - socium.ge
The Internet in China 111“network security.” It specified in broad terms the types of “harmful information”and “harmful activities,” such as hacking and spreading computerviruses. In 1999, the State Encryption Management Commission, in cooperationwith the SSB, promulgated the “Administration of CommercialEncryption Regulations” which required all network encryption products andequipment to be approved because they are regarded as state secret.In 2000 alone, six major regulations regarding state secrets, online businessoperation, information and news services, and Internet security were issued(Cheung, 2003: 79–82). The new rules primarily targeted Internet contentproviders (ICPs). They required, among other measures, online news disseminatorsto get special licenses, prohibited foreign companies from being largeshareholders of Chinese ICPs, and required bulletin board (BBS) and chatroomsystem operators to record user information (including content postedonline, account name, duration online, Internet provider address, accessingphone number) for at least 60 days to facilitate police work. Regulations at thenational level were reiterated, sometimes in stricter terms, in the managementpolicies of regional networks and commercial websites (Qiu, 1999: 12),reflecting a “business culture of self-censorship” (Cheung, 2003: 85).Administrative measures are used to ensure that the system of regulationhas teeth (Cheung, 2003). The MPS and the SSB have set aside special taskforces at national, provincial, and municipal levels, including full-time cyberpoliceand “state information security liaison personnel (guojia xinxi anquanlianluoyuan).” Many of these cyber-cops are college students who are subsidizedfor computer and Internet access by working part-time for law enforcement.26 There are also numerous system operators, webmasters, and BBSboardmasters who are required to share the labor. If they do not cooperate,penalties include temporary or permanent closure of their forums (Qiu, 1999).On the technical front, China is known for its notorious “Great Firewall”which blocks access to harmful information, broadly defined, perhaps as manyas 10 percent of the websites on the World Wide Web (Zittrain and Edelman,2002). The state agencies also apply advanced intranet and tracking technologies,as well as content-filtering software, in the so-called “Golden ShieldProject” (Walton, 2001). Since 1998, dozens of cyber-intruders have beentracked down and imprisoned on charges of disclosing state secrets, incitingsubversion, Internet hacking, propagating Falun Gong, and, more recently,spreading rumors during the SARS epidemic. These men and women aremostly in their late teens to early 40s, and include private IT entrepreneurs,schoolteachers, college students, and unemployed urbanites. From September2002, the blocking mechanisms became more sophisticated and aggressive.They specifically target certain online content (for example, an article atnytimes.com about Chinese corruption scandals, but not other sections of theelectronic newspaper). Those who attempt to access outlawed information via
112 Jack Linchuan Qiuthe Internet may find their browser application or even the entire terminaldisturbed (Zittrain and Edelman, 2002).From an economic perspective, the censorship regime entails higher coststhan justifiable for national development. Slower network speed and efficiencyand the image of a fettered Internet structure may discourage foreigninvestment. Insiders would see the picture differently. The control effortscreate jobs, generate profits, and bring opportunities for international collaborationfor China’s network censors. Surveillance and repressive control are afast-growing global industry, particularly after 9/11. In China, domestic andforeign IT firms seek state contracts to provide security technologies such as“personal identification systems” for e-government projects. 27 Internet contentproviders (ICPs) with government background welcome more stringentcensorship measures that apply to private start-ups with little official guanxi.Since 2000, private ICPs have become increasingly conservative due to newcontent regulations, frequently providing nothing more than clips from officiallysanctioned sources. Meanwhile, ironically, netizen-based politicaldebates (of corruption, WTO, international affairs and so on) migrate to onlineforums such as Qiangguo Luntan (www.qglt.com) hosted by the website ofPeople’s Daily.Another aspect of censorship has to do with China’s Internet cafés, a mainpoint of access for children, migrant workers, and low-income Internetusers. 28 Unlike large ISPs and ICPs, most cybercafés are small, private businesses,many run by laid-off or under-employed workers of state-owned enterprises.29 In April 2001, the Measures for the Administration of Business Sitesof Internet Access Services was promulgated by the MPS, the MII, theMinistry of Culture, the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, andthe State Birth Planning Commission in response to Internet trespassing fromthe cafés and increasing parental complaints about the negative impact ofcybercafés on schoolchildren. The measure formally prohibited Internet cafésfrom allowing patrons to access harmful information, required the speciallicensing of net-cafés, and prevented unaccompanied minors under the age offourteen from entering. However, the regulation was poorly enforced until thefatal Beijing café fire of June 2002 (Murray, 2003). Even after the fire, therehas been great geographical and temporal variation in the implementation ofthe Internet café regulations. Although officers in some municipalities confiscatedequipment or collected heavy fines from the cafés during a crackdowncampaign, others in neighboring towns were less predatory or turned a blindeye because the market demand for cybercafés was so huge.As difficult as it is to control cybercafés, it is even more difficult to monitorindividual users. It is most difficult to enforce the articles pertaining to userregistration. There is no systematic way to ensure that each of China’s 59 millionInternet users is registered or that the registration information is verified.
- Page 82 and 83: Silicon Valley and Finland 61that I
- Page 84 and 85: Silicon Valley and Finland 63EBay,
- Page 86 and 87: Silicon Valley and Finland 65produc
- Page 88 and 89: wholly devoted to, or dependent on,
- Page 90 and 91: Silicon Valley and Finland 69The st
- Page 92 and 93: Silicon Valley and Finland 71JOT Au
- Page 94 and 95: Silicon Valley and Finland 73risk i
- Page 96 and 97: Silicon Valley and Finland 75respec
- Page 98 and 99: Silicon Valley and Finland 77esting
- Page 100 and 101: Silicon Valley and Finland 79100090
- Page 102 and 103: Silicon Valley and Finland 81the Fi
- Page 104 and 105: Silicon Valley and Finland 83——
- Page 106 and 107: The Russian network society 85but s
- Page 108 and 109: The Russian network society 87All t
- Page 110 and 111: The Russian network society 89inequ
- Page 112 and 113: The Russian network society 91estim
- Page 114 and 115: The Russian network society 93expre
- Page 116 and 117: The Russian network society 95in st
- Page 118 and 119: The Russian network society 97actio
- Page 120 and 121: 4. The Internet in China: technolog
- Page 122 and 123: The Internet in China 101power of t
- Page 124 and 125: The Internet in China 103cially tho
- Page 126 and 127: The Internet in China 1057060504030
- Page 128 and 129: The Internet in China 107(Baum, 199
- Page 130 and 131: The Internet in China 109native-pla
- Page 134 and 135: The Internet in China 113Usually on
- Page 136 and 137: The Internet in China 115lifestyle
- Page 138 and 139: The Internet in China 117To borrow
- Page 140 and 141: The Internet in China 119Cartier, a
- Page 142 and 143: The Internet in China 121Bu, Wei (2
- Page 144 and 145: The Internet in China 123jianguanzh
- Page 146 and 147: 5. Reflexive Internet? The Britishe
- Page 148 and 149: Reflexive Internet? The British exp
- Page 150 and 151: Reflexive Internet? The British exp
- Page 152 and 153: Reflexive Internet? The British exp
- Page 154 and 155: Reflexive Internet? The British exp
- Page 156 and 157: Reflexive Internet? The British exp
- Page 158 and 159: Reflexive Internet? The British exp
- Page 160 and 161: Reflexive Internet? The British exp
- Page 162 and 163: Reflexive Internet? The British exp
- Page 164: PART IIIThe Network Economy
- Page 167 and 168: 146 Marshall Van Alstyne and Nathan
- Page 169 and 170: 148 Marshall Van Alstyne and Nathan
- Page 171 and 172: 150 Marshall Van Alstyne and Nathan
- Page 173 and 174: 152 Marshall Van Alstyne and Nathan
- Page 175 and 176: 154 Marshall Van Alstyne and Nathan
- Page 177 and 178: 156 Marshall Van Alstyne and Nathan
- Page 179 and 180: 158 Marshall Van Alstyne and Nathan
- Page 181 and 182: 160 Marshall Van Alstyne and Nathan
The Internet in China 111“network security.” It specified in broad terms the types of “harmful information”and “harmful activities,” such as hacking and spreading computerviruses. In 1999, the State Encryption Mana<strong>ge</strong>ment Commission, in cooperationwith the SSB, promulgated the “Administration of CommercialEncryption Regulations” which required all network encryption products andequipment to be approved because they are regarded as state secret.In 2000 alone, six major regulations regarding state secrets, online businessoperation, information and news services, and Internet security were issued(Cheung, 2003: 79–82). The new rules primarily tar<strong>ge</strong>ted Internet contentproviders (ICPs). They required, among other measures, online news disseminatorsto <strong>ge</strong>t special licenses, prohibited foreign companies from being lar<strong>ge</strong>shareholders of Chinese ICPs, and required bulletin board (BBS) and chatroomsystem operators to record user information (including content postedonline, account name, duration online, Internet provider address, accessingphone number) for at least 60 days to facilitate police work. Regulations at thenational level were reiterated, sometimes in stricter terms, in the mana<strong>ge</strong>mentpolicies of regional networks and commercial websites (Qiu, 1999: 12),reflecting a “business culture of self-censorship” (Cheung, 2003: 85).Administrative measures are used to ensure that the system of regulationhas teeth (Cheung, 2003). The MPS and the SSB have set aside special taskforces at national, provincial, and municipal levels, including full-time cyberpoliceand “state information security liaison personnel (guojia xinxi anquanlianluoyuan).” Many of these cyber-cops are colle<strong>ge</strong> students who are subsidizedfor computer and Internet access by working part-time for law enforcement.26 There are also numerous system operators, webmasters, and BBSboardmasters who are required to share the labor. If they do not cooperate,penalties include temporary or permanent closure of their forums (Qiu, 1999).On the technical front, China is known for its notorious “Great Firewall”which blocks access to harmful information, broadly defined, perhaps as manyas 10 percent of the websites on the World Wide Web (Zittrain and Edelman,2002). The state a<strong>ge</strong>ncies also apply advanced intranet and tracking technologies,as well as content-filtering software, in the so-called “Golden ShieldProject” (Walton, 2001). Since 1998, dozens of cyber-intruders have beentracked down and imprisoned on char<strong>ge</strong>s of disclosing state secrets, incitingsubversion, Internet hacking, propagating Falun Gong, and, more recently,spreading rumors during the SARS epidemic. These men and women aremostly in their late teens to early 40s, and include private IT entrepreneurs,schoolteachers, colle<strong>ge</strong> students, and unemployed urbanites. From September2002, the blocking mechanisms became more sophisticated and aggressive.They specifically tar<strong>ge</strong>t certain online content (for example, an article atnytimes.com about Chinese corruption scandals, but not other sections of theelectronic newspaper). Those who attempt to access outlawed information via