David Peat

72 From Certainty to Uncertaintyphilosophical writings become dense and convoluted as philosophersattempt to express the ineffable in words, and force language into tasksfor which it is not normally adapted.And thus we arrive at another great question: How is it possible tosay something that means something? How do we make sense of theworld when we speak about it? How can we communicate the essenceof what we feel and think about the world? How can we speak in waysthat are not misunderstood? What is the correct way to use language?The philosopher Leibniz argued that a rational and “ideal” languageshould only be used in philosophical arguments. Undergraduatediscussions about “free will,” “consciousness,” “morality,” and so on rapidlybecome bogged down in confusion over definitions. “I’m talkingabout one thing and you’re really discussing another,” we say. “Let’sstart by defining our terms. Let’s all agree on what we’re talking about.”Thus the argument moves in a new direction, in trying to define freewill, or awareness, or what we mean by “goodness.” Yet as soon as we allagree on such a definition it seems to slip through our fingers, for wesense that we are really beginning to talk about something subtly different.Leibniz understood these pitfalls only too well. He proposed thatphilosophers should adopt a language in which all terms are first properlydefined and free from ambiguity. If we all agree on what is meantby “freedom,” “morality,” “causality,” “time,” “space,” and so on, and weare careful only to use those terms in the way we have defined them,then we can talk together and our discussions will proceed logically,step-by-step. In this way we will arrive at a degree of certainty andfreedom from ambiguity and confusionLeibniz’s program sounds ideal. Once such a language has beenperfected philosophical arguments can be cleared up and, step-by-step,the great questions of philosophy resolved and answered. In this wayphilosophy will arrive at a general agreement of what it knows andwhat remains unanswered. In place of the various philosophicalschools we will have total clarity. Philosophy will have placed a fence orboundary around what can be said, what can be known, and what wecan say for certain. Outside this boundary will remain all the unan-