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The Internet in China 109native-place networks for business transactions and sociocultural association(Hamilton, 1996, 1999; Hsing, 1998; Liu, 1998; Olds and Yueng, 1999;Yueng, 1999). According to John Kao’s (1993) survey of overseas Chineseentrepreneurs, 52 percent noted that more than half of their work relationshipsand 39 percent of their international business ties were with Chinese partners.Scholars understand that cultural synergy is attracting members of the Chinesediaspora to invest in Mainland China, particularly traditional origins ofemigration in the southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian (Lin, 1997;Hsing, 1998; Wei et al, 1999; Cartier, 2001). Although the role of returningexpatriates is more prominent in manufacturing and trade than in Internetventures, they have been critical to the globalization of China’s economy andthe dramatic increase in China’s global informational links.While older generation sojourners are returning to their ancestral hometowns, a new school of Chinese engineers, business managers, and financialanalysts are landing in the new airports of Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhouto form “the nucleus of a talented new generation of information technologyentrepreneurs that is forging commercial links with China” (Gilley, 1999: 50).These are returning Chinese students sent offshore in the post-Mao era tostudy Western technology and business skills. Many have worked, or are stillworking, in Silicon Valley and other American or European hi-tech centers.These legendary IT entrepreneurs are like Edward Tian, who grew up in theCultural Revolution, obtained advanced degrees in foreign universities, andthen returned to staff China’s top echelon of Internet entrepreneurs (Sheff,2002: 1–10). This trend of “brain circulation” (Saxenian, 2002) acceleratedafter the burst of the technology bubble in the global IT industry because ofmassive lay-offs in the West, but also because they were lured by China’s hugemarket potential, the temptation of going home, and, above all, the recognitionthat the developmental state could provide competitive jobs and goodsalaries. 24THE NETWORK OF CENSORS AND ITS ENEMIESChina’s effort to adjust to a new mode of development is not unique. The sameprocess is underway in neighboring countries and in economic sectors otherthan the Internet. The most intriguing idiosyncrasy about the Internet in Chinais that, despite the technology’s liberalizing potential, its high speed of growthcan be maintained within the framework of the current political system dominatedby the Communist Party. The case is excellent for comparative purposesbecause the technology is fostered, shaped, and contested under more restrictivecircumstances than in most parts of the world. Yet it developed rapidly,despite political factors that might have handicapped the Internet industry
110 Jack Linchuan Qiufrom the start. Since Internet control in China has been constantly challengedboth domestically and from the outside (Hartford, 2000; Harwit and Clark,2001; Zhao, 2004), it is premature to conclude who is likely to be the ultimatewinner – the state control apparatus or those who challenge the political statusquo. Still, the countless censorship battles fought in China’s cyberspace mayshed light on another restrictive aspect of the Chinese state, the internalconflicts among various state agencies, and the malleability of network technologiesunder politically restrictive circumstances.Why does China control the Internet? Although the developmental state isloosening its grip on various economic and social aspects to promote globalizationand the new economy, the attempt to control the Internet stems from aninstitutional legacy. The Chinese legal system has never paid more than lipservice to the right of free speech. The demands of the authorities usually takeprecedence over the need for privacy protection. In the Chinese political culture,there is no distinction between “censorship” and “regulation.” Hence, since officialsthink that the Internet should be controlled, it is difficult for many of themto imagine that there should be any limit on the power of the state.Although much of the Chinese mediascape has been reformed to suit thegoal of marketization, the very core of China’s media control system is stillguarded by Leninist principles (Zhao, 1998; Lee, 2000; Chan and Qiu, 2001)and governed by stakeholders who do not think like Ministry of InformationIndustry (MII) technocrats. Membership of the State Council InformatizationSteering Group (SCISC), the nation’s highest decision-making body forInternet affairs, is revealing. There are representatives from MII, the majoreconomic, educational, and technological commissions, but also representativesof the CCP Central Propaganda Department, the State CouncilInformation Office, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the State SecrecyBureau (SSB), and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 24 These agencieshave policy priorities that differ from the logic of the developmental state.They care less about the national economy than the image of the CCP leaders,the maintaining and expanding of political power, and the ability to crushdissidents or opponents in future cyber-wars. They constitute a different “ecologyof games” (Dutton, 1992, 1999), which does not share the goals ofeconomic development and which operates with its own rationale of powermaximization.“The Temporary Measures for the Management of Computer InformationNetworks’ International Connection” decree was announced in February 1996and revised in May 1997. It mandated that (1) all international Internet traffichad to go through officially approved gateways; (2) all Internet serviceproviders had to be licensed; (3) Internet users needed to be registered; and (4)“harmful information” which is “subversive” or “obscene” was banned. Asecond ordinance was issued by the MPS in December 1997 to improve
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110 Jack Linchuan Qiufrom the start. Since Internet control in China has been constantly challen<strong>ge</strong>dboth domestically and from the outside (Hartford, 2000; Harwit and Clark,2001; Zhao, 2004), it is premature to conclude who is likely to be the ultimatewinner – the state control apparatus or those who challen<strong>ge</strong> the political statusquo. Still, the countless censorship battles fought in China’s cyberspace mayshed light on another restrictive aspect of the Chinese state, the internalconflicts among various state a<strong>ge</strong>ncies, and the malleability of network technologiesunder politically restrictive circumstances.Why does China control the Internet? Although the developmental state isloosening its grip on various economic and social aspects to promote globalizationand the new economy, the attempt to control the Internet stems from aninstitutional legacy. The Chinese legal system has never paid more than lipservice to the right of free speech. The demands of the authorities usually takeprecedence over the need for privacy protection. In the Chinese political culture,there is no distinction between “censorship” and “regulation.” Hence, since officialsthink that the Internet should be controlled, it is difficult for many of themto imagine that there should be any limit on the power of the state.Although much of the Chinese mediascape has been reformed to suit thegoal of marketization, the very core of China’s media control system is stillguarded by Leninist principles (Zhao, 1998; Lee, 2000; Chan and Qiu, 2001)and governed by stakeholders who do not think like Ministry of InformationIndustry (MII) technocrats. Membership of the State Council InformatizationSteering Group (SCISC), the nation’s highest decision-making body forInternet affairs, is revealing. There are representatives from MII, the majoreconomic, educational, and technological commissions, but also representativesof the CCP Central Propaganda Department, the State CouncilInformation Office, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the State SecrecyBureau (SSB), and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 24 These a<strong>ge</strong>ncieshave policy priorities that differ from the logic of the developmental state.They care less about the national economy than the ima<strong>ge</strong> of the CCP leaders,the maintaining and expanding of political power, and the ability to crushdissidents or opponents in future cyber-wars. They constitute a different “ecologyof games” (Dutton, 1992, 1999), which does not share the goals ofeconomic development and which operates with its own rationale of powermaximization.“The Temporary Measures for the Mana<strong>ge</strong>ment of Computer InformationNetworks’ International Connection” decree was announced in February 1996and revised in May 1997. It mandated that (1) all international Internet traffichad to go through officially approved gateways; (2) all Internet serviceproviders had to be licensed; (3) Internet users needed to be registered; and (4)“harmful information” which is “subversive” or “obscene” was banned. Asecond ordinance was issued by the MPS in December 1997 to improve
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