Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe ... - MemoFin.fr
Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe ... - MemoFin.fr Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe ... - MemoFin.fr
Vulnerability to climate changeFinally, it is also important to account for additionalpolicy co-benefits. Mitigation policy has a beneficialeffect in reducing GHG emissions, but alsoreduces emissions of air pollutants which lead toair quality benefits, which importantly are bothlocal and immediate. The GAINS and ALPHAmodels were used to estimate the health andenvironmental benefits of achieving the EU's 2050low-carbon path (Holland et al., 2011). The largebenefits in terms of increased life expectancy andlower pollution‐related impacts were estimated atEUR 48 billion to EUR 99 billion per year in 2050for the EU-27 (current prices, undiscounted), andgenerated very significant economic benefits pertonne of CO2 reduced. Additional economic benefitswould also arise from enhanced energy security andthe reduction in energy importsEven if emissions of GHGs stop today, changesin the climate will continue for many decadesand there is a need to develop adequate adaptiveresponses (adaptation). To allow a fully informedpolicy debate on adaptation, there is a need toconsider the economic aspects of adaptation, thatis, the costs and benefits. There is an emergingliterature on such estimates, and alongsideEuropean estimates many countries are developingeconomic assessments as part of their climate changeand adaptation policy development. Information onthe costs of adaptation is included in the dedicatedEEA report 'Adaptation in Europe'.The remainder of this section presents informationon costs in the main sectors investigated in theClimateCost project.Coastal floodsThe most studied sector to date is the coastal sector,which has long reported European damage costsfrom models such as DIVA (Vafeidis et al., 2008;Hinkel and Klein, 2009) with more detailed studiesfor some Member States (notably the Netherlandsand the United Kingdom, e.g. Evans et al., 2004;Deltacommissie, 2008). Previously reportedestimates from PESETA (Richards and Nicholls,2009; Bosello et al., 2011) have been updated by(Hinkel et al., 2010) and more recently as part of theClimateCost project (Brown et al., 2011). The latteranalysis considered a medium-high emissions A1Bscenario and a mitigation scenario the ENSEMBLESE1 scenario (Lowe et al., 2009; van der Linden andMitchell, 2009). The mitigation scenario leads tolong-term stabilisation at 450 ppm, which has ahigh chance of limiting global warming to less than2 °C, relative to pre-industrial levels, consistentwith the EU target. It also considered an extremesea-level rise consistent with the more recentliterature since the AR4, considering a rise of morethan 1.2 m of sea-level rise (SLR) by 2100 (see forexample Rahmstorf, 2007). Assuming that defencesare not upgraded from the standards modelled inthe 1995 baseline, the costs in Europe are estimatedat around EUR 11 billion/year (for the mid estimateof temperature-sea level response) for the 2050s(annual average costs for the period 2040–2070),rising to EUR 25 billion/year by the 2080s (annualaverage costs for the period 2070–2100) for theA1B scenario (combined effects of climate andsocio‐economic change, based on current prices,with no discounting). It is highlighted there isa wide range around these values due to theuncertainty in projected temperature and sea-levelrise response. Under the E1 (mitigation) scenario,costs in later time periods fall significantly. Theconsideration of a more extreme sea-level scenario(over 1.2 m by 2100) increases the estimated annualdamage costs for the EU to EUR 156 billion/year(undiscounted) by the 2080s — six times higherthan that for the A1B scenario. This is an importantfinding as it highlights the need for both mitigationas well as adaptation as the chances of these extremescenarios are significantly reduced with mitigation.There are also major differences among MemberStates in the costs projected. At the overall Europeanlevel these coastal damage costs are a relatively lowpercentage of GDP, but there are higher relativecosts (as a proportion of GDP) in some countries.Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal andthe United Kingdom are ranked in the top five mostcostly countries for damage costs relative to GDP.River floodsThere are also European-wide damage cost estimatesfor river flooding. Floods already cause majoreconomic costs in Europe and climate changecould increase the magnitude and frequency ofthese events, leading to higher costs. However,these events need to be seen in the context of othersocio‐economic drivers. A range of European andMember State assessments have emerged over recentyears. Analysis from the ClimateCost project (Feyenet al., 2011) using the LISFLOOD model has assessedthe potential costs of river flooding across Europe.The expected annual damage (EAD) costs under anA1B scenario led to estimated costs of EUR 20 billionby the 2020s (2011–2040), EUR 46 billion by the2050s (2041–2070) and EUR 98 billion by the 2080s(2071–2100) (mean ensemble results, combined234 Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe 2012
Vulnerability to climate changeeffects of socio‐economic and climate change, currentvalues, undiscounted) in the EU-27. However, alarge part of these future costs (and the increasein exposure) is driven by socio‐economic change(population and economic growth), noting thesedrivers vary among EU Member States. Analysis atthe country level shows high climate-related costsin Belgium, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands andthe United Kingdom. The results also show a verywide range around these central (mean ensemble)estimates, representing the range of results fromdifferent climate models. At the EU level, thepotential damage costs were found to vary by afactor of two (higher or lower) across the range ofmodels sampled (12 regional climate models): atthe country level the differences were even moresignificant, with different models even reportingdifferences in the sign of change. This highlightsthe need to consider this variability (uncertainty)in formulating adaptation strategies. Under theE1 stabilisation scenario, the costs were estimatedto fall to EUR 15 billion by the 2020s, EUR 42 billionby the 2050s and EUR 68 billion by the 2080s in theEU-27 (current values, undiscounted). There hasalso been work on European-wide assessments ofdrought risks and water scarcity risks, as part of theClimWatAdapt project (see Section 5.2), though thishas not produced damage costs.EnergySome of the largest potential costs (and also benefits)of climate change in Europe are likely to occur inthe energy sector (see Section 4.5). Climate changewill have negative and positive effects on futureenergy demand, increasing summer cooling butreducing winter heating demand. The ClimateCoststudy has assessed the potential impacts andeconomic costs of climate change on energy demandin Europe using the POLES model (Mima et al.,2012). Considering cooling demand first, the studyreports a strong increase in cooling (and electricity)demand in Europe under the A1B scenario, withthe additional cooling costs from climate changealone estimated at around EUR 30 billion/year inthe EU-27 by 2050, rising to EUR 109 billion/yearby 2100 (current values, undiscounted). There is astrong distributional pattern of cooling increasesacross Europe, with a much higher increase insouthern Europe, and as for other sectors, a verywide range around the central (mean ensemble)estimates, representing the range of results fromdifferent climate models. However, a similar level ofeconomic benefit is projected from the reduction inwinter heating demand from warmer temperaturesunder the A1B scenario, estimated also at just overEUR 100 billion/year by 2100, though the benefitsgenerally arise in different countries due to the costsof increased cooling. Under the E1 scenario, thetotal costs of cooling demand due to climate change(alone) are much lower, estimated at approximatelyEUR 20 billion/year across the period 2050–2100.Climate change will also have effects on energysupply, notably on hydro-electric generation,but also potentially on thermal power (nuclearand fossil) plants and on some renewables. Thecombined effects of these supply effects could besignificant (at up to a few per cent of Europeangeneration) and have potentially large economiccosts, potentially similar in size to the demandeffects described above.Human healthFor non‐market sectors, a key focus has been onthe health sector (see also Section 4.4). The largesteconomic costs are likely to arise from heat-relatedmortality, though the potential effects of food‐bornedisease and flood-related health effects are alsoimportant. ClimateCost provided Europeanestimates of the impacts and economic costs ofclimate change on health in Europe (Kovats et al.,2011). The costs of heat-related mortality wereestimated, though the reported values vary stronglyaccording to whether acclimatisation is assumed,and on the metric used for mortality valuation.The estimated costs of heat-related mortality —from climate change and socio‐economic change(including the population age distribution) — wereestimated at over EUR 200 billion/year by the 2050s(2041–2070) when using a full Value of a StatisticalLife (VSL); however, these estimates are driven byfuture socio‐economic change. The estimated costsof heat related mortality — from climate changealone (over and above socio‐economic change) —were estimated at EUR 31 billion/year by the 2020s(2011–2040), EUR 103 billion/year by the 2050s(2041–2070) and EUR 147 billion/year by the 2080s(2071–2100) for the A1B scenario when using afull VSL. These values fell by over a factor of tenwhen using the Value of a Life Year Lost (VOLY)approach, which adjusts for the average period oflife lost. Including (autonomous) acclimatisationalso reduced these A1B impacts significantly, byaround a factor of three for later time periods.The greatest impacts arise in the most populatedcountries (in absolute) terms, but there are relativelyhigher increases (per population) for Mediterraneancountries, reflecting higher warming and riskClimate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe 2012235
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Vulnerability to climate <strong>change</strong>F<strong>in</strong>ally, it is also important to account for additionalpolicy co-benefits. Mitigation policy has a beneficialeffect <strong>in</strong> reduc<strong>in</strong>g GHG emissions, but alsoreduces emissions of air pollutants which lead toair quality benefits, which importantly are bothlocal <strong>and</strong> immediate. The GAINS <strong>and</strong> ALPHAmodels were used to estimate the health <strong>and</strong>environmental benefits of achiev<strong>in</strong>g the EU's 2050low-carbon path (Holl<strong>and</strong> et al., 2011). The largebenefits <strong>in</strong> terms of <strong>in</strong>creased life expectancy <strong>and</strong>lower pollution‐related <strong>impacts</strong> were estimated atEUR 48 billion to EUR 99 billion per year <strong>in</strong> 2050for the EU-27 (current prices, undiscounted), <strong>and</strong>generated very significant economic benefits pertonne of CO2 reduced. Additional economic benefitswould also arise <strong>fr</strong>om enhanced energy security <strong>and</strong>the reduction <strong>in</strong> energy importsEven if emissions of GHGs stop today, <strong>change</strong>s<strong>in</strong> the climate will cont<strong>in</strong>ue for many decades<strong>and</strong> there is a need to develop adequate adaptiveresponses (adaptation). To allow a fully <strong>in</strong>formedpolicy debate on adaptation, there is a need toconsider the economic aspects of adaptation, thatis, the costs <strong>and</strong> benefits. There is an emerg<strong>in</strong>gliterature on such estimates, <strong>and</strong> alongside<strong>Europe</strong>an estimates many countries are develop<strong>in</strong>geconomic assessments as part of their climate <strong>change</strong><strong>and</strong> adaptation policy development. Information onthe costs of adaptation is <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the dedicatedEEA report 'Adaptation <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>'.The rema<strong>in</strong>der of this section presents <strong>in</strong>formationon costs <strong>in</strong> the ma<strong>in</strong> sectors <strong>in</strong>vestigated <strong>in</strong> the<strong>Climate</strong>Cost project.Coastal floodsThe most studied sector to date is the coastal sector,which has long reported <strong>Europe</strong>an damage costs<strong>fr</strong>om models such as DIVA (Vafeidis et al., 2008;H<strong>in</strong>kel <strong>and</strong> Kle<strong>in</strong>, 2009) with more detailed studiesfor some Member States (notably the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s<strong>and</strong> the United K<strong>in</strong>gdom, e.g. Evans et al., 2004;Deltacommissie, 2008). Previously reportedestimates <strong>fr</strong>om PESETA (Richards <strong>and</strong> Nicholls,2009; Bosello et al., 2011) have been updated by(H<strong>in</strong>kel et al., 2010) <strong>and</strong> more recently as part of the<strong>Climate</strong>Cost project (Brown et al., 2011). The latteranalysis considered a medium-high emissions A1Bscenario <strong>and</strong> a mitigation scenario the ENSEMBLESE1 scenario (Lowe et al., 2009; van der L<strong>in</strong>den <strong>and</strong>Mitchell, 2009). The mitigation scenario leads tolong-term stabilisation at 450 ppm, which has ahigh chance of limit<strong>in</strong>g global warm<strong>in</strong>g to less than2 °C, relative to pre-<strong>in</strong>dustrial levels, consistentwith the EU target. It also considered an extremesea-level rise consistent with the more recentliterature s<strong>in</strong>ce the AR4, consider<strong>in</strong>g a rise of morethan 1.2 m of sea-level rise (SLR) by 2100 (see forexample Rahmstorf, 2007). Assum<strong>in</strong>g that defencesare not upgraded <strong>fr</strong>om the st<strong>and</strong>ards modelled <strong>in</strong>the 1995 basel<strong>in</strong>e, the costs <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> are estimatedat around EUR 11 billion/year (for the mid estimateof temperature-sea level response) for the 2050s(annual average costs for the period 2040–2070),ris<strong>in</strong>g to EUR 25 billion/year by the 2080s (annualaverage costs for the period 2070–2100) for theA1B scenario (comb<strong>in</strong>ed effects of climate <strong>and</strong>socio‐economic <strong>change</strong>, based on current prices,with no discount<strong>in</strong>g). It is highlighted there isa wide range around these values due to theuncerta<strong>in</strong>ty <strong>in</strong> projected temperature <strong>and</strong> sea-levelrise response. Under the E1 (mitigation) scenario,costs <strong>in</strong> later time periods fall significantly. Theconsideration of a more extreme sea-level scenario(over 1.2 m by 2100) <strong>in</strong>creases the estimated annualdamage costs for the EU to EUR 156 billion/year(undiscounted) by the 2080s — six times higherthan that for the A1B scenario. This is an importantf<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g as it highlights the need for both mitigationas well as adaptation as the chances of these extremescenarios are significantly reduced with mitigation.There are also major differences among MemberStates <strong>in</strong> the costs projected. At the overall <strong>Europe</strong>anlevel these coastal damage costs are a relatively lowpercentage of GDP, but there are higher relativecosts (as a proportion of GDP) <strong>in</strong> some countries.Belgium, Denmark, the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s, Portugal <strong>and</strong>the United K<strong>in</strong>gdom are ranked <strong>in</strong> the top five mostcostly countries for damage costs relative to GDP.River floodsThere are also <strong>Europe</strong>an-wide damage cost estimatesfor river flood<strong>in</strong>g. Floods already cause majoreconomic costs <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> <strong>and</strong> climate <strong>change</strong>could <strong>in</strong>crease the magnitude <strong>and</strong> <strong>fr</strong>equency ofthese events, lead<strong>in</strong>g to higher costs. However,these events need to be seen <strong>in</strong> the context of othersocio‐economic drivers. A range of <strong>Europe</strong>an <strong>and</strong>Member State assessments have emerged over recentyears. Analysis <strong>fr</strong>om the <strong>Climate</strong>Cost project (Feyenet al., 2011) us<strong>in</strong>g the LISFLOOD model has assessedthe potential costs of river flood<strong>in</strong>g across <strong>Europe</strong>.The expected annual damage (EAD) costs under anA1B scenario led to estimated costs of EUR 20 billionby the 2020s (2011–2040), EUR 46 billion by the2050s (2041–2070) <strong>and</strong> EUR 98 billion by the 2080s(2071–2100) (mean ensemble results, comb<strong>in</strong>ed234 <strong>Climate</strong> <strong>change</strong>, <strong>impacts</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>vulnerability</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> 2012