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The Internet in China 101power of technology). The appeal of techno-nationalism greatly intensifiedafter the communist takeover in 1949 when fanatical modernization projectssuch as the Great Leap Forward were implemented, emphasizing technologyand engineering sectors. Of these attempts, many were too idealistic, poorlyplanned, and followed by disastrous consequences (Yang, 1998; Shapiro,2001). Still, the PRC became a nuclear power in 1964, launched its first satellitein 1970, and sent a man into space in 2003.Just as Maoist cadres aspired to emulate Soviet industrial statism, Chineseofficials since the 1990s have been fully engaged in building a Chinese informationsociety (Hachigian, 2001). Proponents of China’s Internet often quoteformer President Jiang Zemin (a former Minister of the Electronics Industry),who said “Each of the Four Modernizations (of agriculture, industry, education,and the military) has to depend on informatization.” 10 While addressingthe Sixteenth National Congress of the CCP, Jiang also emphasized the needto “prioritize the information industry, and widely apply information technologiesin economic and social domains.” 11 Unlike the failed Maoist GreatLeap Forward, this campaign, centered on the Internet, has succeeded bymeasures of growth indicators, sustainability (so far), and the capacity of theChinese state to boost the new economy via investment, purchase, assistancein research and development, and the acquisition of foreign capital. China’ssuccesses are comparable to the developmental state model practiced in Japanand East Asian “tiger” economies for decades (Johnson, 1982, 1995; Castells,1996: 172–90). However, China’s advantage as a latecomer, its enormousmarket potential, and its relative independence from the capitalist worldsystem enabled it to limit the damage of the Asian financial crisis as well asthe global downturn in hi-tech industries.The historical legacy and state sponsorship being the same, China’s Internetwould have developed differently had it occurred in the 1980s beforeTiananmen, before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and DengXiaoping’s call for all-out marketization in 1992 (Baum, 1994:119–368). Theoverlapping aftermath of these three interconnected events led to a fundamentalparadox that characterizes contemporary Chinese society in general and thesocial construction of the Internet in particular: state agencies take new technologiesas a means to improve people’s living standards but not citizen participation.In short, China tries to reap economic benefits, while sustaining andreinforcing the political status quo. The policy-makers’ objective is to castcomputer networks primarily in the economic domain. 12 Nonetheless the posthocreaction of Chinese authorities to the many social, economic, and politicalchallenges they face is becoming a major point of reference for theconfiguration of national information infrastructures in authoritarian countriesworldwide (Kalathil and Boas, 2003).That the party-state attempts to construct the new technology as an entirely
102 Jack Linchuan Qiueconomic instrument, however, is an incomplete characterization. Three issuesadd to the complexity of Chinese informationalism. First, it is difficult to estimatethe extent to which the economic benefits of the Internet can be utilizedto stabilize the current social structure. This is problematic because of theuneven pattern of Internet diffusion in China and the lack of attention to issuesof information inequality until recently (Qiu, 2002a; Harwit, 2003; Giese,2003). Second, despite its apparent unity, the Chinese state harbors multipleinterest groups with competing and conflicting goals and rationales. They viefor dominance in China’s cyberspace. Officials, especially at the level of localstate, often form networks of “bureaucratic entrepreneurs” (Hsing, 1998) withmembers of the business community, including IT industry leaders, 13 fromwithin and outside Mainland China. This makes it difficult to operationallydefine the boundary between politics and economy in the many localities,particularly in the coastal regions of Guangdong, Fujian, and Shanghai wheretrans-border commercial activities have been concentrated.Finally, and most importantly, the role of grassroots user networks shouldbe emphasized because their everyday activities not only ensure the continuationof China’s Internet but also embody personal experiences that transformthe new technology from an abstract cyberspace to meaningful places of socialsignificance. User networks at the grassroots level constitute the most innovativesource of change in China’s virtual landscape, forming an unpredictabledimension imbued with tremendous potential for liberalization which is justbeginning to be understood. The multitude of grassroots formations such asweb-based nationalist movements, hacker alliances, youth culture, gay andlesbian groups, and dissident use of the Internet – via diverse channels such aschatrooms, online gaming, peer-to-peer technologies – have given rise to akaleidoscope for the examination of the intricate interplay among a myriad ofsocial forces in the networks of Chinese netizens, whose impact goes farbeyond the online communities and beyond the borders of the People’sRepublic per se.ACCESS, DEMOGRAPHICS, AND PROBLEMS OFDIFFUSIONWho is using the Internet in China? How do they connect to the World WideWeb, for what purposes, and how are Internet resources distributed throughoutthe country? Before reviewing the demography and geography of China’sInternet, it is imperative to recognize that access to information and communicationtechnology is socially shaped (Dutton, 1999), and therefore reflectsfundamental structures of a given society. In China, Internet access is largelylimited to relatively affluent social groups in urban and urbanizing areas, espe-
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102 Jack Linchuan Qiueconomic instrument, however, is an incomplete characterization. Three issuesadd to the complexity of Chinese informationalism. First, it is difficult to estimatethe extent to which the economic benefits of the Internet can be utilizedto stabilize the current social structure. This is problematic because of theuneven pattern of Internet diffusion in China and the lack of attention to issuesof information inequality until recently (Qiu, 2002a; Harwit, 2003; Giese,2003). Second, despite its apparent unity, the Chinese state harbors multipleinterest groups with competing and conflicting goals and rationales. They viefor dominance in China’s cyberspace. Officials, especially at the level of localstate, often form networks of “bureaucratic entrepreneurs” (Hsing, 1998) withmembers of the business community, including IT industry leaders, 13 fromwithin and outside Mainland China. This makes it difficult to operationallydefine the boundary between politics and economy in the many localities,particularly in the coastal regions of Guangdong, Fujian, and Shanghai wheretrans-border commercial activities have been concentrated.Finally, and most importantly, the role of grassroots user networks shouldbe emphasized because their everyday activities not only ensure the continuationof China’s Internet but also embody personal experiences that transformthe new technology from an abstract cyberspace to meaningful places of socialsignificance. User networks at the grassroots level constitute the most innovativesource of chan<strong>ge</strong> in China’s virtual landscape, forming an unpredictabledimension imbued with tremendous potential for liberalization which is justbeginning to be understood. The multitude of grassroots formations such asweb-based nationalist movements, hacker alliances, youth culture, gay andlesbian groups, and dissident use of the Internet – via diverse channels such aschatrooms, online gaming, peer-to-peer technologies – have given rise to akaleidoscope for the examination of the intricate interplay among a myriad ofsocial forces in the networks of Chinese netizens, whose impact goes farbeyond the online communities and beyond the borders of the People’sRepublic per se.ACCESS, DEMOGRAPHICS, AND PROBLEMS OFDIFFUSIONWho is using the Internet in China? How do they connect to the World WideWeb, for what purposes, and how are Internet resources distributed throughoutthe country? Before reviewing the demography and <strong>ge</strong>ography of China’sInternet, it is imperative to recognize that access to information and communicationtechnology is socially shaped (Dutton, 1999), and therefore reflectsfundamental structures of a given society. In China, Internet access is lar<strong>ge</strong>lylimited to relatively affluent social groups in urban and urbanizing areas, espe-
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